page 2

IIA page 1,  this page,  page 3

IIB , page 1,  page 2,  

       = go to NFU page

Searchable text file  IIB , page 1,  page 2,    

Senate Intelligence Committee, pdf download Phase II A, II B  

They document Bush lies in run-up to Iraq War.... and Ommissions

= go to NFU page

 go back to:   BushWatch      Amdocs    Leakgate / Plamegate    Brewster Jennings          

• the Al Husseir1, with an estimated range of 630 km, and "possibly" the Al Abbas, with an estimated range of 900 km. 
• (U) The intelligence community also assessed that Iraq was working to develop new ballistic missiles with a range of 750-3000 km, which would be greater than its presumed "Scud-type force", but available intelligence indicated that Iraq was still at the early stages of development on this project  President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
• (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated that "Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles. . .We’ve also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States."H2 
• (U) As noted above, the IC assessed at that time that Iraq had a small force of pre-Gulf War Scud-variant missiles, with a likely range of 630-900 kilometers, or roughly 400-560 miles. The IC also assessed that Iraq was in the final stages of development of new short-range ballistic missiles, but estimated that the range of these missiles was 150-300 km, or under 200 miles. These judgments were contained in several assessments, including the October 1, 2002 NIE.m 
• (U) The October 2002 NIE stated that Iraq was developing and flight-testing small-to-medium sized UAVs, and had a UAV development program that was "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agent". The majority of the IC also believed that at least one of these UAVs was close to being ready for operational use. The intelligence branch of the US Air Force disagreed with this part of the analysis of the UAV program, however. Air Force intelligence noted in the NIE that "CBW [chemical and biological weapons] delivery is an inherent capability" of UAVs, but judged that "the small size of Iraq’s new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance."H4 110 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; DIA, Iraq Missile Proliferation Activity, March 1, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002; Prepared Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 17, 2002; DIA, Military Threats to Israel, December 2002. U1 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. H2 White House Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. U3 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; DIA, Iraq Missile Proliferation Activity, March 1, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002; Prepared Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 17, 2002; DIA, Military Threats to Israel, December 2002; and National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. Committee staff were also permitted to view a one-page summary of the NIE, which was prepared for the President. This one-page summary included two sentences on delivery systems, which stated "Baghdad has some SRBMs that exceed UN range limits of 150 km. It has UAVs, probably fgrrcéegvery of biological weapons and less likely for chemical weapons agents? 1 . 53

page 53

• _ 
• (U) The NIE also described an older UAV program that used larger aircraft. Analysts assessed that this program involved "as many as ten L-29 1960s vintage Czech-built trainers" which had been converted into UAVs as of 2000, and noted that these planes’ operational status was unknown. The NIE noted that the US Air Force assessed that "no flyable L-29 airframes remain", and included a footnote pointing out that "the Military Intelligence Community assesses that the role of the L-29 UAV-modified aircraft is largely historical and that concentrating on it distracts from other more viable delivery mechanisms for CBW".ll5 
• (U) The NIE went on to state that Iraq had "at least one small UAV that could be employed eovertly against the continental United States", and that this UAV "might be available for operational use within months". The NIE also described an incident in which an Iraqi procurement network "attempted to procure commercially available route planning software and an associated topographic database that [would] provide coverage of the ‘50 states"’. The NIE concluded that this information suggested that "Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States".u6 
• (U) Intelligence assessments regarding UAVs shifted after the October 2002 NIE. A subsequent NIE, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007, published in January 2003, did not describe Iraq’s UAV program as "probably intended" for biological weapons delivery, and instead stated that "Iraq may be modifying UAVs" for CBW delivery. This NIE also noted that Iraqi UAVs could reach the United States, if they were transported (in some unspecified manner) "to within a few hundred kilometers."m 
• (U) The January 2003 NIE also discussed Iraqi attempts to procure mapping software, but stated only that this software "could support programming of a UAV autopilot for operation in the United States."H8 
• (U) The Air Force continued to dissent hom even these less conclusive judgments. Joined by the DIA and the Army intelligence branch, the Air Force stated that, while most UAVs were capable of being used to deliver biological weapons, evidence that Iraqis were modifying UAVs for this purpose was "unconfirmed, and is not sufficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so." These services further noted that they believed that "the purpose of the Iraqi request for route planning software and topographic database was to acquire a generic mapping capability — a goal that is not necessarily indicative of an intent to target the U.S. Homeland."1 9 
• (U) The President did not mention Iraqi missiles or UAVs in the 2003 State of the Union Address.12° *15 md. “‘ mid. t lljlbagional Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats t0 the US Homeland, January 2003. 1 . “° mid. 120 White House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union", January 28, 2003.

page 54

• Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
• (U) The Secretary of State made several mentions of prohibited missiles and UAV capabilities in his February 2003 address to the UN Security Council. He asserted that "Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets", and that "In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif, told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG- 21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons."l2 
• (U) Both of these statements were substantiated by intelligence assessments, however both referred to pre-Gulf War programs - The Secretary made two central assertions regarding prohibited missiles, first stating that "numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometers."m This assertion was included in the earlier NIE and a number of other intelligence reports. However, the NIE did not r ort any direct evidence of this Scud-variant force and stated that this assessment was basedch _”" His other key assertion regarding missiles was that "Ira has no arms that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers."125 These programs were also referenced in the earlier NIE, which noted that they were in an earlier stage of development than shorter-range missile pro grams.126 
• (U) Regarding UAVs, the Secretary made four major statements, including "Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for over a decade."m Intelligence assessments had indicated the existence of the pre-Gulf War MiG UAV program, as well as the L-29 program mentioned in the NIE. Reporting on Iraq’s smaller UAV program was more recent, and appears to have begun in 2001. The Committee is also aware of intelligence provided directly to the Secretary by the CIA which also substantiated this statement.128 m White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. m DIA, Iraq ’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities (DI-156, 9-27-00) May 2000. 123 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 124 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 125 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 126 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 127 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 128 DIA, Iraq ’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities (DI-156, 9-27-00) May 2000; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq: Shopping for UA V Equipment, September 14, 2001. _ 55

page 55

• (U`) The Secretary went on to say that "we detected one of Iraq’s newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted here."129 The January 2003 NIE described this flight data, and stated that the UAVs autonomous flight range was at least 500 kilometers.]3° 
• (U`) The Secretary drew a connection between the apparent UAV program and biological weapons, stating that "There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs." Finally, he argued that "Iraq could use these small UAVs, which have a wingspan of only a few meters, to deliver biological agents to its neighbors, or if transported, to other countries, including the United States."13l 
• (U) Iraq’s pre-Gulf War program to fit Mirage jets with aerosol spray tanks was mentioned in numerous intelligence assessments, as well as Iraqi declarations to the UN.132 As noted above, the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq "may be modifying UAVs to deliver CBW agents, according to numerous sources." The Air Force/Army/DIA dissent to this NIE agreed that biological weapons delivery is an inherent capability of most UAVs," but concluded that "a reconnaissance mission for the UAV program is more likely."133 
• (U) The January 2003 NIE stated that "UAVs could strike the homeland if transported to within a few hundred kilometers." It noted that "Iraq has at least one small UAV" with a range of "at least 500 krn," or roughly 300 miles.134 Additional Statements • "And let there be no doubt about it, his regime has dozens of ballistic missiles and is working to extend their range in violation of U.N. restriction." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "His regime is pursuing pilotless aircraft as a means of delivering chemical and biological weapons." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 129 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 130 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Tltreats to the US Homeland, January 2003. 131 White House Transcript, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N Security Council, February 5, 2003. 132 CIA, Iraq: Iraq’s Biological Warfare Program: Well Positioned for the Future, April 14, 1997; CIA, Iraq’s L-29: A Biological and Chemical Warfare Challenge to US Forces, July 12, 2001; DIA, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post September lim, January 1, 2002; DIA, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook, August 2002; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 133 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland, January 2003. 13* rpm. _ 56

page 56

• • "The Iraqi regime has acquired and tested the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction. All the world has now seen the footage of an Iraqi Mirage aircraft with a fuel tank modified to spray biological agents over wide areas. Iraq has developed spray devices that could be used on unmanned aerial vehicles with ranges far beyond what is permitted by the Security Council. A UAV launched from a vessel off the American coast could reach hundreds of miles inland." — President George W Bush, Statement in the Roosevelt Room, February 6, 2003 
• (U) The above statements are all consistent with the five major policy speeches analyzed. The statement below differs from these speeches. • The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more, and according to the British government, [Iraq] could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as forty-five minutes after the order is given." — President George W Bush, Radio Address, September 28, 2002 - On September 28, 2002, the President cited the British government as the source of a statement that the Iraqi government was capable of launching chemical or biological attacks with forty-five minutes of warning. A report from _ that same month had cited an intelligence source who said that the Iraqi government possessed chemical and biological munitions that could be deployed (apparently against neighboring countries) with a forty-five minute response time. Conclusions 
• (U) Conclusion 7: Statements in the major speeches and additional statements analyzed regarding Iraqi ballistic missiles were generally substantiated by available intelligence. The intelligence community was consistent in its judgments that the Iraqi military possessed a small number of Scud-type missiles left over from the Gulf War era (although the October 2002 NIE noted that these judgments were based on accounting gaps rather than direct evidence), and that Iraq was developing short-range missiles whose range exceeded the range permitted under UN sanctions by as much as 150 km, or 93 miles. The corrnnunity also judged that Iraq was pursuing the capability to build longer-range missiles, but assessed that this project was still at the early stages of development. 
• (U) Conclusion 8: Statements by the President, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons were generally substantiated by intelligence information, but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UAV program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new UAV was probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq "may" be modifying UAVs for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence 57
• Agency argued that the evidence for this was "not sufficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so." 
• (U) Conclusion 9: The President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering using UAVs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate noted that an Iraqi procurement network had attempted to purchase commercial mapping software that included data on the United States, and said that this suggested that the Iraqi governmentwas considering using UAVs to target the US. The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability. Postwar Findings A 
• (U) Postwar findings confirm that Iraq was developing the Al-Samoud and Al-Fat’h (formerly Ababil-100) missiles, and that both had ranges that exceeded 150 km. In early February 2003 the intelligence community revised it’s assessment of the al-Samoud’s maximum range down iiom 300 km to 170 km, which was consistent with postwar iindings.135 In late February 2003 Saddam agreed to UN demands that his Al-Samoud inventory be destroyed. Postwar findings indicate that the Iraqi government unilaterally destroyed its remaining Scud-type ballistic missiles in 1991. 
• (U) Postwar findings confirmed that Iraq’s UAV development program was primarily intended for reconnaissance. Postwar investigations did not find any evidence that Iraq had conducted any research to develop a chemical or biological weapons capability for its developmental UAV program, or that Iraq had intended to use its UAVs for missions targeting the United States.136 135 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, February 2003. 136 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 58

page 58

• VH. Links to Terrorism • "Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraq’s government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "[The Iraqi regime] has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq’s eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Over the years, Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, whose terror organization carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries that killed or injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans. Iraq has also provided safe haven to Abu Abbas, who was responsible for seizing the Achille Lauro and killing an American passenger. And we know that Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives assistance to groups that use terrorism to undermine Middle East peace." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks. We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. And he cannot be trusted. The risk is simply too great that he will use them, or provide them to a terror network. " - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.” — President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modem methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al—Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants.” - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 59

page 59 see NewsFollowUp.com FEMA Concentration Camp, Beech Grove, Indiana YouTube are these meant for US citizens?  Sounds ridiculous until you watch the video.

• • "Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northem Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein’s controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000, this agent offered al-Qaida safe haven in the region." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "After we swept al-Qaida from Afghanistan, some of those members accepted this safe haven. They remain there today." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Zarqawi’s activities are not confined to this small comer of northeast Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May of 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day. During his stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These al- Qaida affiliates in Baghdad now coordinate the movement of people, money, and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they have now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Last year, two suspected al-Qaida operatives were arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were linked to associates of the Baghdad cell and one of them received training in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades-long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and al- Qaida. Going back to the early and rnid-1990s when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an al-Qaida source tells us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that al- Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early al-Qaida ties were forged by secret high-level intelligence service contacts with al-Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraqis continue to visit bin Laden in his new home in Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam’s former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to al-Qaida members on document forgery." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 60

page 60

• • "The support that this detainee describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qaida associates beginning in December 2000." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address t0 the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 
• (U) The Committee addressed the pre-war intelligence linking Iraq and terrorist organizations in its first Iraq report, US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments 0n Iraq, in July 2004. The Committee reviewed the accuracy of the prewar intelligence in its report, Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links t0 Terrorism and How They Compare · with Prewar Assessments, in September 2006. 
• (U) Scope Note: This section addresses statements that referenced past or present Iraqi links to terrorism. Statements regarding possible future links or cooperation between the Iraqi regime and terrorism are discussed in the Intent section. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) 
• (U) The Vice President made no reference to links between Iraq and al Qaeda or any other terrorist group in his August 2002 speech. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 
• (U) In this speech, the President stated that "Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations" in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1372, and that "al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq." 
• (U) The intelligence community believed that Iraq had long supported, through safeharbor, financial support, and training various regional terrorist organizations such as Abu Nidal and Palestinian groups. For example, Director Tenet testified before the Committee on February 6, 2002 that, "Iraq provides safe haven, financial support, and low-level training to a number of terrorist groups——including the Palestine Liberation Front, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the Mojaheddin al Kha1q." 137 (U) The February 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), International Terrorist Threats t0 US Interests, included a section on Iraq under the heading of state sponsors of terrorism. The NIE stated that "Saddam will continue contacts with several terrorist groups and will weigh carefully the risks and possible beneifits of supporting their operations." It continued that "As Iraq strengthens ties to other countries and sends its intelligence officers abroad, under official or commercial cover, its ability to conduct or sponsor terrorism will increase." 137 See also CIA, SEM, The Terrorist Threat jrom Iraq, December 15, 2001, "Baghdad continues to provide safehaven, financial support, and low-level terrorist training to a number of terrorist groups. Iraq continues to support to varying degrees the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abu Ibrahim of the 15 May Organization, the Arab Liberation Front, and the Abu Nidal Organization, which appears to be rebuilding with help from Iraq." _ 61

page 61

• _ A CIA r ort in June 2002 discussed al Qaeda operatives moving from Afghanistan to Iraq, saying ‘ reporting show that unknown numbers of al Qaeda associates fleeing Afghanistan since December have used Iraq—including the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, Baghdad, and other regions—as a safehaven and transit area." The paper continued, "We lack positive indications that Baghdad is complicit in this activity, but the persistence of an al Qaeda presence and the operatives’ silence about any harassment from Iraqi authorities, who closely monitor the population, may indicate Baghdad is acquiescent or finds their presence useful."l38 _ A June 24, 2002 c1A··se¤rer, Pubirsh VVhen Reeayr (sewn) repea, Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to Al-Qa 'ida, stated that ‘ reporting indicate some al Qaeda operatives and fighters, including most notably senior al- Qa’ida operative Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, have fled to Baghdad as well as to the Kurdish regions since the Taliban collapsed. 1 intelligence gives no indication of Iraqi regime complicity but also reveals no concern about possible arrest or scrutiny by Iraqi security services."1 9 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 

Chalabi, and John McCain support of Chalabi

Think Progress  "Iraqi exile leader Ahmad Chalabi was one of the most sordid figures in the run-up to the Iraq war. Paid by the Bush administration to muster pre-war intelligence, Chalabi drummed up claims that Saddam Hussein had WMD, helping lead the United States into war. More recently, he promoted the “surge” to the Iraqi government. A new book by Aram Roston reveals that Chalabi supported John McCain (R-AZ) for president in 2000, believing that the senator would be the most receptive to his agenda. Muckraked reports: One of his key backers has been John McCain, who was one of the first patrons of Chalabi’s grand-sounding International Committee for a Free Iraq when it was founded in 1991. McCain was Chalabi’s favored candidate in the 2000 election since Chalabi knew that he would be able to free up the $97 million in military aid plus millions pushed through in Congress and earmarked for Chalabi’s exile group, the Iraqi National Congress, but held up by the Clinton State Department. Indeed, McCain was a Chalabi backer long before President Bush took power. In 1997, he tried to pressure the Clinton administration into setting up an Iraqi government in exile. Despite opposition from the Pentagon and the State Department, the next fall, McCain co-sponsored the Iraq Liberation Act, committing the United States to overthrowing Saddam and funding opposition groups. According to a 2006 article by John Judis: McCain welcomed Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), to Washington and pressured the administration to give him money. When General Anthony Zinni cast doubt upon the effectiveness of the Iraqi opposition, McCain rebuked him at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In 2003, McCain joined four other Republican senators and asked Bush to “personally clear the bureaucratic roadblocks within the State Department” that blocked increased funding for the Chalabi’s group. Also that year, McCain said of Chalabi, “He’s a patriot who has the best interests of his country at heart.”     Iraqi National Congress research YouTube

•  
• (U) This speech made a number of distinct claims about Iraq and terrorism. The President reiterated his earlier statement about Iraq providing shelter and support to terrorism, specifically citing safe haven for Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas and financing of terrorist groups undermining Middle East peace. 
• (U) The President stated that "We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade." He referenced al Qaeda leaders fleeing Afghanistan for Iraq, noting in particular Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as having "received medical treatment in Baghdad." The President added that "We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." 
• (U) Finally, the President stated that Saddam Hussein was "harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction." While this statement was not specific to any group, the placement in the speech and the context suggests that the President was stating that Hussein was harboring al Qaeda. The statement appeared two paragraphs after statements that ". . .Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy," that some "al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq," and that "Iraq has trained a1 Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." (These statements are discussed elsewhere in this report.) The President’s statement came in the same paragraph as the statement "confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror." 
• (U) The President’s statement on contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda did not elaborate on the nature of these contacts or whether they reflected a substantive relationship between the two 138 Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq and al Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 2l, 2002, 9. Other reports on al Qaeda’s presence in Iraq include CIA, SEIB, Sep l0, 2002, al Qaeda Determined to Strike Soon; and May 24, 2002 State Department INR document entitled, Iraq terrorists Al-Qaida Operatives Moving into Baghdad. 139 CIA SPWR, Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to AZ-Qa ’ida, (SPWRO62402-Ol). 62

page 62

•  
• _ sides. The intelligence community reported numerous times on interactions between elements in the Iraqi regime and members of al Qaeda and, through direct contacts with Saddam Hussein as well as with various high-level Iraq regime officials. (U) DCI Tenet’s statement to the Committee on February 6, 2002 underscored the duration of the contacts but provided additional analysis on the nature of those contacts. He wrote that "Baghdad’s connections to al Qaeda are tenuous, but they appear to have maintained a mutually wary relationship for nearly a decade. Intelligence reports indicate that Iraq has maintained a liaison relationship with Bin Laden. At the same time, we assess that their divergent ideologies make it difficult for Baghdad and al Qaeda to forge the kind of cooperation that Baghdad has with terrorist groups such as the PLF, AN O, and the MEK." (U) A CIA paper from June 7, 2002 noted that intelligence reporting "of varying reliability indicates that the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda have had mutually wary contacts for the last decade. It is possible that the two have forged ties that could have resulted in cooperation on specific terrorist operations, but the available reporting does not point to such a relationship."l 0 (U) In part of an intelligence summary that dismissed a claim that Saddam and bin Laden met in Iraq in 2000, the DLA assessed that "an alliance between the two individuals is unlikely as Saddam views Bin Laden’s brand of Islam as a threat to his regime and Bin Laden is opposed to those Muslim states that do not follow his version of Islam."m This theme was repeated in a June 24, 2002 CIA paper, which assessed that "interaction between Saddam and Bin Laden appears to be more akin to activity between rival intelligence services, each trying to use the relationship to its own advantage."142 (U) The same report also noted that "contacts between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda appear to reach back over the past l0 years and possibly strengthened around 1998. CIA analysts agree al- Qa’ida gained some tangible benefits from these contacts but do not agree on Sadda1n’s agenda. Some think he is concerned principally with penetrating and monitoring al Qaeda, while others see more collusion."143 (U) Another CIA report in June 2002 said, "intelligence reporting highlights more than a decade of contacts between the Iraqi Government and al Qaeda based on shared anti-US goals and Bin Laden’s interest in unconventional weapons and safehaven."144 This report was "purposefully aggressive in seeking to draw cormections, on the assumption that any indication of a relationship between these two hostile elements could carry great dangers to the United States." Nonetheless, the report assessed that the "pattern of contacts and cooperation reflects wariness coupled with recognition of potential mutual benefit. In contrast to the traditional patron-client relationship Iraq enjoys with radical secular Palestinian groups, the ties between 140 CIA SPWR dated June 7, 2002 titled, Possible Meeting Between Bin Laden and Iraqi Ojicials in Sudan. H1 AFebruary 6, 2002, and a February 7, 2002 DITSUM (No. 031-02 and No. 032-02). 142 - A June 24, 2002 SPWR, Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to AZ-Qa ’ida (SPWR062402-0 l). Later, the report states "_ reporting indicates that Bin Laden, while in Sudan in 1993, reached an ‘understanding’ with Saddam under which Bin Laden’s followers would not undertake actions against the Iraqi leader. The report indicated the two also agreed to cooperate, although no details were provided." 1 . 144 CIA, Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 21, 2002. _ 63

page 63

• Saddam and Bin Laden appear to be much like those between rival intelligence services, with each side trying to exploit the other for its own benefit." 
• (U) The intelligence on the contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda appears to have grown by Fall of 2002. A CIA paper from September 13, 2002, stated that "We have identified about 12 meetings between Iraqi officials and senior al-Qa` ida leaders from a review of reporting we assess to have at least some credibility. Ten of these reports mention specific discussions involving top al- Qa’ida operatives."]45 _ DCI Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony to the Committee elaborated on these contacts, saying that "there is solid evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda have had sporadic contacts over the past decade. Intelligence reports point to various Iraq-al Qaeda meetings through high-level and third-party intermediaries. 
• (U) Tenet also described in his testimony "credible reporting of about a dozen direct meetings between senior Iraqi intelligence officials and top al Qaeda operatives from the early 1990s to the present." He noted that the intelligence sources on the contacts "do not describe Iraqi complicity in, control over, or authorization of specific terrorist attacks carried out by al Qaeda. Taken together, the mass of reporting outlines a relationship in which both sides probably were determining how best to take advantage of the other.”]46 
• (U) On the topic of Iraqi providing harbor for al Qaeda members, Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony began by saying that "most of the reporting on this involves Kurdish-inhabited northern Iraq, which Baghdad has not controlled since 1991. Intelligence confirms that al- Qa’ida fighters have relocated to the north, where they are hosted by a local Kurdish extremist group called Ansar al Islam. The relocations have increased since the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan began late last year. We estimate there are about 100 to 200 al-Qa’ ida members and associates in the area." _ Tenet added that "an unknown number of al Qaeda associates have fled during the past six months to or through other parts of Iraq .... 1 intelligence in May 2002 indicated that several militants associated with al Qaeda were checking into hotels in Baghdad and were using the Iraqi capital as a base for financial transactions and other activities.” Tenet concluded these statements, however, by saying that "we do not know to what extent Baghdad may be actively complicit in this use of its territory for safe haven and transit. The operatives have not mentioned Iraq’s security presence, but their conversations often are cryptic, sprinkled with code words, and short on specifics. Given the pervasive presence of Iraq’s security apparatus, it would be difficult for al-Qaida to maintain an active, long-terrn presence in Iraq without alerting the authorities or without at least their acquiescence." 145 SPWR dated September 13, 2002 titled, Terrorism: Contacts Between al-Qu 'idrz Ojjicials and Iraqi Intelligence O cers. l4gSeptember 17, 2002 testimony by DCI Tenet to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. _ 64

page 64

• (U) The President’s next statement in the Cincinnati speech was that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi "received medical treatment in Baghdad.” Director Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony noted this point specifically, saying that, "Of particular interest is senior al Qaeda planner Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, who was in Baghdad under an assumed identity in late May, possibly seeking medical treatment. We do not know his current location, but his close associates remain active in Baghdad, leaving open the possibility that he could be elsewhere in Iraq." The issue of Zarqawi’s medical treatment was also discussed in reports by the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the DLA.147 
• (U) The President’s final terrorism statement in the speech was "[w]e’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and deadly gases .” The intelligence community had produced assessments on the topic of bomb making. The intelligence reports on chemical and biological weapons training came primarily from the interrogation of al Qaeda detainee Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. 
• (U) The September 2002 CIA report Iraqi Support for Terrorism, which was coordinated with the DLA, stated that al-Libi said Iraq had "provided" unspecified CBW training for two al-Qa’ ida associates in 2000, but also stated that al Libi "did not know the results of the training."148 In the June 2002 paper, Iraq and al Qa ’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationshqr, the CIA also stated that al-Libi claimed Iraq had "provided" unspecified CBW training for two al Qaeda associates in 2000.149 
• (U) Director Tenet testified in September 2002 that, "[t]here is evidence that Iraq provided al- Qa’ida with various kinds of training—combat, bomb-making, and CBRN. Although Saddam did not endorse al Qaeda’s overall agenda and was suspicious of Islamist movements in general, he was apparently not averse, under certain circumstances, to enhancing Bin Laden’s operational capabilities. 
• (U) The October 2002 WMD National Intelligence Estimated stated that "Detainee Ibn al- Shaykh al-Libi—who had significant responsibility for training—has told us that Iraq provided unspecified chemical or biological weapons training for two al Qaeda members beginning in December 2000."150 

• (U) Months prior to the speech and the latter intelligence products cited above, questions were raised in iinished intelligence about al-Libi’s credibility. A February 22, 2002 DLA Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary noted that Ibn al-Shaykh [al-Libi] "lacks specific details on the Iraqi’s involvement, the CBRN materials associated with the assistance, and the location where the training occurred. It is possible he does not know any further details; it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers. Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows will retain their interest. Saddarn’s regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary 147 State INR, Iraq/Terrorism: Al-Qaida Operatives Moving into Baghdad, May 24, 2002; DIA, Transnational/Iraq; Senior al-Qaida Operative Reportedly in Iraq, May 28, 2002 DIA. 148 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002, p. I2 (SSCI # 2005-5178). 149 CIA, Iraq and al-Qa ’ida.· Interpreting a Murky Relationship, July 2002, p. 6 (SSCI# 2002-3005). 150 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002, 68. _ 65
• movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control."m 
• (U) DIA reiterated some of these points in additional reports. On August 7, 2002, the CIA reported on al-Libi’s credibility. The summary of the report stated that "questions persist about [al-Libi’s] forthrightness and truthfulness" and later elaborating, "In some instances, however, he seems to have fabricated information. Perhaps in an attempt to exaggerate his own importance, Ibn al-Shaykh claims to be a member of al Qaeda’s Shura Council, a claim not corroborated by other intelligence reporting"l52 President’s State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003) 
• (U) President Bush stated that "Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda." He also reiterated the concern that Iraq could secretly provide weapons to terrorists or help them develop their own. The intelligence relating to these claims was described above. 
• (U) The November 2002 NIE, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007 repeated much of the intelligence cited above on the relationship between Iran and al Qaeda.l53 The NIE said that "the relationship between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda appears more to be two sides trying to feel one another out or exploit each other." The NIE cited "solid reporting" that "Iraq and al-Qa’ ida have had senior-level contacts going back to the rise of Usarna Bin Laden. Intelligence reportirrg-albeit fragmentary and at times corrtlicting-indicates a series of contacts over nearly a decade between the Iraqi Government and al Qaeda .... "l54 
• (U) The NIE also stated that "[w]e have credible reporting that al Qaeda leaders sought help from Baghdad in acquiring WMD capabilities and that Iraq provided training in bomb-making and, according to one detainee, in the area of chemical and biological agents," and that "[w]e have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members including some that have been in Baghdadrm Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
• (U) Secretary Powell’s statements repeated and amplified those previously mentioned. His stated that Iraq "harbors a deadly terrorist network" headed by Zarqawi; that an Iraqi agent "offered al-Qaida safe haven" in the northern Kurdish regions; and that "al-Qaida affiliates in Baghdad now ... have been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months." 151 DIA DITSUM 044-02 of February 22, 2002. 152 CIA, Terrorism: Credibility of Ibn al-Shaykh al—Libi and the Information He Has Provided While in Custody (SPWR080702—05), August 7, 2002. I 153 This NIE was not published until I anuary 2003. 154 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007, NIE 2002-15HJ, November 2002, 16-17. *55 ibid, 17. _ 66

page 66

• (U) Secretary Powell referred to "secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida" that resulted in an understanding between Hussein and bin Laden that al—Qa’ida would not to support terrorist activities against Baghdad. Powell cited "at least eight [meetings] at very senior levels since the early 1990s." He cited "a foreign security service as providing information on meetings between bin Laden and an Iraqi intelligence offrcer in 1996 and the head of the Iraqi intelligence service afterwards. Powell laid out cooperation between Iraq and al-Qa’ ida, including Iraq’s provision of assistance in document forgery, bombmaking, and chemical and biological weapons training. 
• (U) Many of these statements are consistent with ones made in speeches previously described. Additional intelligence relating to Secretary Powell’s statements is below. 
• (U) On January 31, 2003, the State Department Undersecretary for INR, Carl Ford, wrote a memo to Secretary Powell laying out the intelligence on Iraq’s ties to al Qaeda. He wrote that "Our evidence suggests that Baghdad is strengthening a relationship with al-Qaida that dates back to the mid-1990s, when senior Iraqi Intelligence officers established contact with the network in several countries." Ford added that "we have some evidence that Iraqi Intelligence has been in contact with elements in the northeastern area. And the al-Qaida operatives there are in regular contact with other operatives located in Baghdad. The Iraqi governmenthas also received information from other sources alerting it to the presence of al-Qaida operatives in Baghdad." 
• (U) Ford wrote that Zarqawi "has had a good relationship with Iraqi intelligence officials" and that "we have hard evidence that al-Qaida is operating in several locations in Iraq with the knowledge and acquiescence of Saddam’s regime." Ford wrote that intelligence "revealed the presence of safehouse facilities in the city as well as the clear intent to remain in Baghdad. Also, foreign NGO workers outside of Iraq who we believe provide support to al-Qaida have also expressed their intent to set up shop in Baghdad." 
• (U) Secretary Powell stated that the Zarqawi network had freedom of movement in Baghdad the ability to command and control terrorist elements throughout Iraq. As discussed previously, several intelligence reports noted Zarqawi’s presence in Baghdad, including a September 2002 CIA assessment which said "Although most al Qaeda operatives in Iraq are adjacent to the Kurdish safehaven in northern Iraq, an unknown number of individuals have used Baghdad and other regions of the country as bases to orchestrate operations."156 - Director Tenet testifred to the Committee on Se tember 17, 2002 that "In Jaw , an sl- aids assssists brsggsd that the situation in W was ood, that Baghdad could be transited quickly formally or informally, ." 
• (U) A CIA SPWR dated December 21, 2002 titled, Iraq: Extremists in Baghdad Aid Al-Zarqawi Operations, relayed that "[Reporting] indicates more than a dozen al Qaeda affiliated extremists converged on Baghdad beginning in May and have since been coordinating the movement of people, money, and supplies into Baghdad and northeastern Iraq. Veteran Egyptian Islamic Jihad 156 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002, p. iv. _ 67

page 67

• (EIJ) operative Yusif al-Dardiri a.rrived in Baghdad in mid-May—about the time Abu Mus’ab al- Zarqawi went there for medical treatrnent-and signed a one-year house lease for his associates." The CIA reported again on al-Dardiri in a January 2003 report, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, stating that he was in Baghdad and facilitating Zarqawi’s operations. 
• (U) Secretary Powell described the group Ansar al-Islam in northern Iraq, and area that Powell said was outside of Saddam’s control. He that an Iraqi agent that was in a senior position in Ansar al-Islam had offered al-Qaida safe haven in the north. The intelligence community agreed that al Qaeda and Ansar al-Islam had a relationship and that terrorist training and plotting was ongoing in northern Iraq. 
• (U) A February 2003 CIA report noted that "In an August 2000 meeting, al Qaeda officials met with three Kurdish Islamist leaders, now all senior AI officials, who agreed to provide al Qaeda a safehaven if the group lost Afghanistan as a sanctuary, according to a PUK detainee."157 A separate CIA report noted that "Abu Wa’il, whose role as a senior AI official and close al Qaeda associate allows him to know the full scope of activities in northeastern Iraq and in Baghdad, was identified as an IIS associate by three detainees in PUK custody."158 
• (U) The link between Baghdad and Ansar al-Islam was, however, questioned in intelligence channels. An August 15, 2002 State Department INR assessment, Terrorism: Al-Qaida ’s Presence in Iraq—An Update, stated that "We still have not seen definitive evidence of cooperation between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaida, but the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) almost certainly is aware al-Qaida operatives are present in Iraq." Director Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony to the Committee included that "Baghdad reportedly has had contacts with Ansar al-Islam that include IIS penetrations of the organization, but we ca.nnot determine their frequency or purpose." 
• (U) Secretary Powell’s UN speech repeated previous Administration statements about the length and number of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. This issue is addressed above. Secretary Powell did reference "an understanding that al-Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad." 
• (U) A May I4, 2002, CIA paper Iraq: Strengthening Its Terrorist Capabilities, noted that "In 1993, Bin Laden reached an ‘understanding’ with Saddam under which al Qaeda forbade operations against the Iraqi leader, according to sensitive reporting that was released in US court documents during the Aiiica Embassy trial." The September 13, 2002, CIA paper Terrorism: Contacts Between al-Qa ’ida Officials and Iraqi Intelligence Officers included a comment that "Sensitive reporting indicates that Bin Laden reached an ‘understanding’ with Baghdad in 1993 that al Qaeda would not support any anti-Saddarn activities. We have no information about how such an agreement might have been reached." Additional Statements 157 CIA Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Terrorism: Ansar al Islam’s Threat to the US (SEIB 03-028CHX) February 4, 2003. 158 Abu Wa’il was one of the three AI officials in the February 2003 CIA report. 68

page 68

Wayne Madsen Report

January 18-20, 2008 - Plame and Edmonds were looking at the same covert network WMR has learned that former CIA covert agent Valerie Plame Wilson, whose covert status was leaked by the Bush White House, and former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds, who was focused on a major covert network involving Turkish, Israeli, and key members of the Bush administration and Republican Party and weapons and drug smuggling, were essentially looking at the same network. The nexus of Turkey with both the covert CIA Brewster Jennings and Associates operations and the Turkish-Israeli network of influence active within the Defense and State Departments, is the key factor in understanding the complicated counter-espionage operation conducted by both the FBI and CIA. The congressional investigation by Senators Pat Leahy and Charles Grassley in support of Edmonds' revelations and congressional and judicial efforts to obtain White House emails on the leak of Plame's identity have been stymied by a powerful array of top Bush administration officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Bush adviser Karl Rove, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, convicted Cheney Chief of Staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, former Deputy Defense Secretary for Policy and Plans Douglas Feith, and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman.  full article

•  
• • "There is certainly evidence that al Qaeda people have been in Iraq. There is certainly evidence that Saddam Hussein cavorts with terrorists. 1 think that if you asked, do we know that he had a role in 9/11, no, we do not know that he had a role in 9/11. But I think that this is the test that sets a bar that is far too high." — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002. • "He plays host to terrorist networks,’assassinates his opponents, both in Iraq and abroad, and has attempted to assassinate a former president of the United States." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. • "[Since we began after September 11th,] we do have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad. We have what we consider to be very reliable reporting of senior level contacts going back a decade, and of possible chemical and biological agent training. And when I say contacts, I mean between Iraq and al Qaeda. The reports of these contacts have been increasing since 1998. We have what we believe to be credible information that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven opportunities in Iraq, reciprocal nonaggression discussions. We have what we consider to be credible evidence that al Qaeda leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities. We do have -- I believe it’s one report indicating that Iraq provided unspeciied training relating to chemical and/or biological matters for al Qaeda members. There is, I’m told, also some other information of varying degrees of reliability that supports that conclusion of their cooperation." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumskzld, Press briefing, September 26, 2002. ‘ • "We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network, headed by a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner. The network runs a poison and explosive training center in northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad." - President George W Bush, Press conference, February 6, 2003. 
• (U) These statements are consistent with those described above. • "We know that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq today, and that little happens in Iraq without the knowledge of the Saddam Hussein regime. We also know that there have been a number of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda over the years. We know Saddam has ordered acts of terror himself, including the attempted assassination of a former U.S. President" — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002. • ". .. it’s been pretty well confirmed that [Mohammed Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the attack. Now, what the purpose of that was, what transpired between them, we simply don’t know at this point, but that’s clearly an avenue that we want to pursue." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, December 9, 2001. 69

page 69

•  
• • ". .. We’ve seen in connection with the hijackers, of course, Mohamed Atta, who was the lead hijacker, did apparently travel to Prague on a number of occasions. And on at least one occasion, we have reporting that places him in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official a few months before the attack on the World Trade Center. The debates about, you know, was he there or wasn’t he there, again, it’s the intelligence business. [Tim Russert: What does the CIA say about that? Is it credible?] It’s credible. But, you know, I think a way to put it would be it’ s unconfirmed at this point." - Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, September 8, 2002. 
• (U) Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the intelligence community produced reports of a meeting between 9/11 hijacker Mohammad Atta and an Iraqi intelligence official. A September 17, 2001 CIA report, Iraq: Indications of Possible Iraqi Links to Attacks, noted "a foreign government service last Thursday reported that the local Iraqi Intelligence Service chief met in mid-April with suspected American Airlines Flight 11 hijacker Mohammad Atta.159 Shortly thereafter, the CIA reported that Saddam Hussein was trying to "avert a US strike by asking other Arab governments to convey to Washington that Baghdad is not complicit in the ll September attacks."16O 
• (U) There were several intelligence reports between September 2001 and September 2002 that both repeated the initial claims that Atta met with Iraqi officials and stated that the claims could not be corroborated or verified. Some of the reports stated that the only confirmed trip by Atta to Prague was in 2000, most reports stated that a 2001 visit could not be confirmed. A 
• (U) On November 1, 2001, a CIA report relayed the Czech Government’s public confirmation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence official and cited a "foreign government service" as saying the meeting occurred. The CIA stated that the agency "cannot corroborate Atta’s travel to Prague in April through travel or financial records but he could have traveled under an alias" and that CIA has no new information on the substance of the alleged meetings."161 A follow-up CIA report on March 19, 2002, said that the CIA was "pursuing conflicting leads and repeated that it was "trying to confirm a report that American Airlines Flight 11 hijacker Muhammad Atta met with Iraqi intelligence officer al-Ani in Prague in April of last year."l62 The report stated that "Neither the Czechs nor we have been able to verify Atta’s alleged trip to Prague in April of last year." (U) A May 14, 2002 CIA report again cited the foreign government service reporting from September 2001 and said that "Fragmentary intelligence reporting points to indirect ties between Baghdad and the 11 September hijackers but offers no conclusive indication of Iraqi complicity 159 Central Intelligence Agency SEIB, Iraq: Indications of Possible Iraqi Links to Attacks, September 17, 2001. 160 Central Intelligence Agency SEIB, Iraq: Using Back Channels To Refute Terrorist Allegations, September 28, 200 1. 161 - Central Intelli ence A enc , SPWR titled, Terrorism: Muhammed Atta 's travels to Prague - November 1, 2001. CIA, SPWR dated March 19, 2002, T errorism: Reporting on Muhammad Atta in Prague. 70

page 70

• or foreknowledge. Foreign government service sensitive reporting in September. indicated that Muhammad Atta met with an IIS officer in Prague in April of 2001. There is contradictory reporting on this trip and we have not been able to verify Atta’s reported trip through other channels."463 A DIA report on July 31, 2002 stated that "There are significant informationgaps in this reporting that render the issue impossible to prove or disprove with available information."4 4 Conclusions (U) Conclusion 10: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s support for terrorist groups other than al Qaeda were substantiated by intelligence information. The intelligence community reported regularly on Iraq’s safe harbor and financial support for Palestinian rejectionist groups, the Abu Nidal Organization, and others. The February 2002 NIE fully supported the claim that Iraq had, and would continue, to support terrorist groups. 
• (U) Conclusion 11: Statements that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other al Qaeda-related terrorist members were substantiated by the intelligence assessments. Intelligence assessments noted Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq and his ability to travel and operate within the country. The intelligence community generally believed that Iraqi intelligence must have known about, and therefore at least tolerated, Zarqawi’s presence in the country. 
• (U) Conclusion 12: Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al Qaeda had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al Qaeda with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence. Intelligence assessments, including multiple CIA reports and the November 2002 NIE, dismissed the claim that Iraq and al Qaeda were cooperating partners. According to an undisputed INR footnote in the NIE, there was no intelligence information that supported the claim that Iraq would provide weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda. The credibility of the principal intelligence source behind the claim that Iraq had provided al Qaeda with biological and chemical weapons training was regularly questioned by DIA, and later by the CIA. The Committee repeats its conclusion from a prior report that "assessments were inconsistent regarding the likelihood that Saddam Hussein provided chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training to al Qaeda."465 
• (U) Conclusion 13: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s contacts with al Qaeda were substantiated by intelligence information. However, policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al Qaeda. M3 CIA, SPWR dated May 14, 2002 titled, Iraq: Strengthening Its Terrorist Capabilities. 464 DIA, July 31, 2002 DIA Special Analysis, Iraq ’s Inconclusive Ties to al-Qaida. 165 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. 71

page 71

• (U) Conclusion 14. The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001. Postwar Findings 
• (U) The Committee issued a number of conclusions in its September 2006 report, Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, relating to the pre-war links between Iraq and terrorism. The Committee found the following. 
• (U) Iraq and al Qaeda did not have a cooperative relationship. Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al Qaeda and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from al Qaeda to provide material or operational support. 
• (U) Most of the contacts cited between Iraq and al Qaeda before the war by the intelligence community and policymakers have been determined not to have occurred. One of the reported contacts has been confirmed, and two other meetings have since been identified. 
• (U) Postwar information supports prewar assessments and statements that Abu Musab al- Zarqawi was in Baghdad and that al Qaeda was present in northern Iraq. 
• (U) No postwar information has been found that indicates Iraq provided chemical and biological weapons training to al Qaeda. The detainee who provided the key prewar reporting about this training recanted his claims after the war. In 2004, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi recanted his earlier statements about biological and chemical weapons training. Al-Libi told debriefers that he had fabricated information while in US custody to receive better treatment and in response to threats of being transferred to a foreign intelligence service which he believed would torture him. He also said that later, while he was being debriefed by a foreign intelligence service, he fabricated more information in response to physical abuse and threats of torture. The Committee’s prior report on post-war findings cited a CIA officer who explained that while CIA believes that al- Libi fabricated information, the CIA cannot determine whether, or what portions of, the original statements or the later recants are true or fa1se.166 
• (U) Intelligence gathered after the war has led analysts to doubt that Mohamed Atta had ` meetings with Iraq officials in the Czech Republic. According to the Committee’s prior report, "Postwar findings support CIA’s January 2003 assessment, which judged that ‘the most reliable reporting casts doubt’ on one of the leads, an alleged meeting between Muhammad Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague, and confirm that no such meeting occurred."l67 M6 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006, 108. 167 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January 2003, as quoted and described in Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 72

page 72

• VIII. Intent • "And containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime’s good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and building new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest fear is that terrorists will frnd a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we frnd all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to con’rront." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7 2002 • "We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a hope against all evidence." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003 • "Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qaida. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003 • "Some believe, some claim these contacts do not add up to much. They say Saddam Hussein’s secular tyranny and al-Qaida’s religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida _ 73

page 73

• together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al Queda could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond‘?" - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 
• (U) In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State all discussed Iraq’s intentions regarding weapons of mass destruction. Both the President and the Vice President indicated that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorist groups. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) 
• (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he discussed "the case of Saddam Hussein", and indicated that Saddam was "prepared to share [weapons of mass destruction] with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States."166 
• (U) At the time of the Vice President’s speech, the intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists. The intelligence community had previously assessed that Saddam was interested in acquiring WMD to counter his neighbors’ capabilities, deter hostile foreign powers (including Israel, Iran, and the US—led Coalition) and as a means of achieving "regional preemir1ence." 
• (U) The intelligence community had also assessed that Saddam was unlikely to take actions that he believed would threaten the survival of his regime, and that he believed hostile actions such as a re-invasion of Kuwait would in fact threaten his regime’s sru·vival. 
• (U) There were few recent coordinated intelligence assessments regarding Saddam Hussein’s intentions at the time of the Vice President’s speech. In 1998 the intelligence community had assessed that "Saddam has three primary, and interrelated, goals: maintaining power, having sanctions lifted as soon as possible, and, over the long term, reasserting Iraq’s regional dominance. . .Saddam is committee to seeing Iraq reemerge as the dominant power in the region: He is determined to retain elements of his WMD programs so that he will be able to intimidate Iraq’s neighbors and deter potential adversaries, such as Iran, Israel, and the United States".169 166 White House Transcript, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103'6 National Convention, August 26, 2002. 169 Intelligence Community Brief, Iraq: Prospects for Confrontation, July 17, 1998. _ 74

page 74

• (U) In 1999 the intelligence community produced a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) entitled Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003, which discussed Saddam’s likely perceptions and intentions. In 2004, the National Intelligence Council informed the SSCI that the views expressed in the 1999 NIE were "generally held by the IC until well into 2002 with some views carried over into" an October 2002 NIE on Saddam’s military intentions and capabilities.17° 
• (U) Specifically, the 1999 NIE noted that: (U) Reading Saddam’s intentions is difficult. He can be impulsive and deceptive; critical factors in shaping his behavior are largely hidden from us. . .But there are two fundamental guideposts that drive our calculus of his actions. First, we judge that Saddam would be careful not to place his regime’s survival at risk. Second, he probably believes that a re-invasion of Kuwait would provoke a Coalition response that could threaten to destroy his regime. ` 
• (U) ...We judge that Saddam continues to believe that Iraq needs WMD and long-range missiles to: 1) counter Israeli and Iranian capabilities. . .; 2) deter military attacks, including by Coalition forces; 3) achieve regional preeminence.171 
• (U) A separate CIA memorandum on this topic, published in December 2001, stated that "Saddam sees himself as a pan-Arab leader and views his regime as the most glorious chapter in Iraqi history. . .His decision-making is guided by opportunism, distrust for others, a personal need for power, and the sense that he is an historic figure who must take bold risks to advance Iraq’s interests. He views state power primarily in military terms — twice launching wars against his neighbors — and his strategic aim is to establish Iraq as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf" President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 
• (U) In the President’s September 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Saddam Hussein was a "grave and gathering danger", and that to assume Saddam’s good faith would be tantamount to betting "the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble." 
• (U) The President also implied that the Iraqi regime was dangerous because it might provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists ("And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we find all these dangers .... ").m 
• (U) The intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein dealt with other countries in good faith, and assessments regarding the potential use of WMD were not based on 170 Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. m National Intelligence Estimate, Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003, 1999. 172 White House Transcript, President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002. _ 75

page 75

• assumptions of good faith. The 1999 NIE on Iraqi military capabilities noted that it was difficult to gauge Saddam’s intentions, but judged that he would be careful not to put his regime’s survival at risk.173 
• (U) At the time of the President’s UN speech, the October 2002 NIE was still being prepared, and was two weeks away from release. While the document itself was not available at this time, its consistency with the 1999 NIE, and the lack of contradictory assessments in the intervening four year period, illustrate the continuity of the intelligence community’s judgments on this topic. 
• (U) The October 2002 NIE assessed that "Saddam’s past actions suggest that a decision to use WMD probably would come when he feels his personal survival is at stake even after he has exhausted all political, military and diplomatic options". It noted that the US would be unlikely to know when Saddam felt that he had no other options for self-preservation, but pointed out that "Iraq’s methodical conventional defensive preparations also suggest Saddam thinks an attack is not immmcmr-."* 
• (U) Additionally, the NIE pointed out that "Iraq’s historical use of CW against Iran and its decision not to use WMD against Israel or Coalition forces in 1991 indicates that an opponent’s retaliatory capability is a critical factor in Saddam’s decisionmal<ing."l75 
• (U) The NIE also examined a variety of ways in which Iraq might conceivably use WMD, and noted that overall "we have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use WMD."l76 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
• (U) The President spoke further on Iraqi intentions during his speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, where he said that "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists." In discussing Iraq’s alleged nuclear program, he stated that "facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." Finally, he concluded that "we could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a hope against all evidence."m 
• (U) While the October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, it judged that Saddam was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. According to the NIE, "Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger case for making war."m 173 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003, 1999. 1;; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. H6 iii 177 White House Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. 178 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. _ 76
•  
• Harold Rhode

page 76

• (U) The NIE concluded that Iraq would be more likely to conduct a terrorist-style attack on the US if Saddam perceived that the US could not be deterred from invading Iraq and destroying his regime. It assessed that if he made such a decision, Saddam would be most likely to rely on Iraqi intelligence officers under his command. It considered the possibility of Saddam employing an outside terrorist group to assist in such an attack, and concluded that this "extreme step" was conceivable if Saddam were "sufticiently desperate" and seeking a "last chance to exact vengeance." The NIE also noted that "although Saddam has not endorsed al-Qaida’s overall agenda and has been suspicious of Islamist movements in general, apparently he has not been averse to some contacts with the organization." The NIE stated that the intelligence community had low confidence in its own ability to assess when Saddam might use WMD and whether he would engage in clandestine attacks on the US homeland}79 
• (U) As discussed elsewhere in this report, in October 2002 most intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. The State Department’s Office of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) believed that Saddam Hussein wanted to possess nuclear weapons, and was maintaining some capabilities with dual uses, but judged that the available evidence did "not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution."18° President’s State of the Union Address (January 29, 2003) 
• (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he said that Saddam Hussein "could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own." He also stated that Saddam had "ambitions of conquest in the Middle East" that he could resume if he had "nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons".l8l 
• (U) As discussed, the October 2002 NIE judged that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. More generally, it suggested that Saddam would probably decide to use WMD only if he felt he had no other options for survival and that "an opponent’s retaliatory capability" would be a key factor in making this decision}82 
• (U) A November 2002 NIE on nontraditional threats restated the October NIE’s assessment about Saddam’s willingness, if "suff1ciently desperate" to employ an outside terrorist group to conduct an attack on the US as his "last chance for vengeance." This NIE included the caveats U *79 mid. 180 Ibid. As discussed in a previous Committee report (Senate Report 109-331) the Director of Central Intelligence also released a public statement regarding the President’s speech. This statement did not specifically address the possibility of Saddam providing WMD to terrorists, but said "There is no inconsistency between our view of Saddam’s growing threat and the view as expressed by the President in his speech. Although we think the chances of Saddam initializing a WMD attack are low — in part because it would constitute an admission that the [sic] possesses WMD — there is no question that the likelihood of Saddam using WMD against the United States or our allies in the region grows as his arsenal continues to build." I; E/hiite House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union ", January 28, 2003. 1 . _ 77

page 77

• that the intelligence community had low confidence in these assessments, and that "IN`R believes that the intelligence community has no reporting to support this assertion."183 
• (U) The October 2002 NIE’s conclusions were essentially repeated again in a January 2003 Intelligence Community Assessment which said that "Saddam probably will not initiate hostilities for fear of providing Washington with justification to invade Iraq. Nevertheless, he might deal the first blow, especially if he perceives that an attack intended to end his regime is ' inent."184 
• (U) Neither of these reports specifically focused on what Saddam might do if he had nuclear weapons or a "full arsenal" of chemical and biological weapons, possibly because the intelligence community believed that Iraq was still years away from possessing either of these. Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
• (U) In the Secretary of State’s February 2003 address to the United Nations Security Council, he stated that "arnbition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together", and that "al Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction."185 
• (U) The intelligence community did not assess that Iraq and al Qaida had a cooperative relationship. In June 2002 the CIA wrote that "in contrast to the traditional patron—client relationship Iraq enjoys with secular Palestinian groups, the ties between Saddam and bin Laden appear much like those between rival intelligence services, with each trying to exploit the other for its own benefit."186 While there was evidence of limited contacts throughout the 1990s, the CIA did not assess that these contacts added up to an established, cooperative relationship. In a January 2003 report the CIA noted that the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida shared mutual enemies, and that several reports of varying reliability mentioned "the involvement of Iraq or Iraqi nationals in al-Qaida’s efforts to obtain CBW [chemical and biological weapons] training. However, the same report also assessed that "Saddam Husayn and Usama bin Laden are far from being natural partners", and stated that while there was little specific intelligence about Saddam’s opinion of al-Qaida, "his record suggests that any such ties would be rooted in deep suspicion."187 
• (U) The Committee is also aware of intelligence provided directly to the Secretary by the CIA which echoed these assessments. 
• (U) As discussed, the October 2002 NIE assessed that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups at that time, because he did not want to put his 183 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats t0 the US Homeland Through 2007, November 2002 H4 Intelligence Community Assessment, Key Warnings for 2003, January 2003. 185 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 186 CIA, Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 21, 2002. H7 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January 29, 2003. The Iraqi regime’s possible links to terrorist groups are discussed in the Terrorism section of this report. _ 78

page 78

• regime’s survival at risk. It noted that information on possible training of terrorists was "second hand, or from sources of varying reliability."188 Additional Statements • "And as I have said repeatedly, Saddam Hussein would like nothing more than to use a terrorist network to attack and to kill and leave no fingerprints behind." — President George W Bush, Remarks with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, January 31, 2003 • "Every world leader that comes to see me, I explain our concerns about a nation which is not conforming to agreements that it made in the past; a nation which has gassed her people in the past; a nation which has weapons of mass destruction and apparently is not afraid to use them." — President George W Bush, Press Conference, March 13, 2002 • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use them against our friends, against our allies and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors; confrontations that will involve both the weapons that he has today and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth." — Vice President Dick Cheney, Statement before the Veterans of the Korean War, San Antonio, Texas, August, 29, 2002 • "But we should be just as concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons. They’re simpler to deliver and even more readily transferred to terrorist networks, who could allow Iraq to deliver them without Iraq’s fingerprints." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the HASC September 18, 2002 • "There are a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of mass destruction -- Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria to name but a few. But no terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people and the stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "We do know that the Iraqi regime currently has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, and we do know they’re currently pursuing nuclear weapons, that they have a proven willingness to use those weapons at their disposal and that they’ve proven an aspiration to seize the territory of and threaten their neighbors, proven support for and cooperation with terrorist networks and proven record of declared hostility and venomous rhetoric against the United States. Those threats should be clear to all." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 188 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. _ 79

page 79

• _ • "He’s hostile to our country. Because we have denied him the ability he has fought to impose his will on his neighbors, he has said in no uncertain terms that he would use weapons of mass destruction against the United States. He has at this moment stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the 1:L4SC, September 18, 2002 • "There are ways Iraq can easily conceal responsibility for a WMD attack. For example, they could give biological weapons to terrorist networks to attack the United States from within and then deny any knowledge. Suicide bombers are not deterrable." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "Moreover, if he decided it was in his interest to conceal his responsibility for an attack on the U.S., providing WMD to terrorists would be an effective way of doing so." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002 • "We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein, in possession of weapons of mass destruction, could empower a few terrorists to threaten millions of innocent people." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, September 19, 2002 • "Every month that goes by, his WMD programs are progressing and he moves closer to his goal of possessing the capability to strike our population, and our allies, and hold them hostage to blackmail." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Prepared Testimony before the SASCZ September 19, 2002 • "Al Qa’ ida hides, Saddam doesn’t, but the danger is, is that they work in concert. The danger is, is that al Qa’ida becomes an extension of Sadda1n’s madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world...[Y]ou can’t distinguish between al Qa’ida and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror." — President George W Bush, Remarks with Columbian President Uribe, September 25, 2002 • "Each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX -- nerve gas -- or some day a nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally." —- President George W Bush, Remarks in the Rose Garden with Congressional Leaders, September 26, 2002 • "We know that the Iraqi regime is led by a dangerous and brutal man. We know he is actively seeking the destructive technologies to match his hatred. And we know that he must be stopped. The dangers we face will only worsen from month to month and year to year. To ignore these threats is to encourage them -— and when they have fully materialized, it may be too late to protect ourselves and our allies. By then, the Iraqi dictator will have had the means to terrorize and dominate the region, and each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX nerve gas or 80

page 80

• _ someday a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group." — President George W Bush, Radio Address, September 28, 2002 • "The danger to America from the Iraqi regime is grave and growing. The regime is guilty of beginning two wars. It has a horrible history of striking without warning. In deiiance of pledges to the United Nations, Iraq has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons and is rebuilding the facilities used to make more of those weapons. Saddam Hussein has used these weapons of death against innocent Iraqi people, and we have every reason to believe he will use them again. Iraq has longstanding ties to terrorist groups which are capable of, and willing to, deliver weapons of mass death." — President George W Bush, Radio Address, October 5, 2002 • "Indeed, the more time passes the more time Saddam Hussein has to develop his deadly weapor1s and to acquire more. The more time he has to plant sleeper agents in the United States and other friendly countries or to supply deadly weapons to terrorists he can then disown, the greater the danger. The notion that we can wait until the threat is imminent assumes that we will know when it is imminent." — Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Remarks at Fletcher Conference, October 16, 2002 • "After September the llth, we’ve entered into a new era and a new war. This is a man that we know has had connections with al Qa’ida. This is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al Qa’ida as a forward anny." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Dearborn, Michigan, October 14, 2002 • "His regime has had high-level contacts with al Qa’ida going back a decade and has provided training to al Qa’ida terrorists. And as the President has said, ‘Iraq could decide on any given day to provide biological or chemical weapons to a terrorist group or to individual terrorists’ -- which is why the war on terror will not be won till Iraq is completely and verifiably deprived of weapons of mass destruction." — Woe President Dick Cheney, Remarks at the Air National Guard Conference, December 2, 2002 • "He has weapons of mass destruction, the world’s deadliest weapons, which pose a direct threat to the United States, our citizens and our friends and allies." — President George W Bush, Remarks with Economists, January 21, 2003 • "The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World Economic Forum, January 26 2003 • "Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave danger —· not only to his neighbors, but also to the United States. His regime aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qa’ida. He could decide secretly to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for use against us. And as the President said on Tuesday night, it would take just one vial, one canister, one crate to bring a day of horror to our 81

page 81

• nation unlike any we have ever known." — Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks to the Conservative PAC January 30, 2003 • "I believe Saddam Hussein is a threat to the American people. I believe he’s a threat to the neighborhood in which he lives. And I’ve got a good evidence to believe that. He has weapons of mass destruction, and he has used weapons of mass destruction in his neighborhood and on his own people. He’s invaded countries in his neighborhood. He tortures his own people. He’s a murderer. He has trained and financed A1 Qaida-type organizations before -- A1 Qaida and other terrorist organizations." — President George W Bush, News Confrence, March 6, 2003 • "[The Iraqi regime] has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And [Iraq] has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qa’ida. The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other." — President George W Bush, Address to the Nation, March 1 7, 2003 
• (U) The above statements are all consistent with the five policy speeches analyzed. Conclusions (
• (U) Conclusion 15: Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Saddam Hussein did not have nuclear weapons, and was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks the US using conventional, chemical or biological weapons at that time, in part because he feared that doing so would give the US a stronger case for war with Iraq. This judgment was echoed by both earlier and later intelligence community assessments. All of these assessments noted that gauging Saddam’s intentions was quite difficult, and most suggested that he would be more likely to initiate hostilities if he felt that a US invasion was imminent. Postwar Findings (U) Postwar findings indicate that Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qaida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, and refused all requests from al-Qaida to provide material or operational support. No postwar information indicates that Saddam ever considered using any terrorist group to attack the United States. (U) In 2004, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Saddam had aspired to rebuild weapons of mass destruction capabilities if and when international sanctions ended, but that the Iraqi regime had no strategy or plan for the eventual revival of such capabilities. _ 82

page 82

• (U) The Iraq Survey Group<