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110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAQ CONDUCTED BY THE POLICY COUNTERTERRORISM EVALUATION GROUP AND THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PLANS WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

together with A ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of June _, 2008

 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE United States Senate 110th Congress JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA RON WYDEN, OREGON CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA EVAN BAYH, INDIANA SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA BARBARA A. MUKULSKI, MARYLAND ORRIN HATCH, UTAH RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN OLYMPIA SNOWE, MAINE SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA HARRY REU), NEVADA, EX OFFICIO MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN, EX OFFICIO JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO

Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Scope and Methodology 

• (U) ln February 2004 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revised the terms of reference for its ongoing inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. The new issue areas included "any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy." The Committee pursued this issue area in 2004, but subsequently the Committee’s attention was placed on other aspects of the terms of reference.1 
• (U) In September 2005, the Committee deferred efforts on the issue of intelligence activities within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD(P)], when then- Committee Chairman Pat Roberts requested that the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) review whether the OUSD(P)’s Office of Special Plans "at any time conducted unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate intelligence activities." Later in September 2005 Senator Carl Levin, then ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, issued a similar request for the DoD IG to review the activities of the OUSD(P), including the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and Policy Support Office, to determine whether any of their activities were either inappropriate or improper. Senator Levin’s request included a list of ten questions to be answered by the DoD IG. The Intelligence Committee planned to resume its inquiry based on the outcome of the DoD IG’s review. 
• (U) The DoD IG began the review requested by Senators Roberts and Levin in November 2005. In February 2007, the DoD IG issued the requested report, which was titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. That report concluded: The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD(P)] developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the products did not clearly show 1 To date the Committee has published four reports based on its inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq: • July 9, 2004, US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, • September 8, 2006, Postwar Findings about Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and how they Compared with Prewar Assessments, • September 8, 2006, The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, • Mayg3 l , 2007, Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq. _ 1

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• _ the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Committee and were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products. This condition occurred because the OUSD(P) expanded its role and mission from formulating Defense Policy to analyzing and disseminating alternative analysis.2 
• (U) The DoD IG review was focused on intelligence activities within the OUSD(P) only with respect to the production and dissemination of intelligence. The DoD IG stated in materials that accompanied the release of the February 2007 report that the "review focused on OUSD(P) assessments provided to the Executive Branch."3 The DoD IG did not include within its report an assessment of whether any of the OUSD(P)’s actions could be considered the collection of intelligence even though the "collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities" falls under the definition of intelligence activities as set forth in the Executive Order on United States Intelligence Activities.4 
• (U) In February 2004 when the Committee’s terms of reference were updated, the Committee was in the process of looking into issues surrounding a December 2001 meeting in Rome, Italy between DoD officials, including an OUSD(P) representative, and current and former Iranian officials, and a related follow-up meeting in June 2003. The Committee pursued information on these meetings in October 2003 and conducted a number of related interviews in early to mid-2004. The DoD IG touched on these meetings in a separate report, but did not conduct an extensive review. 
• (U) The Committee’s updated terms of reference called for a review of any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the OUSD(P). The Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group was a two person group created in November 2001, after discussions on how to pursue the Rome meeting were already underway in the OUSD(P). No members of that group participated in the meetings that are the subject of this report. The Office of Special Plans was created in October 2002, after the Rome meeting had taken place. One participant in the Rome meeting did join the Office of Special Plans after it was formed, but his activities surrounding the Rome meeting had been completed months before. As noted in the February 2007 DoD IG report, however, "[t]he term OSP [Office of Special Plans] has become generic terminology for the activities of the OUSD(P), including the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and Policy Support Oflice."5 
• (U) The December 2001 Rome meeting involved discussions with alleged current and former members of the Iranian security service and a foreign government (Israel) entity which included the foreign government (Israel) intelligence service. While the information obtained was related to Iran instead of Iraq, senior OUSD(P) personnel were directed to conduct the Rome meeting and were 2 2007-0782, February 9, 2007, DoD IG report titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of theUnder Secretary of Defense for Policy, page 4. 3 2007-0782, Materials accompanying the February 9, 2007, DoD IG report titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Questions and Answers, Answer to question #5. 4 Executive Order Number 12333, dated December 4, 1981, Part 1, Paragraph 1.4 (a). 5 2007-0782, February 9, 2007, DoD IG report titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, pages 1-3. _ 2

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• _ involved in the decision—making process on how to undertake the meeting, and an OUSD(P) employee attended the meeting. In light of the fact that the DoD IG did not evaluate the propriety of conducting these meetings, Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV directed that the Committee’s review of the December 2001 and June 2003 meetings be completed as part of its pre-war intelligence on Iraq inquiry. This report completes the Committee’s inquiry into the Rome meeting and the issue of whether the OUSD(P) undertook inappropriate intelligence collection activities. 
• (U) The Comn1ittee’s review is based on interviews with current and former Intelligence Community and DoD officials, briefings, and documentation provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DoD, and State Department. The DoD Office of the Inspector General provided the Committee with additional information collected as part of its February 2007 review of the activities of the OUSD(P). 

Michael Ledeen, Rove's Brain	Karl Rove, Bush's Brain	= go to NFU pages
	Issues not in this report Forged yellow cake documents. more Rosen Weissman, AIPAC espionage case. Sibel Edmonds FBI wiretap translator, more Role of Judith Miller and the New York Times   Leakgate Project for New American Century, PNAC Valerie Plame, Brewster Jennings & Associates  more Omissions and misstatements in the 911 Commission Report more Israeli Art Students, their addresses tracked the addresses of the 911 hijackers.  more 911 was an inside job (Bush, Israel, neocons) the only people who don't believe this are duped Americans, the rest of the world believes it.   more

• I The Rome Meeting Introduction · (_) The "Rome meeting" was actually a series of sessions that took place in an apartment building in Rome, Italy Hom December 10, 2001 through December 13, 2001. The DoD IG determined that: The meeting included Larry Franklin (Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs), Harold Rhode (Office of Net Assessments), Michael Ledeen (former Office of the Secretary of Defense and National Security Council consultant), Manucher Ghorbanifar (Iranian exile), [Iranian am (Iranian exile living in Morocco), [Iranian #2] (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Official), and an unidentified employee of [a foreign government (Israel)]. Michael Ledeen arranged the meeting with the help of his contacts in Italy and [the foreign government (Israel)] who provided the meeting place and other logistical support. 
• (U) Mr. Franklin joined the OUSD(P) in July 2001 as an Iran desk officer within the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia Affairs, William Luti. (Mr. Franklin was assigned to the Office of Special Plans within Mr. Luti’s office in late 2002, but retained his responsibilities for Iran.)7 Mr. Luti reported to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Peter Rodman. Mr. Rodman played a 6 2007-1142, March 6, 2007, DoD IG Report, DOD Involvement with the Rendon Group, page 8. 7 Mr. Franklin is currently awaiting direction from the Department of Justice to report to prison on matters unrelated to those discussed in this report. He was indicted in August 2005 along with two employees of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for conspiring with each other to unlawfully disclose classified national defense information. Mr. Franklin subsequently pled guilty, and was sentenced in January 2006 on three felony counts: conspiracy to communicate national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it; conspiracy to communicate classified information to an agent of a foreign government (Israel); and the unlawful retention of national defense information. _ 3

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• _ significant role in the decision-making process on how DoD would participate in the Rome meeting, and reported to the USD(P), Douglas Feith. 
• (U) Mr. Rhode was a career civilian employee in the Office of Net Assessment and currently remains employed within the DoD. The Office of Net Assessment is not a part of the OUSD(P). The Director of Net Assessment reports to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and is responsible for providing assessments on the capabilities of the United States (U.S.) military. 
• (U) Mr. Ledeen is a U.S. citizen employed by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Mr. Ledeen had numerous contacts within the DoD and other elements of the U.S. Government at the time of the Rome meeting, but at no time during preparations for or throughout the Rome meeting did he have a formal relationship (e. g., employee, contractor, or consultant) with the DoD. Without any such affiliation, Mr. Ledeen organized the Rome meeting with the help of the foreign government (Israel). Mr. Ledeen paid his own expenses for the trip and never asked or expected to be reimbursed.8 The DoD’s reliance on Mr. Ledeen to organize the Rome meeting resulted in senior DoD officials, to include Mr. Feith and Mr. Rodman, not being aware of the involvement of Mr. Ghorbanifar and the foreign government (Israel) until after the Rome meeting. 
• (U) It is not entirely clear how Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode were selected to attend the meeting. Mr. Ledeen advised the Committee that during a November 200l discussion with Stephen Hadley, then serving as Deputy National Security Advisor, he was asked who he would recommend sending to a potential meeting with the Iranians. Mr. Ledeen said he offered the names of Harold Rhode and Larry Franklin, due to their expertise and language skills.9 Mr. Franklin told the Committee that he was informed by his immediate supervisor, Mr. Luti, of a potential trip for which the DoD needed an Iran analyst who was conversant in Farsi. Mr. Franklin said he did not know Mr. Ledeen at that time.10 Mr. Rhode could not recall who approached him about the trip due to the passage of time, but said it was probably Mr. Luti. Even though he did not work within the OUSD(P), Mr. Rhode often interacted with that office and knew Mr. Luti. Mr. Rhode stated that he was selected most likely because he had studied in Iran and worked on the issue of how to understand Iranians.  In 2003, Mr. Luti informed the DoD’s Counterintelligence Field Activitys that he selected Mr. Franklin, but did not know who had chosen Mr. Rhode to participate in the meeting.l3 Ultimately, Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode traveled to Rome under official U.S. government travel orders. 8 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 12, 14-15. 9 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of lvfr. Ledeen, pages 5-6. 10 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages. 7-8. H 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages. 3-6. NOTE: An attempt was made to reinterview Mr. Rhode to clarify his involvement in a number of the issues raised in this report. Officials within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs informed the Committee that Mr. Rhode declined to be reinterviewed. V 12 As discussed later in this report, the DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity conducted a review of DoD contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar in 2003 at the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Interviews conducted by the Counterintelligence Field Activity are referenced throughout this report and were also a primary source for the DoD IG review. 13 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIPA Report, Luti Interview. _ 4

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• (U) Mr. Ghorbanifar was a long time friend of Mr. Ledeen ’s who lived in France and had offered to arrange a meeting with current and former Iranian officials.14 Mr. Ghorbanifar’s attendance at the meeting ultimately raised concerns because of his prior history with the Intelligence Community and his participation in the Iran-Contra scandal in 1986. As a result of the CIA’s prior dealings with Mr. Ghorbanifar, the agency in l984 had issued a fabrication notice on Mr. Ghorbanifar to its operational personnel stating that he was regarded as an unreliable source of intelligence. A publicly available Congressional report on the Iran-Contra scandal includes a redacted copy of the notice that states Mr. Ghorbanifar "should be regarded as an intelligence fabricator and a nuisance. Any further approaches by subject or his brother Ali should be reported but not taken seriously."15 The Iran-Contra scandal involved the illegal sale of arms to Iran by the U.S. Government and use of the profits to fund rebels in Nicaragua. Mr. Ghorbanifar had been a middleman in the weapons exchange. Mr. Ledeen was a consultant to the National Security Council at the time of the Iran-Contra scandal and also played a role in the weapons exchange.16 According to Mr. Ledeen , the first Iranian participant in the Rome meeting, , was a former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps member who was subsequently branded a traitor, but was able to escape Iran after more than a year of torture. Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that the second Iranian, _ was "a high-ranking officer in the intelligence establishment of Iran."17 The Committee’s attempts to corroborate this information with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were complicated by several factors. The first Iranian has a common name and there are multiple variations of the spelling of both names. The CIA provided information on three versions of the first name, two of which could have been the participant in the Rome meeting. It appears the second Iranian - _ was deemed an "information peddler" based on his attempts to sell information. The information the CIA collected on this individual was sufficient for the Agency 
• (U) During the Rome meeting the two Iranians provided biographic details on themselves and information on the political and economic conditions in Iran. Specific issues discussed during the meeting included Iran’s long standing relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Iran’s perception on Saddam Hussein’s grip on Iraq, the growth of anti-regime sentiment in Iran, and the Iranian regime’s attitudes toward the U.S.19 14 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #4, Undated DIA Contact Memorandum on Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Referral, pages 1-2. 15 Declassified July 25, 1984 CIA Cable Director 023056, Subject: Fabricator Notice — Manuchehr Gorbanifar 16 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 3. 17 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staif Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 17-18. 18 2007-4174, October 22, 2007 & November 28, 2007 CIA responses to Questions for the Record 19 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 7, Mr. Franklins notes on the Iranian interviews. Two versions, one undated and one dated January 21, 2001 (presumed to be a typo). _ 5

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New York Times  "SISMI sent the CIA and U.S. and British officials information that it knew was forged"
	Niger Forged Yellowcake Documents more Michael Ledeen has denied any involvement in the Niger forged documents, but this Senate Report places him on the scene.

• Origins of the Rome Meeting 
• (U) The December 2001 Rome meeting was initiated by Mr. Ledeen . According to Mr. Ledeen , soon after September 11, 2001, probably in the October 2001 timeframe, Mr. Ghorbanifar contacted him about "people in Iran who were willing to come out and meet with officials of the American government to provide accurate information about what was going on inside the country, Iranian support of terrorist organizations and plans to kill Americans in Afghanistan."20 This discussion prompted Mr. Ledeen to contact U.S. Government officials. 
• (U) Mr. Rodman informed the Committee that Mr. Ledeen had contacted him at some point and suggested that DoD officials meet with the Iranian contacts, but Mr. Rodman had deferred at that time. The tasking later came back to him through senior DoD channels as a request from Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley for the DoD to pursue the meeting with the Iranians.21 Mr. Ledeen advised the Committee that he had contacted Mr. Hadley, who he described as an "old fiiend,"22 and subsequently met with Mr. Hadley and another National Security Council official to present Mr. Ghorbanifar’s offer to arrange meetings with Iranian officials. Mr. Ledeen advised the Committee that he did not endorse Mr. Ghorbanifar’s information, but felt obliged to convey the offer to the U.S. Government. Mr. Ledeen indicated that he was certain that the Intelligence Community would not be interested in pursuing the information due to their distrust of Mr. Ghorbanifar.23 
• (U) According to an April 16, 2004, letter to the Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, "in November 2001, the Deputy National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, called the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, and reported that Iranians with inside knowledge of Iranian security and intelligence operations, including involvement in terrorism and threats to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, wished to defect." The letter also indicated that the Iranians did not want to deal with the CIA and that Mr. Hadley asked Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to have the DoD handle the contact. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz agreed to do so and subsequently informed the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.24 
• (U) A February 2004 draft chronology prepared by staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and provided to the Committee in April 2004 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs indicates that the call from Mr. Hadley to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz occurred on November 7, 2001.25 The request from Mr. Hadley prompted Mr. Rodman to ask the DoD Office of General Counsel to review whether contact with potential defectors could take place without CIA involvement.26 In mid-November 2001, Mr. Rodman learned from Mr. 20 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 4. 21 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007 Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1. 22 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staii Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 4. 23 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staif Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 5. 24 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, pages 1-2. 25 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 26 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from the DoD office of General Counsel, and Tab 4, November 16, 2001 Memo from Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. _ 6

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• _ Ledeen that the Iranians did not want to defect, but merely wanted to pass on information.27 The DoD chronology indicated this newfound knowledge prompted Mr. Rodman to inform Mr. Hadley that the DoD could make the initial contact and Mr. Hadley proceeded to obtain approval for this course of action from the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice.28 A memorandum dated November 16, 2001, from Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz indicated that the Deputy Secretary authorized this course of action,29 and a subsequent action memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld dated July 19, 2002, stated that Mr. Hadley "strongly encouraged the meeting."3 
• (U) According to the April 2004 letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, in early December 2001 Mr. Hadley coordinated the proposed DoD contact with Iranian officials with the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet, and they did not object to the DoD’s making the contact. 31 Deputy Secretary Armitage and DCI Tenet were not provided with significant details regarding the proposed meeting. A 2004 State Department response to Committee questions indicated that Deputy Secretary Armitage recalled Mr. Hadley contacting him in the November/December 2001 timeframe and advising that the DoD wished to debrief some Iranians with information on Iraq. The State Department response further indicated that Deputy Secretary Armitage voiced no objections, but was provided no details on who would attend the meeting or its location. 32 

• (U) Director Tenet’s 2007 book titled At the Center of the Storm states that in early December 2001 Mr. Hadley mentioned only "that DoD might meet with some Iranians in Europe who had terrorist threat information." Director Tenet notes that there was no mention of the involvement of Mr. Ledeen or Mr. Ghorbanifar. He also indicates that the discussion made him uncomfortable and that he did not understand why the CIA was not being asked to get involved. He adds, however, that "if there was information available about a threat to U.S. interests, I wasn’t going to let bureaucratic reasons stand in the way of our getting the details."33 In March 2008, DCI Tenet provided the Committee with his recollections of his conversation with Mr. Hadley. He recalled being provided no details on the proposed meeting other than it involved access to terrorist threat information. He reiterated that he had concerns about the information provided by Mr. Hadley, but he was not going to stand in the way of collecting threat information so soon after September 11, 2001. Former Director Tenet also stated his view that Mr. Hadley’s call was not intended to gain his permission. For these reasons he did not pursue further details at that time.34 27 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology, and Tab 4, November 16, 2001 Memo Bom Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. Z8 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 29 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 4, November 16, 2001 Memo from Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz., 30 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 25, July 19, 2002, Action Memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld. 31 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, page 2. 32 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #7. 33 At the Center of theStorm, George Tenet, Page 312. 34 March 10, 2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George Tenet, page 1. _ 7

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• _ -) According to Mr. Ledeen , once he received concurrence from the DoD he directly contacted the foreign government (Israel) official, who he described as an old friend, and told him the background on the proposed meeting. Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that the foreign government (Israel) made any necessary arrangements for the Iranian participants, and provided a secure location and full time intepreter for the meeting.33 ® It is not clear at what point senior DoD officials knew the foreign government (Israel) and foreign government (Israel) intelligence service would play a role in facilitating and attending the meeting. When Mr. Rhode was asked if he knew before the meeting whether the foreign government (Israel) would be involved, he stated "I think so."37 Mr. Franklin told the Committee that Mr. Ledeen advised him on the first morning of the Rome meeting that "the _ [foreign government (Israel)] was involved and had helped out a great deal in setting up the place of the meeting and that they would be present at the meeting." 8 A February 2004 chronology prepared by staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated DoD awareness that the foreign government (Israel) arranged for the meeting site, but it is not stated when this became known.39 In a September 2007 interview, Mr. Rodman, advised the Committee that DoD officials knew the foreign government (Israel) was involved, but they did not know the full extent of that involvement, to include the intelligence service, in advance. 0 
• (U) Regarding Mr. Ghorbanifar’s attendance at the Rome meeting, Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that he had made it clear to Mr. Hadley that it was Mr. Ghorbanifar who had the ability to organize the Rome meeting. Mr. Ledeen did not indicate that he made Mr. Hadley aware that Mr. Ghorbanifar would attend the meeting.4l Correspondence to the Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs in 2004 stated “[n] one of the senior DoD officials involved in this matter — Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Feith, Mr. Rodman, and Mr. Luti — anticipated that the Iranian security officials would be joined by Ghorbanifar, nor, I am informed, did Mr. Had1ey."42 Mr. Rodman conhrmed to the Committee in September 2007 that he did not know in advance that Mr. Ghorbanifar was going to be at the meeting.43 A memorandum prepared by counsel representing Mr. Feith included the following statement: "Before the Rome meeting occurred, neither Hadley, Wolfowitz nor Feith knew that Ghorbanifar was involved."44 None of the three DoD-provided documents that were written during preparations for the Rome meeting contain a reference to Mr. Ghorbanifar. 35 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 9-10. 36 2003-4209, Cable, 11 February 2002. 37 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 15 and 20-21. 3 3 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 18. 39 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, page 2 and Tab 1, Februa.ry 2004 Chronology. 40 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007 Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 2. 41 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 6, and October 24, 2007, staff` interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 2. 42 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, page 2. 43 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1. 44 2007-1561, July 13, 2006, Memorandum from Patton Boggs LLP to the DoD IG, page 21. _ 8

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• _ (U) The only DoD official who indicated an awareness that Mr. Ghorbanifar would attend the Rome meeting was Mr. Rhode. Mr. Rhode informed the Committee in April 2004 that prior to departing for the trip he was aware that Mr. Ghorbanifar would be involved in the meeting. When Committee staff asked Mr. Rhode if he was certain that he was aware Mr. Ghorbanifar would be attending the Rome meeting before the meeting, Mr. Rhode said, "yes."45 Material provided to the Committee by the DoD in March 2008 indicates that Mr. Rhode does not now recall whether or not he knew in advance of Mr. Ghorbanifar’s involvement. The material also states that Mr. Rhode can no longer recall anything he told the Committee on this point in 2004.46 Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that he did not know that Mr. Ghorbanifar was involved until he was informed by Mr. Ledeen on the morning of the first day of the Rome meeting.47 

•  
• Authority to Conduct the Rome Meeting 
• (U) The U.S. Government officials involved in approving the Rome meeting had the authority to do so, even if it was considered an intelligence activity. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council (through the Committee on Foreign Intelligence) is given broad authority to identify intelligence needs, establish priorities to meet those intelligence needs, and establish policies relating to the conduct of intelligence activities of the United States, "including appropriate roles and missions for the elements of the intelligence community and appropriate targets of intelligence collection activities."48 These specified authorities are in addition to "performing such other functions as the President may direct."49 
• (U) Thus, Mr. Hadley, who received concurrence from National Security Advisor Rice, had the authority to request Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, who coordinated with Secretary Rumsfeld, to dispatch two DoD employees to Rome to meet with Iranians who may have been able to provide information related to the national security. 
• Coordination of the Rome Meeting 
• (U) While the DoD had the authority to conduct the meeting in Rome, there was limited advance coordination of the activity outside of the Department. Mr. Rodman informed the Committee that Mr. Hadley had advised the DoD to pursue the matter on a close-hold basis due to its unusual nature and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had reiterated that guidance. Mr. Rodman continued by saying that had the National Security Council or Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz not requested that it be close-hold the meeting would have been handled through normal channels. · But, since that request had been made, it was decided that the first meeting would not involve any element of the Intelligence Community.5O 45 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, StaH Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 4 and 9-10. 46 2008-1182, March 12, 2008 DoD Response to Questions for the Record, Question #4. 47 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, StaH Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 7-8 and 19-20. 48 National Security Act of 1947, NewsFollowUp.com § 101(h). 49id.,§101(b). 50 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman , pages 2 and 5. _ 9

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• (U) Hand written notes prepared by Mr. Rodman on November 7, 2001 indicated that in a discussion with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary conveyed that the Iranians’ mistrust of the CIA had prompted Mr. Hadley to refer the matter to the DoD.5 I The draft chronology prepared by the Department in February 2004 specifically stated that Mr. Ledeen , "who was facilitating the contact, stressed the Iranians’ mistrust of CIA officials."52 In his September 2007 interview, Mr. Rodman reiterated that Mr. Ledeen was adamant about not having any CIA involvement, citing the Iranian’s paranoia about the CIA.53 (U) The Committee received testimony from Mssrs. Ledeen , Franklin, and Rhode that calls into question the willingness of the Iranians who were met in Rome to deal with the CIA. When Mr. Ledeen was asked whether he had suggested that the Iranians would not meet with the CIA he replied that he did not think so. Mr. Ledeen stated that Iranians to be met in subsequent meetings had made it clear they would not meet with the CIA, but he reiterated that the two Iranians at the Rome meeting had expressed no qualms about dealing with the CIA. 54 Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that neither of the Iranians he met in Rome expressed concerns about who in the U.S. Government they were meeting with. When asked if there had been an indication beforehand that there were limitations on whom the Iranians would talk to, Mr Franklin responded "no."55 When asked whether it had been conveyed to him during the meeting that the Iranians did not want to deal with the CIA, Mr. Rhode also responded "no."56 (I) The perceived intention of the Iranians was also a factor in the decision about whether to coordinate the Rome meeting outside of the DoD. According to the April 2004 letter to the Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, when Mr. Hadley first approached Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Mr. Hadley indicated that the Iranians wished to defect. 7 This prompted Mr. Rodman to seek guidance from the DoD Office of General Counsel and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) about whether contact with potential defectors required coordination with the CIA. Mr. Rodman received a memo, dated November 15, 2001, from the DoD Deputy General Counsel (Intelligence) indicating that Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 4/ 158 required each Intelligence Community component to "report promptly _ the identity of any walk-in or other disaffected person who may be of interest together with all available and pertinent information."59 He further advised that the "DIA may initiate an intelligence collection operation with a foreign 51 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 2, November 7, 2001, Handwritten notes of Mr. Rodman. 52 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 53 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1. 54 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 7-8. 55 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 31-32. 56 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 26. 57 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Page 1. 58 A DCID was a directive issued by the Director of Central Intelligence providing guidance to the Intelligence Community on a specific topic of interest. With the creation of the Director of National Intelligence, DCIDs are being replaced by Intelligence Community Directives. 59 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from the DoD office of General Counsel. _ 10

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• _ military member subject to internal DoD regulations and DCID 5/1 coordination."6° Directive 5/1 stated that "the CIA is primarily responsible for the conduct and coordination of espionage to meet the national security intelligence needs of the U.S. Government. . ." The Directive allows that the DoD may conduct such activities in response to tasking from the DCI or "as required for the execution of the Secretary of Defense’s responsibilities."61 The DIA Director, Admiral Thomas Wilson, provided Mr. Rodman similar advice, noting that an individual could defect to a DoD employee, but further handling would be the legal responsibility of the CIA.62 (U) The General Counsel’s memo was written under the assumption that the Iranians wished to defect. Their true purpose, however, became known to Mr. Rodman about the same time the memo was written. Once it was detemined that the Iranians did not want to defect, but merely wanted to pass on information, DoD personnel did not advise CIA personnel of the pending meeting, and DIA officials were not included in further planning for the meeting. In a September 2003 written response to the Committee’s Vice Chairman, the CIA Director of Congressional Affairs stated on behalf of the DCI that "DoD officials did not coordinate their contacts with CIA, and CIA subsequently raised objections and questions about such contacts." The response further stated that the CIA was not in a position to conclude whether DCID 5/1 requirements were applicable to the Rome meeting, but noted that official trips to a country would routinely be cleared through the ambassador.63 Mr. Rhode advised the Committee that he was unaware of the content of DCIDs 4/1 and 5/1, while Mr. Franklin expressed some awareness, but assumed any required action had been taken by his chain of command.64 (I) Materials prepared by counsel on behalf of Under Secretary of Defense Feith expressed the view that "[a]lthough the U.S. ambassador to Italy and the CIA - - complained that they were not informed about the meeting, it was not the responsibility of the Defense Department to inform them." The material noted that the Deputy National Security Advisor had consulted with the Deputy Secretary of State and the DCI in advance. 65 This response fails to consider that the DCI and Deputy Secretary were not provided enough information to know who to inform of the pending activity. (U) In a September 2007 interview, Mr. Rodman summarized the issue of coordinating the Rome meeting by stating that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had wanted to keep this meeting "close-hold" until the DoD could determine if there was any value to the contact and how it should be pursued further. He added that if there had been an attempt to go through normal channels, the State Department and CIA would have never wanted to speak with the Iranians.66 A National Security Council legal advisor informed the Counterintelligence Field Activity in 2003 that Mr. Hadley had been surprised to learn there had been no coordination with the 60 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter Hom the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from the DoD oiiice of General Counsel. 61 DCID 5/1, , effective December 19, 1984, Section 3. 62 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of Events. 63 2003-41 16, September 23, 2003 letter from CIA, Director of Congressional Affairs. 64 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 18, and 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 10-11. 65 2007-1561, July 13, 2006, Memorandum Hom Patton Boggs LLP to the DoD IG, page 21. 66 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 5.

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• _ ambassador and CIA.67 DCI Tenet’s 2007 book notes that after the Rome meeting Mr. Hadley asked him if Mr. Wolfowitz had previously called him to explain the situation and DCI Tenet had responded "no."66 In March 2008, DCI Tenet informed the Committee that at no time prior to or after the Rome meeting did Mr. Wolfowitz contact him to discuss the Rome meeting.6 
• (U) The limited awareness of the Rome meeting within the CIA and the State Department, as well as the involvement of the foreign government (Israel) and Mr. Ghorbanifar, would have a significant impact on the ultimate outcome of this activity. 

Wayne Madsen Report

Mario Scaramella

Dec. 25-26, 2006 -- "The enigmatic Italian self-described environmental "security" expert and alleged weapons smuggler and colleague of various right-wing European operatives Mario Scaramella was arrested ....  As previously reported by WMR, Scaramella's links to various right-wing "intelligence" groups in Italy and abroad have also placed him in the middle of an attempt by former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and his Russian-Israeli Mafia friends to tarnish current Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi as a "KGB agent." Russian President Vladimir Putin was a collateral target of Russian-Israeli mobster Boris Berezovsky.  ....  The activities of Scaramella and his colleagues are now under a criminal investigation by the Rome prosecutor's office.  ...   With Scaramella now under arrest in Italy and all investigative roads -- the forged Niger documents, the kidnapping and rendition by U.S. and Italian agents of an Egyptian Imam in Milan, dirty tricks against Prodi, the Pentagon's pre-war connections to Rome-based Iranian Mossad asset Manucher Ghorbanifar, and the U.S. assassination of SISMI deputy chief Nicola Calipari in Baghdad -- now leading to Rome, Italy may hold the key to much more than Scaramella's dubious business dealings. That key may unlock the door of the identities of the actual perpetrators of the 9/11 and other terrorist attacks in London, Madrid, Beslan, Istanbul, and Casablanca." full article

• Country Clearance through the Ambassador 
• (U) Most U.S. Government employees are required to receive country clearance from the appropriate U.S. ambassador prior to foreign travel on official business. The U.S. ambassador and the CIA were under the impression that DoD employees traveling to Rome on official business would be required to clear their travel through the embassy. According to the State Department, no one from the office of the Secretary of Defense or the foreign government (Israel) notified the Rome embassy about the meeting.76 
• (U) Clearing DoD personnel travel through the ambassador is addressed in a series of DoD guidance. Mr. Rhode had a blanket travel order issued through the Office of Net Assessment that was valid through September 30, 2002. Such a travel order removes the administrative burden of obtaining a new travel order for each trip and is generally only provided to frequent travelers. Mr. Rhode’s blanket travel order specified that the "[c]learance requirements of DoD Directive 4500.54 must be observed." Mr. Franklin’s travel order was issued through the OUSD(P) and made no reference to country clearance regulations.71
• (U) The subject of DoD Directive 4500.54 is Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad. The text applicable to Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode stated that all travelers other than DoD civilian officials appointed by the President "must obtain a ‘theater clearance’ from the Unified Commander and/or ‘country clearance’ from the U.S. Embassy."72 The Directive notes that the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide outlines the procedures for obtaining these clearances. The Directive indicates, however, that in some cases "country or theater clearance may not be required," and again refers to the Foreign Clearance Guide. If the Foreign Clearance Guide is not clear on this requirement the reader is referred to the applicable embassy U.S. Defense Attaché Officer or Office of Defense Cooperation for additional information.76 (I) A review of the Foreign Clearance Guide in effect for Italy at the time of the Rome meeting would indicate that in the specific instance of Mssrs Franklin and Rhode, country clearance was not required because they were not of sufficient rank and did not visit the U.S. 67 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIFA Report, Bellinger Interview. 68 At the Center of the Storm, George Tenet, page 312. 69 March 10, 2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George Tenet, page 1. 76 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #1. 71 The term country clearance refers to the process of notifying a U.S. embassy or mission of the pending travel of a U.S. Government employee to that facility and requesting the appropriate approval for that visit. 72 DoDD 4500.54, Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, Paragraph 5.2 73 DoDD 4500.54, Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, Paragraph 5.4 

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• _ embassy or a consulate. A country clearance would have been required to visit an Italian government, military, or industry organization; however, prior to their departure the DoD officials involved were unaware of the involvement of so, it is not clear whether the Rome meeting took place in an actual . C) There is no evidence that the DoD officials involved in planning for or attending the Rome meeting researched the general requirement for country clearance. Despite the fact that his travel order said that the clearance requirements of DoD Directive 4500.54 must be observed, Mr. Rhode seemed to be unaware of these requirements and noted that he was given no guidance to contact the embassy.75 The 2003 Counterintelligence Field Activity report on DoD contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar stated that Mr. "Franklin assumed that all the necessary coordination had been done at a higher level and that there was no ‘coordination problem’ since the DEPSECDEF [Deputy Secretary of Defense] and the were involved in this matter."76 Mr. Franklin gave a similar explanation to the Committee in 2004, noting that he had been told it had been approved up the chain of command and therefore he did not think it was his responsibility to check in at the embassy.77 Mr. Rodman informed the Committee in 2007 that he was puzzled by all of the interest in whether a country clearance was obtained for the Rome meeting. He reiterated that the whole process was directed by Mr. Hadley to be "close-hold" and by the very definition of the term a lot of people would not be told about the trip. He pointed out again that Mr. Hadley had told both DCI Tenet and Deputy Secretary Armitage about the trip in advance.78 
•  
• Content of the Rome Meeting 
• (U) During the Rome meeting, Mr. Rhode took contemporaneous notes on a laptop computer, while Mr. Franklin took handwritten notes. These notes were provided to the Committee by the DoD. Based on a review of the notes, the specific issues discussed during the meeting included the following:79 . • Iranian "hit teams" targeting U.S. personnel and facilities in Afghanistan; • Iran’s long standing relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization; • Tunnel complexes in Iran for weapons storage or exfiltration of regime leaders; • Iran’s perception on Saddam Hussein’s grip on Iraq; • The growth of anti—regime sentiment in Iran; • Iranian regime attitudes toward the U.S.; and • Internal rivalries among Iran’s intelligence agencies. 74 December 10, 2001, DoD Foreign Clearance Guide, Europe, Italy, Section H A. 1. 75 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 17. 76 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin Interview. 77 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 10. 78 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 2. 79 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 7, Mr. Franklin’s notes on the Iranian interviews. Two versions, one undated and one dated January 21, 2001 (presumed to be a typo). _ 13

page 13

• _ (U) When the Rome meeting ended on December 13, 2001, Mr. Franklin returned to the Pentagon and began preparing a summary of the information provided by the Iranians. It appears there were multiple versions of the summary as a result of the editing process. Mr. Franklin’s summary was completed in early January 2002. Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that he considered the information provided by the two Iranians to be "good".80 The information on Iranian hit teams targeting U.S. interests in Afghanistan was particularly interesting to him because prior to the Rome meeting, Mr. Franklin had traveled to Afghanistan and been in contact with U.S. Special Operations Forces. When the issue was raised by the second Iranian at the Rome meeting, Mr. Franklin requested details on the hit team in a particular part of Afghanistan and the Iranian provided names and a photograph of a team member. 
• (U) While preparing his summary, Mr. Franklin attempted to corroborate the hit team information with some of his contacts at the DIA. He could not recall the content of his discussion with a former colleague in the Defense HUMINT Service beyond going over the general details of the meeting, but Mr. Franklin provided the Committee details of his discussion with a DIA analyst. Mr. Franklin understood that the analyst had been able to corroborate that one of the names associated with the hit team in Afghanistan was a current member of the Iranian intelligence structure.81 During a 2007 Committee interview the DIA analyst recalled that he found no information in the DIA database that specifically corroborated the name and ur1it data provided by Mr. Franklin. The analyst stated, however, that the information provided by Mr. Franklin had sounded plausible and credible because he had other information indicating that Iranian forces were involved in covert activities in Afghanistan.82 
• (U) Based on his exchange with the DIA analyst, Mr. Franklin contacted a Special Forces Commander in Afghanistan and relayed the hit team information via secure telephone. Mr. Franklin indicated that this exchange would have taken place not long after he returned from the Rome meeting while he was writing his summary report.83 That Commander subsequently invited Mr. Franklin to attend a briefing he was giving to Secretary Rumsfeld upon his return to the Pentagon. Mr. Franklin believed that he was invited because his information had proved valuable. He stated that the Commander had advised him that the information had allowed them to turn "the tables on these Iranians" and offered as an example the fact that they had been able to take pictures of the Iranians loading weapons into a van registered to a warlord. Based on his discussions with the Commander, Mr. Franklin concluded that some of the information provided by the Iranians had "saved American 1ives."84 The DIA analyst contacted by Mr. Franklin upon his return informed the Committee that it genuinely seemed to be Mr. Franklin’s perception that the information saved American lives, but added that he could not speculate on whether it was truly useful.85 Mr. Franklin’s notion that the Iranian information "saved American lives" would 80 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 27. Note also that on page l of the September 25, 2003 Counterintelligence Field Activity interview with Mr. Rhode, he indicated that the information was "very good." 81 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 27 and 38-41. 82 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with [DIA Analyst #1], pages 1-2. 83 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 24-25 and 32-33. 84 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin Interview. See also 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 24-25. 85 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with [DIA Analyst 1], page 2. _ 14

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• _ become widely used by DoD officials and Mr. Ledeen to describe the utility of attending the Rome meeting. 
• (U) After the memo was completed, Mr. Franklin went back to his regular duties with almost no role in the decision on whether to continue contact with the Iranians. He remained in contact with Mr. Ledeen , and for a number of weeks after the trip received phone calls and faxes from Mr. Ghorbanifar. Mr. Franklin advised the Committee that he returned the calls for a while to be polite on the chance that Mr. Ghorbanifar could facilitate future access, however the faxes offered no new information and he eventually discontinued the contact.86 Mr. Franklin retained the faxed material for a period of time, but it appears it was destroyed prior to the Counterintelligence Field Activity’s 2003 review.87 
• (U) Mr. Rhode advised the Committee that he passed his Rome meeting notes to Mr. Luti. He subsequently played no further role in the follow up to the Rome meeting.88 Mr. Ghorbanifar’s Plan 
• (U) While in Rome, Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode became involved in discussions that went beyond obtaining information from the Iranian sources. Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that during the trip to Rome Mr. Ghorbanifar pressed his own agenda for regime change in Iran.89 Mr. Franklin stated that late one night during a discussion in a bar Mr. Ghorbanifar laid out his plan on a napkin. The plan involved the simultaneous disruption of traffic at key intersections leading to Tehran that would create anxiety, work stoppages and other disruptive measures. Mr. Franklin recalled that Mr. Ghorbanifar asked for $5 million in seed money to facilitate this activity. He added that Mr. Ghorbanifar indicated that if the iirst action was successful additional money may be needed later on, but Mr. Franklin could not recall speciiic amounts being discussed beyond the $5 million.90 Mr. Rhode recalled Mr. Ghorbanifar discussing a plan to set up a network that could lead to the overthrow of the regime, but could not recall a speciiic dollar amount.91 Mr. Ledeen provided the Committee similar recollections, noting that Mr. Ghorbanifar offered a variety of different schemes for regime change in Iran dating to the time the two had iirst met. Mr. Ledeen added that he believed the U.S. Government should be supporting Iranians who want to overthrow the regime. He stated that he had passed the notion of the plan on to Mr. Hadley, Mr. Luti and Mr. Rodman upon returning from the ’ Rome meeting.92 (I) The proposed funding for, and foreign involvement in, Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan for regime change were never fully understood. When the DoD began receiving questions on this topic in early 2002, several summaries were produced. A synopsis of the discussions in Rome on Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan, prepared by Mr. Rodman in mid—February 2002 with input from Mr. 86 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 29, 37 and 48-49. 87 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin Interview. 88 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 33-34. 89 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 26. 90 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 26-27 and 63-65. 91 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 27. 92 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 21-22, and 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, October 24, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 2. _ 15
• _ Franklin, stated that Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Ghorbanifar advised Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode of "the ign government] support for this information collection opportunity and financing by [foreign] corporate enterprises midway through the interviews .... ." The summary goes on to indicate the costs would be in the millions and entailed "extrication /reentry of numerous sources, granting visas, and eventual resettlement outside of Iran. . ." A later version of this summary dated February 12, 2002 referenced contracts "that would assure oil and gas sales in the event of regime change."93 An action memo prepared by Mr. Rodman in July 2002 referred to "[m]ultimillion-dollar business deals that the h [foreign government (Israel)] arranged for the two Iranian interlocutors."94 Despite the changing descriptions of foreign involvement, there was no attempt by the DoD, or any other entity of the U.S. Governrnent, to determine the true intentions of the foreign government (Israel) with regard to interacting with the Iranians or Mr. Ghorbanifar. (U) The confusion within DoD channels over Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan and foreign involvement partially reflects that Messrs. Franklin and Rhode had focused on the assigned task of listening to the information provided by the Iranians. Officials from the DoD were consistent in stating that the DoD participants had been instructed prior to the meeting that their sole purpose in attending was to listen and bring back any useful information provided by the Iranians.95 Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode were also consistent in stating that they viewed the information gathering with the two Iranians and Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan to weaken the Iranian regime as two entirely separate issues. Mr. Franklin indicated that upon his return he made it clear to those in the OUSD(P) that there should be no follow up on Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan. He added that at no time during the follow-on contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar did he offer encouragement for the p1an.96 Ambassador and CIA Inquire About the Rome Meeting (U) Upon the return of Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode, and the completion of the Rome meeting summary, two series of events began to unfold. First, State Department and CIA officials attempted to determine what Mr. Ledeen and the DoD representatives had done in Rome, and second, DoD officials debated the next course of action. These deliberations eventually became intertwined, but the decision to limit coordination prior to the meeting, and concerns about Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan for regime change, essentially eliminated the potential for further contact with Iranian officials via Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Ghorbanifar. The two series of events are outlined below. 
• (U) The U.S. ambassador to Italy at the time of the Rome meeting was Melvin Sembler. Ambassador Sembler had been sworn in on November 16, 2001. On December 12, 2001, during 93 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tabs 21, February 12, 2002, Note on foreign government (Israel) Support, and 22, February 12, 2002, Rome Meeting: References to Financin . 94 2004- F675, April 16, 2004, letter nom the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 25, July 19, 2002, Action Memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld. 95 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 27 and 58, 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 13, and 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter Bom the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 96 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 37 and 48-49. _ 16

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• _ the course of the Rome meeting, Ambassador Sembler had breakfast with Mr. Ledeen . A February 2002 State Department cable indicated that Mr. Ledeen informed Ambassador Sembler that he was in Italy "under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense and that two DoD employees were with him. Their project was to make contact with high-level officials of the Iranian Intelligence Service."97 In Mr. Ledeen ’s 2004 testimony to the Committee he added that he had told the ambassador they were going to have conversations with Iranians who were promising to be helpful with terrorism, and that he had informed the ambassador as a courtesy and requested that he keep it to himself.98 In an August 2004 response to questions for the record, the State Department indicated that l\/Ir. Ledeen offered the ambassador no explanation for his wish to keep it confidential. The response further stated that Ambassador Sembler speculated that it derived from the involvement of the foreign government (Israel).99 The February 2002 State Department cable further indicated that l\/Ir. Ledeen told that ambassador that he would provide additional information after the Rome meeting. Later on December 12, 2001, Ambassador Sembler had dinner with the foreign government (Israel) official and his wife, and l\/Ir. Ledeen. The Rome meeting was not discussed over dinner.lOO 
• (U) According to the February 2002 State Department cable, following the events of December 12, 2001, Ambassador Sembler asked a senior official at the embassy whether U.S. officials were required to seek country clearance to travel to Rome on official business. The ambassador also expressed awareness that 1\/Ir. Ledeen was not a U.S. Government employee and a lack of comfort with his activities. The senior official at the embassy denied any knowledge of Mr. Ledeen’s activities and confirmed the need for country clearance. The senior official at the embassy agreed to check with the embassy’s Defense Attaché for any further information.1O1 The Defense Attaché was unable to find anyone requesting such a clearance who matched the information provided by the senior official at the Embassy.]O2 
• (U) According to the February 2002 State Department cable, on December 23, 2001, Ambassador Sembler had dinner with Mr. Ledeen and his family at the ambassador’s residence. The cable stated that in a private conversation with the ambassador Mr. Ledeen indicated that he had made contact with the Iranian officials and there was a "sizeable financial involvement to secure their cooperation." During the conversation Mr. Ledeen also expressed his belief that it was a deal the U.S. should take.1 3 The ambassador did not focus on the matter again until a call from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, on February 1, 2002, which the ambassador and his deputy were under the impression was prompted by the Under Secretary becoming aware of a summary of the Rome meeting prepared by 1\/Ir. Ledeen for Mr. Hadley.1°4‘ During that call the ambassador was provided what were believed to be the names of the DoD participants in the Rome meeting. Unbeknownst to the ambassador, one of the names was wrong, but after the call he contacted his deputy and the senior official at the embassy to 97 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). gg 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen , pages 11-12. 99 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #4. 100 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). ml 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). ‘°2 2003-4209, came, February 1, 2002. 103 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). 104 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #3. _ 17

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• _ discuss the matter. Neither of them recognized the correct name of Mr. Rhode}05 The ambassador would memorialize his recollections of his prior discussions with Mr. Ledeen in a February 8, 2002 cable to Under Secretary Grossman, and defer further action on the matter to hjmlros (_) As noted above, in early December 200l Mr. Hadley had mentioned to DCI Tenet that the DoD might meet with Iranians in Europe to discuss terrorist threat information. The DCI had no details, however, on the location of the meeting or its participants.l°7 For that reason, during a January 14, 2002, meeting in the DCI’s office that 01010000 S0¤i0r CLA officials, the CIA participants were surprised when the foreign government (Israel) intelligence service asked if they were aware of DoD officials "coming to Italy to talk about Iran."1°8 The conversation was cut short and was not pursued at that time. When approached by the ambassador after his February 1, 2002, call from Under Secretary Grossman, however, - _ question durin the meeting at CIA headquarters with the activities of Mr. Ledeen . the ambassador had indicated that the DoD participants "were talking about 25 million [U.S. dollars] for some k.ind of Iran program." - noted that the ambassador speculated that "perhaps it was for some sort of opposition sup ort."1°9 . he DCI was in contact with Mr. Hadley about the matter. The DDO also expressed a number of concerns:110 First, I was not advised, the DCI was not advised, and you were not advised of DoD’s apparent use of- [foreign government (Israel)] to facilitate some sort of dialogue with the Iranian government. We were not asked to trace the names of the Iranians. We were not asked to comment on the substance of the alleged Iranian offer. 0n F¢bf¤¤1"y 7. 2002. indicated that the ambassador had clarified that it was the Iranians who had told the DoD officials that for $25 million they could provide “certain unspecified information and services."m He noted that the ambassador planned to inform Under Secretary Grossman that "given the discussion of money for services, this effort may be crossing into the area of covert action, for which he is not aware of any residential authorization."u2 - “" ibid 106 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). 107 At the Center of the Storm, George Tenet, page 312, and March l0, 2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George Tenet, page l. ‘°" 2003-4209, cebre, February 1, 2002. ‘°’ ibid “° 2003-4209, cebre, February s, 2002. ‘“ 2003-4209, cebre, February 7, 2002. *12 ibid _ 18

page 18

• _ Defense Department Decision on VVhether to Continue Contact 
• (U) Mr. Franklin’s summary of the Rome meeting had been passed up his chain of command via Mr. Luti to Mr. Rodman. On January 7, 2002, Mr. Rodman drafted a letter for Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to send to DIA Director Wilson with a copy to Mr. Hadley. The draft letter reminded the Director of their previous interaction on the matter, advised that the meeting had taken place once it became known the Iranians merely intended to provide information and not defect, and requested that the Director review the attached summary to determine whether the DoD should pursue the matter further through DIA channels. This letter was never sent.115 Instead, a meeting was arranged between Mr. Rodman and Director Wilson for February 2, 2002. In a January 31, 2002, handwritten memo to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Mr. Rodman advised that the meeting was set, that a new version of the summary had been prepared, and reminded the Deputy Secretary that he had previously instructed him not to hand the summary over.116 Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz responded with a note indicating that the DoD needed to insulate the activity "from the appearance of being a policy channel, but it might be possible to include Rhode or Franklin as part of a DIA team." Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s response also reiterated the requirement that Director Wilson be allowed read the summary, but not ma.ke a copy, and observed that this would underscore that the Director was not to discuss the matter with anyone else until further authorized. The response also instructed Mr. Rodman to ask Director Wilson his opinion on the intelligence value of proceeding with further contact and how he would handle it if given the assignment.] 17
• (U) Mr. Rodman met with Director Wilson on February 2, 2002, and later that day prepared a memorandum to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz summarizing the meeting. The memo noted that Director Wilson had been shown a copy of the summary, but it had not been left with him, and stated that the Director had found the information to be "mildly interesting." H8 Mr. H3 2003-4209, came, February 11, 2002. U4 2003-4209, came, March 21, 2002. 115 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 11, January 7, 2002, Memo from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Iranian Debrief 116 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 14, January 31, 2002, Handwritten note from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Iranian Matter. 117 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 15, February 1, 2002, Handwritten notes from Mr. Wolfowitz to Mr. Rodman on DIA Director Meeting. Us 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 17, February 2, 2002, Memo Hom Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Meeting with the DIA Director. NOTE: Admiral Wilson was DIA Director Hom July 1999 to July 2002. Committee staff interviewed Admiral Wilson via telephone on June 10, 2004. Admiral Wilson could not recall many of the events relating to the Rome meeting beyond advising Mr. Rodman that DIA could handle any further contacts with the Iranians and that they should be coordinated with the CIA. He could not recall reading the Rome meeting summary or referring to the information as _ 19

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• _ Rodman’s memo also indicated that Director Wilson had offered several different ways to pursue the matter ranging from continued debriefings to full recruitment. Director Wilson had noted that the DIA was capable of handling any of the options, but a clandestine recruitment would require coordination with the CIA, although DIA could perhaps do a one-time interview without informing the CIA in advance. Director Wilson wrote down the names of the Iranians and offered to conduct name traces, but was told to hold off until it was authorized at higher levels. Mr. Rodman reminded him to discuss the matter with no one else without author·ization.u9
• (U) On February 5, 2002, Mr. Rodman prepared handwritten notes for a memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld outlining the potential options for moving forward with the Iranians. The options offered were to drop the matter, continue in non- intelligence channels, or to do it through the DIA without telling the CIA who the sources were.l2° An undated draft memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld that expanded on the material in the handwritten notes offered the same choices, but included the option to seek Presidential authority to override the DCID requirement for CIA coordination. The overall recommendation in the draft memo was to "put it into regular intelligence channels," but the memo noted the conflict between the alleged reluctance of the Iranians to deal with the CIA and the requirement to coordinate future contact with that agency. 121
• (U) Handwritten notes from Mr. Rodman, dated February 9, 2002, indicate his awareness that the Rome meeting issue had become known to the CIA, Under Secretary Grossman, and the U.S. embassy in Rome. The notes indicate that because of Mr. Ghorbanifar the "whole world is involved," and contain the reference "$25 m[illion] ??" with no further explanation.122 The notes also state that Mr. Ledeen played a role in raising that awareness and that Mr. Rodman contacted him at his home that day.l 3 According to a draft chronology prepared for the Secretary of Defense by Mr. Rodman in August 2003, on February 9, 2002, the State Department and CIA indicated their opposition to further contact and as a result the DoD dropped the matter.124 (U) When the DoD decided to drop the matter in early February 2002, the information provided by the two Iranian sources had not been fully evaluated or vetted with other known information by the Intelligence Community, beyond Mr. Franklin passing a portion of the information collected to Special Forces in Afghanistan. Mr. Franklin told the Committee that mildly interesting. When interviewed in 2003 by the Counterintelligence Field Activity Admiral Wilson provided a similar response. 119 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 17, February 2, 2002, Memo from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Meeting with the DIA Director. 120 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 18, February 5, 2002, Handwritten Note from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz. 121 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 19, Draft Memo from Mr. Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld on Iranian Sources. 122 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tabs 21, rcbmapy 12, 2002, Nm.-; pp _ Support, and 22, Febmapy 12, 2002, Rome Muang; References to Financing, and 2004-4231 indicate that on February 12, 2002 Mr. Rodman researched the financial proposals discussed at the Rome meeting. To the best of Mr. Rodman’s recollection, Mr. Franklin assisted in drafting a memo on the subject dated February 12, 2002. 123 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 20, February 9, 2002, Handwritten Notes from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz. 124 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of Events. _ 20

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• _ Mr. Rodman informed him that he had handed the Rome meeting summary to DIA Director Wilson and that "since it was given to the Director I knew that he would pass it down to desk analysts." However, he also stated that he was unaware of: any intelligence reports that were generated from the information; it being passed to another element of the Intelligence Community; or any actions that Director Wilson may have taken with his summary. He added that no one ever called him and asked for input.125 The Defense HUMINT Service representative that Mr. Franklin contacted after his return from the meeting told the Committee that beyond the verbal briefing from Mr. Franklin he never saw any intelligence reports or requests for further follow-up.126 The DIA analyst contacted by Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that to his knowledge there was no subsequent entry of the information provided by Mr. Franklin into DIA databases and it was not used in any DIA analytic products.12 As noted above, Director Wilson had not been allowed to retain a copy of the summary.
• (U) In April 2002, the Defense HUMINT Service received an "executive referral" from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to meet with Mr. Ledeen . A Defense HUMINT Service contact memorandum describing the meeting indicated that the tasking resulted from a briefing on the Rome meeting from Mr. Ledeen to representatives in Mr. Rodman’s office. The Defense HUMINT Service document outlined the Rome meeting as recalled by Mr. Ledeen , and noted that Mr. Ledeen repeatedly declined to provide details that the interviewer deemed necessary to assess the validity of Mr. Ledeen ’s contacts such as specific names, locations, and contact information. The document indicated Mr. Ledeen promised more details once the DoD expressed real interest in pursuing further contact.1 8 (-) Information provided by the DoD in March 2008 indicates that after the interview of Mr. Ledeen , the Defense HUMINT Service held discussions with several <>¤mr¤¤¤¢¤tS Of the CTA, During the meeting, the Defense HUMINT Service learned that Mr. "Ledeen had a history of approaching his USG [U.S. Government] contacts with various ‘schemes’ to gain USG interest and/or support for various issues normally related to Hizbollah, Iran, and or Terrorism." The Service also became aware that some of Mr. Ledeen ’s contacts were considered "nefarious and unreliable." The Defense HUMINT Service determined that no further contact with Mr. Ledeen was warranted or advisable.129 The Ongoing Actions of Mr. Ledeen 
• (U) After the Rome meeting, Mr. Ledeen continued to press for continued contact with the Iranians through his variety of contacts inside the U.S. Government. In mid-January 2002, 125 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 35-36 and 39. 126 2004-2735, Transcript of June 8, 2004, Staff Interview of [DIA Employee #1], pages 4-6. As noted later in this report, in April 2002, the Defense HU`M]NT Service received an "executive referral" from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to meet with Mr. Ledeen . A Defense HUMINT Service contact memorandum outlined the Rome meeting as recalled by Mr. Ledeen , but noted that Mr. Ledeen repeatedly declined to provide details such as specific names, locations, and contact information. 127 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with [DIA Analyst #1], page 2. 128 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #4, Undated DIA Contact Memorandum on Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Referral, pages 1-2. 129 2008-1182, March 12, 2008 DoD Response to Questions for the Record, Question #14. _ 21

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• _ Mr. Ledeen held discussions with Mr. Rodman on how best to continue the exchange, and had scheduled a meeting with Mr. Hadley for January 16, 2002, to discuss the matter.13 Mr. Franklin advised the Committee that he became aware of Mr. Ledeen ’s efforts to push for other elements of the U.S. Government to hear Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan. He recalled being approached by an official from the Office of the Vice President in early 2002 requesting his opinion of Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan and his judgments of its prospects for success. Mr. Franklin stated that he recommended that it not be pursued. 131
• (U) According to a draft chronology prepared for the Secretary of Defense by Mr. Rodman in August 2003, a memorandum that Mr. Ledeen had been circulating was sent from former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich to Secretary Rumsfeld in June 2002. The memorandum expressed concern about the failure to continue contact with Iranian officials who had provided valuable information in the past.132 The DoD provided the Committee with a copy of the memorandum with an explanatory note stating that while a stamp on the memorandum indicated the Secretary saw it on June 27, 2002, it merely reflected that the memorandum had "passed through" the Secretary’s office. The use of that stamp had since been discontinued.133
• (U) According to a July 18, 2002 cable from Ambassador Sembler to Under Secretary Grossman, on July 4, 2002, Mr. Ledeen contacted Ambassador Sembler and at the end of a social conversation informed him that he would be returning to Rome in early August to "resume that program." The ambassador advised the Under Secretary that he presumed this to be a reference to the December meeting with Iranian officials and noted that these activities had undermined the credibility of the U.S. Government. The ambassador also indicated that Mr. Ledeen had only provided him with a small amount of information on the subject and went on to state that "I am increasingly concerned that his activity borders on, or has already entered, an area which would require explicit Presidential authorization and notification of the Chief of Mission."134 There was no response to the cable. The DDO added that CIA leadership had been informed and he had asked that the National Security Council be queried immediately. 136 According to handwritten notes prepared by Mr. Rodman and dated July 13, 2002, a special assistant to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, DoD Employee #2, had advised him that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had spoken with DCI Tenet and determined that the DCI now supported further contacts with the Iranians. In addition, Assistant 130 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 12, January 16, 2002, Note from [DoD Employee #1] to Mr. Rodman. m 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 43-44. 132 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of Events, page 2. 133 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 23, May 10, 2002 fax to Secretary Rumsfeld, and attached explanatory note. 134 2003-4617, Rome 03565, 18 July 2002 (State Department Cable). ‘” 2003-4209, came, July 15, 2002. 126 2003-4209, came, July 16, 2002. _ 22

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• _ Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, Charles Allen, had been selected to coordinate on the matter.137
• (U) On July 19, 2002, Mr. Rodman prepared an action memo for Secretary Rumsfeld in response to the Secretary’s request about what the DoD should do with respect to contacts with Iran, as described in the memo forwarded to him by former Speaker Gingrich. The action memo described the origins of the Rome meeting, and outlined complications due to the involvement of Mr. Ghorbanifar and the previous objections of DCI Tenet and Secretary of State, Colin Powell. The memo concluded with the recommendation that the "DoD be prepared to continue the contact, through regular DHS [Defense HUMINT Service] channels and with CIA coordination." The memo was reviewed by Under Secretary Feith, on July 25, 2002.13 8 <j> in 0 July 25, 2002, according to the ambassador, Under Secretary Grossman had raised the issue with Secretary Powell, who had proceeded to pursue it with Secretary Rumsfeld and the National Security Council. h at each step, Secretary Powell was advised that Mr. Ledeen ’s desire to continue the program at the planned August meeting was not authorized.139 An August 8, 2002 the CIA had been told by a National Security Council legal advisor that Mr. Hadley had personally chastised Mr. Ledeen for continuing to pursue the matter even though he had been told to desist in December 2001, and advised Mr. Ledeen in strong terms to "cease his activity on the issue." At that point, the DDO - concluded the matter was behind them.140 No such meeting organized by Mr. Ledeen occurred in the August 2002 timeframe.
• (U) Ambassador Sembler traveled to Washington, D.C. for a series of meetings on September 4, 2002. During this visit the ambassador met with National Security Advisor Rice and Mr. Hadley and was advised that Mr. Ledeen ’s activities would not continue. He received a similar response from Deputy Secretary Armitage in a separate meeting.141
•  
• Other Related Activities
• (U) The only other event related to the Rome meeting that occurred in 2002 involved a chance meeting between Mr. Rhode and one of the Iranians he and Mr. Franklin had met in Rome. According to a September 2003 interview of Mr. Rhode by the Counterintelligence Field Activity, in December 2002 Mr. Rhode attended a U.S. Government endorsed Iraqi opposition conference in London, England. According to Mr. Rhode a number of DoD and State Department personnel attended the conference. At the conference he unexpectedly encountered one of the Iranians he had met at the Rome meeting. The Iranian asked Mr. Rhode about U.S. views on regime change in Iran and Mr. Rhode indicated that those types of decisions were made 137 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative AEairs, Tab 24, July 13, 2002, Handwritten Notes of Mr. Rodman on a Discussion with [DoD Employee #2] , and 2007-1561 DoD IG source document #1, Draft 8/11/03 chronology, page 2. 138 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 25, July 19, 2002, Action Memo Hom Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld. 139 2003-4209, Cable, July 25, 2002. "° 2003-4209, cubic, August 8, 2002. 141 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #5. _ 23

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continued