• Then, importantly, the report acknowledges that the "Committee is fully aware that officials may have had multiple credible sources of information upon to which to base statements, but has not attempted to document or analyze source materials other than intelligence, so that is beyond the scope of this report.” The report focuses on major coordinated inter-agency intelligence reports and assessments. The Committee deemed that these reports were the most "authoritative” and represented the "full Intelligence Community position.” The Committee elected to not include "less formal communications between intelligence agencies and other parts of the Executive Branch” or reports "from the field.” Although we have repeatedly advocated for releasing as much information to the public as possible, we agreed that in this context, basing the report on major coordinated interagency intelligence reports and assessments, which represent the collective informed views of the Intelligence Community, was appropriate. Although we would have likely supported amendments expanding the scope if afforded the opportunity to vote, the scope and methodology was consistent with the unanimously agreed to charter, and, therefore, we supported it. In the event that assessments were referenced in the report and not included or cited, we would have clearly supported their inclusion. However, these assessments arguably would not have had a profound impact on the report or significantly affected the overall conclusions; they would have only provided context. The report accomplished its primary objective, unanimously agreed to by the committee: to evaluate "whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information.” CHUCK HAGEL OLYMPIA J. SNowE 

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• _ MINORITY Vmws or Vrcn CnA1mv1AN BOND AND SENATORS CHAMBLISS, Hxrcn, AND BURR* This majority-only written report by the Senate Intelligence Committee is a great disappointment to us and an unfortunate commentary on the political nature of intelligence oversight in the Congress today. We regret that at a time when the Committee should be focusing its full attention on improving our intelligence community, closing the gaps in critical intelligence, and making our country safer, that the Committee Ends itself again consumed with political gamesmanship. Although we asked from the beginning of this investigation to be included in it, we were cut out; although we asked that the Members of the Committee produce the conclusions on this report, two majority staff were assigned to the task; and although we had over 50 amendments on the table at our Committee meeting on this report, we were not allowed to offer any of them. We have rarely seen such a poorly handled congressional investigation, and we believe the facts detailed below speak for themselves. Early History In late 2003 the Democrats first proposed that the Committee expand its inquiry of intelligence on Iraq into how administration policymakers "used" intelligence, frankly, we were not sure what they meant. At the time, it was already becoming clear to the Committee that the intelligence community’s performance in its estimate of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities had been a serious failure. Having heard many of the statements those policymakers had made, it seemed obvious to us that they "used" the intelligence on Iraq the same way policymakers in Congress at the time and policymakers in previous administrations had: they read it, made decisions based on what they read (as well as other available information), and they spoke to the American public about their policies and decisions. Once the Committee’s inquiry began to reveal that analysts were not "pressured" by the administration to assess that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and that, in fact, the intelligence itself was wrong, it appeared that the Democrats wanted to add a more subjective element into the investigation—how policymakers "used" intelligence. The reason for this initiative became clear in November 2003 when the press exposed a memo which outlined the "plan" by Committee Democrats to explore "vague notions of use" in order to make the greatest political gain from the Committee’s Iraq investigation. They intended to "pull the majority along as far as we can on issues that may lead to new disclosures regarding improper or questionable conduct by administration officials." The memo said that "we don’t know what we will End but our prospects for getting access we seek is far greater when we have the backing of the majority." The memo also noted that "we can verbally mention some of the intriguing leads we are pursuing"——presumably to the press and in violation of the Committee rules. . In spite of this disturbing revelation that the Democrats were seeking to politicize deliberately the national security oversight function of the Congress, in an effort toward bipartisan compromise, in February 2004 the Committee agreed to examine "whether public * I concur with the Vice Chairman’s views on the substance of the report as well as the Minority’s amendments. I am unable to comment on any Phase I or Phase H activities that preceded my membership on this Committee. 000

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• _ statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information” as part of a second phase of the Iraq inquiry. Given what we had already learned, we warned that this could quickly devolve into an unfortunate use of the Committee’s time and resources, but we were willing to agree to the compromise nonetheless, confident that any fair inquiry would show clearly that the statements of administration officials were substantiated by the intelligence available to them at the time, intelligence that, as described in the Committee’s unanimous Phase I report, was flawed. Unfortunately, the report released today confirmed our early suspicions. The Phase II effort has indeed resulted in a partisan exercise and requests made by the Democrats of the then- Republican Committee leadership from 2004 to 2006 for the inquiry itself and for unnecessary interviews and documents were clearly intended as roadblocks to prevent the inquiry’s completion and to allow bogus charges of "obstruction” intended to help the Democrats’ political goals. Ironically, but not surprisingly, even when the Democrats gained control of the Committee and were in a position to take their best shot at fashioning a purely partisan inquiry— specifically by instructing only two majority staffers to conduct the review, cutting out the minority entirely, twisting the statements of the policymakers they reviewed, and cherry picking the intelligence that helped best make their case—the reports essentially validate what we have been saying all along: that policymakers’ statements were substantiated by the intelligence. As the Committee’s Phase I report showed, it was the intelligence that was faulty. In the cases in which the majority concluded that statements were not substantiated by intelligence or did not convey fully the intelligence community’s analysis, it is clear that either the words of the policymakers in question or the body of intelligence available at the time were distorted in order to make these false charges. We have addressed each of those cases in the attached amendments in Appendix A (see amendments 42, 68, 85, 86, 96, 119, 120, and 136) With the partisan elements of this inquiry now fully exposed, we hope that others will see why we are so disappointed that Committee time and resources have been wasted at this critical juncture in our nation’s history. We have not had an Intelligence Authorization Bill become law in this Congress or the last Congress, we have not had a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) reform bill become law in this Congress—two badly needed bil1s—both to improve the functioning of the intelligence community and protect the nation. Yet, we have been forced to waste countless man-hours to show what we and the American people already knew four years ago, that policymakers’ statements turned out to be wrong after the war because the statements were based on flawed intelligence. The Committee’s Phase I report, which investigated that intelligence failure and explained how it happened, was a judicious and valuable act of intelligence oversight. Distorting intelligence and misleading the public, as the current majority report does, is not. We are also disappointed that in a zealous, but ultimately failed, attempt to expose alleged "distortions" by the administration, the majority chose to cover up and distort information themselves. Specifically, the majority report excludes from consideration all of the statements made by Members of Congress and the previous administration that were submitted wl

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• _ for review by the Republican Members. It also excludes relevant intelligence information requested for inclusion by Republican Members including instances ir1 which the Committee knew that specific policymakers’ statements were fact-checked and approved by intelligence community agencies. It treats policymakers unfairly by distorting their words and refusing those individuals the opportunity to respond to what has been alleged about their statements. Because these issues are our most serious concerns about this flawed majority report, we address each in more detail below. Cover-u for Democrats Following the Committee’s agreement on February l2, 2004, to examine "whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information" the Chairman and Vice Chairman each provided a list of statements their respective Members wanted examined by the Committee staff. In the reports released today, only those statements submitted by the Democrats were reviewed. The Republican Members of the Committee submitted approximately 100 statements for review. These were statements made by officials in the previous administration and Members of Congress. Many of our Members believed it was relevant and important to include those statements, particularly from Democrats in Congress, to show that during the debate leading up to and during the authorization of the war in Iraq and during previous efforts to use force in Iraq, Members of both parties with access to intelligence information, not just the Republican administration, made very similar statements about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities and links to terrorism. In our opinion, the statements from most policymakers, whether or not they supported the decision to go to war in Iraq, were similar because everyone saw virtually the same intelligence and used that same intelligence in speeches to explain their own decision—making. Nuclear In the nuclear area, for example, the majority report’s first conclusion notes that policymakers’ statements about Iraq’s nuclear activities were substantiated by intelligence, but the majority concludes that some statements did not convey disagreements that existed within the intelligence community. Many Democrats in Congress also discussed Iraq’s nuclear efforts during the Iraq war debate and in other venues and similarly did not describe disagreements within the intelligence community. For example, all of the following statements discussed Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, but none of them noted that there was a dissent from one of the agencies within the intelligence community. Conversely, the report is critical of administration officials who did not discuss this dissent even though the dissent had not even been published by that agency at the point the statements by the administration officials were made. The majority apparently believes some policymakers should be mind-readers. All of the following statements made by Democrats in Congress were made after the publication of the Iraq WMD NIE in which the nuclear alternative judgment was published, yet none of them was allowed to be included in the report. 102

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• • In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qa’ida members. — Senator Hillary Clinton, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next 5 years. He could have it earlier if he is able to obtain fissile materials on the outside market, which is possible—difiicult but possible. We also should remember we have always underestimated the progress that Saddam Hussein has been able to make in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • Saddam Hussein is an evil man, a dictator who oppresses his people and flouts the mandate of the international community. While this behavior is reprehensible, it is Hussein’s vigorous pursuit of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and his present and potential future support for terrorist acts and organizations, that ma.ke him a terrible danger to the people to the United States. Senator Charles Schumer, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002 • There is no question that Iraq possesses biological and chemical weapons and that he seeks to acquire additional weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. That is not in debate. Senator Christopher Dodd, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002. • We know that he has chemical and biological weapons. He has already used them against his neighbors and his own people, and is trying to build more. We know that he is doing everything he can to build nuclear weapons, and we know that each day he gets closer to achieving that goal. Senator John Edwards, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • Almost no one disagrees with these basic facts: that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a menace; that he has weapons of mass destruction and that he is doing everything in his power to get nuclear weapons; that he has supported terrorists; that he is a grave threat to the region, to vital allies like Israel, and to the United States; and that he is thwarting the will of the international community and undermir1ing the United Nations’ credibility. Senator J olm Edwards, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002 The following statement from Senator John Keny went a step further, claiming that "all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons." In fact, not "all" intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq was seeking nuclear weapons; as noted in the majority report, one agency considered the evidence inadequate to reach such a judgment. 103

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• • According to the CIA’s report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There is little question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear weapons. The more difficult question to answer is when Iraq could actually achieve this goal. That depends on is its ability to acquire weapons- grade fissile material. If Iraq could acquire this material from abroad, the CIA estimates that it could have a nuclear weapon within 1 year. Senator John Kerry, October 9, 2002. This comment from Senator Durbin, made nearly a year earlier, actually indicated that I Saddam Hussein had “perhaps even nuclear weapons" at his disposal. At no time did the intelligence community assess that Iraq perhaps had nuclear weapons. • When you look at what Saddam Hussein has at his disposal, in terms of chemical, biological, and perhaps even nuclear weapons, we cannot ignore the threat that he poses to the region and the fact that he has fomented terrorism throughout his reign. Senator Dick Durbin, December 21, 2001, Larry King Live. Why were none of these statements considered worthy of analysis by the majority's review staff, particularly those made by Senators Durbin, Edwards, and Rockefeller, who were all members of the Senate Intelligence Committee at that time, and by Senator Clinton, who has publicly acknowledged being briefed on the NIE? UA Vs Regarding Iraq’s UAV capability, the report notes that some administration statements did not convey disagreements or evolving views within the intelligence community about whether Iraq intended to use UAVs for chemical or biological weapons delivery. The report, however, failed to analyze statements made by Democrats like: • Saddam’s existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose real threats to America today, tomorrow. Saddam has used chemical weapons before, both against Iraq’s enemies and against his own people. He is working to develop delivery systems like missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles that could bring these deadly weapons against U.S. forces and U.S. facilities in the Middle East. He could make these weapons available to many terrorist groups, third parties, which have contact with his government. Those groups, in turn, could bring those weapons into the United States and unleash a devastating attack against our citizens. I fear that greatly. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • In addition, Iraq is developing umnanned aerial vehicles UAVs, capable of delivering chemical and biological warfare agents, which could threaten Iraq’s neighbors as well as American forces in the Persian Gulf Senator John Kerry, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002. 104

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•  “Intent " In a section titled "Intent" the majority report includes statements from several administration officials which discussed their concerns about what Saddam Hussein could do with his weapons of mass destruction considering his disdain for the United States and his long association with terrorist groups. We believe that these statements were not about Iraq’s "intent" at all, as the majority report says, but were explaining that with a lack of information about Iraq’s intent, these policymakers were concerned about Iraq’s capabilities. We note that many Democrats also expressed the same concerns about the threat Iraq posed or might have posed to the United States due to his weapons of mass destruction capabilities, connections to terrorists, or both in speeches that were not analyzed in the majority report: • I have come to the inescapable conclusion that the threat posed to America by Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction is so serious that despite the risks and we should not minimize the risks we must authorize the President to take the necessary steps to deal with that threat. There has been some debate over how "imminent" a threat Iraq poses. I do believe Iraq poses an imminent threat. I also believe after September ll, that question is increasingly outdated. It is in the nature of these weapons that he has and the way they are targeted against civilian populations, that documented capability and demonstrated intent may be the only warning we get. To insist on further evidence could put some of our fellow Americans at risk. Can we afford to take that chance? I do not think we can. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • Is [Saddam Hussein] a greater threat than he was in l99l‘? He surely is. There’s different ways of launching scuds and all kinds that go faster, farther. There is no question on that. .. And if [our allies] are not there for us, does that mean in this debate, precedent-based, historically-based, that we sort of sit and take it, or are we going to end up basically being unilateral anyway because we cannot have our children smallpoxed. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, September 25, 2002. ` • When I vote to give the President of the United States the authority to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat to our security and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf region. Senator John Kerry, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002. • I believe that Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime represents a clear threat to the United States, to our allies, to our interests around the world, and to the values of freedom and democracy we hold dear .... Thousands of terrorist operatives around the world would pay anything to get their hands on Saddam’s arsenal, and there is every possibility that he could tum his weapons over to these terrorists...we can hardly ignore the terrorist threat, and the serious danger that Saddam would allow his arsenal to be used in aid of terror. Senator John Edwards, Congressional Record, September 12, 2002. 105

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•  • When I consider that Hussein could either use or give to terrorists weapons of mass destruction biological, chemical or nuclear and that he might just be mad enough to do it I End, aiter careful research, the answer to my question: we cannot afford to leave him alone over the next 5 or even 3 years. Senator Charles Schumer, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002 • If you allow someone like Saddam Hussein to get nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons, how many people is he going to kill with such weapons? He’s already demonstrated a willingness to use the weapons. He poison-gassed his own people. He used poison gas and other weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors. This man has no compunction about killing lots and lots of people. So this is a way to save lives and to save the stability and peace of a region of the world that is important to the peace and security of the entire world. Vice President A1 Gore, Address to the Nation, December 16, 1998. • Our strategic objective is to contain Saddam Hussein and curtail his ability to produce the most deadly weapons known to mankind-weapons that he has unleashed with chilling alacrity against his own people. Leit unchecked, Saddam Hussein would in short order be in a position to threaten and blackmail our regional allies, our troops, and, indeed, our nation. Senator Joe Biden, Congressional Record, February 12, 1998. • Saddam Hussein, with one nuclear weapon, would be far more dangerous than the Soviet Union with 20,000. The difference is, they would not use [their weapons]. They were not suicidal. He would. Senator Carl Levin, Congressional Record, October 9, 1998 • With the peace of the region and, and in fact, much of the world at risk, we cannot allow Iraq to continue its maneuvers designed to protect such a dangerous buildup of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, December 16, 1998. • It is not possible to overstate the ominous implications for the Middle East if Saddam were to develop and successfully militarize and deploy potent biological weapons. We can all imagine the consequences. Extremely small quantities of several known biological weapons have the capability to exterminate the entire population of cities the size of Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. These could be delivered by ballistic missile, but they also could be delivered by much more pedestrian means; aerosol applicators on commercial trucks easily could suffice. If Saddam were to develop and then deploy usable atomic weapons, the same holds true. Senator John Kerry, Congressional Record, November 9, 1997 This is only a sampling of the approximately 100 statements submitted by Republican Members of this Committee for review and which we repeatedly requested be included in the 106

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• _ report as agreed previously by the Committee Members. This request was ignored by the majority during two iterations of comments on the report drafts and a motion to include such statements, offered by the Vice-Chairman at the Committee’s business meeting, was denied a hearing by the Chairman. Che —Pickin Intelli ence We have several concerns about the intelligence information the majority chose to include, and chose to ignore, in its report. j First, the majority chose to include only "finnished disseminated intelligence" for comparison with policymakers’ statements. This is not only a departure from the Committee’s agreed upon terms of reference, it is unfair to policymakers whom we know had access to far more than just published intelligence assessments. For example, in preparation for Secretary Powell’s statement before the UN on February 5, 2003, the CIA provided an intelligence report called a TD (telegraphic dissemination) for use in the speech. In spite of the fact that the CLLX informed the Committee about this in early 2004 and that the information was included in the Committee’s first Iraq report published nearly four years ago, the majority refused to include, or even consider, the TD in its majority report. Instead the majority report included an intelligence assessment published after the Secretary’s speech and noted the existence of "operational intelligence traffic." Any intelligence officer who has been on the job more than a week knows that a TD is an intelligence report, not "operational traffic." Moreover, after refusing our request to include the TD, incorrectly arguing that it was "operational," the majority drafters included several actual operational cables of their choosing in another section of the report. Worse, these were operational cables which the Committee knows were not finished intelligence reports for policymakers and were not given to any administration officials; yet the much more widely disseminated TD, specifically provided to Secretary Powell for use in his speech, was not included in the majority report. Even worse, excluded those sections of the report which specifically analyze the President’s statements, is the President’s Summary of the NIE, a summary document prepared for and presented to the President. This is most disturbing since in two important cases- regarding reconstitution of Iraq’s nuclear pro gram and Iraq’s intent to use its small UAVs for biological weapons delivery—the judgments and dissents were presented differently than in the NIE’s key judgments and main text. In fact, in the case of Iraq’s UAVs, the dissent was not included in the President’s summary at all. Second, the report excludes other information relevant to any fair inquiry of whether policymakers’ statements were substantiated by intelligence. For example, the Committee obtained information related to the coordination, declassifrcation, and fact-checking of the President’s Cincinnati speech with the CIA, relevant portions of which we requested be included in the report. Specifically, a handwritten note by a CIA officer at the bottom of one of the drafts to then-DCI Tenet said that the CIA terrorism analyst had "read all the terrorism paragraphs and said it was all oka ’ (emphasis original.) We believed it was only fair to let the public know that the CIA checked the President’s speech and said that all of the terrorism paragraphs were M

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• _ determined by CIA analysts to be "all okay." Apparently the majority did not think this was something the public needed to know since they denied our request to include it and did not allow a vote on the amendment offered to tix this shortcoming. Why do the Democrats want to hide the fact that the CIA cleared the President’s speech'? As another example, the majority report analyzes Secretary Powell’s UN speech, but does not explain that this speech was not only checked and rechecked by the intelligence community to ensure that the speech was well supported by the available intelligence, but also that the first draft of the speech was actually written by the CIA. Notably, the report fails to mention this. In some cases the majority report actually claims that Secretary Powell’s statements in this speech were not substantiated by intelligence, even though the intelligence was in the original draft written by the CIA. We are at a loss to explain how the majority can believe that a speech drafted by the CIA and then checked and rechecked by the intelligence community to ensure that it was strongly supported by the available intelligence could in any way be characterized as unsubstantiated by intelligence at that time. Third, in several cases, the report compares policymaker statements to intelligence published after, sometimes months after, the statements were made. This just does not make sense. For example, Amendment 97 addresses a conclusion which says the "President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering using UAVs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003." Whether the NIE judgments were reviewed after the President’s speech is irrelevant to whether the statement was substantiated at the time it was made. Furthermore, we note that t.his conclusion also distorts the President’s words because he did not say that Iraq was considering using UAVs to target the United States. Rather, he said: "we are concerned that Iraq was exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States," a comment that was fully consistent with the January 2003 NIE, Nontraditional Threats to the US. Homeland Through 200 7. Obviously the intelligence community had to be concerned that Iraq could use these UAVs to target the homeland or they would not have been included in an NIE about threats to the Homeland at all. We find the refusal to include all relevant intelligence and the inclusion of information published after the delivery of statements to be particularly ironic since in a letter on November 14, 2005, then-Vice Chairman Rockefeller, along with Senators Levin and Feinstein, wrote to the Majority and Minority Leaders explaining that they had "insisted that the Committee compare statements of government officials against all intelligence information prepared for circulation and relevant to the subject matter at issue, provided it was it was available at the time the statement was made." This appeared to be considered a worthwhile task when the burden of collecting all of the available intelligence from the end of the Gulf War through the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom fell to Republican Members and their staff, but when the Democrats took charge, including only some of the intelligence was deemed acceptable. Perhaps forcing the Republican staff to review over 40,000 documents was just a request intended to delay further publication of the Phase II effort and allow the continuation of charges of "obstruction." 108

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• _ The idea of limiting the intelligence to that which was "available at the time the statement was made" must have seemed like a better idea when the Democrats thought policymakers would not be able to use information published even days after their statements to defend themselves. When it turned out that this could be used to the majority’s own advantage, however, information that was actually available to policymakers apparently became less important. Maybe the majority believes those reading the report will not bother to check the dates. On behalf of the minority, the Vice-Chairman filed 26 amendments in the category of "che1ry picking or excluding relevant information from the report." The Chairman refused to allow consideration of any of these amendments at the Committee’s business meeting. (See Appendix A, amendments 13, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28, 29, 32, 38, 39, 54, 71(a), 81, 82, 97, 106, 108, 130,132, and 133. Unsubstantiated Claims/Distorting Intelligence One of the most hypocritical aspects of the Majority report is that while it purports to cast judgment on how well policymakers characterized intelligence analysis in their public statements, the report itself distorts many policymakers’ statements and the intelligence analysis. This has the unfortunate consequence of undermining the Committee’s credibility in exercising oversight. Several of the mir1ority’s amendments focused on the issue of mischaracterizing policymakers’ statements., One example is Amendment 7 which addresses a portion of the majority report which says that the President, Vice President, and the Secretary of State "stated that the Iraq govemrnent had an active nuclear weapons program." However, even a cursory examination of the statements included for review in the report shows that none of the named individuals "stated" that Iraq had an "active nuclear weapons program," not one. Another amendment, Number 136, addresses a conclusion that claims the President and Vice President made statements that "Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States." Yet, neither the President nor the Vice President said this. The report also distorts the intelligence analysis to help bolster its case against policymakers. For example, Amendment 129 addresses a portion of the report which claims that the October 2002 NIE judged that "Saddam was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time." The NIE never said this. In fact, this NIE judged that Iraq was investigating mapping software for its UAVs, useless outside the United States. The NIE said this "suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." ln addition, Amendments 81-82 address a portion of the report which says that the "intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried facilities" in Iraq. This makes it sound as though the intelligence community did not assess that Iraq had deeply-buried facilities. In reality, the intelligence community had long assessed that Iraq had deeply-buried facilities in Iraq; they noted only that they were unable to specifically identify them, something hardly uncornrnon in intelligence. 109

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•  A final example, Amendment 58 addresses a conclusion about Iraq’s biological weapons capabilities which states that policymakers’ statements were substantiated by intelligence information, but concludes that they "did not discuss gaps in Iraq’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the NIE." The NIE’s assessment of Iraq’s biological weapons program was that "all key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war." This judgment and the NIE judgment that Iraq had biological weapons were "high confidence" judgments. In a ten-page discussion of Iraq’s biological warfare capabilities only one sentence noted any gaps in knowledge of Iraq’s BW program and this was only regarding "specific information on the types of weapons, agent, or stockpiles Baghdad has at its disposal." In other words, there were no gaps noted regarding the judgments that Iraq had an offensive biological weapons program or stocks, only uncertainty as to what kinds of agents were in those stocks—hardly a gap. On behalf of the minority, the Vice-Chairman filed 31 amendments in this category- unsubstantiated claims or distorting information. The Chairman reii1sed to allow consideration of any of these amendments at the Committee’s business meeting. (See Appendix A, amendments 7,11,16,17,17(a),19, 21, 22(a), 23, 30, 31, 33, 34, 4·1, 41(a), 58, 68, 70, 71, 83, 85, 86, 90, 96, 99,119,120,121,125,126,127,128,129,131,135,135,136,137, and 140. Reii1sal to Offer Polic akers the Qpp g; to Be Heard We also disagree with the majority’s decision not to request interviews with policymakers whom the report alleges made unsubstantiated statements. These individuals deserve the opportunity to respond to the majority’s allegations and be afforded the opportunity to inform the majority of intelligence information that may be lacking from the report that had been used in the preparation of their statements. We note that in the last Congress the Democrats argued that policymakers needed to be brought before the Committee to be interviewed about their statements even before the ‘ Committee had made a determination about whether their statements were substantiated. Then- Vice Chairman Rockefeller even wrote to the Chairman with a list of people to be interviewed which included Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, among others. In addition, Senators Rockefeller, Levin, and Feinstein wrote to the Senate leadership in November 2005 saying that a task force of Committee Members discussed the importance of interviewing current a.nd former officials within the Departments of State and Defense and the Office of the Vice President, among others. While the letter was, in fact, not an accurate portrayal of the discussions at that meeting (the transcript of the meeting shows that the only individual the task force actually discussed interviewing was Secretary Powell), it nonetheless shows that these Members wanted to conduct such interviews. We agreed that it was important to interview many of these individuals, and others, if the Committee Members found that any of their statements were not substantiated by the intelligence M0

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• or if they were in another way relevant to the Committee’s inquiry. At the time the Committee voted on the Phase II terms of reference in February 2004, Senator Levin agreed with us, noting "but you’ve got to ask policymakers who made statements relative to weapons of mass destruction what was the basis in intelligence for their statements, if we believe that their statements, reports, or testimony went beyond the intelligence that they were given." Despite this and despite Chairman Rockefeller’s own letter requesting these interviews, when we requested that the interviews be conducted so that policymakers could respond to the drafted conclusions that alleged unsubstantiated statements, the request was ignored, and a motion to conduct these interviews offered at the Committee’s business meeting was denied a hearing by the Chairman. Interestingly, in the additional views attached to a Committee report on "The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress," Chairman Rockefeller and Senators Levin, Feinstein, Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, and Feingold wrote that the Committee Chairman had declined a request of the Vice Chairman for the Committee to interview White House officials, including speech writers, to fully understand how and why the intelligence assessments were included in major prewar speeches, such as the President’s State of the Union Address and Secretary Powell’s speech to the UN Security Council. Yet, none of these Members wanted to pursue these interviews once they were in charge of the review. The only reason we can imagine why the Democrats would not undertake interviews that they had repeatedly requested in the last Congress, is that the interviews were another tactic at delaying the report and allowing more false charges of "obstruction." Conclusion Although we are troubled by all of the issues we have outlined thus far—that the report released today was a waste of Committee time and resources that should have been spent overseeing the intelligence community, that the report is part of a partisan agenda, that the report cherry picked information and distorted policymakers’ statements and intelligence, and that the majority refused to offer those it is accusing the opportunity to be heard—we are most concerned about the damage that this report will do, and that the whole Phase II effort has done for the past several years, in creating the impression that policymakers should be bound to make policy based on only that which is published in intelligence assessments. This is not only wrong, it is dangerous and it is contrary to everything else this Committee has done since it published its first report on the Iraq intelligence failure. It has the effect of encouraging intelligence community analysts to become policymakers, and encouraging policymakers to adhere strictly to whatever analysts write, when we know that intelligence analysis can be dangerously inaccurate. Have we forgotten how wrong the intelligence judgments were in the October 2002 Iraq WMD NIE and how many other intelligence failures we had before that one? Intelligence is not incontestable truth and it is only one factor out of many that a policymaker must consider before making a policy decision. This fallacy has also unnecessarily increased demands on the intelligence community. Requesting NIEs with unclassified key judgments has become sport in Washington as each side hopes the NIE will support its position. Cries of "politicization" usually follow from whichever M1

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• side is unhappy with the results. This is not only unfair to the intelligence community, it is dangerous in that analysts will attempt to please all sides and their muddied judgments will help no one. We expect intelligence analysts to follow tried and true marching orders for intelligence: tell me what you know, tell me what you don’t know, tell me what you think, and make sure the policymaker understands the difference. Analysts cannot do this if they are constantly wondering if their assessments will be used for politics. The Democratic maj ority, in the partisan way it attempted to suppress intelligence information and skew the historical record, is betting that the public and the media will not take the time to read these and other minority views that expose its hypocrisy. We have written these views to shine a light on it, for if there is any oversight value left in this fruitless endeavor that has consumed so much of the resources of this Committee over a four year period, it would be to expose the true intent of this supposed "oversight." We regret the damaging effect the majority’s report has on this COI1’1II1llI€€’S credibility to oversee our intelligence community and we urge our colleagues to return to the non-partisan underpinnings that the Senate Intelligence Committee was founded upon. CHRISTOPHER S. Bonn SAXBY CHAMBLISS ORRIN G. HATCH RICHARD BURR _ 112

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• _ Apendix A Filed Amendments 0n Phase II Report: Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence ("Statements") U3

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• Amendment 6 Page 3, last paragraph — Overlaying this issue of the selective use of intelligence is the more fundamental issue of the selective declassification of intelligence. Intelligence information contained in many of the speeches analyzed in this report had to be declassified before being released publicly. The Executive Branch has the prerogative to classify information to protect national security, and unlike Congress the Executive Branch can declassified information relatively easily. Until the Congress sought and obtained the release of an unclassified version of the key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq ’s presumed weapons of mass destruction programs, the analytical judgments of the Intelligence Community on these matters were classified. The collected intelligence underlying these judgments remained classified until after the invasion of Iraq. Few, if any, of the Intelligence Community ’s assessments on Iraq 's links to terrorism, the intent of the Iraqi regime, projected post-war conditions, or other relevant matters contained in the statements of senior officials were publicly released before the war. This ability of the Executive Branch to unilaterally declassified and divulge intelligence information at a time, place, and in a manner of its choosing must also be taken into account when evaluating policymakers ’ use of intelligence information. Amendment 6 — Strike the above paragraph. Comment- It is misleading to simply say that the Executive branch makes ‘“unilateral" decisions about what to declassify. Congress can also request declassification and usually gets what it wants unless the Executive branch can establish a sources-and-methods reason not to disclose it. In addition, Section 8 of S. Res. 400 offers a mechanism for the Senate to disclose classified information. The fact that the Senate chose not to do this does not mean that it did not have the opportunity. Amendment 7 Page 6, first full non-bullet paragraph — In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State indicated that the Iraqi government had an active nuclear weapons program. Amendment 7- Strike the above sentence. Comment- None of the statements listed in the report shows that the President, Vice President, or Secretary of State indicated that the Iraqi government had an active nuclear weapons program. We believe that if this Committee is going to scrutinize each and every word these policymakers uttered, we should clearly state what they said, not re-interpret what they said. U4

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• _ Amendment 11 Page 7, first paragraph — They agreed that y' Iraq decided to restart a nuclear weapons program, with proper foreign assistance it could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon within five to seven years, and that q' Iraq in some way acquired adequate fissile material ]9·om a foreign source, it could produce a nuclear weapon within one year. Amendment 11 — Strike proper, in some way, and adequate. Comment- The coordinated assessments did not use the terms "proper," "in some way" and “adequate." The Committee should be accurate in describing the assessments; they should be deleted from the report. Amendment 13 Page 7, second paragraph — In April 2001 , the CIA noted that Iraq ’s attempts to purchase high- strength aluminum tubes and other dual-use equipment suggested that a reconstitution e]j’ort might be underway. This judgment was included in several other CIA assessments. In August 2002 the CIA published a paper on Iraqi WIMD capabilities (Iraq: Expanding WZMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threay, which concluded that these procurement activities indicated that the Iraqi government had restarted its nuclear weapons program. Amendment13 — Insert after the above sentence A December 2001 CIA Senior Executive Memorandum said that rocurement activities "show Ira is g pg to `um -start a clandestine uranium emichment ro am to roduce the fissile material for a wea on otentiall y late this decade assurnin it roduces the necess com onents indi enousl ." In J anu 2002 the CIA ublished an assessment which said "Procurement activities detected in the ast ear are consistent with Ira attem tin to 'um -start a clandestine uranium enrichment ro am to roduce the fissile material needed to make a nuclear wea on otentiall y late this decade. Ira retains a si `f1cant number of nuclear ro am scientists ro am documentation and robabl the manufacturin infrastructure to su ort a nuclear wea ons ro a1n." 1 Comment — We requested that several relevant reports below be added to this section, but they were added only to the footnote. We would at least like the December 2001 report, which seems to be the most important and relevant to policymaker’s statements in questions, added to the text. • A July 2001 CIA assessment, Iraq: New Effort to Get Centriiiige-Related Tubes, had the same assessment as the April 2001 paper already cited. • An October 2001 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) discussed Iraq’s "nuclear- related procurement efforts," including the aluminum tubes and uranium from Ni er. • In a November 2001 Senior Executive Memorandum (SEM) the CIA wrote that k _ reporting indicate Baghdad still has a vast procurement network to seek materials and equipment that can be used in a centrifuge program, including the recent effort to get aluminum tubes for a Zippe-type centrifuge, but it is unclear if Iraq has embarked on an extensive nuclear weapons effort." M5

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• _ • Also in November 2001 a CIA SEIB titled "lraq: Seeking to Rebuild Enrichment Capability" discussed Iraq’s procurement of aluminum tubes. • A December 2001 SEM said "Procurement activities detected within the past year show Iraq is trying to jump-start a clandestine uranium enrichment program to produce the fissile material for a weapon, potentially by late this decade, assuming it produces the necessary components indigenously." • In January 2002 the CIA wrote in a Senior Publish When Ready (SPWR) that "Procurement activities detected in the past year are consistent with Iraq attempting to jump-start a clandestine uranium enrichment program to produce the tissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon, potentially by late this decade. Iraq retains a significant nrunber of nuclear program scientists, program documentation, and probably the manufacturing infrastructure to support a nuclear weapons pro gram." • In March 2002 a CIA SPWR said "We assess that Iraq currently may be trying to reconstitute its gas centrifuge program. Since intrusive inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has increased efforts to buy critical dual-use items that could support a gas centrifuge program, including aluminum tubes suitable for rotors, magnets, machine tools, essential chemicals and centrifuge cascade related equipment." Amendment 16 Page 7, last partial paragraph — The Department 0f Energy (DOE) disagreed with the CL4 ’s c0nclusi0ns regarding the aluminum tubes, and assessed that it was more likely that the tubes were intended for a dyferent use, such as a c0nventi0nal r0cket program. Based 0n 0ther evidence, including Saddam ’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, and p0ssible attempts t0 pr0cure uranium from Niger, the DOE assessed in July 2002 that Iraq might be attempting t0 reconstitute a nuclear weap0ns pr0gram, but suggested that the evidence was n0t conclusive. Amendment 16 — Strike the above paragraph and insert In a Jul 2002 p p the De artment of Ener DOE said "Multi le-source r ortin su ests that Saddam Hussein is seekin to reconstitute Ira ’s nuclear wea ons ro am. Althou the re ortin roduces no "smoking gun, continued vi 'lance is re uired re ardin Ira ’s attem ts to re 'uvenate its nuclear wea ons ro am." Comment- We do not believe that an assessment which solely discusses DOE’s judgment about the end-use for the alumintun tubes is relevant in this section because the assessment did not discuss nuclear reconstitution at all. The statements under review from the Vice President make no mention of aluminun tubes. The report should say what DOE’s assessment was of reconstitution, which was: "Multiple-source reporting suggests that Saddam Hussein is seeking to reconstitute Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Although the reporting produces no "smoking gun," continued vigilance is required regarding Iraq’s attempts to rejuvenate its nuclear weapons program." H6

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• _ Amendment 17 Page 8, first full paragraph — The Department of State ’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes were probably intended for other purposes. This view was included in congressional testimony in September 2002, but State/INR did not publish any reports on the aluminum tubes outside the State Department until afler publication of the October 2002 NIE. Amendment 17 — strike the above paragraph and insert INR did not ublish y assessments outlinin their views on reconstitution of Ira ’s nuclear ro am rior to the Vice President’s statement. Comment -— The comment that INR "disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes were probably intended for other purposes" has no citation. If the intent is to cite this to the Committee’s first report, the attribution is mischaracterizing the comments in that report. The Committee’s report was describing what INR analysts told the staff after the fact about their views at the time, which should not be construed to mean those views were articulated to policymakers. The report should cite a document or report in which INR "disagreed," otherwise this discussion should be deleted. In addition, if testimony to Congress is going to be offered in lieu of an assessment from INR, the report should include comments attributed to the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) at the same hearing. Testimony at the September 17, 2002 hearing was that "State/INR and DOE are still examining the latest specifications but currently believe that the tubes more likely are intended for alternative conventional weapons uses, such as the multiple rocket launcher program. The NGIC — the U.S. experts on foreign ground force weapons systems — notes, however, that Iraq’s dimensional requirements for the tubes are far stricter than necessary for rocket casings." Finally, we do not understand why testimony given in mid- September is being used in a section which analyzes the Vice President’s speech from August. This report is supposed to determine whether po1icymakers’ statements were substantiated by intelligence. How can we expect policymakers to be aware of a view that wasn’t published or briefed to them until after they made their statement? Mi

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• _ Amendment 17 a _ Page 8, second full paragraph — Several of these intelligence agencies also made reference to assessments by the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) regarding the aluminum tubes. Testimony by the Director of Central Intelligence to Congress stated that NGIC judged that "Iraq ’s dimensional requirements for the tubes are far stricter than necessary for rocket casings. " A later memo ]9·om State/INR said that "the L4EA and the - pertinent nuclear-technical experts have concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for Iraq ’s nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings...DOE and DoD ’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE views on tactical rockets. " q Amendment l7(a) - strike A later memo ]$·om State/INR said that "the L4EA and the pertinent nuclear-technical experts have concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for Iraq 's nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings...DOE and DoD ’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE views on tactical rockets. " Corn1nent— We see that the Majority added this information to the report after the amendment filing deadline. We asked that the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) information be included, but we did not request and did not consent to including the State/INR paper for two reasons: first, because it was published more than two months after the Vice President’s speech; and second, because the report misquotes the INR document. The INR report did not say that DoD’s NGIC concurred with the assessment that the aluminum tubes were consistent with rocket casings. This is a gross distortion of the INR assessments and the position of NGIC. If this text is included, it will make the Committee look foolish since our own 2004 report explained that NGIC was one of the main proponents of the argument that the tubes were inconsistent with rocket casings. The INR report said that that NGIC agreed only with the assessment that high strength is used for tactical rockets by a number of countries; although NGIC said in the NIE that because of the unsuitability of the wall thickness and weight of the Iraqi aluminum tubes that they were "unIikely to be intended for rocket motor cases. The report, as drafted, clearly misquotes the INR paper. This should be deleted. H8

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• Amendment 18 Page 8, third full paragraph — According t0 a DL4 report, the intelligence community continued to assess that it would take five to seven years from the commencement of a revived nuclear program for the Iraqi government to indigenously produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. This same report repeated the assessment that a nuclear weapon could be constructed much faster y' adequate fissile material was acquired from a foreign source, though an earlier CL4 assessment noted that “we have not detected a dedicated Iraqi ejjfort to obtain fissile material abroad. " Amendment 18 — Strike the above paragraph. Comment/Suggestion — This is a May 2002 DLA report referring to an intelligence community judgment which had not been updated since 2000. At the time of the Vice President’s speech, DLA assessed that Iraq could have a weapon as soon as 2006, and INR had no judgment on this since the 2000 ICA. This sentence should be changed to accurately reflect the judgments of each agency. Amendment 19 Page 8, last paragraph — In the President ’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Iraq continued to develop weapons of mass destruction, and indicated that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Amendment 19 — Strike the paragraph above. Con1ment— None of the statements in the report taken from the President’s speech suggest that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. The President commented that Iraq employed capable nuclear scientists, retained physical infrastructure needed to build a weapon, and made attempts to buy aluminum tubes. As noted in the report, several intelligence community assessments mentioned these things without concluding that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. _ H9

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• Amendment 20 Page 9, 'rirst full paragraph - Though the intelligence community as a whole had not yet concluded that a nuclear weapons program was underway, some (though not all intelligence agencies believed that Iraq ’s attempts to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes, along with supporting evidence such as Saddam ’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear science personnel, indicated that the nuclear program was in fact being reconstituted. Amendment 20 — strike (though not alb and insert and the end of the paragraph All intelligence a encies assessed that the aluminum tubes could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons but DOE and State INR assessed that the tubes were more likely intended for a conventional weapons ro am. Comment — Again, the President did not say that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program or had an ongoing nuclear program in this speech. He mentioned the acquisition of aluminum tubes "used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.” All agencies, including DOE and State/INR assessed that these tubes could be used for this purpose and Saddam’s meeting with nuclear science personnel were discussed in numerous intelligence community papers from CIA, DIA, and DOE. A discussion of whether or not agencies judged that these efforts were part of a reconstituted nuclear program is irrelevant here because the President did not say they were part of a reconstituted nuclear program. Also, "some" always means "not all." This is redundant. Amendment 21 Page 9, second paragraph — Intelligence community analysts generally believed that the Iraqi government ’s failure to provide certain evidence and documents regarding its pre-] 99] nuclear program indicated that the Iraqi government was attempting to conceal this information. However, this conclusion was not cited by the intelligence community as compelling evidence for a reconstituted, post-Guy War nuclear weapons program. Amendment 2l— strike However, this conclusion was not cited by the intelligence community as compelling evidence for a reconstituted, post-Gab' War nuclear weapons program. Comment- Again, the last sentence is irrelevant because the President did not cite Iraq’s concealment of documents as evidence of a reconstituted, post-Gulf War nuclear weapons program. His comments about withholding information refer to the pre-Gulf War program. 120

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• _ Amendment 22 Page 9, third full paragraph —— Numerous intelligence assessments made reference to open source information showing that Saddam met with personnel from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (MEC). Amendment 22 — Strike made reference to open source information showing ar1d insert showed Comment - The majority report changed this sentence from saying "ir1telligence reporting" to "open source infor1nation." The report should still say "intelligence" because numerous intelligence assessments cited the meetings between Saddam ar1d the IAEC personnel and much of the information was from intelligence reporting vice open source reporting. This information was provided to the Majority as requested and still it was not included in the report. • In January 2002, a DIA Executive Highlight (EH) said ". .. the increased frequency of operations at former and suspect nuclear facilities is highly suspect. In a possibly related incident, Saddam Husayn met with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission on 10 January and praised its efforts. Baghdad probably will continue trying to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. Although no firm evidence exists that reconstitution has begun, Iraq had continued to obtain dual-use equipment ar1d to maintain its scientific cadre." • In January 2002, ar1other DIA assessment said, "Persistent procurement efforts to acquire approximately 60,000 aluminum alloy tubes, coupled with recent statements by Saddam to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, suggest an intent to reconstitute the nuclear program." • In September 2002, a DIA Key WMD Operational Support study on Iraq said "Iraq likely revitalized its nuclear weapons program shortly after the end of UNSCOM inspections ended in December 1998. There is no firm evidence of a current nuclear weapon design effort, but we judge that continued procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items, the assignment of key personnel to nuclear weapon-capable sites, construction at nuclear facilities, ar1d Saddarn’s interactions with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission all indicate that Iraq revitalized its nuclear weapon program after 1998." • CIA SPWR 9/11/2002 — "Saddarn’s exhortations to his nuclear Mujahidin, periodically reported in the Iraqi press since 1998, are the most compellir1g indicator that his nuclear weapons work resumed in 1998, when inspectors were ordered out of Iraq." • DIA assessment September 2002, "The renewed regular contact between Saddam ar1d the IAEC, as well as the enhanced security, suggests the IAEC is again the focal point of Saddarn’s nuclear prograrn." • July 22, 2002, DOE assessment "Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway‘?" said, "Aecording to Iraqi press reports, Saddam recently met with personnel from the IAEC. He reportedly commended the staff for their efforts ‘to make science serve the programs of comprehensive development, which are under way in Iraq despite the circumstances of the wicked embargo.’ The staff was referred to in the press report as mujahidin . . . These meetings indicate that Saddam continues to place a high priority on a potential nuclear option for his strategic goals." 121

Amendment 22 ) Page 9, fourth full paragraph —At the time of the President ’s address t0 the General Assembly, the intelligence community had not changed its judgment that it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon (five to seven years ’ was the commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002 DIA report judged that it could be done in four), and that Iraq could build a nuclear weapon within one year q' it in some way acquired an adequate amount of fissile material from a foreign source. Amendment 22(a) — strike it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon (five to seven years ’ was the commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002 DIA report judged that it could be done in four), and that Comment- The beginning of this sentence is not related to t.he President’s comments. He said what Iraq could do should it "acquire" Hssile material. How long it would take Iraq to indigenously produce fissile material is irrelevant. In addition, since t.he 2000 ICA did not say "in some way" it should be deleted. Amendment 23 Page l0, first paragraph - Additionally, he said that there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon, declaring that 'facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. Amendment 23 — Strike there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon, declaring that Comment- None of the statements cited in t.he report hom the Cincinnati speech quote t.he President saying that "there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon." The report should simply say what the President said. _ 122

IIa  110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed

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Amendment 26 Page l0, third paragraph — State/INR dissentedfrom the majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did “not add up t0 a compelling case for reconstitution " of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Amendment 26 — strike State/INR dissentedj$·om the majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did “not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution " of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. and insert State/INR dissented from the ma 'ori view and stated in the NIE ke 'ud ents that "the activities we have detected do not however add p to a com ellin case that Ira is currentl ursuin what INR would consider to be an inte ated and com rehensive a roach to a uire nuclear wea ons." In the main text of the NIE INR assessed that the available evidence did "not add p to a com ellin case for reconstitution" of an Ira i nuclear wea ons ro am. In the President’s summ of the NIE INR offered another version of its 'ud ent statin that "INR `ud es that the evidence indicates at most a limited Ira i nuclear reconstitution effort." Comment - Because this section of the report is being used to consider whether the President’s statements were substantiated by intelligence, we believe it is appropriate to include the President’s summary of the NIE, a document specifically prepared for and briefed to the President. The President’s summary of the NIE said, "Most agencies judge that Iraq is reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. INR judges that the evidence indicates, at most, a limited Iraqi nuclear reconstitution effort." In addition, the key judgments of the NIE said, "The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons." All of these are slightly different and should be included to show what was available to the President. Amendment 28 Page l0, fourth paragraph — Construction at sites known to have been part of Iraq ’s pre—GuU War nuclear weapons program was mentioned in earlier assessments (though not specyically in the NIE). Amendment 28 — strike (though not specyically in the NIE). and insert includin ir1 the NIE. Comment — The comment in the report is incorrect. Construction activity at Tuwaitha, a facility associated with Iraq’s pre Gulf war nuclear program was discussed in the 2002 NIE on page 24. This should be noted in the report. 123

Amendment 29 Page 10, last paragraph — State/INR ’s alternative views, which were incorporated in the NIE, said that State/INR accepted “the view of technical experts at the Department of Energy " who concluded that the aluminum tubes were ’poorly suited " for a nuclear weapons program. The alternative views also cast doubt on the judgment that other dual-use procurement ejjzorts were related to a nuclear program, and went on to say that “the information we have on Iraqi nuclear personnel does not appear consistent with a coherent ejjzort to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program. Amendment 29 — At the end of the paragraph insert ln the President’s summ of the NIE [NR said it `ud es that the evidence indicates at most a limited Ira i nuclear reconstitution eHort." Comment - Again, we believe that if the Committee is going to compare intelligence to statements made by the President, it should include the President’s summary of the NIE. _ 124

_ Amendment 30 Page II, first paragraph - The majority view of the NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five to seven years, and posited a “much less likebr scenario " in which production time could be shortened to three to five years. The majority view also assessed that y' Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside source that production time could be "within several months to a year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a "systematic ejfort to acquire foreign fissile materials from Russia [or] other sources. " State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program. Amendment 30 - strike The majority view of the NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five to seven years, and posited a "much less likely scenario" in which production time could be shortened to three to five years. The majority view also assessed that Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside source that production time could be “within several months to a year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a “systematic efort to acquire foreign fissile materials j$·om Russia [or] other sources. " State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program and insert The NIE ke `ud ents said "if Ba dad a uires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear wea on within several months to a ear." The main text of the NIE added "althou we have seen onl a few Ira i attem ts to a uire material from abroad those efforts do not seem to be p of s sternatic effort to a uire forei Hssile materials from Russia or other sources." State/INR said that it could not redict when Ira gl; a uire a nuclear wea on since it lacked ersuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear ro am. Comment - The paragraph as drafted distorts the NIE’s key judgments which actually listed the assessment that Iraq could build a weapon in one year as the first bullet point. The characterization in the report makes it sound like an afterthought or as if it was the last and, therefore, most minor issue the NIE considered, which it was not. Also, how long it would take Iraq to indigenously develop Hssile material was irrelevant to what the President was talking about. He specihcally said he was discussing how long it would take Iraq to build a weapon if it "acquired" fissile material. Also, it should be clear that the detail about not detecting a systematic effort was from the main body of the NIE, not the key judgments. 125

Amendment 31 Page 11, second paragraph — In the President ’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he stated that Iraq had pursued nuclear weapons even while weapons inspectors were in Iraq. He also said that the Iraqi regime had attempted to purchase aluminum tubes that could be used in a nuclear program, and that “the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought signqicant quantities of uranium ]$·om Africa. " While the intelligence community assessed that Iraq had initialhw attempted to continue its nuclear weapons program following the imposition of post-Guy' War sanctions, most agencies believed that the MEA and UNSCOM had succeeded in destroying or neutralizing Iraq ’s nuclear in]$·astructure, and that the regime did not resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons until December 1998, when UNSCOM inspectors le]? the country. Amendment 31 — insert after the first paragraph above He noted that Saddam "has not credibl ex lained these activities." Strike the second paragraph and insert The intelli ence communi assessed that Ira had initiall attem ted to continue its nuclear wea ons ro a.m followin the im osition of ost—Gu1f War sanctions. In Se tember 2002 the DCI submitted testimon to Con ess that "revelations after the Gulf war starkl demonstrated the extent of | Ira ’s denial . . . The IAEA did not reco `ze on oin uranium emichment activities" at two sites ins ected y the IAEA. Most a encies believed that the IAEA and UNSCOM had succeeded in destro ` or neutralizin Ira ’s nuclear infrastructure in the mid—1990s. Comment- None of the above discussion from the report is relevant to what the President said. He said that Iraq had pursued a nuclear weapons program while inspectors were in Iraq. This statement is substantiated by intelligence. Director Tenet’s submitted testimony to the SSCI and SASC from September 2002 notes that, "Revelations afier the Gulf war starkly demonstrated the extent of that denial. Based on CIA briefings about two suspect nuclear sites, the IAEA inspected Tuwaitha and Tarmiyah in rnid-May 1991. The IAEA did not recognize on oin uranium enrichment activities using Electromagnetic Isotope Separation at these sites, as neither it nor the US intelligence community anticipated such work was underwa ." This testimony makes it clear that the intelligence community did say that Iraq’s nuclear progra.m continued while inspectors were in Iraq. Current views of reconstitution and views of whether the IAEA and UNSCOM stopped those activities are irrelevant to the analysis. Finally, there is no citation for these claims at all. 126

_ Amendment 32 Page ll, fourth paragraph — The October 2002 NYE contained an annex on the high-strength aluminum tubes. Although all the intelligence agencies agreed that the aluminum tubes were a dual—use technology, DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikely that the tubes were being used for nuclear weapons-related purposes. Other agencies concurred with the majority view, which cited the aluminum tubes as the primary evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Neither the concurring nor dissenting agencies changed their view between the publication of the NIE and the invasion of Iraq. Amendment 32 — strike the above paragraph and insert - Ir1 the October 2002 NIE all intelli ence a encies a eed that the aluminum tubes could be used for nuclear wea ons and that Ira was r uired to declare the im orts and sub ` ect them to UN/IAEA monitorin but DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikel that the tubes were intended to be used for nuclear wea ons-related u oses. On December 17, 2002 CIA re ared an anal sis of Ira ’s wea ons declaration which noted that it "fails to acknowled e or ex lain rocurement of gl; s ecihcation aluminum tubes we believe suitable for use in as centrifu e uranium enrichment effort" and "fails to acknowled e efforts to rocure uranium from Ni er as noted in the UK dossier." Comment- The President was discussing the fact that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes it was prohibited from importing and that it had not credibly explained these activities. He did not say these items were part of a reconstituted nuclear program, only that Iraq had not credibly explained why it was importing such materials. Intelligence noting that all agencies assessed the aluminum tubes could be used for nuclear weapons and were prohibited items is more relevant to the statement in question. 127

Amendments 33 and 34 Page ll, last paragraph — An unclassyied British white paper from September 2002 had assessed that Iraq had sought large quantities of natural (non-enriched) uranium from Africa. This was echoed by a statement in the NIE, which said “Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons. " This was not cited by the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. State/INR ’s alternative views said that “the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR ’s assessment, highly dubious. " Amendment 33 — strike This was echoed by a statement and insert This assessment was also included Amendment 34 - strike This was not cited by the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. Comment- We suggest not using the word “echoed" which makes it sound like the intelligence community took the idea from the British White Paper, which was not the case. In addition we do not think the characterization of "key evidence" is accurate (we do not think the NIE used the term evidence) and the President did not say it was key evidence of reconstitution so this sentence is irrelevant. 128

_ Amendment 38 Page 13, last paragraph — On September 8, 2002, the National Security Advisor said that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq "are only realbv suited for nuclear weapons programs Although both the CIA and DIA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were “best suited " for centry'uges, and that other explanations were “inconsistent with the total body of intelligence the DOE had assessed that this was unlikely, and had published intelligence reports explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE ’s view, more likely) that the tubes were intended to be used to build conventional rockets. Amendment 38 — strike Although both the CIA and DLA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were “best suited "for centry'uges, and that other explanations were "inconsistent with the total body of intelligence the DOE had assessed that this was unlikely, and had published intelligence reports explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE ’s view, more likely) that the tubes were intended to be used to build conventional rockets. and insert Both the CIA and DLA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear wea ons ro am with the CIA notin that the tubes were "best suited” for centrifu es and that other ex lanations were "inconsistent with the total bod of intelli ence.” ln A ril 2001 CIA ublished a a er which said "Ira is gyg ng to urchase items that have little use other than for a uranium enrichment ro am." In Au st 2002 CIA ublished another a er which said "A1thou we have considered alternative ex lanations for the tubes — such as their use in multi le rocket launchers Q ) — CIA concurs with ound forces wea ons ex erts in the lntelli ence Communit that such an ex lanation is inconsistent with the overall bod of intelli ence on the sub 'ect." More than a ear earlier the DOE ublished an assessment that said an a lication other than centrifu e use was "more likel ’ but noted that "re ardless of end use the delive of aluminum tubes with the r orted s eciiications to Ira would be rohibited” items under the Nuclear Su liers Grou and UN Securi Council Resolutions. Comment- We believe the report as drafted excludes relevant information which was far more likely to have been provided to Secretary Rice than a DOE assessment published a year earlier. These should be included andlDOE’s judgments should be put in its own words, rather than those of the report authors. DOE used the words "more likely" not ‘“unlikely. • CIA, SEIB 01-083CHX April 10, 2001, "Iraq is trying to purchase items that have little use other than for a uranium enrichment program.” • CIA, August 2002, "A1though we have considered alternative explanations for the tubes — such as their use in multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) — CIA concurs with ground forces weapons experts in the Intelligence Community that such an explanation is inconsistent with the overall body of intelligence on the subj ect." _ 129

_ Amendment 39 Page 14, second non-bullet paragraph — - Intelligence obtained after the Guy War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons. Both apparently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the two had an estimated yield of less than _ and the larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of- could not be delivered by missile. Amendment 39 — strike - Intelligence obtained after the Guhf War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons. Both apparently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the two had an estimated yield of less than _ and the larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of- could not be delivered by missile. and insert 1 Numerous intelli ence assessment noted that Ira had develo ed two desi s rior to the Gulf War. Accordin to a 1999 IC nuclear assessment "nuclear desi efforts from 1988 throu mid-1990 were focused rimaril on conce ts and in 1990 Ira be an to ex lore more advanced desi s to ermit smaller size and hi er g eld." Comment- - The Secretary’s comments were made prior to the publication of the NIE, so the citation of the NIE here is irrelevant. The Committee should include intelligence assessments which were published before the statement in question such as the following: • "By 1991, Iraq had demonstrated sufficient calculational capability and an understanding of high-explosive systems to design devices with yields of as much as - for large diameter weapons and as much as _ for more advanced designs." PWR031202- 12 • 1999 JAEIC assessment- "According to all available information, nuclear desi efforts from 1988 through mid-1990 were focused primarily on - concepts and, in 1990, Iraq began to explore more advanced designs to permit smaller size and higher yield." • 1999 DIA assessment, DoD Futures Intelli ence Pro am, "It reviousl erformed field • March 14, 2002 SPWR, Iraq: Nuclear Weapon Design Program PubNo.· SPWR031402- 02, According to Iraqi-supplied documents, seized Ir i documents, and re ortin from Iraqi defectors, Iraq by early 1991 had researched desi and had conducted substantial work on an advanced esign 130

Amendments 41 and 41 a Page 14, last paragraph — In September 2002 the Vice President stated that there was “irrefutable evidence " that Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program. As noted, several intelligence agencies assessed that reconstitution was underway, but the Department of Energy assessed that the evidence was less conclusive (State/INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that poinU. Amendment 41 — strike but the Department of Energy assessed that the evidence was less conclusive. and insert . In an assessment in Au st 2002 the DOE said multi le-source re ortin su ests that Saddam Hussein is seekin to reconstitute Ira ’s nuclear wea ons ro am. Althou the re ortin roduces no "smokin n " continued vi `lance is re uired re ardin Ira ’s attem ts to re `uvenate its nuclear wea ons ro am." At hearin before the SSCI in S tember 2002 however the DCI testified that "Ira ’s a essive ursuit of gh stren aluminum tubes rovides com ellin evidence that Saddam is attem tin to reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort for Ba dad’s nuclear wea ons ro am." No dissentin o inion re ardin reconstitution was included in this testimon and the DOE witness testified that his a enc had no disa eement with testimon resented about Ira reconstitutin its nuclear ro am. Amendment 4-1(a) — strike (State/INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that poinU. Comment — Testimony from the DCI on September 17, 2002 to the SSCI and the SASC says "Iraq’s aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum tubes provides compelling evidence that Saddam is attempting to reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program? There are no dissenting views mentioned on reconstitution during this testimony at all. The DOE never used the words "less conc1usive." We also note that State/INR could not possibly convey an agreement with DOE to policymakers if it did not publish a judgment. In addition, this information was added to the report after the majority imposed amendment filing deadline, without the permission of the minority, which is inappropriate. 131

Amendment 42 Page 15 - Conclusion 1: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor regarding a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community. Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, some intelligence agencies assessed that the Iraqi government was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program, while others disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence. The Estimate itself expressed the majority view that the program was being reconstituted, but included clear dissenting views from the State Department ’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which argued that reconstitution was not underway, and the Department of Energy, which argued that aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended for a nuclear program. Amendment 42 — strike the conclusion as drafted and insert All olic aker statements reviewed in this section were substantiated y the available intelli ence. Comment- It is impossible for us to properly analyze the claims in this conclusion without knowing which specific statements the report is referencing. Also, it is incorrect to say that "others" disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program. At most, only one agency expressed any doubt about the reconstitution judgment and not in any document published outside its own agency prior to publication of the NIE. Although not stated definitely we believe that the statements this conclusion is referencing were made prior to the ‘ publication of the NIE, so the inclusion of INR’s dissent referenced in the NIE is irrelevant and unfair to those speakers. Additionally, it is misleading to discuss DOE’s dissent on the aluminum tubes but not include the fact that DOE agreed that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. Amendment 43 Page 16, Postwar Findings — entire section. Amendment 43 —- strike the postwar findings section Comment - None of the postwar Endings has citations so we cannot check their accuracy. Even with citations, we do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. 132

Amendment 54 Page 26, third paragraph - The DIA issued a report in February 2003, Iraq.· Denial and Deception: Iraqi Countertargeting Strategy, that stated it was standard denial and deception practice for Iraq to place various military hardware in, among other things, ‘palm and date tree groves ..., " but this report was issued ajier Secretary Powell ’s speech and did not mention biological weapons. There was operational intelligence trajjzic on this issue prior to the Secretary ’s speech, but the Committee is not aware of prior analytical assessments. Amendment 54 — Strike the above paragraph and insert The CIA rovided an intelli ence re ort for use in Secret Powell’s UN s eech which said that an lra i missile bri ade commander su ervised the dis ersal of his bri ade’s al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles in order to hide them from UN ins ectors. The re ort said that some of the missiles had warheads containin an ‘“unknown biolo ` cal a ent’ and that the missiles were hidden in "lar e alm oves." Comment- The document which we asked the drafters to incorporate is not "operationa1 intelligence traf’ric" as stated in the report. lt is a TD (telegraphic dissemination), or intelligence report, and it was provided to the Committee by the CIA when the Committee asked specifically what information it provided to Secretary Powell for use in this speech. The fact that the Committee is unaware of "analytical assessments" is irrelevant, because the Committee agreed to use "intelligence" to compare to statements, not just "ana1ytic assessments." This report was included in the Committee’s Erst Iraq report on page 243 and should be included in this report as well. 133

_ Amendment 58 Page 28, BW Conclusions — Conclusion 2: Statements in the major speeches analyzed as well additional statements, regarding Iraq ’s possession of biological agent, weapons, production capability, and use of mobile biological laboratories were substantiated by intelligence information. Intelligence assessments from the late J 990s through early 2003 consistently stated that Iraq retained biological warfare agent and the capability to produce more. Assessments on the mobile facilities included the production capabilities of those labs, both in terms of type of agent and in amount. Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments lef open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was activebi producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq ’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Amendment 58 — Strike Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments lef open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq ’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Comments — We do not think that the report has given any examples of intelligence assessments prior to the 2002 NIE which "left open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them" except the 2000 ICA, which was published more than two years before the policymakers’ statements were made and before any of them entered office. In addition, we do not believe there were any intelligence gaps articulated in the October 2002 NIE about Iraq’s BW program, with the possible exception of a lack of understanding of the specifics about the types of weapons and biological agents that analysts stated were in the possession of the Iraqi government. If the report drafters think there are such gaps they should be described in the report. Amendment 59 [ Page 28, Postwar Intelligence, entire section Amendment 59(a) — Strike the postwar findings section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. 134

_ Amendment 68 ‘ Page 37-38, Conclusions — Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq ’s chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community ’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing. The intelligence community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to have chemical weapons production capability and that Iraq was seeking to hide such capability in its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence assessments, especially prior to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that analysts could not confirm that production was ongoing. Amendment 68 — Strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 4: Statements y senior olic akers re ardin Ira ’s chemical wea ons roduction ca abili and activities were all substantiated y intelli ence information. - Comment- We dispute several of the contentions in this conclusion. The intelligence community assessed both before and alter the NIE that Iraq had a chemical weapons production capability, not just that Saddam wanted one. (See the CIA SEM Dec 2001 — "Iraq in the past several years has rebuilt a covert chemical weapons production capability by reconstructing dual- use industrial facilities and developing new chemical plants .... ") Most of the assessments which judged that actual production was ongoing were contemporaneous with the NIE or slightly prior (see Tenet’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee and SSCI below and the unclassified White Paper), but not all of them. More importantly, prior to the production of the NIE, no policymakers said that production was ongoing. If the report concludes that such statement is not substantiated, the report should clearly identify it so that it can be analyzed. • We assess that Iraq retains a stockpile of at least 100 tons of agent . . . Moreover, Iraq is rebuilding former chemical weapons facilities, developing plants, and trying to procure chemical warfare-related items covertly . . . Based on these construction and procurement activities, we assess that Iraq has a covert chemical wea ons roduction ca abili embedded in its civilian indus . Tenet testimony before SASC and SSCI September 16, 2002. • The main production building at Ira ’s Fallujah III chemical plant appears to have resumed operation, according to h . . . The Intelligence Community suspects this site supports production of CW precursors as well as the biological warfare agent ricin, extracted from castor oil beans. INR, Iraq: Suspect CB WProduction Facility Active, November 5, 200]. _ 135

Amendment 69 Page 38, Postwar Findings section Amendment 69 — Strike the postwar findings section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policy1nakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to mislead readers who might think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. Amendment 70 _ Page 40, second f11ll paragraph, (Scope Note) Scope Note: The term ‘weapons of mass a’estruction' (or ‘WIMDQ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Amendment 70 - Strike the scope note paragraph and insert Accordin to the October 2002 Ira WMD 'White Pa er Ira ’s biolo ` cal chemical ballistic missile and nuclear wea ons ro arns were collectivel referred to as wea ons of mass destruction { WMQ) Comment! Suggestion — We disagree that the intelligence community’s use of the term "WMD" excluded ballistic missiles and other WMD delivery vehicles. The Iraq WMD White Paper (or unclassified NIE) specifically states, "The Gulf war damaged Saddam Husayn’s biological, chemical, ballistic missile, and nuclear weapons programs, collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WIv[D)." The 2002 classified NIE on Iraq’s WMD programs included four categories including delivery systems. The report’s definition of what is included in the term WMD is incorrect and should include delivery systems. 'While this report’s inclusion of the DOD’s definition of WMD is interesting, this report is examining intelligence community judgments, not DOD’s. What matters is what the intelligence community included in defining WMD in 2002 which, the above reference to the NIE and White Papers makes clear, included delivery systems. _ 136

_ Amendment 71 and 71 a Page 40, last full paragraph - In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction, " and that “there is no doubt he is amassing them". He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing “the imminence of prolq’eration of weapons of mass destruction " with regard to Iraq as evidence that preemptive action was necessary. As noted, the term ‘weapons of mass destruction ’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Amendments 71 — Strike He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing “the imminence of proly'eration of weapons of mass destruction " with regard to Iraq as evidence that preemptive action was necessary. Amendment 71(a) - Strike As noted the term 'weapons of mass destruction ’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Comments — We have several comments about these paragraphs: (1) Again, as stated above and as defined by the IC, the term WMD also includes delivery systems; (2) It seems that the report is actually trying to show that the Vice President misrepresented the intelligence because he used the collective term WMD rather than specifically stating biological, chemical weapons and the means to deliver those weapons. The Vice President clearly said in the speech that Iraq was working on developing nuclear weapons—which shows there was no effort to include nuclear weapons among the WMD he said Iraq had; and (3) The use of a collective term does not indicate that all elements of that term must exist for the term to be true and the intelligence community regularly uses the term WMD to refer to some WMD elements. For example: • Tenet’s Threat Hearing testimony said: "Intelligence reporting on Saddam’s intentions to use WMD is clear and consistent .... " • CIA/NESA PC briefing book points stated that "Iraq’s activities since 1998 clearly show that it has repaired and expanded dual-use WMD facilities, increased WMD production capabilities, and advanced clandestine production and procurement." • Tenet testimony for SASC/ S SCI "Thus, experience shows that his regime will maintain weapons of mass destruction for use, not just deterrence" and "Saddam will never end his pursuit and possession of weapons of mass destruction" and Saddam "rnay decided that the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance . . . ." • August 10, 2001 CIA assessment, Developing Biological Weapons as a Strategic Deterrent, stated that "Iraq is attempting to address its regional security concerns by developing weapons of mass destruction and is focusing on biological warfare (BW) agents as a strategic deterrent .... " 137

Amendments 81-82 - Page 48, third non-bullet paragraph - The Iraqi regime was known to have constructed underground facilities for a variety of purposes, but the intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried facilities. US intelligence analysts suspected that the regime might be using underground facilities to conceal weapons activities, and there was some unconfirmed reporting that suggested this, but no intelligence agency claimed to know the location of any active underground WIMD facilities, and none expressed certainty that such facilities existed. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in 2001 that “elements of the regime ’s weapons of mass destruction (WYMD) and ballistic missile rograms probably are located in under round facilities but iieieii iiiiii _ nor intelligence sources have confirmed any WMD- or ballistic missile related underground facilities. " An August 2002 DL4 report noted that “Iraq has reportedly rebuilt its full ojfensive B W program in well-concealed, underground, mobile or dyficult-to- locate facilities " but went on to state that “no biological weapons (BW)—related underground facilities are currently confirmed to be in use in Iraq Amendment 81-82 -— Strike the above paragraph and insert - The intelli ence communi had lon assessed that the Ira i re ` e had hardened or under ound WMD stora e facilities and W"MD facilities dis ised as civilian installations both to im ede detection y ins ectors and intelli ence services and to rotect facilities from air attack. Intelli ence a encies assessed that Ira had dee l buried under ound facilities but had not identiied y of these facilities.2O4 The Defense Intelli ence A enc assessed in 2001 that "elements of the re `me’s wea ons of mass destruction ( W MQ) and ballistic missile ro ams robabl are located in under ound facilities " notin that "numerous re orts before and after DESERT SHIELD/ STORM mentioned the existence of nuclear biolo ` cal chemical and ballistic missile roduction and stora e sites that were shallow buried UGFs or in a few instances even de under ound facilities. The assessment also noted that i

have confirmed y WMD- or ballistic missile related under ound facilities." An Au st 2002 DIA re ort also discussed r orts of shallow and de l buried biolo `cal warfare facilities. The r ort said that "des ite these man credible re orts and no functionin biolo `cal wea ons B - related under ound facilities are currentl confirmed to be in use in Ira ".2°5 Comment- Despite fixes made to this paragraph based on our earlier comments, as draiied it still is far more dismissive of the intelligence community’s assessments of underground facilities than the assessments themselves were. The reports should use the language used in the analytic papers. ’°‘N1c, Denial and Deception Nm, 1998 2°5 DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December l4, 2001; DIA, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook, August 2002. iii

Amendment 83 Page 48, last paragraph — page 49, Erst paragraph - In November 2002, the National Intelligence Council noted in an assessment prepared in response to a request from the Secretary of Deknse, that "all the military and regime-associated UGFs [underground facilities] we have identyied thus far are vulnerable to conventional, precision-guided penetrating munitions because they are not deeply buried Amendment 83 — strike the above paragraph Comment- The November 2002 NIE was published two months after the Secretary spoke and is therefore irrelevant to what he said. In addition, only select information was taken from this NIE which gives a distorted picture of what the NIE said. The following relevant information was excluded: • "To date, the Community has located over 490 Iraqi operational UGFS associated with the military or the regime. • "We assess that Iraq has some large, deeply buried UGFS, but, because of the Iraqi denial and deception (D&D) program, we have not been able to locate any of these. • "All the military and regime-associated UGFs [underground facilities] we have identified thus far are vulnerable to conventional, precision-guided, penetrating munitions because they are not deeply buried. • "The number of UGFs identified and the suspected number of UGFs still tmlocated pose problems for effective operations of any UN inspection regime."2O6 206 National Intelligence Council, Implications of Iraqi Underground Facilities for US National Security, November 2002. 139

_ Amendment 85 Page 49-50, conclusions - Conclusion 5: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding Iraq ’s possession of weapons of mass destr·uction were generally substantiated by intelligence information, though many statements made regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected a higher level of certainty than the intelligence judgments themselves. Many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt that the Iraqi government possessed or was producing weapons of mass destruction. While the intelligence community assessed at this time that the Iraqi regime possessed some chemical and biological munitions, most reports produced prior to fall 2002 cited intelligence gaps regarding production and expressed room for doubt about whether production was ongoing. Prior to late 2002, the intelligence community did not collectively assess with any certainty that Iraq was actively producing any weapons of mass destruction. Amendment 85 — strike generally and strike everything after information Comment - We disagree with the use of the term "generally," because all of the statements were substantiated by the intelligence. Furthermore, the lack of identifying information about exactly which policymakers’ statements were viewed by the authors as reflecting a higher degree of certainty than the intelligence judgments makes it impossible for us to challenge the assertion (which we believe we could if the specific statements were identified). The conclusion is incorrect in asserting that there were "many statements regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002." This is simply false. None of the statements from this time period mentioned ongoing production at all. It is also false to state that "many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt" about Iraq’s possession of VVIVID. Only one policymaker used the term "no doubt" during this time period and it was in August 2002, not early 2002. This type of careless review certainly will be noticed by the readers of the report and harms the credibility of the Committee. We disagree with the comment that prior to 2002 the intelligence community "expressed room for doubt" about whether Iraq possessed chemical and biological munitions and believe, even if it were true, assessments prior to 2002 are irrelevant to what policymakers said in late 2002. We also disagree with including the comment that the intelligence community did not "collectively" assess that Iraq was actively producing any WMD. Whether the intelligence community had a "collective" judgment is irrelevant. The task of this report is not to look at only collective judgments; it is to examine available intelligence. 140

Amendment 86 Page 50, conclusions - Conclusion 6: The Secretary of Defense ’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WYWD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes was not substantiated by available intelligence information. While many intelligence analysts suspected that the Iraqi government might be using underground facilities to conceal WMD activities, no active underground WZMD facilities had been positively identyfied. Furthermore, none of the underground government facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be sa]% from conventional airstrikes. Amendment 86 — Strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 6: The Secreta of Defense’s statement that Ira i WMD facilities were not all vulnerable to attack from the air was substantiated y available intelli ence information. Comment — First, the Secretary did not say "conventional" airstrikes, he said that sites "were not all vulnerable to attack from the air." No intelligence assessments prior to the Secretary’s statement said that "none of the underground WMD facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be safe from conventional airstrikes." Furthermore, the Secretary was not only talking about facilities that were vulnerable due to being deeply buried. He also discussed facilities that were believed to have been located near mosques, schools, and hospitals which made them "not vuh1erable" to airstrikes unless we were willing