The Use by the Intelligence Committee of Information from the Iraqi National Congress   (SEARCHABLE TEXT CREATED BY GOOGLE)

 

 

Page 38
III. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE INC
A. INC Documents
(U) In early 2002, while managing the ICP, the Department of State
received one bundle of approximately 300 pages of mostly Arabic language
materials from the INC. This material was transferred to the Intelligence
Community for analysis in March 2002. The Department of State has informed
the Committee that it received no other documents from the INC.“’
(U) In August 2002, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) published a
memorandum, Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National
Congress, which offered a coordinated Intelligence Community assessment of the
material’s contribution to intelligence on Iraq. The Intelligence Community made
summary translations of the data - in some cases verbatim translations - and
analysts with Arabic language capability also reviewed the documents. The
material included reports on the Iraqi military order of battle and the Special
Security Organization, press clippings, meeting notes, and lists of alleged political
victims of the Ba’ath party. lo6 The following are the key points from the NIC
memorandum:
ii$etter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, April 25,2006.
Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, April 24,2004 and Responses to
questionsl@m Committee staff, November 25,2005.
Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, National Intelligence Council,
August 9,2002
Page 35
Page 39
The written material provided to the Intelligence Community (IC) by
the Iraqi National Congress contains little of current intelligence
value.
.
Overall, the order of battle information throughout the documents was
generally accurate - matching existing IC holdings that are based on
all-source reporting. In some significant areas that information;
although correct, is out of date and no longer useful.
.
An extensive report on the Iraqi Special Security Organization
contained numerous errors.
.
Some of the documents include long lists of names and titles, but few
have addresses or phone numbers that would increase their value.
The intelligence value of almost all the data provided by the INC is
diminished by our inability to assess the origin and authenticity of the
documents. None of the documents, except press clippings, has
sourcing or attribution that can be verified or traced.
.
The numerous press clippings included are openly available through
the Internet or the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.ro7
(U) The DIA received documents from INC-affiliated sources before and
during its official management of the ICP. In each case documents were
disseminated as reporting from sources or as attachments to the source
lo7 Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National Congress,
National Intelligence Council,
August 9,2002.
Page 36
Page 40
reporting.“* Such reporting is described below in more detail. The CIA told the
Committee it did not receive any documents from the INC after 1998.1°9
B. INC-Affiliated Sources
(U) The primary goals of the ICP were to maintain contact with Iraqi
dissidents, collect information from them on the activities of the Saddam Hussein
regime, and disseminate that information as widely as possible.“’ At the time the
Department of State managed and funded the program, it did not act as a
mechanism for the ICP to get its information to the Intelligence Community,
except in the one case described above when it received ICP documents. Instead,
the ICP used a “publicity campaign” to bring sources to the attention of “anyone
who would listen,” which included the media, Congress, members of the
Intelligence Community and other government agencies, think-tanks, and other
interested parties.“’
(U) Through this publicity campaign, the INC brought six sources to the
attention of the U.S. Intelligence Community, either directly or through current
and former U.S. officials. Intelligence Community agencies met with and
debriefed five of the six individuals. The sixth individual was said to be planning
to defect, but never did. Details of the reporting from all five sources, their use in
108
DIA Response to questions from Committee staff, January 17,2006. After the start of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, the DIA did receive caches of documents from the INC, totaling over 3,000 boxes. These documents were
reviewed through DIA’s document exploitation program. Documents were examined for content and those of
potential intelligence value are summarized, digitized, and posted to the IC’s HARMONY database. Post-Operation
Iraqi Free&m information, including documents, provided by the INC is not the subject of this inquiry.
CIA Response to questions from Committee staff, December 1,2005.
‘lo INC Proposal for a Grant Awarded by the U.S. Department of State to the INCSF to Advance and
Establishl($erational Programs, 2000,and staff interview with INC official, December 6,2006).
Staff interview with INC official, December 6,2005 and Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January
3 1,2006.
Page 37
Page 41
finished intelligence products, and a description of the would-be defector are
outlined in detail below.
(U) None of the intelligence reports from the five sources indicated that the
individuals were affiliated with the INC in the reports’ source descriptions. The
DIA said they did not note an opposition affiliation because the sources were not
INC members.‘12 The CIA, which disseminated reporting from one of the sources,
did not note the defector’s INC affiliation, although one CIA report from this
defector did cornrnent that an INC-affiliated translator participated in a press
interview with the source. CIA told the Committee that although the source was a
referral from an INC-affiliated defector, CIA did not know how much, if any,
support the source received from the INC. Although not specifically identified as
INC-affiliated in the intelligence reporting, the information from all five sources,
in some cases including their names and information about their contact with the
Intelligence Community, appeared in numerous press articles as a result of the
INC publicity campaign. Accordingly, the press stories alerted analysts to the
sources’ INC affiliations which were noted in numerous intelligence assessments
that used the information from the INC sources.’ l3
(U) The Intelligence Community, particularly the CIA, believed that the
INC’s efforts to publicize defector information undermined the INC’s credibility.
A July 2002 NIC Memorandum noted, “the INC’s pursuit of publicity has
undermined intelligence exploitation of these sources. The INC encouraged and
sometimes abetted the sources in contravening their agreements with the U.S.
’ l2 Staff interview with DIA officers, November 2005.
‘I3 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, CIA Internal
Memorandum, February 5, 2004, staff interview with CIA analysts, CIA, SP WR, Assessment of the Iraqi defector
, April 22,2002; CIA, SPWR, Iraqi defector
mpril8,2002; CIA, Iraqi Support to Terrorism, September 19,2002, p. 14, and January 29,2003, p.
17-18.
Page 38
Page 42
regarding secrecy. In one instance, the INC’s publicizing of the defector’s story
put his life in danger.“‘i4 According to the DIA, only one defector spoke to the
media after DIA asked him to refrain from doing so. Contact with that defector
was terminated, in part, as a result of the violation.‘i5 Details of that case, and any
other cases in which press articles are pertinent to the Intelligence Community’s
use of INC information or knowledge of the source’s INC affiliation, are described
below in further detail.
(U) The Intelligence Community used reporting from two of the INC-
affiliated sources in the October 2002 NIE on Iraq ‘s Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The two sources were not used as the primary
basis for any of the key judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
capabilities. In one case, reporting from an INC-affiliated defector was assessed
by analysts as corroborating other primary reporting about Iraq’s mobile biological
weapons production capabilities. In the other case, information from the defector
drove Intelligence Community concerns that an Iraqi facility may have had a
nuclear association.“6
(U) The CIA and the DIA used intelligence reporting from two INC-
affiliated sources in intelligence assessments that discussed alleged special
operations training of non-Iraqi Arabs at Iraq’s Salman Pak Unconventional
Military Training facility. Most of the assessments describe the sources as not
having direct access to the information and in some cases as “questionable” and
“exaggerated.” The CIA also included INC-supplied information in a 2003
assessment that the Saddam Hussein regime assassinated dissidents. This INC
i iz NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10, 2002, p. 1,
1 16 Staff interview with DIA officers, February 10,2006, p. 14-16.
National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October
2002, p. 20.
Page 39
Page 43
information was corroborated by a credible body of reporting from other
sources.117 The specific uses of INC-affiliated defector reporting related to these
issues are described in more detail below.
(U) The following section of the report provides detailed information on the
INC-affiliated sources, the information they provided, and how Intelligence
Community analysts and collectors used their information.
1. Source One
facilitated his travel to Asia and his introduction to the international media.
According to the DIA, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence notified the Director of DIA
that he had been contacted by former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) James
Woolsey about Source One.“’ Mr. Woolsey told Committee staff that he did not
recall making this referral to the Department of Defense, though he did not rule it
OUt.“g
‘17 CIA response to Committee questions, January 10,2006, p. 2.
’ ‘* Responses to questions from Committee staff, August 26,2005.
I lg Former DC1 James Woolsey met Ahmed Chalabi in the late 1990s when both men were witnesses
during a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs hearing on Iraq. Shortly
after the hearing, Mr. Chalabi called Mr. Woolsey seeking his legal assistance for eight members of the Iraqi
Opposition, including members of the INC, who had been detained in California by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Mr. Woolsey agreed to become co-counsel in the case, eventually winning the release of all
eight Iraqis by early 200 1. Mr. Woolsey told Committee staff that he came to know Mr. Chalabi slightly in the
course of that representation and came to know his clients well. Mr. Woolsey recalled receiving information on two
sources, and believed he received the information on one of them from one of his clients or from an INC
representative. He did not recall receiving any information on the sources from Mr. Chalabi, but said it was possible
Page 40
Page 44
m A team of analysts from several intelligence agencies worked with
DIA collectors to help vet and debrief Source One. The team’s preliminary
assessment of Source One was relayed to CIA headquarters on January 4,2002. It
said that while Source One “does not have access to specific programs at various
facilities, his knowledge of [facility] details, individual engineers, and
personalities could permit subject matter experts to analyze the data and
extrapolate broader program information.“‘20 DIA administered a polygraph of
Source One in early2Oi2, which he passed. 1
There were no other Intelligence
Community polygraphs of Source One prior to the DIA administered polygraph.‘2’
m On January 10,2002, the CIA reported that based on senior-level
discussions between the CIA and the DIA, “we are now considering this a joint
case.“122 The DIA produced and disseminated over 250 intelligence information
reports from Source One’s debriefings. CIA operations officers and analysts
participated in Source One’s debriefings and each report was sent to the CIA for
review and coordination before dissemination.‘23 The source description described
that he did. He said it was also possible that he had received information on three sources, but could only remember
receiving information on two. Mr. Woolsey said that in all cases he passed the information on to the Department of
Defense. He did not pass any information on to the CIA because he said the CIA tends to not talk to volunteers. He
said the CIA “likes to talk to people it can recruit and control, or liaison services, and neither of these seemed to be
under tha{2ategory.” Staff interview, December 6,2005.
12, CIA operational cable m, Jamtad, 2002.
, 22 Press stories alleging that Source One failed a CIA polygraph in December 200 1 are inaccurate.
123 CIA operational cable -anuary mOO2.
CIA operational cable m, September WOO2 and Staff interview with DIA officials.
Page 41
Page 45
c o n t r a c t o r a t s e v e r a l I r a q i W M D s i t e s , ]
3 124
the facilities in which he worked, personalities and organizations involved in these
facilities, the Iraqi Special Security Organization (SSO), and a variety of related
topics. The majority of reports disseminating from Source One’s debriefs focused
on facilities on which he had worked. The reporting described him as having
direct access to several Iraqi WMD sites.
(U) Two reports from this defector discussed suspect terrorist training sites
in Iraq. The first, dated January 2002, said that from 1997-1998, Afghan,
Pakistani, and Palestinian nationals were trained by the Fedayeen Saddam at an
Iraqi special forces training facility in Salman Pak, Iraq. The report said the camp
is “rumored to provide al-Qa’ida terrorist teams with training” and added, “many
Iraqis believe that Saddam Hussein had made an agreement with Usama bin Ladin
in order to support his terrorist movement against the U.S.125 The second report,
dated March 2002, provided the general locations of suspected Iraqi terrorist
training camps, including one at Salman Pak. The trainees were described as
members of various Iraqi groups including the Fedayeen Saddam and Iraqi Special
Security Forces. The comment section of the second report provided more detail
about how the defector obtained the information for the first report, noting that the
information about foreigners training at Salman Pak was from his personal
Page 42
Page 46
account while traveling the highway from one of his work sites to his home. The
other information was “common knowledge.“126
(U) In early 2002, after an article outlining Source One’s information about
suspect WMD facilities appeared in the media, foreign intelligence services began
contacting CIA for information about Source One.‘27 In mid-February, the CIA
began forwarding Source One’s reporting to two foreign intelligence services.‘28
(U) In March 2002, in preparation for a video teleconference to discuss the
new source, the DIA provided Intelligence Community counterparts with
information on Source One which noted that much of his information “has been
corroborated by the IC” and that he had been “vetted extensively” but noted that
he “does NOT have specific knowledge of concealed WMD/ballistic missile
locations.“‘29
m On March 6,2002, after receiving the DIA information, a
Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) nuclear analyst,
who had access to a copy of an
hat referenced Source One’s
information,‘30 forwarded the information to an INR chemical/biological weapons
analyst noting the following:
On the nuclear side, the source indeed has a remarkable memory and
has clearly been to many sites. His information is useful. But
126 DIA intelligence
127 CIA operational
128 CIA operational
‘29 DIA briefing slides, March 6,2002.
I30 The Department of State informed the Committee that the INR nuclear analyst does not recall how he
came into possession of the= document. The analyst presumed copies were distributed to other Intelligence
Community agenices.
Page 43
Page 47
beware, because he thinks any site being constructed by personnel
formerly connected to the nuclear-weapon program is, by definition, a
site for ongoing clandestine nuclear work. (Not necessarily so, esp.
since so many nuclear personnel have, since the early 199Os, been
assigned to non-nuclear infrastructure related tasks.) . . . Don’t know
if similar problems hold for the CBW areas as well.’
m A July 2002 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress
Defector Program, described Source One as “the most successful INC referral”
with “exceptional access to information of interest to the U.S. Intelligence
Communitv.” The assessment. coordinated onlv with the DIA. the CIA. and the
---------.---.,
-
,
d
,
,
FBI said, “
he had access to as many as 150 facilities
associated with conventional weapons and, to a lesser extent, to facilities
associated with Iraqi WMD programs.” The assessment further noted that Source
One’s:
Information is deemed highly credible and includes reports on a wide
range of subjects including conventional weapons facilities, denial
and deception; communications security; suspected terrorist training
locations; illicit trade and smuggling; Saddam’s palaces; the Iraqi
prison system; and Iraqi petrochemical plants. Many reports included
geo-coordinates, diagrams, and hand drawings. The source provided
13’ Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research e-mail, March 6,2002.
Page 44
Page 48
limited information regarding WMD facilities in Iraq, but he did not
have access to more specific information on Iraq’s WMD programs.‘32
(U) Following publication of the NIC Memorandum, the Director of the
Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues in INR
prepared, but never sent, a memorandum to the National Intelligence Officer for
Near East and South Asia to convey concerns about the NIC Memorandum, in
particular about the discussion of Source One’s information. The memorandum
outlined the concerns discussed in the INR analyst’s e-mail discussed previously
that Source One freauentlv assigned WMD purposes to facilities in which he
claims about WMD work at various facilities are not adequately substantiated in
our view.“133
a, Suspect Nuclear Facility Reporting
m The reports from Source One which garnered the most interest from
Intelligence Community analysts pertained specifically to a facility described in
the reports as the “[suspect] nuclear-related facility.” The intelligence reports,
dated in early 2002, described the location of the facility and security measures,
including high bridge walls to prevent drivers from viewing the site and the
presence of Iraqi intelligence security. Source One reported that there were
individuals associated with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission who were
working on the project. One of the reports noted that the facility was located on
132 NIC Memorandum,
The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program,
July 10,2002, p.2.
133 Draft INR Memorandum for NIO/NESAF, July 29,2002.
Page 45
Page 49
the eastern side of the Tigris river
m.134
(U) The Intelligence Community identified a site they believed matched
Source One’s description, however, there were several inconsistencies between
Source One’s reporting and the identified site. Source One reported that the
construction of the facility had begun in 1999, but construction on the site
identified by intelligence began in the summer of 1998. In addition, the facility
identified was located on the eastern side of the Tigris river, but Source One told
his debriefers he did not recall seeing the river adjacent to the construction site.
He described a concrete pit that exited one of the buildings and drained into an
open pit, which intelligence could neither confirm nor deny. Finally, Source One
drew a sketch of the site indicating at least six small buildings, but intelligence of
the site did not match his sketch. In each case these inconsistencies were included
in the reporting.i3’
(U) Source One’s reporting specifically on this facility was included in two
finished intelligence assessments, the October 2002 NIE on Iraq ‘s Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, and a DIA assessment, Iraq ‘s
Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, published a month earlier. The NIE
included a text box on the reporting on the facility entitled “New Nuclear
Facility?” The text box outlined several points about Source One’s reporting that
drove the Intelligence Community’s concerns that the facility may have been
nuclear related.
*34 DIA Intelligence Reports, July 2002
\
135 DIA Intelligence Reports, July
Page 46
Page 50
.
Four of the lead engineers for the project reportedly were associated with
the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.
.
The source indicated that he had seen cylinders at [the facility] in 2000 that
were similar to sketches of large uranium hexafluoride cylinders.
.
Several buildings reportedly were guarded by An-m Al Khas (the Special
Security Organization, SSO) and Manthuma Al Amn security personnel.
The text box also noted that:
The overall description of the site and the timelines of its construction
as described by the source were reasonably consistent with details
detected through [intelligence]. The site consists of several small
buildings of the shape and layout described by the defector, who
participated in [the facility’s] construction. The site was constructed
rapidly during the summer of 1998, although the defector claimed
construction had occurred in 1999. We judge that the defector may
have been confused about the year.
(U) The NIE concluded that “additional intelligence reporting is necessary
before we can confirm a nuclear association for [the facility].” Source One’s
reporting was not mentioned elsewhere in the NIE, was not included amongst the
four pages discussing facilities of concern, was not included in the key judgments,
and was not one of the six key elements underpinning the key judgment in the NIE
that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.‘36
136
National Intelligence Estimate,
Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,
October
2002, p. 20.
Page 47
Page 51
(U) In contrast to the carefully worded description of the suspect facility as
a possible nuclear facility in the NIE, the September 2002 DIA assessment said an
Iraqi defector “described a nuclear site near Baghdad” and “reportedly observed
new cylinders similar to those used to hold UF6.” The report noted that the
defector saw special security at the facility and individuals formerly associated
with Iraq’s nuclear program. The assessment concluded that the defector’s report
“suggests this site is either a uranium conversion or gas centrifuge facility.” A
picture of the site identified as possibly the suspect facility was included with a
caption that stated “this facility, just north of Baghdad, apparently is either a
uranium conversion facility or gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.“137
m In addition to the these two assessments, on October 17,2002, the
CIA published an assessment detailing the overall reporting of two Iraq sources,
one of which was Source One. The assessment noted that Source One was
debriefed by the CIA and the DIA and said the debriefers described him as
“cooperative and straightforward.” The assessment said that Source One did not
have access to information on the nature of the work being done at the facilities
where he worked, but then added:
Source One alleged was involved in nuclear-related activities. He
reportedly observed known nuclear-associated personnel and steel
containers labeled with radiation warning markings near two small
laboratories. We cannot determine the facility’s function m
m, but its location and heavy security are consistent with other
Iraqi WMD-capable facilities. We do not know what was in the
containers, but it could have been uranium hexaflouride or another
radioactive substance. Source One reported that he never observed
137 DIA, Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, September 2002, p. 10, 12.
Page 48
Page 52
WMD-related equipment installed in any sites he visited because his
work-
was usually
completed as the building was being constructed.13*
:ii CIA, SPWR, Terrorism: Question About the Two Iraqi Defectors, October 17, 2002.
SSCI transcript, Hearing on the History and Continuity of Weapons of Mass Destruction Assessments
Pertainin&o Iraq, June 19,2003, p.79.
,41 CIA, Response to questions from Committee staff, July 6,2006.
Page 49
Page 53
d. Postwar Findings
(U) According to the DIA, the U.S. 75* Exploitation Task Force and the
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) visited the suspect facility in the spring and summer of
2003 respectively. Inspectors “reported a walled probable government compound
with multiple security posts. Samples collected from the site tested positive for
naturally occurring uranium and U.S.-origin depleted uranium consistent with
samples collected elsewhere in Iraq and reflecting probably local soils and
contamination from U.S. depleted-uranium munitions. The samples did not reveal
any enriched uranium or non-U.S. depleted uranium.” No evidence was found to
support intelligence assessments that the site may have been involved in nuclear
IYJ Staff interview with CIA analysts, April 2 1,2006.
Page 50
Page 54
related work. The ISG also visited several other sites identified by Source One
and was able to confirm Source One’s information pertaining to those facilities.144
credibility issues with Source One, Intelligence Community elements brought
Source One to Iraq. When taken to the location Source One had described as the
suspect facility, he was unable to identify it. According to one intelligence
assessment, the “subject appeared stunned upon hearing that he was standing on
the spot that he reported as the location of the facility, insisted that he had never
been to that spot, and wanted to check a map.” Source One maintained that the
facility was in the area, and repeatedly pointed to the location on the map where he
said it was located. Intelligence Community officers confirmed that they were
standing on the location he was identifying.145
m During the same visit, when taken to a second facility Source One
had identified before the war, he was able to quickly identify a specific room
where he said he had worked. The Intelligence Communitv was able to
(U) A CIA nuclear analyst told Committee staff that when he visited the site
it was very much as Source One described it. He said he did not know how to
explain why Source One did not recognize the facility. He, and other officials
144
DIA Information Paper on Suspect Nuclear Site, Iraq, Ott 27,2005, and Committee staff interviews
with CIA,Bd DIA.
CIA Counterintelligence review of NFN800761, July 12,2004, section II.B.l.
14’ CIA Memorandum,
and Committee staff interviews with CIA and DIA.
Page 5 1
Page 55
fi-om the CIA and the DIA assessed that Source One may have been provided
information about the facility second hand.‘47
uring questioning, Source One
with the INC’s Washington Director
acknowledged contact
but denied that the
Washington Director directed Source One to nrovide
anv false information.
Staff interview with CIA analvsts.
Page 52
Page 56
m A July 2004 CIA review concluded that “while the subject has
provided a good deal of generally corroborated information relating to military
infrastructure and conventional facilities, his limited reporting on WMD-related
matters remains questionable and, on a nuclear facility m, demonstrably
incorrect. In the absence of any further [information from Source One we are] left
uncertain about the extent to which the INC influenced intelligence information
subject passed to the USG.““’
(U) An earlier CIA study on possible Iraqi opposition deception efforts,
dated March 8,2004, said that there were misconceptions about Source One’s
reporting that were related to possible “extrapolations” by analysts and case
officers.*52 The CIA study cited a February 5,2004 memorandum prepared by
CIA analysts who had participated in Source One’s debriefings from late January
to early February 2002. The memorandum stated that Source One did not provide
direct reporting on Iraqi WMD programs, but did provide reporting on Iraq’s
military-industrial facilities, many of which were assessed as capable of
supporting a WMD effort. The analysts wrote that Source One “did not [repeat]
not claim that any facility produced or worked on chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons. Those WMD connections were made by analysts and at times DIA
officers writing and disseminating the reporting.” The memorandum said that
Source One “never claimed any knowledge of nuclear weapons program-related
work at the facility. He simply identified what he thought was a suspect facility
and claimed that he saw engineers from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
there.” In addition, the memorandum noted that Source One had said he thought
he had seen something like uranium hexaflouride cylinders only after being shown
15’ CIA review, m, July
152 CIA internal memorandum,
12,2004, conclusions.
,
March 8,2004,
Page 53
Page 57
a picture of them by another CIA analyst, “one of the best, documented examples
of how [Source One] was asked leading questions by debriefers.” The
memorandum cites several instances of reports that described Source One as
having worked on “several Iraqi WMD sites” although the sites were not known to
have been WMD-related.‘53
(U) In the memorandum, the analysts admitted that they knew of no effort to
correct the mischaracterizations of Source One’s reporting. They said that the
“daily press of business and the fact that-with one well-known exception-his
reporting was not used in finished DI products, we did not fight to correct how
[his] reporting was characterized by collectors.” The memorandum did note that
there was one instance in which an effort was made to correct a factual error in
one of the reports. One of the CIA analysts told Committee staff that after
returning to Washington, he reviewed a report that incorrectly described the length
of a missile or rocket as ten meters long when Source One had said it was six
meters long and wrote to DIA about the error. The analyst did not know whether
the correction was made.ls4
The memorandum also discussed Source One’s connections
to the INC, noting that at the time of the debriefs he was:
up front about his ties to the INC, describing how the INC helped
him escape from Iraq, got him in contact with [DIA]B,
made him do an interview with [the press], and then abandoned him.
He explained that some of his earlier reporting was much more
inflammatory because that was what the INC told him to do, but
during our debriefs he carefully explained what he knew, did not
153 CIA internal memorandum, Februrary 5, 2004 and staff interview with CIA analysts.
Is4 Staff interview with CIA analysts, November 28, 2005.
Page 54
Page 58
know, and what he suspected, and why. We believed he was credible
because much of his information could be corroborated and his
information did not go beyond his purported access nor did he try to
embellish his reporting.‘55
(U) Finally, the analysts’ memorandum commented that Source One’s
prolific reporting was “not due to his wealth of knowledge, but partly to a
conscious effort to produce as many reports as possible . . . even if it meant
splitting up reporting on a particular topic.” The analysts told Committee staff
that they did not intend to suggest that Source One did not have a wealth of
knowledge, just that his wealth of knowledge did not pertain to WMD. The
analysts said they did not believe that breaking up the reporting hampered the
reporting and said “it didn’t really change anything.“ls6
(U) DIA officers dispute the analysts’ assertion that DIA collectors alone
were responsible for incorrectly characterizing Source One’s reporting. They told
Con-n&tee staff that DIA and CIA analysts were part of the debriefing team
because they were the subject matter experts. These analysts worked side by side
with the collectors, “collaboratively producing the reports, and before the reports
were released to us or before the reports were released for dissemination as formal
IIRs and they were [coordinated] by CIA . . . , there was a lot of scrutiny that went
into that reporting.” They told Committee staff that the source description which
said Source One worked on “several Iraqi WMD sites” was written overseas by
the debriefing team of analysts, collectors, and a reports officer.157 DIA officers
also said the reason analysts were asked to split Source One’s reporting into many
155
CIA internal memorandum,
vebruary 5,2004.
CIA internal memorandum, February 5, 2004 and staff interview with CIA analysts.
157 Staff interview with DIA offkers, November 2005 and staff interview with DIA offkers, February 10,
2006.
Page 55
Page 59
reports was that DIA attempts to write one report on one subject. The DIA codes
its reports to link them to specific collection requirements, so that one report will
respond to one specific requirement. The DIA officers said this was not an effort
to inflate report numbers for Source One.15*
(U) The CIA analysts told Committee staff that the analysts were not
involved in writing source descriptions or summaries. The analysts drafted the
main text of the reports and the DIA reports officer would take that text and cut
and paste it into a template for the intelligence report. The analysts said that after
they submitted the text, they did not have access to the reports again until they
were disseminated.‘59
m Regarding the overall authenticity of Source One’s reporting, the
DIA and the CIA agree with the conclusion of the CIA review that “there is little
doubt that subiect was in fact a lcontractor who worked at several Iraai facilities1
conventional facilities, areas that are cornrnensurate with his access, has generally
been corroborated.” The agencies believe that Source One had never been to the
facility they identified as the suspect facility and some believe he may have been
provided with information about the facility by someone else. The Intelligence
Community has never deemed Source One to be a fabricator and has not recalled
his reporting.
15* Staff interview with DIA officers, February 10,2006.
159 Staff interview with CIA analysts, November 28,2005.
Page 56
Page 60
2. Source Two
m Source Two
former Iraqi major,
was referred to DIA on February 8,2002. According to the DIA, the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications
and Intelligence had been contacted by former DC1 James Woolsey who said that
the INC had access to a potential source. The Principal Deputy passed the
information on to the DIA.16’ DIA officials met with INC representatives to
establish contact with Source Two.
(U) In February 2002, the CIA notified DIA that a private researcher had
interviewed Source Two earlier in the month. The CIA provided the DIA with a
copy of Source Two’s interview transcript which was reviewed by DIA analysts.
The interview contained information related to Iraqi biological, chemical, and
missile programs. DIA analysts prepared an assessment which noted that the
“source does not appear to have direct access to new Iraqi CW program
information” and “we question the source’s credibility on the CW-related activity
unless he can provide more compelling evidence to support his claim on chemical
weapons.” Regarding biological weapons, the assessment said, “the source
reported no new information on Iraq’s BW program. This source appears to have
information that-if deemed credible-may corroborate previous reporting
indicating Iraq employs transportable production trailers and mobile R&D
laboratories in its BW program.” The assessment said the source provided some
new reporting on a recent al-Abbas missile location and that the missile is
weaponized with VX, a claim considered suspect by the chemical analysts.‘6’
I60 DIA response to questions from Committee staff, December 14, 2005 (SSCI# 20054899). Mr.
Woolsey did not recall making this referral to the Department of Defense but did not rule it out. Staff interview with
Mr. woo g$y.
1
DIA, Analyst Review - webmary 2002 Iraqi National Congress Interview Transcript.
Page 57
Page 61
(U) DIA debriefed Source Two in the Middle East in late February 2002.
Source Two told DIA debriefers he was involved in procuring dual-use technology
in support of Iraq’s WMD program. During these debriefings, DIA asked Source
Two to refrain from talking to the media.162
(U) After several meetings with Source Two, the DIA debriefer began to
have concerns about his reliability, in particular that he may have been coached
and had embellished information, The DIA debriefer told Committee staff that
Source Two acted strangely and seemed “affected.“163 These concerns prompted
DIA to conduct a polygraph, which Source Two successfully passed.‘64
(U) In March 2002, with the DIA debriefer’s original concerns partly
allayed by the polygraph results, DIA disseminated two intelligence reports based
on Source Two’s inforrnation.‘65 One of the reports relayed information about the
activities of a department in the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) charged with
developing foreign business contacts willing to sell prohibited goods and
equipment to Iraq and to develop methods to secure hard currency in order to
finance illegal procurement. lfx The other report stated that in mid-1996 Iraq
decided to establish mobile biological research laboratories to evade United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections. The report contained
information on the planning, acquisition, manufacture, and storage of mobile
biological laboratories in Iraq and organizations and individuals involved in these
162 Staff interview with DIA officers, February 20,2004.
163 Staff interview with DIA officer, March 3 1,2006.
164 Staff interview with DIA, February
20,2004;
CIA, SPWR,
Assessment
of
the Iraqi defector m
m\pril
2002; and Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts f?om DIA and CIA, January
27, 2004.,65
Staff interview with DIA officer, March 3 1,2006.
I’6 DIA intelligence report, -arch 6,2002.
Page 58
Page 62
processes. The report did not state that the research pertained to biological
weapons research, just biological laboratories.‘67 Source Two’s DIA debriefer told
Committee staff he had the impression that Source Two was saying that the
purpose of the mobile biological labs was for weapons, but said that he is
confident the intelligence report said exactly what Source Two told him.‘68
m In both reports, Source Two was described as an “Iraqi
-officer with direct access. First-time reporter who is considered to be
reliable.” In the report on Iraq’s mobile biological research labs the comment
section also noted that the “source passed a [DIA]-administered polygraph
regarding information included in this report.“‘69
In mid-March 2002, the Intelligence Community learned that the
(U) On March 18,2002, the CIA told the DIA that, during a liaison meeting
earlier the same day, a foreign government intelligence service informed the CIA
that it had debriefed Source Two in December 2001 and believed he was largely
unreliable and partially fabricated the information he provided. The foreign
service reported that Source Two was unable to provide specific details on his
chain-of-command or the facilities where he claimed to have worked. The foreign
service said it did not publish any intelligence reports resulting from these
167
DIA intelligence report, -arch mOO2.
{ii Staff interview with DIA officer, March 3 1,2006.
DIA intelligence report,arcoo2.
Page 63
debriefings.‘70 On March 20,2002, the DIA directed that all contact with Source
Two cease.17’
(u) In March 2002, CIA’s Directorate of Operations notified CIA BW
analysts in an e-mail about the DIA and the foreign service’s concerns about
Source Two. All three CIA BW analysts told the Committee that they either
received the e-mail or knew about the concerns.‘72
m In April 2002, the CIA published two assessments on Source Two.
The first assessment, titled
noted that DIA debriefings of Source Two “ceased because of recent disclosures to
the press of the defector’s name and location and his relationship with the U.S.
Intelligence Community.” The assessment noted that the CIA assessed that some
of Source Two’s information may be accurate, especially regarding Iraq’s
procurement and construction of mobile laboratories, but added that he could have
learned that information from press reports. The assessment said that Source Two
passed a DIA administered polygraph, but the DIA debriefer had expressed
concern that Source Two was being coached by the INC to further its goals.‘73
m The second assessment was more expansive, stating that the DIA
had “terminated contact with Source Two after four meetings because of
suspicions he was a fabricator and because Source Two, against direction of his
handlers, continued to cultivate a public profile after the media disclosed his
‘70
I 7l DIA Information Memo-bebruary mOO4.
CIA, Assessment of the Iraqi defector
AprilmOO2;
NIC Memorandum, The Zraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, p.4; and CIA internal
memorandum
, March 8,2004-
:GfCIA response to questions from Committee staff, July 18,2006.
CIA, Iraqi defector in
April 2002.
Page 60
Page 64
contact with the U.S. Intelligence Community.” The assessment noted that the
foreign intelligence service also debriefed Source Two and assessed that he
fabricated at least some of his information.‘74 The assessment stated:
Source Two demonstrated a general understanding of Iraq’s WMD
infrastructure and procurement networks both in his public statements
and in his debriefings, but much of his information was in the public
domain. lacked sufficient detail to verifv his access. or was incorrect.
His position as a midlevel -officer suggests that he would
not have had direct access to a broad spectrum of compartmented
weapons programs. We have not used his information in finished
intelligence products.“175
(U) In May 2002, after lengthy coordination with the CIA’s Iraqi Operations
Group and Counter-proliferation Division, the DIA issued a “fabrication notice”
which said “we have determined that [Source Two] is a fabricator/provocateur”
and advised consumers that “his information is assessed as unreliable and, in some
instances, pure fabrication. We have determined that he had also been coached by
Page 61
Page 65
the Iraqi National Congress (INC) prior to his meeting with western intelligence
services.“‘77 DIA disseminated the fabrication notice to the all of the analytic
agencies that received the original intelligence reports on Source Two, including
CIA, DIA, and State INR, and cited the source identification numbers, reference
numbers, and titles of both original intelligence reports.‘78
(U) The DIA did not recall the original intelligence reports or reissue them
with a warning that Source Two was believed to be a fabricator. The DIA told
Committee staff, “we sent out a fabricator notice, not to necessarily recall the
information but to warn the intelligence community that some of his information
was suspect, that he may have been coached, and, . . . what his modus operandi
was.“‘79
(U) A July 2002 NIC Memorandum on the INC defector program also
outlined the Intelligence Community’s concerns about information from Source
Two, noting that DIA and the foreign intelligence service believed his information
was unreliable. The paper said that “although intelligence reporting on the mobile
labs was favorably received, this information is now considered suspect.“lsO
(U) Despite the warning from the Directorate of Operations in March 2002,
the April 2002 CIA assessments, the May 2002 DIA fabrication notice, the July
2002 NIC Memorandum all suggesting Source Two may have fabricated
information, and the fact that Source Two’s intelligence report never actually said
the labs were for biological weapons, Source Two was cited specifically in five
: ti DIA fabrication noti
DIA fabrication noti
I79 Staff interview with DIA officers, February 20,2004.
‘*’ NIC Memorandum,
The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program,
July 10,2002, p.3-4.
Page 62
Page 66
CIA intelligence assessments and the October 2002 NIE, as corroborating other
source reporting about a mobile biological weapons program.
@) One of the assessments, published in October 2002, WMD Association
at Presidential Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, did not cite Source
Two by name or note an INC-affiliation. The information from Source Two said,
“mobile BW laboratories, managed by key BW figure Rihab Taha, in 1998 were
stored in the Republican Palace garage when not in use, according to a former
Iraqi officer.“‘*’
m The other four assessments: Iraq: Expanding BW Capabilities in
July 2002; Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat in August
2002; Iraq’s BW Capabilities in October 2002; and Lessons Learned From Iraq’s
Past Efforts to Mask Its B W Program in November 2002, and the NIE, used
almost identical descriptions of Source Two’s information. The language in the
papers said that in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile laboratories for BW
agent research to evade UNSCOM inspections, according to
-Source Two, an Iraqi defector associated with the Iraqi National
Congress.“* The two papers described Source Two by name.
(U) Source Two was also one of the four HUMINT sources specifically
referred to in the part of Secretary Powell’s February 2003 speech before the UN
Security Council that discussed the mobile BW production units. Although a DIA
Division Chief, who was aware of the fabrication notice, attended two of the
18’CIA, WMD Association at Presidential Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, October 11, 2002.
182
National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October
2002, p. 43. (SSCI# 2002-4188); CIA IA, Lessons Learned From Iraq s Past Efforts to Mask Its B W Program,
November 11,2002, p, 6.; CIA IA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 1, 2002, p. 6;
and CIA, Iraq: Expanding B W Capabilities, July 15, 2002; and CIA, W&ID Association at Presidential Sites
Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, October 11,2002.
Page 63
Page 67
Powell speech coordination meetings on February 2 and 3,2003, he told
Committee staff that he was unaware that the source mentioned in the speech was
the same source about whom the fabrication notice had been issued and, therefore,
he did not raise any concerns about it. He told Committee staff that he was not
provided with the speech until he arrived at the meeting, that the source was not
specifically discussed, and that the speech did not indicate that the source was a
DIA source. He was later asked to clear about twenty reports for declassification,
including the Source Two report, but said he and a DIA declassification team only
examined the reports to determine whether their release would expose sources and
methods and did not notice that the report was the one on which the fabrication
notice had been issued.‘83
(U) The Iraq BW analysts from CIA, DIA, and State INR all acknowledged
that the fabrication notice was available in their message handling systems, but
they all said they did not see the notice. A joint CIA/DIA notification to the
Committee on January 27,2004 said that the fabrication notice had not come to
the attention of relevant analysts from the DIA or the CIA when Source Two’s
information was included in the NIE and Secretary Powell’s speech.184
(U) Two CIA analysts, one who was involved in coordinating the Powell
speech, said although they were aware in early 2002 that DIA and the foreign
intelligence service had concerns about Source Two’s reporting, they believed that
the reporting about the mobile labs remained plausible. They said that even
fabricators will usually have some truth in their stories. They said that if the
reporting has not been recalled, as long as the information was used with
appropriate caveats, it could continue to be used in finished intelligence reporting.
When asked why the caveats were not included in the Powell speech or explained
183 Staff interview with DIA offkers, June 3, 2004.
184 Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from DIA and CIA, January 27,2004.
Page 64
Page 68
to Secretary Powell, the analyst who coordinated the speech said that “we lost the
thread of concern . . . as time progressed I don’t think we remembered.” A CIA
supervisor noted that, “clearly we had it at one point, we understood, we had
concerns about the source, but over time it started getting used again and there
really was a loss of corporate awareness that we had a problem with the source.“185
(U) The analysts also noted that the original reporting was not recalled and
was not altered in any way to reflect the fact that a fabrication notice had been
issued. In addition, there was not a practice in Intelligence Community at the time
of electronically attaching a fabrication notice to the original reporting. As a
result, when analysts searched their electronic files even after the fabrication
notice had been issued, there was no indication of the notice.ls6
(U) The CIA and the DIA told the Committee in the January 2004 joint
notification that the May 2002 fabrication notice, “was intended to warn analysts
reviewing the IIRs that the source may be unreliable. Regrettably, the fabrication
notice overstated the reservation DIA had about the source.” The notification
added that the decision to issue the notice was based on a “determination he had
been coached by the INC,ls7 the fact that he was conveying similar information to
the news media, and the foreign intelligence service concerns, regarding the
veracity of Source Two’s reporting based on its prior experience with him, DIA
debriefers believed further questioning was appropriate.““’ Since Operation Iraqi
Is5 Staff interview with CIA analysts, July 26,2006, (2006-3248).
Is6 Staff interview with CIA analysts, July 26, 2006, (2006-3248).
’ 87 The DIA officer who debriefed Source Two told Committee staff that he believed Source Two showed
indications of having been coached, but that he had not assessed that the INC had coached him. Staff interview with
DIA offi?%\ March 3 1,2006.
Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts horn DIA and CIA, January 27,2004.
Page 65
Page 69
Freedom, the Intelligence Community has been trying, unsuccessfully, to locate
Source Two to seek further clarification of his reporting.‘89
3. Source Three
m On September 27,200 1, former DC1 James Woolsey contacted the
Director of the DIA to advise him that the INC had information about a possible
former Iraqi mfficer who had served as a liaison between Iraqi
intelligence and the Fedayeen Saddam from 1998 to 2000 and had information on
terrorist training in Iraq.19’ At the same time a Washington representative of the
INC contacted the CIA to alert them about the source and the source’s claim that
he had information on another individual from the training camp who was now
living in the United States.
m On September 28,200 1, DIA officers met with the INC’s
Washington representative; Haydr al Bandar, an INC employee who had spoken to
the defector on the telephone; and Dr. Chalabi.“’ According to both DIA officials
and Dr. Chalabi, at the meeting, Bandar provided DIA with the details about the
source, -Source Three, based on his phone call. Bandar said that
Source Three was a former Iraqi-lieutenant colonel who conducted
training of 70 non-Iraqi Arab terrorists at a special Iraqi training facility at Salman
Pak. Bandar said that Source Three observed the trainees receiving training on
aircraft hijackings. Bandar also reported that Source Three observed frogmen
training to blow up mock-ups of U.S. Navy vessels using underwater explosives
and booby traps at a separate facility. Following this training, 34 terrorists
departed Iraq for the UAE. These 34 terrorists were not identified by Bandar as
189 Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts f?om DIA and CIA, January 27,2004.
:if) DIA operational cab1
Septembem2001.
DIA operational cab1
September E200 1.
Page 66
Page 70
non-Iraqi Arabs.‘92 Later the same day, DIA officers sent a request to a CIA
station requesting the station’s opinion on meeting with Source Three in the
Embassy to debrief him on possible terrorist related information.‘93
(U) Using the information from al Bandar, the DIA disseminated two
intelligence reports. Both reports described the information from Bandar as from
“a former Iraqi citizen, [who] received this information from a subsource. Source
and subsource’s credibility have not been determined.” The reports did not
indicate that the source was a member of the INC or that the subsource was Source
Three. 194
(U) The first report, disseminated on September 29,2001, stated that Iraq
trained terrorists in hijacking operations at the Salman Pak intelligence training
facility and that seventy non-Iraqi Arabs trained at the camp, also in hijacking
procedures. The report said that the Iraqis used a second camp at Lake Tharthar
for underwater demolition training and that 34 individuals from this camp were
sent to the UAE in the winter of 2000. The report also said that Faruq Hijazi was
the liaison between Saddam and the terrorists and noted that Hijazi had met Usama
bin Ladin in Khandahar in December 1998.‘95 It is unclear if the report was
suggesting that Hijazi was Saddam’s liaison to the training camp terrorist or
terrorists in general. The second report from Bandar provided only one paragraph
of text identifying an Egyptian businessman who maintained a relationship with
the Iraqi intelligence service. 196
192 DIA operational cabl- September E200.
193 C I A o p e r a t i o n a l c a b l e , - , Septembem00 1.
194 DIA intelligence reports, September and October 2001
196 DIA intelligence report,
DIA intelligence report,
Page 67
Page 71
(U) DIA analysts used the first intelligence report in which Source Three
was the subsource in a Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary (DITSUM) on
September 30,2001, titled Terrorists Allegedly Training at Iraqi Camps.‘g7 The
DITSUM said “Salman Pak was purportedly used to train non-Iraqi Arabs in
hijacking operations while underwater demolition training took place at Lake
Tharthar.” The DITSUM comment noted that “there is presently no other
indication that terrorists are training at these facilities.“lg8
(U) On October 3,200 1, a CIA station which had been contacted about
Source Three by both the DIA and the CIA, asked CIA headquarters to have the
INC’s Washington representatives instruct Source Three to come to the U.S.
embassy in that country for an interview. On October 4,2001, the INC’s
Washington representative went to the Department of State to discuss Source
Three. A CIA officer also attended the meeting. The INC’s Washington
representative again noted that Source Three had information about an Iraqi
officer who had worked at a terrorist training facility, Salman Pak. An
operations cable about the meeting said, “this officer specialized in training non-
Iraqi Arabs in hijacking civil aircraft” and had relocated to the United States.“’ At
the meeting, the Department of State provided the INC’s Washington
representative with the telephone number of the FBI Legal Attache in the same
foreign country, with the direction that the INC’s representatives in that country
contact the Attache.200
(U) On October 5,2001, U.S. embassy officials received a Department of
State e-mail outlining Source Three’s information about the individual living in
‘g7 DIA, DITSUM,
Terrorists Allegedly Training at Iraqi Camps,
September 30,200l.
: ii DIA, DITSUM,
Terrorists Allegedly Training at Iraqi Camps,
September 30, 200 1.
2oo CIA operational cable,
CIA operational cable,
Page 68
Page 72
the United States. The e-mail said the FBI Legal Attache should expect a call
from an unnamed INC representative who had information on “Iraqi efforts to
train non-Iraqi Arabs to conduct airplane hijackings and other terrorist acts against
Americans.“201 Later that morning, an INC representative called the FBI Legal
Attache. The INC representative said he only had second or third hand knowledge
of the defector’s information and said his role was only in brokering an
introduction. The two made arrangements for a debriefing of Source Three.202
m On October 10,2001, the FBI Legal Attache debriefed Source
Three. According to the FBI reports about the debriefing, Source Three told the
FBI that he had worked for
was not a member of
the IIS. The FBI, which had primacy on the debrief because of Source Three’s
information on the individual in the United States, did not continue to pursue
discussions with him, noting that he was unable to provide specific information
pertaining to terrorist training activities.
(U) The FBI referred Source Three to the CIA and the DIA because he
demonstrated “a great deal of knowledge about Iraqi politics.“203 The FBI did
contact the individual in the United States who had been identified by Source
Three. The results of those interactions and other FBI and CIA contact with that
individual are outlined in the next section of the report.
(U) The CIA and the DIA continued to debrief Source Three about
information related to the Fedayeen Saddam organization and training. In
response to questions from the debriefers about INC attempts to coach Source
Three, he told the debriefers that his INC handler did not prime him with
:ii CIA operational cable,OctobeOOl.
CIA operational cable,
203 FBI, October 9,200l.
-0ctobemOO 1.
Page 69
Page 73
information or suggest topics to discuss with any U.S. authorities. Source Three
also told the debriefers that he had the impression his INC handler “cared more for
the U.S. than for his own INC.” 204
(U) In mid-October 200 1, following these debriefings, the DIA
disseminated an additional three reports based directly on Source Three’s
reporting. The reports described him as a “high-ranking Iraqi public official with
direct access to reported information. First time reporter who appeared reliable.”
None of the reports discussed Iraq’s suspected WMD programs.205
(U) The first report said that Kuwaiti prisoners were being held in two
separate locations in Iraq and identified Iraqi intelligence personnel responsible
for the prisoners.206 The second report discussed a special 520 member unit of the
Fedayeen Saddam, al-Qarai’a Force, which received specialized training in
commando skills, including airborne operations, underwater demolition, hand-to-
hand combat, explosives and sabotage. The report included the names of the top
30 members of the unit who were given UAE passports and were to deploy to the
UAE under the supervision of Iraqi intelligence. The report noted that the source
had no information on the mission or ultimate location of the unit members and
that as of October 2000 they had not deployed.207 The third report described
Fedayeen Saddam training at the IIS training facility Salman Pak and said Source
Three observed individuals he believed to be non-Iraqi Arabs training in an
abandoned aircraft shell. He believed they were either Egyptians, Gulf Arabs, or a
mixture of the two, based solely on their dialect and appearance. The report
provided additional information on the Qaria’a force, stating that the recruits
204 CIA operational cable, m, Octobem00 1.
205
DIA
2002
206
intelligence reports
DIA intelligence report 2002,m.
207 DIA intelligence report 2002,
Page 70
Page 74
received training in “explosives to booby-trap vehicles, preparation of suitcase
bombs, and aircraft security operations” which Source Three believed involved
both defensive and offensive training.208 The DIA told the Committee that
analysts determined the intelligence reports related to the Fedayeen Saddam
organization and training were “of value.”
(U) In November 200 1, the CIA published an assessment of the Salman Pak
facility titled Iraq: Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training Facility. The
assessment noted that since the September 11 attacks, defectors of questionable
reliability claimed that Salman Pak was used to train non-Iraqis. The report
included Source Three’s information that:
Approximately 520 Special Operations recruits of the Saddam
Fedayeen were permanently based at Salman Pak, where they
received training on the use of explosives to booby trap vehicles,
preparation of suitcase bombs, and aircraft security operations. The
same source indicated that in 2000 he observed non-Iraqi Arabs -
reportedly Egyptians or Gulf Arabs- training on the abandoned
aircraft at the facility. 209
(U) The report concluded that “since the Salman Pak facility is used by a
number of different organizations-and various reports have indicated foreign
activity at the site in the past-the reports of non-Iraqi Arabs receiving training
cannot be discounted.“210
208 DIA intelligence report 2002,m.
$ CIA, Iraq: Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training Facility, November BOO 1.
CIA, Iraq: Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training Facility, NovembemOOl
Page 71
Page 75
(S) On December 6,200 1, a foreign intelligence service told the CIA that
their Iraqi contacts in m said that the CIA was working with Source Three.
The foreign service noted that they had previously obtained intelligence from him
which had been shared with the CIA.212 In a written response to questions from
Comrnittee staff about this reporting, the CIA said the foreign service usually does
not provide the name of their sources. The CIA was able to find four reports from
the service dated from March through October 2001 that are sourced to a Fedayeen
Saddam officer who left Iraq in late 2000 and whose reporting was similar to
Source Three’s. All three reports were disseminated by the CIA as intelligence
reports.
211
i:: CIA operationalcable,-, December1200 1.
Page 72
Page 76
response from CIA’s Counterterrorism Center stated that the
information would not be disseminated because the information was previously
reported in DIA channels. The response added that Source Three “is under the
Page 73
Page 77
influence/control of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not considered to be
very credible.“220
m Following his debriefings with U.S. intelligence, Source Three’s
story began to appear in the press. The CIA judged the press reports to be more
sensational than the accounts provided to the Intelligence Community. In January
2002, the CIA published an intelligence assessment which described the
Intelligence Community’s contact with Source Three and a description of the
contents of a media story.
The assessment
said, “the information Source Three provided to debriefers was less sensational,
more detailed, and more credible than depicted in recent [press].” The assessment
pointed out several discrepancies between the two accounts:
The magazine reported that Source Three was a Brigadier General in
the Iraqi intelligence service who personally directed a special
operations unit in Saddam’s Fedayeen, the al-Qarai’a Force, which
trained to conduct airborne operations, underwater demolition,
sabotage, and VIP security. Source Three told debriefers that he was
never an intelligence officer and never controlled these forces.
The magazine indicated that the al-Qaria’a force consisted of 1,200
personnel stationed at the IIS’s Salman Pak special operations facility
who were trained for suicide missions. Source Three told debriefers
that the al-Qaria’a force was composed of only 520 personnel capable
of unconventional warfare missions but trained more as an internal
security force. He opined that perhaps two men out of a hundred
would actually perform suicide missions if directed,
Page 74
Page 78
The intelligence assessment concluded that:
Source Three’s claim that the Fedayeen has a special unit trained for
special operations,
is consistent with
other intelligence reporting, but the precise mission, size, location,
equipment, and intended targets of this unit are unclear. [Other
intelligence] -shows a special operations training
facility
hat includes a village mock-up, a derelict
aircraft, and string of three railcars identified by Source Three.
- Several Iraqi security organizations use the-facility.
Source Three’s report of non-Iraqis training there is possible, but
Source Three was clear that he had no firsthand information linking
activities at [the facility] to 11 September.223
intelligence report based on information from Source Three about suicide
i:t CIA, Iraq: Defector
CIA, Iraq: Defector m, Januaa 2002. ’
January I, 2002.
Page 75
Page 79
commandos preparing for missions abroad in 2000, this time from a station
contact.224 An operations cable accompanying the report said that the station
contact attributed the information to a subsource, Source Three, and noted that
headquarters had previously decided not to disseminate comparable information
from the same subsource. CIA operations cables do not clarify whether the
station contact obtained the information directly from Source Three, or from press
accounts of Source Three’s information. The station contact said that he was not
affiliated with the INC, but was a member of the Officers Movement for Salvation
of Iraq, a separate Iraqi opposition group. He said his group was being actively
courted by, but had not joined with, the INC.
(U) On February 6,2002, CIA’s Iraq Operations Group (IOG) disseminated
a cable attempting to surnmarize the Intelligence Community’s various
interactions with Source Three and the station contact. The cable outlined the
IOG’s conclusion regarding Source Three that:
Although we can verify a few elements of his story, we have
determined that much of his information is inaccurate and appears
aimed at influencing U.S. (and probably western) policy on Iraq. The
fact that he has reiterated this same story to numerous
audiences-including the media-had further damaged his credibility
with our service
a. Mistaken Identity
(U) On June 7,2002, another CIA station requested a name trace on a
former Iraqi military officer,
According to a station
ii;’ CIA operational cable, mebruary mOO2.
CIA operational cable, mebruary 12002.
Page 76
Page 80
asset, the
individual fled Iraq to Europe miaa number
of other countries.
The same day, the CIA’s
Iraq Operations Group responded to the station that headquarters “is quite familiar
with subject . . . whose name is [Source Three.] . . . [Two other CIA stations] are
likewise very familiar with Source Three, and we find it rather telling that he
neglected to mention to the Immigration Service [in the country where the station
was located] that he has been debriefed in both of those locations. We have no
information that he has spent any time in [one of the countries mentioned in the
cable], and we assess his story in ref to be entirely fabricated.” The cable advised
the station against any contact with him.226 In a response to Committee staff
questions about why the Iraq Operations Group was so certain that the station
contact was the same individual as Source Three, especially considering that the
personal data and the reporting from the two did not match, CIA noted that “in
hindsight, it is possible that there were in fact two individuals, as Arabic names
are often very alike.“227
(U) Similarly, in August 2002, a CIA domestic station wrote to CIA
headquarters requesting assistance in accessing or interviewing an unnamed
defector discussed in the media. The station noted that an FBI office was very
interested in information the defector was said to have on the Muiahideen e Khalq
(MEK), an Iranian opposition group
.228 The CIA’s Iraq
Operations Group responded on September 6,2002 that “the individual referred to
in ref is [Source Three], a former Iraqi Fedayeen Saddam officer who did, in fact,
flee to Europe in mid-2001 .” The Iraq Operations Group outlined its assessment
226 CIA operational cable, m, June& 2002.
227 Responses to Additional Requests Concerning the Iraqi National Congress, February 28,2006.
228 CIA operational cable,
August a, 2002.
Page 77
Page 81
that Source Three embellished his access and.advised against further contact.229 In
fact, the subject of the media article was not Source Three, it was Source Two.
b. Intelligence Assessments
(U) CIA analysts included Source Three’s information in three extensive
assessments about Iraq’s links to al-Qa’ida, a June 2002 paper, Iraq and al-
Qa ‘ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, and September 2002 and January 2003
versions of Iraqi Support for Terrorism. All three assessments noted that
reporting surged after September 11,200 1 from Iraqi defectors claiming that al-
Qa’ida and other non-Iraqi Arabs engaged in special operations training at Salman
Pak.230 The two Iraqi Support for Terrorism papers more explicitly described the
information as:
Press and sensitive reporting about al-Qa’ida activity at
Salman Pak-ultimately sourced to three Iraqi
defectors-surged after 11 September. The defectors
claimed that al-Qa’ida and other non-Iraqis engaged in
special operations training at Salman Pak. It was
subsequently determined, however, that at least one of
these defectors, whose story appeared in [the media], had
embellished and exaggerated his access. The other two
reported similar information but apparently did not have
229 CIA operational cabl-, September mOO2.
230
CIA,
Iraq and al-Qa ‘ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship,
June
2
1,2002, p.
6;
CIA,
Iraqi Support
for Terrorism,
September 19,2002, p. 14; and January 29,2003, p. 17-18.
Page 78
Page 82
first-hand access to it. No al-Qa’ida associates detained since 11 September
have said they trained at Salman Pak.231
(U) All three defectors referenced were affiliated with the INC. The first of
the three defectors, described as having embellished and exaggerated his access, is
Source Three. CIA officials told Committee staff that the comment that he had
“embellished and exaggerated” his access referred to the press stories, not to his
debriefings with the Intelligence Community. In addition, these officials
acknowledged that they do not know that it was Source Three who exaggerated,
only that they believe the press story was an exaggerated verison of what Source
Three told his Intelligence Community debriefers.232 The second of the three
defectors referenced in the paper was also debriefed by the Intelligence
Community agencies and is described in further detail below as Source Four.
m The Intelligence Community did not debrief the third defector and
does not know his identity. The CIA paper’s reference to his reports refers to
information from the defector that appeared in media stories. When asked by
Committee staff how the CIA could judge that this defector “apparently did not
have first-hand access” when no CIA nersonnel had ever snoken to him. CIA
23’ CIA, Iraqi Supportfor Terrorism, September 19,2002, p, 14 and January 29,2003, p. 17-18. The last
sentence y&the September version stated “no al-Qa’ida associates detained since 11 September reinforced them.”
233 Interview with CIA officials, February 2006.
Interview with CIA officials, February 2006.
Page 79
Page 83
(U) Despite the assertion in Iraqi Support to Terrorism that the “defectors
claimed that al-Qa’ida and other non-Iraqis” trained at Salman Pak, Committee
staff found no reports from these defectors claiming that it was members of al-
Qa’ida who received the training. In fact, Source Three and Source Four (who is
discussed below) specifically told their debriefers that they did not know whether
the non-Iraqi Arabs were al-Qa’ida members.236
@ The Intelligence Community did not have any further direct contact with
Source Three after
Intelligence Community has no information on his
location after that time. 237
“’ CIA intellieence reDor&.
237 CIA operatyonal cable,-, Septembea 2002.
Page 80
Page 84
4. Source Four
(u) In October 2001, -SourceFour, a
former Iraqi Fedayeen Saddam captain, living in the United States, was referred to
the Intelligence Comrnunity by Source Three as someone who could confirm
Source Three’s story. He provided Source Four’s name, address and telephone
number to the debriefers.
m Before the any members of the Intelligence Cornmunity met with
Source Four, the INC arranged a meeting between him and a U.S. journalist.
During the meeting, an INC member acted as the interpreter and several INC
officials participated in the discussion. The CIA received an advance copy of a
draft media article based on the interview with Source Four. According to a CIA
cable about the article, it said Source Four was an Iraqi terror school instructor and
said that the methods used at the training school, in mraq, were similar
to those used by September 11 hijackers. A CIA cable discussing the draft article
Page 85
noted that CIA debriefers had been notified about Source Four from another Iraqi
defector, Source Three (see previous discussion), who had referred Source Four
because he was -Commander’s deputy at the training camp and
would have a good overview of the training there. Source Three said that Source
Four had no terrorist connections. 239
d>
The FBI and the CIA debriefed Source Four in October 2001. The FBI
report from the interview says that Source Four was an Iraqi army Captain who
brought his
personnel to-he camp as part of their training in 1995. The FBI report
said that the purpose of the Fedayeen, according to Uday Hussein, was to strike
against America and American interests. Source Four said the camp had a train, a
bus, and a Boeing 707 aircraft to train in hijacking operations. Source Four was
not a terrorist instructor, but did provide his soldiers with weapons training.240
(U) The FBI report said Source Four saw the hijacking training of his
soldiers which included training to gain control of the cockpit using any type of
weapons they could get, including guns, knives, sticks, or toy guns. Source Four
said Iraqi intelligence also trained non-Iraqi Arabs in hijacking techniques at this
facility. Source Four told the FBI that he had no specific information that tied the
training he observed directly to the September 11 attacks, but said the training he
saw was nearly identical to the methods used by the September 11 terrorists.24’
m The CIA has not provided the Committee with contemporaneous
operations traffic that discusses its interview with Source Four. The CIA did
disseminate three intelligence reports from Source Four’s debriefs prior to
239 CIA operational cable, mctober mO01.
240 FBI Interview of Source Four, October 30,200 1.
241 FBI: Interview of Source Four, October 30,200l.
Page 82
Page 86
Operation Iraqi Freedom, however. The first report, dated October 3 1,2001, said
that the former Fedayeen Saddam captain said U.S. news accounts of his activities
at the training camp
ad been distorted because the INC
translator involved in the press interviews had distorted what he said. This was
the only mention of the source’s DE-affiliation in any of the three disseminated
reports.242 The report said that Source Four had never provided training in terrorist
techniques. He oversaw two groups of Fedayeen Saddam trainees, taking care of
their administrative needs and providing rifle and pistol training. He was at the
camp for only eight months, but did observe Iraqi intelligence trainers teaching
techniques for hijacking aircraft, buses and trains. The report also said he
occasionally observed men he believed to be non-Iraqi Arabs receiving terrorist
training in these tactics. He observed between 70-75 non-Iraqi Arab trainees, He
could not evaluate their nationalities, nor whether any of them participated in the
September 11 attacks. The source description said Source Four was “a contact
with excellent access who spoke in confidence but who does not have an
established reporting record.“243
(U) The second report described details of a typical training day at the
camp. The report described a typical camp hijacking scenario which would
involve a five-member team, two to control the crew and three to control the
passengers. The report said that between 1994 and 1995 approximately 75 non-
Iraqi Arabs or Arab extremists trained at the camp.244 The third report provided
information on the Fedayeen Saddam and locations associated with the Fedayeen
Saddam and the Ba’ath Party in Baghdad and another Iraqi city.245
242
In a response to questions from Committee staff, CIA said it omitted Source Four’s INC affiliation from
its report&q because CIA did not know how much, if any, support Source Four had received t?om the INC.
244 CIA intelligence report,
CIA intelligence report,
245 CIA intelligence report,
Page 83
Page 87
m The CIA included reporting from Source Four’s debriefs in the
assessment on the -facility describing him as a former Iraqi Saddam
Fedayeen captain who observed 70-75 non-Iraqi Arabs receiving terrorist training
at Salman Pak from October 1994 to May 1995. “According to the former captain,
his role has been distorted in open source accounts, which described him as
training members of Saddam’s Fedayeen to conduct kidnappings, assassinations,
and hijacking operations. He insists his duties were strictly administrative in
nature, aside from instructing recruits in marksmanship training.“246
(U) The CIA case officer who debriefed Source Four told Committee staff
that Source Four did not say that he knew his remarks had been distorted, rather
that Source Four believed he had been distorted because after some of Source
Four’s short responses, the INC translator would speak in English for long
periods.247
(U) Committee staff reviewed a tape recording of a press interview with
Source Four in which several INC officials participated and an INC member
translated. A U.S. government contract translator reviewed the tape recording and
told Committee staff that the defector was not mistranslated. In a few cases the
translator added “definitely” to the defector’s response and added “all over the
world” to his comment that the terrorist training was intended to target American
interests and the American military. Neither Source Four, nor the translator, ever
claimed that the defector provided the terrorist training himself, only that he was at
the camp where such training was provided and that he was at the camp for only a
year. In several instances the translator responded to the reporter’s questions
without actually asking the defector, most often because the defector had already
246 CIA intelligence assessment,
EOOl a?& CIA, I
rag and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murb Relationship,
June 2 1,2002, p 6.
Staff interview with CIA officer.
ovember
Page 84
Page 88
responded to the question previously. Much of the interview involved the INC
officials providing information about another INC-affiliated source.248
(U) The CIA included the intelligence reports from Source Four’s
Intelligence Community debriefs in three comprehensive assessments about Iraq’s
links to al-Qa’ida that included Source Three’s information: the June 2002, Iraq
and al-Qa ‘ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, and September 2002 and
January 2003 versions of Iraqi Support for Terrorism. 24g
m Source Four is one of the two “other” defectors cited in the Iraqi
Support for Terrorism papers as follows:
[Three] defectors claimed that al-Qa’ida and other non-
Iraqis engaged in special operations training am
mt was subsequently determined, however, that at
least one of these defectors, whose story appeared in the
media
had embellished and
exaggerated his access. The other two reported similar
information but apparently did not have first-hand access
to it.250
(U) Because Source Four’s source description said he had “excellent
access,” Committee staff asked for the basis for saying in Iraqi Support to
Terrorism that he “apparently did not have first-hand access to” the information.
248
24g Source Four press interview.
CIA,
Iraq and al-Qa ‘ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship,
June 2 1,2002, p 6.
250
CIA,
Iraqi Support to Terrorism,
September 19,2002, p. 14 and January 29,2003, p. 17-18.
Page 85
Page 89
CIA officials told Committee staff the description was meant to indicate that he
did not personally provide the training.251
m In October 2002, the CIA published an assessment titled,
Terrorism: Question About the Two Iraqi Defectors. The assessment noted that
the CIA and the
FBI debriefed Source Four in October 2001and found him to be
“forthcoming and cooperative and assessed he was a dedicated regime opponent.”
The assessment outlined Source Four’s account to debriefers that media stories of
his activities at -he training camp “were distorted because his
statements had been mistranslated by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).“252
m The CIA and the FBI continued discussions with Source Four until
and during Operation Iraqi Freedom, particularly for assistance in contacting other
former Iraqi military officers.253 The CIA stopped contact with Source Four for
several months when Source Four moved in March 2002
-intending to work for the INC. Source Four returned to his
original location in December 2002, saying he had become disillusioned with the
INC and “its hollow promises of meaningful employment.“254
(U) In January 2003, Source Four told CIA and FBI debriefers that he had
received menacing phone calls from an individual he believed was Iraqi
intelligence requesting unspecified assistance. The individual called for a third
time on February lo,2003 and asserted that he was calling on behalf of the Iraqi
government which wanted a peaceful resolution to tensions with the U.S. Source
Four speculated that the Iraqi believed Source Four had a relationship with the
25* Staff interview of CIA officials, February 6,2006.
252
CIA,
Terrorism: Question About the Two Iraqi Defectors,
October 12002.
253 CIA operational cable,
254 CIA operational cable,
, February 12002.
, December mOO2.
Page 86
Page 90
U.S. government through which he could articulate his or Iraqi government
views.255
@ On February 17,2003,
he same Iraqi asked for Source
Four’s assessment of American views of war with Iraq and asserted that “Iraq was
providing true and accurate information to the UN inspectors and noted that Iraq
was ready for war.“256 A CIA domestic station requested a response from CIA
headquarters regarding continued interest in gauging the Iraqi intelligence
officer’s interest in meeting with U.S. government officials.
several concerns referenced in a separate cable, including Source Four’s past
exposure in the media and his employment with the INC, “we do not have any
operational interest in further pursuing [the suspected Iraqi intelligence officer] at
this time.“257
a. Postwar Information on Salman Pak
(U) A November 2003 assessment from DIA noted that postwar exploitation
of the facility found it “devoid of valuable intelligence.” The assessment added
that CIA exploitation “found nothing of intelligence value remained and assessed
the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) cleaned it out.” The DIA assessment concluded
that “we do not know whether the ex-regime trained terrorists on the aircraft at
Salman Pak. Intelligence of the Salman Pak facility in late April 2003 indicated
::i CIA operational cable,
February mOO3.
257 CIA operational cable,
February mOO3.
CIA operational cables, mebruary 12003 and February mOO3.
Page 87
Page 91
the plane had been dismantled. DIA and CENTCOM assess the plane was sold for
scrap.“258
(U) In a June 2006 response to questions from Comrnittee staff, DIA said it
has “no credible reports that non-Iraqis were trained to conduct or support
transnational terrorist operations at Salman Pak after 199 1. DIA assessed that
following Operation Desert Storm, Salman Pak became well known to the general
public as a center for terrorist training, weapons of mass destruction storage and
other sensitive activities. As a result, “fabricators and unestablished sources who
reported hearsay or thirdhand information created a large volume of human
intelligence reporting. This type of reporting surged after September 2001 and
continued well after the capture of Salman Pak.“259
(U) In June 2006, CIA told the Committee that:
There was information developed after OIF that indicated terrorists
were trained at Salman Pak; there was an apparent surge of such
reporting. As with past information, however, the reporting is vague
and difficult to substantiate. As was the case with the prewar
reporting, however, the postwar sources provided few details, and it is
difficult to conclude from their second-hand accounts whether Iraq
was training al-Qa’ida members, as opposed to other foreign
nationals. Postwar site exploitation of Salman Pak has yielded no
indications that training of al-Qa’ida linked individuals took place
there, and we have no information from detainees on this issue.260
258 Director for Intelligence (52) Memo to DEPSECDEF,
The Salman Pak
Facility, November 10,2003.
259 DIA Response to SSCI Question, June 7,2006.
260 CIA notes on Committee draft report, June 2006.
Page 88
Page 92
(U) The Iraq Survey Group found that an Iraqi intelligence directorate,
M 14, which was responsible for training and special operations missions, used the
Salman Pak facility to train Iraqis, Palestinians, Syrians, Yemeni, Lebanese,
Eqyptian, and Sudanese operatives in counter-terrorism, explosives, marksmanship,
and foreign operations.261
5. Source Five
m Source Five
-as referred to the DIA by the INC through the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs. The Assistant Secretary of Defense did
not recall making this referral to DIA. According to the DIA, Source Five had
been smuggled out of Iraq by the INC. The DIA debriefed the source from late
September through October 2002 and produced sixteen intelligence reports based
on Source Five’s debriefs on leadership atmospherics, routines, and various social
activities.262
(U) The source descriptions in the intelligence reports varied to some
extent. Most described Source Five as “a naturalized Iraqi citizen with direct
access to the highest levels of the Iraqi leadership. Source reliability has not yet
been determined.” Some of the reports added “information may be intended to
disinform.“263
261 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DC1 on Iraq’s WMD, Regime Strategic Intent
section a& 78.
263 DIA response to questions from Committee staff, December 14,2005.
DIA intelligence reports,-.
Page 89
Page 93
One DIA report described a debrief with Source Five in which the source claimed
to have seen Saddam meeting with a man, who Uday Hussein identified as bin
Ladin. Uday told Source Five he was there to discuss training of some of his
people in Iraq.265 Source Five passed a DIA administered polygraph in which the
source was questioned about provided reports, including the report on having seei
bin Ladin meeting with Saddam.266
(U) The comment section of the bin Ladin meeting report noted that it
appeared to the reporting officer that Source Five may have reconsidered how the
bin Ladin information was presented during the public disclosures and in the
interim, had prepared for the reporting officer a careful, somewhat circumscribed,
delivery of this part of the story. “Based on a preliminary examination, [Source
Five’s] travel documents appear to support the basic facts of how [Source Five]
left Iraq. The documents neither confirm nor deny the claim of long-term close
personal access to Saddam and his inner circle. Significant further vetting of
source is appropriate.“267
that Source Five’ bin Ladin story appeared to be more or less cogent, but was
perhaps contaminated with pockets of coached fabrications. DIA administered a
polygraph of Source Five in November 2002 in which the source was assessed to
and staff interview with DIA officers,
Novemb005
DIA intelligence report,-, September 12002.
Page 90
Page 94
believe what the source said to be true. Test administrators indicated that the
source had emotional and psychological issues which could affect test reliability
and the source’s perception of past events. DIA said that in light of the above
information, DIA officers included in disseminated reporting the notification that
Source Five was connected to the Iraqi opposition, was aware information was
being provided to the U.S. government, and that Source Five’s comments may
have been intended to influence as well as inform decision makers.268
(U) The bin Ladin-Saddam meeting report was the only terrorism related
report from this source. Source Five’s other reports focused on Saddam’s family
and associates and identified multiple facilities associated with the senior regime
leadership and security services. None of the reports related to w&ID.269
@ Following Source Five’s media appearance in 2002, CIA published an
assessment,
he
assessment noted that Source Five’s reports of a meeting between Saddam and bin
Ladin “have not been corroborated.” The assessment added that “sensitive
reporting of meetings between senior Iraqi officials and al-Qa’ida members
provide no indication that Saddam and Bin Ladin have met each other.“270
(U) CIA published another assessment after the DIA debriefed Source Five.
CIA noted that the source provided documents which substantiated the basic
framework of the story that Source Five lived and fled from Iraq. Source Five
provided telephone numbers, some of which were determined to be accurate and
showed familiarity with members of Saddam’s family. The assessment noted that
Source Five’s claims to DIA about meetings between Saddam and bin Ladin
268 DIA, Response to questions fi-om Committee staff, April 27,2006.
26g DIA, response to questions from Committee staff, September 30,2005.
270 CI
September pOO2, p. 1.
Page 91
Page 95
“differ from [media accounts] in terms of time, place, and number of meetings.
The [DIA] team says [Source Five’s] body language in this part of the debriefing
suggested [the source] was uneasy with the topic; team members assessed [the
source] might have reconsidered the statements to the press and prepared a careful
story for the [DIA] interview.“27*
6. The Would-Be Defector
m In July 2001, Ahmed Chalabi told an individual in the Department
of Defense272 he had information from an intermediary that a senior Iraqi diplomat
in Europe
anted to defect to the United States. DIA officers met with Chalabi to
discuss- thediplomat’spossible defection. Chalabi informed the DIA that the
diplomat had been directed by the Iraqi government to return to Baghdad with his
family in the next few weeks or possibly days because of an ongoing dispute with
the IIS station chief who was displeased with the diplomat’s refusal to do “nasty
things.” and because the Iraai rrovernment was disnleased with the diplomat’s iob
(U) The CIA Iraq Operations Group informed the DIA that it had no interest
in supporting resettlement of the diplomat because his academic background and
limited government experience indicated that he would be of no value to the
Intelligence Community. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications,and Intelligence and the DIA concurred that the
diplomat was not likely to have secrets that were of high intelligence value. The
27’ CIA,
ctobea 2002, p. 2.
272
DIA records do not indicate which o&e or who specifically at DOD made this referral.
273 NIC Memorandum,
The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program,
July 10,2002, p.4 and DIA
response to questions from Committee staff, December 14,2005.
Page 92
Page 96
diplomat never defected and neither CIA nor DIA officers ever met with him.274
No reporting resulted from this referra1.275
C. INC Reporting During DIA’s Management of the ICP
(U) As noted previously, the DIA officially took over management of the
ICP from the Department of State in late October 2002. Between that time and
before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DIA disseminated reporting from
fourteen other sources who were either members of or were associated with the
INC. In addition to the fourteen individuals, the DIA also disseminated four
prewar intelligence reports from a source number assigned to the INC organization
itself. The reports assigned to this source number resulted from CIA and DIA
meetings with several INC officials who “provided composites of what the INC
ICP had on hand concerning Iraq. . . . [DIA] is unable to attribute the reporting to
any single source within the INC’s ICP.“276
(U) According to the DIA, reporting from sources provided by the ICP
“covered a myriad of information and was not uniform in quality, accuracy, and
utility. In some cases it provided solid intelligence leads, corroborated other
information, and contributed to our knowledge base. In other cases, the
information was of low or no value.“277 DIA said its “experience with INC ICP
sources is similar to that with many HUMINT sources.“278
274 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, p.4.
275 CIA response to questions from Committee staff, January 18,2006.
276 DIA response to questions fi-om Committee staff, March 2006.
277 DIA Response to Questions for the Record, March 23,2004.
278 DIA Response to Questions for the Record, March 23,2004.
Page 93
Page 97
(U) Three of the four reports sourced to the INC organization identified the
reporting as from “a member of the Iraqi opposition who was aware his
information would reach the U.S. government and who may have intended the
comments to influence as well as inform.“279 One of the reports did not include
this warning, but did indicate that the source had “indirect access whose reliability
has yet to be determined.” This report, disseminated in November 2002, provided
information about the establishment of a “crisis management committee” in Iraq
which was responsible for preserving the life of Saddam and his family, protecting
Baghdad and other vital locations, and the “use of weapons of mass destruction.”
The report stated that Iraq possessed several thousand chemical weapons shells
filled with VX and mustard, as well as 320 biological shells filled with ebola and
anthrax.280 According to the DIA, the reference to the chemical weapons stockpile
was considered credible by DIA analysts and was included in threat briefings as an
example of reporting on the existence of a CW stockpile in Iraq. It was not cited
in any written assessments.281
(U) Two of the three reports which did note the source’s opposition
affiliation, both disseminated in December 200 1, provided a database and
handwritten charts depicting Saddam Hussein’s genealogy and a document
describing key personnel in Iraq’s intelligence and security services.282 The last
report, which also noted the source’s opposition affiliation, was attributed to a
subsource of undetermined reliability. The report said that Saddam Hussein had
told his closest friends and family members to stockpile water because he was
preparing to poison the water supply in Baghdad and Kurdish-controlled northern
279 DIA intelligence reports, 2003,
, DIA,
response JoCommittee staff request.
DIA intelligence report, sovember mOO2, DIA, response to Committee staff
request.
281 DIA response to questions from Committee staff.
282 DIA intelligence reports, 2003].
Page 94
Page 98
Iraq. The exact contaminant was not identified, but “is believed to be a biological
agent, possibly anthrax or a derivative of anthrax.“283
(U) The fourteen other sources reported on a variety of topics including
regime biographic and personality information, Saddam’s palaces, tribe loyalties,
Iraqi concealment efforts, prohibited procurement, the Fedayeen Saddam, military
order of battle, Iraqi intelligence, the movement of prohibited weapons, and the
locations of suspect WMD facilities.284
(U) According to DIA, the impact of reporting from INC-affiliated sources
varied substantially by issue. The quality and impact were higher for leadership
tracking, prisoners of war, and identification of medical facilities as compared to
military issues and WMD.285 INC sources in some cases provided verified and
useful information that directly supported contingency planning and operations for
Operation Iraqi Freedom. In other instances, the information was vague, incorrect,
or unverifiable.286
(U) INC-affiliated reporting was “highly useful,” according to the DIA, in
identifying important medical facilities. Reporting confirmed facility locations,
identified new facilities, and providing a means for de-conflicting previously
erroneous geographic coordinates provided by other sources. Most of the
information was used for no-strike targeting to avoid civilian casualties.287
283
DIA intelligence report, manum003.
284
DIA, response to Committee staff request.
285 DIA response to Committee staff questions, February 2004.
286 DIA, Iraq: INC Source Pre-War Intelligence Reporting, Response to SSCI request, December 13,2005.
287 DIA response to Committee staff questions, February 2004.
Page 95
Page 99
(U) Information provided by INC-affiliated sources was used to identify key
leadership residences, office locations, and clubs frequented by Saddam and his
sons. The information also helped analysts establish behavior patterns, in
particular, for the two sons. Reporting from several sources on Iraq’s internal
security apparatus was corroborated by either open or classified sources of
information and contributed to the Intelligence Community’s baseline
understanding of this issue. According to the DIA, information on internal
security was largely accurate.288
m Source Six
an Iraqi-born businessman, provided
twenty-three reports, almost exclusively on regime biographies and personalities.
One such report, in December 2002, identified an individual said to be in charge
of Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear programs. It provided no other WMD
related information.289 Another report, in February 2003, discussed Saddam
Hussein’s confidence in Faruq Hijazi for intelligence assessments. A source
comment noted that if Saddam wanted to build a relationship with bin Ladin, “he
would have picked Hijazi as his representative.” The report did not indicate that
Saddam did want to build a relationship with bin Ladin.
(U) The only report from Source Six that did not discuss regime
personalities, dated February 2003, said that some of the Iraqi population is
excited about the idea of removing Saddam Hussein from power and replacing him
with improved leadership. Source Six said the Iraqi people expect a U.S.
operation to take
about four weeks, and understand that a short U.S. presence after
that will be necessary. He said if the U.S. stays too long it may be viewed as an
occupation and said the U.S. should work closely with local officials to avoid that
:ii DIA response to Committee staff questions, February 2004.
290DIA intelligence report,
DIA intelligence report,
Page 96
Page 100
perception. The source said the Iraqi people will want a new government created
from officials in Iraq, not from Iraqi exiles who may “be seen as spies that are not
loyal to Iraq and are placed into a position by the USG as a puppet government.“291
The CIA included this report in a March 13,2003 paper, Iraq: Diaspora Brings
Tensions, Hope, as one of many sources used to support the judgment that Iraqis
would be threatened by an exile-led transitional authority. The citation said, “an
Iraqi businessman with high-level contacts inside Iraq says most Iraqis prefer a
new government composed of those now living in the country.“292
thirteen prewar reports on a variety of topics including a three part report on
prominent Iraqi tribes, Iraqi smuggling of prohibited materials, Iraqi intelligence
assassination teams sent to kill Iraqi opposition members, infighting within the
INC, and two reports on Iraq’s missiles. Source Seven is described in the
reporting as a Middle Eastern businessman with indirect access to the information.
After the first three reports, which did not indicate Source Seven’s INC affiliation,
all subsequent reporting carried the comment, “the source of this report is a
member of the Iraqi opposition who was aware that his/her comments would reach
the U.S. government and who may have intended the comments to influence as
well as inform.“293
(U) An October 2002 report from a Source Seven subsource said three Iraqi
Scud missile systems had recently deployed to Mosul, Iraq. The subsource
reported that the Scuds were capable of delivering chemical or biological
warheads and that the units were believed to have orders to fire on Turkey in the
staff.
:ii DIA intelligence report,sebruary 12003.
CIA, Diaspora Bring Tension, Hope, March WOO3 and CIA response to questions from Committee
293 DIA intelligence report,Bctober mOO2.
Page 97
Page 101
event of U.S. hostilities with Iraq. A November 2002 report, also from a
subsource, said that Qusay Hussein, Saddam’s son, had assumed control of Iraq’s
strategic rocket forces from the Iraqi army. The subsource believed Saddam made
this change because he did not trust the army to follow his orders and fire on
designated targets in neighboring countries in the event of an attack on Iraq. The
comment section of the report stated that the “source is unvetted. He is a member
of an Iraqi opposition group, and admittedly part of a faction that favors finding a
surgical means to remove Saddam Hussein and purge his close followers, instead
of achieving regime change through a large-scale attack. He therefore may have
intended his information to persuade that a military attack on Iraq could be too
risky.“294
m The DIA disseminated eight reports, all in late October and early
November 2002, from Source Eigh
logistics specialist for
the Iraqi military production agency. All of the reports described Source Eight as
a member of the Iraqi opposition. Source Eight reported almost exclusively on
Iraqi conventional weapons production facilities and told debriefers that he had no
knowledge of chemical, biological, or missile-related production, storage or hide
sites.295 He reported that a business associate told him Iraq was smuggling
“sanctioned” materials to Syria, which the individuals driving the materials
believed to be chemical and biological weapons.296 Another report from Source
Eight, attributed to a subsource, said that Iraqi intelligence officers provided
“bearded fundamentalist terrorists” in Kuwait with small arms and explosives in
the summer of 2002 to be used against U.S. forces in Kuwait.297
294
295 DIA intelligence report,
296 DIA intelligence report,
297 DIA intelligence report,
DIA intelligence report,
Page 98
Page 102
m Source
Qa’ida travel pattern
but none of the reported activities involved Iraq. The
reports included a number of enclosures
All of the
reports from Source Nine described him as a member of the Iraqi opposition.2g8
m The DIA disseminated two prewar reports from Source Ten m
. Both reports described him
as a member of the Iraqi opposition, in one case, a senior member. The first
report, dated November 2002 reported on Iraqi purchasing agents in Jordan
acquiring dual-use materials for Iraq. The report said Iraq had also successfully
obtained refurbished T-72 tank engines, anti-tank missiles, helicopter engines and
night vision goggles.2gg The second report, dated January 2003, was from a
subsource who allegedly worked on two Iraqi nuclear facilities described in the
report, Tuwaitha and Ameriyah. The report said unspecified nuclear activity was
rumored to have been occurring at the facility for two years, but was “definitely
operating” between April and June 2002 when radiation levels were above
acceptable safety standards.300
m The DIA disseminated one report from Source 1
mroviding the alleged daily routine of Uday Hussein. The report specified
that the source was “connected with the Iraqi opposition and was aware that
his/her comments would reach the U.S. government. He/she may have intended
the comments to influence as well as inform.“3o1
298
2ggDIA intelligence report, yovember 2002.
3oo DIA intelligence report,
301 DIA intelligence report,
DIA intelligence report,
Page 99
Page 103
m The DIA disseminated twenty-eight prewar intelligence reports
from Source Twelve
an INC handler. All
_^_
of the reports identified Source Twelve as a member of the Iraqi opposition.‘“’
Sixteen of the reports provided information from 1998 regarding Hussein family
residences, security at the residences, and the activities of the Hussein family at
the residences. One report identified the exact location where Saddam parked his
car within the Republican Palace, while visiting Uday.303 Another report identified
a security signature inside the Republican Palace that indicated when Saddam was
in the general area.3o4 The DIA told the Committee these reports were verified
A
through Bother intelligence reporting prior to the war.3o5
(U) Source Twelve also provided twelve reports from the translation of a
100 page Arabic document providing extensive order of battle information and
Iraqi government structure information including on Iraqi border forces,
Republican Guard Corps, the Special Security Organization, the General Security
Directorate, and Military Intelligence Directorate. These reports also described
the source as a member of the Iraqi opposition.306
Source
busine
b The DIA disseminated approximately 50 prewar reports from
: Thirteen
ho conducted
ss with Uday Hussein and other senior Iraqi officials
About half of the reports,
describe
the source as a member of the Iraqi opposition. The reports largely focused on the
Saddam family, in particular Uday Hussein’s lifestyle and habits, and Hussein
302
DIA. resDonse to Committee staff reauest. reDor& fi-om Source Twelve.
311; DIA response to questions from Committee staff.
DIA, response to Committee staff request, reports fi-om Source Twelve.
Page 100