The Use by the Intelligence Committee of Information from the Iraqi National Congress   (SEARCHABLE TEXT CREATED BY GOOGLE)

 

 

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III. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE INC
A. INC Documents
(U) In early 2002, while managing the ICP, the Department of State
received one bundle of approximately 300 pages of mostly Arabic language
materials from the INC. This material was transferred to the Intelligence
Community for analysis in March 2002. The Department of State has informed
the Committee that it received no other documents from the INC.“’
(U) In August 2002, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) published a
memorandum, Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National
Congress, which offered a coordinated Intelligence Community assessment of the
material’s contribution to intelligence on Iraq. The Intelligence Community made
summary translations of the data - in some cases verbatim translations - and
analysts with Arabic language capability also reviewed the documents. The
material included reports on the Iraqi military order of battle and the Special
Security Organization, press clippings, meeting notes, and lists of alleged political
victims of the Ba’ath party. lo6 The following are the key points from the NIC
memorandum:
ii$etter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, April 25,2006.
Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, April 24,2004 and Responses to
questionsl@m Committee staff, November 25,2005.
Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, National Intelligence Council,
August 9,2002
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The written material provided to the Intelligence Community (IC) by
the Iraqi National Congress contains little of current intelligence
value.
.
Overall, the order of battle information throughout the documents was
generally accurate - matching existing IC holdings that are based on
all-source reporting. In some significant areas that information;
although correct, is out of date and no longer useful.
.
An extensive report on the Iraqi Special Security Organization
contained numerous errors.
.
Some of the documents include long lists of names and titles, but few
have addresses or phone numbers that would increase their value.
The intelligence value of almost all the data provided by the INC is
diminished by our inability to assess the origin and authenticity of the
documents. None of the documents, except press clippings, has
sourcing or attribution that can be verified or traced.
.
The numerous press clippings included are openly available through
the Internet or the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.ro7
(U) The DIA received documents from INC-affiliated sources before and
during its official management of the ICP. In each case documents were
disseminated as reporting from sources or as attachments to the source
lo7 Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National Congress,
National Intelligence Council,
August 9,2002.
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reporting.“* Such reporting is described below in more detail. The CIA told the
Committee it did not receive any documents from the INC after 1998.1°9
B. INC-Affiliated Sources
(U) The primary goals of the ICP were to maintain contact with Iraqi
dissidents, collect information from them on the activities of the Saddam Hussein
regime, and disseminate that information as widely as possible.“’ At the time the
Department of State managed and funded the program, it did not act as a
mechanism for the ICP to get its information to the Intelligence Community,
except in the one case described above when it received ICP documents. Instead,
the ICP used a “publicity campaign” to bring sources to the attention of “anyone
who would listen,” which included the media, Congress, members of the
Intelligence Community and other government agencies, think-tanks, and other
interested parties.“’
(U) Through this publicity campaign, the INC brought six sources to the
attention of the U.S. Intelligence Community, either directly or through current
and former U.S. officials. Intelligence Community agencies met with and
debriefed five of the six individuals. The sixth individual was said to be planning
to defect, but never did. Details of the reporting from all five sources, their use in
108
DIA Response to questions from Committee staff, January 17,2006. After the start of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, the DIA did receive caches of documents from the INC, totaling over 3,000 boxes. These documents were
reviewed through DIA’s document exploitation program. Documents were examined for content and those of
potential intelligence value are summarized, digitized, and posted to the IC’s HARMONY database. Post-Operation
Iraqi Free&m information, including documents, provided by the INC is not the subject of this inquiry.
CIA Response to questions from Committee staff, December 1,2005.
‘lo INC Proposal for a Grant Awarded by the U.S. Department of State to the INCSF to Advance and
Establishl($erational Programs, 2000,and staff interview with INC official, December 6,2006).
Staff interview with INC official, December 6,2005 and Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January
3 1,2006.
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finished intelligence products, and a description of the would-be defector are
outlined in detail below.
(U) None of the intelligence reports from the five sources indicated that the
individuals were affiliated with the INC in the reports’ source descriptions. The
DIA said they did not note an opposition affiliation because the sources were not
INC members.‘12 The CIA, which disseminated reporting from one of the sources,
did not note the defector’s INC affiliation, although one CIA report from this
defector did cornrnent that an INC-affiliated translator participated in a press
interview with the source. CIA told the Committee that although the source was a
referral from an INC-affiliated defector, CIA did not know how much, if any,
support the source received from the INC. Although not specifically identified as
INC-affiliated in the intelligence reporting, the information from all five sources,
in some cases including their names and information about their contact with the
Intelligence Community, appeared in numerous press articles as a result of the
INC publicity campaign. Accordingly, the press stories alerted analysts to the
sources’ INC affiliations which were noted in numerous intelligence assessments
that used the information from the INC sources.’ l3
(U) The Intelligence Community, particularly the CIA, believed that the
INC’s efforts to publicize defector information undermined the INC’s credibility.
A July 2002 NIC Memorandum noted, “the INC’s pursuit of publicity has
undermined intelligence exploitation of these sources. The INC encouraged and
sometimes abetted the sources in contravening their agreements with the U.S.
’ l2 Staff interview with DIA officers, November 2005.
‘I3 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, CIA Internal
Memorandum, February 5, 2004, staff interview with CIA analysts, CIA, SP WR, Assessment of the Iraqi defector
, April 22,2002; CIA, SPWR, Iraqi defector
mpril8,2002; CIA, Iraqi Support to Terrorism, September 19,2002, p. 14, and January 29,2003, p.
17-18.
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regarding secrecy. In one instance, the INC’s publicizing of the defector’s story
put his life in danger.“‘i4 According to the DIA, only one defector spoke to the
media after DIA asked him to refrain from doing so. Contact with that defector
was terminated, in part, as a result of the violation.‘i5 Details of that case, and any
other cases in which press articles are pertinent to the Intelligence Community’s
use of INC information or knowledge of the source’s INC affiliation, are described
below in further detail.
(U) The Intelligence Community used reporting from two of the INC-
affiliated sources in the October 2002 NIE on Iraq ‘s Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The two sources were not used as the primary
basis for any of the key judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
capabilities. In one case, reporting from an INC-affiliated defector was assessed
by analysts as corroborating other primary reporting about Iraq’s mobile biological
weapons production capabilities. In the other case, information from the defector
drove Intelligence Community concerns that an Iraqi facility may have had a
nuclear association.“6
(U) The CIA and the DIA used intelligence reporting from two INC-
affiliated sources in intelligence assessments that discussed alleged special
operations training of non-Iraqi Arabs at Iraq’s Salman Pak Unconventional
Military Training facility. Most of the assessments describe the sources as not
having direct access to the information and in some cases as “questionable” and
“exaggerated.” The CIA also included INC-supplied information in a 2003
assessment that the Saddam Hussein regime assassinated dissidents. This INC
i iz NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10, 2002, p. 1,
1 16 Staff interview with DIA officers, February 10,2006, p. 14-16.
National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October
2002, p. 20.
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information was corroborated by a credible body of reporting from other
sources.117 The specific uses of INC-affiliated defector reporting related to these
issues are described in more detail below.
(U) The following section of the report provides detailed information on the
INC-affiliated sources, the information they provided, and how Intelligence
Community analysts and collectors used their information.
1. Source One
facilitated his travel to Asia and his introduction to the international media.
According to the DIA, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence notified the Director of DIA
that he had been contacted by former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) James
Woolsey about Source One.“’ Mr. Woolsey told Committee staff that he did not
recall making this referral to the Department of Defense, though he did not rule it
OUt.“g
‘17 CIA response to Committee questions, January 10,2006, p. 2.
’ ‘* Responses to questions from Committee staff, August 26,2005.
I lg Former DC1 James Woolsey met Ahmed Chalabi in the late 1990s when both men were witnesses
during a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs hearing on Iraq. Shortly
after the hearing, Mr. Chalabi called Mr. Woolsey seeking his legal assistance for eight members of the Iraqi
Opposition, including members of the INC, who had been detained in California by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Mr. Woolsey agreed to become co-counsel in the case, eventually winning the release of all
eight Iraqis by early 200 1. Mr. Woolsey told Committee staff that he came to know Mr. Chalabi slightly in the
course of that representation and came to know his clients well. Mr. Woolsey recalled receiving information on two
sources, and believed he received the information on one of them from one of his clients or from an INC
representative. He did not recall receiving any information on the sources from Mr. Chalabi, but said it was possible
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m A team of analysts from several intelligence agencies worked with
DIA collectors to help vet and debrief Source One. The team’s preliminary
assessment of Source One was relayed to CIA headquarters on January 4,2002. It
said that while Source One “does not have access to specific programs at various
facilities, his knowledge of [facility] details, individual engineers, and
personalities could permit subject matter experts to analyze the data and
extrapolate broader program information.“‘20 DIA administered a polygraph of
Source One in early2Oi2, which he passed. 1
There were no other Intelligence
Community polygraphs of Source One prior to the DIA administered polygraph.‘2’
m On January 10,2002, the CIA reported that based on senior-level
discussions between the CIA and the DIA, “we are now considering this a joint
case.“122 The DIA produced and disseminated over 250 intelligence information
reports from Source One’s debriefings. CIA operations officers and analysts
participated in Source One’s debriefings and each report was sent to the CIA for
review and coordination before dissemination.‘23 The source description described
that he did. He said it was also possible that he had received information on three sources, but could only remember
receiving information on two. Mr. Woolsey said that in all cases he passed the information on to the Department of
Defense. He did not pass any information on to the CIA because he said the CIA tends to not talk to volunteers. He
said the CIA “likes to talk to people it can recruit and control, or liaison services, and neither of these seemed to be
under tha{2ategory.” Staff interview, December 6,2005.
12, CIA operational cable m, Jamtad, 2002.
, 22 Press stories alleging that Source One failed a CIA polygraph in December 200 1 are inaccurate.
123 CIA operational cable -anuary mOO2.
CIA operational cable m, September WOO2 and Staff interview with DIA officials.
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c o n t r a c t o r a t s e v e r a l I r a q i W M D s i t e s , ]
3 124
the facilities in which he worked, personalities and organizations involved in these
facilities, the Iraqi Special Security Organization (SSO), and a variety of related
topics. The majority of reports disseminating from Source One’s debriefs focused
on facilities on which he had worked. The reporting described him as having
direct access to several Iraqi WMD sites.
(U) Two reports from this defector discussed suspect terrorist training sites
in Iraq. The first, dated January 2002, said that from 1997-1998, Afghan,
Pakistani, and Palestinian nationals were trained by the Fedayeen Saddam at an
Iraqi special forces training facility in Salman Pak, Iraq. The report said the camp
is “rumored to provide al-Qa’ida terrorist teams with training” and added, “many
Iraqis believe that Saddam Hussein had made an agreement with Usama bin Ladin
in order to support his terrorist movement against the U.S.125 The second report,
dated March 2002, provided the general locations of suspected Iraqi terrorist
training camps, including one at Salman Pak. The trainees were described as
members of various Iraqi groups including the Fedayeen Saddam and Iraqi Special
Security Forces. The comment section of the second report provided more detail
about how the defector obtained the information for the first report, noting that the
information about foreigners training at Salman Pak was from his personal
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account while traveling the highway from one of his work sites to his home. The
other information was “common knowledge.“126
(U) In early 2002, after an article outlining Source One’s information about
suspect WMD facilities appeared in the media, foreign intelligence services began
contacting CIA for information about Source One.‘27 In mid-February, the CIA
began forwarding Source One’s reporting to two foreign intelligence services.‘28
(U) In March 2002, in preparation for a video teleconference to discuss the
new source, the DIA provided Intelligence Community counterparts with
information on Source One which noted that much of his information “has been
corroborated by the IC” and that he had been “vetted extensively” but noted that
he “does NOT have specific knowledge of concealed WMD/ballistic missile
locations.“‘29
m On March 6,2002, after receiving the DIA information, a
Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) nuclear analyst,
who had access to a copy of an
hat referenced Source One’s
information,‘30 forwarded the information to an INR chemical/biological weapons
analyst noting the following:
On the nuclear side, the source indeed has a remarkable memory and
has clearly been to many sites. His information is useful. But
126 DIA intelligence
127 CIA operational
128 CIA operational
‘29 DIA briefing slides, March 6,2002.
I30 The Department of State informed the Committee that the INR nuclear analyst does not recall how he
came into possession of the= document. The analyst presumed copies were distributed to other Intelligence
Community agenices.
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beware, because he thinks any site being constructed by personnel
formerly connected to the nuclear-weapon program is, by definition, a
site for ongoing clandestine nuclear work. (Not necessarily so, esp.
since so many nuclear personnel have, since the early 199Os, been
assigned to non-nuclear infrastructure related tasks.) . . . Don’t know
if similar problems hold for the CBW areas as well.’
m A July 2002 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress
Defector Program, described Source One as “the most successful INC referral”
with “exceptional access to information of interest to the U.S. Intelligence
Communitv.” The assessment. coordinated onlv with the DIA. the CIA. and the
---------.---.,
-
,
d
,
,
FBI said, “
he had access to as many as 150 facilities
associated with conventional weapons and, to a lesser extent, to facilities
associated with Iraqi WMD programs.” The assessment further noted that Source
One’s:
Information is deemed highly credible and includes reports on a wide
range of subjects including conventional weapons facilities, denial
and deception; communications security; suspected terrorist training
locations; illicit trade and smuggling; Saddam’s palaces; the Iraqi
prison system; and Iraqi petrochemical plants. Many reports included
geo-coordinates, diagrams, and hand drawings. The source provided
13’ Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research e-mail, March 6,2002.
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limited information regarding WMD facilities in Iraq, but he did not
have access to more specific information on Iraq’s WMD programs.‘32
(U) Following publication of the NIC Memorandum, the Director of the
Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues in INR
prepared, but never sent, a memorandum to the National Intelligence Officer for
Near East and South Asia to convey concerns about the NIC Memorandum, in
particular about the discussion of Source One’s information. The memorandum
outlined the concerns discussed in the INR analyst’s e-mail discussed previously
that Source One freauentlv assigned WMD purposes to facilities in which he
claims about WMD work at various facilities are not adequately substantiated in
our view.“133
a, Suspect Nuclear Facility Reporting
m The reports from Source One which garnered the most interest from
Intelligence Community analysts pertained specifically to a facility described in
the reports as the “[suspect] nuclear-related facility.” The intelligence reports,
dated in early 2002, described the location of the facility and security measures,
including high bridge walls to prevent drivers from viewing the site and the
presence of Iraqi intelligence security. Source One reported that there were
individuals associated with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission who were
working on the project. One of the reports noted that the facility was located on
132 NIC Memorandum,
The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program,
July 10,2002, p.2.
133 Draft INR Memorandum for NIO/NESAF, July 29,2002.
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the eastern side of the Tigris river
m.134
(U) The Intelligence Community identified a site they believed matched
Source One’s description, however, there were several inconsistencies between
Source One’s reporting and the identified site. Source One reported that the
construction of the facility had begun in 1999, but construction on the site
identified by intelligence began in the summer of 1998. In addition, the facility
identified was located on the eastern side of the Tigris river, but Source One told
his debriefers he did not recall seeing the river adjacent to the construction site.
He described a concrete pit that exited one of the buildings and drained into an
open pit, which intelligence could neither confirm nor deny. Finally, Source One
drew a sketch of the site indicating at least six small buildings, but intelligence of
the site did not match his sketch. In each case these inconsistencies were included
in the reporting.i3’
(U) Source One’s reporting specifically on this facility was included in two
finished intelligence assessments, the October 2002 NIE on Iraq ‘s Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, and a DIA assessment, Iraq ‘s
Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, published a month earlier. The NIE
included a text box on the reporting on the facility entitled “New Nuclear
Facility?” The text box outlined several points about Source One’s reporting that
drove the Intelligence Community’s concerns that the facility may have been
nuclear related.
*34 DIA Intelligence Reports, July 2002
\
135 DIA Intelligence Reports, July
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.
Four of the lead engineers for the project reportedly were associated with
the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.
.
The source indicated that he had seen cylinders at [the facility] in 2000 that
were similar to sketches of large uranium hexafluoride cylinders.
.
Several buildings reportedly were guarded by An-m Al Khas (the Special
Security Organization, SSO) and Manthuma Al Amn security personnel.
The text box also noted that:
The overall description of the site and the timelines of its construction
as described by the source were reasonably consistent with details
detected through [intelligence]. The site consists of several small
buildings of the shape and layout described by the defector, who
participated in [the facility’s] construction. The site was constructed
rapidly during the summer of 1998, although the defector claimed
construction had occurred in 1999. We judge that the defector may
have been confused about the year.
(U) The NIE concluded that “additional intelligence reporting is necessary
before we can confirm a nuclear association for [the facility].” Source One’s
reporting was not mentioned elsewhere in the NIE, was not included amongst the
four pages discussing facilities of concern, was not included in the key judgments,
and was not one of the six key elements underpinning the key judgment in the NIE
that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.‘36
136
National Intelligence Estimate,
Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,
October
2002, p. 20.
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(U) In contrast to the carefully worded description of the suspect facility as
a possible nuclear facility in the NIE, the September 2002 DIA assessment said an
Iraqi defector “described a nuclear site near Baghdad” and “reportedly observed
new cylinders similar to those used to hold UF6.” The report noted that the
defector saw special security at the facility and individuals formerly associated
with Iraq’s nuclear program. The assessment concluded that the defector’s report
“suggests this site is either a uranium conversion or gas centrifuge facility.” A
picture of the site identified as possibly the suspect facility was included with a
caption that stated “this facility, just north of Baghdad, apparently is either a
uranium conversion facility or gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.“137
m In addition to the these two assessments, on October 17,2002, the
CIA published an assessment detailing the overall reporting of two Iraq sources,
one of which was Source One. The assessment noted that Source One was
debriefed by the CIA and the DIA and said the debriefers described him as
“cooperative and straightforward.” The assessment said that Source One did not
have access to information on the nature of the work being done at the facilities
where he worked, but then added:
Source One alleged was involved in nuclear-related activities. He
reportedly observed known nuclear-associated personnel and steel
containers labeled with radiation warning markings near two small
laboratories. We cannot determine the facility’s function m
m, but its location and heavy security are consistent with other
Iraqi WMD-capable facilities. We do not know what was in the
containers, but it could have been uranium hexaflouride or another
radioactive substance. Source One reported that he never observed
137 DIA, Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, September 2002, p. 10, 12.
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WMD-related equipment installed in any sites he visited because his
work-
was usually
completed as the building was being constructed.13*
:ii CIA, SPWR, Terrorism: Question About the Two Iraqi Defectors, October 17, 2002.
SSCI transcript, Hearing on the History and Continuity of Weapons of Mass Destruction Assessments
Pertainin&o Iraq, June 19,2003, p.79.
,41 CIA, Response to questions from Committee staff, July 6,2006.
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d. Postwar Findings
(U) According to the DIA, the U.S. 75* Exploitation Task Force and the
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) visited the suspect facility in the spring and summer of
2003 respectively. Inspectors “reported a walled probable government compound
with multiple security posts. Samples collected from the site tested positive for
naturally occurring uranium and U.S.-origin depleted uranium consistent with
samples collected elsewhere in Iraq and reflecting probably local soils and
contamination from U.S. depleted-uranium munitions. The samples did not reveal
any enriched uranium or non-U.S. depleted uranium.” No evidence was found to
support intelligence assessments that the site may have been involved in nuclear
IYJ Staff interview with CIA analysts, April 2 1,2006.
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related work. The ISG also visited several other sites identified by Source One
and was able to confirm Source One’s information pertaining to those facilities.144
credibility issues with Source One, Intelligence Community elements brought
Source One to Iraq. When taken to the location Source One had described as the
suspect facility, he was unable to identify it. According to one intelligence
assessment, the “subject appeared stunned upon hearing that he was standing on
the spot that he reported as the location of the facility, insisted that he had never
been to that spot, and wanted to check a map.” Source One maintained that the
facility was in the area, and repeatedly pointed to the location on the map where he
said it was located. Intelligence Community officers confirmed that they were
standing on the location he was identifying.145
m During the same visit, when taken to a second facility Source One
had identified before the war, he was able to quickly identify a specific room
where he said he had worked. The Intelligence Communitv was able to
(U) A CIA nuclear analyst told Committee staff that when he visited the site
it was very much as Source One described it. He said he did not know how to
explain why Source One did not recognize the facility. He, and other officials
144
DIA Information Paper on Suspect Nuclear Site, Iraq, Ott 27,2005, and Committee staff interviews
with CIA,Bd DIA.
CIA Counterintelligence review of NFN800761, July 12,2004, section II.B.l.
14’ CIA Memorandum,
and Committee staff interviews with CIA and DIA.
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fi-om the CIA and the DIA assessed that Source One may have been provided
information about the facility second hand.‘47
uring questioning, Source One
with the INC’s Washington Director
acknowledged contact
but denied that the
Washington Director directed Source One to nrovide
anv false information.
Staff interview with CIA analvsts.
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m A July 2004 CIA review concluded that “while the subject has
provided a good deal of generally corroborated information relating to military
infrastructure and conventional facilities, his limited reporting on WMD-related
matters remains questionable and, on a nuclear facility m, demonstrably
incorrect. In the absence of any further [information from Source One we are] left
uncertain about the extent to which the INC influenced intelligence information
subject passed to the USG.““’
(U) An earlier CIA study on possible Iraqi opposition deception efforts,
dated March 8,2004, said that there were misconceptions about Source One’s
reporting that were related to possible “extrapolations” by analysts and case
officers.*52 The CIA study cited a February 5,2004 memorandum prepared by
CIA analysts who had participated in Source One’s debriefings from late January
to early February 2002. The memorandum stated that Source One did not provide
direct reporting on Iraqi WMD programs, but did provide reporting on Iraq’s
military-industrial facilities, many of which were assessed as capable of
supporting a WMD effort. The analysts wrote that Source One “did not [repeat]
not claim that any facility produced or worked on chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons. Those WMD connections were made by analysts and at times DIA
officers writing and disseminating the reporting.” The memorandum said that
Source One “never claimed any knowledge of nuclear weapons program-related
work at the facility. He simply identified what he thought was a suspect facility
and claimed that he saw engineers from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
there.” In addition, the memorandum noted that Source One had said he thought
he had seen something like uranium hexaflouride cylinders only after being shown
15’ CIA review, m, July
152 CIA internal memorandum,
12,2004, conclusions.
,
March 8,2004,
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a picture of them by another CIA analyst, “one of the best, documented examples
of how [Source One] was asked leading questions by debriefers.” The
memorandum cites several instances of reports that described Source One as
having worked on “several Iraqi WMD sites” although the sites were not known to
have been WMD-related.‘53
(U) In the memorandum, the analysts admitted that they knew of no effort to
correct the mischaracterizations of Source One’s reporting. They said that the
“daily press of business and the fact that-with one well-known exception-his
reporting was not used in finished DI products, we did not fight to correct how
[his] reporting was characterized by collectors.” The memorandum did note that
there was one instance in which an effort was made to correct a factual error in
one of the reports. One of the CIA analysts told Committee staff that after
returning to Washington, he reviewed a report that incorrectly described the length
of a missile or rocket as ten meters long when Source One had said it was six
meters long and wrote to DIA about the error. The analyst did not know whether
the correction was made.ls4
The memorandum also discussed Source One’s connections
to the INC, noting that at the time of the debriefs he was:
up front about his ties to the INC, describing how the INC helped
him escape from Iraq, got him in contact with [DIA]B,
made him do an interview with [the press], and then abandoned him.
He explained that some of his earlier reporting was much more
inflammatory because that was what the INC told him to do, but
during our debriefs he carefully explained what he knew, did not
153 CIA internal memorandum, Februrary 5, 2004 and staff interview with CIA analysts.
Is4 Staff interview with CIA analysts, November 28, 2005.
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know, and what he suspected, and why. We believed he was credible
because much of his information could be corroborated and his
information did not go beyond his purported access nor did he try to
embellish his reporting.‘55
(U) Finally, the analysts’ memorandum commented that Source One’s
prolific reporting was “not due to his wealth of knowledge, but partly to a
conscious effort to produce as many reports as possible . . . even if it meant
splitting up reporting on a particular topic.” The analysts told Committee staff
that they did not intend to suggest that Source One did not have a wealth of
knowledge, just that his wealth of knowledge did not pertain to WMD. The
analysts said they did not believe that breaking up the reporting hampered the
reporting and said “it didn’t really change anything.“ls6
(U) DIA officers dispute the analysts’ assertion that DIA collectors alone
were responsible for incorrectly characterizing Source One’s reporting. They told
Con-n&tee staff that DIA and CIA analysts were part of the debriefing team
because they were the subject matter experts. These analysts worked side by side
with the collectors, “collaboratively producing the reports, and before the reports
were released to us or before the reports were released for dissemination as formal
IIRs and they were [coordinated] by CIA . . . , there was a lot of scrutiny that went
into that reporting.” They told Committee staff that the source description which
said Source One worked on “several Iraqi WMD sites” was written overseas by
the debriefing team of analysts, collectors, and a reports officer.157 DIA officers
also said the reason analysts were asked to split Source One’s reporting into many
155
CIA internal memorandum,
vebruary 5,2004.
CIA internal memorandum, February 5, 2004 and staff interview with CIA analysts.
157 Staff interview with DIA offkers, November 2005 and staff interview with DIA offkers, February 10,
2006.
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reports was that DIA attempts to write one report on one subject. The DIA codes
its reports to link them to specific collection requirements, so that one report will
respond to one specific requirement. The DIA officers said this was not an effort
to inflate report numbers for Source One.15*
(U) The CIA analysts told Committee staff that the analysts were not
involved in writing source descriptions or summaries. The analysts drafted the
main text of the reports and the DIA reports officer would take that text and cut
and paste it into a template for the intelligence report. The analysts said that after
they submitted the text, they did not have access to the reports again until they
were disseminated.‘59
m Regarding the overall authenticity of Source One’s reporting, the
DIA and the CIA agree with the conclusion of the CIA review that “there is little
doubt that subiect was in fact a lcontractor who worked at several Iraai facilities1
conventional facilities, areas that are cornrnensurate with his access, has generally
been corroborated.” The agencies believe that Source One had never been to the
facility they identified as the suspect facility and some believe he may have been
provided with information about the facility by someone else. The Intelligence
Community has never deemed Source One to be a fabricator and has not recalled
his reporting.
15* Staff interview with DIA officers, February 10,2006.
159 Staff interview with CIA analysts, November 28,2005.
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2. Source Two
m Source Two
former Iraqi major,
was referred to DIA on February 8,2002. According to the DIA, the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications
and Intelligence had been contacted by former DC1 James Woolsey who said that
the INC had access to a potential source. The Principal Deputy passed the
information on to the DIA.16’ DIA officials met with INC representatives to
establish contact with Source Two.
(U) In February 2002, the CIA notified DIA that a private researcher had
interviewed Source Two earlier in the month. The CIA provided the DIA with a
copy of Source Two’s interview transcript which was reviewed by DIA analysts.
The interview contained information related to Iraqi biological, chemical, and
missile programs. DIA analysts prepared an assessment which noted that the
“source does not appear to have direct access to new Iraqi CW program
information” and “we question the source’s credibility on the CW-related activity
unless he can provide more compelling evidence to support his claim on chemical
weapons.” Regarding biological weapons, the assessment said, “the source
reported no new information on Iraq’s BW program. This source appears to have
information that-if deemed credible-may corroborate previous reporting
indicating Iraq employs transportable production trailers and mobile R&D
laboratories in its BW program.” The assessment said the source provided some
new reporting on a recent al-Abbas missile location and that the missile is
weaponized with VX, a claim considered suspect by the chemical analysts.‘6’
I60 DIA response to questions from Committee staff, December 14, 2005 (SSCI# 20054899). Mr.
Woolsey did not recall making this referral to the Department of Defense but did not rule it out. Staff interview with
Mr. woo g$y.
1
DIA, Analyst Review - webmary 2002 Iraqi National Congress Interview Transcript.
Page 57
Page 61
(U) DIA debriefed Source Two in the Middle East in late February 2002.
Source Two told DIA debriefers he was involved in procuring dual-use technology
in support of Iraq’s WMD program. During these debriefings, DIA asked Source
Two to refrain from talking to the media.162
(U) After several meetings with Source Two, the DIA debriefer began to
have concerns about his reliability, in particular that he may have been coached
and had embellished information, The DIA debriefer told Committee staff that
Source Two acted strangely and seemed “affected.“163 These concerns prompted
DIA to conduct a polygraph, which Source Two successfully passed.‘64
(U) In March 2002, with the DIA debriefer’s original concerns partly
allayed by the polygraph results, DIA disseminated two intelligence reports based
on Source Two’s inforrnation.‘65 One of the reports relayed information about the
activities of a department in the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) charged with
developing foreign business contacts willing to sell prohibited goods and
equipment to Iraq and to develop methods to secure hard currency in order to
finance illegal procurement. lfx The other report stated that in mid-1996 Iraq
decided to establish mobile biological research laboratories to evade United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections. The report contained
information on the planning, acquisition, manufacture, and storage of mobile
biological laboratories in Iraq and organizations and individuals involved in these
162 Staff interview with DIA officers, February 20,2004.
163 Staff interview with DIA officer, March 3 1,2006.
164 Staff interview with DIA, February
20,2004;
CIA, SPWR,
Assessment
of
the Iraqi defector m
m\pril
2002; and Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts f?om DIA and CIA, January
27, 2004.,65
Staff interview with DIA officer, March 3 1,2006.
I’6 DIA intelligence report, -arch 6,2002.
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processes. The report did not state that the research pertained to biological
weapons research, just biological laboratories.‘67 Source Two’s DIA debriefer told
Committee staff he had the impression that Source Two was saying that the
purpose of the mobile biological labs was for weapons, but said that he is
confident the intelligence report said exactly what Source Two told him.‘68
m In both reports, Source Two was described as an “Iraqi
-officer with direct access. First-time reporter who is considered to be
reliable.” In the report on Iraq’s mobile biological research labs the comment
section also noted that the “source passed a [DIA]-administered polygraph
regarding information included in this report.“‘69
In mid-March 2002, the Intelligence Community learned that the
(U) On March 18,2002, the CIA told the DIA that, during a liaison meeting
earlier the same day, a foreign government intelligence service informed the CIA
that it had debriefed Source Two in December 2001 and believed he was largely
unreliable and partially fabricated the information he provided. The foreign
service reported that Source Two was unable to provide specific details on his
chain-of-command or the facilities where he claimed to have worked. The foreign
service said it did not publish any intelligence reports resulting from these
167
DIA intelligence report, -arch mOO2.
{ii Staff interview with DIA officer, March 3 1,2006.
DIA intelligence report,arcoo2.
Page 63
debriefings.‘70 On March 20,2002, the DIA directed that all contact with Source
Two cease.17’
(u) In March 2002, CIA’s Directorate of Operations notified CIA BW
analysts in an e-mail about the DIA and the foreign service’s concerns about
Source Two. All three CIA BW analysts told the Committee that they either
received the e-mail or knew about the concerns.‘72
m In April 2002, the CIA published two assessments on Source Two.
The first assessment, titled
noted that DIA debriefings of Source Two “ceased because of recent disclosures to
the press of the defector’s name and location and his relationship with the U.S.
Intelligence Community.” The assessment noted that the CIA assessed that some
of Source Two’s information may be accurate, especially regarding Iraq’s
procurement and construction of mobile laboratories, but added that he could have
learned that information from press reports. The assessment said that Source Two
passed a DIA administered polygraph, but the DIA debriefer had expressed
concern that Source Two was being coached by the INC to further its goals.‘73
m The second assessment was more expansive, stating that the DIA
had “terminated contact with Source Two after four meetings because of
suspicions he was a fabricator and because Source Two, against direction of his
handlers, continued to cultivate a public profile after the media disclosed his
‘70
I 7l DIA Information Memo-bebruary mOO4.
CIA, Assessment of the Iraqi defector
AprilmOO2;
NIC Memorandum, The Zraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, p.4; and CIA internal
memorandum
, March 8,2004-
:GfCIA response to questions from Committee staff, July 18,2006.
CIA, Iraqi defector in
April 2002.
Page 60
Page 64
contact with the U.S. Intelligence Community.” The assessment noted that the
foreign intelligence service also debriefed Source Two and assessed that he
fabricated at least some of his information.‘74 The assessment stated:
Source Two demonstrated a general understanding of Iraq’s WMD
infrastructure and procurement networks both in his public statements
and in his debriefings, but much of his information was in the public
domain. lacked sufficient detail to verifv his access. or was incorrect.
His position as a midlevel -officer suggests that he would
not have had direct access to a broad spectrum of compartmented
weapons programs. We have not used his information in finished
intelligence products.“175
(U) In May 2002, after lengthy coordination with the CIA’s Iraqi Operations
Group and Counter-proliferation Division, the DIA issued a “fabrication notice”
which said “we have determined that [Source Two] is a fabricator/provocateur”
and advised consumers that “his information is assessed as unreliable and, in some
instances, pure fabrication. We have determined that he had also been coached by
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the Iraqi National Congress (INC) prior to his meeting with western intelligence
services.“‘77 DIA disseminated the fabrication notice to the all of the analytic
agencies that received the original intelligence reports on Source Two, including
CIA, DIA, and State INR, and cited the source identification numbers, reference
numbers, and titles of both original intelligence reports.‘78
(U) The DIA did not recall the original intelligence reports or reissue them
with a warning that Source Two was believed to be a fabricator. The DIA told
Committee staff, “we sent out a fabricator notice, not to necessarily recall the
information but to warn the intelligence community that some of his information
was suspect, that he may have been coached, and, . . . what his modus operandi
was.“‘79
(U) A July 2002 NIC Memorandum on the INC defector program also
outlined the Intelligence Community’s concerns about information from Source
Two, noting that DIA and the foreign intelligence service believed his information
was unreliable. The paper said that “although intelligence reporting on the mobile
labs was favorably received, this information is now considered suspect.“lsO
(U) Despite the warning from the Directorate of Operations in March 2002,
the April 2002 CIA assessments, the May 2002 DIA fabrication notice, the July
2002 NIC Memorandum all suggesting Source Two may have fabricated
information, and the fact that Source Two’s intelligence report never actually said
the labs were for biological weapons, Source Two was cited specifically in five
: ti DIA fabrication noti
DIA fabrication noti
I79 Staff interview with DIA officers, February 20,2004.
‘*’ NIC Memorandum,
The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program,
July 10,2002, p.3-4.
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CIA intelligence assessments and the October 2002 NIE, as corroborating other
source reporting about a mobile biological weapons program.
@) One of the assessments, published in October 2002, WMD Association
at Presidential Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, did not cite Source
Two by name or note an INC-affiliation. The information from Source Two said,
“mobile BW laboratories, managed by key BW figure Rihab Taha, in 1998 were
stored in the Republican Palace garage when not in use, according to a former
Iraqi officer.“‘*’
m The other four assessments: Iraq: Expanding BW Capabilities in
July 2002; Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat in August
2002; Iraq’s BW Capabilities in October 2002; and Lessons Learned From Iraq’s
Past Efforts to Mask Its B W Program in November 2002, and the NIE, used
almost identical descriptions of Source Two’s information. The language in the
papers said that in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile laboratories for BW
agent research to evade UNSCOM inspections, according to
-Source Two, an Iraqi defector associated with the Iraqi National
Congress.“* The two papers described Source Two by name.
(U) Source Two was also one of the four HUMINT sources specifically
referred to in the part of Secretary Powell’s February 2003 speech before the UN
Security Council that discussed the mobile BW production units. Although a DIA
Division Chief, who was aware of the fabrication notice, attended two of the
18’CIA, WMD Association at Presidential Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, October 11, 2002.
182
National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October
2002, p. 43. (SSCI# 2002-4188); CIA IA, Lessons Learned From Iraq s Past Efforts to Mask Its B W Program,
November 11,2002, p, 6.; CIA IA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 1, 2002, p. 6;
and CIA, Iraq: Expanding B W Capabilities, July 15, 2002; and CIA, W&ID Association at Presidential Sites
Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, October 11,2002.
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Powell speech coordination meetings on February 2 and 3,2003, he told
Committee staff that he was unaware that the source mentioned in the speech was
the same source about whom the fabrication notice had been issued and, therefore,
he did not raise any concerns about it. He told Committee staff that he was not
provided with the speech until he arrived at the meeting, that the source was not
specifically discussed, and that the speech did not indicate that the source was a
DIA source. He was later asked to clear about twenty reports for declassification,
including the Source Two report, but said he and a DIA declassification team only
examined the reports to determine whether their release would expose sources and
methods and did not notice that the report was the one on which the fabrication
notice had been issued.‘83
(U) The Iraq BW analysts from CIA, DIA, and State INR all acknowledged
that the fabrication notice was available in their message handling systems, but
they all said they did not see the notice. A joint CIA/DIA notification to the
Committee on January 27,2004 said that the fabrication notice had not come to
the attention of relevant analysts from the DIA or the CIA when Source Two’s
information was included in the NIE and Secretary Powell’s speech.184
(U) Two CIA analysts, one who was involved in coordinating the Powell
speech, said although they were aware in early 2002 that DIA and the foreign
intelligence service had concerns about Source Two’s reporting, they believed that
the reporting about the mobile labs remained plausible. They said that even
fabricators will usually have some truth in their stories. They said that if the
reporting has not been recalled, as long as the information was used with
appropriate caveats, it could continue to be used in finished intelligence reporting.
When asked why the caveats were not included in the Powell speech or explained
183 Staff interview with DIA offkers, June 3, 2004.
184 Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from DIA and CIA, January 27,2004.
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to Secretary Powell, the analyst who coordinated the speech said that “we lost the
thread of concern . . . as time progressed I don’t think we remembered.” A CIA
supervisor noted that, “clearly we had it at one point, we understood, we had
concerns about the source, but over time it started getting used again and there
really was a loss of corporate awareness that we had a problem with the source.“185
(U) The analysts also noted that the original reporting was not recalled and
was not altered in any way to reflect the fact that a fabrication notice had been
issued. In addition, there was not a practice in Intelligence Community at the time
of electronically attaching a fabrication notice to the original reporting. As a
result, when analysts searched their electronic files even after the fabrication
notice had been issued, there was no indication of the notice.ls6
(U) The CIA and the DIA told the Committee in the January 2004 joint
notification that the May 2002 fabrication notice, “was intended to warn analysts