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Zionism and Apartheid: a comparative study of the ideologies of Israel and South Africa

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ZIONISM AND APARTHEID : A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
IDEOLOGIES OF ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
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ABSTRACT

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ZIONISM AND APARTHEID:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE IDEOLOGIES
OF ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA

Advisor: Dr. Larry Noble
Dissertation dated July, 1990

This study is about the ideologies of Zionism and Apartheid, whose regimes (Israel and South Africa) represent the last bastions of the colonial settler enterprise. This study is multidimensional, coming under the fields of both political sociology and comparative politics. It is a cross-national analysis of ideology and race relations, and is concerned with exposing the role of ideology in perpetuating and legitimizing political domination.

The November 10, 1975 U.N. resolution that equated Zionism with racism and racial discrimination has generated a great deal of controversy and debate. Supporters of Israel denied the charge, arguing that Zionism is a progressive national liberation movement which led the fight against imperialism. The Afrikaners, too, rejected their colonialist origins and claimed that they led the decolonization movement in Southern Africa.

This inquiry tests the fairness and the validity of the anti-Zionist thesis (not popular in the West) which sees Israel as a colonial-settler state, like that of South Africa, and which maintains that Zionism is a no less racist ideology than South African apartheid. In other words, the purpose of this inquiry is to find out whether the ideology of Zionism and the laws of Israel sanction discrimination against non-Jews in Israel. If so, how are these conditions similar to that of apartheid in South Africa?

The evidences reviewed in this study suggest that the course of the Zionist enterprise was similar in essence to that of European colonialism in Africa and Asia, and emphasize the settler-colonial character of the Zionist movement and the state of Israel. The findings do not support the Zionist thesis of liberation, and see Zionism as a racist ideology whose ethnic policies lead in the same direction of South African apartheid: expropriation of the lands of other people, denying the natives' fundamental human and political rights, and practicing extreme discrimination based on race superiority and purity using the myth of fulfilling a divine mission. One can argue about the relative differences between the two situations, but the essence is the same. In both cases, the colonial settler either denied the existence of the local native or wished his disappearance. Both regimes are committed to a practical policy of apartheid, though Israel does not formally employ the term. Both regimes follow domestic policies based on race discrimination, which is a logical consequence of settler colonialism.

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Chapter I

Introduction

The Problem Statement

Can Israel be classified as a colonial settler state like those of the former Rhodesia and South Africa? Does a form of apartheid exist in Israel similar, along general lines, to that of South Africa? Is Zionism* a liberation movement or a racist ideology? The present study seeks to answer these questions. I shall start by presenting the Zionist point of view.

The Israeli writer, Amos Elon, argues that although, in technical terms, the early Zionist pioneers can be considered as colonists, the essence and intention of their enterprise differed from other colonial ventures. He explains:

Technically speaking, they were colonists. Yet by temperament, motivation, circumstance, and choice they differed sharply from other emigrants of that period who colonized Australia, Africa, Canada, or the United States. They were not in search of fertile land, gold, unlimited opportunity, or steady employment in a fast-expanding economy. Nor were they sent by chartered companies or government anxious to rid themselves of surplus populations, expand the territories under their control, or make the flag follow the trade.

This was colonizing without a motherland, an attempt to establish a state without the backing of state power; it was also a dramatic reversal of the then current village-to-city trend.¹

Elsewhere, Elon adds:

By avoiding the typical pattern of colonial settlers elsewhere, the policy of *Avoda Ivrit* bred in their hearts a deeply felt, and totally sincere, sense of moral superiority over other colonialists. If this be a fallacy, it gained ground, again, because there was some truth to it. There was never a sense of "colonial vocation" among the Zionist settlers. There was a cultural arrogance here as elsewhere; but individual motivation was sharply different. Elsewhere, a colonial career frequently meant social and professional advancement. In Palestine the opposite was true. Elsewhere, those who failed to attain bourgeois status at home often found it in the colonies; again, here the opposite happened. The settlers were not looking for individual material benefits but aimed at achieving a collective goal.²

In a similar vein, John Farley states that this Israeli pattern of colonialism and conquests differs from that of Rhodesia and South Africa because ". . . the impetus for the Jewish settlement came not from the expansionist desire of colonial power but in large part from the desire of a persecuted people for a safe homeland."³

Zionism sees itself as a national liberation movement of the Jewish people. In his criticism to the 1975 United Nations resolution that equated Zionism with racism, the Israeli delegate, Chaim Hertzog, stated: "Zionism is one of the most striking and constructive national movements in human history."⁴ As to the charge of racism, defenders of Zionism argue that Zionism cannot be viewed as a racist ideology because it "define[s] its members in terms not of birth, but of belief." In his U.N. speech, the then U.S. Ambassador explained:

It was not a movement of persons connected by historic membership in a genetic pool . . . nor yet of diverse groups occupying the same territory . . . To the contrary, Zionists defined themselves merely as Jews and declared to be Jewish anyone born of a Jewish mother or, and this is the absolutely crucial fact, anyone who converted to Judaism . . . With a consistency in the matter which surely attests to the importance of this issue to that religious and political culture, Israeli courts have held that a Jew who converts to another religion is no longer a Jew.⁵

In the same U.N. debate, the representative of Barbados declared that the concept of racism is based on color, and thus cannot apply "where the target of discrimination was not 'black'."⁶ In an article in the Washington Post, William Drummond admitted that "discrimination does take place" in Israel "for a variety of reasons, but none of them appears to be racist in origin."⁷

In regard to the charge of Israeli apartheid, the editor of the Israeli liberal political weekly, Koteret Rashit, said: "We do not have apartheid in Israel; Jews and Arabs for that matter can live where they want."⁸ Likewise, in 1985, the Israeli cabinet announced that it "unconditionally objects to the policy of apartheid . . . The Jewish

people's state will never agree to any discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, or color, or any other grounds."⁹ Another Israeli writer projected the Zionist colonization as a progressive one. In his book Conflict and Contradiction, Meron Benvenisti argues that the creation of a separate Jewish society by early Zionists aimed 'to prevent the rise of a colonial society in Palestine consisting of Jewish masters and Arab peons."¹⁰ Finally, the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, spoke of democracy, equality, and justice within Jewish society, stating:

Israel's citizens--Jews, Muslims, Druze and Christian--are equal before the law. Its judiciary is totally independent and beyond reproach; its elections, in which 70 to 80 percent of the electorate vote, are exemplary; its parties, from the extreme left to the extreme right, are all represented in parliament; and its numerous newspapers, in Hebrew, Arabic, English and other languages, reflect an incredible diversity of opinions. The Arab citizens of Israel are the only Arabs in the Middle East who can vote freely for a representative democratic government and who enjoy freedom of speech, assembly and movement.¹¹

The foregoing discussion outlines the controversy in Israel and the world concerning the charge of "Zionist racism" or "Israel's apartheid". I am fully aware that the comparison between Zionism and South African apartheid is a very controversial subject, and thus no thesis can satisfy all parties. While it is not difficult from the Afro-Asian perspective to view the Zionist state as another manifestation of racial colonialism, Western public opinion tends to see Zionism and Israel in a different light. Those Western "liberals" who oppose colonialism and apartheid but firmly support Israel argue that Israel's ties with South Africa are exaggerated and that comparison between Zionism and apartheid is superficial or misleading. Several professors and students with whom I have discussed my study expressed reservation and disbelief, asking how a country like Israel, established as a refuge for the persecuted, could become a persecutor. How could a state founded as a homeland for victims of racism turn out to be itself guilty of racism?

The Literature Review

It is by no means an exaggeration to say that Zionism is a very controversial subject which is "adequately understood by only a small percentage of its critics and by an even smaller percentage of its supporters."¹² The question is also sensitive for its obvious relevance to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Zionism is frequently depicted by its supporters as a national liberation movement which seeks to establish a Jewish state in Palestine where Jews can find a safe haven. Those who oppose Zionism see it as being part of the colonizing movement of the white man who goes to live among the non-white for purposes of exploitation. Holders of this view have frequently emphasized the similarities between the Zionist "settler-colonialism" in Palestine and the white colonial enterprise in South Africa. This perception holds that the "racist" nature of Zionism is similar, although not identical, to that of South African apartheid. The following discussion clearly indicates the conflict in the literature.

Yigal Allon, one of the early Zionist leaders stated:

Zionism is the national liberation movement of a people exiled from its historic homeland and dispersed among the nations of the world. Zionism is the redemption of an ancient nation from a tragic lot and the redemption of a land neglected for centuries.

Zionism is, in sum, the constant and unrelenting effort to realize the national and universal vision of the prophets of Israel¹³ (p. 75).

In his book, The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State,¹⁴ Sholomo Avineri describes Zionism as a revolutionary response to "anti-semitism" and "emancipation." He credits Zionism with the creation of Israel and with the unity of the Jewish people all over the world. The author seems to overlook Zionism's inability to solve "the Arab problem." Another book from the Zionist perspective is: The Siege: The Saga of Israel's Zionism,¹⁵ by Conor O'Brien. The author believes that the powerful influence of the Zionist movement cannot be explained except

by Biblical divine power. Although he acknowledges that Israel, as far as the Arab inhabitants are concerned, is not a true democracy, O'Brien finds this excusable because the Arabs are non-Jews who live in basically a Jewish state, and because the Arabs are "reasonably" considered a security problem. A pro-Zionist author, Yohanan Romati, states that if the rights of the minorities all over the world are not equal to that of the majorities, why does anyone demand equal rights for the Palestinians in the Jewish states. Writing in Midstream,¹⁶ Ramati put it this way:

Frenchmen enjoy special rights in France, the Dutch in Holland, and the Swedes in Sweden. Zionism demands special rights for Jews in their country--Palestine. It is as legitimate as any other nationalism, and no more racist. It has no wish to oppress the Arabs. But it definitely claims that the rights of the Arab minority in Palestine are not equal to Jewish rights--just as the rights of the Swedes in Finland are not equal to the rights of the Finns (p. 25). [Emphasis in original]

In her book, Human Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territories,¹⁷ Esther Cohen holds that "Israel's security legislation was patterned after the Fourth Geneva convention and was in conformity with its provisions." (p. 143); "customary international law is absorbed automatically into Israeli courts" (p. 156), and the economic condition of the occupied territories has benefitted from the growth of Israel's economy (p. 286). Cohen concludes: ". . . Israel's policy of balancing security measures with economic, cultural, social, and civil liberties can be taken as a paradigm for future occupations" (p. 289). In his book, Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilization¹⁸, S. N. Eisenstadt expressed admiration of the "revolutionary" Zionist experience in Palestine, but made no reference to the Palestinian Society and its doom at the hands of the Zionists. He writes:

Israeli society shared important features with such non-imperial immigrant societies as the United States and the British dominions: (1) a strong emphasis on equality, at least among the earliest settlers . . . (259)

The revolutionary experience of the Zionist movement as manifest in the colonialization of Palestine and later the

state of Israel is closest to the experience of the American colonies . . . (260).

In the same vein, Jacob Tsur, in his book, Zionism, The Saga of a National Liberation Movement¹⁹ defines Zionism as "the Jewish people's movement of national liberation" which "constitutes an integral part of the wider historic process of the emancipation of nations" (p. 9). Tsur also adds that from the beginning, Zionism has been progressive, democratic, and a "mass movement of the oppressed Jewish people. It developed as an offshoot of the egalitarian doctrine heralded by the French Revolution" (p. 11). In defense of Zionism is Amnon Rubenstein's book, The Zionist Dream Revisited: From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back.²⁰ Rubenstein contends that Zionism is a revolutionary liberation movement that "is not content with returning the Jewish people to its lost sovereignty, never forgotten homeland; it also seeks to be the midwife who helps the Jewish people give birth to a new kind of man" (p. 6). What went wrong, like the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the author maintains, does not reflect the Zionist ideal; rather, it reflects the growing influence of religious nationalists in Israeli society.

On November 10, 1975, the United Nations issued its resolution of 3379 which "determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."²¹ The Zionist scholarship responded vigorously by attacking the resolution as "anti-semitic". In its "editorial,"²² Midstream, a monthly Jewish review, describes the U.N. resolution as a "cynical drive of the Arab-Communist axis" (p. 3), and holds that Zionism is a unique national liberation movement inspired by "universalist social vision" (p. 3) and that "its egalitarian vision continues to shape" Israel, the only "democratic" country in the Middle East, (p. 5). A month later, another critical review appeared in Midstream²³ in which the author attacks the resolution and echoes the charge of U.N.'s "anti-semitism." In defense of Zionism is Robert Goldston's book, Next Year in Jerusalem, A Short History of Zionism.²⁴ The author pointed out that throughout its

history, the Zionist movement waged a constant struggle against racism.

He added:

Nowhere in Zionist teaching, philosophy, or action can the faintest taint of racism be found. Racism is diametrically opposed to all Jewish belief and practice. To impute to Jews the very evil from which they have suffered so terribly throughout history is a truly vicious, truly ignorant slander (p. 224)

Similarly, Seymour Finger and Ziva Flamhaft wrote an article in Middle East Review²⁵ in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the "outrageous Zionism-racism resolution" (p. 49). They stated:

It is ironic and tragic that Zionism--which sprang up out of the need to combat racial discrimination--and the state of Israel--which was born out of the shadow of the most savage form of racism--were singled out by the very organization that proclaims itself to be guided by the principles of freedom and equality (p. 49).

A Zionist' advertisement published in the Christian Science Monitor,²⁶ claimed that the Zionism-racism resolution is not valid because Israel is a multi-racial society where all races are treated equally. Another advertisement²⁷ repeated the pro-Zionist argument by saying that "the Arabs in Israel are full-fledged citizens, enjoy every civil right, and have the same status in law as Jewish Israelis." The Arabs also, the advertisement continues, "enjoy the highest standard of living and liberty of any Arabs in the Middle East." As to the question of Israel's connection with South Africa a pro-Zionist advertisement appearing in The Christian Science Monitor²⁸ stated: "Israel is a very minor player in trade and military relations with South Africa, has no nuclear cooperation, and has, at all times, condemned and denounced apartheid." Further, the Israeli newspaper, Ha'aretz²⁹ describes the U.N. resolution which equated Zionism with racism as an "attempt to delegitimize the state of Israel's right to exist." The comparison with South Africa is not valid, it continues to say, because there is a difference between apartheid which is the ideology of racial superiority and Zionism which is a "national liberation

movement." In defense of Zionism is an article which appeared in the New Outlook,³⁰ "Israel and South Africa: Some Preliminary Reflections." The author of this article contends that the analogy between Israel and South Africa can be misleading. He said: "The comparison between Israel and South Africa is often distorted and analytically unhelpful; it is also perplexing and deeply troubling," (p. 8). He believes that "the Zionist struggle for national liberation was, and many believe, still is, a struggle against exactly those principles of racial supremacy on which the present regime in South Africa is based," (p. 9). The author finds a "major" difference between the two situations: South Africa is a classic example of minority rule, while Jews constitute a majority in Israel. "And while apartheid is an unassailable reality in South Africa, it is still not policy or practice in Israel," (p. 9). The author concludes his argument by saying while "Apartheid in South Africa is a system of domination," in Israel, "despite increasing discrimination of Jews against Arabs, Israelis are less bent on dominating another people than on securing their own boundaries. Israel may act as a conqueror and a colonizer, but it is precisely the colonial analogy rather than the racist one that is apt." (pp. 9-10).

In the opposite camp, there are many writers and scholars who argue the case against Zionism. Their charge against Zionism ranges from "racism" to "colonialism" to "apartheid", that is similar, in general lines, to that of South Africa.

In his book, A History of the Jews--Ancient and Modern,³¹ Ilan Halevi, a leftist anti-Zionist Israeli, argues that Zionism is another false solution to the Jewish problem. He believes that Zionism was used by the Great Powers to solve the problem of the fate of the Jews and the problem of western domination over the east. Halevi also contends that the Zionist leaders have sought to use the tragedy of the Holocaust for their own political purposes.

In an essay in Race and Class,³² Eqbal Ahmad wrote that the

establishment of Israel in 1948 was a setback to the decolonialization process which began with India's independence in 1947. He explained:

Thus, at the dawn of decolonization, we were returned to the earliest, most intense form of colonial menace--the exclusivist settler colonialism which had dealt genocidal blows to the great civilizations and peoples of the Americas. As if to compel our historical memory, Israel's sectarian, racist character was ensured by the expulsion of the native Palestinians from their homeland. The tragedy occurred as a counterpoint to contemporary history, a reminder that all was not well with the era of decolonialization (p. 4).

Elsewhere he added:

Israel obviously shares many similarities with South Africa, and may in time come to resemble the apartheid state more than most liberal Zionists suspect. However, structurally and substantively the Zionist movement and State share significant similarities with the early form of colonial movements which transformed the western hemisphere into the 'new world' of the West.

In their "Introduction," the editors of Israel and the Palestinians,³³ contends that in 20th century Palestine, Zionism is necessarily discriminatory and racist. They point out:

It seems obvious to us that Zionism as the major political force in Israel aims at preserving, consolidating, and expanding Jewish privileged position in Israel. There is no way this can be carried out without the domination of the Palestinian Arab people, (p. 9).

In a letter³⁴ to an Arab Ambassador, the Jewish American Rabbi, Elmer Berger, accused Zionist policies of being "discriminatory" and "exclusivist". He said: "Israel is a state, therefore, in which if apartheid is not blatant or as territorially visible as South Africa, 'Jews' are nevertheless 'more equal than others.'" As to the charge of Zionist' racism, Rabbi Berger explains" ". . . if racism is a form of government or a structure of society in which national rights and responsibilities are officially legislated upon the basis of creed, color, ethnic derivation, then the Zionist' character of much 'Basic' Israeli law qualifies." In a book³⁵ published in 1978, Rabbi Berger expressed concern

that the "racist, discriminatory political sovereignization of Zionism" possesses dangers to the spiritual message of Judaism (p. 57). In 1944, a critic of mainstream Zionism, Hannah Arendt,³⁶ an American-Jewish scholar, suggests that Herzl's (the founder of modern political Zionism) Zionism was not a mass movement, as it is claimed, but an ideology of European-Jewish intellectuals and that Herzl had constantly expressed hostility toward revolutionary movements. She also criticized the Zionist project in Palestine because it left the Palestinian Arabs with only two choices: emigration or second class citizenship. Another anti-Zionist Jew is Roberta Feuerlicht, who, in her book, The Fate of the Jews: A People Torn Between Israeli Power and Jewish Ethics,³⁷ finds that there is a conflict between Israeli power and Jewish ethics. The author believes that the Jews betrayed the ethics of Judaism when they established the State of Israel, and that the Jews wanted Palestine to "serve as a litter basket for Jews unwanted elsewhere" (p. 94). She also made it clear that Israel is "a form of colonialism" (p. 220). Akiva Orr, an anti-Zionist Israeli writer, advanced a similar thesis by suggesting that Zionism is in conflict with the spiritual message of Judaism. In his book, The UnJewish State: The Politics of Jewish Identity in Israel,³⁸ Orr states that "Zionism was a heresy which overturned every single precept of religious Judaism" (p. 6). In addition, Moshe Menuhin, in his book, The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time,³⁹ argues that modern Judaism had become decadent because of its close identification with Zionism. In an article in Critical Inquiry,⁴⁰ entitled "Ideology of Difference," Edward Said maintains that whatever the nature of the debate, there is a general agreement that Israel is a Jewish State. "To be a non-Jew in Palestine/Israel is first of all to be marked negatively" (p. 43), Said argues. He sees Zionism as an ideology of difference and separation. The result has been inequalities between Jews and non-Jews, the author holds, and that such inequalities are sanctioned by Israeli "Basic Laws." In his book, The Question of Palestine,⁴¹ Professor Edward Said suggests that

Zionist "racism" is manifested in the exclusionary idea of the Jewish State, in the philosophy of Kibbutzim which indeed practices a system of apartheid, in the discriminatory land regulation, and in the Law of Return which guarantees any Jew (but only a Jew) living anywhere the right to emigrate to Israel and automatically to become a citizen. The author contends that Israel is a colonial-settler regime, but, unlike South Africa or former Algeria, the Israeli case sought to exclude rather than to exploit the natives. Similarly, in an article in MERIP Reports⁴² Fred Halliday suggests that the Israeli-colonial type is different from the South Africa model in that the former has sought to expel the indigenous population, while the latter has sought to maintain the natives for exploitation. Also, Uri Davis, an anti-Zionist Israeli scholar, advances similar ideas regarding a "specific pattern of the Zionist colonial initiative in Palestine" (p. 8). In his book, Israel: Utopia Incorporated,⁴³ Davis said:

The Zionist movement did not originally predict its efforts on colonialization of the native land by way of exploitation, but rather, systematically followed the pattern of colonialization by way of dispossession (p. 8).

In TELOS,⁴⁴ Dan Diner asserts the colonial character of the conflict in Palestine and suggests that any discrimination against Palestinian Arabs cannot be removed without a fundamental change in the Zionist structure of Israel. He explains, "If one, however, wishes to end the discrimination against Arabs in Israel within the 'Zionist structure', then the national identity of Israel as a Jewish nation-state comes into question" (emphasis is in origin) (p. 43). In an article published in Race & Class,⁴⁵ Jenny Bourne, a Jewish-feminist activist, emphasizes the charge against Zionism: a colonial movement, expansionist, exclusivist. She also finds that the practice of Zionist separation created similar conditions to that of South African apartheid in terms of ". . . who can buy land in Israel, where people can buy homes and where workers may live"

(p. 7). Henry Cattán, in his book, The Palestine Question,⁴⁶ indicates the "colonial" character of Israel and the "racist" essence of Zionist ideology. Writing from the Palestinian perspective, Sabri Jiryis, wrote an essay in the Journal of Palestinian Studies⁴⁷ in which he examined three areas of Israeli legislation; security legislation, nationality and citizenship legislation, and the question of land regulations. The author concludes that discrimination against the Arab minority is sanctioned by Israeli laws despite the existence of an independent judiciary. In an article in American-Arab Affairs,⁴⁸ Roselle Tekiner examined Israeli laws that "legalize discrimination" against non-Jewish citizens in Israel. She said: "It is true that Arabs in Israel may become Israeli citizens, but Israeli citizenship does not give Arabs the same rights as Jews" (p. 84). Tekiner suggests that three "fundamental laws,"--Israel does not have a written constitution--legalize discrimination against non-Jews. These are: The Law of Return, the Law of Citizenship, and the Status Law. He also contends that, unlike South Africa whose apartheid is stated in its constitution, Zionist "racism" has been successfully concealed thanks to the Status Laws. Maxime Rodinson, the French-Jewish scholar, was among the foremost to emphasize the colonial-settler character of the Zionist enterprise. In his book, Israel, A Colonial-Settler State?,⁴⁹ Rodinson demonstrates that the creation of Israel came as a result of colonial conquest which was based on racial exclusive ideology that was in line with the dominant outlook of European chauvinism.

Three political movements, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the South African Communist Party, and the African National Congress (ANC) have carried the struggle against Israel and South Africa, and have accused Zionism of being a "racist", "colonialist", and "fascist" ideology. The Palestinian National Covenant reads:

Zionism is a political movement originally related to world imperialism and hostile to all movements of liberation and progress in the world. It is aggressive, expansionist and colonialist in its aim; and Fascist and Nazi in its means.

Israel is the tool of the Zionist movement and a human and geographical base for world imperialism . . . (p.49).⁵⁰

In a leaflet entitled, "Israel and South Africa--The Present-Day Nazism" and published in The African Communist,⁵¹ the South African Communist Party states:

It is ironic that a state founded on a wave of emotion against Nazi persecution and genocide should itself end up employing the same Hitlerite methods and techniques? . . . We say no, it is not at all ironic! This is actually the logical consequence of Zionism which is an exclusive, narrow, racist ideology comparable to Apartheid.

The ANC's position is that Zionism and apartheid:

are based on ideologies that preach a supremeness of one people over another, and they have translated this ideology into a constitutional reality in Israel and in South Africa. Both are based on the uprooting of an indigenous people and the takeover of the Palestinian and South African peoples' land . . . (p. 8).⁵²

In its "editorial," the African Communist indicates a striking similarity between Zionism and apartheid:

Both exist on the basis of the theft of land from the indigenous peoples, who are in consequence placed in a position of dependence and inferiority and denied the basic right of self-determination. Both follow domestic policies based on race discrimination and oppression in the interest of the colonizing elite . . . (p. 10)⁵³

The anti-Zionist literature is rife with the question of the link/analogy between Israeli Zionism and South African apartheid. In an article entitled, "South Africa: The Israeli Connection,"⁵⁴ the authors maintain that Zionism and apartheid are both products of European nationalism and that both ideologies "are, in essence, the same" (p. 108). They also refer to apartheid as "the Afrikaner version of Zionism" (p. 108). The authors also find similarities in the myths and policies of apartheid and Zionism concerning the question of land. They pointed out:

Both Israel and South Africa propagate the myth that the land

of Palestine and South Africa was "empty" a 'desert waiting to bloom,' the same myth under the slogan, 'manifest destiny,' used by the United States to displace its large indigenous population (p. 108).

In a booklet, entitled, Israel and South Africa--Ideology and Practice,⁵⁵ Alfred T. Moleah maintains that "the Zionist entity and the Apartheid entity are an idea--an idea that has become a material force. They are an idea that is racist, an idea that is anti-human" (p. 1). He also notes that both apartheid and Zionism have relied heavily on religion (especially Old Testament) to justify political purposes. Drawing an analogy between the two situations, Moleah notes that while the central question in Israel is who is Jewish, the question of who is white is vital in South Africa. Moleah concludes: "The similarities between Israel and South Africa are basic and fundamental and, therefore, totally unaffected by the vicissitudes of politics in both countries" (p. 5). In an essay published in the Journal of Palestine Studies,⁵⁶ Alfred Moleah draws the analogy between the "miserable" conditions of the Palestinians in Israel and that of Africans in South Africa. He maintains that violation of human rights in both situations is an inevitable result of the racist ideology of Zionism and apartheid. He said: "In essence, therefore, South Africa is a state for whites just as Israel is a state, not for Jews, but of Jews . . . In both States, discrimination is inherent" (p. 28). In another essay entitled "Zionism and Apartheid: An Unlikely Alliance?",⁵⁷ Moleah notices that the relationship between Israel and South Africa has developed from a state of alliance to a state of organic links. He maintains that the ties between the two countries "are based on an identity of position and goals" (p. 158) and that both "are settler-colonial entities" (p. 158) that robbed the land of the Africans and Palestinians and both became "garrison states" (p. 159). In an article entitled "The South Africanization of Israel,"⁵⁸ Bruce Harris holds that there is a striking similarity between Israel and South Africa. He said: "Whether it is rigidly entrenched in law as in South African apartheid or

embedded in custom as in Zionist Israel, social segregation is the practice" (p. 177). "The Arabs," Harris continues, "like the Africans, live in separate areas; though it is not as formalized or legalized in Israel, it is just as real" (p. 179). Joe Toris,⁵⁹ an editor of the Berkeley Graduate, accused Zionism of "genocide" and emphasized its "racist nature" which is manifested, as the author believes, in the Israeli "Law of Return." Does a systematic policy of apartheid exist in Israel? Joe Toris answers, yes. The question of "Israeli Apartheid" was also discussed by two Israeli scholars. In his book, Israel: An Apartheid State,⁶⁰ Uri Davis argues that although it is different, in terms of structure and pattern, from South African' apartheid, Israeli-style apartheid is a reality. He puts it clearly:

The legal regulation of apartheid in Israel is structured in terms that are very different from the structures of legal apartheid in the Republic of South Africa. Nevertheless, apartheid in Israel is an overarching legal reality that determines the quality of everyday life and the circumstance of living for all the inhabitants of the state of Israel (p. 55).

In the summer of 1988, Israel Shahak, a professor of organic chemistry at the Hebrew University, wrote an essay in Race & Class⁶¹ entitled, "Israeli Apartheid and the Intifada," in which he suggests that in regard to the land question (where to live or buy land), water distribution, economic exploitation, and "Pass laws," Israeli apartheid is worse than that of South Africa. Comparing the two systems, Shahak explains:

South Africa invites any white person to emigrate to the country and to join in the benefits of the apartheid regime. Israel invites any person who can prove that he or she is a Jew, either by descent or by converting to Judaism. If someone converts today, then tomorrow they can go to Israel and demand all the rights, in this case to the land, which are denied to palestinians under this allocation (p. 6).

The foregoing discussion outlines the controversy within the literature regarding Zionism and its "parallel" with South African

apartheid.

The Significance of the Study

The topic is timely, of great controversy, and of social and political significance. The growing struggle of the Blacks against the oligarchic regime in South Africa and the recent Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories have caught the attention of the world community. In South Africa, (despite the tendency towards dismantling apartheid) a national state of emergency is now (March 1990) in its 41st month and the popular uprising in the tribal homelands during March 1990 matched the level of confrontation in the 1984-1985 nationwide rebellion in black townships.

In the occupied territories, demonstrations, since December 1987, occur almost daily against the harsh punitive measures Israel is enforcing. Israeli soldiers are permitted to ruthlessly open fire on Palestinian protesters. As the intifada (uprising) went into its third year, it was reported that more than 700 Palestinian civilians were killed, thousands wounded, and fifty thousand imprisoned by the Israelis, many of them without trial.⁶² Since the beginning of the intifada, the U.S. used its veto five times in the U.N. in order to rescue Israel from the world's condemnation.⁶³

A new Israeli official policy of "force, might, and beating" was adopted after a series of measures--including arrest, curfews, and deportations--failed to quell Palestinian protests. The Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, said: "I am convinced that this is the most crucial period that Israel has faced since 1948."⁶⁴ As in South Africa, the Israeli government decided to impose more restrictions on press coverage in order to hide its repressive policy. It is interesting to note that Henry Kissinger and Mayor Koch of New York City recommended that television cameras be barred from the occupied territories until Israel put down the uprising.⁶⁵

The method used by Israel in handling the Palestinian uprising continues to draw condemnation from around the world. After a visit to Gaza, the British Foreign Office Minister called Israeli policy in the Gaza Strip "a blot on the face of civilization."⁶⁶ Norway's ambassador to Israel, himself a survivor of Nazi concentration camps, was quoted as saying that the Israeli soldiers "used tactics shunned even by the Nazis as the Israelis handled Palestinian unrest."⁶⁷ However, it was hardly pointed out that what has taken place and so shocked the world has long--as the evidence reviewed later does suggest--been part and parcel of Zionist ideology and practice.

The shooting and beating of Palestinian youths challenging the might of the Israeli army with stones and bottles, and the increasing restrictions on press coverage by Israeli authorities have intensified the debate regarding the comparison with South Africa and have led many critics to draw an analogy between the two countries. Moreover, attention is being focused once again on the U.N. resolution of 1975 equating Zionism with racism.⁶⁸ Israeli officials have frequently rejected the notion that Israel is becoming the South Africa of the Middle East and have considered this accusation as "a disgusting and unfair comparison." To help dismiss the analogy, the Israeli Foreign Ministry has recently issued an internal guidance paper to its embassies and consulates abroad explaining how Israel is different from South Africa.⁶⁹

However, the dimensions of the comparison between Israel and South Africa go beyond similar repressive styles of handling unrest. There are questions of political power and its allocation, questions of the structure of the political system, and questions of the ideology that serves to maintain the status quo.

Much has been written about Israel and South Africa: their growing political, economic and military relationships, and their sensitive geopolitical roles within the general Western strategic framework. Despite the importance of such studies, the ideological dimensions of the

question have been overlooked. The author of this study believes that the essence of their relationship goes far deeper than trade figures or even military collaborations. It is a question of ideological affinity. Such an affinity has both Biblical (Old Testamental) and secular (the perception of being in the same boat as far as current international politics is concerned) foundations. "The growing relations between Israel and South Africa," Moleah pointed out, "are not the ordinary state relations based on pragmatic national needs and self-interest, they are the manifestation of a shared ideology of a common worldview."⁷⁰ The growth of apartheid and racism in our modern world and its inevitable danger to world peace and security necessitate the need for cross-national examination and indicate the obvious relevance of this study to vital contemporary concerns. Hence, the pressing need for a comparative analysis of the ideologies of these two systems. This analysis both reveals the ideological basis of political domination and underlines the component of settler mentality.

In addition to the seeming similarities between the two systems, there is another motive which underlies this undertaking. It is what seems to be as quantitative and qualitative inconsistencies in world criticism directed against Israel and South Africa. The nature of South African apartheid has been amply studied from various perspectives. However, perhaps because of traditional western bias, the Zionist enterprise and its consequences on the Palestinians has been overlooked. Edward Said rightly pointed out:

In my opinion, the question of Zionism is the touchstone of contemporary political judgement. A lot of people who are happy to attack apartheid or U.S. intervention in Central America are not prepared to talk about Zionism and what it has done to the Palestinians. To be the victim of a victim does present quite unusual difficulties. For if you are trying to deal with the classic victim of all times--the Jew and his or her movement--then to portray yourself as the victim of the Jew is a comedy worthy of one of your own novels.⁷¹

It seems to me unjustified and unfair--and, of course, I am not

defending South Africa--for the world to condemn Pretoria's practice of apartheid and at the same time keep silent with respect to Israel's mistreatment of the Palestinians. Little is known about the dilemma of the Palestinians, and what is known has generally been disguised by the powerful influence of Zionism. Consequently, western opinion has been seriously impaired through misinformation and has been "deliberately disguised or suppressed . . . by pro-Israeli pressure and propaganda."⁷² In this respect the British historian, Arnold Toynbee notes:

What is peculiar about the Palestinian question is that the world has listened to the party that committed the offense and has turned a deaf ear to the victim.⁷³

Whereas the African people enjoy international sympathy and support against Apartheid, the victims of Zionism have been forgotten or ignored. Many writers, journalists, and public figures who are willing to denounce apartheid tend to overlook similar practices by Zionism. The Jewish Israeli scholar, Dr. Israel Shahak, has this to say about the problem:

Very many non-Jews (including Christian clergy and religious laymen, as well as some Marxists (from all Marxist groups) hold the curious opinion that one way to 'atone' for the persecution of Jews is not to speak out against evil perpetrated by Jews but to participate in 'white lies' about them. The crude accusation of 'antisemitism' (or, in the case of Jews, 'self-hate') against anybody who protests at the discrimination of Palestinians or who points out any fact about the Jewish religion or the Jewish past which conflicts with the 'approved version' comes with greater hostility and force from non-Jewish 'friends of the Jews' than from Jews. It is the existence and great influence of this group in all western countries, and particularly in the U.S. (as well as the other English-speaking countries) which has allowed the rabbis and scholars of Judaism to propagate their lies not only without opposition but with considerable help.⁷⁴

From its very inception, Israel has generally enjoyed favorable western media coverage and stands as a country above criticism. Alfred Moleah pointed out:

Whereas South Africa finds itself universally vilified for its racist policies, the state of Israel is vaunted as an oasis of democracy and decency. Given the worldwide, awesome power

of Zionism, the Israelis can act quite brazenly and arrogantly: they answer to on one.⁷⁵

When South African repression was intensified after the declaration of a state of emergency, most Western powers issued official statements condemning the Pretoria government and some withdrew their ambassadors. No comparable action has been taken in regard to the recent daily killing of the Palestinians by the Israelis. Compare Washington's invitation to Nelson Mandela to visit the White House with the U.S. administration's refusal to grant Yasir Arafat a visa to address the United Nations. Such glaring inconsistencies between the two situations can, in part, be explained in terms of an "anti-Semitism" paradigm.

Any attempt to examine Israel's ties with South Africa or to expose what is considered as "discriminatory" practice against Palestinians will immediately be branded as an "anti-Semitic" act. Alfred Lilienthal noted:

So strong has become the general aversion to anti-Semitism that even full-blooded Semites, the Arabs and Palestinians, find it difficult to defend themselves against the charge.⁷⁶

In an interview conducted by the Christian Science Monitor, the Jewish writer, Roberta Feuerlich, said:

If you offer criticism of Israel as a Jew, you are supposed to be 'self-hating'. If you offer criticism of Israel as a non-Jew, you are labelled anti-Semitic. We criticize Reagan, we criticize the Soviets; we can criticize any country in the world. But we cannot criticize Israel.⁷⁷

In a similar vein, Chris Haney wrote a letter to the New York Times in which he stated:

We can deplore Nazi German's action and not be regarded as anti-Christian. We can be revolted at My Lai and not be anti-American. But we can never even question Israel's action against the Arabs lest we be branded anti-Semitic. That is psychological blackmail.⁷⁸

The concept of "anti-Semitism" was recently given a new definition. In their book, The New Anti-Semitism, Arnold Foster and Benjamin Epstein,

leaders of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, argue that hostility toward Jews as Jews or toward Judaism is not necessarily the only criterion determining the anti-semitism phenomenon. Criticism of Israel and its policies can also be considered as anti-semitism because of Israel's centrality for Jewish security and survival.⁷⁹

Needless to say, anti-Semitism must be rejected at all levels but must never be used as an ideological weapon to silence legitimate criticism. It should be noted that the critical discussion of Zionism presented in this study does not imply any condemnation of Judaism which is a matter of religious choice and should be seen as separate from Zionism as a political ideology. I add this note because those who seek to suppress criticism of Israeli policies have used the tactic of blurring this distinction, charging that a critic of Zionism automatically criticizes Judaism and is therefore anti-Semitic.⁸⁰ It should also be noted that not all Jews consider themselves to be Zionist and that not all Zionists are Jews. As a matter of fact, Zionism, from its very inception, has been bitterly opposed by prominent Rabbinical leaders as being in conflict with the spiritual message of Judaism. As we shall presently see, many Jewish intellectuals and writers such as Maxim Rodinson, Albert Einstein, Noam Chomsky, Israel Shahak, Uri Davis, Alfred Lilienthal, Rabbi Elmer Berger, and others are opposed to Zionism.

Method of Research

This study is multidimensional, coming under the fields both of political sociology⁸¹ and comparative politics⁸² because it deals with ideology and race relations, an important area of political sociology, and because it compares two political systems. Further, it is a cross-national analysis of ideology and race relations. Its purpose is to give a descriptive and interpretive account of Zionism and apartheid in order to expose the role of ideology in perpetuating political domination. The study is concerned with an analysis and explanation rather than merely

with description. In other words, the major concern is with understanding why Zionism and apartheid play the role the way they do and not merely with describing the pattern of ideological domination within the two systems. The study devotes considerable attention to the functional role of the ideology in the construction of the Zionist and apartheid discourses on the non-Jews in Israel and non-whites in South Africa. The study does not intend to examine and evaluate the growing relations between Israel and South Africa: a variety of good studies on this subject are available.⁸³ Again, this study is primarily interested in the ideological aspect of the problem. Its core is a discussion of Zionism and apartheid as they actually operate in Israel and South Africa.

More specifically, the study attempts to test the fairness and the usefulness of the argument--not popular in the West--which sees Israel as a colonial-settler regime, like that of the former Rhodesia and South Africa, and which maintains that Zionism is a no less "racist" ideology than South African apartheid. In other words, this study attempts to find out whether the ideology of Zionism and the laws of Israel sanction discrimination against non-Jews in Israel. If so, how are these conditions similar to that of apartheid in South Africa?

In so doing, the study examines the Zionist political literature especially its position toward indigenous non-Jews as presented by prominent Zionist thinkers and leaders such as Theodor Herzl, Ahad Ha'am, A. D. Gordon, Vladimir Jabotinsky and others. Similar discussion is devoted to the ideology of apartheid and its position toward non-white Africans. Since South Africa is generally acknowledged to be the world's most racist state whose apartheid is more familiar and generates less controversy, the study puts more emphasis on Zionism and Israel, the main bulk of whose discriminatory policies is not reflected in the terminology of its legal system. It should be noted that the study not only explains what was said, but places ideas in the context of social and historical milieus. In other words, this study is not only concerned with the

theoretical aspects of the intellectual-political positions of Zionism and apartheid, but with their implementation or the way in which these positions are translated into reality.

Thus, the study examines the official and unofficial policies that seem to sanction "systematic discrimination" in both societies. Unlike the situation in South Africa, such policies in Israel are not explicit. However, a noted exceptions are Israel's Law of Return (1950), the Law of Citizenship (1952), and The World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency (Status) Law. A systematic "unequal treatment" seems also evident in such areas as: land regulation, (Basic Law: Israel Lands - 1960, Agricultural Settlement Law - 1967, Lands Law - 1980) and security legislation, (Defense Regulation - 1945, Emergency Regulation Ordinance - 1949). While in Israel the central question for the Zionist legislations appears to be the distinction between "Jews" versus "non-Jews," in South African apartheid, the key legal distinction is between "white" versus "non-white". Laws were passed to justify and maintain white privilege. Among them are: the Population Registration Act of 1950 which classifies people as whites, coloreds, Asians, and blacks, the Immorality Act of 1927, 1950 which prohibits any carnal intercourse between whites and coloreds, and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 which forbids marriage of a European to a non-European. The South African law, the Bantu Homeland Citizen Act (1970) (amended as the Bantu Laws Amendment Act (1974) seems to have similar effects in terms of depriving citizenship, to the Israeli law, the Absentee Property Law (1950). Besides discussing these legal mechanisms, the study focuses on the role of religion within the framework of Zionist ideology and apartheid.

The Old Testament has a special place in Zionist ideology, and the Zionist literature is rife with the religious concepts of "chosen people" and "promised land". The Jewish people are seen as "spiritual people," "Holy people"--a people set apart from the rest of mankind for having a special relationship with God. Israel is seen as a fulfillment of God's

promise as a holy possession of the Jews. In Afrikaner mythology, one finds similar justification derived from the Old Testament and Calvinism. Afrikaners draw a parallel between themselves and the ancient children of Israel. Like Israel, South Africa is seen as a God-given area whose survival and triumph is unique and miraculous. Thus, the study attempts to explain the role of these religious myths as ideological weapons used to justify the settlers' claim to the land and to maintain domination in both societies.

The seeming similarity making a cross-national analysis of ideology in Israel and South Africa fruitful is the common use of religion for political purposes, the European settlers' attitudes toward the indigenous population, and the policies of social segregation. I utilize causal, evaluative, and comparative approaches in the course of my investigation. It is no exaggeration to say that all good research in social science is comparative. I believe that ideology and race relations can best be understood through comparison.

The comparative method refers to scientific analysis involving observations in more than one social system in order to explain similarities or differences in philosophies and sociopolitical behavior. The central task of the comparative approach is to distinguish between those regularities in sociopolitical behavior that are unique and those that are universal. The value of comparison is that it enables us to find out whether a certain process or development in a given society is a unique or a common phenomenon and to work toward a general rather than a parochial theory of politics. Randall Collins points out:

The comparative method is an important means of generating and testing theory. By comparing the conditions under which similar activities and institutions appear, the social scientists can approximate the advantages of the experimental method of research. His aim is to generalize his explanations beyond particular instances, to reject unsound inferences, and to refine his explanations to take account of complex processes. Comparative politics, therefore, should not be viewed as a peripheral specialization within the study of politics but as a crucial set of materials for developing our

understanding of politics everywhere.⁸⁴

Most of the data used in this research was collected from three main sources: primary, consisting of official government documents; secondary, consisting of published works dealing with the subject matter, and tertiary, such as periodicals, newspapers, and magazines. In order to fully document the record of Zionism, the study quotes extensively from scholarly articles, public statements, and editorials of major Israeli newspapers such as: Haaretz, Maariv, Jerusalem Post, Yediot Aharonot, Davar, and others. The sociopolitical condition of the Palestinian inside Israel and in the occupied territories is a subject of regularly documented journalistic as well as specialist literature produced by many investigatory bodies including the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the Special Committee on Israeli Practices in the Occupied Territories, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International and the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights. The search for resources began in computerized social science and current periodical databases. These searches have since been updated several times. Many important materials were available in the library of the University of Georgia in Athens. The staff of Woodruff Library of the Atlanta University Center helped considerably in obtaining materials from other libraries. Before closing the methodology section, a few words about "value-free" social science seem to be useful.

Western scholarship always claims to be objective and accuses Marxist social science of having an ideological bias. Shakhanzarov notes that despite their claim of value-free science, the work of western scholars "shows quite a wide spectrum of political views--from conservative and ultimately apologist in regard to the status quo to liberal and even radical (petty-bourgeois revolutionarism).⁸⁵ In this connection Wilmot writes: "Western social science was 'neutral' and 'objective' in the same sense that the bourgeois press and political

system were 'free', or the citizen in the bourgeois society was 'equal'."⁸⁶

In recent decades many scholars have begun to challenge the traditional assumption that social science is neutral and should have no ideological bias. Ake simply states that such social science is impossible and does not exist.⁸⁷ It is appropriate for scholars to place a high value on accurate knowledge, but it is unrealistic to assume that they are entirely value free. In this respect, Morgenthau acknowledges the strong influence of social, economic, cultural, and political factors on the course of investigation. He suggests that "the 'personal equation' of the political scientists both limits and directs his scholarly pursuits."⁸⁸ As Ake notes, even the selection of subject matter for investigation reflects an ideological bias. For example, one scholar chooses to study the maintenance of political stability while the problem for another scholar is how to engineer a revolution. Ake adds, "Whenever social science defines something as a problem, it reveals and makes value commitments."⁸⁹ Furthermore, Ake notes that a solution to certain social problems involves values and morality, and thus inevitably reflects an ideological bias. However, Professor Mack Jones suggests that the value judgment or the normative choice does not necessarily take place at the expense of the truth of the investigation, and that the scientific method can enhance the quality of value judgment.⁹⁰ To sum up, although it seems unrealistic to speak about value-free social sciences, scholars should maintain high ethical standards in their research by presenting the truth in a scientific manner.

To complete my introductory presentation, I will proceed to define related concepts to be encountered throughout the study and to explain the study's outline.

Analytical Framework

Ideology

Ideology is a highly controversial topic. The meaning of the word

is frequently debated. It is said that almost no two writers hold the same definition. In its broad meaning, an ideology usually refers to a set of ideas and beliefs held by a group of people. Jean Blondel defines ideology as "a set of interrelated attitudes which indicate a specific approach to society's problems."⁹¹ Others see ideology as "a concise set of political, social, and economic beliefs--a well-formulated sequence of pertinent and related ideas in the realm of world politics."⁹² Still others define ideology as "the medium through which men make their history as conscious actors."⁹³ And similarly, it is defined as "the realm in which people clarify and justify their actions as they pursue divergent interests."⁹⁴ In a more restricted definition, Hagopian sees ideology as "a programmatic and rhetorical application of some grandiose philosophical system, which arouses men to political action and may provide strategic guidance for that action."⁹⁵ Another narrow definition sees ideology as "the study of ideas, identified with political movements and charismatic leaders and falsely set apart from scientific knowledge or knowledge in general."⁹⁶ However, despite the above differences, it is generally agreed that ideology refers to a form of social or political philosophy that aspires both to explain the world and to change it.

The word "ideology" was first used in 1797 by the French philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy, who saw it as a process of forming a "science of ideas."⁹⁷ Thus, ideology was a positive and progressive notion in its origin. Napoleon gave a negative meaning to the word,⁹⁸ and this negative connotation was intensified by Marx.

Marx and Engels developed the first theory of ideology, and thanks to Marx, the concept of ideology is still frequently debated in today's social science. Anthony Pavel states that "all contemporary discussions, consciously or unconsciously, tend either to confirm Marx or to find fault with him."⁹⁹ Marx argued that the ideology of society originated with and is proclaimed by the ruling class. Control over material conditions allows the ruling class to control the production of ideas. In this

context, the major purpose of the ideology is to justify the status quo.¹⁰⁰ Marx was mainly interested in exposing the role of ideology in the perpetuation of social inequalities. For him, "ideology was simply a fabrication used by a group of people to justify themselves."¹⁰¹ Ideology in this sense "is a false consciousness."¹⁰² Marger defines false consciousness as "a belief on the part of nonruling groups that the prevailing sociopolitical system works in their interest when in fact it works primarily in the interests of the powerful few."¹⁰³ Marxism sees that false consciousness among the masses as an important factor which permits the continuity of ideological hegemony. However, the editors of the book A Dictionary of Marxist Thought took issue with the oft-quoted definition of ideology as "false consciousness." They argued that it is not correct to project the matter as a permanent Marxist position. The Marxist negative definition of ideology should apply only to the situation in which distortion and the concealing of economic contradictions take place.¹⁰⁴

The evolution of the concept of ideology within the Marxist traditions resulted in attaching a positive meaning and dynamic function to ideology. Lenin played an important role in this respect. Thus, for Marxism "ideology is no longer a necessary distortion which conceals contradictions, but becomes a neutral concept referring to the political consciousness of classes, including the proletarian class."¹⁰⁵ According to Macridis, there is a general agreement among "New-Marxists" that to accomplish a revolutionary change of the society, a revolution in the ideology of that society must first take place.¹⁰⁶ Thus, as Paul Lovejoy points out, any scholarly discussion of ideology must take into account both the negative and the positive aspects of the concept.¹⁰⁷

Ideologies have several functions: (1) to legitimize or justify the status quo, (2) to mobilize the people of the society, (3) to manipulate ideas in order to incite people into action, (4) to serve as a channel to express people's hopes and interests, and (5) to serve as a channel to

criticize social and political beliefs.¹⁰⁸ Macridis says that there are three types of ideologies: (1) the status quo ideologies which rationalize the existing order, (2) revolutionary ideologies which advocate drastic change in the existing order, and (3) reformist ideologies which call for gradual change in the existing order.¹⁰⁹

In contrast to what became known in the academic world as the "end of ideology" thesis, which claims that the age of ideology has passed, the troubled nature of world politics during the last two decades shows that political confrontation and social strife are still alive, and so is the need to justify political interests. Ideas and ideologies have played an important role in political life. As Macridis points out: "ideologies are very much a part of our lives; they are not dead and they are not in decline anywhere, as some authors have argued."¹¹⁰ Ideology has been used by various groups and social systems to incite people into political action. It is also inevitably linked to domination. In South Africa and in Israel, apartheid and Zionism have been used as effective tools for maintaining and justifying the continued power and privilege of the ruling groups.

Racism

Racism generally refers to the notion that certain people are superior to others on the basis of race. It can more narrowly be defined as "a mode of thought that offers a particular explanation for the fact that that population group that can be distinguished by ancestry is likely to differ in culture, status, and power."¹¹¹ In a broader definition, racism can be seen as "any attitude, belief, behavior, or institutional arrangement that tends to favor one race or ethnic group (usually a majority group) over another (usually a minority group)."¹¹² Such definitions lead to six complementary and interconnected conclusions:

. . . two implications, two principles of faith and two principles of practice. The implications are (1) that mankind

is divided into groups of ethnic or racial or color distinctiveness and these groups are distinct from one another and different from one another, and (2) belonging to any of these groups has an important--if not a decisive effect on the aptitude, qualities and capabilities of the persons who compose the group. The principles of belief are (1) that some races, or at least one race, are superior and therefore the others are inferior. The superior races are entitled to privileges to which the inferior races are not entitled. (2) Races cannot live in harmony with one another; coexistence is precluded by the very nature of the relationship; racial incompatibility is an essential corollary to racial diversity. Two principles of practice follow: (1) since races cannot live with one another, since they are essentially diverse, they must be separated; racial segregation is an essential prerequisite of a healthy international existence. (2) Where races coexist, supremacy and discrimination by one race against another are the inevitable consequence.¹¹³

The division of the human race into superior and inferior is a western product. "Indeed it was the colonial expansion of capitalist European nation-states that set the historical stage for the ideology of racism."¹¹⁴ Racist philosophies and practices were evident in European policies toward Third World people. Racism has been used to justify a diverse range of economic exploitation. Hence, one must have a deep understanding of the economic dimension of racism. With regard to South Africa, for example, many scholars emphasize a link between its racist ideology and the development of its capitalist economy.¹¹⁵

A related concept is what came to be known as "scientific racism" or "academic racism"--a notion which finds scientific proof for the argument that some groups are superior to others. This concept was based on Charles Darwin's evolution theory and later developed into an ideology that "essentially legitimated the position of those on top and those on bottom as a consequence of biology."¹¹⁶ Inspired by Darwin's Origin of Species, Francis Galton emphasized racial and hereditary elements in human development.¹¹⁷ "Scientific racism" was widely advocated in Europe and North America to justify colonialization of the non-European people. Leonard Thompson pointed out that: "Scientific racism was a perfect fit with the global political economy of the period of white hegemony. It was used to justify white hegemony in North America and in the European

empires in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean."¹¹⁸ However, by the 1930s, "scientific racism" lost its influence and respectability.¹¹⁹

As to the related concept of "racial discrimination," the International Convention on Racial Discrimination defines it as:

any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin, which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.¹²⁰

It is obvious that most "multi-racial" societies have experienced some form of racial prejudice and discrimination. However, Zionism and apartheid appear to imply more than that. They seem to suggest, as the evidence reviewed later propose, a systematic effort to make race, color, or religion a qualification of membership in the civil community.

In examining Zionism and apartheid, there are three additional chapters to this study. A brief account of the content of each chapter follows. Chapter Two is about the ideology of apartheid. It discusses the basic principles of apartheid and the centrality of the race question in South Africa. This chapter pays considerable attention to the religious, political, and historical myths of apartheid and their role in perpetuating and legitimizing racial domination. Chapter Three is about Zionism. It explains the basic principles of political Zionism. It examines the early colonial efforts of the Zionist movement and its link with the colonial powers of the time. This chapter also examines the Zionist philosophy of separation and the use of religion for political purposes. The Israeli laws that seem to sanction discrimination against non-Jews are also dealt with in this chapter.

The fourth chapter is the concluding chapter in which the actual comparison between Zionism and apartheid takes place. It seeks to test the fairness and validity of those arguments which consider Zionism as a liberation movement, and which deny the existence of apartheid in Israel.

The discussion in this chapter focuses on the similarities and differences between the two situations in regard to the philosophies of separation, the mistreatment of the natives, and the use of religion in perpetuating domination.

ENDNOTES

*I am referring exclusively to political Zionism and not to its religious or cultural variants.

1. Amos Elon, The Israelis, Founders and Sons, (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 111.
2. Ibid., p. 170.
3. John E. Farley, Majority-Minority Relations, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), p. 178.
4. The New York Times, November 12, 1975, p. 15.
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Chapter II

APARTHEID

Introduction

This chapter begins with a brief historical background about the coming of early white settlers in South Africa and their initial contact with the indigenous population. The next section defines apartheid and explains its basic themes. The third section discusses the question of race, which is central in apartheid ideology. It begins with the use of ideology since the Greece's time and discusses the concepts of "civil-savage" and "Christian-heathen" and superiority-inferiority dichotomies. That was a necessary background for the discussion of the race question in Afrikaner ideology. The fourth section discusses the Afrikaner literature concerning "black inferiority," and its use to justify the apartheid policies of separation. The section about religion discusses the role of religion in South African apartheid. The analysis of this section explains the use of religious themes such as "chosen people," "promised land," and "children of Ham" to justify the white's privilege and domination. The last section of this chapter is devoted to the discussion of some "historical myths" that have been used within apartheid ideology. The myths of the "vacant land" and "simultaneous migrations" have been used to justify the claim of the white settlers to the land of South Africa.

A Brief Historical Background

The Early European settlement in South Africa took place when the Dutch founded a refreshment station at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, an era of outward European expansion. The Dutch East Indian Company had no intention of establishing "a permanent colony" and sought "to keep the establishment as small as possible."¹ The main objectives of the company "was business and profit."² The general instructions of the Company's directors were "to build a fort, plant a garden on the best land, and keep

peace with the natives."³ The Company's instruction was to treat the natives with gentleness in order to encourage the cattle trade that was needed for the European ships.⁴ The early Dutch comers to the Cape were servants of the Dutch East India Company. Because of the need for more agricultural productions, some of these servants "were freed and allowed to take up land as freehold farmers."⁵ This led to the creation of a "class of free burghers" which "would gradually grow in number as the company servants and soldiers fulfilled their terms of service and were induced to remain at the Cape as free colonists."⁶ Bernard Magubane suggested that the labor needed to operate the station motivated the company's efforts "to dominate the local area."⁷ Thus, the relationship between the settlers and the natives became one "of conflict over land and cattle at first, then over industrial opportunities when towns grew up."⁸

The indigenous peoples, the Khoikhoi (the Hottentots, as called by the Europeans) did not initially object to the presence of the Dutch since "they had a long experience of trading with ships of various European nations."⁹ But soon they began to realize the danger of the growing number of the foreigners, and felt some restrictions on their freedom of movement. Tension was developed and led to the first Khoikhoi-Dutch wars. The fighting was resolved by a treaty that ensured the settlers' right concerning the disputed territory.¹⁰ The Commander of the garrison reported the opinion of a wounded Khoikhoi as follows:

The prisoner . . . who could speak Dutch fairly well, having been asked why they caused us this trouble, declared, for no other reason than that they saw that we kept in possession the best lands, and grazed our cattle where they used to do so, and that everywhere with houses and plantations we endeavoured to establish ourselves so permanently as if we intend never to leave again and take permanent possession of this Cape land (which had belonged to them during all the centuries) for our sole use. Yea! to such an extent that their cattle could not come and drink at the fresh water without going over the corn lands which we did not like them to do.

He asked finally what we would have done had the same thing happened to us. Moreover, he added, they observed how we were strengthening ourselves daily with fortifications and bulwarks, which according to their way of thinking could have

no other object than to bring them, and all that was theirs under our authority and domination."¹¹

War broke out again in 1659-60 and in 1673-77, which resulted in the victory of the white settlers due to the fact that the Khoikhoi "were divided into small and loosely organized tribes whose mutual jealousies and animosities could be manipulated by the invaders for their own advantage."¹² The modern weapons the Europeans had at the time was also an important factor that contributed to the White victory.

During the course of their expansion, the white settlers came into conflict with another local people, the San (whom the whites called Bushmen). The San used the tactic of hit and run raids "making life precarious for Whites . . . until well into the nineteenth century."¹³ The Trekboers (the white settlers) responded by organizing "hunting parties which killed adult Bushmen and captured the children where they were used as herdsmen. In one such party 250 Bushmen were killed."¹⁴ It was reported that "men bragged about their bag of Bushmen as fishermen boast about their catch."¹⁵

Khoikhoi and San were thus subdued and their way of life disintegrated. "The indigenous herding and hunting societies had largely disappeared as autonomous entities by the late eighteenth century."¹⁶ Once they lost their ability to supply cattle to the Company, the indigenous people's "continued survival as independent societies" became no longer important "to the success of white settlement."¹⁷ Force was used to satisfy the white's hunger for land. "The end result was dispossession of the indigenes and their loss of power, independence, and cultural cohesion."¹⁸

By the 1770's, the forefather of today's Afrikaners came into clash with Bantu-speaking people. This became known as the first Kaffir War. The Kaffir Wars lasted for over a century until the time when England entered into her war with the Boer republics. With the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the expansion of white settlers was

carried out through "legal" devices such as the Natives Land Act of 1913. The National Party won control of the state machinery in 1948. Since then the ideology of apartheid became the framework within which the subjugation and exploitations of the Africans were justified.

Definition and Basic Principles

Apartheid is a complex concept that has a variety of interpretations. Literally the word in Afrikaans means "apart-ness," "the state of being apart 'separateness' or 'separation,' and in the South African context means racial distinction."¹⁹ In the South African political language, apartheid refers to "separate development of each race in the geographical area assigned to it."²⁰ The white rulers have frequently claimed that they have sought to help the Africans to advance in their own areas and that apartheid is the proper framework within which the Africans can fulfill their aspirations in life. The then Premier Vorster stated:

I say to the Coloured people, as well as to the Indians and the Bantu, that the policy of separate development is not a policy which rests upon jealousy, fear, or hatred. It is not a denial of the human dignity of anyone, nor is it so intended. On the contrary, it gives the opportunity to every individual, within his own sphere, not only to be a man or woman in every sense, but it also creates the opportunity for them to develop and advance without restriction or frustration as circumstances justify, and in accordance with the demands of development achieved.²¹

Apartheid has been given a variety of names such as "white leadership," "separate development," "parallel development," "multi-national development," and "co-operative co-existence."²² Opponents of apartheid see it as racism, exploitation, and domination. For Bernard Magubane apartheid is "more than mere racial discrimination or casual exploitation of one group by another. It is a strict ideology of white supremacy, racial oppression, and exploitation, whose logical extremity--genocide--is tempered by the need for African labor."²³ In the words of the South African poet Breyten Breyenbach:

Apartheid is the state and the condition of being apart. It is the no man's land between peoples. But this gap is not a neutral space. It is the artificially created distance necessary to attenuate, for the practitioners, the very raw reality of racial, economic, social and cultural discrimination and exploitation. It is the space of the White man's being. It is the distance needed to convince himself of his denial of the other's humanity. It ends up denying all humanity of any kind both to the other and to himself.²⁴

Apartheid, in the opinion of the French writer Jacques Derrida,

Concentrates separation, raises it to another power and sets separation itself apart: "apartitionality," something like that. By isolating being a part in some sort of essence or hypostasis, the word corrupts it into a quasi-ontological segregation. At every point, like all racism, it tends to pass segregation off as natural--and as the very law of the origin.²⁵

The word apartheid was used for the first time in 1943 in a South African newspaper.²⁶ Dr. Malan used the term apartheid for the first time in parliament in 1944 when he stated: "To ensure the safety of the white race and of Christian civilization by the honest maintenance of the principles of apartheid and guardianship."²⁷ Speaking in the House of Assembly in 1963, the South African Prime Minister Henrik Verwoerd said: "We want to keep South Africa White . . . 'keeping it white' can mean only one thing, namely White domination, not 'leadership,' not 'guidance,' but 'control,' 'supremacy.'"²⁸ Merle Lipton identified four features of apartheid:

First, it is the hierarchical ordering of the whole social, economical and political structure of South African society on the basis of statutorily defined race. Whites (who constitute some 18% of the population) are at the top of the hierarchy; mixed-race coloureds together with Indians (roughly 12% of the total) are in the middle; and the indigenous African population (the remaining 70%) are at the bottom. Secondly, apartheid involves systematic political and economic discrimination against all blacks, but particularly against Africans. Thirdly, it involves segregation of the races not only politically and economically, but also socially, particularly in housing and social services, including education and health care. Fourthly, apartheid is the legalization and institutionalization of this hierarchical, discriminatory and segregated system.²⁹

The roots of apartheid indeed go back 300 years long before the National Party gained control of the state machinery. It "evolved out of the structures of segregation established during the course of colonial settlement and conquest."³⁰ Between 1910 and 1934 many laws were passed which encompassed practically every aspect of life such as "land-ownership rights, employment and wage conditions, the place and nature of a person's residence, freedom of movement, political rights, the quality of education, etc., on the basis of membership in a racial group."³¹

The backbone of the apartheid system is what became officially known as "homelands" (originally called Bantustans) by which South Africa was divided into eleven independent states. Ten "black states" comprise 72 percent of the population and occupy 13 percent of the area. Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, and Bophuthatswana are now all "independent," and supposed to be followed by other six black states. The eleventh white state comprises a white majority and two minorities: the coloureds and the Indians. According to the apartheid system, the population of South Africa is classified into four main racial groups called White (16.1 percent), Coloureds (9.2 percent), Asian (2.9 percent), and Africans (71.8 percent), with the whites having a monopoly of political and economic powers.³² The question of race is central in apartheid ideology.

Race and Ideology

Throughout history, ideology has been used to explain or rationalize the ruler's action and their privileged position. Magubane maintained that the ruling class has sought

To find theoretical and ideological weapons to supplement their physical domination. They propagate these ideologies in all the institutions of society in order to convince themselves and the oppressed classes that inequality is inevitable, the natural state of human society.³³

In his Politics, Aristotle provided an elaborate rationalization for

slavery. He wrote: "It is thus clear that, just as some are by nature free, so others are by nature slaves, and for these latter the condition of slavery is both beneficial and just."³⁴ Plato for his part believed that "truth was a vital virtue." However, to promote domestic harmony and to ensure citizens' loyalty, "the rule of his model Republic should create and propagate an official mythology--a 'royal lie' an 'audacious fiction.'"³⁵ Plato's "royal lie" developed to "a rigid system of closed classes." He explained:

Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the highest honour; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard, or of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the race . . . For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed.³⁶

Aristotle's doctrine that some men are slaves by nature was used, in the middle of the sixteenth century, by the great Spanish jurist Juan Gineés de Sepúlveda in his debate with Las Casas on the question of whether the Aristotelian theory could be applied to the Indians.³⁷ Thus, according to the Aristotelian doctrine,

Society consists of people who differ not only in skin color but in ability. Members of certain races are masters because their achievements re-echo across the world, others are capable of nothing. They can serve, at best, as fertilizers for history, tilling the soil, digging the mines, and doing other chores for the European bourgeois civilization.³⁸

The concept of "savagery" which was developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries became an important guide by "which the early colonists assessed the potential and predicted the fate of the non-European peoples they encountered."³⁹ The human race was divided into

superior and inferior, and accordingly non-Europeans were treated differently from Europeans.⁴⁰ The civil-savage dichotomy was used by the Greeks who declared themselves superior to "barbarians."⁴¹ The Christian-heathen dichotomy was also used to emphasize the notion of European (white) superiority. The Spanish and Portuguese were guided by the Pope's instructions to enslave and seize the lands and property of "all saracens and pagans whatsoever, and all other enemies of Christ wheresoever placed."⁴² Christianity was equated with civilization and slavery was attributed to an inherited curse that God had placed on nonwhite people. In the first quarter of the sixteenth century, Johan Boemus, a German Hebraic scholar, argued "that all barbarous peoples descended from Ham, while all civilized men were the issue of Shem and Japheth."⁴³ The Afrikaners, during the eighteenth century, referred to themselves as "Christians" and the Africans as "heathen."⁴⁴ "Indeed, the Africans who were trained by European missionaries were considered heathen, while those European farmers or cattlemen who had no religious affiliation were considered Christian."⁴⁵

That was the background of the superiority-inferiority dichotomy which sought to rationalize "political and economic interest of conquering and exploiting groups throughout history."⁴⁶ Thus, "racial superiority became the theory justifying conquest and territorial expansion: it was the manifest destiny of the 'civilized' world to control and guide 'inferior' peoples for the good of all."⁴⁷ The notion of "white supremacy" which "refers to the attitudes, ideologies, and policies associated with the rise of blatant forms of white or European dominance over 'non-white' populations"⁴⁸ became central in Afrikaner mythology. Most whites in South Africa "assumed that any sensible, civilized person knew that Africans were a culturally inferior race and should be treated accordingly."⁴⁹ The whites see themselves as "members of a race that was superior to all other races in Africa."⁵⁰ This has been manifested, they believe, in every aspect of life: "religion, technology, politics, and the arts, as well

as the vast differences in power and wealth."⁵¹

Race has always been a vital factor in Afrikaner ideology. The white South Africans see races as "static, self-perpetuating entities with fixed cultural and linguistic as well as physical characteristics, and that they themselves represented the summit of human achievement."⁵² White supremacy became "a conviction deeply rooted in subconscious of all white South Africans."⁵³ Marianne Cornevin argued that "the absolute superiority of the white race and the need to safeguard its political and economic supremacy are the twin cornerstones of the ideology of apartheid."⁵⁴

As is the case with Zionism, separation of races is central in apartheid ideology. Apartheid believes:

That each race is predestined to lead its own special way of life and development. Any assimilation is regarded as a violation of "purity of blood" and branded as a path jeopardizing the "supreme" white race. For the "lower" race, the Africans, exposure to European culture is allegedly harmful because deviation from the primitive way of life predestined by God would result in loss of their originality.⁵⁵

The question of who is a white is just as important in South Africa as the question of who is a Jew in Israel. "The fact that Africans, Indians, and Coloureds have been collectively referred to as 'non-whites' in official terminology," Manas Buthelezi said, "suggests that they have the identity of non-persons who exist only as a negative shadow of whites."⁵⁶ D.F. Malan, who became Prime Minister when the NP took power in 1948, explained:

Difference in colour indicates a simple but highly significant fact, i.e., that Whites and Non-whites are not of the same kind. They are different . . . The difference in colour is merely the physical manifestation of the contrast between two irreconcilable ways of life, between barbarism and civilization, between heathenism and Christianity, and finally between overwhelming numerical odds on the one hand and insignificant numbers on the other.⁵⁷

The White perception of African inferiority goes back before the arrival of the white settlers. By the time the Dutch East India Company

decided to establish a supply station at the cape in 1652, Europeans had already considered themselves superior to Africans. They tended to look down at people who differed from them "in physical appearance and social behavior."⁵⁸ At the time, the Dutch had already participated in the Atlantic slave trade along the west African coastline. Leonard Thompson wrote:

Throughout northern Europe, Africans were stereotyped as idolatrous and licentious, thieving and lying, lazy and dirty. The stereotype persisted throughout the eighteenth century, spiced by reports of wars and massacres, and allegations of cannibalism and sexual relations between apes and Africans. Abolitionists as well as defenders of the slave trade had no doubt that Africans were inferior to Europeans. Explanations for African inferiority varied. Environmental determinism was a common explanation: tropical heat combined with the alleged abundance of tropical natural conditions was responsible. Nevertheless, few Europeans doubted that Africans were members of the human species. They were immature people, to be treated like children. They were lagging a thousand years or more behind Europeans. This line of thought led to justification of slavery. Europeans could save Africans from the degradations of their own societies by taking them to the Americas, where hard work and civilized discipline would be a step toward maturity.⁵⁹

By 1652 the Dutch had at their disposal enough information about the cape collected from many Portuguese, English, French, Dutch, and other European ships' crews. Most of these accounts emphasized the strangeness of the natives' "speech, their physical appearance, their clothing, their mode of life, and their customs."⁶⁰ By the middle of the seventeenth century, the term Hottentot "was becoming a symbol of human degradation in European literature."⁶¹ The following passage written by Jacobus Hondius in 1652 seems to be representative.

The natives in the vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope are generally called Hottentots by us on account of their speech, which sounds very much like stuttering and, in fact, they even refer to themselves as Hottentots . . . They have very ugly countenances . . . They have everything in common with the dumb cattle, barring their human nature, from which, occasionally, some co-ordination of the senses may bring forth a spark of intelligence . . . So far as clothing is concerned, they usually wear nothing but a small skin, as wide as a hand, and as long as a span, which serves to cover their private parts; both men and women being otherwise entirely naked . . .

. Since they hang the entrails of animals round their legs and neck as containers to hold odds-and-ends of things . . . (fresh as well as stale), dripping with fat, and plaited twice or thrice, they all smell fiercely, as can be noticed at a distance of more than twelve feet against the wind, and they also give the appearance of never having washed . . . They are thus very dissolute and in every way like animals, for they are wild, rough, and unclean in their habits . . . There are no signs of Belief or Religion to be found among them and it is for this reason they are called Cafres, Caferes, or, according to Marmol, Quefreres, in keeping with the name of the country Quefrerie.⁶²

One account in 1609 described the natives as "cannibals."⁶³ Thus, the early Dutch settlers "were prepared to deal with a degraded people--human indeed, but 'beast-like.'"⁶⁴ In 1657 Johann Schreyer described Hottentots as "false by nature, inconstant, revengeful, thievish, lazy and slow to work, nearly always gay [cheerful]."⁶⁵ During the eighteenth century "'Hottentot' was a widely accepted symbol for irredeemable savagery and the very depth of human degradation."⁶⁶ The Oxford English Dictionary of 1899 defined Hottentot as a "person of inferior intellect or culture."⁶⁷ According to a study published in 1937 by I.D. MacCrone, the unfair treatment of the natives by the white settlers was justified "because they were not Christians and also because their appearance and behavior resembled those of wild beasts rather than civilized humans."⁶⁸ The Dutch East India Company, for its part, played an important role in emphasizing the racial structure of the colonial society "by prohibiting interracial marriages, appointing only white people as local officials, and making it increasingly difficult for people who were not white to own land."⁶⁹

Black inferiority was a constant theme in the literature of white South Africa. Richard Godlonton, a white settler who edited the Grahamstown Journal in 1820, emphasized "the barbarous state of nudity in which [blacks] are found at the present day."⁷⁰ William Harris, a British military officer who conducted a hunting expedition north of the Vaal River in 1836-37, expressed dissatisfaction with the British government which in his opinion

Should not long ago have seen the imperious necessity, dictated alike by reason, Justice, and humanity, of exterminating from off the face of the earth, a race of monsters, who, being the unprovoked destroyers, and implacable foes of Her Majesty's Christian subjects, have forfeited every claim to mercy or consideration.⁷¹

The conclusion of a commission appointed in 1852 by the British Colonial government, read in part:

The Kafirs are lazy by nature and accustomed to do their work under the influence of fear; they are protected in this district, they live on land for nothing, and as they have little wants in their condition of life, they can live without working. Their own work must be done by their women, who they treat as slaves. But I consider it with respect to their civilization, as well as to their own improvement, as an act of justice to the white inhabitants that they should be compelled to go into the service of the Boers.⁷²

Most of the British witnesses who gave evidence to the Commission stereotyped Africans in a similar fashion. Benjamin Blaine suggested that the African

Position on the scale of civilization . . . is almost as low as humanity has fallen since the creation of man . . . They are crafty and cunning, and at the same time indolent and excitable; averse to labor, but when their passions are roused bloodthirsty and cruel, and are apparently unaffected by those influences which tend to raise barbarism to civilization.⁷³

S.J. du Toit, the author of an influential book published in 1877, suggested that:

It was self-evident that all the precolonial inhabitants of South Africa were savages. That required no explanation. Some people, he wrote, say that the Bushmen are not human; that was not true; nevertheless, the Boers could do nothing else but shoot them dead. The Kaffers are more human than the Bushmen, but their customs stamped them as savages; by practicing witchcraft, buying women with cattle, and making the women do all the work.⁷⁴

Another influential study conducted by Theal described the "Bushmen" as an "unimprovable race, one of the lowest, if not the very lowest, of all the races on the face of the earth."⁷⁵ According to Teal, "The intelligence of an African child stops developing at about the age of

puberty"--a popular notion in nineteenth century Europe.⁷⁶ He explained: "The growth of his mind, which at first promised so much, has ceased just at that stage when the mind of the European begins to display the greatest vigour."⁷⁷

By the end of the nineteenth century, these ideas were published in major textbooks in the Cape Colony. Alexander Wilmot, a major textbook writer, a Cape Town politician and a fellow at the Royal Geographical Society, wrote:

The existence of the coloured races is an immense benefit, as, by means of them, cheap labour is obtainable, and large agricultural supplies can be constantly procured; but Southern Africa, although its population chiefly comprises the descendants of stalwart nomadic races who have migrated from a northern part of the continent, is eminently a white man's country, where homes can be found for millions of the overflowing population of Europe.⁷⁸

These studies formed the basis for future publications on South Africa that flowed from the British presses. James Bryce, who wrote an important book on American democracy, was a clear example of "the racism that permeated the British ruling class in the high imperial age."⁷⁹ After touring South Africa for several months, he, in his Impression of South Africa, emphasized the notion of "inferior races." Bryce wrote:

Here in South Africa the native races seem to have made no progress for centuries, if, indeed, they have not actually gone backward; and the feebleness of savage man intensifies one's sense of the overmastering strength of nature . . . When the Portuguese and Dutch first knew the Kafirs, they did not appear to be making any progress toward a higher culture. Human life was held very cheap; women were in a degraded state, and sexual morality was at a low ebb. Courage, loyalty to chief and tribe, and hospitality were the three prominent virtues. War was the only pursuit in which chieftains sought distinction, and war was mere slaughter and devastation, unaccompanied by any views of policy or plans of administration. The people were--and indeed still are--passionately attached to their old customs . . . and it was probably as much the unwillingness to have their customs disturbed as the apprehension for their land that made many of the tribes oppose to the advance of the Europeans so obstinate a resistance . . . Their minds are mostly too childish to recollect and draw the necessary inferences from previous defeats, and they never realized that the whites possessed beyond the sea an inexhaustible reservoir of men

and weapons.⁸⁰

Another influential British publication was a Clarendon Press series, A Historical Geography of the British Colonies, whose volume on South Africa was published in 1897. The same stereotypes were repeated: Bushmen were described as "the outcasts of South Africa, untameable, savage," while Hottentots as "a desultory race, with little capacity except for loafing and minding cattle," and "Kaffirs were much more primitive than American Indians."⁸¹ The Boer President of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger (who was influenced by Calvinism)⁸² stated that "the black man had to be taught that he came second, that he belonged to the inferior class which must obey and learn."⁸³ "Savages," he continued, "must be kept within bonds, and always overruled by justice and morality."⁸⁴ The constitution of the Boer Republics emphasized "no equality between coloured people and the white inhabitants, either in church or state."⁸⁵

The war of 1899-1902, which resulted in the defeat of the Boers at the hands of the British, led to no basic change in the relations between whites and blacks. The British backed off from "their previous intention to extend the Cape franchise to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State"⁸⁶ when they agreed in the Treaty of Vereeniging (1902) to leave the matter to the white settlers "to determine the extent of black's political rights in a British-dominated South Africa."⁸⁷ Lord Milner, the British High Commissioner, who headed the "reconstruction" efforts in South Africa in the years immediately following the war, put it clearly in 1903:

A political equality of white and black is impossible. The white man must rule, because he is elevated by many, many steps above the black man; steps which it will take the latter centuries to climb, and which it is quite possible that the vast bulk of the black population may never be able to climb at all.⁸⁸

The British racial policy sought to treat the "natives" differently from the "coloured" people. Lord Selborne, who was the high commissioner for South Africa and governor of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony from

1905 to 1910, recommended:

Coloured people. Our object should be to teach the Coloured people to give their loyal support to the white population. It seems to me sheer folly to classify them with Natives, and by treating them as Natives to force them away from their natural allegiance to the whites and into making common cause with the Natives. If they are so forced, in the time trouble they will furnish exactly those leaders which the Natives could not furnish for themselves. It is, therefore, in my opinion, unwise to think of treating them as natives; and it would be as unjust as unwise. There are many Coloured people who are quite white inside, though they may be coloured outside. There are some, indeed, who are quite white outside also. The problem of the treatment of the Coloured people, is, indeed, sadly complicated by the fact that they vary in every shade of character and colour from pure white inside and outside to pure black inside and outside.

I suggest that the wise policy is to give them the benefit of their white blood--not to lay the stress on the black blood, but to lay the stress on the white blood, and to make any differentiation of treatment between them and whites the exception and not the rule. A case for such differentiation would only arise when a Coloured man showed by his manner of living, e.g., by the practice of polygamy, that he had reverted to the tribal type.

Natives. The objects which the Government must have in their Native policy are: (i) to preserve the peace of the country, for nothing is so demoralizing or injurious to its true welfare as a native war; (ii) to ensure the gradual destruction of the tribal civilization among the Natives; (iii) to ensure the gradual destruction of the tribal system, which is incompatible with civilization. An important feature of this policy will be teaching the Natives to work. A large proportion of them do work now, but mostly in a desultory and inefficient manner. The object must be to teach them to work as continually and effectively as the whites are supposed to but do not always do.⁸⁹

In his address to the Cape House of Assembly, Cecil John Rhodes said:

I will lay down my policy on this Native question . . . either you receive them on an equal footing as citizens or call them a subject race . . . I have made up my mind that there must be class (race) legislation . . . The Native is to be treated as a child and denied the franchise. We must adopt the system of despotism such as works well in India in our relations with the barbarians of South Africa . . . These are my politics and these are the politics of South Africa.⁹⁰

The legal mechanism of apartheid was established when the political power was granted to the White minority by the British in 1910. The constitution legalized the oppression and the exploitation of the non-White population. During the period 1934-1948, several Afrikaner

intellectuals returned to South Africa with doctoral degrees from German universities. They were "attracted by the cruder elements in German national socialism," which emphasized "the supremacy of the nation over the individual."⁹¹ Race purity became a central issue for Afrikaner nationalists. A pamphlet by G. Eloff, entitled "Race and Races Mixing," read:

The preservation of the pure race tradition of the *Boerevolk* must be protected at all costs in all possible ways as a holy pledge entrusted to us by our ancestors as part of God's plan with our People. Any movement, school, or individual who sins against this must be dealt with as a racial criminal by the effective authorities.⁹²

This ideology laid the basis of the policy of apartheid. Sociologist G. Cronjé argued:

The more consistently the policy of apartheid could be applied, the greater would be the security for the purity of our blood and the surer our unadulterated European racial survival . . . total racial separation . . . is the most consistent application of the Afrikaner idea of racial apartheid.⁹³

The policy of apartheid was crystallized by the conclusion of a special commission appointed by the Nationalist Party. It read:

The policy of our country should encourage total apartheid as the ultimate goal of a natural process of separate development.

It is the primary task and calling of the State to seek the welfare of South Africa, and to promote the happiness and well-being of its citizens, non-White as well as White. Realizing that such a task can best be accomplished by preserving and safeguarding the White race, the Nationalist Party professes this as the fundamental guiding principle of its policy.⁹⁴

White domination was stated clearly in the statements of the National Party leaders. Mr. Strijdom said:

Our policy is that the Europeans must stand their ground and must remain *baas* in South Africa. If we reject the *herrenvolk* idea and the principle and the idea that the White man cannot remain *baas*, if the franchise is to be extended to the non-Europeans, and if the non-Europeans are given representation

and the vote and the non-Europeans are developed on the same basis as the Europeans, how can the European remain *baas* . . . our view is that in every sphere the Europeans must retain the right⁹⁵ to rule the country and to keep it a White man's country.

Similar to Zionism, the ideology of apartheid is based on separation. Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, who was the prime minister from 1958 until his death in 1966, stated:

True unity in a racial group can only develop amongst its own people, separated from the others. The only national unity for the whites is unity amongst the whites. We do not only seek and fight for a solution which will mean our survival as a white race, but we also seek a solution which will ensure survival and full development--political and economic--to each of the other racial groups, and we are even prepared to pay a high price out of our earnings to ensure their future . . . We want each of our population groups to control and to govern themselves, as is the case with other Nations. Then they can cooperate as a Commonwealth--in an economic association with the Republic and with each other. In the transition stage the guardian must teach and guide his ward. This is our policy of separate development. South Africa will proceed in all honesty and fairness to secure peace, prosperity and justice for all, by means of political independence coupled with economic interdependence.⁹⁶

Needless to say, the above statement does not reflect reality. We all know the plight of the Africans under the white rule as well as the plight of the Palestinians despite the nice words of the Israeli Declaration of Independence. On the South African case Leonard Thompson commented:

However, the results were anything but peace, prosperity, and justice for the vast majority of the population. Going far beyond previous laws and practices, the government made racial segregation and discrimination pervasive and unescapable; it suppressed dissent with the utmost rigor; and it ensured that the most Africans would live in squalid poverty by limiting their rights to land ownership and citizenship to the former reserves, which, in Orwellian style, it redesignated as "Homelands." In those scattered and impoverished territories, African communities could survive only by sending their healthy adults out to earn wages as laborers in the "white areas"; but the government tried to ensure that no more Africans should exist in the white areas than those whom white employers needed to work in their homes, on their farms, and in their industries.⁹⁷

Like Zionism, apartheid exclusiveness is based on several religious

themes.

The Role of Religion in Apartheid Ideology

As in Zionism, religion in South Africa has been used to justify a wide range of exploitation, discrimination, and racial policies. It has also been a dynamic force in the development of Afrikaner nationalism. George Fredrickson pointed out that

The idea that there was a divine plan to establish independent white Christian communities in what is now Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal contained the seeds of an Afrikaner nationalism that would eventually lay claim to all of South Africa in the name of ethnic and racial supremacy.⁹⁸

Dr. D.F. Malan, the Nationalist leader who became a Prime Minister in 1948, stated:

Our history is the greatest masterpiece of the centuries. We hold this nationhood as our due for it was given us by the Architect of the Universe. His aim was the formation of a new nation among the nations of the world . . . The last hundred years have witnessed a miracle behind which must lie a divine plan. Indeed, the history of the Afrikaner reveals a will and a determination which makes one feel that Afrikanerdom is not the work of men but the creation of God.

He further continued:

It is through the will of God that the Afrikaner People exists at all. In his wisdom He determined that on the southern point of Africa, the dark continent, a People should be born who would be the bearer of Christian culture and civilization. In His wisdom He surrounded this People by great dangers. He set the People down upon unfruitful soil so that they had to toil and sweat to exist upon the soil. From time to time he visited them with droughts and other plagues.

But this was only one of the problems. God also willed that the Afrikaans People should be continually threatened by other Peoples. There was the ferocious barbarian who resisted the intruding Christian civilization and caused the Afrikaner's blood to flow in streams. There were times when as a result of this the Afrikaner was deeply despairing, but God at the same time prevented the swamping of the young Afrikaner People in the sea of barbarianism.⁹⁹

Leonard Thompson suggested that religion has been a major force in Afrikaner politics.¹⁰⁰ W.A. de Klerk noted that "Afrikaner politics was

slowly but fatally being theologized." The National Party, he continued to say, "was itself becoming, if not a church, then a party imbued with religion--a secular religion--at its very roots."¹⁰¹ The Constitution Act of 1961 "refers to South Africa as having been given by God to a specific people, 'this their own' land."¹⁰² The Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa (1982) indicated the increased importance of the role of religion in South African life. It stated that "the defence and police forces regard religious instruction as an indispensable adjunct to the training of recruits."¹⁰³ Dunbar Moodie noted that the ideas of "divine calling" and "special destiny" have played an important role in the interpretation of Afrikaner history and became a sort of "civil religion"¹⁰⁴ or a "folk theology" in the words of Alton Templin.¹⁰⁵ Leonard Thompson noted that:

The Afrikaans press has always given immense prominence to religion, printing numerous biblical quotations, editorials, special articles, and letters to the editors on religious themes on the leader page. Indeed, despite the inroads of urbanization and capitalism, religion continues to be a determining influence over the personal beliefs, the corporate behavior, and the self-justification of the Afrikaners.¹⁰⁶

In his book, The Church Struggle in South Africa, de Gruchy suggested that the use of religion in Afrikaner politics led to a "distortion of the biblical belief in providence." Such a distortion, de Gruchy maintained, was manifested in four points:

First of all, national history is given a quasi-sacred character. It functions as another norm beside the kingdom of God for evaluating history and for determining future plans. In all past and present events--the Great Trek, the Wars of Independence, the National Party victory in 1948, the establishment of the republic in 1961, or South Africa's role in war-torn southern Africa today--God is declared to be *our* God. With him on our side, victory is assured, our cause will be vindicated and our enemies vanquished. We are given an assurance upon which we may build for the future. Secondly, the Afrikaner nation (*volk*) has become a special people, a holy people, a church. Afrikanerdom has a peculiar relationship to the Almighty; it has assumed the mantle of Israel in southern Africa; it has a particular vocation among the nations. Thirdly, the policies of Afrikaner Nationalism have become transfused with a sense of divine calling and

mission, if not to the whole world, then at least to this subcontinent. This means that separate development has become, for many, more than a pragmatic attempt to solve a complex political problem; it is regarded as part of the divine purpose. Opposition to it is, per se, unchristian. And fourthly, because providence has led us to this point, the present order must have been ordained by God. Separate development may evolve, but it cannot be allowed to change radically without denying the very order of creation.¹⁰⁷

Similar to Zionist political socialization, Afrikaner children are taught the notion of divine intervention in the creation of their nation.

A boy of twelve related what he had learned:

We came here, and there was the bush, with wild grass growing. My father says the hills must have wondered who these strange people were! But we showed the hills. God had the sun smile on us. God told the skies to give us the water we needed. God asked the land to be kind to us; it took our seeds and gave us back our crops. We worked all the time, no vacations, only Sunday to pray to God. This is our country of South Africa . . . We love our fatherland; and we'll fight for it, and we'll die for it . . .¹⁰⁸

Like the Jews, Afrikaners consider themselves as a chosen people with a God-given destiny. They have frequently emphasized the notion that God himself placed them in Africa to fulfill a particular calling as a nation, that he gave them the Afrikaans language, and that he entrusted them with a mission to spread Christianity among the heathen. In the words of P.J. Cilliers, editor-in-chief of the Afrikaans daily Die Burger, Afrikaners "see themselves as a sort of Israel in Africa, with a sense of God-guided destiny that it would be as perilous to discount as in the case of the original mode."¹⁰⁹ The Chairman of the Afrikaner Broederbond, J.C. van Rooy, stated in 1944:

In every People in the world is embodied a Divine Idea and the task of each People is to build upon that Idea and to perfect it. So God created the Afrikaner People with a unique language, unique philosophy of life, and their own history and tradition in order that they might fulfill a particular calling and destiny here in the southern corner of Africa. We must stand guard on all that is peculiar to us and build upon it. We must believe that God has called us to be servants of his righteousness in this place. We must walk the way of obedience to faith.¹¹⁰

Paul Kruger, who was the President of the Transvaal between 1884 and 1900, stressed on "God's leadership in the history of the Afrikaner people; whatever happened to them was His will; He was the sovereign of history and its central theme."¹¹¹ In the same line of thinking, Daniel Francois Malan, leader of the "Purified" National Party, stated:

The history of the Afrikaner reveals a determination and a definiteness of purpose which make one feel that Afrikanerdom is not the work of man but a creation of God. We have a divine right to be Afrikaners. Our history is the highest work of art of the Architect of the centuries.¹¹²

The idea of chosenness, an element of Judaism that has been manipulated by the Zionist movement, has played a significant role in Afrikaner politics. "The Christian doctrine of election," J. Alton Templin wrote, "has its origin in a modification of the concept of a chosen people, developed by Apostle Paul and the early church and used by Augustine and Reformers such as Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli."¹¹³ In his The Institutes and De Aeterna Dei Predestinatione, "John Calvin spelled out the doctrine more completely . . . as he coordinated the concept with his doctrine of the Providence of God."¹¹⁴ The tenets of the orthodox Calvinism to which the White settlers in South Africa adhered were basically

[A] belief in the sovereign God, sole creator and ruler through his Providence of the universe; the inborn sinfulness of both man and the world as a result of the Fall; the election by predestination of the few through grace to glorify God in building his kingdom on earth; and the damnation of the rest of mankind, also to the glory of God.¹¹⁵

Templin maintained that the Afrikaners' interpretation of themselves as elect or chosen was that:

(1) Their election by God was assured to those who maintained the scriptural pattern in organizing their government and their personal lives; (2) their election was substantiated by the cultural advantages they enjoyed; (3) their election must be defended in the face of British imperialism that sought to compromise the Afrikaner cause; (4) their election must be maintained through their own language, Dutch or Afrikaans; (5)

their election assured them of an innate superiority when contrasted to African races; and finally, (6) their different interpretations of the doctrine of election were functionally related to the total social development.¹¹⁶

Templin maintained that after the Great Trek the concept of chosen people began to play a significant role in the Afrikaners' struggle against the British and the Africans and also in the development of their nationalism. Like the ancient Israelites, the Afrikaners saw themselves as a chosen people "with England in the role of Pharaoh, the highveld as the promised land, and the Africans as the Canaanites."¹¹⁷ Fredrickson wrote:

Their mission, as they saw it, was not so much to spread Christianity among the heathen as to preserve themselves as a Christian community amid a horde of savages who needed to be ruled firmly in the name of order and civilization but were unlikely candidates for conversion. Their struggle with the British missionaries in the Cape had in fact encouraged some Boers to take the view that propagating the gospel among the Africans was tantamount to making them their equals--an action that was "contrary to the laws of God." According to a missionary who visited the independent Boer republics in the 1860's, 'they have persuaded themselves by some wonderful mental process that they are God's chosen people and that the blacks are wicked and condemned Canaanites over whose head the divine anger lowers continually.'¹¹⁸

The Afrikaners interpreted the doctrine of their election to meet their practical needs. They, Templin suggested, saw that

[T]hey must maintain a scriptural framework for their government and for their personal lives; they assumed that cultural advancement was a sign of God's approval; they sought freedom from Dutch, or more usually from British, domination; they fought to maintain their language whether Dutch or Afrikaans; they assumed they were superior to Africans educationally and culturally, and hence more surely were chosen; and they integrated the theological ideology into their total culture. Afrikaner leaders saw themselves as a special people led as the pastoral children of Abraham in search of prosperity and religious peace or as the followers of a new Moses or Joshua going to a promised land. They had made their covenant with God, and they believed implicitly that He was to be their God in a special way, and they were special people in His sight. This interpretation soon ceased to be strictly theological and entered the realm more properly called legend, or even rationalization, as the leaders attempted to justify their position in the last half of the nineteenth century. With this understanding of themselves and the theological interpretation of their own cultural destiny, they conquered the wilderness while they oppressed the

Africans; they exploited the land while they opposed social reforms inspired by European intellectual developments; they became more orthodox in their theology while they reacted against various new theological and philosophical ideas of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In many ways the Afrikaner society retained its seventeenth-century character until after the Boer War. The theological and scriptural doctrine of an elect people afforded a means whereby the Afrikaners could both create a new society and react against a foreign influence.¹¹⁹

Marianne Cornevin linked three ideas to the concept of Afrikaners' election:

The first is that this chosen people is endowed with the 'divine mission' of guiding and civilizing African peoples. The Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of St. Paul furnish many quotations that can be used in this sense. The second is that this 'chosen people' cannot and must not interbreed with other peoples: hence the enactment of sexual prohibitions (the 1927 Immorality Act, amended in 1950 and 1956). The third is that the 'chosen people's' right of ownership over the land is inalienable, because it is the 'promised' land given by God.¹²⁰

Alfred Moleah pointed to the similarity between Zionism and South African apartheid in their use of the chosen concept for political purposes:

People become agents of God's will; human acts are attributed to a divine calling, and responsibility is avoided. Actions, and the consequences of those actions, become unquestionable and unassailable. This is the claim of Zionists and that of Afrikaner nationalists: they claim to be chosen peoples, the elect of God put into this world to fulfill a divine mission. These claims also have a virulent racist component.¹²¹

Similar to Zionism, the ideology of apartheid has frequently used religion to interpret the events of national history. This was manifested in the myth of the "covenant" which was a pledge supposedly made by the white settlers to God that ensured their victory over the Africans. To escape the British rule, the trekkers (the Boers) emigrated further inland (this migration became known as the Great Trek of 1835-1937), where a full-scale war broke out with the Zulu. In the Battle of Blood River on December 16, 1838, the 470 trekkers won a decisive victory over a Zulu army of approximately 10,000 men. That was possible, according to the

myth, because of a covenant between God and the settlers. The vow read:

Brothers and fellow-countrymen, we stand here before the Holy God of Heaven and Earth to make a vow that, if He will be with us and protect us and give the foe into our hands, we shall ever celebrate the day and date as a Day of Thanksgiving like the Sabbath in His honor. We shall enjoin our children that they must take part with us in this, for a remembrance even for our posterity. For the honor of God shall herein be glorified, and to Him shall be given the fame and the honor of the victory.¹²²

The Afrikaner historians considered the Great Trek as "a turning-point in South African history, and one of the greatest single events of the nineteenth century."¹²³ The voortrekkers were given "all the qualities that . . . deemed necessary to promote the nationalist cause." They "were profoundly and uniformly religious. They were adamantly opposed to the mixing of the races. They stood for Afrikaner freedom and solidarity . . ."¹²⁴ According to the Reverend L.N. Botha, "The Solemn covenant [verbond] locks the voortrekkers with God. They take a vow [Geloofte] in the name of the volk of South Africa."¹²⁵ G.F. Combrinck described the Great Trek as "the central event in the history of South Africa . . . Blood River made the Afrikaner volk a covenanted volk [Verbondsvolk]."¹²⁶ Trying to use the occasion to promote Afrikaner solidarity, Combrinck declared:

Afrikaners, after you have again considered anew the heritage of your Fathers, what right have you before the God of the Voortrekkers to stay divided any longer? The oxwagons and Blood River call you to come all together in a mighty Afrikaner laager with a circular wall of Spiritual Voortrekker wagons around you.¹²⁷

D.F. Malan commented on the same subject:

Behind you lie the tracks of the Voortrekker's Oxwagons, deeply and ineradicably imprinted across the wide high plains and over the sneering dragon-like mountain areas [Drakensberg = Dragons' Mountains] of South African history. They heard the voice of South Africa. They received their task from God's Hand. They gave their answer. They made their sacrifices. There is still a white race. There is a new volk. There is our own language. There is an undying urge for freedom.¹²⁸

Then Malan linked current and future problems in South Africa:

You and your children will make history. Will South Africa still be a white man's country at the end of this new century? Will there then still be a poor white problems which this rich land of ours will face with weary eyes as a heavy reproach?¹²⁹

The Great Trek became central in Afrikaner nationalism. Leonard Thompson wrote:

In subsequent years, every 16 December was an occasion for Afrikaner nationalists to use the mystique of the *voortrekkers* to endorse their policies. In a modification of the 1938 Ox-wagon Trek, dispatch riders rode on horseback to Pretoria from fifteen starting points, and celebrations were held at more than four hundred places. Once again there was a plenitude of ethnic symbolism. While young boys and girls wore the uniforms of the *voortrekker* movement--the Afrikaner breakaway from the Boy Scouts--adults in traditional *voortrekker* costume sang ethnic songs and performed ethnic dances.¹³⁰

Like the Zionists who explained Israel's victories in religious terms, the successful South African penetration in Angola was seen as a sign of divine intervention.¹³¹

Comparison with the Israelites

Afrikaners interpreted their history in a way that corresponds and mirrors that of Israel in the Old Testament. André Du Toit pointed out:

Conscious analogies between Afrikaner history and that of Israel in the Old Testament were already current in the nineteenth century, and this sense of being a chose people was later revived and codified in a particular interpretation of Afrikaner history, which centered on selected events like the Great Trek.¹³²

Afrikaners saw themselves as a new Israel. They believed that God similarly chose them, protected them, and placed them in Africa for a special mission. Alton Templin wrote:

Their thorough reading of the Bible revealed several instances similar to their own: Moses in the wilderness, Joshua and the Judges opposed to "heathens," and Nehemiah's problems with "uitlanders." They read about the covenant between God and

Abraham establishing the old Israel as a people, and they assumed that their covenant made in 1838 and renewed in 1879 and every year thereafter was the origin of their modern Zion in South Africa. As they renewed their covenant with God before certain crises in their history and as they knelt in prayer before every battle, they were, they thought, faithful to the example of Abraham. The more they read and reread the narratives about Moses, Joshua, and the Psalms, they were reassured of God's favor. Their faith was biblical and Calvinistic, but neither term was used in its accepted interpretation. Both were now strictly South African terms, modified by the culture for specific purposes.¹³³

Apartheid ideology sees the white control of South Africa as a covenant with God that is similar to the Old Testament covenant with Israel. Afrikaners equated their situation with the Israelites fleeing from Egypt under Moses' leadership. De Gruchy wrote:

The exodus of the people of Israel and their testing in the wilderness were happening again. Any obstacle along the way to the promised land had to be overcome, by sheer grit and by the gun. Any doubt of divine providence was not only unthinkable, but blasphemy, a harbinger of disaster. The church at the Cape was no longer relevant, but the saga of Israel in the holy book was.¹³⁴

In their racial policies, Fredrickson suggested, the Afrikaners looked to the Old Testament for support to make the "racial ancestry a qualification for citizenship."¹³⁵ The Israelites, according to Deuteronomy 23, "had banned bastard, Amonites and Moabites from 'the congregation of the Lord' to the tenth generation."¹³⁶ Thus the constitution of the Potchefstroom Republic (later to be incorporated into the South African Republic) stated clearly that "No person of mixed race [bastards] shall be able to sit in our meeting as members or judge, down to the tenth degree."¹³⁷ Quotations from the Old Testament have frequently been used by the Afrikaners to "justify God's ordination of the diversity of people and their territorial separation."¹³⁸ Cornevin cited two examples: "So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth" (Genesis 11:8); and "When the Most High divided to the nations their inheritance, when he separated the sons of Adam, he set the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Israel" (Deuteronomy 32:8).¹³⁹ Cornevin

described the analogy with the Israelites as follows:

These nomadic stock-breeders, nurtured solely on the Bible, paid special attention to the accounts of the Hebrews' long march to Palestine, and thought that the vast wilderness of the Karroo, scoured by several generations of *trekboers*, would also lead to a promised land. It is hardly surprising that they reacted as they did when they finally reached the lush meadows between the Sunday and Great Fish Rivers and found them already occupied by Xhosa herdsmen. It seemed obvious that the Xhosa were the Philistines settled in Palestine when the Hebrews arrived and equally obvious that they, the 'chosen people,' had every right to drive the blacks out of the land promised to the whites. The same deep conviction of right was to characterize all their subsequent encounters with the blacks.¹⁴⁰

Like the Zionists who explained the birth of Israel in 1948 and their consecutive victories over the Arabs as a sign of God's support to His chosen people, Afrikaner history was interpreted within a similar framework. Templin pointed out:

God's plan for Afrikanerdom was seen as a typological reenactment on the South African frontier of various Old Testament episodes, notably the making of the Covenant, the Exodus, and the conquests of Joshua and Gideon. The Boers assumed that if they looked to the Bible in humility, they could find answers for their needs; nothing would be hidden from them. Consequently, the situations which seemed to reflect a biblical event were interpreted as direct signs from God. On this basis the Great Trek became the new Exodus; conquest of the land was blessed by God, with mention of Joshua, Gideon, and others; and Providence was on the side of the Boers' freedom fight against both African and British. In battles against the Zulus, the Boers kept the stories of Gideon and Jephthah before their eyes as examples of God's favor. The freedom fighters at Slagters' Nek were bound by a religious covenant in opposition to the British. The Boers' success against Dingane in 1838 was interpreted as a confirmation of the covenant constructed on the basis of the Abrahamic covenant, and the victory in 1881 against Britain was further confirmation of the covenant of 1879 drawn up in anti-British terminology.¹⁴¹

He further added:

These Biblical parallels which seemed to be re-enacted in South Africa formed a proof of the correctness of preconceived strategy in battle or in government. In every success God was given credit for various conquests of Africans. The Boers believed that they could never have achieved victory on their own, although they never mentioned the part their superior weapons played. God brought victory against the British in

1881, again corroborating the Boers' conception of the rightness of their cause. Boer fears for a government led by liberal President Burgers were based on biblical injunctions, mainly Leviticus. The religious orthodoxy and the pious speeches, filled with biblical allusions, of President Kruger gave the nation the strength it needed, for their confidence was now in a higher power. God's favor seemed assured.¹⁴²

In apartheid ideology, religion has also been used to justify inequality, exploitation, and discrimination against non-whites. Racial differences among people must be maintained because it represents God's will. This idea, it was argued, was supported by:

Such biblical writings as the letters of Paul, especially those passages in 1 Corinthians (12:12-30; 15:39-41) and Romans (12:4-5) that speak of the different kinds of bodies or of how each of the various parts of one body has its own appropriate and distinct function.¹⁴³

The Reverend T.F. Dreyer said:

God created the color line . . . So if we efface God's lines of separation, we destroy his handiwork. If we go and mix with Indians, Coloureds, and Natives, our descendants will be mules who will not be able to hide their long ears, the sign of their bastardization. It is a heritage from our forefathers, which must be beautiful for us and which we must honor and value. God has willed that we must be a separate, independent volk.¹⁴⁴

D.F. Malan, who was a minister of the Dutch Church--the spiritual guide of Afrikanerdom--stated:

The deep-rooted colour consciousness of the white South African . . . rises from the fundamental differences between the two groups white and black. The difference in colour is surely the physical manifestation of the contrast between the two irreconcilable ways of life, between barbarism and civilisation, between heathenism and Christianity and *finally between overwhelming numerical odds on the one hand and insignificant numbers on the other*. Such it was in the early beginning and such it largely remains. [Emphasis in original.]¹⁴⁵

In the same line of thinking, the report Human Relations in South Africa, which was adopted by the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church (1966), stated:

God created everything including the different races, peoples and nations on the earth. Had He wished to create all men the same He would have done so . . . God mercifully decreed that man should have many languages and that he should be diversified and spread to all parts of the earth. This resulted in the formation of many different races, peoples, languages, and nations. This can be seen from His anger at the sinful attempt at unity, manifest in the attempted construction of the Tower of Babel.¹⁴⁶

Similarly, H.G. Stoker of the University for Christian Higher Education at Potchefstroom, stated:

God willed the diversity of Peoples. Thus far He has preserved the identity of our People. Such preservation was not for naught, for God allows nothing to happen for naught. He might have allowed our People to be bastardized with the native tribes as happened with other Europeans. He did not allow it . . . He has a future task for us, a calling laid away. On this I base my fullest conviction that our People will again win back their freedom as a People. This lesson of our history must always be kept before our eyes.¹⁴⁷

The white settlers considered the native "as culturally inferior heathen destined by God to be the 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for their superior masters."¹⁴⁸ Such white perception led "many blacks today [to] regard white Christianity, if not Christianity itself, as a form of European domination."¹⁴⁹ They see that "the Christian faith seemed to provide the rationale necessary to justify the situation"¹⁵⁰ of inequalities. On the eve of the Puritan colonization of Massachusetts, John Winthrop declared: "God Almighty in his most holy and wise providence hath so disposed of the Condition of mankind, as in all times some must be rich and eminent in power and dignitie, others mean and in subieccion [sic]."¹⁵¹ A century later, Alexander Pope expressed a similar view: "Order is Heav'n's first law; and this confest, / some are, and must be, greater than the rest . . ."¹⁵² In his justification to South African racism, the Reverend J.A. Kriel declared in Cape Town:

Discrimination, injustice and suffering will always exist until Christ comes again, and then Christ will remove them. Through fighting against discrimination now, people are trying to take God's task over from Him, and thus open the way for

the Antichrist. 'He who wants to do more than what God wants him to do, commits suicide, as will happen to the United Nations and the world powers.'¹⁵³

In this connection, Dr. John Phillips of the London Missionary Society wrote:

While the missionaries have been employed in locating the savages among whom they labour, teaching them industrious habits, creating a demand for British manufactures, and increasing their dependence on the colony, there is not a single instance of a tribe thus enjoying the labour of a missionary making war against the colonists, either to injure their persons or to deprive them of their property. Missionary stations are most efficient agents which can be employed to promote the international strength of our colonies, and the cheapest and best military posts agreement can employ.¹⁵⁴

The Afrikaners believed "that education, culture and skin color were marks of, or proofs of, God's election."¹⁵⁵ Thanks to Calvinism, a White skin was equated with Christianity and Western European culture.¹⁵⁶ In the context of South African apartheid, the dichotomy between the elect and the damned "was transmuted into racial categories, whereby all whites belonged to the elect and all Africans and non-Whites belonged to the damned."¹⁵⁷ Like the case with Zionism, Afrikaners have frequently used biblical themes to justify their political actions. Alfred Moleah maintained that Psalm 105, which reads: "He brought forth his people with joy, and his chosen with gladness: and gave them the lands of the heathen, and they inherited the labour of the people" was used as a justification for "African expropriation."¹⁵⁸ Moleah also noted that:

Segregation and discrimination find their justification in the advice given to the Corinthians which reads: 'Be ye not unequally yoked together with the unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? Wherefore come out from among them and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch not the unclean thing and I will receive you.'¹⁵⁹

The Old Testament curse (the curse on Ham), which was used to justify slavery in America, was also used in apartheid ideology to rationalize mistreatment of the Africans. According to the Old Testament, the blacks

were considered as descendants of Ham. The curse applies to all descendants of Ham, Canaanites (predecessors of modern Palestinians) and all black people.

In apartheid ideology, the Africans were presented to be of Arabian origin. In 1882 F. Lion Cachet, a Dutch theologian, argued that "the most reliable informants agree that the Kaffers [the Africans] are sons of Ishameal who, in relatively recent times, have reached the South Coast of Africa over land."¹⁶⁰ Cachet elaborated:

They call themselves with one general name, Amakafula in which Kafula is not an original Kaffer word but a corruption of Kaffir. Now since that name is given by the Arabs to everyone who rejected Mohammed's doctrine, it is very likely that the present Kaffir tribes earlier trafficked with the Arabs and are of Arabian origin. Not too risky even is the interpretation that Kaffers were originally fugitives who, unwilling to submit to Mohammed, had to escape persecution and, trekking in a southeasterly direction, eventually found an uninhabited country between Delagoa Bay and the Fish River, where they could settle, or out of which they could drive the weaker tribes of Hottentots and Bushmen, who previously lived there.¹⁶¹

Similarly, J.C. Voigt wrote:

It is a curious fact that circumcision was, and still is, prevalent among all the Kaffir nations. This seems to show that the original cradle of the race must have been somewhere not very far removed from the influences of the ancient Egyptian civilisation and its customs; for it is well known that the rite of circumcision spread from Egypt to Syria, Palestine and Arabia.¹⁶²

Thus, similar to Zionism, religious themes have been central in apartheid ideology. The concepts of "chosen people," "promised land," and "children of Ham" have been used to justify white privilege and domination in South Africa. However, in addition to those religious concepts, apartheid ideology is also based on historical myths such as "vacant land" / "simultaneous migrations."

One basic feature of the settler colonialism is the notion of "vacant land." The Zionists and the Afrikaners claimed that the territories which they colonized were empty lands at the time of their

arrival. South Africa was presented as a land filled with roaming wild animals when Jan van Riebeeck built his station in 1652. The official book South Africa 1977 reads:

After the devastation and disruption of the Difaqane, vast sections of the interior were virtually depopulated. It was mainly these parts that the Boer Afrikaner pioneers populated . . . The Matabele depopulated the whole of the western Transvaal in the years 1825 to 1832.¹⁶³

A Standard--6 textbook, published in 1974, stated:

Two 'Commissie Treks' sent out beforehand to gather information about the interior (in 1834) . . . brought back very favourable reports of fertile land and good grazing. It appeared, too, that the land was almost uninhabited by natives. This was because many had been massacred by the *impis* of the Zulus and the Matabele, and the survivors were in hiding.¹⁶⁴

Similarly, in 1964, Dr. Muller stated:

Shortly after the establishment of the victualing station at the Cape, the settlers started moving further afield. They crossed one mountain range, and then another. They moved from one fertile valley to the next. In their wake they left tiny settlements. With the years these grew into towns, into cities. During all this time they met with no indigenous people. This was no man's land.¹⁶⁵

In the same line of thinking the Zionists declared Palestine to be a "land without a people for a people without land." Ben-Gurion, the first Israeli Prime Minister, stated: "In a historical and moral sense, Palestine, the Holy Land, is a country without inhabitants."¹⁶⁶ Levi Eshkol, a former Israeli Prime Minister, asked: "What are the Palestinians?"¹⁶⁷ Golda Meir, a former Israeli Prime Minister, declared:

How can return the occupied territories? There is nobody to return them to . . . There was no such thing as Palestinians . . . It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist.¹⁶⁸

The other myth connected to the myth of "uninhabited land" is the

notion of "simultaneous migrations." It maintained that the whites and the blacks arrived in South Africa at the same time. The assumption here is that Europeans and Africans arrived roughly at the same time, therefore Africans "have no greater historical claim to dominion over the land than whites."¹⁶⁹ A typical argument within the ideology of apartheid is that: "When the whites came to Africa in the sixteenth century, there were no native blacks in South Africa--only some nomadic tribes, including the Hottentots, who were of Arabic origin."¹⁷⁰ South Africa 1977, which was published by the Department of Information, stated:

Prior to the southward migration the forebears of the present black groups apparently used to live in the region of the great lakes of Central Africa. Their entry into what is today South Africa roughly coincided with the arrival of the first whites at the Cape in 1652.¹⁷¹

Another book of the Department of Information elaborated:

In the 1770's, some one thousand kilometres to the north-east of Cape Town, the Afrikaner migratory stream came into substantial contact with the vanguard of a second migratory movement from the vicinity of the Great Lakes of Central Africa. It would appear that by the end of the 15th century these tribes had moved as far as present-day Zambia, Rhodesia, and Mozambique. They probably crossed into the present-day Republic of South Africa in appreciable numbers in the course of the 17th century--at about the same time as the Afrikaner freefarmers' settlement was expanding inland from the Cape of Good Hope.¹⁷²

The writer G.W. Stow considered the Hottentots as "recent immigrants," arguing that the Bantu-speaking people "invaded South Africa in a number of successive 'waves' from Central Africa, driving the Hottentots before them."¹⁷³ In 1959 Eric Louw, then South African Foreign Affairs Minister, declared that "the Bantu began to trek from the North across the Limpopo when Jan van Riebeeck landed in Table Bay in 1652."¹⁷⁴ Louw concluded that the Bantu "are not the original inhabitants of the country," and thus "have no greater claim to the southern end of the African continent than the white population."¹⁷⁵ In the same line of thinking, Dr. Hendrick Verwoerd, a former South African Prime Minister, considered the Africans

and the Whites as "two population groups equally foreign to South Africa," which "converged in rather small numbers on what was practically empty country."¹⁷⁶ Verwoerd concluded that "neither group colonized the other's country or robbed him by invasion."¹⁷⁷

Thus, the Afrikaners denied the colonialist origin, arguing that by historical right they are now as indigenous, if not more so, than the Africans. However, historical evidence indicates that the present-day Bantu-speaking peoples have been settling in South Africa since the third century A.D. (which means they were there fourteen hundred years before the arrival of the whites at the Cape of Good Hope).¹⁷⁸

Like every other ideology, apartheid has been used to justify the privileged position of the ruling class. Throughout history the civil-savage and the Christian-heathen dichotomies were used to emphasize the notion of white superiority and to justify conquest and territorial expansion. Dehumanizing the natives is central in apartheid. The Africans were projected as a culturally inferior race which should be treated accordingly. Separation of races became essential for white domination. Apartheid exclusiveness is based on some religious themes. The concepts of "chosen people," "promised land," and "children of Ham" were used to justify a wide range of exploitation, discrimination, and racial policies. Afrikaners became agents of God's will, and their national history was given a quasi-sacred character. Their victories in the Great Trek, the Wars of Independence, and the war with Angola were attributed to divine support. Apartheid policies of separation were connected with a sense of divine calling and mission. Conscious analogies between Afrikaner history and that of Israel in the Old Testament became evident. White control of South Africa was seen as a covenant with God similar to the Old Testament covenant with Israel. Similar to the case of Zionism, the myth of "vacant land" was used to justify colonialism. The Afrikaners have frequently claimed that the territories which they colonized were empty lands or their entry into what is today South Africa

roughly coincided with the blacks' arrival. The assumption here is that the blacks were not the original inhabitants of the country and thus have no greater claim to the land than the white people. Similarly, Palestine was declared to be a land without people for a people without a land.

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178. For this see: Thompson, op. cit., pp. 205-206, Pheko, op. cit., p. 4, Cornevin, op. cit., p. 76. Leonard Thompson and Monica Wilson, eds., The Oxford History of South Africa, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969, 1971), Vol. I, Vol II, also see "Introduction," Sbulu Marks and Antony Atmore, in Economy and Society in Pre-industrial

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Chapter III

Zionism

Introduction

This chapter is divided into several sections. The first section defines Zionism and explains briefly its basic principles. The second section deals with "Anti-Semitism" and "Assimilation," which were the two dynamic factors behind the rise of the Zionist movement. This section analyzes the historical and theoretical developments of these concepts, their interaction with each other, and their influence on Israeli policies. This was a necessary background for the following section, which deals with Jewish nationalism. This section discusses the thought of Zionist thinkers such as Moses Hess and Herzl, who emphasized a distinctive national Jewish identity. The next section deals with the concept of a Jewish statehood and discusses the various Zionist projects to find a piece of land for the proposed Jewish state. This section analyzes the interaction between the interests of imperialist European powers and the Zionist movement. The growing relationship led to the Balfour Declaration--a document that contributed to the fulfillment of the Zionist desire for a Jewish state in Palestine. The section on the Balfour Declaration discusses the Zionist strategy in gaining the Declaration and explains the British motives behind the Declaration. The following section explains the Zionist tactics in dealing with the natives and documents the thought of the Zionist leaders (such as Borochoy, Herzl, Weizman, and Jabotinsky) on how to deal with the Palestinians. It also explains the actual behavior of the Zionist settlers who began to immigrate to Palestine in 1882. It is said that colonialism goes hand in hand with racism. The section on racism analyzes the concept of "Jewish Purity/Jewish Superiority" and its connection with some religious concepts such as "promised land" and "chosen people." The analysis in the next section deals with the use of religious themes to justify the Zionist

claim to Palestine and to justify current Israeli policies; such as the invasion of Lebanon and the establishment of new settlements in the occupied territories. Dehumanization of the native people is a basic feature of every colonial enterprise. The next section discusses the Zionist literature in this connection; and the section following it deals with the question of education. It explains how Zionist education influenced the minds of Jewish children and shaped the Jew's attitude towards the Palestinians. The subject of the next section is the Zionist philosophy of "separation," which is considered the root of Zionist discrimination. The section after that analyzes the contradiction between the notion of Israel's democracy and the concept of a Jewish-Zionist state. The next section discusses the Zionist practice of "apartheid" and its manifestation in the conditions of the Palestinian workers, the Israeli army, and kibbutzim. As in the case of South Africa, laws were passed to legitimize the practice of apartheid and discrimination. This last section discusses certain Israeli laws such as the Law of Return, the Law of Citizenship, and the Status Law.

Definition and Basic Principles

Zionism is a modern political movement officially founded by Theodor Herzl in August 1897 when the First Zionist Congress met in Basel and created the World Zionist Organization (WZO).

The first usage of the term "Zionism" was in Vienna in 1892 by Nathan Birnbaum.¹ Zion was the name of one of the hills of Jerusalem which later "became a poetically descriptive term for all of Jerusalem, then for all of Palestine, and, eventually, for all of . . . Jewish religious community."² Uri Davis, an Israeli Jewish Scholar, defined Zionism as:

a political ideology formulated to rationalize a solution to the Jewish problem in terms of the establishment of a Jewish national home, and subsequently, a Jewish state in Palestine based on the mobilization of mass Jewish colonial immigration and settlement

. . . Zionism constitutes the immediate ideological and political context for the emergence of the state of Israel,

and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 is the culmination of Zionist colonial efforts in Palestine over a period of half a century.³

Zionism is a political ideology of complex European origins: "The ideology was formulated in Western Europe" by Theodor Herzl (an assimilationist Viennese Jew) while the masses "came from East Europe where the ideology and conceptions articulated found a great resonance and initial response."⁴ Herzl hoped that the Jews of Western Europe would provide the diplomatic and financial resources of the movement while East European Jewry would supply its desperate need of manpower.

The aim of the Zionist movement was to solve the "Jewish problem" by creating a Jewish state in Palestine, in line with the spirit of the nineteenth century national movements in central Europe and the Balkans. "The Jewishness of this state," Elmessiri wrote, "lay neither in its religious orientation nor in its commitment to Judaism and its values; it lay in its presumed national (ethnic) Jewish character."⁵ The origin of modern political Zionism was not connected to a messianic attempt of a return to spiritual Zion, rather it was a modern political effort to change the socio-political conditions of the European Jewish community.⁶ Max Nordau (1847-1923), one of the early fathers of Zionism, said: "Zionism rejects all mysticism, does not believe in a Return to Zion through miracles and wondrous happenings, but sets out to create it through its own efforts."⁷ There is no doubt, however, that some pattern of religious longing to Zion took place within most Jewish communities but that was not associated with the movement of political Zionism. It should be noted, however, that although Zionism is considered as a secular movement, it heavily relies, as we shall see, on religious principles and conceptions.

Basically, Zionism rests on the following arguments:

- The distinguishing characteristic of the Jews has been their "Exile".

- The conditions of the Jews in Exile were conceived to be unnatural or anomalous.
- Despite their dispersion, division, and differences (living among other nations throughout the world), the Jews are one (one people or one race).
- The Jews are unique people (the purest race or the chosen people) for having special relations with God.
- The Jews are different from others (in their culture, values, and traditions).
- Being unique and different, the Jews cannot be assimilated into other nations.
- Because they are unique and different, the Jews have become a subject of anti-Semitism.
- Anti-Semitism is an incurable disease (or eternal character) of Gentile (non-Jewish) societies.
- Living among other nations, the Jews would lose their heritage, values, and identity.
- To solve the "Jewish problem" (physical, spiritual, or psychological), the Jewish situation should be corrected or normalized.
- Normalizing the Jewish conditions requires the establishing of a Jewish state (like other nations).
- Within a Jewish state and away from Gentile hostilities, the Jews can carry on a normal and creative life.
- The Jewish people have the capacity to set up a movement of "national liberation." This movement is Zionism (no question about who the "Jewish nationals" are, or what they are to be liberated from, or how that liberation is to be effected).
- The place of the Jewish state is to be Palestine (the promised land or the homeland of the worldwide Jewish nation).
- Palestine is not only a Holy Land (reflects religious

consideration), but is also a Homeland (implies political considerations).

- Why Palestine? Because the Jews have continuing spiritual (God's promise that He would give the land to Abraham and his descendants) and historical (their ancestors first settled in Palestine sometime around 20 B.C., until they were forcibly dispossessed by the Babylonians in 587 B.C. and then by the Romans in A.D. 135) connections to Palestine.
- Beside such spiritual and historical considerations, Palestine was seen as an ideal place on the grounds that it was "a land without people" waiting for "a people without land."
- The investment the Jews made in Palestine (draining the swamp and making the desert "blossom like a rose") was seen as another factor that enhanced the Zionist claim to the land.
- The Balfour Declaration (by which the British Government in 1917 promised the Jews that they should have a national home in Palestine) was also cited as an important "legal" document that helped "legitimize" the Zionist cause.
- The Jewish immigration to Palestine was considered as a vital step on the road to Jewish statehood.
- Because of the civilization and superior technology of the European Jews, the native Palestinians (who were projected as "backward" or "uncivilized") would benefit from Jewish socio-political development.
- The Palestinian Arabs who have been living in Palestine since at least the seventh century A.D. were referred to as "inhabitants", "residents living in the area," or "uncivilized tribes," but never a "people."

Zionism arose out of two fears: Fear of anti-Semitism and fear of

assimilation. Hanna Arendt suggested that "anti-Semitism was the father of both Assimilationism and Zionism."⁸ Anti-Semitism is a central theme in Zionist ideology. Political Zionism grew out of, and was conditioned by, the negative experience of the Jewish community in diaspora: anti-Semitism.⁹

Anti-Semitism

During the feudal era, while religion was the dominant force, European Jewry was culturally and legally segregated. Jews were restricted by law to special areas (ghettos) and to special occupations. However, with the advent of the Renaissance (the cultural revolution of the European bourgeoisie), and later its political revolution, the segregation was eliminated. Thus, secularization and liberalism opened European societies for Jews as equals. Jews began to enjoy equality before the law, and schools and the professions were gradually, though never completely, opened to them. This process, which started in the eighteenth century, became known as the "Emancipation."¹⁰ This revolutionary atmosphere had a great impact on Jewish thought and experience.

While a significant number of Jews considered Emancipation as a serious threat to the maintenance of Jewish traditions and values, an equally large portion of them responded favorably by adopting a variety of programs and attitudes which became known as the Haskala, or the Jewish Enlightenment movement.¹¹ The Haskala "involved a radical rupture not only with the traditional habits and beliefs but with the fundamental vision according to which Jews had long understood the world."¹² The Haskala was based on the following principles: 1) that Jews should become normal by adopting assimilation; 2) that Jewish nationhood is a false conception, that Jews are not a people; 3) that the new Judaism should get rid "of medieval obscurantism, including its messianic and folk nationalistic elements."¹³ Opposing these views were those who rejected liberalizing and

modernizing Jewish life, fearing the loss of Jewish identity. Smolenskin, a Jewish scholar, stated that the Haskala made us (the Jews) "imitate the Gentiles, abandon our own traditions, disdain our own manners, and ideas . . . "14

However, the commonly held view of those emancipated Jews that the "Jewish Question" could be solved by the fulfillment of political emancipation, suffered a slight setback by the third quarter of the nineteenth century when the liberal climate began to turn conservative and resulted in some outbreak of anti-Semitism. A wave of pogroms swept over Russia in 1881 and 1882, the appearance of racist theories in France and Germany, and the Dreyfus Affairs in France in the early 1880's. All these events, it was held, disillusioned the effort of some Jewish intellectuals to assimilate.¹⁵ Uri Davis summarized the situation of European Jewry as follows:

For Jewish communities in Europe, enlightenment brought emancipation and legal equality of civil rights. In parallel, a newly secular racism manifested itself in the form of anti-Jewish persecution . . . Those in the Jewish communities who opted for secularism and enlightenment lent their support, in one capacity or another, to democratic, socialist, or revolutionary political organizations in the countries of their residence. Those who opted for secularism and racism turned, in one capacity or another, to political Zionism.¹⁶

Herzl's Jewish State, published in 1896, was his response to the anti-Semitism generated by the Dreyfus trial.¹⁷ It was believed that this event transformed Herzl into an ardent Jewish nationalist. Born in Budapest, Hungary, Herzl received a legal education in Vienna, where he turned his talent to journalism. He became interested in the Jewish question when he covered the Dreyfus trial in Paris as a representative of a Vienna newspaper. Herzl (1860-1904) concluded that the policy of Enlightenment and Assimilationism had failed and that anti-Semitism is a natural phenomenon in Gentile society which needed a radical solution--the creation of a Jewish state.

Even before Herzl, Zionist thinkers, like Pinsker and Hess,

expressed dissatisfaction with the Jewish existence in the Diaspora and maintained that the main cause of anti-Semitism is the homelessness of the modern Jew. Leo Pinsker (1821-1891) expressed his thought in a small pamphlet, Auto-Emancipation, which was published in 1882. He contended "that anti-Semitism is a psychic disease which seems incurable."¹⁸ He also believed that there was a "natural antagonism" between Jews and Gentiles, and thus concluded that assimilation was impossible.¹⁹ Pinsker explained:

To the living, the modern Jew is dead, to the native-born he is a stranger, to the long-settled a vagabond, to the wealthy a beggar, to the poor a millionaire and exploiter, to the citizen a man without a country, to all classes a hated competitor.²⁰

Therefore, nationalism, Pinsker contended, became the only solution to the Jewish problem, and this should take the form of creating a Jewish state whether in Palestine or elsewhere.²¹ For Pinsker, a sovereign Jewish entity will guarantee that other nations will treat the Jews equally.²² Accompanying Pinsker's nationalist appeal was the political movement of Hibat Zion (Love of Zion) which called for the establishment of Jewish colonies in Palestine, and which resulted in the formation of the earliest Zionist settlement in Palestine.²³

Like Pinsker, Herzl believed in the doctrine of eternal anti-Semitism governing the relation of Jews and Gentiles everywhere and always. "Anti-Semitism," Herzl said, ". . . is a bacillus which every Gentile carries with him, wherever he goes and however often he denies it."²⁴ On another occasion, he wrote: "We [the Jews] might perhaps be able to dissolve without a trace in the surrounding races if we were left in peace for only two generations on end. But we shall not be left in peace."²⁵ On this Akiva Orr suggested that Herzl's belief "reveals a total dependence on external hostility to save the Jews from "disappearing altogether."²⁶ The perception of constant Gentile hostility led Herzl to define a nation as ". . . a group of people . . . held together by a common enemy."²⁷ In 1896 Herzl wrote:

The Jewish question exists wherever Jews live in appreciable number. Where it does not exist, it is brought in together with Jewish immigrants. Naturally we move where we are not persecuted; our appearance then gives rise to persecution. This is a fact and is bound to remain a fact everywhere, even in highly developed countries . . .²⁸

Zionism - Anti-Semitism Interaction

One would assume that, as Jews, the Zionist leaders would always consider anti-Semitism as the prime danger. But this is not so, as the following discussions suggest.

Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement, wrote: "anti-Semitism has grown and continues to grow--and so do I."²⁹ On another occasion, he declared "that only anti-Semitism has made Jews of us."³⁰ For Herzl, anti-Semitism is a blessing and it " . . . probably contains the Divine Will to Good because it forces us to close ranks."³¹ When asked what could generate Jewish immigration to Palestine, Herzl answered: "The anti-Semitism."³² Herzl was on record as saying: "Above all, I recognized the emptiness and futility of trying to 'combat' anti-Semitism."³³ He added: "I hold it to be a movement useful for the development of Jewish character."³⁴ Hanna Arendt held that the Zionists concluded: "That without anti-Semitism the Jewish people would not have survived in the countries of the Diaspora; and hence they were opposed to any attempt to liquidate anti-Semitism on a large scale."³⁵

However, Herzl was not alone in stressing the "naturalness" of and the important need for "anti-Semitism." In 1925, Jacob Klatzkin, one of the early Zionist ideologues, wrote: "Instead of establishing societies for defence against the anti-Semites, who want to reduce our rights, we should establish societies for defence against our friends who desire to defend our rights."³⁶ This seeming perception of a common outlook between Zionism and anti-Semitism was reflected in an article written in 1969 by the Israeli writer, Uri Harari.³⁷

In the same line of thinking, the American Jewish Congress was of

the opinion that discrimination against Jews "may well be a blessing," and that "it is possible that some anti-Semitism is necessary in order to ensure Jewish survival."³⁸ This opinion was shared in 1959 by Nahum Goldman, then president of the World Zionist Organization when he held "that a current decline of anti-semitism might constitute a new danger to Jewish survival; . . . the disappearance of anti-semitism in its classic meaning, while beneficial to the political and material situations of Jewish communities, has had a very negative effect on our internal life."³⁹ On this the British historian Toyonbee suggested that "Zionism and anti-Semitism are expressions of an identical point of view."⁴⁰ In his book, Israel An Apartheid State, Uri Davis suggested that "Political Zionism and secular anti-Jewish racism share a common view on the existential status of Jewish minority communities in non-Jewish (Gentile) societies."⁴¹ Both movements see that "the Jew cannot, by definition, be--nor can he or she be expected to be--an equal citizen and a free individual in a non-Jewish society and polity."⁴² Davis elaborated:

Given the moral and ideological convergence of political Zionism and anti-Jewish racism, the Zionist movement, as represented in the official institutions of the World Zionist Organization, has at critical junctures, opted for collaboration rather than conflict with anti-Jewish racists, even when that racism has taken the form of pogroms and genocide.⁴³

Ian Gilmour, one-time member of the British Parliament, maintained that Jewish emigration to Israel from Arab countries was the result of Zionist activities.⁴⁴

Thus an important part of Zionist strategy was to inflame anti-Semitic sentiment in non-Jewish communities in order to generate a flow of Jewish immigrants. The following statement from one of the leaders of the MAPAI party, Sharun, seemed to be representative.

If I have the power, as I have the will, I would select a core of efficient young men--intelligent, decent, devoted to our ideal and burning with desire to help redeem the Jews--and I would send them to the countries where Jews are absorbed in

sinful self-satisfaction. The task of these young men would be to disguise themselves as non-Jews and plague Jews with anti-Semitic slogans such as 'Bloody Jew,' 'Jews go to Palestine' . . .⁴⁵

And this statement was translated into reality. The immigration of the Iraqi Jews is a case in point. It was reported that in the early 1950's an Iraqi Zionist organization called The Movement was found responsible for throwing grenades on Jewish gathering places in Baghdad. The aim was to intensify Jewish immigration to Palestine. This story was published in two Israeli magazines: Haolam Hazeh and The Black Panther.⁴⁶

Zionism and anti-Semitism have influenced each other in the past and will continue to do so in the future. Examining the complex link between the two movements, one can see an ironic kind of welcome on the part of the Zionists to anti-Semitism. Jacob Klatzkin, one of the early Zionist theoreticians, said: "If we do not admit the rightfulness of anti-Semitism, we deny the rightfulness of our own nationalism."⁴⁷ The same sentiment was reiterated by Max Nordau (1849-1923). He was delighted "to see that honest anti-Semites applaud our proposed [nationalist] solution for the Jewish question."⁴⁸ Der Spiegel (December 1966), a leading West German Magazine, pointed to this irony:

The Zionists were delighted by the victory of the German anti-Semites, for this victory meant a defeat for the enlightened Western Jewry which cared nothing for Zionism and preferred to become a part of other nations. As the Zionists and the Nazis had both made race and nation their fundamental principle, it was inevitable that a common meeting-ground would be found between them.⁴⁹

In the eyes of the Zionist leaders, Hitler's victory was a "positive proof of the bankruptcy of assimilationism and liberalism."⁵⁰ The Zionist biographer, Emil Ludwig, stated: "You know . . . the coming of the Nazis was rather a welcome thing . . . Thousands who seemed to be completely lost to Judaism were brought back to the fold by Hitler, and for that I am personally very grateful to him."⁵¹ The racist anti-Semites, for their part, expressed admiration of Zionism because it suited their strategy.

The following statement, written in 1912 by the head of the Pan-German League (an organization that formally accepted the anti-Semitic ideology), seemed to be representative.

One must take off one's hat to the Zionists; they admit openly and honestly that their people are a folk of its own kind whose basic characteristics are immutable . . . they also declare openly that a true assimilation of the Jewish aliens to the host nations would be impossible according to the natural law of race . . . *The Zionists confirm what the enemies of the Jews, the adherents of the racial theory, have always asserted;* . . . Germans and Jewish nationalists are of one opinion in regard to the indestructibility of the Jewish race--who then wants to deny the Germans their right to draw the necessary political conclusions? [Emphasis is in origin]⁵²

The Anti-Zionist Committee of the German Jewish community issued, in 1912, a statement which attributed racism to Zionism.⁵³ The mutual understanding or the meeting of the minds between the two movements led Regina Sharif to conclude "that Zionism, racism and anti-Semitism are all part of one phenomenon: the very nature of Zionism not only accommodated anti-Semitism, but often welcomed it."⁵⁴ She also suggested that there was an "alliance" between the two movements which "operate on the same plane, complementing and reinforcing each other."⁵⁵ Current Zionist literature indicates that Zionism's position regarding the question of anti-Semitism has remained intact.

Anti-Semitism: Current Zionist Literature

The concept of "traditional Gentile hostility" is still rife in today's Israeli society and in modern Zionist literature. Orr wrote: "The phrase Ha'olom kulo negdeinu ("The whole world is against us") is evoked recurrently (on the eve of the 1967 war it was turned into a song which became a national hit) engendering a feeling not of despair but of national purpose--"We shall overcome."⁵⁶ Yehoshuah believed that "there is something in the Jews" which "arouses 'insanity' among other nations." And he explained "Arab hostility" in this context.⁵⁷ Pinhas Sadeh, the Israeli poet, described the Arabs as "the emissaries of the Christian

world's need to liquidate the phenomenon of the Jews."⁵⁸ Eliezer Liuneh, the former co-founder of the Hagana (a secret militant Zionist organization), emphasized the thesis "that the Holocaust was the 'central truth' of European history."⁵⁹ He also maintained "that the destruction of the Jews was facilitated by the complicity of almost all the Western nations, regardless of their political regimes."⁶⁰ Similarly, an Israeli Minister of Education believed that ". . . the Holocaust is not a national insanity that happened once and passed, but an ideology that has not passed from the world and even today the world may condone crimes against us."⁶¹ A Knesset (the Israeli parliament) member held a similar conviction: "even the best friends of the Jewish people refrained from offering significant saving help of any kind to European Jewry and turned their back on the chimneys of the death camps," he said. He added: "Therefore all the free world, especially in these days, is required to show its repentance . . . by providing diplomatic defensive-economic aid to Israel."⁶²

The memories of the Holocaust have influenced current Israeli politics. Dan Diner held that the Zionist position concerning the present Palestine conflict is colored to a large extent by the negative experience of the Holocaust. "As long as the consciousness of the Holocaust remains interwoven with the real conflict in Palestine," Diner pointed out, "the terror and the extent of mass extermination by the Nazi will function as a relevant measure of the present killing."⁶³ He also suggested that the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 by an Israeli air raid can be explained within this context.⁶⁴ In the midst of the siege of Beirut (during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982), the then Israeli prime minister Begin wrote a letter to President Reagan, in which he repeatedly referred to World War II:

May I tell you, dear Mr. President, how I feel these days when I turn to the Creator of my soul in deep gratitude: I feel as a prime minister empowered to instruct a valiant army facing "Berlin" where amongst innocent civilians, Hitler and

his henchmen hide in a bunker deep beneath the surface.⁶⁵

On this Amnon Rubinstein commented:

Begin justified the war and the cruelty inflicted upon the civilian population by invoking repeatedly images and memories of World War II and the Holocaust. What the Syrians were doing before the war to the Christians was "exactly" what the Germans had done to Jews in the forties, and Israel was not going to let this happen. The bombing of Beirut was akin to the bombing of German cities--Dresden was the unfortunate precedent mentioned by the prime minister--and the PLO were equated with the Nazis.⁶⁶

Just two days before his death, the famed philosopher Bertrand Russell said:

We are frequently told that we must sympathize with Israel because of the suffering of the Jews in Europe at the hand of the Nazis . . . What Israel is doing today cannot be condoned, and to invoke the horror of the past to justify those of the present is gross hypocrisy.⁶⁷

The Zionist perception of "world hostility" has led to a distrust of non-Jewish communities and has shaped Israeli policies. In their Introduction, the editors of Dissent & Ideology in Israel pointed out:

From Zionist ideological point of view, anti-Semitism is not a socio-political phenomenon with some clearly identifiable contexts. Rather it is defined as an intrinsic aspect of non-Jewish human nature . . . every non-Jew in support of the Zionist endeavor will invariably be treated as a quisling, if not overtly then covertly. His support and cooperation are crucial to the success of the endeavor, but he is never to be trusted and he is always ultimately despised.⁶⁸

Similarly, Alan Taylor suggested that:

The Zionist emphasis on the necessity of "auto-emancipation" in an "anti-Semitic world" is basic to Israeli psychological perceptions. It involves an essential distrust of non-Jewish communities, however overtly sympathetic they may be. For this reason many Israeli feel insecure in a situation that involves accommodation to foreign pressure.⁶⁹

Rabbi Abraham Avidan said: "We should not, according to religious law, trust a gentile."⁷⁰ Amnon Rubinstein suggested that the Zionist reaction

to critics of certain Israeli policies can be explained within the context of "inherent" world hostility toward the Jews. Thus, objection to Israeli policies has not been seen as "a valid criticism but merely another manifestation of the old disease."⁷¹ Hence, the attitude: "We can't do right anyway. So let's do what we ought to do regardless of what others say."⁷² In 1965, Ben-Gurion (one-time Israeli Prime Minister) "emphasized that what the Jews do is more important than what the Gentiles say."⁷³ More recently, Geula Cohen, a Zionist leader, said: "We always get the blame, whatever we do . . . Throughout the history of the people of Israel, we have always been accused of the worst evils."⁷⁴

The perception of "natural Gentile hostility" was reflected in the attitude of the early Zionist settlers toward the native Palestinians. In a discussion at the Seventh Zionist Congress (1905) over a possible Palestinian reaction as a result of their displacement, a Zionist settler insisted "that Arab peasants would turn against Jews no matter how the Jews behaved . . ."⁷⁵ Such a Zionist attitude was also observed by others, though in different terms. In her book, Prophecy and Politics, Grace Halsell cited the conviction of an Israeli writer: "the greatest danger facing Israel today is the 'collective version' of Samson's revenge against the Philistines--'Let me perish with the Philistines'--as a case in point. Halsell held that "this modern-day 'Samson Complex' is reinforced by the feeling that 'the whole world is against us' because of its ineradicable anti-Semitism."⁷⁶ In his Ph.D. dissertation, Benjamin Joseph pointed to a similar South African attitude concerning the conception of a "world hostility." He stated:

There are telling similarities in the ways dominant groups in the two countries [Israel and South Africa] view the world. From the perspective of a fortress mentality, the world is unjustly hostile, a "pack of wolves" ganging up with double standards and no regard for fairness, truth or principles.⁷⁷

In this respect, Heribert Adam suggested that "the manufacturing of enemies and threats" was needed for both Israel and South Africa in order

to mobilize internal support.⁷⁸ And so, the Zionist leaders have frequently tended to emphasize the idea of a "hostile environment" by projecting Israel a "little David" under constant threat of genocide by the "Arab Goliath" who wants to throw him into the sea!"⁷⁹ Amos Elon believed that this perception of constant threats became "more powerful a weapon than a mighty armored division . . . it adds resolve, inventiveness, devotion, cohesion . . ."⁸⁰ to the Israeli society. Some observers maintained that external threats tended to enhance internal cohesion in Israel. They charged that in order to quell unrest and generate public support, the Israeli authorities might have instigated some incidents.⁸¹ Louis Guttman, the academic Director of the Israeli Institute of Applied Social Research, noted that the October War of 1973 "had saved the Labor Government of Golda Meir," and that "the air raid on Syria and the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear facility enabled Begin's cabinet to win the 1981 election."⁸² In the same line of thinking, Alan Taylor held that the Six-Day War of 1967 was intended to rekindle the emotional support of world Jewry to Zionism. "The war itself was welcomed and triggered by Israel," Taylor wrote, "not so much for the sake of security and expansion, but to galvanize the Zionist image and to intensify Jewish support for the State."⁸³ Thus, the question of anti-Semitism has influenced Zionist strategy and Israeli policies. The other factor which played an important role in the emergence of the Zionist movement was the question of "assimilation."

Assimilationism

Besides anti-Semitism, the question of assimilation was considered another driving force behind the rise of Zionism. It was held that "the emancipation and assimilation of the Jews triggered off the de-Judaization of Jewish life--and also paved the way for Zionism and the State of Israel."⁸⁴ Assimilation in principle saw the Jew as a person belonging to the country of his residence, contributing to the culture of that country

and at the same time being able to keep his own religious values. The assimilationists raised the question of a "double loyalty," arguing that it was impossible to be a French or Russian patriot and at the same time Zionist.

In contrast to this outlook, the Zionists declared that assimilation was impossible, because of the "inherent" anti-Semitism of non-Jewish communities, and because the Jews are "different" people. B. Borochoy (1881-1917), one of the early "socialist" Zionist thinkers, saw that widespread assimilation failed to solve the Jewish question. "We will consider the Jewish question fully solved and its anomalies wholly removed . . .," he wrote, "only when territorial autonomy for the Jewish people shall have been attained."⁸⁵

The opening up of European society during and after Emancipation created, it was held, a new dilemma to a large part of European Jewry. Some Jewish intellectuals feared that the "unique" Jewish heritage might ultimately disappear through assimilation. Sholomo Avineri argued that liberalism and tolerance did not solve the problem of the "Jewish identity" but, in a way, exacerbated it. And what shocked Herzl most was not the Dreyfus affairs but, Avineri held, the existence of "a completely emancipated, successfully integrated, and largely secularized Jewish person."⁸⁶ For the Zionists, assimilation, as a means to solve the Jewish problem, "meant suicide."⁸⁷ Arthur Ruppin, an early Zionist thinker, described assimilation as an "imminent danger"⁸⁸ and in the words of Klatzkin it was an "infecting" disease.⁸⁹ Further, a statement released after a joint meeting of the Israeli Cabinet and the Zionist Executive considered "the danger of assimilation" as a major problem facing Diaspora Jewry.⁹⁰ In a similar vein, Dr. Nahum Goldman, a former President of the World Zionist Organization, stated in 1978:

The real motivation for creating the modern Zionist movement was fear for the survival and future of our people after the emancipation in the 19th century and the practical end of anti-Jewish persecution.

It may sound paradoxical and brutal but, as I said on other occasions, the survival of our people seems to be more threatened today than in the worst days of the Nazi regime.

Reliable statistics predict that, with the present rate of mixed marriages, the lack of a real system of Jewish education and the indifference of the majority of the young generation toward their Jewishness, the number of convinced Jews in the United States may decrease in a few years to four or five million and may be less than one million within a decade or two.⁹¹

Such a position led some writers to notice a kind of inherent paradox in Zionist ideology. Harold Fisch pointed out:

The history of Zionism in the nineteenth century is rooted in paradox. On the one hand Zionism was an expression of the desire to abolish the difference sensed by the Jews between themselves and other men . . . On the other hand the Zionist movement constituted the ultimate affirmation of this difference, a courageous, even defiant gesture against all attempts at assimilation by Jews in exile.⁹²

Similarly, Yonatan Ratosh pointed to the Zionist "paradoxical formulation":

Zionism is essentially an attempt to provide an undefined answer (from a "spiritual center" to an empire) to an undefined problem (the Jewish question, all depending on the various attitudes towards the question of what Judaism is) of an undefined human grouping (all the Jews, according to the various conceptions of "Who is a Jew?"--or portions thereof) in an undefined territory (from Wester Palestine, or a portion thereof--to the borders of Egypt and the Euphrates).⁹³

Thus, while anti-Semitism was considered a useful force to enhance the Zionist cause, assimilation was seen as a real threat to Jewish nationalism.

Jewish Nationalism

It was against this background that the anti-assimilationist Zionists sought to "normalize" the situation of the Jews to be like all the "other peoples." Max Nordau maintained that the "sole purpose of the Zionist movement was the desire to normalize a people . . ."⁹⁴ M.J. Berdichevski, who had a great influence on the labor Zionists, shared Herzl's view of the "abnormality" of the Diaspora Jewry. He saw "Jewish

life outside Palestine as a tragic mistake of history that Zionism had set out to correct."⁹⁵ Thus, the only solution, the Zionists held, was to "rebuild" their homeland and their identity on the "ancestral" soil in Palestine. That is, a Jewish statehood in Palestine. In other words, the position of the Jews should be "normalized" through the realization of a Jewish political sovereignty. Menachem Brinker argued that by identifying the Jewish life to be "abnormal," the Zionist movement got the chance to emerge and to succeed.⁹⁶

The question of "Jewish nationalism" is central in Zionist ideology. "In the thought of Zionists," Mikhail Gershenzon wrote, "the development of mankind occurs exclusively in national forms; it is nothing other than the general results of national developments."⁹⁷ Amos Elon maintained that Jewish nationalism was "derived from French positivism, German idealism, and Russian populism."⁹⁸ It began in Eastern Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century. European nationalism had a great impact on Zionist philosophy. Alan Taylor held that ". . . the primary stimulus to the founding and development of Zionism was the impact of chauvinistic nationalism on the social and intellectual life of the West."⁹⁹ Political Zionism, according to Alvin Rubinstein, "reflected late nineteenth-century European nationalism, with its stress on ethnic identity, self-determination, and the idea of a nation-state."¹⁰⁰

Early Zionist thinkers had stressed the idea of Jewish nationalism. In his attack on the Haskalah movement, Smolenskin, in 1883, spoke of "one Jewish nation."¹⁰¹ In 1880, Eliezer Ben Yehuda (who was considered the father of the modern Hebrew language) emphasized the importance for the Jews to "revive the nation and return to its fatherland."¹⁰² Similarly, Moshe Leib Lillienblum believed that a Jewish political independence is the only solution to the crisis of Jewish identity. He suggested that Jews indeed have only one choice which was "to initiate efforts for the renaissance of Israel in the land of its forefathers, where the next few generations may attain, to the fullest extent, a normal national life."¹⁰³

The development of the idea of "Jewish nationalism" by Moses Hess (1812-1875) was "the first expression" of Zionist ideology. Hess grew up in Germany and was associated with Marx and Engels until he dissociated himself from them over the materialist approach of Marxism. In his book, Rome and Jerusalem, published in 1862, "Hess subscribed to the notion of distinct ethnic types as the basic components of human society."¹⁰⁴ He believed that "every Jew, whether he wants to or not, is solidly tied with his own nation."¹⁰⁵ He called for the reasserting of Jewish "uniqueness" and the creation of a Jewish national center in Palestine.¹⁰⁶

The emphasis on distinctive "national Jewish identity" is central in Zionist philosophy. Elmessiri noted that:

The Jew, who is at the heart of the Zionist Program, is at times biologically determined, at others the determination is cultural or even religious, but at all times he is determined by the one or two exclusively "Jewish elements" in his existence, which turn him into an immutable element or essence, existing above all Gentile time and place and therefore, like all Gentiles, he needs to be "ingathered" in his own Jewish homeland, on his own soil.¹⁰⁷

It was Hess who first emphasized the idea "of a biologically or racially determined Jewish identity. Herzl, for his part, spoke of "uplifting the Jewish race" and observed the "likeness between the Jews of Vienna and Persia" with regard to "bold misshapen noses; furtive and cunning eyes."¹⁰⁸ All this emphasis on the question of "Jewish nationalism" pointed to the need to "normalize" the situation of the Jews which required, according to Zionism, a Jewish independent political entity.

A State for the Jews

Thus a state for the Jews was considered to be the only solution to the "Jewish Question." In his small book, The Jewish State, published in 1896, Herzl wrote:

Yes, we are strong enough to form a State, and indeed, a model State. We possess all human and material resources necessary for the purpose . . . Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful

requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves . . . The Governments of all countries scourged by Anti-Semitism will be keenly interested in assisting us to obtain the sovereignty we want.¹⁰⁹

He further elaborated:

The idea which I have developed . . . is an ancient one: it is the establishment of a Jewish state. The whole plan is in its essence very simple . . . The poorest will go first to cultivate the soil . . . They will construct roads, bridges, railways and telegraph installations, regulate rivers and build their own dwellings. Their labor will bring trade markets, and markets will attract settlers . . . The Jewish company is partly modelled on the lines of a great acquisition company, but it cannot exercise sovereign power and has no other than purely colonial tasks.¹¹⁰

Herzl had a clear vision about the proposed Jewish entity. For him scattered agricultural colonies were not an effective means because the authority which controls that territory might stop the influx of the Jews as a result of possible natives' demand. Thus "immigration is only truly viable if it is based on assurance of our sovereignty,"¹¹¹ Herzl maintained. And this should be done under the protection of the European powers when "they find the arrangement to their liking"¹¹² Herzl said. As one can see, the feeling and the interests of the native population in question had no place in Herzl's proposal.

In August 1897, at the First Zionist Congress, the Zionist movement stated clearly its goals and strategy. Its statement read:

Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end: 1) The promotion on suitable lines of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers, 2) The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country; 3) The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness; 4) Preparatory steps toward obtaining Government consent where necessary to the attainment of the aims of Zionism.¹¹³

Again, it is important to note that there was a total absence of any reference to the native Arabs, who at the time constituted 95 percent of

the population of Palestine and 99 percent of Palestine's land was owned by Arabs.¹¹⁴ The Zionist movement has been ignorant of the national existence of the Palestinians. This attitude has underlain Zionist policies ever since their inception. However, to implement the Zionist goal of establishing a Jewish statehood, extensive efforts were made to find a piece of land.

The Search for a Land

In its effort to locate the territory for the proposed Jewish entity, the Zionist movement was not motivated by a "mystical yearning for Zion" or the fulfillment of Biblical prophecies. The central question, instead, was to find a piece of land, any land. According to Zangwill (one of the fathers of Zionism), Herzl's search for a state was "anywhere so long as it brought Jewish independence and freedom from persecution."¹¹⁵ Pinsker, for his part, was not interested in Palestine. He wrote: "The goal of our efforts must not be the Holy Land, but a Land of Our Own. All we need is a large territory . . . that remains our own property."¹¹⁶ Herzl stressed the importance of the geological, climatic, and other "scientific" factors instead of religious or historical ones. He said: ". . . I shall now tell you everything about the 'promised land' except its location. This is a purely scientific question." From there he went on to say: "We must have regard for geological, climatic and other natural factors" taking into account the "consideration of the latest research."¹¹⁷ Indeed, before he got the British offer of a Jewish autonomous territory in East Africa, Herzl negotiated a possible Jewish settlement in El-Arish, Cyprus, and Southern Syria.¹¹⁸ At the Sixth Congress of the World Zionist Organization, Herzl lobbied hard in favor of the Uganda project.¹¹⁹

Indeed Palestine, for most early Zionist leaders, was declared to be unsuitable for Jewish settlement. Baron de Hirsch, one of the wealthiest Jews in France, established the Jewish Colonization Association

which financed Jewish immigration to Argentina. The Zionist movement was, at various times, interested in other locations such as "Cyprus, the Sinai peninsula, the Belgian Congo, Mozambique."¹²⁰ British Honduras, Australia, Angola, Brazil, and Mesopotamia (now Iraq) were also under Zionist consideration.¹²¹

The Uganda project was the most interesting one for it became a subject of official negotiation. Only several years after the publication of Herzl's Jewish State, the British Minister for Colonial Affairs, Joseph Chamberlain, proposed Uganda (now part of Kenya) to be a territory for Jewish settlement--a proposal that was adopted by the Sixth Zionist Congress in 1903.¹²² Herzl was more than happy about this British offer. Writing to Max Nordau, Herzl stated:

Look at England: She pours her excess population into the immense empire she has acquired . . . Their national base has enable many nations to build colonial empires that are making their fortune. Let us seize the opportunity offered us to become a miniature England. Let us begin by acquiring our own colonies. On the strength of our colonies we shall conquer our own homeland . . . other countries will follow the example of England; we will establish new "reserves of powers" in Mozambique, Congo, and Tripolitania with the help of the Portuguese, Belgians, and Italians.¹²³

Israel Zangwill, a British Zionist and a close collaborator of Herzl, shared Herzl's conviction to go anywhere under imperial protection. "Zion is not the only possible center for a restored Jewish nationality"¹²⁴ Zangwill declared. He founded the Jewish Territorial Organization (JTO) whose "objective was to procure territory upon an autonomous basis for those Jews who cannot or will not remain in the land" of their residence.¹²⁵ At one time Zangwill preferred a "Jewish colonization in Mesopotamia" on the ground that it was better than East Africa for strategic and economic consideration.¹²⁶ In 1909, he contacted the Turkish authorities (which ruled Iraq at the time), proposing "to enrich the Ottoman Exchequer and to develop Mesopotamia" in exchange for Turkey's help "to set aside a definite territory there within which the Jews should

be able to form the predominant majority."¹²⁷ Not successful in this, Zangwill turned to Britain. He suggested that the Zionists could be of help to England in her efforts to establish white settlements in British dominions. He stated:

There are not enough British settlers to go out to the Transvaal or Canada, countries much further developed . . . The whole white population of the British colonies is only some twelve millions. So that if Britain can attract all the Jews of the world to her colonies, she would just double their white population . . . A far better statesman than the Sultan, Mr. Chamberlain sees that although we need a land, East Africa needs a population.¹²⁸

Other territories like Surinam, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, and Cyrenaica, were also subjects of consideration for possible Zionist settlement.¹²⁹ The white settlers of South Africa were especially in favor of the JTO's activities. Speaking at an JTO meeting in Johannesburg in 1906, Lord Selborn, the High Commissioner for South Africa, described JTO's members as "wise, noble and practical."¹³⁰ Even the famous South African General Smuth, it was reported, had joined one of the local branches of the JTO in South Africa.¹³¹ Finally, in 1925 the JTO died off.

It is not difficult to place these Zionist projects within the framework of European imperialist policies. Maxim Rodonson contended that all these Zionist projects would:

. . . Unquestionably fit into the great movement of European expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the great European imperialist groundswell. There is no reason whatsoever to be surprised or even indignant at this. Except for a section (only a section) of the European Socialist parties and a few rare revolutionary and liberal elements, colonization at the time was essentially taken to mean the spreading of progress, civilization and well-being.¹³²

Eventually, the Zionist endeavour would focus on Palestine alone. After the death of Herzl and the dissolution of the JTO, the Zionist movement became dominated by the so-called "Practical Zionists" who for cultural, historical, and practical considerations, favored penetration into Palestine.¹³³

It is not the purpose of this study to detail the various colonial projects of the Zionist movement. However, the foregoing discussion was necessary as an argument against the Zionist thesis of "national liberation," for it is obvious, as we have seen, that the Zionist movement was eager to get any piece of land, protected by imperial powers, for its enterprise. As the Israeli writer, Uri Eizensweig put it: "Beyond the political, pragmatic needs dictated by circumstances, there is an inherent--indeed tragic--correlation between the very nature of the Zionist idea of the needed territory and its inscription in the colonial world."¹³⁴ However, the idea of a Jewish settlement and its connection to the colonial powers goes back to the fifteenth century.

The Imperialist Connection

The search for a land in order to establish a Jewish settlement can be traced back to the beginning of European colonialism. It was recorded that in 1652 (the same year in which the Cape station was created), the Dutch East India Company was interested in founding a colony of Jews on the island of Curacao, off the coast of Venezuela.¹³⁵ Other colonial powers followed suit. In 1654, Britain proposed a Jewish settlement in Surinam.¹³⁶ In 1659, the French East India Company was interested in establishing a Jewish colony in Cayenne.¹³⁷

History also told us that Napoleon Bonaparte was the first statesman to suggest a Jewish statehood in Palestine. Dr. Chaim Weizmann (the head of the Zionist movement after Herzl's death) described Bonaparte as "the first modern non-Jewish Zionist."¹³⁸ During his great Oriental Expedition in 1799, Bonaparte issued a Proclamation in which he appealed to the African and Asian Jews to fight under his leadership in order "to re-establish the Ancient Kingdom of Jerusalem."¹³⁹ The Jewish historian Salo Baron suggested that "although of little immediate consequence," the Proclamation "symbolized Europe's acknowledgement of Jewish rights to Palestine."¹⁴⁰ In 1860, Ernest Laharanne, private secretary to Napoleon

III, suggested that Jewish settlement in Palestine would lead to economic gain to Europe and that injection of European civilization, through a Jewish presence, would save the Middle East's "decadent" civilization.¹⁴¹ Likewise, Lord Palmerston (1784-1865), the then British Foreign Minister, held that a Jewish presence in Palestine was beneficial to Britain and that by their financial and industrial power, the Jews would advance "the progress of civilization" in the Middle East.¹⁴² Edward L. Mitford, a high ranking official in the British Colonial Office in London, shared a similar view. In case of a Jewish state in Palestine, Mitford believed "the management of our steam communication" would be "entirely in our hands" and we would be "in a commanding position in the Levant from whence to check the process of encroachment, to overawe our enemies and, if necessary, to repel their advance."¹⁴³ Taking the British colonial interests into account, General Sir Charles Warren, in 1879, proposed the establishment of a "chartered company" that would negotiate a Jewish self-government in Palestine.¹⁴⁴ In 1879, Lawrence Oliphant (a member of the British parliament) negotiated with the Turkish government over obtaining special facilities for Jewish settlement in Palestine.¹⁴⁵

The leaders of the Zionist movement, for their part, had frequently emphasized the importance of European protection to the proposed Jewish state which would, in return, protect Western interests in the region. Herzl declared:

We should there form a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism. We should as a neutral state--that is, neutral among European powers--remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence.¹⁴⁶

Before finally relying on Western powers, the Zionist leaders tried to win the Turkish support. "If His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could undertake to regulate Turkey's finances"¹⁴⁷ Herzl proposed. Two weeks after the war of 1897 between Turkey and Greece started, Herzl sided with Turkey and expressed friendship:

I beg to congratulate Your Excellency on the splendid victories of the Turkish arms. The desire of several Jewish students to attach themselves voluntarily to the armed forces of His Majesty the Sultan is a small token of the friendship and gratitude which we Jews feel for Turkey. Here and in several other places I have organized committees to initiate collections of money for wounded Turkish soldiers.¹⁴⁸

Yet this loyalty to Turkey was not real. In 1904, Herzl sought to convince King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy to personally intervene with the Sultan in favor of a Zionist settlement in Palestine. In return, Herzl offered Zionist help to the Italians in their effort to take Libya.¹⁴⁹ Herzl recorded the conversation with the King:

And finally, I broached my Tripoli scheme also: "to channel the surplus Jewish immigration into Tripolitania, under the liberal laws and institutions of Italy."

"Ma e ancora casa di altri" (But that again is someone else's house), he said.

"But the partition of Turkey is bound to come, Your Majesty."¹⁵⁰

However, the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse; and the British should have the upper hand in determining the future of the Ottoman provinces, including Palestine. Hence courting Britain was vital to realize the Zionist goal. In 1898, Herzl declared: "From the first moment I entered the movement my eyes were directed toward England."¹⁵¹ Two years later, at the Fourth Zionist Congress in London, Herzl publicly announced: "England, the great, England, the free, England with her eyes roaming over all the seas, will understand us and our aims."¹⁵² He added: "From this place the Zionist idea will take a still further and higher flight: of this we can be sure."¹⁵³ With their great experience about colonial enterprises, "The English were the first to recognize the necessity for colonial expansion in the modern world"¹⁵⁴ Herzl suggested. He concluded: "I believe the Zionist idea, which is a colonial idea, must be understood in England easily and quickly"¹⁵⁵ [emphasis added]. These were the words of the founder of the movement. Abdeen Jabara noted that

in its early days Zionism "had no difficulty in seeing itself as a colonizing movement," for "it called its first bank the Colonial Trust Company and its settlement department the department of colonization."¹⁵⁶ In a letter to Herzl in 1905, the South American Zionist official Samuel Goldreich wrote: "I did my best to convince Lord Milner that what he called Imperialism is identical with Zionism . . ."¹⁵⁷ The identity with Western colonialism was also manifested in the following passage written in 1930 by Abba Achimeir, one of the Zionist leaders:

In every East-West conflict, we will always be on the side of the West, for the West has represented a more superior culture than the East over the last thousand years, after the destruction of the Baghdad Caliphate by the Mongols . . . and we today are the most prominent and loyal bearers of the culture . . . our interest lies in expanding the British Empire even further than intended by the British themselves.¹⁵⁸

Herzl believed that by supporting the Zionist project in Palestine, the British would gain a great deal:

. . . At one stroke . . . ten million secret but loyal subjects active in all walks of life all over the world . . . As at a signal, all of them will place themselves at the service of the magnanimous nation that brings long-desired help. England will get ten million agents for her greatness and influence.¹⁵⁹

Again strategic or security benefits were officially acknowledged by the British. Meinertzhagen, a chief British political officer, held that:

In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that, for the future, a strong and friendly Palestine is vital to the future strategic security of the British Commonwealth. It can never be strong and healthy under divided control, still less under any form of Arab government.¹⁶⁰

In the same line of thinking, Jabotinsky, the father of Zionist revisionism (during the 1920's, the Revisionists had separated from the Zionist mainstream, accusing the latter of betraying Herzl's legacy and thus needing "revision"), stated:

I needn't dwell on the well-known truism of Palestine's

importance from the viewpoint of British imperial interests; I have only to add that its validity absolutely depends on one paramount condition: namely that Palestine should cease being an Arab country . . . Should Palestine remain Arab, Palestine will follow the orbit of Arab destinies--secession, Federation of Arab countries, and elimination of all traces of European influence. But a Palestine predominantly Jewish, surrounded on all sides by Arab countries, will in the interests of its own preservation always tend to lean upon some powerful empire, non-Arab and non-Mahomedan. This is an almost providential basis for a permanent alliance between England and a Jewish (but only a Jewish) Palestine.¹⁶¹

Examining the Zionist strategy toward the great powers, Maxim Rodonson noted that the Zionists tended "to play upon their [European] rivalries; to pressure them" through "the electoral or financial power of their Jewish" communities, or "to play on their anti-Semitism and their desire to get rid of the Jews."¹⁶² Rodonson further pointed out:

The Europeanism of the Zionist made it possible for them to present their plan as part of the same movement of European expansion that each power was developing on its own behalf. Hence, the many statements pointing out that it was in the general interest of Europe or civilization (which amounted to the same thing), or even in the particular interest of this or that power, to support the Zionist movement. This was perfectly natural given the atmosphere of the period.¹⁶³

Obviously, the Zionist lobbyists were all Europeans who occupied key positions in their societies and who could easily interact with the European leaders both politically and socially. In other words, the Zionists were in the right place at the right time following the rules of European politics and influence. This situation led to their success in gaining the Balfour Declaration of 1917--a document that largely contributed to the fulfillment of their desire for a Jewish state.

The Balfour Declaration

Following Herzl's death in 1904, the Zionist movement made significant progress during World War I under the leadership of Dr. Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952), who created an executive apparatus in England to win support for the Zionist cause. "To him, more than to any other single individual, goes credit for the creation of the State of Israel,"¹⁶⁴ John

Davis said. Through his diplomatic contacts, Weizmann was successful in winning the support of high ranking British officials such as "Lloyd George, Balfour, Churchill, Samuel, Grey, Cecil, Milner, and of key members of the Rothschild family."¹⁶⁵ After assuming the leadership of the Zionist movement, "Weizmann hit upon the approach of relating the Zionist goal to British interests and ambitions in the Middle East."¹⁶⁶ The result of his efforts was the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, in which the British government expressed sympathy for and support of a Jewish home in Palestine. The Declaration took the form of a letter written by Arthur Balfour, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and addressed to Lord Rothschild. It read:

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet.

His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.¹⁶⁷

Thus the Jews got two promises: one from God, the other from Lord Balfour. Although "the document bears Balfour's name," David Hirst suggested, ". . . in reality it was the Zionists themselves who, in very large measure, both inspired the Declaration and framed its text."¹⁶⁸ He added: "It must be reckoned the finest flower of Zionist diplomacy and its most sophisticatedly ambivalent."¹⁶⁹

Despite some opinions (such as of Amos Elon)¹⁷⁰ that tended to belittle the importance of the Declaration, it was indeed vital to the Zionist endeavour. In one of his speeches, Weizmann described the Declaration as "the golden key which unlocks the doors of Palestine . . ."¹⁷¹ and "the Magna Charta of the Jewish people."¹⁷² On the occasion Weizmann said: "We the Jews got the Balfour Declaration quite

unexpectedly . . . it came to us overnight."¹⁷³ David Hirst considered the Declaration to be "one of the key documents that have shaped the modern history of the Middle East."¹⁷⁴ Despite ambiguity (concerning the term National Home), the Zionist leaders, as did the author of the Declaration, interpreted it to mean a Jewish State. Weizmann declared:

It [the Declaration] meant, as I say, at that time, and speaking in political parlance, a Jewish State; and when I was asked at the Peace Conference, quite impromptu, by Mr. Lansing, "What do you mean by a Jewish National Home?" I gave this answer: To build up something in Palestine which will be as Jewish as England is English.¹⁷⁵

In their contact with Weizmann, Lloyd George and Balfour told the Zionist leader that by using the term "national home" in the Declaration, "we meant a Jewish state."¹⁷⁶ The real intention of the British government was stated by Sir Hubert Young, a senior official in the Colonial office, who said:

The problem which we have to work out now is one of tactics, not strategy, the general strategic ideas as I conceive it being the gradual immigration of Jews into Palestine until that country becomes a predominantly Jewish State . . . But it is questionable whether we are in a position to tell the Arabs what our policy really means.¹⁷⁷

As to the reality of the second part of the Declaration, which deals with the rights of the "non-Jews," it is appropriate to quote from the former Liberal Foreign Secretary, Lord Grey, who in 1923 pointed out:

The Balfour Declaration promised a Zionist home without prejudice to the civil and religious rights of the population of Palestine. A Zionist home, my Lords, undoubtedly means or implies a Zionist government over the district in which the home is placed, and if ninety-three percent of the population of Palestine are Arabs, I do not see how you can establish other than an Arab government, without prejudice to their civil rights.¹⁷⁸

Sharif believed that "the term 'civil rights,' if indeed it meant anything at all, could only have referred to the rights of aliens in a foreign country."¹⁷⁹

Thus the future of the Palestinians was already decided regardless of their will. In his memorandum, the author of the Declaration, Lord Balfour, admitted:

For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are. The Four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of profounder import than the desire and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.¹⁸⁰

The above passage is indicative. The Declaration came as a result of extensive negotiation (with the Zionist leader and other European governments) from which the indigenous inhabitants were excluded. Lord Balfour elaborated more on this point when he said:

The weak point of our position is that in the case of Palestine we deliberately and rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants were consulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish verdict. Our justification for our policy is that we regard Palestine as being absolutely exceptional; that we consider the question of the Jews outside Palestine as one of world importance and that we conceive the Jews to have an historic claim to a home in their ancient land; provided that home can be given them without their dispossessing or oppressing the present inhabitants.¹⁸¹

The Zionist position concerning the rights of the Palestinian natives was one of misleading. Weizmann declared that "Palestine must be built up without violating the legitimate rights of the Arabs--not a hair of their heads shall be touched."¹⁸² He further assured the Arabs, while he was in Palestine, that "our objective" is not "to seize control of the higher policy of the province of Palestine. Nor has it ever been our objective to turn anyone out of his property."¹⁸³ Behind the scenes, however, Weizmann showed a different attitude. While he was in Palestine, Weizmann wrote a letter to Lord Balfour stating:

The Arabs, who are superficially clever and quick-witted, worship one thing, and one thing only--power and success . .

. The British authorities . . . knowing as they do the treacherous nature of the Arab, have to watch carefully and constantly that nothing should happen which might give the Arabs the slightest grievance or ground of complaint. In other words, the Arabs have to be "nursed," lest they should stab the army in the back. The Arab, quick as he is to gauge a situation, tries to make the most of it. He screams as often as he can . . . the fairer the English regime tries to be, the more arrogant the Arab becomes.¹⁸⁴

Simha Flapan, an Israeli historian, suggested that the legacy of Weizmann's prejudice toward the Arabs has had a great impact on future Jewish-Arab relations.¹⁸⁵

It is important to note that the Declaration was issued at a time when the British government had no sovereignty over Palestine and was not even in occupation of the country. As Henry Cattan put it: "A donor cannot give away what he does not own."¹⁸⁶ Arthur Koestler put it this way: "One nation solemnly promising to a second nation the country of a third."¹⁸⁷ Similarly, W.T. Stace noted that the Declaration was in contradiction to the principle of democracy and self-determination; and that Britain had no "right to make promises about the disposal of Palestine contrary to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of that country."¹⁸⁸

The Declaration was of great value to the Zionist cause. It provided the recognition of the Jews as a nation. Thanks to the effort of the British government in securing the approval of the League of Nations to the Mandate, the "'Jewish people' became a national entity recognized by international law."¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, the Declaration denied the existence of the Palestinian people (who comprised 90 percent of the population at the time) by referring to them merely as "the non-Jewish communities."¹⁹⁰

Why the Declaration

The first motive behind the Declaration was the British strategic interests. The British writer, Herbert Sidebothman, suggested in 1915 "that Palestine was crucial to the defence of Egypt and the Suez Canal."¹⁹¹

Mixing together the biblical theme of ancient history with British security needs, Sidebothman stated:

Mesopotamia was the cradle of the Jewish people and the place of its exile in the captivity. From Egypt came Moses, the founder of the Jewish State. The wheel of destiny will have come full circle round if at the end of this war the extinction of the Turkish empire in Mesopotamia and the need of securing a more defensible frontier in Egypt were to lead to the re-establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.¹⁹²

Sidebotham did not forget to mention the civilizing mission of the Jews:

Nor is there any indigenous civilization in Palestine that could take the place of the Turkish except that of the Jews, who already numbering one-seventh of the population, have given to Palestine everything that it has ever had of value to the world.¹⁹³

Then he concluded: ". . . so strong is the argument for Zionism to our own security that if there had been no Zionism ready made to our hands . . . we should have had to invent it."¹⁹⁴ A European-Jewish settlement in Palestine was seen to be helpful to the war effort of Britain and its allies. "It is indicative of this importance that texts of the Declaration in large quantities were thrown from low-flying planes over German towns,"¹⁹⁵ Jabbor stated. Explaining the circumstances that necessitated the Declaration, David Lloyd George (the British Prime Minister at the time of the Declaration) said:

The French army had mutinied, the Italian army was on the eve of collapse and America had hardly started preparing in earnest . . . It was important for us to seek every legitimate help we could get. We came to the conclusion, from information we received from every part of the world, that it was vital we should have the sympathies of the Jewish community . . . They were helpful in America and in Russia, which at the moment was just walking out and leaving us alone.¹⁹⁶

Similarly, in a straightforward statement, Winston Churchill said:

It [the Declaration] was made to world Jewry and in particular to the Zionist associations. It was in consequence of and on the basis of this pledge that we received important help in the War, and that after the War we received from the Allied

and Associated Powers the Mandate for Palestine.¹⁹⁷

Lenni Brenner maintained that Zionism suited perfectly the British colonial scheme which followed the principle of "divide and rule."¹⁹⁸

A second factor behind the Declaration was the confrontation with Communism. Zionism was seen as helpful in the fight against Bolshevism. In his article "Zionism versus Bolshevism" (1920), Churchill suggested that Zionism was helpful in frustrating Trotsky's effort of "world revolution," on the grounds that Zionism could divert "the energies and the hopes of the Jews in every land towards a simpler, a truer, and a far more attainable goal,"¹⁹⁹--that is a Jewish state in Palestine.

Another motive which promoted the Declaration was the British desire to avoid a large influx of Jewish refugees into Britain. Lord Balfour was hostile to the idea of England as the place for immigrant Jews of Eastern Europe. Being the head of the British government at the time, Balfour played an important role in passing the 1905 Aliens Act.²⁰⁰ Most likely, Balfour's position was influenced by Herzl, who, in his speech before a British Royal Commission on the immigration of Jews to England (1902), suggested that transferring the Jews to Palestine was the solution to the British problem.²⁰¹ Likewise, the Tsarist leaders were informed by Herzl that Jewish settlement in Palestine would be a good solution to get rid of radical Jewish elements in Russia.²⁰²

Besides Britain, the U.S. also stood against the idea that the expelled Jews come to America. By 1925, the U.S. had begun to impose some restrictions on its free immigration policy. The new regulations were based on a quota system which favored immigrants from Western and Northern European countries over those of Eastern and Southern Europe. This new policy restricted Jewish immigration since most Jews came from Eastern Europe.²⁰³ In his protest note to the Russian Government, the then American Secretary of State indicated that because of the "oppressive measures" of the Russian Government, a huge Jewish settlement took place

in America, and that the American hospitality "should not be turned into a burden."²⁰⁴ Palestine was seen as the perfect place for the unwanted Jewish refugees. President Roosevelt said: "We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization . . ."²⁰⁵ Richard Stevens commented: "To Roosevelt it seemed dishonest to demand immigration concessions from the Arabs while the United States retained its tight and selective quota laws."²⁰⁶ Speaking about the position of the Western countries concerning Jewish immigration, W.T. Stace observed "that none of the great nations want these refugees." Instead "we have found a small country, Palestine, and a remote and defenseless people, the Arabs, on whom we can unjustly shove the burden of our duties."²⁰⁷

Thus, the Balfour Declaration was made by Britain (and supported by Western powers) to solve the demographic problem, to enlist Jewish support in the fight against world communism, and to protect western interests in the Middle East. The Zionists, for their part, were successful in their tactics to mislead the Palestinian natives.

Zionist Strategy and Attitude Toward Palestinian Natives

Examining the Zionist literature, one sees that the Zionist leaders were deliberately ambiguous concerning the nature of the Jewish settlement in Palestine. Instead of a Jewish state, the Basle program of 1897 spoke of "home in Palestine secured by public law." Twenty-three years later, Max Nordau took pride in his effort to dissimulate the real Zionist aim. He wrote:

I did my best to persuade the advocates of the Jewish State in Palestine that we might find a circumlocution that would express all we meant, but would say it in a way that would avoid provoking the Turkish rules [who ruled Palestine at the time] of the coveted land. I suggest "Heimstätte" [Homeland] as a synonym for "state" . . . this is the history of the much comit meant . . . to us it signified "Judenstaat" (Jewish State) and it signifies the same now . . .²⁰⁸

Nahum Sokalov, a participant in the drafting of the Balfour Declaration, denied in 1919 that the objective of the Zionist movement was to establish

a Jewish state in Palestine.²⁰⁹ In his speech to open the tenth Zionist Congress (1911), the President of the movement declared that "only those suffering from gross ignorance, or actuated by malice, could accuse us of the desire of establishing an independent Jewish Kingdom."²¹⁰ And yet, according to Herzl's diaries, not published until twenty-six years after his death in 1904, the founding father related:

Were I to sum up the Basle Congress in a word--which I shall guard against pronouncing publicly--it would be this: at Basle I founded the Jewish state . . . If I said this out loud today, I would be answered by universal laughter. Perhaps in five years and certainly in fifty everyone will know it.²¹¹

In 1919, Weizman (who became the first president of Israel), in a letter to one of his associates, expressed hope to form in "Palestine a Jewish commonwealth under British trusteeship."²¹²

"Force and cunning," according to Alan Taylor, were to be used in transforming the status quo in Palestine.²¹³ The settlers were to follow Herzl's strategy which was clearly stated by the founder in 1895:

We must expropriate gently the private property on the estates assigned to us. We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by producing employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it employment in our own country. The property owners will come over to our side. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly. Let the owners of immovable property believe that they are cheating us, selling us things for more than they are worth. But we are not going to sell them anything back.

The voluntary expropriation will be accomplished through our secret agents. The company would pay excessive prices. We shall then sell only to Jews, and all real estate will be traded only among Jews.²¹⁴

It is important to note that when Herzl wrote this piece, Palestine was not specifically in his mind. It was meant to apply to any natives anywhere.²¹⁵ In case of possible natives' resistance, force could be used to handle the situation, Herzl recommended.²¹⁶ David Hirst believed that the use of violence was seen inevitable to achieve the Zionist goal. He wrote:

Violence, then, was implicit in Zionism from the outset. The prophet of Zionism foresaw that coercion and physical force were inevitable; they were not unfortunate necessities thrust, unforeseen, on his followers. To his diaries, not published until twenty-six years after his death in 1904, Herzl confided the beliefs which, in his public utterances, he had been careful to omit: that military power was an essential component of his strategy and that, ideally, the Zionists should acquire the land of their choice by armed conquest.²¹⁷

And what about the future of the Palestinian natives? Borochov the "socialist" Zionist leader answered:

The native population of Palestine will be economically and culturally absorbed by those who will bring order to the land and develop its productive forces. The Jewish immigrants will build up Palestine, and the native population will in time be absorbed by the Jews, both economically and culturally.²¹⁸

And no word whatsoever about the natives' national inspiration. Anticipating armed resistance by the natives, Borochov prepared his Zionist followers:

Those who think that such a radical transformation of Jewish life as territorialism implies can occur without a bitter struggle, without cruelty and injustices, without suffering for the innocent and guilty alike, are utopianists . . . They are written in sweat, tears, and blood.²¹⁹

Similarly, Weizmann emphasized that a Jewish state " . . . will come about not through political declaration, but by the sweat and blood of the Jewish people . . . " ²²⁰ Faithful to the Herzlian guidelines, Weizmann instructed his followers:

. . . We require evolutionary tactics. For example, we should not ask the Government if we are to enter Palestine as masters or with equal rights to the Arabs. All depends on the number of Jews living in Palestine at the time or in the future. From the Declaration it appears that we are being offered the opportunity of becoming the masters of the country. As long as we have neither people nor money at our disposal we can ask no more than that. If we set ourselves small goals and implement them in the best possible fashion, we will some day win the confidence of the British Government. But if we make sweeping demands and do not immediately follow up with actions, they will no longer have confidence in us. Englishmen operate empirically, by experience and not by plan. Everything depends on the people, their ability, and their

iron patience. There is an English proverb about the 'camel and the tent': first the camel pushes a foot into the tent, then he slips inside. This is the policy we must adopt. We must avoid sharp corners.²²¹

More direct and blunt was Jabotinsky. He believed in the doctrine of "Iron Wall" which means that only immensely superior force could compel the natives to accept the occupation of their land. He wrote that there is an:

. . . Iron law of every colonizing movement, a law which knows of no exceptions, a law which existed in all times and under all circumstances. If you wish to colonize a land in which people are already living, you must provide a garrison on your behalf. Or else--or else, give up your colonization, for without an armed force which will render physically impossible any attempts to destroy or prevent this colonization, colonization is impossible, not 'difficult,' not 'dangerous' but IMPOSSIBLE! . . . Zionism is a colonizing adventure and therefore it stands or falls by the question of armed force. It is important to build, it is important to speak Hebrew, but, unfortunately, it is even more important to be able to shoot--or else I am through with playing at colonialization.²²²

Jabotinsky elaborated more:

Zionist colonialization, even the most restricted, must either be terminated or carried out in defiance of the will of the native population. This colonization can, therefore, continue and develop only under the protection of a force independent of the local population--an iron wall which the native population cannot break through. This is, in total, our policy towards the Arabs. To formulate it any other way would only be hypocrisy.²²³

When one Zionist warned the Twelfth Zionist Congress (1912) about a possible increasing of native hostility that might lead to a total war with the Arabs, Jabotinsky replied: "History teaches that all colonization has met with little encouragement from the natives on the spot; it may be very sad but so it is and we Jews are no exception."²²⁴

Lenni Brenner commented:

Jabotinsky was quite correct in defining Zionism as a colonial racist enterprise. He envisioned a triumphant Zionist state amidst a Middle East and a world dominated by imperialism, with the Palestinian population accepting their lot, as so many native peoples had been forced to do before them.²²⁵

And Hilton Obenzinger said this about Jabotinsky:

The least that could be said of Jabotinsky was that he was not a hypocrite. Indeed he saw Zionism as explicitly colonialist and racist, casting aside any of the utopian niceties that the "socialist" Zionists entertained to obscure the basic underpinning of the entire project.²²⁶

David Ben Gurion (who became the first Prime Minister of Israel) echoed Jabotinsky's position: the Palestinian problem would be solved "by force of arms and not through official resolution."²²⁷ On another occasion Ben Gurion said:

At the present time we speak of colonization, and only of colonization. It is our short term objective. But it is clear that England belongs to the English, Egypt to the Egyptians and Judea to the Jews. In our country there is room only for Jews. We will say to the Arabs: "Move over;" if they are not in agreement, if they resist, we will push them by force.²²⁸

The following conversation which took place in 1891, seemed to be a representative reflection of the settlers' attitude toward the native Palestinians.

- We should go east, into Transjordan. That would be a test for our movement.
- Nonsense . . . isn't there enough land in Judea and Galilee?
- The land in Judea and Galilee is occupied by the Arabs.
- Well, we'll take it from them.
- How? (Silence.)
- A revolutionary doesn't ask naive questions.
- Well then, "revolutionary," tell us how.
- It's very simple. We'll harass them until they get out . . . Let them go to Transjordan.
- And are we going to abandon all of Transjordan? (Asks an anxious voice.)
- As soon as we have a big settlement here we'll seize the land, we'll become strong, and then we'll take care of the Left Bank. We'll expel them from there, too. Let them go back to the Arab countries.²²⁹

The organized newcomers translated such a Zionist outlook into acts which led to the violence that has stamped the Arab-Jewish relationship.

The year 1882 marked the first organized wave of Jewish immigration

(Aliyah) to Palestine. At that time, there were already in Palestine about 24,000 Jews (as compared with 525,000 Palestinians), mostly immigrants, who came to Palestine for religious purposes: Dwelling in Zion was considered as a religious duty.²³⁰ According to David Hirst, those Jews "were often old, and many spent their time in perpetual study of the Talmud. Most lived in great poverty."²³¹ The newcomers of the first Aliyah (called lovers of Zion) were more politically conscious though they had no clear-cut vision of a Jewish statehood.²³² With the heavy financial support of Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris, the settlers were able to establish thirty-nine agricultural colonies.²³³ The second wave of Jewish immigration (beginning in 1905 and lasting until 1914) consisted of very committed Zionists who were inspired by Herzl's philosophy and who were to become the leaders of the Zionist movement two or three decades later. They were the vanguard in the process of transforming Palestine into a Jewish state.

Up to the end of the First World War, Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. Between the Wars it was ruled by Britain until the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. According to a book (published in Hebrew, 1980) written by the Israeli writer A.L. Auneri, the ratios between Jews and Palestinians were as follows: In 1800, the ratio of Arabs to Jews was 40:1; in 1880 it was 22:1, and in 1914 (according to a Turkish census) it was 11:1;²³⁴ in 1915, it was 6-7:1; in 1931 the ratio was 5:1, and by 1947 it had become 2:1.²³⁵ It should be noted that the Jewish community in Palestine was protected, according to the "capitulations" agreement, by the consuls of foreign powers.²³⁶ Through their consuls, the Great Powers pressured the Turkish authorities in favor of more Jewish immigration into Palestine.²³⁷ The many protests by the Palestinians against the increasing Jewish immigration failed to stop a future influx of settlers. "The Port would periodically impose restrictions on immigration," Hirst wrote, "only to lift them again under European pressure, or to allow venal officials on the spot to turn a blind

eye to the continued defiance of them."²³⁸

Thus, the increased number of the settlers had led to a lot of friction and hostility with the natives. As is the case with all settler enterprises, hostility revolved above all around the question of land. The Zionists often emphasized that "the Jews have too much history and too little geography."²³⁹ A purchase agency, the Keren Kayemet Le Israel Company, was set up to purchase Palestinian land for the settlers. It was mainly non-Palestinian absentee landlords who cooperated with the settlers in giving them large areas of the most fertile Palestinian land.²⁴⁰ In his book, Israel: Utopia Incorporated, Uri Davis pointed out:

The successful accomplishment of the Jewish colonial task and the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel followed rather standard patterns of colonial dispossession. Sensing clearly and correctly that the task required first and foremost the consolidation of monopoly over the land resources of the country, the Jews felt that their allies could not possibly be the impoverished, dominated local peasantry, divested of all legal rights, and transformed under the Ottoman imperial rule into tenants and serfs. Their allies could only be the big absentee feudal land owners who were thirsty for cash in order to enter into the capitalist market economy, introduced into the area by the European imperial powers.²⁴¹

According to Dr. A. Ruppin, the master mind of the early Zionist colonization, "ninety percent of all land bought before 1929 came from absentee landlords."²⁴² Again, pressures were used by the Great Powers to relax Turkish restrictions concerning land sale to the settler Jews.²⁴³ The native peasants who lived under conditions of feudal tenancy and serfdom²⁴⁴ did not confront the actual sale of the land (a process of which they had no knowledge because it was usually done between the absentee landlord and the settler). They resisted the following step which was the process of their evacuation.²⁴⁵ Dr. Ruppin said: "on every site where we purchase land and where we settle people, the present cultivators will inevitably be dispossessed."²⁴⁶ Sometimes Turkish troops were needed to ensure the transferral of land to the settlers.²⁴⁷ The position of the Turkish rulers was to approve the sale of the land to the Jewish settlers,

hoping to "attract Jewish capital to their exhausted economy."²⁴⁸ However, despite vigorous Zionist effort to buy Palestinian lands, "only 8% of Mandatory Palestine" came under Jewish ownership by 1947.²⁴⁹ Thus it became essential that new avenues be devised to expand the Zionist control of Arab land. This was facilitated by the dispersion of the Palestinians during the 1948 fighting. In 1948, according to United Nations sources, more than 726,000 Palestinians were forced to leave their country during the war. At the same time there were 340,000 European Jews waiting in Cyprus to go to Israel. Don Peretz wrote:

. . . The property abandoned by the Palestinian Arabs was a valuable resource helping to make room for hundreds of thousands of Jews who replaced the Arab refugees. The abandoned Arab fields, orchards, vineyards, homes, shops, factories, and businesses provided shelter, economic sustenance, and employment for a significant percentage of the nearly 700,000 new immigrants who came to Israel between May, 1948, and the end of 1951. Israel would have found it far more difficult to more than double its population during this period without access to abandoned Arab property.²⁵⁰

Thus, the problem of the Palestinian tenants cultivating land sold to settlers marked the beginning of the conflict between the newcomers and the indigenous people. Mistreatment of the Palestinian native became an inevitable outcome. In 1891, the Zionist philosopher Ahad Ha'am criticized the settlers' attitude toward the Palestinians:

Slaves [the Jews] they were in their country of exile, and suddenly they find themselves in a boundless and anarchic freedom, as is always the case with a slave that has become king; and they behave towards the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, infringing upon their boundaries, hitting them shamefully without reason, and even bragging about it.²⁵¹

These words were written in 1891. When the Palestinian resistance reached its peak in 1908, Yitzhak Ben Zvi (who became Israel's second president) described the Palestinian reaction as "anti-Semitic pogroms."²⁵² However, "The Zionists were hardly concerned at all about the reactions of the Arabs," Maxim Rodonson noted. He added: "and it is here that the unconsciously imperialist element in their thinking stands out."²⁵³

The colonial settler character of the Zionist movement and the state of Israel was evident. The course of the Zionist enterprise was not dissimilar in essence to that of European colonialism in Africa and Asia. The Zionist project was set up to establish an exclusive colonial society with the support of colonial powers. Raphael Shaprio maintained that seeking the support of an imperial power was quite natural for Zionism and other colonizing movements. But Zionism was different in that it had no specific sponsor power. Instead, it had sought the support of Western imperialism in general.²⁵⁴ Therefore, Shaprio concluded, "Zionism's antagonism towards the Orient was more a part of its character, and hence more radical and complete, than one normally finds in colonial movements."²⁵⁵ Egbal Ahmed pointed to the specific character of the Zionist movement. He argued:

It is a pioneering colonialism, one that seeks to exclude and eliminate the native inhabitants rather than to occupy and exploit them. Although produced by the process and power of imperialism, it is a form of colonialism which offers refuge to the disinherited, to persecuted minorities and to the surpluses, marginals and misfits created by industrialism and modernization in the metropolis. A colonialism committed to replacing the native people, it is racist and extremist by nature. [Emphasis in original]²⁵⁶

Similarly, Maxim Rodonson pointed to the colonial nature of the Zionist enterprise.²⁵⁷ Writing about the same subject, Alfred Moleah concluded:

. . . Israel, like South Africa, is a settler-colonial state. Political Zionism is a 19th-century colonial movement of some European Jews to found an exclusive Jewish colony, preferably in Palestine. This was European settler colonialism with the outlook and objectives reflective of other European colonial and imperialist ventures of the period.²⁵⁸

Abdeen Jabare held that the history of world colonialism indicated that the colonizer would have three options in handling the native population: 1) to eliminate all or part of them (genocide), 2) to subjugate them in a specific "system of inclusion and exclusion, or 3) to deport them outside of their land (population transfer).²⁵⁹ The Zionist movement,

Jabara noted, adopted the latter two options: "pushing the bulk of the population out and subjecting the remainder to a system of inclusion and exclusion." He added: "It was, as Jacques Berque wrote, 'a total colonialism' because the native Palestinian Arab could derive no benefit from it."²⁶⁰

The settler-colonial character of Zionism was acknowledged by Zionist leaders. Moshe Dayan, at one time Israel's Defense Minister, said:

We are a settler generation and without the steel helmet and the cannon we cannot plant a tree or build a house. Let us not flinch from the hatred inflaming hundreds of thousands of Arabs around us. Let us not turn our heads away lest our hands tremble. It is our generation's destiny, our life's alternative, to be prepared and armed, strong and harsh, lest the sword drop from our fist and life cease.²⁶¹

During the expulsion of 6,000 Palestinians from the Gaza strip in the spring of 1972, Israel Galili, a leading veteran architect of the original colonization programs, and Premier Golda Meir's top advisor, stated: "'Our right on Gaza' is 'exactly like our right on Tel Aviv.'" He added: "We are colonizing Gaza exactly in the same manner in which we colonized Jaffa. Those who doubt our right on Gaza should doubt our right on Tel-Aviv as well."²⁶² The dilemma for the Zionist establishment is quite clear: If land occupied in 1967 should be given back, then why not land seized the same way in 1948? The Zionist leaders had not hesitated to emphasize the expansionist nature of their state. After the six-days war of 1967, Moshe Dayan declared:

Our fathers had reached the frontiers which were recognized in the Partition Plan [that of the United Nations in 1947]. Our generation reached the frontiers of 1949. Now the six-day generation has managed to reach Suez, Jordan and the Golan Heights. That is not the end. After the present cease-fire line, there will be new ones. They will extend beyond Jordan—perhaps to Lebanon and perhaps to central Syria as well.²⁶³

It is interesting to note that this reference to Lebanon was stated fifteen years before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

Other evidence of Zionist colonialism can be found in the support of the colonial powers to the Zionist cause. The European powers were guided partly by self-interest and partly by strong internal pressure from their Jewish communities. The pressure on President Truman is a case in point. In his address to the American ambassadors to Arab countries, President Truman stated in 1945: "I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents."²⁶⁴ In his "Memoirs," Truman again mentioned the pressure put on him in 1947.

I do not think that I ever had so much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders--actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats--disturbed and annoyed me. Some were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into favorable votes in the General Assembly.²⁶⁵

It should be mentioned that the original United Nations recommendation of 1947 to establish a "Jewish state" in Palestine was rejected by all Asian and African states (with the exception of South Africa). Only the European states, the United States, and Australia voted for it.²⁶⁶

The Great Powers, according to the Israeli writer Yosef Gorny, provided "considerable contribution" to the advancement and the success of Zionism. "The modest achievements of the Zionist movement in Palestine in that period would probably not have been possible without" the involvement of the Great Powers.²⁶⁷ During the Palestinian revolt of 1936-1939, the British provided significant military support that paved the way to the ultimate Zionist victory in Palestine. The military correspondent of the Israeli daily Haaretz stated:

With respect to the events of 1936, it seems to us that had they not happened in the manner and at the time in which they did in fact occur, it is doubtful that the Jewish community could have waged a war for independence eight years later. The Jewish community emerged from these dangerous 1936 events in a stronger position as a result of the strong support it

received from the British government and army in Palestine.²⁶⁸

Likewise, Lenni Brenner believed that without "the presence of the protecting British troops" the Zionist settlers "would have been driven into the Mediterranean by the Palestinians and the millions of Arabs in the surrounding countries."²⁶⁹ Brenner also suggested that the association with the British colonial power "demonstrates the reactionary nature of Zionism."²⁷⁰ Similarly Elmessiri pointed to the link between Zionism and European colonialism:

Given the colonial frame of reference within which the idea of the Zionist state was conceived and implemented, one can argue that it is by no means a coincidence that the Balfour Declaration and the South African Act of Union (1909) were both effected in "large part by the same handful of politicians"--Lord Milner, Lord Selbourne, Lord Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain, and General Smuts. In implanting and backing white settlers in South Africa and Zionist settlers in Palestine, the British Empire was founding two little pockets of settler-colonists who would owe allegiance to the imperial metropolis and would serve as bases of operations when the need arose.²⁷¹

In an attempt to link Zionism to the worldwide system of imperialism, Patrick F. Wilmot argued that Israel, like South Africa, is "part of imperialism's design to box in and destabilize the continent and divert its historical destiny from the primary task of uplifting its population."²⁷² In the same line of thinking, the writer of an article published in the Israeli daily Haaretz (September 30, 1951) acknowledged that "Israel has been assigned the role of a kind of watchdog" which "can be relied upon to punish properly one or several of her Arab neighbor states whose lack of manners toward the West has exceeded permissible limits."²⁷³

The foregoing discussion clearly indicates the colonial-settler character of Zionism and Israel--a fact that has not been widely recognized by world public opinion. Far from being a movement of national liberation, the Zionist movement was part of an imperialist wave sponsored by Western powers to serve as a base to protect Western interests in the

region. Israel, like South Africa, constitutes a beach head of Western Capitalism in an underdeveloped world. However, it is said that colonization goes hand in hand with racism. And the Zionist case is not exceptional.

RACISM: Jewish Purity/Jewish Superiority

Racism basically is based on the idea that a certain group of people is naturally (physically or culturally) superior to others. Western colonialism emphasized the genetic and cultural superiority of Western civilization. In common with the dominant outlook of nineteenth century colonialism, the rule of the white man over the indigenous population seemed quite normal on the assumption that he could boast a moral superiority derived from advanced socio-political order. "The development of racism in all its different forms of expression," Sharif suggested, "corresponded to the emergence and expansion of European imperialism based on the colonization of the non-European world."²⁷⁴ Racism was used to justify a diverse range of economic and socio-political exploitation. "'The White man's burden' was to civilize the 'backward' nations incapable of helping themselves."²⁷⁵ Military ingenuity or technological advance might be considered as signs of superiority. In the case of Zionism, Jewish superiority was based on two concepts: "pure race" and "chosen people." Sharif maintained that Zionist racism was manifested in "its essential claim that the Jews make up a 'chosen Race' which should not be assimilated with other 'inferior races.'"²⁷⁶

The Zionist philosophy emphasized the question of "racial purity." Zollschan, an early Zionist thinker, wanted "to prove that Jews constitute a pure race."²⁷⁷ Martin Buber, an early Zionist philosopher, claimed that "the deepest layers of our being are determined by blood; that our innermost thinking and our will are cloved by it."²⁷⁸ Similarly, Jabotinsky spoke of ". . . one single red thread, leading from Zion to Zion, traverses the entire history of our people."²⁷⁹ He believed that

"racial traits" are the criteria "which determined the singular nature of different nations."²⁸⁰ Naum Sokolow, a Zionist scholar, maintained that ". . . absolute purity does not exist, but relatively the Jews are doubtless the purest race among civilized nations . . ."²⁸¹ After denying the existence of a pure race or a pure nation, Edward Said suggested that all efforts and claims to purify one race "are tantamount to organized discrimination or persecution," and he cited Nazi Germany and South Africa as clear examples.²⁸²

The question of "Jewish Purity" became equivalent to the concept of "Jewish superiority." Arthur Ruppin, an early Zionist theoretician, suggested that "a highly cultivated race deteriorates rapidly when its members mate with a less cultivated race, and the Jew naturally finds his equal and match most easily within the Jewish people."²⁸³ Ruppin opposed intermarriage on the ground that it is "detrimental to the preservation of the high qualities of the races," and that preventing mixed marriage "is necessary . . . to preserve Jewish separation."²⁸⁴ The necessity of preserving "Jewish purity" led the Zionist religious leaders to introduce a new social category, the "mamzerim." The term "mamzerim" referred to a Jewish child of a marriage that was not sanctioned by biblical law as interpreted by orthodox rabbis. Accordingly, thousands of children whose parents re-married after a divorce fell in this category. "The mamzerim and their children--to the tenth generation--are not allowed to marry 'pure' Jews."²⁸⁵ Ruppin believed that although other nations might have some kind of superiority, the Jewish people, with regard to intellectual gifts, "can be scarcely surpassed by any nation."²⁸⁶ Joseph Kohler (another thinker who contributed to the theory of race) described the Jews as "one of the most gifted races mankind has produced."²⁸⁷ The Jewish Press (November 1972) referred to "the fact that three of five American Nobel Prize winners were Jews," asserting "that this percentage was certainly higher than the Jewish share of the U.S. population."²⁸⁸ Max Nordau went on record as saying that the "Jews were more enterprising and

more talented than the average European, not to mention the 'sluggish' Asians and Africans."²⁸⁹ A. Bartal claimed that "the Jewish culture is in actual fact the driving force, the dynamo behind other cultures, and behind European culture in particular."²⁹⁰ Morris R. Cohen suggested that the "Zionists fundamentally accepted the racial ideology" of anti-Semitism, "but drew different conclusions. Instead of the Teuton, it is the Jews that is the pure or superior race."²⁹¹ On this Mick Ashley stated:

It is ironic, to put it mildly, that Israel and the Zionists use the memory of the Jewish victims of the Nazi gas chambers to justify building a society based on the same concept of a racially pure and superior people, minus only the gas chambers, as they deny the Palestinian Arabs the right to return home because it might imperil the "Jewish state."²⁹²

Within Zionist ideology the ideas of Jewish purity and Jewish superiority are linked to several religious themes such as "chosen people" and "promised land."

The Role of Religion

Beside "racial superiority," religious themes have been used to indicate "Jewish superiority." Martin Buber maintained that "the Jews are not like 'all other nations' but a res sui generis, a unique national unity."²⁹³ Such uniqueness derived from the mission of the Jews to introduce "Judaic morality into the international system."²⁹⁴ This view is shared by all Zionist leaders who repeatedly emphasized the role of Israel as the Light unto the Nations. Rabbi Kook insisted that the Jews "are different from all nations, set apart by a historical experience that is unique and unparalleled."²⁹⁵ This uniqueness, Kook claimed, is based on the argument that "the spirit of Israel is so closely linked to the spirit of God."²⁹⁶ Kook's philosophy considered the state of Israel as "the kingdom of heaven on earth," and thus "total holiness embraces every Jewish person, every deed, every phenomenon, including Jewish secularism . . . "²⁹⁷ Rabbi Kahane articulated the thoughts of many:

Israel is indestructible. It is unique, it is holy, it is the Chosen of the Lord, it has a reason for being. Its national uniqueness is built on an idea, on an ideology, that it alone has. That is, indeed, reason to be different. The Jew is selected and obligated to be a religio-nation, commanded to obey the laws and follow the path of the Torah . . . the Jew is commanded to create for himself a holy nation and that can only be done free of others, separate, different, apart. That is why the unique Jewish nation, chosen for holiness and a unique destiny, was given land for itself: so that it might create a unique, holy society that would be a light unto the nations who would see its example and model.²⁹⁸

On this, Goodman Smith commented: "Kahane's idea of Israel's mission to the world . . . , is shared by almost all shades of Zionists, even the most liberal."²⁹⁹ He continued to say: "This is so to speak, the Jewish version of the 'White Man's burden' or the 'mission civilizatrice' of European colonialists."³⁰⁰ M. Begin, former Israeli Prime Minister, stated:

Other nations started out as savages, living in jungles and caves, in fear of thunder and lightning, and in star-worship. Foreign nations came and forced their religion upon them Our nation arose differently. It began with a divine promise And it was by this promise that they returned to Eretz Yisrael [the land of Israel, as geographic Palestine was known in Hebrew].³⁰¹

Ofira Seliktar attributed such outlook of being a "world master race" to the teaching of the Talmud (a compilation of rabbinical commentaries and decisions on the Torah). Seliktar stated: "The Talmudic definition of the Jews as a moral religious community might have actually created a feeling of superiority over the Gentiles, who were perceived as lacking in spiritual, scholarly and intellectual values."³⁰² Similarly, Israel Shahak believed that the Talmud's teaching contributed to an anti-Christianity attitude. He stated:

For example, in addition to a series of scurrilous sexual allegations against Jesus, the Talmud states that his punishment in hell is to be immersed in boiling excrement-- a statement not exactly calculated to endear the Talmud to devout Christians. Or one can quote the precept according to which Jews are instructed to burn, publicly if possible, any

copy of the New Testament that comes into their hands. (This is not only still in force but actually practiced today; thus on 23 March 1980 hundreds of copies of the New Testament were publicly and ceremonially burnt in Jerusalem under the auspices of Yad Le'akhim, a Jewish religious organization subsidized by the Israeli Ministry of Religions.)³⁰³

Henry Cattan attributed "what can be considered racist teaching and discrimination against non-Jews" to the Old Testament. He cited the following examples:

Neither shalt thou make marriages with them; thy daughter thou shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son.

Again, it is stated in the Book of Exodus,

(23:27) I will send my fear before thee, and will destroy all the people to whom thou shalt come, and I will make all thine enemies turn their backs unto thee.

(23:28) And I will send hornets before thee, which shall drive out the Hivite, the Canaanite, and the Hittite, from before thee.

(23:29) I will not drive them out from before thee in one year; lest the land become desolate, and the beast of the field multiply against thee.

(23:30) By little and little I will drive them out from before thee, until thou be increased, and inherit the land.

(23:31) And I will set thy bounds from the Red Sea even unto the sea of the Philistines, and from the desert unto the river: for I will deliver the inhabitants of the land into your hand; and thou shalt drive them out before thee.³⁰⁴

The Talmud, according to Israel Shahak, "commands every Jew, whenever passing near a cemetery, to utter a blessing if the cemetery is Jewish, but to curse the mothers of the dead if it is non-Jewish."³⁰⁵ It was reported that two members of an "Ultra orthodox" urban settlement in Israel:

. . . Removed the body of a Christian-born woman, who had been married to an Israeli (and had accompanied him to a concentration camp during the Nazi period), from a Jewish cemetery in Rishon Lezion and dumped it into a nearby Muslim cemetery.³⁰⁶

According to Israel Shahak, the Jewish orthodox have frequently emphasized the idea:

. . . That the cosmos is divided into five parts: the inanimate; plants and vegetables; animals; human beings and Jews--and the differences between human beings and Jews is as great as between human beings and animals.³⁰⁷

This concept was also emphasized by the Zionist philosopher Ahad Ha'am who put it this way:

Everyone quite naturally takes it for granted that there are different steps in the ladder of creation: The appearance of nonorganic matter, the plants, the animal kingdom, then the beings endowed with speech, and above all the Jews.³⁰⁸

In the same line of thinking, Mordechai Piron, Chief Military Rabbi in Israel, declared:

As a result of the selective process within the human community the people of Israel have alone been endowed with a biological and metaphysical special capacity operating within the cosmos . . . Only within the people of Israel has the miraculous phenomenon of the prophecy appeared which is the peak of the ideal of the identification of man with the Divine Plenitude . . .³⁰⁹

During the invasion of Lebanon (1982), an Israeli soldier made this comment to the British journalist, Robert Fisk: "And for us, I guess, I hope you understand this, the death of one Israeli soldier is more important than the death of even several hundred Palestinians."³¹⁰

Thus religious principles have been used to justify practical acts of abuse. For example, with regard to the murders of Palestinian students carried out by members of the Jewish underground, Rabbi Lichtenstein, head of a Yeshiva in the occupied territories, declared that those Jews must be punished "but should not receive the same punishment as a Jew convicted to murdering a fellow Jew, because the soul of a non-Jew has a different quality from the soul of a Jew."³¹¹ Israel Shahak considered this as "a moderate statement." He stated:

Only last year [1987] the religious parties in the Knesset proposed that amnesty should be given to Jews who had murdered Arabs. All the religious Knesset members voted without

exception for this proposal. Or take the statements of the fanatical chief Rabbi Lior of Kiryat Arab. When asked in 1985 why Israel had to retreat from Lebanon, he said it was obvious that God, by making Israel fail in Lebanon, was punishing it for the crime of returning Sinai to Egypt.³¹²

Rabbi Mordechai issued the following instruction to Israeli soldiers during the invasion of Lebanon:

When our forces encounter civilians in war, in ambush, or in a raid, so long as there is no definite evaluation that those civilians are incapable of damaging our forces, it is permissible and even obligatory by the Halukhic Law to kill them. In every case one should refuse to trust the Arab, even when he gives the impression of being a civilized person.³¹³

Asked if he would "accept the fact that Arab civilians are being killed," Rabbi Kahane replied: "Of course. Sure. In the same way that I wholly approved of the Israelis bombing Lebanon."³¹⁴ It was reported, according to Ofire Seliktor, that rabbinical authorities issued a number of statements which "Justified killing civilians--including women and children--in wartime."³¹⁵ Seliktar further noted that Biblical interpretations of "religious Jewish law" justify such killing "even if they contradict Israeli military policies."³¹⁶ It was documented that the Israeli rabbinate officially selected the following psalm to be read by the Israeli soldiers during the war of Lebanon:

O my God, make them like the whirling dust;
As stubble before the wind.
As the fire that burneth the forest,
And as the flame that setteth the mountains on fire;
Let them be ashamed and dismayed for ever;
Yea, let them be confounded and perish.³¹⁷

In Israel, like in South Africa, religion has been used to serve political purposes. The Zionist colonization of Palestine was justified on the grounds of Biblical promises of four thousand years ago. In his Ph.D. dissertation, Benjamin Joseph observed that the Zionists heavily leaned on the Old Testament to justify political actions. For instance, the project of settlement which "in effect involves the reclamation of an

ancient but eternal title to the land," was based on "a divine promise to a chosen people who established an ancient kingdom, events for which the Old Testament is the primary available record."³¹⁸ Joseph believed that "this is a major reason for the significance attached to the Old Testament in Zionist ideology."³¹⁹ Joseph elaborated further:

The Israeli child in public school begins to study the Old Testament as soon as he can read and write. It remains a mandatory subject through graduation from high school. Biblical verse can be heard at the beginning and end of each day on the state broadcast media. Some of the verse mention the conquest of the Land of Canaan and God's desire that the Canaanites be removed or turned into "hewers of wood and drawers of water", their rightful place (Book of Joshua).³²⁰

The Relationship Between Zionism and Jewish Religion

Although Zionism has some disagreements with Jewish religion (i.e. about the religious definition of the Jews and the use of "historical rights" as a secular substitute for "divine promise"), such disagreements are considered minor ones. "The Zionists do not hesitate to make full use of mystic elements and to take advantage of any religious sanction they can get,"³²¹ Elmessiri wrote. He added: "They form many government coalitions with the 'religious' parties, and make many concessions to some of the formalities of orthodoxy."³²² Similarly, Ehud Ein-Gil stated:

From its very beginning, zionism was marked by an alliance between 'secular' and 'religious' elements. Claiming to be a 'national movement,' zionism always regarded the preservation of Jewish 'national unity' as a supreme value; and it was always the religious members of the movement who drew the 'red line,' beyond which they would prefer to cause a split. Thus the tradition whereby the secular zionists always make concessions to the religious zionists when the latter threaten to cause a split is as old as the movement itself. The religious zionists have always kept the initiative in the movement on matters involving religion.³²³

As an example of religious hegemony is the law of marriage and divorce. Uri Davis considered Israel as a "theocratic" state in which:

Civil marriage is not permitted under Israeli law, and marriage can be legally consecrated only by Rabbinical, Church or Sharia courts. The same applies to divorce. Under Israeli

law (Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts (Marriage and Divorce), 1953), religious courts are state courts and the religious judiciary (Rabbinical, Church and Sharia) are paid by the state.³²⁴

Ein-Gil further elaborated on the connection between Jewish religion and the Zionist movement:

It is a fact that Zionism from its very beginning was not (as some secular Zionists try to argue) a progressive movement of 'rebellion against religion' but, on the contrary, a reaction *against* secular trends towards the integration of Jews in the society in which they were living--individual integration by assimilation, or political integration through participation in democratic or socialist movements. All these facts constantly undermine the repeated attempts of secular Zionists to sever the organic connection of Zionism with religion. For Zionism and the Jewish religion are tied to each other ideologically as well as in practice. If Zionism were to lose its last ideological line of defense, which is provided by religion, then its true nature would be exposed even to its own adherents--its nature as a colonisatory, xenophobic and racist movement.³²⁵

The Zionists have frequently used religious symbols and conceptions to enhance their cause, Alfred Moleah pointed out:

It freely misuses names and symbols sacred to Judaism. A prime example is the name Israel for the Zionist state. The Zionist land acquisition fund's name in Hebrew is *Keren Kayemeth Leisrael*; *Keren Kayemeth* meaning permanent fund or lasting reward, is taken from the Jewish daily morning prayers. Even more cynically, this term traditionally implies the reward for piety, good deeds and charitable work. The state symbol of Israel is the *menorah* (candelabrum). This is extremely cynical. The Israeli army fights under an emblem that means 'not with armed force and not with power, but in My spirit says the Lord of Hosts.' Even the special relation between God and the children of Israel, so predominant in the Old Testament, has been cynically transmuted. The idea of chosen-ness as regards the Jewish people in Judaism is a religious one, signifying a community of true believers who put faith in one true God, and whose membership in that community is conditional on their obeying God's commands. Zionist leaders reject this, except in its totally prostituted form.³²⁶

One of the Biblical concepts which has been used by the Zionists, is the idea of "chosen people"--an idea that gives them the right to populate, civilize, and rule a God-given land. Moleah wrote:

Jewish religious tradition has a rich vocabulary referring to the Jewish people variously as the chosen people, the holy people, the spiritual people--a people set apart from the rest of mankind by having a special relationship with a transcendent God. This derives from the Bible which, as a holy book, is linked in a supernatural way with the people of Israel who produced it, and with the land of Israel which nurtured it.³²⁷

Fayez Sayegh noted that after being:

--secularized, and given a new political temporal meaning that was not implicit in the original Biblical spiritual connotation, the concept of the chosen people [became] at the root of the Zionist belief in the superiority of the Jew to the non-Jew and therefore in the necessity for the Jew to enjoy privileges which he denies to the non-Jew both in theory and in practice.³²⁸

The idea of "chosen people," as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, was used by the white settlers in South Africa to justify their claim to the land and to legitimize their domination over the African natives.

Religious arguments were used to legitimize the establishment of the state of Israel. Rabbi Kahane argued that the basis of Israel's legitimacy is a divine law. For him, "the Jews are a nation only by the will of God."³²⁹ He explained:

The legitimate reason why we have the right to come back here is that we are Jews and because we are Jews we have a 2,000-year bond with this land. We have always prayed three times a day to be able to come back to this land. And we have never given up this hope. It's not the fact that we have come back and that we have created an Israeli state. That's not the reason. The reason is that, first and foremost, we are Jews.³³⁰

The "holy mission" of the Jews was linked to a unique piece of land.

Kahane explained:

A unique people given, uniquely, a *particular* land Unlike all other faiths that are not limited to one special country, the Jew is given a particular land and commanded to live there. And for a reason, as Moses explains: "Behold, I have taught you statutes and judgments, even as the L-rd my G-d, commanded me, *that you shall do so in the Land whither you go to possess it*" (Deuteronomy 4:5) (Kahane's emphasis)³³¹

For Kahane "redemption" of the land is a religious duty of the Jews. He wrote:

The land was given as a reward, as a blessing. But it is more, much more, than that. The people of Israel have more than a *right* to the land; they have an *obligation*. "For you shall pass over the Jordan to go in to possess the Land which the L-rd your G-d gives you, and you shall possess it and dwell therein" (Deuteronomy 11:31)³³²

In the same line of thinking, Hanan Porat, a Knesset member and a leading organizer of the Gush Emunim, believed that the "Land of Israel" is central "in the process of the redemption of Israel," and that "the connection between the people and the land is analogous to the connection between the body and the soul."³³³ A statement appearing in an Israeli religious journal read:

We must stay in the Land even at the price of war. More than that, we have to initiate war in order to conquer and free the Land. Without the Land of Israel we are not the People of Israel.³³⁴

And what is the border of the unique land? Kahane answered by quoting the Torah: "Unto thy seed have I given this land from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates" (Genesis 15:18).³³⁵ Kahane elaborated further:

Let me tell you what the minimal borders are, and which the rabbis agree upon, according to the description given in the Bible. The southern boundary goes up to El Arish, which takes in all of northern Sinai, including Yamit. To the east, the frontier runs along western parts of the East Bank of the Jordan river, hence part of what is now Jordan. Eretz Yisrael also includes part of Lebanon and certain parts of Syria, and part of Iraq, all the way to the Tigris river.³³⁶

The use of religious themes was not confined to a justification of the establishment of the state of Israel, but it was extended to legitimize the annexation of land seized as a result of the six-day's war. For example, the Gush Emunim (literally "bloc of the faithful") believed that settling the occupied territories was a religious imperative that

superseded strategic considerations:

For us there was no question but that the liberation of those ancestral territories of the Jewish people was an act of God, the Finger of the Almighty at work. It would be sinful, not politically mistaken, or a security slip, but positively sinful, for us to have permitted the undoing of such a divine act.³³⁷

The Gush Emunim believed that the holy link of the Jews to the land justified the expropriation of the Palestinian land. The process of settlement in the West Bank was seen "as analogous to the Biblical conquest of the land of Israel from the native Canaanites."³³⁸

What about the non-Jews, especially the Palestinian Arabs who live in the "Land of Israel"? Kahane's answer: "They must go." Asked if he favored forceful eviction of all Arabs from the Land of Israel, Kahane replied:

Yes, obviously, but that won't be necessary for most of them. I'd offer financial compensation for those who want to leave the country voluntarily. I would only use force for those who don't want to leave. I'd go all the way, and they know that.³³⁹

Kahane cited a previous biblical pattern to support his idea of the expulsion of the non-Jewish population:

The L-rd, Creator and Proprietor of the world-all the lands are his. He took that which was His from the Canaanites and gave it to His Chosen People Israel. "And He gave them the lands of the nations and they inherited the lands of the people, so that they would observe His statutes and guard His laws . . ." (Psalm 105:44-45). The right of the Jewish people to the land is not based on human favors or historical residence. It is a title granted by the Builder and Owner. Clearly, it was not taken from one set of nations in order that others share it with the Jews. The land was given to serve the Jewish people so that they have a distinct, separate place in which to fulfill their obligation. There can be no others who freely live there, let alone share sovereignty and ownership. To allow such a thing is to destroy and put an end to that unique Torah society for which the Land of Israel was given to the Jews.³⁴⁰

Again he supported his position with Biblical quotations:

So basic and important is this concept [of not sharing the Holy Land with non-Jews] that as the Jews prepared to cross the Jordan into the land of Israel, as the waters rose to enormous heights and the Children of Israel rapidly crossed to the other side, as they were in the middle of now-dry riverbed, suddenly Joshua paused and spoke to them. What was so vital that could not wait until they had crossed safely to the other side? . . . While still in the Jordan, Joshua said to them: "Know why you are crossing the Jordan! In order that you drive out the inhabitants of the Land from before you as it is written" (Numbers 33:52). "And you shall drive out all the inhabitants of the land from before you." "If you do this--it shall be good. If not--the waters shall come and inundate me and you." (Talmud, Sota 34a).³⁴¹

Kahane argued that it was a religious duty to expel the Arabs from the Land of Israel. He stated:

The Arabs of Israel represent *Hillul Hashem* in its starkest form by their rejection of Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel despite the covenant between the L-rd of Israel and the Jews constitutes a rejection of sovereignty and kingship of the L-rd G-d of Israel. Their transfer from the Land of Israel thus becomes more than a political issue. *It is a religious issue, a religious obligation, a commandment to erase Hillul Hashem.* Far from fearing what the Gentile will do if we do such a thing, let the Jew tremble as he considers the anger of the Almighty *if we do not.*³⁴²

It is further, in Kahane's view, a direct order from God to "clean up" the land from all non-Jews:

And as the Torah clearly commanded: "And you shall drive out all the inhabitants of the land from before you . . . But if you will not drive out the inhabitants of the land from before you, then it shall come to pass that those which you let remain of them, shall be thorns in your eyes and thistles in your sides and shall torment you in the land wherein you dwell. And it shall be that I will do to you as I thought to do to them (Numbers 33:52-56).³⁴³

Kahane further presented Rabbinical commentaries to support his position:

When you shall eliminate the inhabitants of the land, then you shall be privileged to inherit the land and pass it down to your children. But if you do not eliminate them, even though you will conquer the land you will not be privileged to hand it down³⁴⁴ to your children" (Sforno--Rabbi Ovadiah ben Yaakov).

Goodman Smith commented:

It is obvious that Kahane's *final redemption* is linked by necessity to the *final solution* of the "Arab question." The Arabs are the definite obstacle to the final redemption and to the fulfillment of God's plan for the world. On this point, there is a meeting of minds between this brand of Zionism and Fundamentalist Christian Zionism. The two differ on the goal. To the Torah Zionist, it is the establishment of the State of Israel where all the Jews will be ingathered and the State will become a model for the world. To Christian Zionists, this is only a prelude and prerequisite to the Second Coming of the Lord Jesus and the establishment of the millennium. While the difference seems irreconcilable as far as the final goal is concerned, the two groups meet on the near and intermediate course of events, which is the building of the State of Israel and the continuing "ingathering" of the Jews in it. Both parties are totally convinced of the divine nature of this venture.³⁴⁵

Kahane was critical of the policies and measures taken by the Israeli government because they were not as strict or religious as they should be. He explained:

Far better than foolish humans did the Almighty understand the dangers inherent in allowing a people that believed the land belonged to it to be given free and unfettered residence, let alone ownership, proprietorship, citizenship. What more natural thing than to ask to regain what it believed to be rightly its own land? And this over and above the need to create a *unique* and distinctly separate Torah culture that will shape the Jewish people into a holy nation. That "uniqueness" can be guaranteed only by the non-Jew's having no sovereignty, ownership, or citizenship in the state that could allow him to shape its destiny and character.³⁴⁶

Kahane argued that every non-Jew person is a "resident stranger" who must accept inferior status.

The purpose is clear. The non-Jew has no share in the Land of Israel. He has no ownership, citizenship, or destiny in it. The non-Jew who wishes to live in Israel must accept basic human obligations. Then he may live in Israel as a *resident stranger*, but never as one who can hold any public office that will give him dominion over a Jew or a share in the authority of the country. Accepting these conditions, he admits that the land is not his, and therefore he may live in Israel quietly, separately observing his own private life, with all religious, economic, social and cultural rights. Refusing this, he cannot remain.

This is Torah. This is *Jewishness*. Not the dishonest pseudo-"Judaism" chanted by the liberal secularists who pick and choose what "Judaism" finds favor in their eyes and who reject what their own gentilized concepts find unacceptable.³⁴⁷

And what about possible international pressure on Israel because of her policies toward non-Jews? Kahane said that there was no need to fear from foreign powers because God is always on Israel's side. He explained:

And if this is not only the right of Jews but their obligation, what do we fear? Why do the Jews tremble and quake before the threat of the nations? Is there no longer a G-d in Israel? Have we so lost our bearings that we do not understand the ordained historical role of the State of Israel, a role that ensures that it can never be destroyed and that no further exile from it is possible? Why is it that we do not comprehend that *it is precisely our refusal to deal with the Arabs according to halakic obligation that will bring down on our heads terrible sufferings, whereas our courage in removing them will be one of the major factors in the hurrying of the final redemption?* (Kahane's emphasis).³⁴⁸

Kahane, as might be expected, did not forget to present the theme of "anti-Semitism." He said that the "Gentile world's anger and condemnation" was after all a result of "a pathological hate that has its root in the existence of the Jew."³⁴⁹ He added: "Nothing that Israel does or does not do affects this [anti-Semitic] hatred."³⁵⁰ This view was shared by others. Current "Israeli isolation" was interpreted as being "the outcome of an everlasting hatred of Gentiles toward the Chosen People."³⁵¹ Such hatred, according to Rabbi Ephraim Zimmell, "has little to do with ordinary human envy." Instead, "it is an expression of the eternal confrontation between Good and Evil and of Satan's desire to eradicate the Holy Torah."³⁵²

It should be noted, however, that Kahane and his party (Kach) are not the only exponent of extremist policies. They are part of the so-called "radical religious right" which is comprised of different groups: Morasha, the National Religious Party, the Tehiya party, Herut, Gush Emunim, and the settlement organizations. In the view of these organizations, "the modern Zionist movement acts as God's agent in returning his people from exile and establishing 'the third commonwealth.'"³⁵³ In this light, "Israel's wars are seen as miraculous

victories advancing this process."³⁵⁴ Edward Said believed that many of Kahane's ideas "(i.e., forced expulsion of Arabs) have been canonical dogmas of Zionist thought and practice for many decades."³⁵⁵ Similarly, Goodman Smith suggested that Kahane's position represented ". . . the inevitable curse of Zionism in general" as a movement which sought to emphasize "the distinction of the Jewish people and aims at the ingathering of the Jews into a specific land (Palestine), and at keeping Israel as a purely Jewish State."³⁵⁶

Within Israel's political messianism, Uriel Tal identified three approaches concerning the issue of human and civil rights of the non-Jews. They are "the restriction of rights, the denial of rights, and the most extremist level preaching genocide based on the Bible."³⁵⁷ The first approach which was considered moderate, saw the principle of human equality as a foreign notion which "is essentially a European concept that alienates Jews existentially from the Holy Land."³⁵⁸ Therefore, such a democratic principle was not binding in the Jews' relationship with the Arabs and thus "leaves only the status of aliens for them"³⁵⁹ (the resident alien and the convert). The second approach, the denial of rights, was based on the argument that the Jewish "existence in Eretz Israel is made conditional on the emigration of the Arabs from the country."³⁶⁰ Tal cited Rabbi Shelomo Aviner as saying "the command to conquer the Land is above the moral human considerations about the national rights of the Gentiles to our country."³⁶¹ On this Tal commented:

Indeed, Israel has been instructed in the Bible to be holy, but not to be moral, and the general principle of morality, which are customary for all humanity, do not bind the people of Israel because they have been chosen to be above them.
[Emphasis added]³⁶²

The third approach in handling the issue of the Gentile's human rights "is based on the Biblical command to annihilate the memory of Amalek, i.e. real genocide."³⁶³ This resolution found its expression in an article written by Rabbi Israel Hess and titled: "The Command of Genocide in the

Bible" (1980). Hess suggested that "the day will still come when we all shall be called to wage this war for the annihilation of Amalek."³⁶⁴ Similarly, Kahane saw "that all non-Jews in Israel were akin to the famous biblical foe, the Amalekites, and as such should be decimated by God's chosen."³⁶⁵ The method, according to Tal, is specified in I Samuel 15:3: "Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have and spare them not: but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox or sheep, camel and ass."³⁶⁶ Tal noted that "the silence of most sages of Jewish Religious Law" concerning this issue "is of special significance here, because this is a group whose political leadership provides not only guidance but also absolutions."³⁶⁷

Beit-Hallahmi, an Israeli scholar, "argued that religious sentiments were more acceptable to the international community and were therefore used by the Israeli Government to cover up the aggression."³⁶⁸ The Lebanon war (1982), for example, was seen as:

. . . a Holy War, a war which was a good deed. Israel's presence in Lebanon is evidence of the fulfillment of the biblical promise made in Deuteronomy 2:24: "Every place whereon the sole of your foot shall tread shall be yours: from the wilderness and Lebanon, from the river, the river Euphrates, even unto the hinder sea shall be your border."³⁶⁹

It was also reported that:

During the Lebanon fighting, which the rabbinate designated as a 'divinely inspired war' ('milhemet mitzva') a daily reading was recommended of Psalm 83, calling for the destruction by fire and tempest of the enemies of Israel. The military rabbinate also issued a map which laid claim to large areas of southern Lebanon as the inheritance of modern Israel bequeathed by one of the original twelve tribes of Israel, the Tribe of Asher, which once possessed the territory between the Chouf Mountains and Sidon. The Sephardi Chief Rabbi also ruled that wounded Jewish soldiers should not be given non-Jewish blood unless their lives were endangered, and even then it was better not to begin such a practice as 'it takes Jewish blood to cure Jews.'³⁷⁰

Ofira Seliktar held that the Israeli victory in the six-days war (1967) was seen:

. . . as an act of divine intervention, rather than a manifestation of Israel's military prowess. The occupation of the West Bank and Jerusalem came to be interpreted as a most important step in the process of Redemption, because it restored the intrinsic wholeness of Eretz Israel. Moreover, since the God of Israel promised the whole country to the sons of Israel, this divine title deeply pre-empts any other claim to either bank of the Jordan River. Giving up Judea and Samaria [the West Bank and Jerusalem] would constitute a mortal sin³⁷¹ by interfering with the unfolding process of Redemption.

To sum up, in a country founded on religious exclusivity, where the biblical scriptures influence foreign and domestic policies, and where religious parties can determine the government decisions, religion has played an important role in justifying wide ranges of practical political abuses such as annexation of territories seized by wars, expulsion of the Palestinians from their land, and the discrimination against non-Jews in Israel.

Racism: Dehumanization of Arab Image

"Jewish Superiority" (whether based on the notion of 'purest race' or the concept of 'chosen people') has frequently been associated with a Zionist tendency to dehumanize the image of the Orient in general and that of the Arabs in particular. Jabotinsky, the father of Zionist revisionism, had frequently emphasized his pro-Western outlook. He stated:

We Jews have nothing in common with what is denoted "the East,"--and thank God for that. To the extent that our uneducated masses have traditions and spiritual prejudices which are reminiscent of the East, they must be weaned away from them . . . As for the Arabs of Palestine, that is their own affair, but there is one favor we can do them: to help them to free themselves of the East.³⁷²

According to Yosef Gorhy:

Jabotinsky saw the East as representing passivity as against European activism; submission to oppression against love and liberty; and social oppression and discrimination against some as compared to the Western love of equality and justice. His conclusion was the Jews, even though they originated in the

East, belonged, as regarded their spiritual traits, to the West.³⁷³

Jabotinsky held that the Eastern orientation of the Arabs was in conflict with the Jews who were bearers of progressive Western values.³⁷⁴ This position reflected on identical outlook of Zionism's founder, Theodor Herzl, who wrote: "Everybody in the Orient is frightened of everyone else." He added: "The people are like a raging animal, which can be released, but can also be directed and led in any direction."³⁷⁵ Jabotinsky's racism was manifested in his reaction after he, along with Arabs, was released from prison. He sent a telegram to the British High Commissioner in Palestine protesting: "Don't make this mistake! Better leave me here in Acre, but don't put me in the same level with a blackie."³⁷⁶

It is important to note that hostility toward the Orient even extended to the Israeli Jews of non-European origin. In a speech to the Knesset in 1960, Ben-Gurion expressed his belief:

. . . that the Oriental Jews should be made to acquire the superior moral and intellectual characteristics of those who created the State. Similarly, Levi Eshkol found that the trouble with the Oriental Jews is not simply a question of their "not knowing Yiddish but rather it is a question of their not knowing anything."³⁷⁷

Further, according to Ofira Seliktar,

Ben-Gurion often described in contemptuous and derogatory terms the "primitive Arab mentality" of the Oriental Jews, and expressed apprehension that even the children of these immigrants "whose forebears have been uneducated for generations will sink to the level of Arab peasant children." Abba Eban, the then Minister of Education, was equally uneasy that the newcomers would drag Israel into an "unnatural orientalism" and Golda Meir wondered whether they could be brought to a "suitable level of civilization."³⁷⁸

In practice, discriminatory treatment against Oriental people was manifested in the following during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Dr. Chris Giannou from Canada was arrested by the Israeli army with other

doctors from various countries who were working in the International Red Cross institution in Lebanon. He noted that "darker-skinned" doctors (Arabs, Africans, Asians) got more punishment than European white doctors.³⁷⁹

The Zionist identification with western racism can be traced back to nineteenth century Europe where the notion of "European Superiority" was an accepted and powerful concept. George Jabbor suggested that in Palestine "the 'ordinary' European superiority toward the natives is reinforced by the Zionist ideology and the whole religious-historical concept of the Jews being a chosen people."³⁸⁰ Zionism projected itself as a movement with a mission to civilize and modernize backward Palestine. Herzl wrote: "For Europe we shall serve there [in Palestine] as a bastion against Asia, and be the vanguard of civilization against the barbarians."³⁸¹ The same tone was struck by Max Nordau:

We shall in the Middle East, endeavour to do what the British did in India, namely undertake cultural activities and not foster domination. We are going to Palestine as an expedition on behalf of civilization. Ours is the mission of spreading Europe's ethical code out to the Euphrates.³⁸²

Edward Said pointed to the common origins of imperialism and Zionism and drew the following analogy between them:

Thus the concept of a land without people is exactly analogous with Westlake's theory of unpopulated territory. The concept of Jewish Labor (*Avodah Ivrit*) and an unassimilated or separate European enclave in Asia is exactly analogous with Leopold de Saussure's theses on the necessity of maintaining separate European and native structures in newly acquired territory. The concept of an unlimited Law of Return for Jews and none for non-Jews is based on the same thing to be found in every white colony in Asia, Africa, and America. Most important of all, the militant concept of a Jewish "race" derived itself not simply from the age-old persecution of Jews in Christian Europe, but from the racial typologies of Gobineau, Stewart Chamberlain, and Renan.

In theory and in practice then Zionism is a degraded repetition of European imperialism. As Marx said of Napoleon III, that he was a parody of his uncle Napoleon I, so too Zionism is a parody of European imperialism, as a nephew is to a greater uncle. Like imperialism, Zionism is a system of thought that governs--and infects--everything in the state whose ideology it is, from state institutions to who may or

may not be a part of the Israeli basketball league, who may or may not be a Jew, who may or may not travel from point A to point B, who may or may not own land. Thus when we talk about Zionism and imperialism we are talking about a *family of ideas* belonging to the same dynasty, springing out of the same seeds.³⁸³

Jewish superiority was frequently presented in conjunction with Arab inferiority:

In Meinertzhagen's own words "intelligence was a Jewish virtue and intrigue was an Arab vice." He described the Jews as "virile, brave, determined and intelligent" and the Arabs as "decadent, stupid, dishonest and producing little beyond eccentricities influenced by the romance and silence of the desert."³⁸⁴

Ian Smith believed that the Jewish people "has had a mission, a civilizing mission, in the world, second, perhaps, to none."³⁸⁵ He stated:

The Jewish people were above all the fountain-head of Western civilization to whom the West owed its very existence. And now they were to awaken the Middle East which "had been sleeping for centuries" and lead it "along the path of progress."³⁸⁶

On the same subject Reinhold Neibuhr (jointly with six other American notables), after the Second World War declared:

American interests 'dictate speedy modernization of the Middle East,' that the Muslims present a 'hopeless' picture of backwardness and despotism, and that 'there is only one vanguard of progress and modernization in the Middle East, and that is Jewish Palestine.'³⁸⁷

This western outlook was extended to color the current Arab-Israeli conflict. Edward Said wrote:

. . . Israel was [presented as] a democracy whose "right" to existence was religious, was morally correct (since no one had suffered more than the Jews), was historically inevitable (since the whole world had promised empty Palestine to these enlightened Jewish liberals from Europe), was, above all, politically attractive since it seemed to embody every conceivable cliché about pioneers, ingenious scientists, intrepid humanitarians, and noble fighters; Israel was the target of terrorist attacks . . . , and Israel has stood for progress and peace whereas its Arab enemies are medieval Muslim fanatics, irrational murderers, contemptible

hypocrites.³⁸⁸

Ahad Ha'am observed: "We think that the Arabs are all savages who live like animals and do not understand what is happening around them."³⁸⁹ In the eyes of an early Zionist leader, Sh'muel Dayan (one-time Knesset member and father of Moshe Dayan who once became Israeli Defense Minister):

. . . the Arabs were just another part of the wild locality, like the mosquitoes, insects and wild animals. For this reason they were merely temporary. Just as the wild grass and the prickly bush were liable to be burned and the marsh to be dried out, so the diseased and starving Bedouin tribes were destined to disappear.³⁹⁰

And most currently, Prime Minister Begin, while in office, described the Palestinian guerrillas as "two-legged animals." Army Chief of Staff Raphael Eitan referred to the Palestinian civilians in the West Bank as being "drugged cockroaches in a bottle." General Avigdor Ben Gal, former Commander of the Northern Front, described the Arabs inside Israel as "a cancer in the Israeli body politic."³⁹¹ One basic belief in Zionist ideology is that the Arabs can only be dealt with by force. An Israeli writer observed that:

A dominant theme in this context is the frequently expressed belief that the Arabs respect and submit only to power. "I know the Arabs well, they are all cowards and treacherous. A kick in the teeth is the only language they understand."³⁹²

Again religious themes have been used in current Zionist literature to dehumanize the image of the Arabs. "Throughout history the sons of Ismael have been renowned for their thievery," one Zionist writer stated in 1982. He added: "The Bible itself proclaims them to be lawless men who do not hesitate to take possession of that which does not belong to them."³⁹³ Such a Zionist outlook has been taught to the Jewish children in Israel.

Racism: The Role of Education

The educational system in Israel has contributed to such racist

perceptions of Arabs. Zionist political socialization ensured that the Israeli children, from their first days in school, were taught to see themselves as one of the select race. A religious textbook in secondary schools explained why non-Jews ought to be slaves of Jews. The reason, the book stated, is that:

Jews are the elite of the human race and were specially created to pay homage to the Creator. Because of this they deserve to have slaves, and these must be non-Jews, because a Jewish slave would not devote himself entirely to God. Non-Jews can serve Jews after they have been rid of their idolatry.³⁹⁴

This passage was read at the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly in July 1971. The following quotation (taken from a book that was approved by the Israeli Ministry of Education and Culture to be a textbook for secondary school), which fell within the general conception of "Jewish superiority," seemed to be representative.

The Israeli people is select among others for its race and upbringing and for the climate of the country in which it develops.

The Israeli people comes from the best race since it has evolved through the selection of all that was best from every generation.

Hebrew is the best language since, we see, the prophets have used it to express their profound sentiments and ideas. Since they chose it as an instrument, it is the most perfect instrument.

Israel to other nations is like the heart to other organs of the human body. Thus, the Israelites have the rarest opportunity of attaining the highest power and recognition that mankind can attain.³⁹⁵

The Zionist writers tend frequently to distort the image of the Arabs. Based on a recent survey of Israeli children's literature, an Israeli writer observed that one popular theme advanced in adventure books for Israeli children was: "The Arabs slaughter Jews for pleasure and the pure Jewish child defeats the cowardly pigs."³⁹⁶ Yokheved Saks is a popular Israeli writer of children's books. By 1984 her production comprised 69 books, 138 plays, and 400 songs. In most of her works the Arabs were portrayed as having "heavy hairy arms, a twisted mouth, black

eyes shining with anger, they stink, they listen to noisy music."³⁹⁷ In addition, the Arabs "have low morals, they maltreat children, they swear, they are cowards, and worst of all--they steal from Jews."³⁹⁸ The following interview with Yokheved Saks (which appeared in the Friday Jerusalem paper, Kol Ha'ir, December 30, 1983) reflected a deep-seated attitude of distaste toward the Arabs.

- Q Are you not deliberately creating a negative stereotyped attitude to the Arabs in your books?
- A I believe the attitude I create in my books is the truth, and therefore it is right . . . Everyone knows that they are thieves. If our laundry falls, who steals it? The Arabs. Everyone knows this, even if I don't write about it in my books . . . I have never met a gentle Arab.
- Q Have you known any other Arabs?
- A Sure I do! We bump into them every day. I can even remember from my childhood, when we had an Arab woman to do our laundry. And the man who cleans the steps here, isn't he an Arab? Sure he is! And we also buy our fruit from them.
- Q The descriptions of Arabs in your books fit all the Arabs you have seen?
- A Sure.
- Q Do you believe that there is any reason to try and live with them somehow?
- A I think we should treat them with "respect and suspicion." . . . I, for example, make sure to pay on time the Arab who cleans my stairs. In any case, he is quite an honest Arab . . . But to say that therefore he is gentle? I never spoke to him, but I am convinced that he could never speak delicately.
- Q Do you watch television? Have you heard about the confrontation between Jews and Arabs in Upper Nazareth?
- A . . . I personally would never harm an Arab who did not harm me. But I would not agree to have him living next to me . . . Can you be sure that the Arabs from Tarshileha did not take part in murdering the children? I would never take the risk. Especially with Arab mentality being what it is, that they can be so very nice to you, and you never know what is hiding behind their smile. One must know that this is their mentality. You really can never know what will happen once you turn your back on them.
- Q Do you believe that this attitude of suspicion should be developed in such young children?
- A It is not a matter of suspicion, it's a matter of recognizing reality. If you want to teach a child to confront danger in life, you must rob him of his childhood innocence . . . ³⁹⁹

In his study on the stereotypical depiction of the Arab, specifically the Palestinian Arab, in Hebrew children's literature, Fouzi El-Asmar, a Palestinian writer, observed that Zionist ideology has served as a guide to Israeli children's writers.⁴⁰⁰ He noted that the Israeli

authors of the children's story books "constantly present the Arabs in the most negative light" in order to justify "the dispossession of the Arabs and the occupation of additional territory."⁴⁰¹ The following passage, taken from a book written for elementary government religious schools by the Department of the Israeli Ministry of Education, provides another example of how Zionist education influences the mind of Jewish children. It stated:

Jew and Arab sitting under one tree as a symbol of peace between them is a utopia of Zionism's creation. The Arabs have no roots in the Land of Israel. They did not plant any trees here, and therefore they will not "eat of the fruit of those trees." If they are sitting under trees, these trees do not belong to them. The connection of Arabs to the land is a material one, while the relation of the Jew to the land is historical and religious.⁴⁰²

Al-Asmar further pointed out:

It is also clear that the image of the Arab is presented in such a way as to undermine any positive relationship between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. The young reader is educated through this literature to avoid the Arabs. He or she is warned not to approach the Arabs because they are physically filthy and diseased, because they steal, because they cannot be trusted, because they swear constantly, and because they are corrupt.⁴⁰³

Sammy Smoocha, an Israeli scholar (Chairman of the University of Haifa's Department of Sociology and Anthropology) touched upon this point:

If racism is defined to be the perception of one ethnic or national group as inferior, and subsequently having lesser rights than others, there are unquestionably disturbing manifestations of Jewish racism against Arabs in Israel today. Blatantly racist, Kahanism is but the extreme form of the predominant Israeli attitude towards Arabs. The unfavorable images of Arabs found in the Hebrew literature and the mass media are deeply rooted and widespread throughout the Israeli-Jewish community.⁴⁰⁴

Zionist political socialization has constantly tended to denationalize Israeli non-Jews, such as the Palestinian and the Druze, by exposing them to a great deal of Zionist history and literature. Adel Mana'a, an Israeli Arab who lectured at the Hebrew University at

Jerusalem, related: "It was my fate to grow up in a village in Galilee, and to be taught in its school to love Zionism, which was said to have 'redeemed our empty country.'"⁴⁰⁵ Sabri Jiryis, an Israeli Arab scholar, noted that 384 hours were devoted to Jewish history during the whole of the four years of Arab secondary schools in Israel, while only 32 hours were devoted to Arab history during the same period.⁴⁰⁶ Rafik Halabi, an Israeli Druze writer who described himself as "an Israeli patriot, " related:

And I must admit that whatever else I may have lacked as a child, the state of Israel saw to it that I got good Jewish education. Of the history of the Druze and their heroes I was never taught a thing in school though we did manage to pick up something about Islam and Christianity, but I can clearly remember drilling for difficult exams on the history of the Maccabean revolt. I did not know the names of any Druze writers nor did I ever read any of their works, but I spent many hours studying the Zionist's philosophy of Ahad Ha'am, learned to love modern Hebrew poetry, and dabbled in Abraham Mapu's stories of longing for Zion.⁴⁰⁷

A Palestinian education officer who taught in Israel, summarized the Zionist educational policies toward the Palestinian Arab inside Israel:

In short, Israeli education and cultural policies for Arabs aimed at nothing less than the de-Palestinization and denationalization of those Arabs under its control since 1948 . . . Education of Arabs in Israel has been perceived and used as an instrument of ideology through which the Zionist entity can, so it had hoped, achieve the goal of annihilation of Palestinian cultural and national identity . . . The modern history of Palestine is distorted and reduced to the "history of the lands of fathers," of the desert which was transformed into paradise by Zionist settlers and "newcomers."⁴⁰⁸

Such anti-Arab teaching has shaped Jews' attitude toward the Palestinians. According to Ian Lustick, an opinion poll conducted in 1968 revealed:

. . . that 91 percent of all Israeli Jews believed that "it would be better if there were fewer Arabs." Eighty percent believed that "every Arab hates Jews." Seventy-six percent maintained that Arabs would "not reach the level of progress of Jews." Eight-six percent said they would refuse to rent a room to an Arab, and 67 percent indicated that they would not agree "to have an Arab as a neighbor." According to a

similar survey in 1976, "71 percent of the respondents [Jews] declared that Arabs will not reach the level of progress of Jews, 97 percent thought that it would be better if there were fewer Arabs in Israel, 83 percent believed that it is impossible to trust Arabs, 87 percent agreed that surveillance of Arabs should be expanded, and 76 percent rejected the possibility of having an Arab superior at work." Ordinary language in Israel includes the use of "Arab" as an adjective to denote faulty work, undependable performance, etc. Epithets such as "Araboosh" and "dirty Arab" are widely used. It is also common to hear Arabs referred to as "dogs," especially among working-class Jews.⁴⁰⁹

According to a survey conducted in the middle of the 1960's, it was found that 80 percent of the Jews believed that "Arabs will not reach the level of progress of the Jews," and 90 percent preferred to see fewer Arabs remain in Israel.⁴¹⁰ Another poll carried out in the early 1970's showed that 84 percent of the Jews sampled would be bothered if a friend or relative married an Arab; 74 percent if their children make friendships with the Arabs, and 49 percent if Arabs moved next door.⁴¹¹ It was also reported that two-thirds of the Israeli Jews thought Arab Israelis "to be lazier, crueller, crookeder than themselves."⁴¹² According to Benjamin Joseph, "polls consistently find widespread prejudice" in "Israeli Jewish attitude towards Arabs."⁴¹³ He added:

The findings of one poll, conducted by the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem were reported on the front page of Meariv: 36% of Israeli Jews regarded Arabs as "dirty", 42% as "primitive", 33% as "not valuing human life" and 41% as "violent". 36% of the respondents opposed equal rights for Arabs and Jews, two in every three opposed the sale of lands to Arabs in the central region of the country and one in three believed that a way should be actively sought to induce Arabs to emigrate. The pollster, Dr. Mina Zemach, described the sample as scientific and representative of Israeli Jews.⁴¹⁴

Another poll conducted in 1984 by Dr. Mina Zemach revealed that 15 percent of the Israeli public favored deportation of Palestinians in the occupied territories. About as many felt it was O.K. to grant them full civil rights in Israel. 43.5 Percent of the Israeli public would allow these Palestinians to live in Israel but with no civil or electoral rights.⁴¹⁵ In the words of the Israeli newspaper which published the finding,

"deportation or apartheid" were the two choices of the majority of the Israeli public.⁴¹⁶ Shlomo Ariel, an Israeli educator, explained the level to which anti-Arab feeling reached among Israeli youths. He stated:

As part of my job, I organized some seminars about current issues for youngsters about to be conscripted. I met with ten such groups of 50 boys each, who can be described as a representative random sample of Israel's Jewish population. The boys came from all sections of society and from all groups of ethnic origin existing within that age group . . . In every discussion group there were several boys who argued that the Arabs of Israel should be physically eliminated including the old, women and children. When I drew comparisons between Sabra and Chatila and the Nazi extermination campaign, they voiced their approval and declared in all honesty that they were willing to do the exterminating with their own hands, without guilt feelings or hang-ups. Not a single boy voiced his horror or even reservations about these remarks, but some did say that there was no need for physical extermination. It was enough to expel the Arabs across the border.

Many argued for South Africa style apartheid. The idea that the Arabs of Israel regarded this country as their homeland was received with amazement and contempt. Any moral arguments presented were rejected with sneers. In any one group there were never more than two or three boys with humanitarian and anti-racist opinions, and I felt that they feared to express these publicly. Those few who dared to present unpopular views were indeed immediately silenced by a chorus of shouts.⁴¹⁷

A clear representative of modern Zionist racism is Rabbi Kahane. As a member of the Knesset, he presented the following draft law:

A citizen can only be who belongs to the Jewish people . . . a non-Jew who wants to live in Israel must observe the seven commandments of the Jewish religious law . . . a foreign resident must accept the burden of taxes and slavery . . . if he does not accept slavery, he shall be deported . . . a foreigner shall not reside in the area of Jerusalem . . . shall not vote to the Knesset.⁴¹⁸

Another draft law by the same author called for an establishment of separate beaches for Jews and non-Jews, and prohibiting mixed marriage or sexual contact between Jews and non-Jews.⁴¹⁹ Henry Cattan noted that "such laws are not dissimilar to Nazi legislation against the Jews and South African apartheid regulations against blacks."⁴²⁰ It was reported, according to The Jewish Press (October 16, 1981), that the walls of the Hebrew University were plastered by Kahane's Party (Kach) with posters

that called the attention of Jewish women to "beware of Arabs who seek only to shame you and take advantage of you." They also read in part: "You are a daughter of a great nation. Chosen and Holy, the Jewish nation. Do not defile yourself."⁴²¹ The popularity of Meir Kahane, who called for the expulsion of the 700,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel as well as the 1.5 million who lived in the occupied territories, has been rife in Israeli society. "Just under 30 percent of the [Israeli] public accept some or all of" Kahane's ideas regarding the treatment of the Palestinians.⁴²² However, racism can be seen as a "natural" outcome to the Zionist philosophy of exclusiveness and separation.

Zionist Exclusiveness

The background of the Zionist discrimination against non-Jews can be traced back to the basic principles of Zionist ideology which called for exclusive employment of Jewish labor in the process of building a Jewish state in Palestine. "The Zionist movement aspired to create an autarkic society, set apart from the non-Jewish society around it."⁴²³ The land, it was held, must be physically worked only by Jews. Separation, Jabotinsky argued, was important to national creativity. In 1905 he considered "national spiritual creativity" as "the end purpose of the existence of any nation." Thus, ". . . the creative nation requires separation and seclusion just like the creative individual personality."⁴²⁴ A.D. Gordon, an early Zionist thinker, called for "every single tree or plant in the Jewish Fatherland . . . [to] be planted only by [Jewish] pioneers."⁴²⁵ In a similar line of thinking, Dr. Ruppin, at the Eleventh Zionist Congress (1913), expressed his desire to establish "a closed Jewish economy" where "producers, consumers, and even middlemen shall be Jewish."⁴²⁶

Thus, the Zionist settlers sought to create in Palestine a Jewish entity which would be nationally and culturally separated from its surroundings. Hence the Zionist slogans: "Jewish work," "Jewish

production," and "Jewish defence." Igor Yaroslavtsev explained the implication of such "racist slogans":

The slogan "Jewish land" for example, meant buying land through the Jewish National Fund, which had been specially set up for the purpose, and encouraging Zionist colonizers to settle there. The slogan "Jewish work" concealed the racist objective of having only Jews entitled to work on "Jewish land." "Jewish products" implied an organized boycott of Arab goods to improve the sales of Jewish commodities. Practical attention was given to the slogan "Jewish defence" which ultimately came to mean Zionist terrorism.⁴²⁷

The Histadrut (Israel's general federation of labor) representative on the Zionist Executive Council in 1935 pressed for a motion (which was unanimously adopted) making it a duty for Zionists "to employ only Jewish labor." Violation "of this resolution would entail expulsion from the Zionist Organization."⁴²⁸ The Jewish National Fund (established in 1901) made it a rule "that all land which it acquired was to remain inalienable Jewish property that could not be sold or leased to others."⁴²⁹ In 1908 a forest was founded in the memory of Herzl. When it was learned that the saplings were planted by Arabs, the purists came and replanted them.⁴³⁰ Separation was also justified on religious grounds. Rabbi Kahane said:

God wants us to live in a country of our own, isolated, so that we live separately and have the least possible contact with what is foreign, and so that we create as far as possible a pure Jewish culture based on the Torah. This is why I am a nationalist, why I want a state: this is what God wants. And not so as to have a flag like the one you see outside.⁴³¹

He further emphasized:

The biggest racist is the Jew who doesn't see that to be a Jew is something special. When I say that I am a Jew, it means that I accept that there is a wall separating Jews and non-Jews. It's a terrible thing to create a wall between people-between Jews and non-Jews in this case. But this is conceivable when there are reasons to be Jewish and to want to live one's Jewishness.⁴³²

Lenni Brenner pointed out:

If one believes in the validity of racial exclusiveness, it

is difficult to object to anyone else's racism. If one believes further that it is impossible for any people to be healthy except in their own homeland, then one cannot object to anyone else excluding 'aliens' from their territory.⁴³³

Besides ideological considerations, separation was sought for its practical economic benefits to the settlers. The Israeli writer Ben-Porath explained:

Zionism's social objectives were concerned with Jewish society. Given the great gap in living standards and levels of education and health, it was in the Jewish interest to separate the provision of public services and diminish the spillover of resources, through taxation, from the Jewish sector into the Arab sector.⁴³⁴

Jabotinsky demanded total separation between Jews and Arabs on the ground that "rapprochement could help the Arabs gain strength in the economic, technological, and social spheres."⁴³⁵ Ben-Porath held that the creation of separate Jewish institutions (such as the Jewish Agency, the Haganah, the Histadrut, the Jewish National Fund):

. . . were vital to the development of the Jewish economy and society. It often actively sought to prevent or impede the process of market integration, which feeds on economic realities. Many elements in the organized Jewish sector helped create barriers to labor integration: the separate organization of Jewish labor in the Histadrut; cooperative and collective organizations (particularly in agriculture); and national ownership of much of the Jewish-owned land (where the employment of Arabs was prohibited).⁴³⁶

In practical terms, the Zionist policy of exclusion meant that the native Arabs, both Christian and Muslim, were to be excluded from participating in the socio-political life of the Jewish settlement. Michael Adams suggested that Zionist exclusion "established a form of apartheid."⁴³⁷ He further stated:

The policies adopted by the Israelis toward the Palestinian Arabs after the establishment of the Jewish state followed logically--and indeed, inevitably--from the attitudes of the Zionist "Pioneers" in the pre-state period. Zionism as it developed in the 1930's and 40's was an essentially undemocratic movement, because it favored one section of the community in Palestine at the expense of another.⁴³⁸

The legacy of Zionist exclusion has influenced Zionist policies after the establishment of the state of Israel. The state apparatus became a tool to implement Zionist philosophy. Ben-Porath wrote:

In the early years, the state maintained market segregation between the sectors. For some time there was segregation of the trade in agricultural produce, but the longer and more serious struggle evolved over the free movement of labor. The Arab sector was governed (until 1966) by military administration, which meant restrictions on the Arabs' freedom of movement. These restrictions were enforced throughout the 1950's to regulate the entry of Arab labor and to protect the employment opportunities of Jewish immigrants. These restrictions were liberalized in 1959, but institutional separation remained in place. Throughout the 1950's, the labor exchanges in the Jewish sector were run by the Histadrut, which actively tried to protect the interests of Jewish labor. The military government was instrumental in continuing this institutional separation. State organs did not include the Arab population under their normal jurisdiction. The power of the state was also used for the acquisition of land through confiscation. (This was largely the Arab refugees' land, but in many cases the owners or their families were living in Israel.)⁴³⁹

However two developments took place: First, the Histadrut (founded in 1920) began in 1960 to admit Arab workers to its membership. Secondly, in 1966 the military government, over the Arab sector, was abolished. Elmessiri held that such "moderation" could be seen as a natural outcome since "the full rigor in the implementation of repressive acts is necessary only in the first stage of settler colonialism."⁴⁴⁰ He further pointed out: "Once the settler-colonialist power structure has fulfilled its objectives, such as a demographic majority and expropriation of the land, it can somewhat relax the stringent regulations."⁴⁴¹ Jabotinsky was of the opinion that full and equal rights to the Arabs could be granted only after achieving a Jewish majority.⁴⁴² In this connection Elmessiri argued that a moderation tendency after consolidating the power structure was a common phenomenon among settler colonial regimes. He explained the move of the Prime Minister Voster (when he declared in 1977 his intention to eliminate discrimination in South Africa), within this context.⁴⁴³ The

same analysis can be applied to the so-called South African "reforms" and to the question of Israel's "democracy."

Israel's "Democracy"

In comparison with South Africa, the Zionists have frequently referred to the fact that the natives who remained in Israel can and do vote. However, one should realize that the natives in Israel are a minority (17 percent of the population); and thus participating in the political process would not pose a real threat to the structure of Zionist domination, while the ruling whites in South Africa (who comprise only 16 percent of the population) were in a totally different situation that necessitated a more concrete and open stand against the African native.

Israel has been very sensitive about its democratic image. "Israeli officials have been more reluctant than South African authorities to ban outright Arab organizations that engage in political activities."⁴⁴⁴ However, through the devices of security regulations, the Israelis "have succeeded in stifling and crushing attempts by Palestinians to establish political organizations that challenge the Zionist nature of the state."⁴⁴⁵ Auishai Ehrlich suggested that "Israel must maintain the formal facade of a democracy" for two reasons: First, since its deep economic dependence on the U.S., an Israeli democratic system would ensure the flow of American aids. Secondly, Israel has to maintain a good relationship with world Jewry. "Under conditions of open dictatorship, immigration could well come to a halt and most Jewish support could cease."⁴⁴⁶ A third reason could be added which is concerned with the special background of the Israeli state. Israel was the only state that was created by the United Nations (through the 1947 General Assembly Resolution recommending the partition of Palestine). Because of this fact, Uri Davis argued, it would be:

. . . Politically impossible for the newly established state of Israel immediately to contravene the terms of the UN Charter by passing open and explicit apartheid legislation.

For the newly established government of Israel it was both morally and materially imperative to present Israel to the West as an advanced form of democracy and social progress.⁴⁴⁷

Israel's democracy, in the words of Israel Shahak, "is strictly for Jews only."⁴⁴⁸ On July 31, 1985, an amendment to the election law was passed, "prohibiting in Knesset elections of any list `rejecting the existence of the state of Israel as a state of the Jewish people.'"⁴⁴⁹ Sammy Smoocha, an Israeli professor, maintained that with such amendment, "the Knesset ruled that Israel is not only a Jewish but also a Zionist state: the state for the Jewish people, the majority of whom are living outside Israel."⁴⁵⁰ Thus, he concluded: "Full participation by Israeli Arabs in the Israeli democracy is, therefore, conditional upon their acceptance of the Jewish-Zionist character of the state."⁴⁵¹ Further, the Supreme Court of Israel decided that "there is no Israeli nation apart from the Jewish people and the Jewish people consists not only of the people residing in Israel but also of the Jews in the Diaspora."⁴⁵² On this Noam Chomsky commented:

[Israel] is a Jewish State governing a society that is in part non-Jewish. This fact . . . has always been the Achilles heel of Political Zionism. If a state is a Jewish state in certain respects, then in these respects it is not democratic . . . and a non-Jewish citizen suffers various forms of discrimination. He is not permitted to lease or work on state lands. He is not able to reside in all Jewish cities, such as Karmil, built on land confiscated from Israeli Arabs.⁴⁵³

Being a democratic and a Jewish state is a conflicting matter. Rabbi Kahane was more honest on this point than other Zionist leaders. He explained his argument in the New York Times (July 18, 1983):

Israel's Declaration of Independence is a schizophrenic document, for it speaks of the establishment of `a Jewish state in the Land of Israel' while, in the same breath offering `equal social and political rights to all citizens, regardless of religion.' That is clearly an absurdity--a contradiction in terms. A Jewish state, by definition, is one with a majority of Jews who can, thus, establish their own sovereignty and become captains of their own fate. A democracy, on the other hand, allows non-Jews to become a majority and, thus, to turn Israel into a non-Jewish state.

The very idea of a 'democratic Jewish State' is nonsense. A state can be permanently defined as Jewish or as democratic, but never both.⁴⁵⁴

Instead of being a democratic state, Kahan held, Israel has to be an all-Jewish theocracy which is ruled by the law of the Torah. He explained:

I'm taking on people steeped in Western concepts who tell themselves that Judaism is really Thomas Jefferson or Burke or Rousseau when it's really nothing of the sort . . . Judaism was always an exclusive group and it doesn't integrate with other people. I'm a Jew, not a democratic.⁴⁵⁵

On another occasion, Kahane emphasized that "Judaism does not accept democracy unless it is within a structure that adheres to the law of the Torah. I challenge any rabbi to contradict me on this."⁴⁵⁶ Kahane made many in Israel extremely uncomfortable when he raised simple but vital questions: If the Arab citizens of Israel became a majority, will Israel remain a Jewish state? Is Israel ready to abandon its Jewish character? "Obviously, nobody in Israel can accept this because to accept this would amount to being anti-Zionist!,"⁴⁵⁷ Kahane said. He insisted: "You can't have Zionism and democracy at the same time" because they "cannot go together."⁴⁵⁸ In an exchange with critics, Kahane clarified his position:

You claim to be democratic and secular, but one of the laws which you accept is neither democratic nor secular. It is, furthermore, the law on which your state is built: the Law of Return, which applies solely to Jews. You are blind to the future; when changing population patterns mean that Arabs become a majority in this country, and they abolish the Law of Return, will you still be so democratic and secular? And when this state has an Arab majority, the Arab laws--because the Arabs won't have your complexes--will you still be so democratic and secular? And when that Arab majority decides to throw out the Jews, will you still be so democratic and secular? You are also blind when you tolerate mixed marriages. For centuries, the Torah has barred Jews from marrying non-Jews.⁴⁵⁹

To conclude our discussion about Zionist exclusivism and Israel's "democracy," let us quote from Benjamin Joseph, who argued that:

. . . In a land populated with growing numbers of non-Jews, policies of "separate development" in some form or another are

inevitable if Zionist ideology is to be implemented Israel's commitment to Zionist principles and the operating procedures of its major institutions assure that the country does not belong to all its citizens. National goals such as "ingathering of exiles", being "the sovereign state of all Jewish people" and maintaining a Jewish majority cannot easily be reconciled with secular citizenship rights and political pluralism. Hence it is misleading to describe Israel as "Jewish" in the same sense that France is French. The latter does not officially strive to be the country of one ethnic group or race. Arabs living in the French state are French, but Arabs living in the Jewish state are not Jewish.⁴⁶⁰

Similarly, Uri Davis concluded that "the state of Israel is not a legally independent state with a "democratic constitution," rather it "is a legally Jewish state, and it has no constitution."⁴⁶¹

The Jewish State

Israel is a Jewish state. As Ben-Gurion plainly put it: "Israel is the country of the Jews and only the Jews."⁴⁶² Racism seemed to be a natural outcome in a state established exclusively for the members of one religious group. The basic argument here is very simple: Israel is not merely another independent state, or a state of its citizens, but it is a "Jewish State." Zionism defined Israel to be "a state that embodies Jewish nationalism and serves the national interest of the Jewish people."⁴⁶³ The Declaration of Independence stated:

ACCORDINGLY WE, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF ERETZ-ISRAEL AND OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, ARE HERE ASSEMBLED ON THE DAY OF THE TERMINATION OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OVER ERETZ-ISRAEL, AND, BY VIRTUE OF OUR NATURAL AND HISTORIC RIGHT AND ON THE STRENGTH OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HEREBY DECLARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN ERETZ-ISRAEL, TO BE KNOWN AS THE STATE OF ISRAEL.⁴⁶⁴

The Declaration also stated that the Jewish State "will be open to Jewish immigration and the Ingathering of Exiles."⁴⁶⁵ As one can realize, the Declaration did not mention Israel as an independent or sovereign state, rather, it declared Israel as a Jewish state. Uri Davis said that "what may seem to an uninformed outside observer a minor technical quibble was" actually a subject "of explicit discussion and controversy" among the

Zionist leaders at the time.⁴⁶⁶ Akiva Orr, a Jewish-Israeli writer, argued that the difference between "independent state" and "Jewish state" was not insignificant. He explained:

[The Declaration] does express the spirit of political Zionism (and of its creation--the state of Israel), the raison d'etre of all its institutions as well as its self-image. A "Jewish state" expresses a concept of identity different from that of an "independent state." It is a state whose main quality is its Jewishness rather than its independence.⁴⁶⁷

Ian Lustick maintained that "the Jewish character of Israel has been manifested in all the trappings of its official existence, from its national anthem to its seals, emblems, calendar, and postage stamps."⁴⁶⁸ In his testimony before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine in 1947, Ben-Gurion said: "When we say 'Jewish independence' or a 'Jewish State' we mean Jewish country, Jewish soil, we mean Jewish labor, we mean Jewish economy, Jewish agriculture . . ."⁴⁶⁹ Similarly, Golda Meir, the Israeli Prime Minister, said: "I want a Jewish state with a decisive Jewish majority which cannot change overnight . . . I always believe this was plain Zionism."⁴⁷⁰ In a straightforward statement, Moshe Dayan expressed the wish of the Zionist leaders to see the Arabs out of Israel. He said:

There are about one million Arabs whom we don't want as citizens in Israel . . . It is not in accord with our aims for the future; it would turn Israel into either a bi-national or an Arab state instead of a Jewish state, and we want a Jewish state.⁴⁷¹

The Declaration also stated that Israel "will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race, or sex."⁴⁷² Orr pointed to the "significant omission" of "ethnic or national origin," arguing that this omission was done deliberately on the grounds that the founders of the state of Israel did not really intend to grant "full political equality for all citizens, including the indigenous Palestinian Arabs."⁴⁷³ He

continued to say:

It was, after all, a Jewish state, not just another independent state, and in that state Jews, and Jews only, were entitled to special political privileges, hence the careful omission of any reference to ethnic and national origin. Full social and political equality for the Arab citizen of Israel is something to which most Israelis, and Jews everywhere, would object even today . . . ⁴⁷⁴

Orr further pointed out:

Yet it would be wrong to conclude that the founders of the Jewish state intended to discriminate against non-Jews. They intended to discriminate, and did discriminate, in favor of Jews, but most of them refused to accept that discrimination in favor of Jews implies--by default--discrimination against non-Jews . . . "Full political equality" was transformed into the vague phrase "full and equal citizenship," i.e. minority rights. In practice the Palestinian Arabs in Israel were not even allowed to form their own political parties, for elections to the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) . . . ⁴⁷⁵

Similarly, Michael Adams contended that the Jewish state "could only be achieved by violating the rights of the Palestinian Arabs."⁴⁷⁶ Edward Said believed that as a Jewish state, Israel was:

. . . created by and for the Jewish people, then it must be the case that non-Jews are posited as radically other, fundamentally and constitutively different. . . . To be a non-Jew in Palestine (Israel) is first of all to be marked negatively ⁴⁷⁷ . . . [and then] by inferiority and secondariness.

Yet beside being a Jewish State, Israel saw itself as a "Zionist state." The then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said: "Israel is a Jewish-Zionist state in which a minority of Arabs live with religious and cultural distinctions."⁴⁷⁸ Ian Lustick explained the interrelation between Israel and the Zionist apparatus:

These overarching ideological commitments and the overall "project" character of Israel are embodied in a set of institutions that have been fighting, for over fifty years, for Jewish independence in Palestine (Eretz-Yisrael), for mass Jewish immigration, for the expansion of Jewish land ownership, and for other Zionist objectives. Together these institutions represent the organizational apparatus of the Zionist movement . . . Before 1948 the institutions of the

movement--including the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, the Haganah (underground army), the JNF, the Basic Fund (Keren Hayesod), and the various political parties and their associated school systems and kibbutz (agricultural collective) movements--constituted, administratively and substantively, a kind of protostate.

After 1948 these institutions continued to function, and their commitment to the basic tenets of Zionist ideology remained intact, but with the emergence of Israel as a sovereign state the division of labor among them was somewhat rearranged.⁴⁷⁹

Abdeen Jabara noted that:

The World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency were charged in the Status Law of 1952 with being the "authorized agency" which would continue to operate in Israel for: (1) "the development and settlement of the country," (2) "the absorption of immigrants from the Diaspora," and (3) "the coordination of the activities in Israel of Jewish institutions and organizations active in those fields. Section 5 of the law states that "the ingathering of the exiles" is the "central task of the State of Israel and the Zionist Movement in our days."⁴⁸⁰

As we shall see, these Zionist institutions have played important roles in maintaining and perpetuating discrimination against non-Jews.

From Discrimination to Apartheid

So what are the practical implications for those inhabitants who are officially classified as non-Jew? No one better than Israel Shahak (a survivor of the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, and the President of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights) can answer this question. He stated:

The state of Israel builds huge building projects in Jerusalem. But for whom? Not just for "Israeli citizens"; only for Jews. An inhabitant of Jerusalem can never be eligible for a flat in those building projects if he for example happens to believe in Jesus Christ or in the Prophet Mohammed and acts on this belief, i.e. is a member of any Christian or Muslim religion. If he is an atheist, his right for obtaining a flat in most of the newly built housing projects in Jerusalem belonging to the State of Israel, depends strictly on his race. If he can bring proof that his mother, grandmother, great grandmother and the grandmother of the grandmother were all Jewesses, he is regarded as a Jew and can obtain a place to live in. If one of the links is weak he can not.⁴⁸¹

He further continued to say:

This situation is the same in most areas of Israel. More than 90% of the inhabited areas of the State of Israel are under the rule of the Jewish National Fund regulations, under which non-Jews cannot rent or buy a house or flat, open a business, in short cannot live. This land is called in Hebrew "the saved" land. The land which belongs to non-Jews is called unsaved or not national (the term "national" in Israel does not mean "Israeli" but "Jewish") and by buying or confiscating it from a non-Jew by a Jew, the land is supposed to be "saved."⁴⁸²

And more:

This is of course only the beginning. A Jew by the mere fact that he is a Jew, will obtain a host of other privileges, over the non-Jew, some of them worth a lot of money, some honorary. A Jew obtains not only the right to live on most of Israeli land, he also obtains a loan and a mortgage to help him. When a new Jewish settlement is being established (on the land that was "saved--confiscated from non-Jews and made Jewish) all the Jewish inhabitants enter into prepared houses, with water and electricity. Many of the old non-Jewish villages have still no water or electricity now and there are some cases in which the electricity line newly built to serve the new Jewish settlement passes the old Arab (in official parlance non-Jewish) village which is still forbidden to use it and sits in the evening in darkness watching the shining Jewish settlement. A building project for the newly-married applies only for the Jewish newly-married and so on. To be a Jew in a Jewish state is to be both a privileged being, and to be able to receive a lot of "easy" money a non-Jew can not ever get.⁴⁸³

Thus the question of "who is a Jew" has not been a matter of intellectual debate or a matter of religious interpretation. Rather it has socio-political implications. Shahak explained:

This is the reason for the furor raised on the question of "who is a Jew." It is not theology they are so concerned about it is money and status. Imagine that a non-Jew would be able "to pass" merely by obtaining a certificate from somebody in USA that he is a Jew! HORRIBLE things would then happen: Non-Jews will be able to live in Ramat-Eshkol. Palestinians from the Old Nazareth will be able to obtain flats in Upper Nazareth, which so far is a completely Apartheid city closed completely to non-Jews. And so on and so on. But no danger of that: The gate is strongly watched and only "real" Jews will be subsidized flats in the Jewish state.⁴⁸⁴

In Israel there are certain areas which are completely and officially reserved for Jews only and where non-Jews are prohibited from building houses, renting apartments or engaging in trade or business. Israel Shahak wrote:

Most of the land in Israel belongs to or is administered by the Jewish National Fund (JNF), which . . . forbids non-Jews to dwell or to open a business, and sometimes even to work on its lands only because they are not Jews! Such policy not only enjoys here perfect legality (in contrast to a similar discrimination against the Jews which is illegal in most countries of the world), but is supported by all the instruments of the Israeli rule. In such a manner many whole towns were created in Israel, which are as the phrase goes "clean of Arabs" and this legally, or rather as we should say "*clean of Gentiles (goyim)*." In other towns, like Upper Nazareth, only one special quarter is "devoted" to the dwelling of Arabs. Any attempt of an Arab to buy or to rent a flat from a Jew is opposed openly and legally by all the branches of the government (the Ministry of Housing, Municipality, etc.) and also by the illegal opposition of the Jewish inhabitants, which is nevertheless supported by the Israeli police. I can only remind you that nobody opposes an operation of the sale or the rental of a flat in Nazareth, if the buyer or the lessee is a Jew, which means, according to the racist definition of this word employed legally in Israel, a human being who can prove that his mother, his grandmother, his great-grandmother and the grandmother of his grandmother were Jewish. If he can prove this, such an operation becomes all right all of a sudden and nobody opposes it, neither the government nor the inhabitants. There is opposition only if the mother of the buyer is not a Jewess.⁴⁸⁵

Shahak referred to Muhammad Ma'aruf, an Israeli citizen who attempted to open a factory in Carmiel. Ma'aruf's demand was rejected because Carmiel was "'out of bounds'" to non-Jews."⁴⁸⁶ Shahak held that this discrimination was not related to "security" matters. He said: "I can dwell or open a business in any place of my choice . . . but only because my mother was a Jewess. An Israeli citizen whose mother was not a Jewess cannot enjoy this right."⁴⁸⁷ Mr. Ma'aruf was a Druze and accordingly he had to serve a compulsory service in the Israeli army. However he could not "dwell in Carmiel only because he happened to be born to the 'incorrect' mother."⁴⁸⁸ But "a Jewish thief or robber or murderer, who has completed his sentence, has the right to dwell in Carmiel. Similarly, Israeli Arabs had no right to live in the new town of Ymit, which was

built exclusively for Jews.⁴⁸⁹ Comparing this with South Africa apartheid, Shahak wrote:

Zionism is worse than the Apartheid regime of South Africa. That regime has "divided" the country and has forbidden the whites to buy land in a "black" area (the Bantustans) and the blacks to buy land in a "white" area. Zionism wants to "save" as much land as it can without any limit at all, in all areas of the "Land of Israel," and it turns the land that it "saves" into one big Apartheid area, in which human beings who were born from non-Jewish mothers have no right to live. I see no difference whether the Apartheid-area was created by confiscation or by purchase. The most important fact is that it exists.⁴⁹⁰

Everything within the Zionist framework is divided along this line: Jew and non-Jew. Israel Shahak observed:

No one is astonished in Israel that almost all the Israeli statistical data about human beings are racist in essence: There are no Israelis inside Israel. Officially there are only "Jews" and "non-Jews." No babies. No dead men, no ill men, again only Jews, who *incidentally* can be babies, can die, or be ill; and "non-Jews," who *also, incidentally* to their "chief" quality--which is the absence in them of "Jewishness"--have the impudence to behave like "the chosen people" and to be born, be ill and die, likewise.⁴⁹¹

The system of the public school in Israel is divided into two systems: one for Arabs and another for Jewish Israelis.⁴⁹² "Jewish Israelis are completely prohibited from attending Arab schools while an Arab Israeli may attend a Jewish school only by special state authorization."⁴⁹³ Further, all Israeli ministries or departments are organized along racial lines. "For instance, the Israeli Ministry of Health has a general health office for Jews only while a subdepartment exists for minorities."⁴⁹⁴ Israel Shahak said "Human health is not recognized as such in Israel and this is because of racist Zionist reasons. Only a separate health of a body of a Jew, and another sort of health of a body of a non-Jew are allowed to exist."⁴⁹⁵ A similar division existed within the Israeli Ministry of Housing. The "department for the housing of minorities" deals exclusively with non-Jews. Shahak pointed out:

The racist state of Israel has no human housing policy, as it exists in varying manners in the U.S.S.R., in the U.S.A., and in Britain. The State of Israel does not pretend to care about housing for a human being because he is a human being, for a poor family, or one that has many children, because decent housing is a human need. No! The State of Israel because of its Zionist aims, such as the "Judaization of the Galilee," is carrying out two contradictory sets of policies at the same time: One of maximum care for Jews and the other of discrimination against and oppression of the "non-Jews."⁴⁹⁶

The structure of the Zionist state has inevitably led to discrimination. Consider the role of the two Zionist, non-governmental institutions: the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and the Jewish Agency (JA). According to Israeli sources, world Jewry (between 1948 and 1978) had supplied \$5,000,000,000 to Israel, of which 65 percent came from American Jews.⁴⁹⁷ From 1948 through mid-1977 the total income of the Jewish Agency was \$5,092,500,000.⁴⁹⁸ Because of their non-governmental status, these agencies "do not serve a constituency of `Israeli citizens.' Rather they are communal Jewish-Zionist organizations which serve a transitional constituency--the Jewish people,"⁴⁹⁹ Ian Lustick stated. He elaborated more:

That is, although the government of Israel is bound according to its own democratic norms to address itself, in the laws it promulgates, in the programs it sponsors, and in the services it provides, to Jewish and Arab citizens alike, the Jewish Agency and the JNF are mandated to operate only in regard to Israel's Jewish population. There therefore constitute efficient conduits for channeling resources to the Jewish population only, resources which are converted into capital-intensive economic development projects, educational vocational training, social services, land acquisition, etc. In the implementation of such programs officials of these institutions see themselves ideologically as well as legally justified in ignoring the needs of Arab Israelis and the impact of their activities on the Arab sector.⁵⁰⁰

The intention of benefiting the Israeli Jews alone was clearly manifested in the following statements, issued by JNF and Jewish Agency officials.

The economic impact of our land purchases and our activities on Arabs is not considered . . . The government would have to look after all citizens if they owned the land; since JNF owns the land, let's be frank, we can serve just the Jewish people.

Arab villages are of course ineligible [for our economic assistance] because this is a Jewish Agency.⁵⁰¹

Consider also the following statement written in 1967 by the Zionist leader, Joseph Weitz of the Jewish Agency Colonization Department:

Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples together in this country . . . We shall not achieve our goal of being an independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is Palestine without Arabs . . . And there is no other way but to transfer the Arabs from here to neighboring countries, to transfer all of them; not one village, not one tribe should be left.⁵⁰²

In terms of their objectives and structures, the Zionist agencies intended to promote exclusively the interests of the Jewish citizens. Article 3 of the constitution of the JNF said: "Land is to be held as the inalienable property of the Jewish people."⁵⁰³ And the JA, according to its constitution, "shall promote agricultural colonization based on Jewish labor" and that "in all works or undertakings carried out by the Jewish Agency it shall be a matter of principle that Jewish labor shall be employed."⁵⁰⁴ The efforts of these agencies were closely coordinated with the Israeli government. In the years between 1948 and 1970, the Israeli government transferred 1,330,000 dunams of land to the JNF.⁵⁰⁵ Lustick stated:

Most of the land transferred to the JNF was that of Arab refugees; much, however, was land expropriated from Arabs who remained to become citizens of Israel . . . By transferring these lands to the control of the JNF, which of course works closely with the Land Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, the government was able to insure that decisions about the use of the land would be made strictly on the basis of Jewish-Zionist considerations. As indicated earlier, all "state" lands were placed at the disposal of the JNF by the creation of the Israel Land Administration and the Land Development Authority. As noted, these two bodies develop, lease, and administer 92 percent of Israel's land area . . . Since the JNF, as an institution, does not and cannot address itself to the Arab sector, Arab access to JNF-controlled lands for the purpose of long-term leasing or development is effectively denied.⁵⁰⁶

In accordance with the JNF principles, the Israeli government passed the

Agricultural Settlement Law, whose purpose was "to stop the infiltration of the Arabs into the Jewish agriculture sector, [and to] prohibit even the subleasing of Jewish National Fund land to Arabs."⁵⁰⁷ According to this law, any individual or settlement that leased or hired Arabs "would be subject to the expropriation of the land involved."⁵⁰⁸ The law ensured that "the land would then revert to the JNF or the Israel Land Administration, whereupon these bodies would make arrangement for the use of the land in a more suitable fashion."⁵⁰⁹ Article 23 of the JNF's constitution made it clear that an "employment of non-Jewish labor renders the lessee liable to the payment of compensation of a certain sum of money for each default."⁵¹⁰ The Israeli newspaper, Ma'ariv (October 26, 1971) reported "that the Jewish Agency planned to confiscate the land of a settler in moshov . . . for renting land to Arabs."⁵¹¹ Several cases were also reported in the same newspaper (November 5, 1971) "where the Zionist settlers committed the 'criminal' act of renting 'land to Arabs who used to dwell on it before' 1948."⁵¹² On this, Israel Shahak commented:

Pay attention, please: Because I am a Jew, I am allowed to lease orchards for picking or marketing, but an Arab, only because he is an Arab, is forbidden this! The Ministry of Agriculture of the State of Israel together with the settlement authorities will persecute and prosecute the Jewish settlements, for doing actions which are completely legal when done between Jews and Jews and become a grave offence when done between Jews and Arabs! And truly enough the settlements were punished. But since this country "the settlements" are a holy cow, because they are racist, a special privilege was granted to those offenders who "broke the law." They were not brought to court, on the accusation of this most horrible "crime" of not being racists, but made "a deal" and bought themselves off by giving "donations" to a mysterious fund!⁵¹³

It is important to recognize fully the contribution of these Zionists institutions to the discriminatory practice in Israel. Ian Lustick maintained that the task of these organizations was to pursue Zionist objectives which the state could not do because of its formal obligations to all its citizens (Jew and non-Jews). Consider the question of the birth rate. The Israeli government sought to increase the birth

rate of the Jewish family (as opposed to the Israeli family). Ben-Gurion explained:

Since the problem of the birthrate does not affect all the inhabitants but only the Jewish community, it cannot be solved by the Government. Israel provides equal rights for all its citizens without distinction of race and nationality Consequently if the Government plans to increase the birthrate by providing special assistance to large families, the main beneficiaries will be the Arab families, which are generally larger than Jewish families.

Since it is only the Jews who need such incentives, the Government is unable to deal with the problem, and the matter should be transferred to the Jewish Agency or some special Jewish organization. If the Jewish birthrate is not increased, it is doubtful that the Jewish State will survive.⁵¹⁴

Lustick elaborated more on the link between these Zionist institutions and the state of Israel:

The role of the JNF, the Jewish Agency, and other institutional components of the world Zionist movement in the distribution of resources in Israel and the concentrated development of the Jewish sector is augmented by common statutory provisions which assure these institutions representation on various public regulatory agencies, marketing boards, and planning authorities. In addition, during the early and mid-1960's, when financial contributions from world Jewry were at a low ebb, the Israeli government effected unilateral transfers of public monies into the treasuries of the national institutions. Between 1959 and 1967, for example, the Israeli government donated over \$100 million to the Jewish Agency.⁵¹⁵

Then he concluded:

What should be emphasized is that the existence of separate, Jewish institutions such as the JNF and the Jewish Agency, controlling as they do vast resources and not including Arabs in the purview of their activities, enables the government to use the legal system to transfer resources from the public domain to the Jewish sector. It does this without discriminating in the law between Jews and Arabs, but by assigning responsibility for the disposition of those resources (especially land and funds from abroad) to institutions which are historical creations of the Zionist movement with personnel imbued with the desire to consolidate and strengthen the Jewish community in Eretz Yisrael.⁵¹⁶

However, awareness of Israeli practice of discrimination and apartheid has been growing in today's Israel. The Israeli press described

the phenomenon of "racial purity" as "Jewish Nazism." The activities of MENA (an organized group whose aim was to prevent Arabs from living in the same apartment block or neighborhood as Jews), was the subject of an article entitled "Ku Klux Klan in Upper Nazareth" written in the Hebrew language daily Ha'aretz (December 12, 1983) by Heda Boshes. The writer criticized the practice of racial discrimination against the Arabs.⁵¹⁷

The "Institute to Search Social Problems in the Light of the Halakha" issued a decision concerning the question whether Jews and non-Jews should live together in the same neighborhood. The decision, which was published in the Hebrew language daily Yediot Aharonot (December 25, 1983), stated that: "Jews and non-Jews should not live in the same building."⁵¹⁸ Journalist Aharon Bkhar described in the same newspaper the Halakha's decision as a "racism of the ugliest sort." He wrote:

If such a decision were made by a Christian priest in New York against Jews, we would witness a scandal there. And here as well, all the hypocrites would crawl out and scream, and they would be justified in doing so.

But when it is said here, and by a Rabbi, there is no one to protest. No one has misused Jewish morality as was done yesterday by a Rabbi. This Rabbi also condemned the friendship that developed between Tel Aviv school children and children in an Israeli Arab Village, claiming that this might end with mixed marriages. What would we have said if a Christian priest in New York, or the Moscow party secretary, had said something similar about Jews? If this is the Halakha, count me out!⁵¹⁹

In an article published in Al Hamishmar (December 27, 1983) Yehoshua Sobol made an analogy between the Halakah's decision and a similar practice of Nazi Germany. He wrote:

After the rise of the Nazis to power, Alfred Rosenberg established a sort of "Institute for Research on Judaism" . . . in order to research the dangers to the Aryan society and its culture from Judaism.

. . . One of the tasks of this institution was to give the ideological legitimation for the uprooting of the Jews from German society, to justify their removal into the ghettos so that German society would remain clean of any contact with the Jewish element.

And so the institute was able to state that German property must not be sold to Jews; that all the property Jews had ever purchased from Germans should be confiscated. And

since there was to be no contact between Jews and Aryans, Rosenbergs' Institute issued orders that Jews and non-Jews were not to live in one neighborhood, that the Jews should live separately. Obviously Rosenbergs' Institute could have issued a decision forbidding Jews and non-Jews from living in one and the same building.

Such a decision could have come out of Rosenbergs' Institute since it fits with the Nazi doctrine concerning the idea of racial separation. But this specific decision was not issued by Rosenbergs' Institute, but by an institute operating in Israel in the 80s--"The institute to research social problems in the light of the Halakha."⁵²⁰

Sobol concluded:

Judaism as it is daily practiced by the Halakha priests has long ago turned into a tool for the theological and ideological justification of any racist crime performed in this state, either by the authorities or by citizens with a racist ideology.⁵²¹

Similarly, Shulamit Aloni (member of the Knesset) criticized the practice of "separation" which took place in Jerusalem. He wrote in Yediot Aharonot (December 11, 1983):

In order to renew and rebuild the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem, all its Arab inhabitants were ordered to leave. No requests, no demonstrations, no press conferences could stop this from happening. Even Burkan, who lived there in rented flat and who wanted to buy a flat there for the full sum of money which was required, failed in this attempt.

The Supreme Court decided that Burkan did not have the right to purchase a flat in the Jewish Quarter--in spite of the fact that he owned property in the same quarter--and that this decision did not imply any discrimination since separation of people according to religion in housing is acceptable, and in Old Jerusalem people live in quarters divided according to religion.

The directors of the Jewish Quarter and the Minister of Justice Nissim were thinking of this court decision when they refused to give permission to a Scandinavian Christian couple, who came here for a year of study, to rent a flat in the Jewish Quarter. In the Knesset on January 24, 1981, Nissim emphasized that this decision was justified and it was in accordance with the criteria of a democratic society to try and keep the Jewish Quarter clean of Arabs and Christians, in general.⁵²²

However, the attitude of MENA and other racist organizations that called for separation should not be surprising when one listened to the Israeli Minister of Agriculture (a member of the so-called "Socialist

International") describing his own fellow citizens, the Palestinian Arabs, as being cancer within Israeli society.⁵²³ Or consider the following proposal by a prominent Israeli official (The Northern District Commissioner of the Ministry of Interior), Israel Koenig, which recommended to restrict job opportunities, housing, education, and family payments for Israeli Arabs, and to stimulate their departure.⁵²⁴ After pointing to the "danger" of the increasing rate of Arab population, Koenig recommended:

. . . to redress the drastic situation by giving Arabs no more than 20 percent of the available jobs; by changing the selection system to reduce the number of Arab students in the universities and encouraging the channeling of these students into technical professions, physical and natural sciences and thus to leave them with less time for dabbling in nationalism-also to make trips for students easier while making the return and employment more difficult, which is to encourage their emigration. [Payment of] big family grants to Arabs should be transferred from the national insurance system to the Jewish Agency or the Zionist Organization.⁵²⁵

On this Alfred Lilienthal commented: "Never has Israel's Zionist system of classifying its citizens into Jews and non-Jews been more nakedly exposed."⁵²⁶ It is obvious that Koenig's position reflected the entire Zionist philosophy in dealing with the Palestinian Arabs. In the words of the Israeli professor Sammy Smooha, ". . . the Arab minority is considered hostile, and a potential fifth column which must be contained."⁵²⁷ Their disloyalty is assumed and thus "they are kept under ongoing, covert official surveillance."⁵²⁸ Michael Hudson wrote:

There is not doubt that Zionism today remains an exclusivist, particularist ideology, a throwback to the folk nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century. Nor is there any doubt that the behavioral manifestations of Zionism in the Israeli state have given rise to systematic discrimination against Arabs, both Muslim and Christian, and also against Jews from Arab societies.⁵²⁹

Rehavam Ze'evi, a high ranking Zionist official (a retired general and one-time head of the Central command) advocated the idea of "transferring" the Palestinians. He said:

Two peoples can't live in one land. When they live in one land, there is blood and fire . . . wherever in the world two peoples live, sooner or later war begins between them. Look at Lebanon, Ireland, Sri Lanka . . . It's possible to live as neighbors, but in the same house--impossible. When they live in the same house, the sorrows begin. When there's a big national minority in a country, it begins to demand rights, begins to demand autonomy, builds an underground which starts planting bombs. Their children and ours begin killing one another. Among us it's worse . . . a minority that will soon be the majority in this country. Look around here, as we've done. Every [Arab] settlement is becoming a village, every village a small town, every small town a city.

In a dozen years, according to the statisticians, the numbers will be equal. In a democratic state where everyone has the right to vote, they'll be the majority. In 13 years, the prime minister, minister of defense and chief-of-staff here will be Arabs . . . ⁵³⁰

Ze'evi admitted that expelling the Arabs from the Land of Israel has been central to Zionism.. He stated:

. . . everything carried out by Zionism over the past 100 years has been precisely that--'transfer.' Every place we built here was on the ruins of an Arab village or city. I was an officer in the Palmach in 1948 when we conquered Lod and Ramleh. The inhabitants raised white flags. We asked our commanders what to do. The second officer in charge of the battalion, Yitzhak Rabin, answered: 'expel them.' We said: 'What do you mean? How?' He said: 'that's an order from B.[en] G.[urion].' And that's how it was--in Acre, Haifa, Tiberius, and right here in Salamea where there was also an Arab village . . . ⁵³¹

Apartheid in Practice

Israeli practice of apartheid, according to Israel Shahak, has been clearly manifested with regard to the land question. There has been a "continued system of discrimination amounting to apartheid with regard to the use of the land which has been confiscated,"⁵³² Shahak said. Examining the Israeli policies in the occupied territories, Shahak stated:

The land which has been confiscated, by whatever legal subterfuges, is openly and officially devoted for the use of Jews only, for the sole reason that they are Jews. Again, accuracy in the use of terms and descriptions is important: the confiscated land is not being officially devoted for the use of Israeli citizens, for about 15 percent of Israeli citizens are Palestinians. It is devoted for the use of Jews whether they are citizens of Israel or the USA or of any other

state . . . The racist policy practiced by the Israeli government with the regard to the use of land, land unjustly confiscated, is another form of racism, parallel to and as wicked as the worst form of anti-Semitism.⁵³³

The situation inside Israel (as opposed to the Occupied Territories) was not dissimilar. Shahak explained:

More than 90 percent of the land of Israel belongs to, or is administered by, the Israel Land Authority. This land is not administered for the benefit of all Israeli citizens. It is administered exclusively for the benefit of Jews--whether Israeli or American or from any other country--to the total exclusion of all Palestinians and all non-Jews. It is administered in conjunction with the so called Jewish National Fund, a branch of World Zionist Organization, which invented this racist rule with regard to the use of land.⁵³⁴

The Israeli government established an official "committee for the evaluation of land policies" with the task "to examine the aims of Israeli land policy, of allocating land for housing and recommending laws governing the work of the Israel Land Authority."⁵³⁵ Meir Shamir, Director of the Israeli Land Authority, declared: "We have a definition and the aim is that any Jew in the world is an Israeli citizen."⁵³⁶ As to the Arab citizens of Israel, Shamir said: "our assumption is that, at least at present, the mixed town in which Jews and Arabs live, is not the way to live."⁵³⁷ The reason, as explained by Gur Arie, then the advisor on Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister, was that "if you let Arabs into the Jewish towns which have difficulties . . . you prevent the Jews in those towns from dominating the employment possibilities."⁵³⁸ Meir Shalmir said: "we have been operating according to a government consensus on this issue. I am not authorized to tell you whether there is any such government decision written down anywhere." He added: "But I can tell you from present knowledge that, in any case, these are the guidelines we have received--not to encourage mixed areas of housing."⁵³⁹

Thus, Shahak found that the similarity with South African apartheid seemed to be compelling:

The infamous system of South African apartheid amounts to a declaration by the government, which has all the power, that certain areas of land will be open only to a particular kind of human being, for their exclusive benefit, and closed to others (the emigration policy will be carried out accordingly). We should mention in the connection that more than half of the land of West Bank and about 40 percent of the land of Gaza Strip has already been confiscated and converted into a closed domain ruled by racist regulations. These regulations put the Palestinians in exactly the same situation as the Blacks under the South African regime: they are excluded by law--a racist, unjust law--from living on a huge portion of their land.⁵⁴⁰

In another essay, Shahak suggested that the conditions of the occupied territories "are actually, theoretically and officially worse than in South Africa."⁵⁴¹ He presented facts and figures:

In the West Bank the proportion of the land which had already been confiscated by the beginning of 1987 was, according to Israeli figures, 52 percent and according to Meron Benvenisti's figures, 59 percent--in either case, more than half. Jewish settlers number 60,000; the Palestinians officially number 850,000--according to Benvenisti's more realistic figures, one million. Take out your pocket calculator; you will see the proportions. As for the Gaza Strip, it has a higher human density than Hong Kong. 39.5 Percent of land there has been confiscated for exclusive Jewish use. And 28 percent--not of the 39 percent but of the whole area--has already been given to the settlers. Jewish settlers in the Gaza strip number 2,500 and the Hebrew press suspect that of these a few hundred are temporary residents--students, religious Jewish academics of Yeshivot. Let us compare this with South Africa (and, of course, again you will understand I am not praising the devil), if you take the 13 percent allocated for the blacks and the 80 percent for the whites and compare it according to population, you will see that Gaza strip is infinitely worse in terms of apartheid than South Africa.⁵⁴²

Similarly, within Israel, the Palestinian residential areas have the same problem of over-population. Louise Cainkar wrote:

The land around them has been confiscated and Palestinians are not allowed to live in most Jewish areas. Homes are overcrowded as building permits are regularly denied to "non-Jews." Pursuing a policy of liquidating the historic Arab quarters in mixed cities--cities such as Haifa, Jaffa, and Acre. Palestinian Arabs are denied permits to renovate their homes, many of which are on the verge of collapse. The Palestinians are thus forced out. Municipal budget allocations from the Israeli government keeps Palestinian Arab cities and towns underdeveloped.⁵⁴³

Shahak cited what he considered another "clear case of apartheid," which was the question of water distribution in the occupied territories. He stated:

One of the first acts of the Israeli government after the conquest of 1967 was to check on all the water consumption of Palestinians, whether from wells or from springs, to install meters on all the sources, and to prohibit Palestinians, and Palestinians only, from drawing more water than they did before that date except by a special license (very rarely given). At the same time, settlers receive almost unlimited permission to draw water, dig and drill new wells . . . And control is very strict: buying new pumps is prohibited--even spare parts--registering power pumps needs a special permit and so on. By autumn 1987, according to official Israeli data, the 60,000 settlers in the West Bank were using more water than the 850,000 or million Palestinians.⁵⁴⁴

Shahak supplied many examples of "oppression and discrimination inflicted on Palestinians"⁵⁴⁵ of the Occupied Territories. He maintained that the Israeli rule "has been more totalitarian in all aspects of daily life than previous regimes."⁵⁴⁶ He considered the Ottoman Turkish rule of 1905 as "more liberal than the Israeli occupation regime of 1985."⁵⁴⁷

Shahak explained:

All crosswords in the newspapers have to be submitted for censorship, lest a word such as "homeland" should appear in them. All obituaries in the press are likewise censored: Quite recently an Arabic paper of East Jerusalem, *Al-Sha'ab*, was closed for three days (together with the printing shop whose sole offense was that it prints the paper) for the sole "crime" of publishing the obituary of two Palestinians. Censorship of the news and of expressions of opinion has simply no limits as to what can be prohibited. It is sufficient to state, by way of example, that translations of news items from the Hebrew press about brutalities committed by the occupation forces are frequently prohibited in the Arab press. It is likewise prohibited to indicate that a censorship took place by leaving white spaces in the middle of an article which was mutilated by the censors.⁵⁴⁸

The Israeli Knesset passed the "law for prevention of terror" defining "as a criminal offence any expression of a pro-Palestinian opinion whether in form of sounding an anthem or a slogan or in any other act."⁵⁴⁹ Shahak further informs us that:

A whole system of prohibitions applies to everything that the censor can label as a "national symbol." It applies not only to works of art, such as pictures, but even to combinations of colors. I should mention here that not only is the Palestinian flag strictly prohibited, both in the Occupied Territories and in Israel, but in the Territories any combination of the four colors of the flag, namely red, green, black, and white, is also prohibited. For example (and this is an actual example!) a painting of a girl lying on the ground surrounded by flowers was prohibited since the sharp eye of the censor discovered that some of the flowers were red, with green leaves too, and some were made black in surrealist style, and there were white spaces too; a clear case of terror in the opinion of the Occupation regime! There was also the case of a textile shop in East Jerusalem which was observed, to the horror of the guardians of law and order, to display shirts of the four colors in close proximity, and was ordered not to do so anymore.⁵⁵⁰

The following story of the "confiscated cake" seemed to be interesting.

Shahak related:

Out of literally thousands of examples, I will save time and present another one only. When a new house was finished in the town of El Bireh, a big cake was ordered for the celebration party. The military governor had heard that this cake was coated with icing in the four prohibited colors. He sent an officer to the party, and the cake was solemnly confiscated.⁵⁵¹

Needless to say, that this ill treatment did not extend to the Jewish settlers who live in the Occupied Territories. And for Shahak, this was simply a plain apartheid whereby "the behavior of the state towards different groups of human beings should be as different as possible."⁵⁵² Shahak insisted "that the apartheid regime in the Occupied Territories is actually worse than the apartheid in South Africa both in intentions and in actuality."⁵⁵³ Shahak also suggested that the system of "courts and police" gave more evidence of Israel's apartheid. He stated:

The civil courts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip do not have any legal powers with regard to any Jews, especially the settlers of course, but also all Jews, American ones too, even in cases of traffic offenses (in spite of the fact that all the judges are nominated by the Israeli Military Government). Jews living or passing through the Occupied Territories can not even be stopped by the local Israeli-commanded police. If a settler forcibly steals a piece of land belonging to a Palestinian and the local court issues an injunction, this

injunction has no legal power and the robbery can continue. In a similar way, enormous areas of the Occupied Territories have been put under the municipal rule of the so called Jewish "local councils" which have the power to give or deny permits for the building of houses. In more general ways, by 1970, the municipal rights of all Palestinian municipalities and councils, rights established by the Ottoman Empire and kept, more or less, by the British and the Jordanian regimes, were abolished. From that date, no village or town in the Occupied Territories has been allowed to issue permits for building new houses; and recently, for the addition of a room to an existing house.⁵⁵⁴

Louise Cainkar cited another example which indicated different treatment between Jews and Palestinians. She wrote:

Palestinians guilty of stone-throwing have been punished by 10 years imprisonment plus the destruction of the family home; Jewish settlers were recently given three-year sentences for planting bombs in Palestinian mayors' cars, which resulted in severe bodily injury to two mayors . . . In Israeli courts, one Jewish soldier's testimony is often all that is necessary to convict Palestinians arrested on "security" charges.⁵⁵⁵

A report prepared by Meron Benvesti, a leading Israeli demographer, and published in The New York Times, indicated that Israel was "sliding slowly toward apartheid." Jewish settlers of the West Bank, have the same civil rights of Israelis, including the right to vote; Arabs do not. Benvesti observed that discrimination has already become institutionalized. For example, the Knesset extended "social security" to include West Bank residents, who are Israeli Jewish citizens or who are entitled to enter Israel according to the Law of Return simply because they are Jewish. Arab residents of the West Bank are not covered by social security.⁵⁵⁶ Benvesti concluded:

Arabs have been discriminated against ever since the state of Israel has existed. Israeli Arabs live in the shadow of discrimination in almost every sphere of life. The present government only changed the style, not the context. Up till now discrimination was justified by 'objective' and 'practical' arguments, such as security . . . Now it seems that the government doesn't need these delicate explanations.⁵⁵⁷

Writing on the same subject, Brice Harris pointed out:

Just as South Africa denies Africans in the Bantustans the right to participate in Assembly elections, so Israel excludes from Knesset elections the Arabs living in West Bank and Gaza territories. The reasons are the same: that African or Palestinian voters might threaten the dominant European (Afrikaner Nationalist) or Jewish (Zionist) character of the two States.⁵⁵⁸

The practice of apartheid has also manifested itself in the Israeli policies that restrict the movements of the Palestinians.

Restriction of the Movements of the Palestinians

Palestinians from the Occupied Territories must carry with them all the time an Israeli-issued identity card. Anyone caught without such a card would be subject to punishment. The process is not dissimilar to South African "Pass" laws. Shahak explained:

Under Israeli law it is a crime for any Palestinian from the occupied territories--but not for a settler in the occupied territories--to be inside the state of Israel at night between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. Even if during those five hours he is in bed, he commits a crime for which the usual punishment is several months in prison and a stiff fine. But the Israeli economy has become so dependent on Palestinian labor from the territories, that if all were made to obey the law, it would interfere with the Israeli economy. So there is a system, unofficial but nonetheless carried out by the Israeli police, that if those Palestinians workers who stay in Israel illegally have been locked in from the outside between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m., the police will not molest them. But the police have to know exactly where they are, so a system of nightly control has grown up, carried out both by police and by volunteer bodies called civilian guards, manned in many cases by teenagers under military age. This is particularly horrible because there is a very strong cruel streak at that age, and in any case people, if they are not cruel, will not volunteer for such work. This system, in addition to its apartheid nature, provokes an enormous amount of cruelty--of beatings up, of harassment etc.

One of the forms of control invoked is that Palestinians always have to have their identification on them. Anyone caught without an identity card is not only arrested and heavily punished, but is also beaten on the spot. To be without an identity card is like being under fascist or nazi occupation without papers--or like being in South Africa.⁵⁵⁹

Palestinian cars are distinguishable from that of Israeli Jews: The plate number of Palestinian cars are blue or white ones while Jewish settlers have yellow plates.⁵⁶⁰ In the "new united Jerusalem" (where Arabs and Jews

are supposed to be equal, as the Israelis claimed), a similar situation existed: "Car plates for Arabs were distinguished by the first three digits; Arab taxis had to be painted in a distinctive manner."⁵⁶¹ It was reported that "American visitors to Jerusalem who rode in Arab cars and taxis have found themselves harassed at checkpoints."⁵⁶² The following story cited by Israel Shahak reflected the ill treatment of the Palestinians.

One guard, stationed outside the French embassy, would, when he saw Palestinians from the territories, stop them--and don't ask me how he used to spot them; our Israeli answer would be that just as anti-Semites used to spot Jews, and quite often they were not wrong, so these Jewish racists can spot Palestinians. This guard, because he was stationary within the French embassy gates, didn't beat people, but he would take their identification cards, and say: 'Run to this mark on the seashore, and if you run quick enough you will have your identity card back, if not you will run again.' Only when we finally got the French ambassador to intervene was the guard removed from this duty to another. But he wasn't punished--the official response being that he had done nothing wrong, he hadn't beaten anybody, he had only asked them to run. I mention this not only because of its apartheid nature, but also because such cruelty became greatly intensified in connection with the general rise in Jewish racism and chauvinism during the summer of 1987.⁵⁶³

This situation put into question the finding of Esther Cohen who, in her book, Human Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territories, 1967-1982, suggested that "Israel's policy of balancing security measures with economic, cultural, social, and civil liberties can be taken as a paradigm for future occupations."⁵⁶⁴ Israel Shahak explained the restriction measures of the Israeli authorities in the occupied territories and their economic implications with regard to the Palestinians:

Everything in the occupied territories needs a permit. When I say everything, first of all I mean agriculture. Literally, to plant one orange tree, any fruit tree, or one tomato plant on one's own property (this only applies to Palestinians, of course) needs a special permit from the military governor. A special unit composed of settlers is supposed to check these things. What is more, this order is being specially used to ruin the more fruitful forms of Palestinian agriculture: citrus trees need to be replaced every twenty to twenty-five years, so the obvious way to ruin the Palestinian orange plantations in Gaza is not to give permits for replacements.

In addition, all imports from Israel are allowed into the occupied territories, not only without customs barriers but without any license, without any limitation. Imports from the occupied territories to Israel, however, are strictly prohibited, except by special order, which is only given if there is a scarcity of a particular item in Israel.⁵⁶⁵

The occupied territories do not, contrary to the prevailing opinion up to the current Palestinian uprising, constitute an economic burden for Israel. Instead, they have been a source of revenue to Israel. Raja Shehadeh, a Palestinian lawyer, stated:

The occupied territories represent to Israel not only a pool of cheap labor and an unrestricted export market or "dumping ground" for its own goods, but also a source of revenue through direct and indirect taxation that goes directly into the Israeli treasury and is used for Israeli public consumption.⁵⁶⁶

Shehadeh presented facts and figures to support his argument:

In 1986, Israel exported \$730.3 million worth of goods to the West Bank and Gaza, making the territories Israel's second largest export market after the U.S. Israeli goods, meanwhile, represented 89.4 percent of the occupied territories' imports both in 1985 and 1986. Indeed, the territories are virtually obliged to import from Israel because they have been cut off from their traditional sources in the Arab world. Fees levied on imports from Jordan are so high as to make them uncompetitive. Direct imports from other countries are either entirely banned or heavily taxed, with import duties reaching 200 and 300 percent.⁵⁶⁷

He further elaborated:

But while Israeli exports to the occupied territories are unrestricted and competition from goods from other sources virtually eliminated through duties and other controls, Palestinian access to Israeli markets is sharply limited. Palestinians cannot sell their agricultural produce in Israel without permits, the issuance of which is severely restricted in order to prevent competition with Israeli farmers. Nonetheless, 73.2 percent of the territories' exports in 1986 were to Israel, most of which were re-exported. Indeed, Israel totally controls the export of goods from the territories by requiring that they be channeled exclusively through Israel's own export marketing board, Agrexco, which sells the produce at profits accruing to Israel and under an Israeli brand name.⁵⁶⁸

This situation led Meron Benvenisti, a former mayor of Jerusalem, to

describe the economy of the occupied territories as "undeveloped, non-viable, stagnant and dependent."⁵⁶⁹ Shannee Marks saw this dependency as "a model for colonial society."⁵⁷⁰ She added: "Israel is no different from the French in Algeria, the Belgians in the Congo, or the British in Palestine."⁵⁷¹ This put into question the findings of Esther Cohen, who argued that Israeli economic policies "promoted the economy of the occupied territories."⁵⁷²

The Israeli government declared (spring 1987) that "'local revenues' would entirely cover expenditures in the occupied territories."⁵⁷³ It was reported further that over the past twenty years of occupation "some \$1 billion has been deducted from the wages of Palestinians working in Israel for employee benefits for which they are not eligible, since they are not residents of Israel."⁵⁷⁴ According to Meron Benvenisti "at least \$250,000 of this 'deduction fund' has been used directly for Israeli public consumption" while the rest was "used to subsidize the civilian administration in the occupied territories."⁵⁷⁵ In addition to this, Israel has benefited from the so-called "occupation taxes" (indirect taxes paid by the Palestinians). It was reported that during the past twenty years of occupation Israel gained \$800 million, much of which has been used for Israeli public expenditure.⁵⁷⁶ This situation led Alfred Moleah to suggest that there has been a "colonial relationship" between Israel and the occupied territories, whereby the latter "serves as a source of cheap labor"⁵⁷⁷ and provides "Israel with a market for its goods."⁵⁷⁸ This situation represents more evidence of Zionist racism.

The Palestinian Workers

The other question which connected with racism is the situation of the Palestinian workers. It was reported that "in the West Bank 54 percent of the wage labor force is employed in Israel; in Gaza, 67 percent."⁵⁷⁹ Those Palestinian workers get paid half wage as compared to that of Israeli workers.⁵⁸⁰ Azmy Bishara maintained:

Palestinian workers in Israel save about \$500 million for Israeli employers in lower labor costs, not to mention the amount they save the Israeli treasury in social security benefits that they do not receive despite deductions from their paychecks.⁵⁸¹

Similarly, Danny Rubenstein wrote in Davar (May 18, 1976):

. . . an Arab worker is extremely moveable, one can fire him at one moment and transfer him from one place to another; he does not strike and he has no 'claims' as the Israeli worker has. In short, in many economic respects, the workers of the territories are a treasure for the Israeli economy.⁵⁸²

Sheila Ryan stated that the occupied territories provided:

. . . thousands of workers for the most menial, miserable and poorly paid jobs in Israel. Each morning these workers leave their homes in Gaza and the West Bank to face a day of hard work and racial discrimination; their labor goes not to build a national economy of their own, but to augment the economy of the colonial power which oppresses them. . . .⁵⁸³

The psychological cost for the Palestinian workers has been high. They have felt a sense of humiliation knowing that their labor has been helpful in advancing the Zionist cause.

In the occupied territories there has been a surplus of unemployed Palestinians--a situation from which the Israeli government gained two advantages: to satisfy its need for unskilled workers and at the same time to distract Palestinians from their miserable conditions under occupation.⁵⁸⁴ According to the Israel Economist (October 1971):

The Israeli government is channeling Palestinian workers into the lowest ranks of the Israeli proletariat by denying work permits to persons from the occupied territories for any job deemed appropriate for unemployed Israelis and by referring workers from occupied territories only to unskilled or semi-skilled jobs.⁵⁸⁵

Israel Shahak identified two categories of Palestinian workers. The first one consisted of those who obtained work inside Israel through official channel (Labor Exchange). It:

. . . means that they register with their military governor, who then, through his labor bureau, sends them to an Israeli employer. The employer doesn't pay them directly, but through the military governor, who deducts a third of their salary. Thus, the Israeli employer pays the same salary as to Israelis, so there will be no undue competition; but the military governor takes a third of the money, puts in the Bank of Israel, where it sits--I don't know what happens to it. Through the military governor the worker obtains the rest of the salary.⁵⁸⁶

The second group was the so-called "unorganized work," which was comprised of workers who were vulnerable to the most severe exploitation. Those workers used to:

. . . go to Israeli towns and hire themselves direct, in places which are called, not only by the Hebrew press but by everybody in conversation, 'slave markets.' If you ask anybody in Jerusalem, 'Where is the slave market?'--you don't even have to specify 'slave market for Palestinians'--they will say, In Musrara. Go over there . . .⁵⁸⁷

It should be noted that workers in both categories have no protection through a union because the Histadrut (General Federation of Workers of the Land of Israel) does not accept workers from the occupied territories as members. This resulted "in such phenomena as work obtained through labor contractors, inferior social benefits, longer hours, and vulnerability to discharge on arbitrary or economic grounds."⁵⁸⁸ Sheila Ryan elaborated more on the conditions of the Palestinian workers:

The laborers from the occupied areas, especially agricultural workers from Gaza, are often forced to reside temporarily in Israel, illegally and in inhuman conditions, because the time and cost of transportation to their own residence is excessive . . . The Israeli police have been instructed to take firm measures against [them] . . . Reports in the Israeli press describe "entire families [from Gaza] including children and toddlers sleeping overnight in the chicken houses of Jewish farmers. Some employers lock their employees from the West Bank and Gaza in at night, lest they be found in the streets by the police, and the employer fined heavily. In March 1976, three workers were sleeping in a warehouse at night when a fire broke out; trapped behind locked doors, they died."⁵⁸⁹

Despite such inhuman conditions, finding a job was not an easy task. Shannee Marks, who lived in Israel many years, related:

The workers coming in from Gaza already stand in the palm-tree lined square of Gaza City at three in the morning. The square of this sluggish town is so packed at that hour it is difficult to drive through. Trucks, small half-open lorries in which six people can sit knees touching knees on hard benches, long Mercedes taxis, and private cars belonging to 'independent' Israeli employers pick up their passengers. Those who know their destination in advance are the lucky ones. They know that their trip is not going to be for nothing. Many come with only the hope of finding work. Many are day laborers who are happy when they work one day in the week.⁵⁹⁰

The foregoing findings should not be surprising for anyone who realizes the norm of colonial relationships with a conquered people. However, for some Zionist "socialists" like Itzhak Ben-Aharon (Secretary-General of the Histadrut), such treatment of the Palestinians became a source of embarrassment. Ben-Aharon "charged that Israel was 'building Zionism' on the backs of hired Arab labor from the occupied territories."⁵⁹¹ In this respect, Sheila Ryan argued that the "cultural conflict" within the Zionist establishment "is not merely between racism and humanitarianism, but between two different forms of racism": one argued that Arabs should not be a part of the process of building Zionism, while the other held that "Arabs are in fact precisely fitted to do the hard and dirty work of Zionist society."⁵⁹² To support her argument, Ryan cited two examples. The first was a letter from a Zionist to the then Prime Minister Golda Meir. It stated:

If Mrs. Meir wants to see Hebrew workers sweating away on hot summer days, if it gives her pleasure, this is her own business. But it cannot become the national criterion on which to convince the public that we should not integrate the economy of the West Bank . . .

Every Jewish mother wants her son to finish high school and university and to become a chemist, technician, engineer, or at least a trained plumber. Who is training the young people of today for the simple tasks, carrying buckets of cement or asphalt for road making? In the course of time we shall in any case need Arab workers for building agriculture and even industry. Immigrants are more and more people whose professions are far from these simple tasks.⁵⁹³

The second was a letter written by a Jewish Israeli woman to Moshe Dayan.

It read:

Both I and my husband were born in a moshav in the center of the country. Up until the Six Day War we lived comfortably, worked hard and made an honorable living. Since that war, however, things have changed dramatically, for my husband, a capable man, has become a farm-work contractor.

His work involves no problems: labor is cheap and there is a ready market. Today we have five Arab workers and we have reached the point where no one on the moshav lifts a finger. Nowadays my oldest son refuses even to mow the lawn. "Let Mohammed do it," he says. And to ask him to shift the irrigation pipes or do any manual labor is simply out of the question. My children and the other children of the moshav are, before my eyes, becoming rich men's sons of a base and disreputable kind, whose work is done by servants. They do not know how to drive the tractor standing in our yard and they behave as if farm work is beneath their dignity.⁵⁹⁴

Richard Stevens found that the relationship between the Zionists and the Palestinian was basically similar to that between the whites and the native Africans. He pointed out:

. . . in Israel as in South Africa, the alienation of the indigenous peoples from the land has occurred as part of the pattern of establishing and maintaining a settler state. Unlike South Africa, however, Israel does not assign to the "native" a primary role as laborer although this role, through force of circumstance, is steadily growing. Israel like South Africa, will increasingly need the cheap labor whose physical presence it equally fears.⁵⁹⁵

Louise Cainkar reached a similar conclusion concerning Israel's parallel to South Africa. She maintained:

In both Israel and South Africa, industrial development is in the hands of the ruling group and is confined to their areas. The brunt of the hard labor, however, is performed by the non-whites in South Africa and the Arabs in Israeli-controlled territory. The result is the same in both places: workers must either commute daily to work or spend the night in cramped shelters, returning home on weekends for Palestinians, one month a year for South African non-whites. Again, only the difference in the sizes of these two countries creates this difference.⁵⁹⁶

She further stated:

In South Africa, non-whites were forced off the land from which they drew their livelihood. The white minority government then created Bantustans in areas that were

economically unviable, forcing non-whites to seek jobs as low level workers in the white economy. Israel has taken most of the Palestinian people's lands and has crushed their economy, thereby forcing Palestinian dependency upon the Israeli economy. Palestinians who do not sell their labor to Israeli industries, developments or farms suffer tremendously, and their economic position resembles that of South Africa non-whites who work inside the Bantustans. Palestinians from the Occupied Territories who work in Israeli industries are about on par economically with South African non-whites who sell their labor to white industries. Both groups form a reserve labor army, brought in and cast out according to the whims of capital development. Just as the South African economy could not survive without exploiting non-white labor, so the Israeli economy is dependent for profits on the exploitation of Arab labor. Neither group of workers has any labor rights, "legal" unions or benefits.⁵⁹⁷

It is obvious that the Israeli policies in the occupied territories are aimed to convince the Palestinians to leave the territories. This was reflected in the position of Hagai Lev, one of the Herut leaders who pointed to Israel's "particular problem" in the territories which "could hardly be Jewish with a population of nearly 1 million Arabs and only some 200,000 Jews."⁵⁹⁸ Lev argued "that the Arabs would eventually get fed up with their life under Israeli rule and leave 'voluntarily.'⁵⁹⁹ He noted that this has been the case since "the number of Arabs in the West Bank has remained constant since 1967, even though the area has the highest birth rate in the world."⁶⁰⁰

That was the situation of the Palestinian workers who lived in the occupied territories. The conditions of the Palestinian workers who are Israeli citizens are basically the same. Facts and figures indicated the existence of disparities between them and that of Jewish workers. It was reported that:

Only 14.5 percent of the Arab labor force is engaged in white-collar jobs, as compared with 41 percent among the Jews (i.e. government posts, administration, planning, management, free professions, etc.), while 16 percent of Arabs and 5 percent Jews are employed in cheap labor. 38 Percent of Arab workers are employed in the construction industry and agriculture, compared with 12 percent of Jewish workers. 'To keep the Arabs as water carriers and wood choppers' was the slogan coined by an Israeli official (Lubrani) who was in charge of Arab affairs in the late fifties.⁶⁰¹

Most Arab villages find work in the Jewish metropolitan areas as unskilled or semi-skilled workers, especially in the construction industry and as porters in hotels, restaurants, garages, etc. They leave their villages between 5 and 6 a.m. and return home in the evening.⁶⁰² Lustick noted that "more often than not their status is not permanent and job insecurity is high, especially during the periods of economic strain."⁶⁰³ When questioned on this issue, a Labor Party leader in Haifa who handled the Arabs' affairs answered: ". . . when you tell them [higher government officials] about the boys' condition, you always get the same answer; they weren't better off under the Mandate; boys in Arab countries are just as neglected."⁶⁰⁴ Note that the white rulers in South Africa have advanced the same argument: the black workers in South Africa are better off than the black workers in other African countries.

The Israeli army represented another area of Zionist discrimination. Lenni Brenner pointed to the "discriminatory" structure of the Israeli army. He explained:

The Israeli army is officially discriminatory: Jewish males are drafted as are the Druse males (they are Arabs, but their religion is extremely accommodating to any powers that be), but Christians are not drafted, though they may volunteer. Town-dwelling Muslims (the majority of the Arab population) are neither drafted nor permitted to volunteer (Bedouins are allowed to volunteer--traditionally they have been antagonistic to the town dwellers and indifferent to nationalism, the very small Cirassian minority, who are Muslims but not Arabs, are drafted).⁶⁰⁵

Serving in the army provides special economic benefits. Ian Lustick wrote:

The possession of veteran status is a prerequisite to a wide variety of jobs and public assistance programs. The personal associations, as well as the rank and service records, a soldier establishes in the course of regular service and reserve duty are among the most important elements in the determination of a future career in Israeli society . . .⁶⁰⁶

Since most Israeli Arabs were barred from the armed service, this meant

that they were deprived of certain state subsidies and transfers (university fee, housing, child allowance, etc.) which were associated with military service. Although compulsory military service opened many job opportunities which were closed to other non-Jewish citizens, it did not save the Druze community from other Zionist discrimination such as confiscating Druze landholdings and neglecting to develop Druze villages. According to the Financial Times (November 10, 1982), an Israeli Druze officer said: "The government is quite happy for me to fight and die for the country. But after the army service I am treated as a second class citizen, just like the rest of the Arabs here."⁶⁰⁷ It was reported that this officer who has been wounded twice was at the time unemployed and wanted to emigrate. Expressing resentment with Israeli unequal treatment, the officer stated:

There is a lot of agitation in the West to force Russia to release that fellow Shcharansky. But what will happen if he is let out? He will come here and take over our land. My family has lived here for more than ten generations. I have fought in the army to defend Israel, but when he arrives, Shcharansky will have more rights here than I do.⁶⁰⁸

Another Druze who was a law student at Tel Aviv University expressed similar feelings:

The government doesn't give me the feeling that I am an Israeli. Israel took away the land of the Druze for Jewish settlements, and discriminates against Druze villages in the financial assistance which it gives their local councils.⁶⁰⁹

He pointed to the fact that Beit Jann (a Druze village) "receives only one tenth of the annual government financial allocation given to the nearby Jewish village of Ma'alot which has the same size population."⁶¹⁰

Kibbutzim (a collective agricultural, military, and industrial enterprise) is another area where Zionist racism has taken place. As a part of the Zionist "cooperative" movement, the kibbutz, like the Histadrut, has been a vehicle for the realization of the Zionist philosophy of separation. The kibbutz is a very important organization

which provides technical, financial, and social service assistance to member settlements. Israel Shahak considered kibbutz's members (who often claim to be "socialists") as "the worst racist in Israel."⁶¹¹ He referred to the fact that a non-Jewish Israeli citizen "cannot be accepted as a member in any Kibbutz, even in cases where a daughter of a Kibbutz fell in love with one of its hired non-Jewish workers."⁶¹² Despite its popularity in the U.S.A., the kibbutz, Shahak argued, "practices the greatest degree of racist exclusion."⁶¹³ He explained:

Since all non-Jews cannot become members of a kibbutz, because of its official exclusive character, and because the kibbutzim employ many temporary workers, under the misleading nickname of "volunteers," romantic love has naturally bloomed between young men and women under these conditions, in spite of all official discouragement. Therefore, the Christian partners had to be forced into conversion to Judaism, since without such conversion they could not become members of a kibbutz. A special school for such conversions was set up in Kibbutz Sa'ad. The Hebrew press reported some years ago that the Christian candidates for kibbutz membership, through conversion, had to promise that in the future they would spit when passing before a church or a cross. I regard it as natural, although regrettable, that the American media did not mention this interesting story. We can imagine what the American media, not to mention the present American Administration, would say had spitting before churches or crosses been recommended in certain other countries.⁶¹⁴

Discrimination extended even against fellow Jews of non-European origin. It was reported that those Jews who came from Arab countries "were often referred to contemptuously as 'hashechorim' the dark ones."⁶¹⁵ Their behavior was seen as "primitive."⁶¹⁶ It was also reported that "some students, for example, refused to eat at the same table with those Oriental Jew who work in the Kibbutz."⁶¹⁷

Within the Zionist movement, Shahak observed, racism has no connection with "left" or "right" learning. He criticized those Jews who joined "socialist" or "communist" parties in order to promote Jewish interests alone and at the same time kept silent about racist practices in Israel.⁶¹⁸ Their silence about the racist structures of the Kibbutz, Shahak saw, was a case in point. Similarly, General Eytan (a leading

right-wing Zionist), in exchange with critics, stated:

They [the Israeli left] call me a racist because I say what I believe. But you will never see an Arab in a left-wing Kibbutz or in one of their schools. Once they expelled a girl from the Kibbutz for having married an Arab. The Left claims that they want a democratic Jewish state. But what does that mean, a democratic Jewish state? It means a state without Arabs.⁶¹⁹

Even the Peace Now movement in Israel (very popular in the West for its "moderate" position concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict) was seen as a racist movement because of its refusal to accept Israeli Arabs as members in its organization.⁶²⁰

"Kiryat Arab," a Kibbutz settlement, proposed that all Palestinian workers employed by it should be dismissed. Professor Asa Kasher of Tel Aviv University criticized such "Nazi-like character and proposed that the name of the settlement should be changed to 'town of Nuremberg.'" He was answered in the well-known Hebrew weekly Koteret Rashit "that all Kibbutzim are as racist as Kiryat Arab."⁶²¹ The following poem reflected a growing awareness of Zionist racism among certain Israeli intellectuals.

Don't go to town of Nuremberg, Asa Kasher, Come with me to Kibbutz 'the Fields of Fuhrer,' and there with Jewish members we will check if there is even one Arab member. It will be simple and not difficult. Let us ask one of the waiting Arab workers whom they despise to go out, and check in their office. No one, not one Arab member Asa Kasher. Not one would be found. For the kibbutzim which could be called 'Fields of Fuhrer' or 'Furrow of Stirmer' are as they could have said in German 'Araber Rein'--'Clean of Arabs' all of them have not one Arab member . . .⁶²²

Shahak concluded:

It is my considered opinion that the State of Israel is a racist state in the full meaning of this term: In this state people are discriminated against, in the most permanent and legal way and in the most important areas of life, only because of their origin. This racist discrimination began in Zionism and is carried out today mainly in cooperation with the institutions of the Zionistic movement.⁶²³

As in South Africa, case laws are needed to "legitimize" the practice of

apartheid and discrimination in Israel.

The Legal Framework of Racism

Unlike South African apartheid, Zionist systematic discrimination was not explicitly recognized in the legal framework of the state of Israel. Most Israeli laws are free of formal provisions for separate development. However, laws were passed to sanction Zionist exclusivism and to ensure the subordination of the non-Jews to the Jewish character of the state. The law of Return which entitles every Jew (and only a Jew) anywhere in the world to immigrate to Israel and obtain automatic citizenship, is a case in point.

The Law of Return

Mick Ashley maintained that although Israeli discrimination against the Arabs was embodied in the "application of laws concerned with land acquisition, security, and citizenship, . . . Israel's racism is perhaps seen most clearly in her July 1950 Law of Return."⁶²⁴ In his speech before the Knesset (1950), David Ben-Gurion stated:

The Law of Return is one of the fundamental laws of the state of Israel. It embodies a central purpose of our state, the purpose of the ingathering of exiles. This law states that it is not this state which grants Jews from abroad the right to settle in it, but that this right is inherent by virtue of being a Jew, if one wishes to settle in the country . . . This right precedes the state of Israel, and it is this right which built the state of Israel.⁶²⁵

The Law of Return is basically a law of immigration because it deals with the immigration of Jews to Israel. However, it is called the Law of Return because Jews, according to Zionist ideology, "do not `immigrate' to Israel, but `return to it.'"⁶²⁶ Akiva Orr wrote:

The insistence on the latter term is an essential part of Zionism. The Zionist movement did not aspire merely to create a Jewish state, but insisted that this state be established in biblical Zion. It considers the Jews who come to Palestine as exiles returning to the homeland. The entire Zionist claim to Palestine is based on this conviction. This is not mere political expediency, it is a genuine conviction, and a

powerful emotional drive.⁶²⁷

The Law of Return stated:

1. Every Jew has the right to immigrate to the country.
2. (a) Immigration shall be on the basis of immigration visas.
 (b) Immigrant visas shall be issued to any Jew expressing a desire to settle in Israel except if the Minister of Immigration is satisfied that the applicant:
 - (1) Acts against the Jewish nation; or
 - (2) May threaten the public health or state security; or
 - (3) Has a criminal past liable to endanger public peace.
3. (a) A Jew who comes to Israel and after his arrival expresses a desire to settle there may, while in Israel, obtain an immigrant certificate.
 (b) The exceptions listed in article 2 (b) shall apply also with respect to the issue of an immigrant certificate, but a person shall not be regarded as a threat to public health as a result of an illness that he contracts after his arrival in Israel.
4. Every Jew who migrated to the country before this law goes into effect, and every Jew who was born in the country either before or after this law is effective, enjoys the same status as any person who migrates on the basis of this law.
5. The Minister of Immigration is delegated to enforce this law and he may enact regulations in connection with its implementation and for the issue of immigrant visas and immigrant certificates.⁶²⁸

The Law of Return embodied the fundamental principles of Zionist ideology which saw Israel as "the sovereign state of the Jewish people." Roselle Tekiner explained:

Its sovereignty is not limited to the Jewish citizens of the existing State of Israel. It claims as Jewish nationals all persons, wherever they live in the world, who are recognized by the state to be the descendants of the inhabitants of the Israelite nation that existed over two thousand years ago. In other words, there is no Israeli nationality status defined by the geographic boundaries of the state. There is an extraterritorial Jewish nationality which is accorded to all who are said to be descendants of Abraham, to whom, according to Biblical accounts, God promised the land of Canaan. Arabs are Israeli citizens, but they are not citizens *by return*. This means they do not possess nationality in Israel, for the *Jewish people* nationality is the only nationality status accorded by the state. It means that they are not served by *Jewish* (Zionist) institutions. The practical consequence is that they occupy a permanently disadvantaged position.⁶²⁹

Palestinian Arabs, who became refugees from areas that became part of Israel in 1948, were denied entry into Israel. Ashley suggested that "this blatant discrimination against the Palestinians surpasses anything practiced in South Africa."⁶³⁰ Although they are second or third class citizens, Ashley continued to say, black Africans, unlike the Palestinians, are "allowed to live within the border of [their] homeland."⁶³¹ Following the emergence of the Palestinian refugees problem, Israel rejected all United Nations resolutions which called on it to recognize the right of these refugees to return to their homes. At the same time, Israel has continued to demand more Jewish immigration. Ahmed Khalil, a Palestinian lawyer, now in exile, touched upon this point when he said:

I was born in Haifa, and so was my father and my grandfather. Now I am a refugee. Golda Meir was born in Russia, educated in America, and now she is Prime Minister of my country. I studied law with Abba Eban in Cambridge. He was born in South Africa and educated in England. Now he lives in my country and I can't.⁶³²

Mick Ashley commented:

It is immoral for Jews to quote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as giving Russian Jews the right to leave or to return to their country, while as Zionists they continue to support the denial of this right to the Palestinians. It is also morally wrong for non-Israeli Jews to support the dispossession of the indigenous Arabs by Jewish settlers on the grounds that it is a Jewish homeland, while they continue to ignore Israel's Law of Return. Hypocritically most non-Israeli Jews welcomed the Law of Return as the fulfillment of the ingathering of the exiles, but 80 percent of them voted against it with their feet by remaining in the land of their birth.⁶³³

The Law of Citizenship (The Nationality Law)

The Law of Return has direct connection with the Law of Citizenship of 1952 (better known as the Nationality Law) "which states that any Jew who comes to Israel by virtue of the Law of Return becomes--automatically--a citizen of Israel."⁶³⁴ Article 2 (a) of the Nationality Law stated that

"every Oleh [an immigrant Jew] under the Law of Return shall become an Israeli National."⁶³⁵ Article 2 (b) of the same law stated: "Israeli Nationality by return is acquired by a person having come to Israel as an Oleh after the establishment of the state with effect from the day of his Aliyah [immigration]."⁶³⁶ It is interesting to note that the citizenship in this case would be granted automatically without applying for it on the part of the Jewish immigrant. Orr wrote:

There is no need for an immigrating Jew to go through any legal procedure in order to become a citizen. Quite the opposite. Such an immigrant must go through a legal procedure in order to ensure--if he so wishes--that he does *not* become a citizen of Israel. Many Jews who came to Israel from countries which do not permit dual citizenship, and were unaware of the extraordinary nature of the Israeli Law of Citizenship, discovered--often to their dismay--that they lost their former citizenship when they failed to declare on arrival that they did not wish to have Israeli citizenship imposed upon them.⁶³⁷

The granting of "Jewish nationality," Roselle Tekiner argued, provided "special privileges" which have not been clearly recognized by foreign observers. She maintained that, unlike the United States, there is, in the Israeli case, "a major difference between 'citizenship' and 'nationality.'" The vagueness stemmed from the "'Jewish people' nationality status, which is unique in the world because it applies to all persons of one religion, wherever they live, but does not apply to citizens of the state itself that are not of the specified religion."⁶³⁸ She further explained:

"Nationality" is not merely a social identification with some political connotations that is applied to the various religious and/or ethnic groups within a state, as in many Eastern European and Middle Eastern countries. In Israel, "Jewish people" nationality is regarded as a concept of international law. This opinion was stated in the Eichmann Trial Judgment of 1961. Israel's highest court held, "The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, given by the League of Nations to Great Britain, constitutes an international recognition of the Jewish people."⁶³⁹

Indeed, Tekiner argued, "there is no Israeli nationality in Israel . . .

Jews must indicate their nationality as 'Jew.' Others are identified as 'Arab' or 'Druze,' etc. . . . "⁶⁴⁰ To clarify this, Tekiner cited the case of George Tamarin.⁶⁴¹ Tamarin, a Jewish Israeli human rights activist, demanded "that his nationality identification be changed from 'Jewish' to 'Israeli.'" His request was rejected by the Interior Ministry and later by the Supreme Court. The Court decision "stated that the desire to create an Israeli nation separate from the Jewish nation is not a legitimate aspiration." It further emphasized "that a division of the population into Israeli and Jewish nations would create a schism among the Jewish people and" thus "negate the foundation on which the State of Israel was established." The Court decision also stressed: "There is no Israeli nation separate from the Jewish people. The Jewish people is composed not only of those residing in Israel but also off Diaspora Jewry."

Contrary to the seeming clarity of the Law of Return, many problems arose from different interpretations. The case of Oswald Rufeisen⁶⁴² represented another confusion regarding the definition of "Nationality" and "Religion." Rufeisen is a Polish Jew who converted to Catholicism during the Second World War. In 1958, he immigrated to Israel demanding Israeli citizenship in accordance with the Law of Return. He considered himself as a Jew by nationality and a Catholic by religion. His request to consider him as a Jew for the purpose of "return" was rejected by the Israeli government and by the Supreme Court later. Instead, he "was granted residence in Israel under the Entry into Israel Law (1952), and subsequently, citizenship (by 'residence,' not by 'return')." Eventually Rufeise was "registered under the Population Registration Law (1965) as Israeli by citizenship, indefinite (blank) by nationality and Catholic by religion."

The other case was that of Major Benjamin Shalit⁶⁴³ (an atheist of Jewish descent) who together with his wife Ann Shalit (an atheist of Christian descent) "demanded that their children be registered as Israeli

by citizenship, Jewish by nationality and indefinite (blank) by religion." The Israeli government refused their request but the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Shalits. However, two months later, the Israeli Knesset passed an amendment to the Law of Return (1950) and to the Population Registry Law (1965) aimed "to prevent the ruling from becoming a legal precedent."⁶⁴⁴ Another amendment to the Law of Return was made by which the Minister of Interior was empowered to grant Israeli citizenship even prior to immigration to Israel.⁶⁴⁵ It was reported that the purpose of this amendment was to make it easier to the Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel.⁶⁴⁶ The Minister of Interior was also empowered "to withdraw the Israeli nationality of any person who has performed an action involving disloyalty to the State of Israel."⁶⁴⁷ Needless to say, the main target here is the Israeli Arabs. On the other hand, the Minister of Interior, according to another amendment, was empowered "to grant Israeli nationality to the inhabitants of the occupied territories."⁶⁴⁸ This was directed to those Arabs who collaborated with the Israeli authorities. To ensure their safety, a special arrangement was made whereby the granted Israeli nationality might not be stated in the identity card.⁶⁴⁹

Christopher Mansour and Richard Stevens suggested that the religious authorities (with the full support of the Israeli government) have contributed to what they considered a similar South African racism.⁶⁵⁰ By allowing the Rabbinical courts to rule on matters of who is a Jew and the issues of marriage and divorce, the religious authorities have influenced "the applicant's ability to claim Israeli citizenship as a Jew."⁶⁵¹ The Akwitz family's⁶⁵² problem is a case in point. The father (a Russian Jew) and the mother (a Russian Christian) emigrated to Israel with their two children. When the oldest son applied for the Army, he was rejected because "he was classified as a Russian and a Christian." A Jew in Israel "means a person who was born of a Jewish mother or who has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion."⁶⁵³ Such a device, Mansour and Stevens contended, enabled "the Israeli government

[to] neatly sidestep any charge of legislated discrimination by leaving the classification of the inhabitants to the rabbinical courts."⁶⁵⁴

The problem of Mrs. Rita Eitani⁶⁵⁵ added another case to the Zionist record of racism. Mrs. Eitani, a German immigrant, was able to enter Palestine clandestinely after the beginning of the Second World War. She became an active member in the Mapi (the right wing of the ruling Labor party at the time), and subsequently served in the Israeli army where she established a distinguished career. Because of some tension between her party and the Social-Religious party, rumors went around that Mrs. Eitani was not a real Jew on the grounds that she was born of a non-Jewish mother, and that she had never converted to Judaism. The matter was exploited by the other rival party. Thus a request for information from the German registration bureau concerning the origin of Mrs. Eitani's mother was made. It was found that her mother was not a Jew. Thus, Mrs. Eitani was asked "to give back her passport on the grounds that she had obtained her Israeli nationality by fraud." Further, "her marriage with a Jew was found invalid as civil marriage is not recognized in Israel." Her chance to be converted to Judaism was not there because the rabbis would realize that the case would not be inspired by real faith. Eventually Mrs. Eitani was fired from her work. On this, George Jabbour commented:

This case illustrates clearly the discriminatory practices of Israel with regard to its citizens. Israel and other settler states abound with such examples. The purity of blood which was the catch-word of the Nazi German regime, is also the catch-word of the settler regimes in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel.⁶⁵⁶

Similarly, Haim Cohen, one-time judge of the Israeli Supreme Court, declared:

The bitter irony of fate has decreed that the same biological and racist arguments extended by the Nazis, and which inspired the inflammatory laws of Nuremberg, serve as the basis for the official definition of Jewishness in the bosom of the State of Israel.⁶⁵⁷

Registration of Birth

The process of "Registration of Birth" represented another area of Zionist discrimination. Birth certificates for Jews list the following categories: Religion, Nationality, Citizenship of the Infant at the Date of Birth. Birth certificates for non-Jews list the following categories: Religion and Confession, Nationality, Citizenship of the Infant at the Date of Birth.⁶⁵⁸ Uri Davis held that there was a significant difference between the two cases:

In the case of the Jewish infants, the registration of religion alone is stipulated. The registration of confession (orthodox, conservative or reform) is not required, presumably in order not to undermine the effective state-supported monopoly of the orthodox Jewish confession in Israel. [It should be] noted [that] conservative and reform Jewish Rabbis, who may legally lead their congregations in all parts of the world outside the territory of the state of Israel, cannot legally officiate in the Jewish state.

In the case of non-Jewish Palestinian Arab infants, however, the registration of confession (for example, Sunni Muslim, Shia Muslim) is mandatory, in line with the supreme policy of all Israeli governments to consolidate confessional divisions within the non-Jewish population.⁶⁵⁹

Davis pointed to what he called another "shocking practice." While "the citizenship of the Jewish infant is registered as Israeli at the time of his or her birthday, the citizenship of the non-Jewish Arab infant is left indefinite at the time of his or her birth."⁶⁶⁰ Davis stated:

Both babies were born in the state of Israel. Both birth certificates were issued by the State of Israel, Ministry of the Interior, Population Registry Division. For the clerk at the Population Registry Division at the Ministry of the Interior a Jewish infant in the state of Israel has *Israeli* citizenship at birth, but an Arab infant in the state of Israel is *devoid of citizenship and is, therefore, stateless* at birth.

The World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency (Status) Law

Another Israeli law which "legally" discriminates against the non-Jews is the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency (Status) law, which was passed by the Knesset in 1952. This law coordinated the efforts of

the Israeli government and the Zionist institutions in order to achieve "the central task" which is the "ingathering of the exiles."⁶⁶¹ In this respect, Alfred Lilienthal commented that ". . . the other side of the coin was that more Palestinians had to be removed, let alone not permitted to return home, to make room for incoming Jews."⁶⁶² The Status Law charged the Zionist organization (JNF, WZO, JA) with the matters concerning settlement of immigrants and the development of the country. However, these organizations:

. . . have no desire or inclination to aid or even acknowledge the presence of the non-Jewish Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel. And yet these organizations have been granted a quasi-governmental status to the extent that they are "a state within a state," and have control over many public functions which are normally reserved for the government. They control immigration policies and thus grant special economic and financial benefits to new Jewish immigrants. They provide Jewish settlements, cities and villages with financial and technical aid that is denied Arab villages.⁶⁶³

Roselle Tekiner argued that "the Status law is the most significant of the 'fundamental laws' for recognizing Israel's legal clandestine racism."⁶⁶⁴ She further pointed out:

A nation which codifies in a *fundamental* law that its "central task" is to serve one particular group of citizens, identified by ancestry (born of a Jewish mother) or by religion (converted to Judaism), is racist, according to the definition adopted by the General Assembly in 1965. This definition is, as stated earlier, "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin." If Zionism's discriminatory principles were incorporated in a constitution, as in South Africa, its racist nature would be open to view and condemned by the world. Instead, it is given lowered visibility by specifying the discrimination in the inconspicuous Status Law.⁶⁶⁵

And then concluded:

In short, the Status Law legitimates an arrangement between the government and the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency, the effect of which is permanent discrimination against the non-Jewish sector of Israeli citizenry. The Status Law makes the government a full and equal partner in activities which provide advantages to citizens *by return* which are legally denied to other citizens.⁶⁶⁶

In the same line of thinking, Alan Taylor pointed to the racist nature of Zionism and its discriminatory practices.

The net result of these executive policies, legislative actions, and judicial decisions has been to maintain Israel as an exclusivist State. The assignment of an ethnic-religious *motif* as the guiding principle of national character and destiny separates Israel from other polities. Whereas, a naturalized citizen of France, for example, becomes "French" in the legal and social sense, a citizen of Israel does not become "Jewish." If he is a Jew he is registered as such and gains immediate rights of full citizenship and participation in the national ideal upon entry as an immigrant. If he is a non-Jew, his status is automatically subordinate, whether it be as an undisplaced Palestinian or an immigrant subject to the residence requirement for naturalization. The discrimination, both implicit and explicit, against non-Jewish citizens is thus the measure of Israel's departure from established democratic practice.⁶⁶⁷

The discussion in this chapter clearly indicated the settler colonial character of the Zionist movement. The course of the Zionist enterprise was similar in essence to that of European colonialism in Africa and Asia. The Zionist project was set up to establish an exclusive colonial settlement with the support of the colonial powers. The link with the British colonial power indicated the reactionary nature of the Zionist movement. This has also been manifested in current imperialist support to Israeli policies. In addition to its colonial character, Zionism is a racist ideology. This was manifested in the argument that the Jews make up a "chosen/pure race" which should not be assimilated with other "inferior races." As is the case with every colonial movement, Zionism has constantly tended to dehumanize the image of the local population. This has been manifested in the widespread prejudice and discriminatory policies against the non-Jews. The practice of apartheid is not dissimilar in essence to that of South Africa. In practical terms, Zionist exclusiveness meant that the native Arabs, both Christian and Muslims, were to be excluded from participating in the social and political life of the state. In the Jewish state, the Jews alone are entitled to special political and economic privileges. Unlike South

African apartheid, Zionism's systematic discrimination was not explicitly recognized in Israeli laws. However, the Law of Return, the Law of Citizenship, and the Status Law were passed to sanction Zionist exclusivism and to ensure the subordination of the non-Jews in Israel. Thus, far from being a progressive movement, Zionism is a colonial racist enterprise.

ENDNOTES

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Chapter IV

Conclusion

I went to Israel recently, and enjoyed every moment there. I told the Prime Minister when I got back that as long as Israel exists we have a hope. If Israel should, God forbid, be destroyed, then South Africa would be in danger of extinction.

This statement was made by General Hendirk Van den Bergh, head of South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS), as quoted in Zednek Cervenka and Barbara Robers, The Nuclear Axis (New York: Times Books, 1978), p. 311.

During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982), an Israeli family was sailing in the Green islands where they were shocked by the feelings of hostility of everyone they met, even traditionally friendly Western Europeans. However, a couple from South Africa were exceptional. They welcomed the Israeli family by saying: "You're just like us. We're outcasts too."¹

The story serves to explain a growing phenomenon--that Israel, like South Africa, is a pariah state outside the international community. In his article "The Club of Pariahs," Kenneth Adelman suggested that Israel, like South Africa, is an international pariah.²

The relative isolation is due to the uniqueness of the two countries. South Africa is a unique state where apartheid is official and de jure. The white minority (16 percent of the total population) exerts virtually total political, economic, and military power. Israel is also unique, for it was established as a refuge for the Jews who were victims of prejudice and persecution. However, the reality (which has often been ignored or rationalized) that another people had to be robbed of their land and the Palestinians had to be discriminated against or expelled suggested increasing similarities between the two situations. The Zionist treatment of the Arabs under Israeli control was equated with Pretoria's barbaric handling of Africans. In 1975, the U.N. passed a resolution

equating Zionism with racism and comparing it to apartheid. In 1978, Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky asked: "When are people going to investigate the apartheid system in Israel?"³ Returning from a trip to the Middle East (September 1985), congressman George Crockett suggested that "a system of apartheid exists on the West Bank and Gaza under the Israeli military occupation."⁴ For Israel, the analogy with South Africa is very upsetting. It is seen by Israeli officials as "a disgusting and unfair comparison," which has "more than a little anti-Semitism behind it."⁵ In a lecture given to the School of Law, Tel Aviv University, Raphael Eitan, a member of the Israeli Knesset (Chief of Staff of the Israeli army during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon), stated:

I don't understand this comparison between us and South Africa. What is similar here and there is that both they and we must prevent others from taking us over. Anyone who says that Blacks are oppressed in South Africa--is a liar. The Blacks there want to gain control of the White minority just like the Arabs here want to gain control over us. And we, too, like the White minority in South Africa, must act to prevent them from taking us over. I was in a gold mine there and I saw what excellent conditions the Black workers there have. So there are separate elevators for Whites and Blacks, so what? That's the way they like it.⁶

However, many observers (including Israelis) believe that the analogy with South Africa became inescapable. In January 1988, Shlomo Avineri, a prominent Hebrew University political scientist close to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, suggested that "by the year 2000 we will look into the mirror and we will see South Africa."⁷ Nevertheless, Avineri's vision of the future has already materialized in the occupied territories. The Chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, Dr. Israel Shahak, maintained that the Palestinians' "conditions are actually, theoretically and officially worse than South Africa."⁸ Examining the situation in the occupied territories, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz stated that while "South Africa abolished the 'pass laws' for the non-white residents," the Jewish state "is liable to find itself now on the road that South Africa abandoned."⁹ The Israeli handling of the

current Palestinian intifada (uprising) reflected typical South African-style confrontations between stone-toting youths and heavily armed army units. However, the parallel with South Africa is not only a matter of similar repressive techniques used to quell restless natives. Rather, the analogy runs deeper to the philosophies of exclusiveness and separateness, which are the basic principles of the ideologies of apartheid and Zionism.

An ideology is a set of beliefs and values which rationalizes a society's structure of power and privilege. It can be used by the ruling groups or by those who oppose the system. An ideology that explains and justifies the status quo is called the dominant ideology. "The beneficiaries of a dominant ideology rationalize their role by false claims which they want the dominated to believe, because this facilitates dominations."¹⁰ However, according to Heribert Adam, an effective ideology must address both subordinate and superordinate groups. In other words, "a ruling group too must feel morally comfortable with its ideology."¹¹ The divine right of kings was an effective ideology during Europe's Middle Ages. European colonialism of the nineteenth century justified its domination over the natives on the basis of biological and moral superiority--a rationale also used by whites of North America in their handling of both black and native Americans. Hence the idea of the "white man's burden" which was used to rationalize all European expansions. The inferiority of the natives was a basic theme used in Palestine and South Africa by the European settlers who leaned heavily on the West's racism and its deep prejudices about the Orient.

Zionism and apartheid are both products of the European nationalism which emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century.¹² Alfred Moleah maintained that the origin of Israeli Zionism and South African apartheid "are an idea--an idea that has become a material force."¹³ Ali Mazrui believed that "both Zionism and Afrikaner nationalism have borrowed from the anti-pluralistic and exclusivist tendencies of German nationalistic thought as a special case of European nationalism."¹⁴ A

common feature of the two ideologies, according to Steve Goldfield and Hilton Obenzinger, "is a mixing of national and racial identities and aspirations, often symbolized as bult, or blood, i.e., genetic purity."¹⁵ Heribert Adam considered Israel and South Africa as ethnically divided societies whereby "the ruling group ideology is enshrined in law or custom at the expense of secular citizenship rights," and where there "are second class citizens, almost outside the polity, who are perceived as untrustworthy by birth."¹⁶

However, the two types of colonialism are different. Fred Halliday,¹⁷ Eqbal Ahmed,¹⁸ and Edward Said¹⁹ maintained that Zionist colonialism seeks to "expel," "exclude," and "eliminate" the indigenous population while Afrikaner colonialism involves occupying and exploiting the native population. Israel and South Africa represent the world's only remaining example of a settler-colonial regime.²⁰

Settler colonialism is the movement of permanent settlement of people from one country to the other. The indigenous people are seen as a cheap labor source and, at the same time, as a part of the hostile environment that needs to be overcome.²¹ Settler colonialism has a tendency "to move toward exclusivism, exploitation, oppression, and racism."²² It is different from traditional colonialism in that the ill treatment of the natives in the former situation "is more systematic, intense and brutal" than that in the latter situation.²³ As Alfred Moleah put it, "all colonialism has a racist predicate but settler colonialism has virulent racist predicate."²⁴ The interests of the settler-colonialists are in contradiction to those of the natives and on some occasions to the parent country. The settlers tend to secede from the sponsoring power and establish their own supremacist system, which is characterized by a ruthless oppression of the natives.

A common feature of settler regimes is the question of security. These regimes, according to Eqbal Ahmed, are insecure unless three conditions are fulfilled:²⁵

1. A solution to the "native problem" is found.
2. A decisive hegemony over neighboring countries is established or at least a normal relationship with them is accomplished.
3. A certain autonomy from its sponsoring power is obtained.

Settler regimes succeeded in the U.S. and Canada, but failed in Kenya, Algeria, Angola, and Zimbabwe. South Africa has tried (not very successfully) to fulfill the third condition. The increasing resistance of the Africans has made apartheid unworkable. The establishment in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe of independent government has intensified the white's sense of insecurity. Furthermore, the South African whites have a demographic problem that cannot be overcome. Israel, for its part, "is trying to fulfill all three conditions simultaneously."²⁶ Like South Africa, Israel has succeeded in establishing a great deal of independence from the core.²⁷ However, in terms of independence that is based on economic strength, Heribert Adam,²⁸ Uri Davis,²⁹ and Brice Harris³⁰ believed that South Africa, because of its abundant resources of gold, coal, and strategic minerals, is in a better position than Israel. On the other hand, having made themselves a majority in the land of Palestine, the Israelis feel more secure than the whites of South Africa. Unlike South Africa, Israel enjoys unconditional Western support, which helped continual Israeli colonization of Palestine.

All movements of colonial settlement need land. From the beginning of the colonial era until the age of imperialism, non-European lands were seen as being "free" or "vacant" land available for permanent European settlement. That was manifested in the European description of America, in the Afrikaner description of South Africa, and in the Zionist description of Palestine. The main concern of the newcomers was the question of acquiring land. That was the case in Palestine and South Africa.

Both Israel and South Africa started as immigrant societies of

technologically superior settlers who managed to seize land and overcome the resistance of the local population. The settlers, in both cases, succeeded in occupying the coastal areas and pushed the natives into the interior. In the course of time, the settlers had sought more favorable locations further inland. In both societies, European immigrants were able to create a political structure in which they and their descendants control the political process and thus enjoyed superior socio-political status. They have used their superior technology and close connection with the West to ensure their domination. The resistance of the indigenous population (seen by the settlers as terrorism) has continued in both societies. The Zionists and the South African whites have tried to convince the world that the conflict in the Middle East and Southern Africa was entirely the fault of the Arabs and Africans because of their refusal to accept the Jewish state and the white regime. In the Zionist case, the process of colonial expansion (called frontier) is still taking place as the Israeli government supports new Jewish settlement in the occupied territories. Leonard Thompson and Howard Lamar contended that today's Israel represents a present case of "a frontier situation" which is basically characterized by:

Settlement by people with a technology superior to that of the "indigenous" inhabitants and with access to the skills, products, and capital of the industrialized West; their creation of a bridgehead behind the shelter of colonialism; their control of a postcolonial state; and their victories in frontier wars, followed by the incorporation and settlement of conquered territory, the expulsion of many of the indigenous people, and the subjugation and segregation of those remaining. The Israeli frontier is still "open," with raids and counterraid taking place across its contested boundaries; and it remains to be seen whether, when it closes, the state of Israel will be secure or whether it will have been ephemeral, like the white settlements in tropical Africa.³¹

In the Zionist case, Palestine was simply declared empty. The most appealing Zionist slogan has always been "the land without people for a people without land." Such a slogan, according to Eqbal Ahmed, "was not

an expression of sheer ignorance," instead "it was an ideological statement, the declaration of a political program totally congruent with the contemporary ethos of imperialism."³² The claim of uninhabited Palestine was part of the Zionist strategy set forth by Herzl, who (after a meeting with the British Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain) stated: ". . . if I could show him [Chamberlain] a spot in the English possession where there were no white people as yet, we could talk about that."³³ To the founding father of the movement, Zionism was a colonial enterprise requiring imperialist sponsorship.

However, the problem was that Palestine already had a people. (In 1918 there were 56,000 Jews out of a total population of 700,000; and in 1946 there were 608,000 out of a total population of 1,900,000.³⁴) By 1948, Palestinian Arabs comprised 67 percent of the population and owned over 90 percent of the land.³⁵ This is, of course, after decades of Jewish immigration.) Eventually the Israelis became a majority after the forceful transformation of the Palestinian inhabitants in 1948 and in 1967. In today's Israel the Arabs comprise 17 percent of Israel's four million people in addition to 1.2 million Arabs in the occupied territory.

The premise of Herzl was to "spirit away the population." Arthur Ruppin, the chief architect of early Zionist colonization, declared in the 1920's that "Herzl's concept of a Jewish state was only possible because he ignored the presence of the Arabs."³⁶ In 1940 (eight years before the creation of the state of Israel), Joseph Weitz, then Director of the Jewish National Fund, wrote in his diaries: "there is no room for both people in this country . . . There is no room for compromise on this point . . . We must not leave a single village, not a single tribe."³⁷ According to Israeli government data, 45 percent of all Palestinian settlements disappeared after the establishment of the state of Israel.³⁸

In the early stage of the Zionist settlement, the only method for the acquisition of land was by means of economic exchange. When the Zionists became militarily powerful, conquering land replaced buying it.³⁹

In honoring its Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate helped facilitate Zionist land acquisition. Arthur Ruppin stated: "on every site where we purchase land and where we settle people, the present cultivators will inevitably be dispossessed."⁴⁰ This set in motion a pattern of colonial dispossession which led to the Palestinian rebellion of 1936-1939. By 1947, when the British turned the Palestinian question to the U.N., Jewish landholdings in Palestine was about 8 percent of the whole territory.⁴¹ In 1947 the U.N., under pressure of Western powers, awarded 54 percent of Palestine's land to a Jewish state. The new settler state of Israel managed to expand its territory from the 54 percent allocated by the U.N. to 78 percent in 1948.⁴² Israeli expansion continued further in 1967. The rest of Palestine's territory and of two neighboring states was conquered by Israel as a result of the Six-Day War (1967). The 1967 war also resulted in the evacuation of about three hundred thousand Palestinians from the West Bank.⁴³ The massive dispossession and population transfer has been central in Zionist policies. A straightforward statement by the Israeli journalist, Y. Ben Porat, is representative:

It is the obligation of the leadership to openly and bravely remind the public of truths which have been whitewashed and blurred in the course of time. One of them is that there is no Zionism and no settlement and no Jewish state without the evacuation of the Arabs and the expropriation of lands If the public so desires it will accept Zionism as it is, with all its implications and "deviations"; if not, it will negate Zionism from its beginnings until today.⁴⁴

Many collective settlements were established in the "occupied territories"--a term that was changed into "the administered territories" and then "the territories" and eventually "Judaea and Samaria." This is a typical Zionist posture. Israel Galili, a veteran architect of early Zionist colonization, openly admitted that the state of Israel was the product of conquest: "Our right in Gaza is exactly like our right on Tel-Aviv. We are colonizing Gaza exactly in the same manner in which we colonized Jaffa." He added: "Those who doubt our right on Gaza should

doubt our right on Tel-Aviv as well."⁴⁵ Zionist colonization and displacement continue unabated. The Jewish National Fund and the state of Israel own 92 percent of today's Israeli land. Non-Jews have no right to lease or to farm this land. The remaining 8 percent of the land is privately owned by Jews and non-Jews.⁴⁶

Once a settler state is established, then the process of land acquisition is legalized through state laws. In the words of Heribert Adam, "legality . . . becomes a substitute for legitimacy."⁴⁷ In this context "the separation of legality from legitimacy make it possible to rule illegitimately with the aid of law."⁴⁸ This applies to both Israel and South Africa.

The Absentee Property Law of 1950 in Israel is a case in point. This law, with the Emergency Regulations, led to the transfer of Palestinian property into Zionist hands. The Absentee Law considered every locally born Palestinian who fled the war of 1947-48 as a foreigner subject to expropriation. The term "Absent-Present" was introduced, making any person who left his residence between November 29, 1947 and September 1, 1948 for any place outside Palestine or inside Palestine but outside Jewish control an absentee and thus denied citizenship.⁴⁹ In his book Israel: An Apartheid State, Uri Davis, the Israeli Jewish scholar, held that the Absentee Law is in contradiction to the U.N. Partition Plan of 1947. The two million Palestinians defined under this law as absentees "are constitutionally entitled without qualification to Israeli citizenship."⁵⁰ He believed that the denial of Palestinian's citizenship "is an act of mass denationalization, and a blatant violation of the U.N. Charter and international law."⁵¹ Comparing this with South Africa, Davis pointed out that the process of denationalization of the Palestinians "is far more radical and far-reaching than its South African equivalent."⁵² He explained:

It still remains the case, however, that South African apartheid recognizes the legal personality of its black

inhabitants in a way that Zionist apartheid with regard to the Palestinian Arabs does not. While aiming to exclude its black inhabitants from citizenship in the Republic of South Africa, South African apartheid still recognizes them as legal persons (albeit inferior), and thus predicated the legal mechanism of their exclusion on the *replacement* of their citizenship in the Republic of South Africa with an alternative citizenship, namely, citizenship in one of the ten bogus ethnic "new independent states." Through this mechanism the majority of the inhabitants of the Republic of South Africa, its black people, are rendered aliens in their own homeland, but they are not defined out of legal existence.⁵³

He added:

In the case of Israel, Zionist apartheid is applied under the categories of "Jew" versus "non-Jew." Of the almost three million non-Jewish Palestinian Arabs who are today entitled, under the constitutional stipulations of the 1947 UN Partition Plan, to Israeli citizenship, less than 25 percent (approximately 700,000 persons) are Israeli citizens. Under the Absentee Property Law (1950), the state of Israel has similarly denationalized 75 percent of its non-Jewish Palestinian Arab inhabitants (over two million persons classified as "absentees"). However, having classified them as "absentees" in the eyes of the law, it has thereby not only defined them as aliens in their own homeland, but has cast them outside legal existence altogether.⁵⁴

Israel is a state of Jews. According to its Supreme Court, Israel is a "sovereign state of the Jewish people."⁵⁵ Similarly, South Africa is a state for whites. Its conditions are not dissimilar in essence to that of Israel.

In South Africa the ideology of apartheid was based on similar myth: The land of South Africa was simply declared vacant; the native did not exist. The Dutch settlers became Afrikaners as Palestine became Israel. The natives in both societies were defined in negative terms: non-whites in South Africa, and non-Jews in Israel. However, unlike Israel, which seeks to annex the occupied territories, South Africa is giving up land to fix its demographic problem.

The whites claim 86 percent of South Africa's territory for themselves. The Group Areas Act, The Native Land Act (1913), and the Native Trust and Land Act (1936), restricted the areas that are open to ownership by non-whites to about 14 percent of South Africa's territory.⁵⁶

The rest, the poorest land, is divided up into ten "homelands" or "bantustans." Africans are citizens of their "homeland" and thus not of South Africa. It is a device for ridding white South Africa of its unwanted black majority. Africans living in the "common area" are considered as migrant workers. The Bantustan policy was manifested in the granting of "independence" of Transkei in 1976, Bophuthat-swana in 1977, Venda in 1979, and Ciskei in 1981. In these homelands, Africans have the right to form political parties, carry on election campaigns, and vote for self government. Accordingly, the Afrikaners claim that apartheid does not deny African political rights; it only separates Europeans and Africans by granting each a political home. Africans are forbidden from living in or owning land in the "white areas." There is also a great deal of restriction (lifted recently) concerning their freedom of movement. Such restriction was regulated through several laws such as the Group Area Act, and the Bantu Law Amendment Act of 1964. Africans in white areas can travel and reside there only by obtaining official travel documents. However, the pass laws (repealed in 1986) which controlled black movement around the country are matched by Israeli restrictions against Palestinian movement. It is illegal for Palestinian workers who work in Israeli factories to spend the night inside Israel.⁵⁷ Indeed, the roots of Afrikaner discriminatory legislation can be traced back to the South African Act of 1909, which stated that to be a member of the South African Parliament, one must be "a British subject of European descent."⁵⁸ The 1984 constitution of the Republic of South Africa recognizes the "white," "coloured," and "Indian," inhabitants (all comprise 25 percent of the total population) as citizens of the Republic. They are, however, segregated politically in three separate Houses of Parliament. The rest of the population, the blacks (comprising 75 percent of the total population), are denied South African citizenship. Apartheid's version of the Nuremberg race laws are the Immorality Act and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (abolished in 1985). The Population Registration Act

of 1950, which was introduced by the Nationalist Party, became the cornerstone of the apartheid system. According to this Act, every person in South Africa is classified as either white, colored, or black. Thus, all aspects of life are determined by a racial label which one acquires at birth.

While the key question in South Africa is who is a white, the key question in Israel is who is a Jew. However, in the Israeli case one does not find similar legislations that make overt distinction between the Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. A noted exception are the following: the Law of Return (1950), the Nationality Law (1952), and the Status Law. Israel does not have a written constitution. These three fundamental laws substitute for a constitution.

Israel's Law of Return and Nationalist Law grant automatic citizenship to any Jews from anywhere while denying this to Christian and Muslim Palestinians whose rights to their land go back centuries. A Jew in Chicago or New York who wishes to live in Israel only has to knock on the doors of Israel and forthwith becomes a citizen. This is a racist doctrine which treats all Jews, anywhere, as inchoate citizens of Israel. One wonders what the reaction of American Jews would be if the United States Congress passed immigration laws stating that "every Christian has the right to immigrate to America." Like the concept of "Eretz Yisrael" (Greater Israel), this Law is inherently expansionist. As long as the Law of Return operates in Israel, the Zionist state seeks to expand in order to provide room for the newcomers. The Economist (London) reported that in wake of recent immigration of Soviet Jews, the Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir, stated that "a 'big Israel' was needed to absorb 'a big immigration'"⁵⁹ (emphasis added). Zionism has made no secret of its intention to create "Greater Israel"--a land that runs from the Nile to the Euphrates. This expansionist dream even became a subject of U.S. criticism when, in May 1989, Secretary of State James Baker told the annual conference of Israel's lobby, AIPAC (The American Israeli Public

Affairs Committee) that the time had come for Israel "to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a Greater Israel."⁶⁰

Although "apartheid in Israel is overarching legal reality" which "determines the quality of everyday life," its legal structure, Uri Davis suggested, is different from that of South Africa.⁶¹ The Zionist key legal distinction ("Jews" versus "non-Jews") is manifested in two levels. The first one exists in the Constitutions and Articles of Association of all the Institutions of the Zionist movement, such as the World Zionist Organization (WZO), the Jewish Agency (JA), and the Jewish National Fund (JNF) (all of which were granted quasi-governmental status by the state of Israel in the early 1950's). The Constitutions of these organizations state clearly their objectives to exclusively promote the Jewish interests.⁶² The second level is embodied in the incorporation of those constitutions into the body of the laws of the state of Israel. Examples are: The Agricultural Settlement Law (1967), Covenant Between the Government of Israel and the Jewish National Fund, and others.⁶³ In this situation, the government and the Jewish institutions become partners in implementing socio-economic programs which benefit only Israeli Jews. The policies of the JNF (which covers 92 percent of Israel's land) prohibit the use of non-Jewish labor. A standard clause in JNF leasehold reads: "The lessee undertakes to execute all works on the holding . . . only and exclusively with Jewish labourers."⁶⁴ As Rosella Tekiner noted, the Status Law "facilitates legal, economic, political and social discrimination against Arabs by delegating a wide range of national service to Zionist institutions serving only Jews."⁶⁵ Another discriminatory practice (not easily recognized) is the question of financial aid which the government provided to Israeli families. The Discharged Soldiers Law restricted the subsidies to soldiers or members of their family only.⁶⁶ Since most Israeli Arabs are not allowed to serve in the army, they become "deprived of certain national insurance benefits, government backed mortgages, scholarships, and the discharge papers demanded by many prospective Jewish

employers."⁶⁷ Thus, through such devices, the Zionist state was able to maintain its apartheid system without explicit mention of "Jew" as a legal category vs. "non-Jew."

In addition to these laws, the religious authorities, who have a great say in determining personal status, have contributed to Zionist discrimination. Because they hold the final decision of who is and is not a Jew, the rabbinical courts affect the applicant's ability to claim Israeli citizenship.

It is well-known that the definition of a Jew remains one of the most controversial subjects in Israeli politics. The issue is connected to critical questions such as: What is the nationality status of a child of a mixed marriage when the mother is not a Jew? If a Jew converted to Christianity, is he or she eligible for citizenship according to the law of return?

It is remarkable to know that the state of Israel, through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, recognizes only one of the three contemporary Jewish confessions, the minority orthodox rabbinate. The other two Jewish confessions (the conservative and reform) are denied recognition in Israel.⁶⁸ Thus, both conservative and reform Jewish Rabbis can perform religious business such as marriage, divorce, etc. everywhere in the world with the exception of Israel's territory.⁶⁹ In Israel, the definition of a Jew is one who was born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism by the orthodox rabbinate.⁷⁰

It is ironic that Israel is presented to the world as a secular democracy while in reality it is regulated as a Jewish state. Civil marriage is not permitted, and the Israeli Law of Marriage and Divorce prohibits Jews from marrying non-Jews. Maintaining "Jewish purity" is seen as a vital matter. Golda Meier, a former Israeli prime minister, expressed fear from increasing cases of mixed marriage.⁷¹ Rabbi Levin, a Knesset member, put it clearly: "We are not religious and not national, but we are special people, God's people . . . genuinely different from all

people."⁷² I.F. Stone wrote:

For Israel is creating a kind of moral schizophrenia in world Jewry. In the outside world the welfare of Jewry depends on the maintenance of secular, non-racial, pluralistic societies. In Israel, Jewry finds itself defending a society in which mixed marriages cannot be legalized, in which non-Jews have a lesser status than Jews, and in which the ideal is racial and exclusionist. Jews might fight elsewhere for their very security and existence--against principles and practices they find themselves defending in Israel.⁷³

A government does not need to emulate Pretoria, openly proclaiming social segregation, to be judged a racial state. In 1965, the U.N. defined racial discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin."⁷⁴ This definition provided the basis for the U.N. resolution of 1975, which stated that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."

In addition to the myths of the "empty land" and "civilizing mission," Biblical themes were used to justify and rationalize the claim to the land and the dominant position of the governing groups in Israel and South Africa. Both Afrikaners and Zionists see themselves as God's "chosen people" to fulfill a divine mission--a position which explains their superiority and the necessity to be separated from the "lesser" people around them. They have a sense of special destiny among people of the world and are motivated by concepts of a "promised land," a "new Israel," and a people "destined to be a light among nations."

In South African apartheid, the Bible is central as a document in which the Afrikaners' rights are stated. Calvinism (to which the white settlers adhered) inspired Afrikaners to draw a parallel between themselves and the ancient children of Israel. They see themselves as a sort of Israel in Africa, and interpreted their history in a manner that corresponds with and mirrors that of ancient Israel. "It was the Old Testament and the doctrines of Calvin that moulded the Boer into the Afrikaner of today," Sheila Patterson stated.⁷⁵ Afrikaner settlements were given biblical names such as: "Betlehem, Nasareth, Bethan,

Oalmanutha and Benoni."⁷⁶ The Afrikaners see that their victory over the natives and their survival in Africa was divinely ordained. Using the Calvinist concept of elect, Afrikaners classified all whites as the elect and non-whites as the damned. The Afrikaner interpretation of the chosen concept led to the establishment of three basic principles of apartheid: A) Afrikaners have a divine mission to guide and civilize Africans; B) As a chosen people, they must not interbreed with other people; and C) Afrikaners' right of ownership over the land is unquestionable because it is God's promised land given to them. Afrikaners contend that the color line was created by God and thus racial differences among people must be preserved, for these differences represent God's will.

The Zionists, too, used the Bible to justify their claim to the land and their privileged position in Palestine. In this respect, Zionism has a lesser problem. The Old Testament has frequent references to the Jewish people as a "chosen," "holy," and "spiritual" people. It also emphasized the idea of Palestine as a promised land given to them by God. David Ben-Gurion, the first Israeli prime minister, described the Bible as the "sacrosanct title-deed to Palestine."⁷⁷ This is an important reason for the significance attached to the Old Testament in Zionist ideology. The land of Israel is of cardinal importance. The Zionist philosopher, Martin Buber, wrote: "The world can be redeemed only by the redemption of Israel and Israel can be redeemed only by the reunion with its land."⁷⁸ The Chief Rabbi in Israel, Rabbi Nissim, stated in 1968: "The Land of Israel was, with its border, defined for us by Divine Providence . . . In this connection it is not a question of law or logic; neither is it a matter of human treatment or that sort of thing."⁷⁹ Accordingly, the Zionists see the colonization of Palestine as nothing more than reclaiming what is Biblically theirs and the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy. Hence, the removal of the Palestinians (who were identified with the Amorites of the past) from the God-given land is seen as a necessary step for the purity and security of the Jewish people. Palestinian opposition represents

resistance to Israel's eternal battle to overcome the forces of evil. With God on the side of Israel, Palestinian resistance will be overcome like the "Canaanites" or "Ishmaelites" of ancient times. Current history and all its manifestations (the rebirth of Israel, its victory in six wars, even its invasion of Lebanon) reflected the redemption process, which eventually leads to the return of the Messiah. It should be stated that this view is shared by Protestant fundamentalists. In her book Prophecy and Politics, Grace Halsell pointedly noted that those fundamentalists hailed the invasion of Lebanon as "God's will" and a "sacred war."⁸⁰ They also share several basic Zionist principles, such as the necessity for the removal of Palestinians from Israel's land,⁸¹ and the return of the Jews to Palestine as a fulfillment of prophecy and a precondition for the second coming of Christ.⁸²

The Zionist use of religious themes sought to rationalize current Israeli policies such as the establishment of a Jewish settlement in the occupied territories and the occupation of Lebanon's land. The Israeli presence in Lebanon is seen as a sign of the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy stated in Deuteronomy 2:24: "Every place where the sole of your foot shall tread shall be yours: From the wilderness and Lebanon, from the river, the river Euphrates, even unto the hinder sea shall be your border."⁸³ South Africa, too, explained its successful penetration in Angola as a sign of divine intervention.⁸⁴ Both Israel and South Africa have similar policies of incursions into, and occupation of, their neighbors.

The political dynamics of apartheid and Zionism extended to neighboring states. Both regimes have sought to deal with their international situation by intimidating their neighbors with repeated attacks. Both Israel and South Africa have played the role of regional superpower, which often requires crossing international borders (South Africa in Angola, Lesotho, and Mozambique; Israel in Lebanon). They also tend to create surrogate forces to protect their interests. "The

equivalent of Hadad and the Falangists in Lebanon is Savimbi's UNITA in Angola or the South African backed MRM in Mozambique."⁸⁵ They share a similar perception of the external world as a hostile environment that needs to be overcome. The two systems are "alike" in their "siege or fortress mentality."⁸⁶ The Zionists and the Afrikaners emphasize the notion that "the rest of the world is against us." They view "themselves as embattled and persecuted peoples struggling valiantly to preserve themselves and their civilized values in an environment of barbarians and terrorists."⁸⁷ This is, as Heribert Adam saw it, "an ideology of survival" which requires "the manufacturing of enemies and threats" in order to enhance the unity of the ruling groups in both societies.⁸⁸ Since its inception, settler colonialism was concerned about the settler's survival, which often took place at the expense of the local people. Thus, "in the name of the right of the immigrant peoples to survive in a new land" the indigenous population "have been pushed off their ancestral lands, driven to or relocated in smaller, poorer areas, utilized as relatively cheap and defenseless labor, and denied effective political or civil rights."⁸⁹

To summarize, it is evident that the two systems share analogous backgrounds, political perceptions, commitments to separatist ideologies, and restless natives in their midst. All of these factors helped to establish a sense of kinship and solidarity between the two regimes. The head Rabbi of the Great Synagogue of Capetown stated: "I am convinced that the Afrikaner and the Israeli are made of the same metal. They share an awareness of calling and a right of self-determination which neither dare abandon."⁹⁰ However, there is more to the link than ideological affinity. There is a long history of cooperation between Zionist leaders and that of South Africa which led to growing and ever deepening relations in the economic, political, and military fields.

The roots of their relationship go back to the early years of this century. Three men, Jan Smuts, Chaim Weizmann, and Lord Balfour, dominated the relationship between South Africa, the World Zionist

Organization, and the British government. Those three politicians contributed to the birth of the South African Union of 1910 and the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The contribution of Chaim Weizmann (the British Zionist leader and later first president of Israel) to the wartime effort by his discoveries of high explosive materials, enabled him to cultivate the friendship of Britain's highest political figures. Balfour was instrumental in authoring legislation for the establishment of the South African State in 1910. His argument was that: "You cannot give the natives in South Africa equal rights with the whites without threatening the whole fabric of white civilization."⁹¹ Seven years later, Jan Smuts, South Africa's celebrated prime minister, played an important role in helping draft the 1917 Balfour Declaration, promising a "Jewish homeland" in Palestine.

Smuts and Weizmann met for the first time in London in 1917.⁹² At the time, Smuts was a "special delegate" from South Africa and War Cabinet. Weizmann was President of the English Zionist Federation. The meeting was successful and friendly, whereby the two men recognized their similarities and common interests. Weizmann found Smuts to be very sympathetic to the Zionist cause because of its link with British interests, and also because it was, in the words of Weizmann, "a simple question of the 'desert versus civilization.'"⁹³ On this Professor Richard Stevens commented:

In short, the subordinate position of the African majority in South Africa posed no difficulty for Weizmann, nor did it detract from the respect felt by the "New Moses," as Smuts called Weizmann, for the South African leader. Similarly, Smuts assumed without question "the right" of Jewish settlers to occupy Palestine without regard to the rights of the indigenous Palestinian Arabs. In both cases, Smuts and Weizmann projected at the highest level the capacity of Western civilization to rationalize domination and exploitation, conquest and control, as Christian civilizing mission or as ethnocentric Judeo-Christian fulfillment.⁹⁴

In a meeting of the South African Board of Deputies and the Zionist Federation, held in 1919, Smuts stated:

I need not remind you that the white people of South Africa, and especially the older Dutch population, has been brought up almost entirely on Jewish tradition. The Old Testament, the most wonderful literature ever thought out by the brain of man, the Old Testament has been the very matrix of Dutch culture here in South Africa . . .

That is the basis of our culture in South Africa, that is the basis of our white culture, and it is the basis of your Jewish culture; and therefore we are standing together on a common platform, the greatest spiritual platform the world has ever seen.⁹⁵ On that platform I want us to build the future South Africa.

Three decades later (1949), Smuts reemphasized his conviction about the "special" historical role of the Jewish people. He stated: "I do not think that at any other stage in history has there been an event of such far-reaching importance as the return of the Jewish people to their ancient homeland."⁹⁶ Smuts used his influence at the U.N. in favor of Zionism during a discussion concerning the partition of Palestine.⁹⁷ When Smuts passed away in September 1950, the then acting Israeli prime minister, Joseph Sprinzak, declared: "General Smuts is written on the map of Israel and in the heart of our nation."⁹⁸ Two years later in March 1952, Israel dedicated its "living memorial" to Jan Smuts. Alfred Moleah suggested that although the efforts of Weizmann and Smuts played an important role in initiating the alliance between Israel and South Africa, such an alliance was indeed created "by the objective conditions of their situation and goals."⁹⁹ Similarly, Richard Stevens saw the personal interaction between the two men as "a microcosm of all the cultural, economic, political, and imperial factors converging in the triangular relationship of Zionism, Britain, and South Africa."¹⁰⁰

The year 1948 marked both the declaration of the state of Israel and the accession to power of the National Party in South Africa. Dr. Malan, the architect of apartheid, declared his government to be the first to recognize Israel. In 1953, Malan was the first prime minister to visit Israel. His government permitted South African Jewish Reserve officers to serve in the Israeli army and eased the transfer of Jewish donations

to Israel.¹⁰¹ In return, the South African Jewish community (considered the most Zionist, and wealthiest, Jewish community in the world, and also the highest per capita contributor to the state of Israel), toned down their criticism of apartheid policies. This position was reflected in the following statement given by Rabbi M.C. Weiler at the eighth International Conference of the World Union for Progressive Judaism in London in 1953:

The Jews as a community had decided to take no stand on the native question, because they were involved with the problem of assisting Jewry in other lands. South African Jewry was doing more to help Israel than any other group. The community could not ask for the government's permission to export funds and goods and, at the same time, object to the government.¹⁰²

Hoping to gain the support of the newly independent African states, the Israeli government began to criticize South African policies of apartheid. In response, Dr. Handrik Verwoerd, a former South African prime minister, declared that "the Jews took Israel from the Arabs after the Arabs had lived there for a thousand years. In that I agree with them, Israel like South Africa is an apartheid state."¹⁰³ However, that was not serious, for the ties between the two systems were too deep to suddenly disappear.

In the wake of the Six-Day War (1967), Israel and South Africa were drawn increasingly closer. Upon Israeli initiative, the Israeli-South African Friendship League was established, and Menachem Begin was made its first president.¹⁰⁴ In South Africa, Harry Oppenheimer helped to create the Israeli-South African Man-to-Man Committee, which led to the establishment of the Israel-South Africa Trade Association.¹⁰⁵ Business was promoted especially in the form of joint investment ventures.¹⁰⁶ The two countries helped each other in time of difficulties (the first U.N. arms embargo against South Africa in 1963 and de Gaulle's 1967 embargo against arms to Israel) by exchanging Mirage aircraft and parts.¹⁰⁷ It was reported that Israeli licenses for weapon systems such as the Uzi Submachine gun, the Galil assault rifle, and Gabriel ship-to-ship missiles, were granted to South Africa.¹⁰⁸ In his book, Israel's Global

Role: Weapons for Repression, Israel Shahak stated that South Africa became "Israel's single largest weapons customer."¹⁰⁹ Even the AIPAC (American Israeli Public Affairs Committee) was forced to admit that "Israel has become South Africa's growing bilateral trade partner."¹¹⁰ On this, the Israeli Newspaper, Maariv, published "A Letter to a Dear South African Friend" by the Israeli author Ephraim Sidon, which read:

You can oppress, discriminate, shoot Blacks
Be racist--that's no tragedy

As long as the dead Black
Was shot by an Uzi round.

And if the head was split open with a club
Which was made in Israel
We will be the last ones in the world
To make a fuss over apartheid . . .

At times, as general lip service,
We'll condemn and say "not very nice"
But better one Kfir in the hand
Than three speeches coming out of our mouth.

And the arms will flow
No, we will not stop.
This is signed
In black and white.

That's because we have a
Long-term policy:
Money has no smell
And certainly no color.

Anyway, my good friend
In Pretoria,
Over here economics
Is more desirable than history.

So don't be upset
And get ready
To continue business
Under the table.¹¹¹

It is obvious that the aftermath of the 1967 war crystallized Israel and South Africa's communality of interest. As Die Burger, an organ of the National Party in the Cape Province, put it clearly:

Israel and South Africa have a common lot. Both are engaged in a struggle for existence, and both are in constant clash with the decisive majorities in the United Nations. Both are reliable foci of strength within the region, which would,

without them, fall into anti-Western anarchy. It is in South Africa's interest that Israel is successful in containing her enemies, who are among our own most vicious enemies; and Israel would have all the world against it if the navigation route around the Cape of Good Hope should be out of operation because South Africa's control is undermined. The anti-Western powers have driven Israel and South Africa into a community of interests which had better be utilized than denied.¹¹²

In the same line of thinking, the Jewish Affairs, the official organ of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, stated:

The argument that Israel and South Africa have a basic community of interest in the Middle East and further south has more than a grain of truth in it. There is nothing secret or sinister about it. The strong ties between the two countries, closer than ever since the 1967 war, are inseparable from their geographical and strategic position, from their anti-communist outlook, and from all the realities of their national existence . . . In short, the destinies of the two countries, so different in many ways, but so alike in the fundamental conditions of their survival, are interwoven in a much more meaningful sense than any enemy propagandist could conceive, or, for that matter, would be happy to see. Economic, political and military links between the two countries grew rapidly in the subsequent years.¹¹³

Indeed, Israel became a significant arms exporter, providing military and intelligence assistance not only to South Africa but to several dictatorships and pariah states. In his book, The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why (1987), Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, the Israeli scholar, wrote: "Mention any trouble spot in the Third World over ten years and inevitably you will find smiling Israeli officers and shiny Israeli weapons on the news pages."¹¹⁴ Hallahmi argued that beside "technology, armaments, and experience . . ." the Israelis export "a certain frame of mind, a feeling that the third world can be controlled and dominated, that radical movement in the third world can be stopped, that modern crusaders still have a future."¹¹⁵

As a result of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, relations between the two countries flowered and were expanded in all fields. The then South African prime minister Vorster declared "that if Israel lost the war, its defeat would have important consequences for South Africa."¹¹⁶ Vorster's

visit to Israel in 1976 concluded several agreements of cooperation between the two states.¹¹⁷ Despite the 1977 U.N. embargo against South Africa, the Israelis continued supplying South Africa with technology and advanced weapons in exchange for South African money and raw material.¹¹⁸ The potential interdependence between the two countries was clearly indicated by Itzhak Unna, Israel's ambassador to South Africa, when he said: "With South Africa's abundance of raw materials and Israel's know-how, we can really go places if we join forces."¹¹⁹ He also argued for the importance "for Israel and South Africa to stick together in order to confront the alliance of Africa and the Arab World."¹²⁰

Equally important is the cooperation in the field of nuclear technology. Between 1977 and 1979, the CIA noticed "a steady stream of visits to South Africa by Israeli nuclear scientists, technicians, and defense officials."¹²¹ In 1979, a "flash in the Southern skies" was believed to be a secret nuclear test conducted by Israel and South Africa.¹²² Evidence of such collaboration surfaced when, in October 1986, the Sunday Times (London) published the revelation of Mordechi Vanunu (a defected Israeli nuclear technician who was kidnapped later by the Mossad and brought back to Israel), in which he pointed to the presence of South African technicians at the Dimond Plant.¹²³ In June 1989 the Gurdian reported that South Africa was prepared to test a medium-range nuclear missile developed in cooperation with Israel.¹²⁴ In a review article, the editors of the Sunday Times of London (1984) described the connection between Tel-Aviv and Pretoria as a "major new force on the world scene."¹²⁵ Alfred Moleah pointedly noted that Israel-South Africa "links became organic."¹²⁶ In December 1984, the U.N. passed Resolution 39/72C on Israel-South Africa relations, in which the U.N. "again strongly condemned the continuing and increasing collaboration of Israel with the racist regime of South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields."¹²⁷

For those who advocate sanction against South Africa, Israel's involvement represents a great obstacle. Carole Collins, former national

coordinator of the Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa, explained:

Israel is now the biggest hole in the growing fence of sanctions surrounding apartheid South Africa. Israel is forcing the anti-apartheid movement--even the UN corridors--to ask: will we have to boycott Israel in the future to support the liberation of South Africa?¹²⁸

The Financial Times of London (1986) described Israel as "a weak link in the chain of international sanction."¹²⁹ In 1987, the Israeli Defense Minister Izhak Rabin gave one reason for Israel's opposition to sanctions against South Africa: "If we were up to the UN we would be the second in line."¹³⁰

Israel's connection with South Africa has been a subject of the U.N.'s criticism. The United Nations Centre Against Apartheid has published several reports about the progress of the ties between the two states.¹³¹ Archbishop Desmond Tutu condemned Israel's ties with South Africa and described the ill treatment of the Palestinians as "totally inconsistent with who she [Israel] is."¹³² In his recent visit to Jerusalem (December 1989), Tutu "supported the Palestinian people's right to self-determination" and "wasted no time in comparing events in the occupied territories with those in South Africa."¹³³ In an interview in Jerusalem, Tutu stated that if he had the chance to meet the Israeli prime minister "I would say to him that I cannot myself understand people who have suffered, as Jews have suffered, inflicting suffering of the kind that I have seen on the Palestinian."¹³⁴

Equally extensive is the scope and volume of intelligence and military cooperation. The Economist (London) reported that Israeli engineers assisted to "develop a sensitive surveillance system using highly sophisticated electronic detection equipment along South Africa's border aimed at detecting guerrilla attacks."¹³⁵ In his book, The Unnatural Alliance, James Adams (formerly defense correspondent and now features editor of the Sunday Times of London) described the Israeli-

South African partnership as being "one of the most significant strategic alliances of the past ten years," and suggested that "neither country is prepared to admit how interdependent they have become and yet this will affect forever the balance of power on the African continent, the stability of the Middle East."¹³⁶

However, by 1987 the Israeli position, because of U.S. pressure, was not to sign further contracts with South Africa.¹³⁷ In January 1987 Newsweek reported that Defense Minister Rabin made a secret trip to South Africa and told Pretoria's government that "the alliance can continue but much more quietly."¹³⁸ It was also reported that Israeli officials urged Israeli newspaper editors to "stay away from this [the relation with South Africa] sensitive matter of national interest."¹³⁹ Cooperation has continued unabated. In 1988 "50 Israeli aircraft engineers and technicians has signed contracts with South African Aircraft Industries to work on the Cheetah."¹⁴⁰ In 1989, "South Africa was preparing to test a medium-range nuclear missile . . . developed in cooperation with Israel." The New York Times reported that Israeli ties with Pretoria involved "hundreds if not thousands of jobs in Israeli military industries and several hundred million dollars in earnings."¹⁴¹

The "homelands," too, have growing ties with Israel. Israeli companies are involved in several projects in the homelands.¹⁴² The extensive Israeli involvement in the homelands "including trade offices in Israel" is considered as "a kind of de facto recognition."¹⁴³ Israel is the only country which treats the homelands as independent states. In Israel "the bantustans of Transkei and Bophuthatswana are listed among the other nations in the international dialing section of the directory of the government-run telephone company."¹⁴⁴ Israelis serve as guards protecting leaders of Ciskei. In late 1984, President Lennox Sebe of Ciskei visited Israel and signed the agreement of the "twinning" of the West Bank Settlement Ariel with Bisho, the capital of Ciskei.¹⁴⁵ During the ceremony several Israeli Knesset members hailed "Israeli-Ciskeian brotherhood and

a common struggle against a cruel world of double standards."¹⁴⁶ Israel, it was reported, helped to develop a small air force for Ciskei.¹⁴⁷ The extensive Israeli involvement in the homelands added another dimension to the nature of the Israeli-South African link.

To conclude, the Israeli-South African connection is not based on economic and political pragmatism; rather, it is based on philosophies of separation and exclusion which are the essence of Zionism and apartheid. The alliance "is a matter of true national consensus"¹⁴⁸ which is "based on an identity of position and goals."¹⁴⁹ Both regimes are committed to a practical policy of apartheid, though Israel does not formally employ the term. In both societies, social segregation is the practice which is enforced by members of the dominant groups. One can argue about the relative differences between the two cases, but the essence is the same. Both regimes follow domestic policies based on race discrimination, which is a logical consequence of settler colonialism. As the evidence reviewed suggested, Zionism is not a liberation or progressive movement. Rather, it is a racist ideology whose ethnic policies lead in the same direction of South African apartheid: expropriation of the lands of other people, denying the natives' fundamental human and political rights, and practicing extreme discrimination based on race superiority and purity using the myth of fulfilling a divine mission.

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