Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century The
Washington NATO Project Daniel Hamilton, Lead Author, Charles Barry,
Hans Binnendijk, Stephen Flanagan, Julianne Smith, James Townsend
Co-Authors February 2009 Atlantic Council of the United States Center
for Strategic and International Studies Center for Technology and
National Security Policy, NDU Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns
Hopkins University SAIS ii Table of Contents Preface and
Acknowledgments…………………………………………………iii
Introduction……………………………………………………………………...iv Executive
Summary………………………………………………………………vi I. New World, New Partnership…………………1
Chapter 1 New World Rising………………………………………………………...2 Chapter 2 A 21st
Century Transatlantic Partnership………………………………6 A Partnership with
Purpose A Better Box of Tools Chapter 3 Two Immediate
Tests……………………………………………………14 The Strategic Priority of Afghanistan and
Pakistan Relations with Russia: Engagement and Resolve II. A New
NATO………………………………….20 Chapter 4 NATO’s Missions: Home and
Away…………………………………....21 Where does NATO fit? Home Missions Away Missions
Chapter 5 What’s Needed for NATO……………………………………………….27 Carrying Out NATO
Missions at Home Carrying Out NATO Missions Away Chapter 6 Internal NATO
Reforms…………………………………………………43 Change the Way NATO Makes Decisions Change
the Way NATO Spends Money Generate Appropriate Military Capabilities
Match Missions to Means Rethink Functional and Geographic “Areas of
Emphasis” Conclusion………………………………………………………………...52
Endnotes…………………………………………………………………………..53 About the
Authors………………………………………………………………..56 iii Preface and Acknowledgements In
fall 2008 our four U.S. think tanks – the Atlantic Council of the United
States; the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); the
Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at the
National Defense University (NDU); and the Center for Transatlantic
Relations (CTR) at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) -- launched the Washington NATO
Project to spark debate before and after NATO’s 60th anniversary summit
in April 2009. The Washington NATO Project seeks to generate new ideas
and thinking about the transatlantic community's role in a changing
global security environment. Over the past five months we have solicited
views on NATO’s future from scores of current and former government
officials and military leaders, legislators, think tank colleagues,
scholars and other experts from both sides of the Atlantic. Four major
conferences examined specific issues. The first conference, co-hosted by
the Royal Netherlands Embassy and the SAIS Center for Transatlantic
Relations (CTR), focused on the strategic environment and implications
for Alliance missions. The second conference, co-hosted by the Embassy
of France and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Advisors Group, focused
on institutions and processes. The third conference, held at NDU with
cooperation of the Embassy of Denmark, focused on capabilities. The
final conference, co-hosted by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of
Germany and CSIS, with support from the NATO Public Diplomacy Division
and EADS, sought to bring the various strands together. This report
draws on these consultations. As we have engaged in these dialogues, it
has also become clear that a parallel effort is required to rethink and
reform the U.S.-EU relationship. We will produce a companion report on
that vital partnership later this year. We wish to thank those mentioned
above for helping to sponsor our deliberations, and the many Europeans
and Americans who engaged in the discussions. We also wish to thank the
Norwegian Ministry of Defense. Support for the Atlantic Council’s
Strategic Advisors Group by General Brent Scowcroft and Ralph Crosby and
Tom Enders from EADS/Airbus is also greatly appreciated. We are grateful
to Espen Barth-Eide, Esther Brimmer, Fran Burwell, Camille Grand,
Kenneth Huffman, Clarence Juhl, Andrzej Karkoszka, Franklin Kramer,
Richard Kugler, Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Julian Lindley- French, Leo
Michel, Klaus Naumann, Diego Ruiz-Palmer, Simon Serfaty, Marten van
Heuven, Alexander Vershbow and others who remain anonymous for helpful
insights. The views we express are our own, however, and do not
necessarily reflect those of our institutions, our sponsors, the U.S.
government, or anyone participating in our discussions. We do not claim
to have found all the right answers. But we hope we have raised some of
the right questions. iv Introduction We have an open but fleeting moment
to forge a more effective Atlantic partnership. We must seize it now.
European and North American allies have allowed their relations to
become discordant, yet the times demand vigor and unity. Courageous
decisions need to breathe new life and relevance into the Atlantic
partnership, which must be recast to tackle a diverse range of serious
challenges at home and abroad. This vital task needs to be a top
priority of the Obama Administration and its European counterparts.
Together, the United States and its European allies must embed their
mutual commitment of collective defense within a wider spectrum of
collective security. They need to stretch their partnership and better
connect their institutions. They are called to advance a new vision of
Atlantic partnership, underpinned by decisive actions that will reform
NATO, the U.S.-EU relationship, and other key areas of transatlantic
endeavor. This report has two purposes. First, it aspires to help chart
the path of change ahead for the transatlantic partnership. Second, it
makes specific recommendations for the future of NATO. A companion
report on U.S.-EU partnership will be released later this year. 60 years
after its founding, NATO’s three-fold purpose remains: to provide for
the collective defense of its members; to institutionalize the
transatlantic link and offer a preeminent forum for allied deliberations
on security and strategy; and to offer an umbrella of reassurance under
which European nations can focus their security concerns on common
challenges rather than on each other. Yet each of these elements is
being questioned today. In past decades, the Alliance met its purpose by
adjusting to changing strategic circumstances. Over four Cold War
decades NATO protected the western half of the European continent from
threats from its eastern half, while transforming relations among NATO
members themselves and working to overcome the overall divisions of the
continent. NATO’s original military strategy evolved to complement the
emergence of political détente. As the Cold War ended, NATO began, as
did the European Union, to work toward a Europe whole, free and at peace
with itself. After hesitation, missteps and great human tragedy in the
Balkans, NATO intervened to stop bloodshed and ethnic cleansing, and to
maintain the subsequent peace. It anchored central European countries
into the Euro-Atlantic community; extended that vision to those in
southeastern Europe prepared to build democracy, market economies and
peaceful relations with their neighbors; and acted further on that
vision to include other democracies from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
The result has been the successive advance of democracy, security, human
rights and free markets throughout most of the Euro-Atlantic region.1
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO for the first
time invoked its collective defense commitment, Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, declaring the attacks on the United States to be an
attack on all nations of the Alliance. Since then, NATO has engaged in
Afghanistan and built additional partnerships to address the threat of
terrorism and evolving challenges to Alliance security. v Each time new
challenges have arisen, NATO nations have sought a new consensus on the
changing strategic environment and how to address it together by
crafting a guidance document, or “Strategic Concept,” for the Alliance.
Yet NATO’s current Strategic Concept, its sixth over the past sixty
years, was adopted in 1999 – before the September 11 assaults and
anthrax attacks in the United States and major terrorist attacks in
Europe, before transatlantic dissonance over the invasion of Iraq,
before Alliance engagement in Afghanistan, before additional waves of
NATO and EU enlargement, before cyber attacks on Estonia, before the
reappearance of an assertive Russia and many other global trends. In
light of these changes, and as NATO enters its seventh decade, reaching
consensus on a new long term strategy should be of high priority, no
less than operational success in Afghanistan. However, the next concept
should go beyond providing direction to the NATO institution. This time,
the Alliance should take a higher plane, charting its future in ways
that relate the security, prosperity and freedom of its people and its
nations to the world as a whole. To symbolize this change, the next
guidance document should be formulated as a broader Atlantic Compact.2
Work on a new approach should begin with the 2009 NATO summit. At the
summit, Alliance leaders should affirm their central commitment to
collective defense in the context of 21st century challenges, and launch
an effort to prepare an Atlantic Compact that is more than a
fine-sounding communiqué. If it is to be useful, an Atlantic Compact
must reflect a firm, real-life political consensus between Americans,
Canadians and their European allies on how their partnership is to
function in coming years. It should be guided by a small group of
respected opinion leaders who would solicit advice from parliaments,
think tanks and experts. It should speak directly to its essential
audiences: the people of NATO, their partners and their potential
adversaries. It must provide unambiguous direction for NATO roles at
home and away. It should be more than a strategic concept for an
institution, it should renew for a young century the historic covenant
forged by the people of the North Atlantic. An Atlantic Compact offering
political guidance and future direction for the transatlantic
partnership can in turn offer a framework for a more focused and
detailed strategic concept that provides guidance to Alliance military
authorities regarding the forces and capabilities they must produce to
support the overall approach. This study is an earnest attempt to spark
transatlantic debate on this vital topic. vi Executive Summary We have
an open but fleeting moment to forge a more effective Atlantic
partnership. We must seize it now. European and North American allies
have allowed their relations become discordant, yet the times demand
vigor and unity. Courageous decisions need to be taken to breathe new
life and relevance into the Atlantic partnership, which must be recast
to tackle a diverse range of serious challenges at home and abroad.
Reaching consensus on long term strategy should be of high priority.
Leaders should go beyond providing direction to the NATO institution and
take a higher plane, charting in an Atlantic Compact the future of their
partnership in ways that relate the security, prosperity and freedom of
their people and their nations to the world as a whole. I. A 21st
Century Atlantic Partnership With the Cold War over and new powers
rising, some argue that the transatlantic partnership has had its day.
We disagree. Our achievements may not always match our aspirations, but
the common body of accumulated principles, norms, rules and procedures
we have built and accumulated together – in essence, an acquis
Atlantique -- affirms the basic expectations we have for ourselves and
for each other. For sixty years this foundation has made the
transatlantic relationship the world’s transformative partnership. North
America’s relationship with Europe enables each of us to achieve goals
together that neither can alone – for ourselves and for the world. This
still distinguishes our relationship: when we agree, we are usually the
core of any effective global coalition. When we disagree, no global
coalition is likely to be very effective. Our partnership remains as
vital as in the past, but now we must focus on a new agenda. Today’s
strategic environment is complex and unpredictable. North America and
Europe still face the menace of terrorism and the potential for conflict
between major states. Yet a host of unorthodox challenges demand our
urgent attention. These challenges require us to affirm our mutual
defense commitment within a wider spectrum of security; reposition our
key institutions and mechanisms, particularly U.S.-EU partnership and
NATO; and connect better with other partners. Five strategic
priorities loom large. Together, Europe and North America must o tackle
immediate economic challenges while positioning economies for the
future; o build transatlantic resilience – protect our connectedness,
not just our territory; o address the full range of international
security challenges we face together; o continue to work toward a Europe
whole, free, and at peace with itself; o reinvigorate transatlantic
efforts to preserve a habitable planet. NATO is indispensable yet
insufficient to this agenda. A new U.S.-EU framework, anchored by a
clause of mutual assistance, and other institutional innovations are
needed. In a companion report we will address U.S.-EU partnership in
greater detail. vii Two Immediate Tests The Strategic Priority of
Afghanistan and Pakistan Visions of a more effective, resilient
partnership will be moot if allies fail to quell terrorism and turmoil
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands. Afghanistan has become a
crucible for the Alliance. NATO’s credibility is on the line. We must
be clear regarding the threat, our goal, and our strategy: o Terrorist
threats to the U.S. and Europe directly linked to the
Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands present the most immediate acute danger
to transatlantic security today. o Our goal is to prevent any attacks
and ensure that this region never again serves as a base for such
threats. o Our strategy must have various components: greater
understanding that NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan follows from the
Alliance’s invocation of its Article 5 collective defense clause on
September 12, 2001; more effective, integrated international
coordination, working from Afghan priorities, coupled with political
engagement of local leaders; a broader region-wide approach geared to
stability in Pakistan and beyond. Relations with Russia: Engagement and
Resolve Western coherence and effectiveness is also hampered by
divisions over Russia. The West should advance a dual track strategy
with Moscow. The first track should set forth in concrete terms the
potential benefits of more productive relations. The second track should
make it clear that these relations cannot be based on intimidation or
outdated notions of spheres of influence but rather on respect for
international law, the UN Charter and the Helsinki principles. NATO
should be integral to both tracks. II. A New NATO In essence, a new NATO
needs a better balance between missions home and away; will be
indispensable but insufficient to current and future security
challenges; must therefore stretch its missions and connect better with
partners; and, depending on specific contingencies, must be prepared to
be the leading actor, play a supporting role, or simply join a broader
ensemble. NATO’s Missions: Home and Away NATO is busier than ever, but
many see an Alliance adrift. A new consensus is needed on the challenges
to our security and NATO’s role in meeting them. If NATO is to be
better, not just bigger, we must transform its scope and strategic
rationale in ways that are understood and sustained by parliaments and
publics. We must change the nature of its capabilities, the way it
generates and deploys forces, the way it makes decisions, the way it
spends money, and the way it works with others. NATO needs a new
balance between missions home and away. For the past 15 years the
Alliance has been driven by the slogan “out of area or out of business.”
Today, NATO operates out of area, and it is in business. But it must
also operate in area, or it is in trouble. NATO today faces a related
set of missions both home and away. o At home, it is called to
maintain deterrence and defense; viii support efforts to strengthen
societal resilience against threats to the transatlantic homeland;
contribute to a Europe that truly can be whole, free and at peace. o
Away, it is called to prevent and respond to crises; participate in
stability operations; connect better with global partners to cover a
broader range of capabilities. These missions share five common
requirements. All require o intensive debate to sustain public and
parliamentary support; o improved capabilities that are deployable; o
better synergy between NATO and partners; o better cooperation between
civil and military authorities; o matching means to agreed missions.
NATO remains the preeminent transatlantic institution for deterrence and
defense. In all other areas, however, it is likely to take only a
selective lead, play a supporting role or work within a larger network
of institutions. Knowing where and when NATO can add value is critical
to prioritization of resources and effort. Home Missions Deterrence
and Defense. To strengthen Article 5 preparedness NATO nations should: o
ensure a fully capable NATO Response Force (NRF) available in and out of
area; o exercise appropriate reinforcement capabilities within the NATO
area to improve capacities neglected over the past decade; such
exercises should be fully transparent and sized appropriately; o invest
in essential infrastructure in appropriate allied nations (especially in
the newer allies) to receive NATO reinforcements (including the NRF); o
consider positioning additional NATO common assets, for instance NATO’s
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, in a new member state; o
consider the creation of another NATO multinational corps composed of
new members in central Europe. Transatlantic Resilience. NATO is
likely to be a supporting player in more robust overall efforts at both
homeland and societal security in the North Atlantic space, to include:
o guarding the approaches; o enhancing early-warning and air/missile
defenses; o improving counterterrorism activities; o strengthening
transatlantic capabilities for managing the consequences of terrorist
attacks or large-scale natural disasters; o cyberdefense; o biodefense;
o political consultations on energy security; o incorporating
transatlantic resilience into the NATO Strategic Concept. Europe
Whole, Free and at Peace. NATO allies have an interest in consolidating
the democratic transformation of Europe by working with others to extend
as far as possible across the European continent the space of integrated
security where war simply does not happen. Yet the situation today is
different, and in many ways more difficult, than at the end of the Cold
War. The West must keep its door open to the countries of wider Europe.
NATO governments must remain firm on the Bucharest Summit commitments to
Georgia and Ukraine and to follow through on subsequent pledges of
further assistance to both countries ix in implementing needed political
and defense reforms. NATO and the EU should work with the states in the
region, including through invigorated efforts at “forward resilience,”
to create conditions by which ever closer relations can be possible and
the question of integration, while controversial today, can be posed
more positively in the future. Away Missions Crisis Prevention and
Response. If the Alliance is to continue to play an effective role in
this area, NATO needs a deeper pool of forces that are capable,
deployable and sustainable. Maintaining the operational effectiveness of
the NRF is essential to NATO’s credibility and should not be beyond the
means of allied governments. Yet allies are stretched thin, and there is
no easy fix. Either defense budgets must be increased for personnel,
training and equipment; or spending on existing force structure and
unnecessary command structure and bureaucracy must be re-mixed to
prioritize deployable forces and force multipliers such as Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and helicopters.
Stability and Reconstruction Operations. Although many of these
capabilities exist within the EU, NATO and the Partnership for Peace,
they are not organized into deployable assets. Consideration should be
given to the creation of a NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force
(SRF), an integrated, multinational security support component that
would organize, train and equip to engage in post-conflict operations,
compatible with EU efforts. Connect Better with Others: NATO’s
effectiveness depends on solid partnerships. NATO should establish a
truly strategic partnership with the EU and meaningful partnerships with
the UN, the OSCE and the African Union; and establish an Assistant
Secretary General for Partnership to improve current partnerships and
operationalize the Comprehensive Approach. Internal Reforms Change the
Way NATO Makes Decisions o Apply the consensus rule only in the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) and when voting on funding in budget committees.
o Develop an opt-out option for nations whereby they can join consensus
in the NAC on an operation but choose not to participate; in return they
also do not participate in the decision-making for that operation. o
Delegate authority to the Secretary General for internal matters. o
Merge the NATO International Staff and International Military Staff. o
Revamp the NATO Military Committee. Change the Way NATO Spends Money o
Use NATO’s “Peacetime Establishment” review to cut static command
structure and outmoded NATO agencies or field activities, and redirect
savings to mission support. o Expand use of common funds to cover some
costs for participating in NATO missions. o Expand use of common funds
to procure common equipment for operations. o Coordinate procurement
with the EU to fill common capability shortfalls. o Create a NATO-EU
working group, including defense industry representatives, to build a
strong, complementary transatlantic defense industrial base.
Streamline to create a three-level Command Structure o Strategic: Allied
Command Operations (ACO), with an American Supreme Commander (as
currently structured); x Allied Command Transformation (ACT), with a
European Supreme Commander and two Deputies, one charged with defense
planning and acquisition and one (U.S. dual hatted as Deputy Commander
of U.S. JFCOM) charged with transformation. ACT’s duties would also
include doctrine and training for the comprehensive approach and
transatlantic resilience and defense. o Operational: three Joint Force
Command (JFC) headquarters in Brunssum, the Netherlands; Naples, Italy;
and Lisbon, Portugal. Each JFC should be able to deploy a robust Joint
Task Force, and there should be at least two Combined Air Operations
Centers (CAOC) with a deployable CAOC capability. o Deployable: three
joint deployable HQs, replacing most or all of the current six fixed
component commands. If additional HQs are needed, they might be sourced
from High Readiness Force HQs already in existence in some allied
nations. o Potential savings from cuts in command structure would be
used by NATO to help procure common items for deployment. Generate
Appropriate Military Capabilities o Deployable Conventional Forces.
Forces that cannot deploy are of little utility for missions home or
away. Allies must be able to deploy light and heavy armored forces;
initial intervention forces, including the NATO Response Force (NRF);
special operations and stabilization forces -- increasingly needed yet
currently inadequate to the long or unique nature of modern military
operations. Force Enablers. Three multipliers should be approved for
common funding: Strategic and Theater Lift -- including aerial
refueling and transport helos; Network Enabled Command, Control and
Communications (C3); Interoperable Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Missile Defense has emerged as a
potentially important requirement for future deterrence against missile
threats from Iran and possibly other countries. Should transatlantic
diplomacy succeed in stopping Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons,
interceptor deployment may not be necessary. Yet current U.S. and allied
efforts should continue now for two reasons. First, such efforts are
prudent given the lead time necessary for deployment. Second, should
diplomacy fail and Tehran acquire nuclear weapons capability, a
defensive response is likely to be a more palatable and effective option
than an offensive military response. As diplomatic efforts are
reinvigorated, the Alliance needs to follow through on its 2008
Bucharest Summit commitments to explore how planned U.S. missile defense
sites in Europe could be integrated into current NATO plans; develop
options for a comprehensive missile defense architecture to extend
coverage to all allied territory and populations not otherwise covered
by the U.S. system; and work with the U.S. for Russian participation.
Nuclear Forces. We support the long-term goal of a world without
nuclear weapons. None of our considerations contradict initiatives such
as Global Zero. When it comes to practical implementation, however, it
is important to keep the following in mind: Historically, the presence
of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has been a preeminent symbol coupling
European and North American security. For this xi reason, a unilateral
U.S. decision to withdraw its nuclear weapons could be seen in Europe as
a U.S. effort to decouple its security from that of its allies and thus
question the very premise of the Atlantic Alliance. If such a step is
to be considered, the initiative should come from Europe. If European
allies are confident that European and North American security is
sufficiently coupled to no longer require the presence of U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe, the U.S. is unlikely to object to their removal.
When addressing the question, allies should also consider future
requirements and keep in mind that once such forces are withdrawn, it
will be all but impossible politically to return them. If reductions
or eliminations are considered, allies should seek equivalent steps by
Russia. Match Missions to Means. NATO cannot expect any growth in
resource availability. It must enhance and deliver more capabilities
from the same resources and redouble efforts to cut existing spending on
questionable static command structure or NATO agency/field activities
that no longer can be justified as nations face budget pressures. NATO
should develop a new approach to how operations are funded and
essential capabilities are fielded; increase the deployability, and
thus the usability of its overall force, including its 12,500 person
formal command structure, little of which is deployable; look for
capabilities where the pooling of assets by some members can be agreed,
such as the C-17 consortium initiative among 12 members and partners;
increase the number of multinational units comprised of national forces,
including niche forces; establish a NATO-EU working group to flesh out
and implement the Comprehensive Approach; establish an
industry/NATO/EU group to collaborate on procurement of common items;
press allies to shift defense budget spending away from personnel and
infrastructure to investment, training, and readiness. Rethink
Functional and Geographic “Areas of Emphasis.” For good reasons the
Alliance has resisted ‘divisions of labor’ in the past. Yet, persistent
low defense investments create serious gaps that cannot be closed in the
near term. Therefore coordination along both functional and geographic
lines may be wise, with central organizing principles and procedures. o
Functional areas of emphasis should be explored along the lines of
stability operations/special operations forces and major combat forces.
o A geographic view might look at NATO and EU regions of emphasis. For
example, NATO is charged with responsibility for collective defense of
allied territory as well as operations in south Asia, particularly
Afghanistan. The EU has taken the lead on most crisis response
operations in Africa and is assuming more and more missions in the
Balkans outside of NATO itself. o Neither functional nor geographic
roles should be considered exclusive domains. Rather these should be
regarded as lead and support domains, such that transatlantic partners
reinforce each other with an array of capabilities. 1 I. New World, New
Partnership 2 Chapter 1 New World Rising “...An old world is collapsing
and a new world arising; we have better eyes for the collapse than for
the rise, for the old one is the world we know.” -- John Updike It is
urgent that we renew and reform the transatlantic partnership, for the
world we have known is fading. A new world is rising, uncertain,
indeterminate, yet forming fast. There is much that is positive about
this transformation. For the first time in human history, most people on
this planet live under governments of their own choosing. Revolutions in
science, technology, transportation and communications are improving
lives and freeing minds. A rising global middle class is creating major
new opportunities. More people have been lifted out of poverty in the
last twenty years than in all of human history. The Great Powers are at
peace. Overall, more people in more parts of the world have benefitted
from these dramatic changes. Gains have not been shared evenly, however.
For too many, change has simply meant disruption and uncertainty. Around
the world there is great concern about the impact of corrosive regional,
ethnic, and religious conflicts; the rise of terrorism and organized
crime; migration flows provoked by poverty, population growth,
environmental change or insecurity; the accelerating proliferation of
mass destruction capacities; the spread of pandemics; increasing
resource scarcity, particularly energy and water; environmental
degradation and the effects of climate change. Moreover, the potential
of our young century has been stunted by the deepest recession in
generations. While the U.S. and Europe still account for more than 60
percent of the global economy, the financial crisis and attendant
recession have greatly damaged Western capacities. In 2009, for the
first time in history, the world's emerging economies are forecast to
provide 100 percent of global economic growth. Within the next 10-15
years, they are expected to generate more than half of the world’s
output. Yet they too have been hurt by the financial crisis. Developing
countries have seen foreign capital dry up, export markets shrivel, and
currencies, banks and stock markets weaken. Despite the global downturn,
growing connections between continents will continue to exert a powerful
influence on the evolving international order. Globalization has brought
large gains in terms of trade and inflows of capital, greater
technological diffusion and higher economic growth. But it has not
brought geopolitics or ideological struggles to an end. Rather, darker
forces, including terrorism, organized crime, and radical ideologies—
particularly the jihadist vision of ridding the Muslim world of Western
influence, corrupt regimes, and restoring the Caliphate—will continue to
exacerbate regional tensions and transnational threats and fuel
competition and instability. Moreover, the technology and knowledge to
make and deliver agents of mass destruction is proliferating among some
of 3 the most ruthless factions and regimes on earth. The ability of
individuals and groups to employ destructive power will continue, as
governments struggle to meet the challenge of stateless networks that
move freely across borders. The world’s most devastating agent of mass
destruction – infectious disease – is moving from the hands of Mother
Nature to the hands of man. Stunning scientific advances are enhancing
biology’s dual-use potential for beneficence or malevolence. Biological
techniques available today permit rapid synthesis of large viruses from
non-living parts. This will help researchers seeking new drugs and
vaccines. But it also puts the synthesis of viruses such as smallpox
within the reach of thousands of laboratories worldwide. The age of
engineered biological weapons is neither science fiction nor suspense
thriller. It is here, today. The world is on the cusp of exponential
change in the power of bioagents and their accessibility to state and
non-state actors. The absence of available medical countermeasures
(medicines, vaccines and diagnostic tests) and the inadequacies of
health information and distribution systems will limit most nations’
capacities to deal with large-scale epidemics. Current systems to manage
epidemics were stretched to the limit by SARS and other natural
outbreaks, and are wholly inadequate for the unique challenges of
bioterrorism. Efforts to adopt nuclear nonproliferation regimes to the
biological realm have been fraught with difficulties and are of
questionable merit.3 While most threats to peace and stability today
remain regionally rooted, in an increasingly interconnected world
conflicts that once might have remained local disputes can now have
global impact. In this context, problems of governance have become a
central national security dilemma. Unstable and ungoverned regions of
the world, or governance that breaks when challenged, pose dangers for
neighbors and can become the setting for broader problems of terrorism,
migration, poverty and despair. The broader Middle East, stretching to
southwest Asia, remains the region of the world where unsettled
relationships, religious and territorial conflicts, impoverished
societies, fragile and intolerant regimes and deadly combinations of
technology and terror brew and bubble on top of one vast energy field
upon which global prosperity depends. Choices made here could determine
the shape of the 21st century – whether agents of mass destruction will
be unleashed upon mass populations; whether the oil and gas fields of
the Caucasus and Central Asia can become reliable energy sources;
whether catastrophic terrorism can be prevented; whether Russia’s
borderlands can become stable and secure democracies; whether Israel and
its neighbors can live in peace; whether millions of people can be
lifted from pervasive poverty and hopelessness; and whether the great
religions of the world can flourish together. A number of significant,
interrelated trends will continue to affect alliance security: Sunni-Shia
conflicts and Islamist violence; Israeli-Palestinian tensions; Iraq’s
precarious transition as U.S. and coalition forces withdraw; Iranian
efforts to assert regional influence and develop nuclear weapons; and
sustained insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan that offer safe
harbor to terrorists. Central Asia has become a focal point for
competition over energy resources, and Russia and China could intensify
their efforts to gain influence in the region. Leadership 4 transition
will test key regional powers, and could trigger regime failure and
instability, opening doors to clan, tribal, and regional rivalries that
may transcend state borders and lead to turmoil and violence.
Significant and protracted instability could become the defining
characteristic of Central Asia, including failed and failing states;
radical Islamic movements; organized crime; and trafficking in weapons,
WMD materials, and narcotics. Rising China, India and Indonesia will
reshape power dynamics in Asia and beyond. Japan remains a major world
player, but domestic political differences have prevented it from
shouldering additional burdens to enhance global security commensurate
with its position. China is on track to become the world’s second
largest economy, the world’s largest importer of resources, the world’s
biggest polluter, and a leading military power. Yet it faces significant
domestic challenges, including environmental degradation, AIDS, and the
prospect of wider social unrest if economic growth falters or problems
in governance, social welfare, and regional development cannot be
overcome. India is likely to continue to enjoy economic growth, develop
its military, and seek to establish itself as a major independent power,
even as rivalry persists with Pakistan. Burgeoning Indonesia is
grappling with secessionist challenges and the spread of Islamist
fundamentalism. An unpredictable North Korea will require significant
international attention. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be a major
global supplier of oil, gas, and other commodities, yet remains
vulnerable to HIV/AIDS, economic disruption, population stresses, civil
conflict, corruption and failed governance. Many states lack the
capacity to break up terror cells, thwart trafficking in arms, drugs or
people, or provide domestic security. The Darfur crisis is a tragic
reminder of the potential for local strife to affect millions. While
Africans are assuming more of their own security responsibilities,
Europeans and Americans are called to provide emergency assistance,
deploy and train peacekeepers, and mediate disputes. Despite the rise of
Brazil and broadening commercial relations with Asia and Europe, Latin
America has yet to add its potential to broader transatlantic
partnership. Some areas in this region continue to be among the most
violent in the world, due to the activities of drug trafficking
organizations, criminal cartels, and persistent weaknesses in governance
and the rule of law. Resource issues are gaining in prominence as
energy, water, and food pressures grow. The concentration of energy
resources under state control and/or in regions of instability, together
with rapidly changing resource distribution patterns, increasing demand
and decreasing reserves will continue to challenge all consuming
countries. Lack of access to stable water supplies is reaching critical
proportions, particularly for agriculture, and rapid urbanization is
exacerbating the problem. The World Bank estimates that demand for food
will rise by 50 percent by 2030.4 Climate change is expected to
exacerbate resource scarcities, prompting greater humanitarian crises,
large-scale migration of people, instability, and conflict. Although the
impact of climate change will vary, a number of regions are already
suffering harmful effects, particularly water scarcity, storm intensity
and loss of agricultural production. 5 The International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that by 2020, up to 250 million Africans
could face starvation and malnutrition due to lack of fresh water
supplies, lower crop yields, and drought. The IPCC also warns that
mega-delta regions throughout Asia will face huge geopolitical
challenges from climate-induced migration. One immediate strategic
consequence of climate change is likely to be an ice-free summertime
Arctic within the next few years, which will open up vast energy and
mineral resources yet pose considerable environmental, legal and
geostrategic challenges. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that at
least 25 percent of the world’s remaining oil and gas resources lie
north of the Arctic Circle. Although the circumpolar states share a
common interest in addressing environmental vulnerabilities as they
exploit these resources, unresolved jurisdictional claims could result
in greater tensions. Moreover, a host of new players could join the mix,
since world shipping could also be transformed: the Northern Sea Route
between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific is about 5,000 nautical
miles shorter – a week’s sailing time -- than a trip via the Suez Canal.
6 Chapter 2 A 21st Century Transatlantic Partnership The new world
rising underscores how the challenges facing Europeans and Americans
have changed since the end of the Cold War. We are accustomed to
associating historic change with significant dates and catalytic events.
Even today, the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 remains the
most potent symbol of the attraction and power of open societies. Yet
when walls come down for families and friends they also can come down
for hatred, prejudice and new forms of competition. There is no more
vivid example than the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001.5 The
changes we are experiencing today are no less historic. They are perhaps
less vivid in the popular mind because they cannot be tied to one
symbolic event but emanate from the billions of individual decisions
made around the globe every day. Yet the consequences of those choices
are no less dramatic for our welfare. We no longer face a singular
threat to our mutual security, nor can we afford to subsume diverse
dangers under simplistic slogans such as the Global War on Terror. We
still face the potential for conflict between major states. We will
perhaps always face the menace of terrorism. But today, a host of
unorthodox challenges also demand our urgent attention. Two broad themes
emerge from our assessment. First, the global has become local. Our
well-being is increasingly influenced by flows of people, money and
weapons, goods and services, technology, toxins and terror, drugs and
disease. We characterize these phenomena as "global," but their impact
is local. They are unprecedented in their range, scope and speed. They
offer untold opportunities and terrible dangers. They are impersonal
forces with very personal consequences. As a result, “human” security
has become integral to “national” security. The networked nature of
modern societies should prompt reconsideration of what, exactly, needs
protecting in today’s world. Traditional strategies focused on securing
territory. Yet what do cyber hackers, energy cartels and al-Qaeda have
in common? They are networks that prey on other networks - the
interconnected arteries and nodes of vulnerability that accompany the
free flow of people, ideas, energy, money, goods and services, and the
complex interdependent systems on which free societies depend. It is our
complete reliance on such networks, matched with their susceptibility to
catastrophic disruption, that make them such tempting targets. In the
21st century, we are called to protect our connectedness, not just our
territory.6 A transformative approach to security should supplement the
traditional focus on the security of territory with more energetic
efforts to protect the critical functions of societies, and the manifold
connections those societies have with others. Second, the local has
become global. For many of our citizens the new world has meant
disruption and insecurity. They worry that a job gained abroad means a
job lost at home, that their hard-won prosperity could simply slip away.
They are anxious about the pace of 7 global change, about their
livelihoods, about their future. They worry that their way of life is at
the mercy of distant events. These concerns are real, widespread, and
legitimate. Yet domestic renewal cannot come at the expense of our
international engagement. The affairs of the world have become too
deeply entrenched in our domestic lives for us to ignore global
developments while we concentrate on problems at home. Domestic renewal,
in fact, requires our active international engagement – together. Some
argue that with the Cold War over and new powers rising, the
transatlantic partnership has had its day, that the values and interests
of Europeans and Americans have diverged, and that many of our
institutions are of little relevance to today’s global challenges. We
disagree. Our partnership remains as vital as in the past, but now we
must focus on a new agenda. The new world rising offers us both
necessity and opportunity to reposition our partnership to meet 21st
century challenges, and to improve the institutions and tools at our
disposal. In recent years, Europeans and Americans have differed on the
nature of some of these challenges and how best to confront them.
Differences of perspective and policy can be powerful. But the history
of European-American relations has often been the history of difference.
Merely asserting difference or reciting lists of tough issues does not
make the case for estrangement. It makes the case for better leadership.
Moreover, that which has driven us apart has rarely overshadowed that
which keeps us together: basic principles of democracy, liberty, human
rights, nondiscrimination and the rule of law; mutual peace and
security; open, rules-based markets; and an open door to those who
choose to abide by these principles and add their strength to ours --
all underpinned by deep security and economic linkages and an intensity
of cooperation without parallel anywhere on earth. At times, each side
of the Atlantic has honored these principles in the breach. Our
achievements do not always match our aspirations. But the common body of
accumulated principles, norms, rules and procedures we have built and
accumulated together – in essence, an acquis Atlantique -- affirms the
basic expectations we have for ourselves and for each other.7 It offers
a unique foundation to build upon. For sixty years this foundation has
made the transatlantic relationship the world’s transformative
partnership. North America’s relationship with Europe enables each of us
to achieve goals together that neither can alone – for ourselves and for
the world. This still distinguishes our relationship: when we agree, we
are usually the core of any effective global coalition. When we
disagree, no global coalition is likely to be very effective. In short,
transatlantic partnership remains indispensable if we are to tackle
effectively the challenges we face. But unless we address the deep
changes that have altered the context of our relationship, and unless we
develop common strategies to advance the broadened range of interests we
share, we are less likely to harness transatlantic potential to our
wider goals and more likely to hold each other back. 8 Skeptics point to
the relative decline of North America and Europe when it comes to global
population trends or the world economy. Yet those trends underscore the
need to deepen, not dilute, transatlantic cooperation. A weaker
transatlantic bond would render Americans and Europeans less safe, less
prosperous, and less able to advance either our ideals or our interests
in the wider world. At the same time, our partnership, while
indispensable, is also insufficient to many of the challenges we face.
Only by banding together with others are we likely to advance our
values, protect our interests, and extend our influence. Once again, the
U.S. and Europe are called to tune their partnership to new times and to
a diverse and dangerous set of challenges. Many of those challenges
range far beyond the North Atlantic, but they can have very direct
consequences for every citizen, right at home. If the U.S.-European
alliance is to be rebuilt, two challenges must be met. The first is to
provide the tone and purpose that can reinvigorate our partnership. The
second is to give ourselves the appropriate tools to advance a common
agenda. A Partnership with Purpose 2009 offers an unusual opportunity to
reconcile Europe’s grand experiment of integration with a reorientation
and strategic transformation of transatlantic relations to create a new
model: a resilient Atlantic partnership that is more effective at
enhancing our prosperity; protecting our societies; advancing our
values, and working with others to forge global responses to global
challenges.8 Five transatlantic priorities loom large. First, we must
tackle immediate economic challenges while positioning our economies for
the future. Few issues are likely to shape European-American relations
over the next few years as the global economic crisis. This epochal
event has erased any doubt about how interconnected the transatlantic
economy has become. The deeper and more prolonged the economic recession
of 2009, the greater the risks of inward, insular policies on both sides
of the Atlantic. Our common challenge is to show our citizens and
millions around the world that it is possible to reap globalization’s
benefits while making its costs bearable to those most directly
affected, without succumbing to protectionist temptations. This requires
more than large dollops of fiscal and monetary stimuli. Bolder thinking
and action are needed. To paraphrase an old Chinese adage, “a crisis is
a terrible thing to waste.” Economic recessions are invitations for
change, for new ideas. The present economic climate is ripe for change,
and is thus an ideal time for both the United States and Europe to work
jointly on such large scale initiatives as energy security, sustainable
economic development and global climate change. Innovation in these
areas could generate new long-term avenues of growth and prosperity.
Europe and North America are better positioned than most other economies
to break the link between the generation of wealth and the consumption
of resources. Rapidly rising economies are all growing in a world
economy premised on extensive use of oil and gas 9 and intensive use of
resources. That is untenable for a global economy of 6 billion people.
Breaking this link is an historic challenge – but also an opportunity to
move toward entirely different patterns of consumption and
competitiveness. Transatlantic cooperation and innovation could lead the
way. Over the next two decades, the prospect of a shift in the global
economic balance is very real. But a number of big emerging markets do
not necessarily share some of the core principles or basic mechanisms
that underpin open rules-based commerce. Even though the credibility of
the U.S. and Europe has also been damaged on this score, no plausible
alternative to global economic leadership is in sight, and the rapidly
emerging economies have also been swamped by the global crisis.
Moreover, the transatlantic economy remains very strong on a secular and
structural basis, generating $3.75 trillion in total commercial sales a
year and employing up to 14 million workers in mutually “onshored” jobs
on both sides of the Atlantic.9 Instead of spending significant
political capital on transatlantic disputes over bananas, beef and state
aid to industry, eking out marginal advantage through preferential trade
arrangements with tiny markets, or being tempted into
beggar-thy-neighbor approaches to import surges from countries such as
China, Europe and the U.S. could invest in new forms of transatlantic
collaboration that would enable them to be true pathfinders of the
global economy – essentially to reposition the West as it works to
integrate others into mechanisms of global good governance Our second
task is to build societal resilience – together. Homeland security may
begin at home, but in an age of potentially catastrophic terrorism and
networked threats, no nation is home alone. If Europeans and Americans
are to be safer, individual national efforts must be aligned with more
effective transatlantic cooperation. There have been some promising
beginnings, but they have been ad hoc, low-priority achievements rather
than integrated elements of a comprehensive approach. Biosecurity is
perhaps the most dramatic example of the changing challenges we face.
Bioterrorism is a first-order strategic threat to the transatlantic
community, and yet neither our health nor our security systems are
prepared for intentional attacks of infectious disease. Homeland
security approaches that focus on guards, gates and guns have little
relevance to this type of challenge. A bioterrorist attack in Europe or
North America is more likely and could be as consequential as a nuclear
attack, but requires a different set of national and international
responses. Unless we forge new health security alliances and take other
measures, an attack of mass lethality is not a matter of whether, but
when. A great challenge of our century is to prevent the deliberate use
of disease as a weapon from killing millions, destabilizing economies
and disrupting societies. The grand security opportunity of our century
is to eliminate massively lethal epidemics of infectious disease by
ensuring that biodefense – humankind’s ageless struggle to prevent and
defeat disease – is far more potent than attempts to create and deploy
bio agents of mass lethality.10 This example underscores the need for
the United States, Canada and European partners to advance a
multidimensional strategy of societal resilience that goes beyond
“homeland” security and relies not just on traditional tools but also on
new forms of 10 diplomatic, intelligence, counterterrorism, financial,
economic and law enforcement cooperation; customs, air and seaport
security; equivalent standards for data protection and information
exchange; biodefense and critical infrastructure protection. It needs to
begin with the transatlantic community, not only because European
societies are so inextricably intertwined, but because no two continents
are as deeply connected as the two sides of the North Atlantic. Our
ultimate goal should be a resilient Euro-Atlantic area of freedom,
security and justice that balances mobility and civil liberties with
societal security.11 Such efforts, in turn, can serve as the core of
more effective global measures. Europeans and Americans share a keen
interest in building the societal resilience of other nations, since
strong homeland security efforts in one country may mean little if
neighboring systems are weak. In fact, 20th century concepts of “forward
defense” should be supplemented by the broader notion of “forward
resilience.” Elements of this initiative will need to be conducted
bilaterally, and much of it through invigorated channels between North
America and the EU, but other mechanisms and organizations, including
NATO, can offer support in specific areas, as we outline later. Third,
we must deal with the full range of international security challenges we
face together. Many of those challenges are in southwest Asia and the
broader Middle East. Today, our security is being defended at the Hindu
Kush, not the Fulda Gap. The main threat to European and American
citizens emanates from turmoil and terrorism in Afghanistan and the
tribal areas of Pakistan. We address this issue in the next section.
Closer transatlantic cooperation is not only essential if we are to
prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, it will be even more
essential in crafting an extended deterrence regime in the Persian
Gulf/Middle East if Iran does in fact acquire such weapons. Solutions to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and civil instability in Lebanon depend
first and foremost on the people of the region. But transatlantic
cooperation is essential to establish a new roadmap for peace, keep the
process on track, offer assistance and humanitarian support, and
facilitate new forms of regional diplomacy. Stronger support also needs
to be given to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in their efforts to reform
and contain radical Islamists.12 This agenda also includes Iraq.
Although many Europeans opposed the U.S./UK-led invasion, Europe has an
interest in a secure, stable and unified Iraq. Europeans should now work
with Baghdad and Washington to increase EU engagement, from financial
assistance, trade, investment and training for police and judges, to
engagement with political parties, election monitoring, and diplomatic
efforts to provide a regional framework conducive to Iraq’s peaceful
development. These examples highlight the need to redouble our efforts
to halt proliferation of agents of mass destruction. We can begin by
reaffirming our support for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) and related efforts, and offer the possibility of deep cuts in
strategic offensive forces. Yet today’s non-proliferation and
disarmament framework has become both insufficient and inadequate. As we
have argued, biosecurity is a unique 11 challenge that requires its own
set of responses, not approaches derived from the nuclear world. Nations
look to the World Health Organization, yet in the words of former WHO
Director General Gro Harlem Brundtland, “the WHO has all the resources
of a mediumsized hospital in England.”13 In addition, more states seek
nuclear capacity, and nuclear know-how is becoming increasingly
accessible. The 2010 NPT Review Conference will be a key opportunity to
strengthen its provisions. We should support a nuclear fuel bank so that
the nuclear fuel cycle is under strong international oversight and
control. Further development of the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) and better intelligence-sharing should be explored. Fourth,
despite the historic progress made to extend democratic stability on the
European continent, Europe is not yet whole, not yet free, and not yet
at peace. Wider Europe beyond the EU and NATO is still beset with
historical animosities and multiple crises on or near its borders,
including a number of festering conflicts that in some way affect all
the countries of the region. The U.S. and its European allies share an
interest in extending the space of democratic stability where war simply
does not happen. They also share an interest in a confident, capable,
outward-looking Europe, not one so best by turmoil or so focused on
instability along its periphery that it cannot play a broader role.
Successes in this region – more effective democratic governance grounded
in the rule of law, progress against corruption and trafficking,
peaceful resolution of conflicts, secure energy production and transit,
more confident and prosperous market economies – could resonate
significantly across the post-Soviet space and into the broader Middle
East. Failure to deal with the region’s problems risks destabilizing
competition and confrontation among regional and external actors,
festering separatist conflicts, greater transnational challenges and
dysfunctional energy markets, the negative consequences of which could
also spill into Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East. The ability of
countries in the region to deal with these issues, and the willingness
and ability of Europe and the U.S. to work together with those countries
and with Russia to address these issues, could determine not only where
Europe ends, but what it represents.14 The fifth priority is renewed
effort to preserve a habitable planet, including improving the human
condition of those most impoverished and distressed. For decades we
applied our best strategic thinking to issues of deterrence and
containment. Today, there is a clear need to apply that sort of thinking
to the strategic challenges posed by humankind’s impact on our earth.
How we tackle the related issues of climate change, energy efficiency,
resource scarcity and human development will determine whether we will
live securely in the world of tomorrow. Recent decades have brought
unparalleled progress and prosperity for many parts of the world. But
billions of people have been left behind. Helping them break the cycle
of poverty and despair is not only the right thing to do, it is clearly
in our self-interest. The impoverished regions of the world can be
unstable, volatile, and dangerous and can represent great threats to
America, Europe, and the world. We must work with the people of these
regions to promote sustainable economic growth, better health, good
governance and greater human security. 12 Large-scale human disasters
burden much of today’s world. Humanitarian crises are immediate; often
they are manmade. We must try not only to react to them but also to
prevent them. If we do, we can save lives and money. If we can improve
the collective machinery to carry out humanitarian actions, we may be
able to avoid having to choose between intervening militarily and
turning away in the face of massive human tragedy. A Better Box of Tools
This is a daunting and wide-ranging agenda, and close transatlantic
coordination will be essential to harness hard and soft power
capabilities and be able to project and deploy them at distance,
including within the North Atlantic space; to include interior, finance,
justice, health, development and other agencies more systematically into
our work; to ensure that our institutions work synergistically; and to
match our missions to our means. Unfortunately, our instruments are out
of tune with the times. There is a growing mismatch between the nature
of our challenges, the capacity of our institutions, and the tools at
our disposal. Ad hoc responses are the result, as we have seen regarding
Afghanistan, Iran and Darfur, or energy security, SARS, and financial
turbulence. Optimal performance, of course, will never be easy for a
partnership composed of two continents, many diverse countries and a
constellation of institutions. Yet we can do better. This new agenda
will require new patterns of cooperation between the U.S., Europe, and
other partners to improve our mechanisms of global governance, such as
the UN and its specialized agencies, the G8, the G20, international
financial, health and humanitarian institutions. There is a growing
mismatch between the scope and scale of global challenges and the
ability of global mechanisms to deal with them. We need to consider new
forms of governance at the global level, and integrate rising powers and
new actors in ways that give them a stake in the system, based on
principles of good governance. And if we expect rising powers to respect
those principles, we must commit to them ourselves. Since our report is
focused on NATO, we do not address global governance issues in detail,
except to note that our ability to get our global financial and economic
architecture right is certain to impact on our capacity to deal with our
security challenges. This review of our agenda, however, should
underscore that any discussion of NATO must also take account of other
international institutions, particularly the UN and the EU. We address
NATO-UN and NATO-EU issues later. Our recommendations, however, are
premised on the need for the U.S. and the EU to boost their own
relationship. NATO is the institutional expression of the transatlantic
link. It remains essential to many of the challenges facing Europe and
North America today. There is no equivalent U.S. link with the European
Union, however, even though the EU is the most important organization in
the world to which the U.S. does not belong, and will be America’s
essential partner in many of the strategic areas sketched out above. If
we are to advance a 13 more effective transatlantic partnership,
including a reformed NATO, we must build a stronger U.S.-EU
relationship. The European Union, of course, is a work in progress, with
uneven capacities. How the EU structures itself is a matter primarily
for Europeans. Yet Washington should make it clear that however EU
members organize themselves, the U.S. supports a more capable EU that
can act as a counterpart, not a counterweight. The U.S.-EU strategic
partnership should evolve as “Europe” itself evolves, and in ways that
support the transatlantic link expressed through NATO. We intend to
issue a companion report proposing specific ways that U.S.-EU
partnership can be transformed. Yet in the context of this report one
specific suggestion is warranted. We propose that the U.S. and the EU
develop a new framework for cooperation that moves beyond current
arrangements, which are badly outdated and often ineffective. The
current framework was agreed in 1995 during Spain’s EU Presidency. We
recommend that a new agreement be prepared for signing in spring 2010,
again during Spain’s EU Presidency. It should set forth an updated
framework that undergirds strategic cooperation with a recommitment to
shared values. It should express what we stand for, and why we stand
together. Most importantly, it should be anchored by a clause of mutual
assistance whereby the U.S. and EU declare that they shall consult
together if one of them is the victim of a terrorist attack, natural
disaster or other man-made disaster, and will offer assistance as deemed
necessary.15 Other institutional innovations have been suggested that we
could support.16 Regardless of the specific mechanisms, the
transatlantic community needs a framework that accommodates the
evolution of the EU, affirms the importance of NATO, the OSCE, and the
Council of Europe, and addresses our strategic challenges. We must seize
the opportunity to rebuild a sense of common cause and reposition our
partnership before the fluid trends of the moment harden into something
not to our liking. Our agenda is ambitious. It cannot be accomplished
overnight. But if the effort is launched and sustained, progress can be
made in ways that have steady cumulative effects. If it is to succeed,
it must be anchored in more than lofty rhetoric. And NATO, the
embodiment of our Alliance, must be a central element in this
transformation. 14 Chapter 3 Two Immediate Tests Discussion of an
Atlantic Compact and a new NATO will be moot if allies stumble in
Afghanistan or are unable to devise a common approach to Russia. While
these two challenges are considerably different, each poses an immediate
test for Western cohesion. The Strategic Priority of Afghanistan and
Pakistan The mounting number of thwarted plots and terrorist attacks in
the U.S. and Europe that emanate from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
regions presents the most immediate acute threat to transatlantic
security.17 The September 11 attacks on the United States were
masterminded from Afghanistan and carried out to a large degree by
individuals living in Europe. Other potentially catastrophic schemes
planned for Europe and North America have been stopped by Western
officials before they could be executed. Al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who are actively plotting further
attacks, are most likely operating from this region. North America and
Europe share a fundamental interest in preventing such attacks and
ensuring that Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan never again
serve as a base for terrorism. If the situation in Afghanistan continues
to deteriorate, terrorist networks will be able to operate there again
with relative impunity, posing a direct threat to the European and North
American homelands and to neighboring Pakistan. Instability in
nuclear-armed Pakistan, in turn, would pose a severe threat to regional
and global stability. The costs and risks of failing to stabilize
Afghanistan and Pakistan are significant for the U.S. and Europe, and
the increasing level of violence in both countries warrants an urgent
response. The threat is clear and present – for Europeans and Americans.
A comprehensive regional strategy is needed if either country is to be
stable and capable of securing its own borders. Afghanistan is NATO’s
first-ever ground combat operation. It is not a war of choice; it is a
war of necessity. It is supported by every conceivable avenue of
international and multilateral legitimacy. The initial U.S. military
operation was successful and the Afghan people welcomed NATO’s
subsequent intervention. Before long, however, the Alliance and its
partners on the ground began making mistakes that still haunt the
mission today. For one, NATO opted to conduct its mission on the cheap.
The number of U.S. troops per capita in Afghanistan has been
significantly less than almost every nation-building effort since World
War II. This “light footprint” has been a strategic mistake. Those
troops that are in Afghanistan face two challenges: many lack
operational and tactical lift, preventing them from moving from one
region to another; and others operate under national caveats that
dictate when, where and how they can be deployed. Not all caveats are
declared in advance, complicating planning and operations. As a result,
15 tactical commanders spend more time thinking about what they can’t do
than what they can do. In addition, the resource costs associated with
ISAF are taking a heavy toll on several European troop contributor
nations. Under standard NATO practice, nations must absorb the lion’s
share of costs associated with their participation in operations. This
is a particular disincentive to allies who have the political will to
sustain or increase troop contributions in the most demanding missions
but lack sufficient resources to do so. However, several allies resist
suggestions to increase NATO’s common funding for operations or to
acquire more collective assets. Some seem unwilling to improve
capabilities, fearing they might be called upon to use them. Others,
faced with low and relatively stagnant defense budgets, probably worry
that greater NATO common funding would come at the expense of their
national programs. Finally, NATO’s difficulties in Afghanistan are
taking a toll on the overall credibility of the Alliance. Growing doubts
about Allied political resolve and military capacity to sustain
expeditionary operations in Afghanistan are also eroding the credibility
of the Alliance’s core mission of collective defense in the minds of
opinion leaders in some allied countries. The result is a scramble for
bilateral security assurances from Washington, which only serves to
further undermine NATO’s credibility and mutual defense commitments.
Afghanistan has become a crucible for the transatlantic alliance. NATO’s
credibility is on the line. The pressure on nations to meet their force
requirements has exposed fissures between allies; some feel they are
carrying the combat burden while others get off lightly. Moreover, most
Europeans do not believe the U.S. or NATO has a strategy to succeed in
Afghanistan, and thus are reluctant to take the political risks involved
in doing more. Capability shortfalls and force generation problems are
casting doubt on Alliance staying power. If demonstrable progress is not
evident soon, it will be difficult for several allies to sustain their
engagement. Failure in Afghanistan – on the heels of divisions over Iraq
-- would be devastating. Discussions of NATO’s strategic vision will be
moot if allies stumble in Afghanistan. An earnest and rapid
transatlantic reassessment is needed to create realistic goals, a
common, comprehensive approach, a regional policy, and sustained public
support. Unfortunately, recognition of the risk of failure is not shared
across the Atlantic. Without such a shared understanding, a more
cohesive, determined approach will remain elusive. Although NATO invoked
its mutual defense clause – Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – for
the first time on September 12, 2001 in response to the September 11
attacks plotted from Afghanistan, NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan has
not been formally designated as an Article 5 mission. Yet it is critical
to generate greater understanding among parliamentarians and publics
that NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan follows from the invocation of
Article 5. European efforts in Afghanistan are necessary not as a
gesture of support for Americans, but because Europeans are directly
threatened as well. 16 The central objective of our effort must be to
create an environment in which Afghans are able to exorcise terrorists
and govern themselves. Successful counterinsurgency efforts hinge on the
competence of local security forces, not international ones. Much
greater effort needs to be invested in the generation, organization,
training and recruitment of gendarmerie or carabinieri types of police
forces. Strong and capable Afghan security forces are critical for
Afghanistan’s stability. Until this is achieved, international forces
will be needed in Afghanistan. There can be no security in Afghanistan
without successful civil reconstruction, however, and great challenges
remain: the opium economy, endemic corruption, weak governance. NATO
offers the essential framework for our military efforts, but it is not
equipped to advance the range of civil efforts, from economic
development to police and judiciary training to voter registration, that
will ultimately determine success. Afghanistan offers compelling
evidence of the need for a “comprehensive approach” that brings both
civil and military capabilities to bear, across the range of
international institutions, on the full range of problems inherent in
dealing with conflict in a failed or failing state. Yet current military
and civil structures are a shaky patchwork. More effective and
integrated international coordination among NATO, the EU and the UN,
preferably through each organization’s senior civilian representative on
the ground, working alongside U.S. and NATO military leaders, and
working from the Afghan government’s priorities, should be central. In
line with the Declaration of the June 2008 Paris Conference, the
Afghanistan Compact needs to be extended, expanded and properly funded,
with an emphasis on better promotion of good governance. The new
strategy should distinguish between al-Qaeda, which is an international
terrorist organization, and different elements within the Taliban. The
new approach should encourage practical arrangements with tribal leaders
willing to join a new political process and exclude terrorists and
insurgents from their territory. The conflict cannot be won in
Afghanistan alone, however, because the Afghan government is challenged
by the fundamentalist insurgency operating out of sanctuaries in
Pakistan. And the war cannot be won militarily inside Pakistan, at least
not by U.S. or NATO troops. So while an inadequate NATO response inside
Afghanistan may lose the war, only much broader efforts on a region-wide
basis can win it. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai offer the latest
evidence that insecurity in the region will only provide a staging
ground for threats that will impact allies both in the region and
outside it in Europe and North America. Successful Western engagement
must therefore also include efforts with all of Afghanistan’s neighbors,
especially Pakistan. We must encourage and support Pakistan in a
campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda extremists. These efforts must be
supplemented by greater international support for development of
Pakistan’s Pashtun areas, which are a root cause of extremism. We should
also encourage both Afghanistan and India to reduce activities that
exacerbate Pakistani security concerns; engage India and Pakistan in
identifying the perpetrators of the Mumbai terrorist attacks; and broker
discussions between Afghanistan and Pakistan over their own border
dispute. 17 Relations with Russia: Engagement and Resolve Vladimir Putin
has transformed Russia from a relatively weak, partially democratic
country into an authoritarian, mercantilist system. Strengthened by
Russia’s resource wealth, the Kremlin has wielded political, economic
and energy power and employed military force to intimidate its
neighbors, assert a self-proclaimed right to “privileged interests”
throughout eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space, attempt strategic
control over key energy transportation corridors, and establish itself
as an independent Eurasian power. Russia’s assault on Georgia in August
2008 was an audacious demonstration of contempt for post-Soviet
realities.18 Strong domestic support for the Putin-Medvedev system rests
on two pillars. The first is economic performance and resource wealth.
The second is the specter of foreign enemies. The leadership justifies
its intimidation tactics at home and abroad by stoking popular fear of
encirclement by a hostile world. These two pillars have restored
Russia’s self-confidence and sustained Putin’s influence. Yet as strong
as the Putin-Medvedev system may appear today, its foundations betray
serious fissures. The high growth of recent years has stalled, oil and
other commodity prices have plunged, the ruble and the stock market have
collapsed, inflation is raging, unemployment is rising and currency
reserves are being depleted. Operations in Georgia highlighted the fact
that the country’s eroding military lacks effective command and control
systems and has problems projecting power even along its own periphery,
leading President Medvedev to reaffirm the need for military
modernization. The leadership has failed to invest its energy wealth in
efforts to diversify its economy or tackle truly stunning health
challenges, decaying infrastructure and a host of other domestic ills.
Intimidation tactics justified by a hostile world have only served to
stunt investment and encourage capital flight, and have left Moscow with
few friends. Russia and the West are tangling over issues such as Kosovo
and Iran, and the entire structure of conventional and nuclear arms
control is dissolving. A new missile race looms, with Russia claiming
that its thousands of strategic nuclear weapons are threatened by ten
missile interceptors to be deployed in Poland as a precaution against
growing Iranian ballistic capabilities. A host of other trends
contribute to Russian problems, including a dramatic population
implosion, shrinking oil production growth, inability to meet natural
gas contracts, and failure to develop new fields. As these challenges
mount, the leadership is likely to face some key choices. It may decide
to invest in its society, transform its economy with outside help, and
forge productive relations with its neighbors; or it could turn to
further bluster and adventurism. A mix is perhaps most likely, with
Russia becoming less predictable and more inconsistent as it responds to
a variety of pressures. Of the major powers, Russia’s future seems the
most open and uncertain. The West has a vested interest in making sure
that Russia understands the opportunities and consequences of its
decisions, and urgently needs to develop a coherent and coordinated
framework of relations that can help shape those choices. This strategy
should have two tracks that work together.19 18 The first track should
demonstrate the genuine interest of North America and Europe in close
and friendly ties with Russia, and should set forth in concrete terms
the potential benefits of more productive relations. Track One should
make it very clear that Europe and the U.S. stand as willing partners if
Russia decides to use its wealth to invest in its people, build a more
sustainable economy grounded in the rule of law, tackle its health and
demographic challenges, and build better relations with its neighbors.
Western leaders should seek a broad strategic dialogue with Russia on
topics ranging from the global financial crisis, global health, climate
change, transportation and energy in the Arctic, and initiate
comparative assessments of such challenges as terrorism, Iran and
Islamic radicalism, similar to those they have conducted vis-à-vis the
Balkans and Central Asia. This should be combined with an offer to
extend monitoring and verification provisions of the START I treaty
before it expires in December; revitalize both bilateral U.S.-Russian
and broader multilateral arms control negotiations; and engage in
serious discussions on missile defense in Europe and globally. Russia’s
concerns about the balance of forces in Europe should be addressed by
renewing efforts to secure ratification of the amended Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and getting Russia to both resume
compliance with its provisions and fulfil certain Treatyrelated
commitments. The U.S. and Europe should reiterate their interest in
working with Russia to ensure the security of its nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons, materials, facilities and technologies; expand
trade, investment and sustainable energy supplies; graduate it from the
U.S. Jackson-Vanik Amendment and support its efforts to enter the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the OECD by fulfilling the terms and
responsibilities of membership; facilitate its constructive
participation in global economic and financial markets; and include it
in a broad-based program of “forward resilience” as proposed in this
report. They should encourage active Russian engagement to prevent Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons. North American and European allies
should also engage President Medvedev on his proposals20 for a new
European security architecture, ensuring that such discussions serve to
strengthen and revitalize the Helsinki principles and the OSCE. Serious
debate over the proposals would assuage Moscow’s concerns about being
ignored and possibly even lead to some improvements in the Euro-Atlantic
security architecture. Such discussions could explore constructive
provisions of pan-European security arrangements; steps to enhance
crisis prevention and management; provisions that would enhance the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states such as Ukraine and
Georgia and counter Russian assertion of “privileged interests” in
certain countries along its periphery; provisions to enhance energy
security throughout Europe; and ways to advance progress on contentious
security and arms control issues. Under the second track, the U.S. and
Europe should make it clear that these relations must be based on
respect for international law, the UN Charter and the Helsinki
principles, and respect for the sovereignty and independence of Russia’s
neighbors, including those in the former Soviet space, and that if the
leadership continues to resort to intimidation tactics, cling to
outmoded notions of spheres of influence, and fails to meet 19 its
agreements, as is currently the case regarding the Georgian cease-fire
arrangements, the international community will hold Russia accountable.
Track Two should encompass both clear signals to Moscow and independent
allied measures that can reassure allies concerned about Russian
pressure and deter Russia from further intimidation. This should include
steps to diversify European energy resources; support democratic
progress and “forward resilience” in wider Europe; improve cooperation
regarding energy and cybersecurity; and reinforce the credibility of
NATO’s own mutual defense commitment. NATO should be an integral part of
both tracks of this strategy. It should be prepared to propose
far-reaching cooperation that could transform Russia’s relationship with
the West. For starters, NATO and Russia should look for ways to build on
their Afghanistan transit agreement and their successful
counternarcotics training program for Afghan and Central Asian
personnel, and move ahead with their planned Air Transport Framework
Agreement, which would make Russia’s airlift capability available for
joint efforts. Joint or complementary efforts on missile defense should
be explored anew. Exchanges of information on civil defense and
biodefense, cooperation and training between NATO and Russian special
forces, Russian involvement in collaborative armaments programs, and
additional NATO-Russia military and “joint resiliency” exercises could
be contemplated. A series of official and quasi-official dialogues could
outline future directions for NATO-Russia relations. NATO’s door should
remain open. Russia is not the Soviet Union, and dusted-off policies of
containment are inappropriate to the challenges and opportunities we
face with Moscow today. But keeping faith with our principles and
holding true to our mutual commitments does not have to mean stumbling
into a new Cold War. That is why both tracks of a new Russia strategy
are so important. For this overall approach to be effective, each track
must be advanced via close transatlantic consultation. Inevitable allied
differences will need to be addressed, and nations on each side of the
Atlantic will need to make resource commitments and difficult political
choices of their own to make the strategy work. We have no illusions
about the difficulty of such a strategy. Russia today is in a
selfconfident and assertive mood. It will be a challenging partner even
in areas where U.S., European and Russian interests may coincide and
cooperation would be mutually beneficial. Yet there is no alternative to
engagement. Russia's choices are hers to make, but it is the West’s
responsibility to make the opportunities and consequences of those
choices clear and credible. 20 II. A New NATO 21 Chapter 4 NATO’s
Missions: Home and Away Where does NATO fit? NATO never fought a day
during the Cold War. Today, it is involved in five different operations
-- fighting and securing stability in Afghanistan; keeping the peace in
Kosovo; assisting defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina; patrolling
the Mediterranean Sea in a maritime anti-terrorist mission dispatched
under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and training Iraqi
security forces. It launched an extensive humanitarian relief operation
for Pakistan after the massive earthquake in 2005, helped victims of
Hurricane Katrina in the United States, and provided security support to
the 2004 and 2006 Olympics and 2006 World Cup. It has welcomed new
members, additional allies are about to join, and others are applying.
Budding partnerships have been cultivated with the UN, the EU and
nations from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. NATO is busier than ever,
but it has also become less central to many members. It is doing more
now than during the Cold War, but its wide range of activities does not
easily inspire or sustain public, parliamentary – and hence financial --
support. It is performing at an unprecedented tempo, but this
operational reality has exposed differences among allies in terms of
threat perceptions, strategic cultures, resources and capabilities. It
is not heavily engaged in some key security challenges facing its
members, and is not succeeding at some in which it is engaged. As a
result, many see an Alliance adrift, lacking identity and driven more by
outside events than by collective interests. This is troubling, because
the need for transatlantic cooperation is rising, not falling. We must
create a new Alliance consensus on the challenges to our security and
NATO’s role in meeting them. Such a consensus is as important today as
it was when NATO was born. The security challenges we face have changed,
but the need for a common response has not. 60 years after its founding,
NATO’s three-fold purpose remains: to provide for the collective defense
of its members; to institutionalize the transatlantic link and serve as
a preeminent forum in which allies can discuss issues of common security
and strategy; and to offer an umbrella of reassurance under which
European nations can focus their security concerns on common challenges
rather than on each other. To meet this purpose today, each element
needs urgent attention, and each needs more than NATO. As we have
outlined, the nations of the Atlantic Alliance face a wide range of
security challenges that call for capabilities beyond those of NATO
alone. Security today means more than just the military defense of
territory and sovereignty. We are called increasingly to plan, support,
and execute a broad range of new and non-traditional roles, missions and
functions – not all of which are well suited to traditional military
forces. 22 If NATO is to be better, not just bigger, we must transform
its scope and strategic rationale in ways that are understood and
sustained by parliamentary and public opinion. We must change the nature
of its capabilities, the way it generates and deploys its forces, the
way it makes decisions, the way it spends money, and the way it works
with others. Most importantly, NATO needs a new balance. For the past 15
years the Alliance has been driven by the slogan “out of area or out of
business.” Threatened with irrelevance by its Cold War success, the
alliance reached across the old East-West divide to include new members
and new partners. It has sent soldiers and peacekeepers to trouble spots
beyond its boundaries, from the Balkans to Afghanistan. It has become an
expeditionary alliance. We support NATO’s continuing out-of-area
transformation. But a single-minded focus on "out of area" risks
diverting us from NATO's enduring "in area" mission to protect North
Atlantic nations from armed attack. Alliance leaders are right to say
that Western security today begins at the Hindu Kush. But in an age of
catastrophic terrorism, the front line tomorrow may run through
Frankfurt's airport, Washington's metro, Rotterdam's port or Istanbul's
grand bazaar. If NATO is visible in expeditionary missions but invisible
when it comes to protecting our own societies, support for the alliance
will wane. Its role will be marginalized and our security diminished.
NATO operates out of area, and it is in business. But it must also
operate in area, or it is in trouble. If NATO cannot protect, it cannot
project.21 NATO today faces a related set of missions both home and
away. At home, it is called to maintain deterrence and defense; support
efforts to strengthen societal resilience against a host of threats to
the transatlantic homeland; and contribute to a Europe that truly can be
whole, free and at peace. Away, it is called to prevent and respond to
crises; participate in stability operations; and connect better with
partners to cover a broader range of capabilities. NATO Missions Home
Away Deterrence and Defense Crisis Prevention and Response Transatlantic
Resilience Stability Operations Europe Whole, Free and at Peace Working
Effectively with Partners These missions, whether close to home or far
away, share five common requirements. All require intensive debate to
sustain public and parliamentary support and receptivity by other
partners. All require improved capabilities that are deployable. All
require better synergy between NATO and partners – whether those
partners are nations, institutions or non-governmental organizations.
All require better cooperation between civil and military authorities.
All require allies to match their means to agreed missions. 23 This
outline of NATO home and away missions does not mean that NATO should
always take the lead. Depending on the contingency at hand, NATO may be
called to play the leading role, be a supporting actor, or simply join a
broader ensemble. For deterrence and defense, for instance, NATO remains
the preeminent transatlantic institution. In all other areas, however,
it is likely to play a supporting role or work within a larger network
of institutions. Knowing where and when NATO can add value is critical
to prioritization of resources and effort. NATO: Leading Role,
Supporting Actor, or Ensemble Player? Home Missions Role Deterrence and
Defense Lead Transatlantic Resilience Support/Selective Lead Europe
Whole, Free and at Peace Support/Selective Lead Away Missions Role
Crisis Prevention and Response Lead/Selective Support Stability
Operations Support/Selective Lead Working Effectively with Partners
Support/Ensemble Player Home Missions In this new century, NATO has
three missions at home: maintaining the deterrence and defense
capabilities required to underpin the credibility of the Alliance’s
mutual defense commitment; bolstering NATO’s ability to contribute to
societal resilience against a host of threats to the transatlantic
homeland; and continuing its efforts towards a Europe that is truly
whole, free and at peace. These missions underscore NATO’s need to
supplement its core focus on collective defense with greater attention
to ways it can contribute to collective security. They require
expeditionary capabilities and new forms of civilmilitary cooperation.
They cannot be addressed by NATO alone. In this section we briefly
explain each element; in the next section we offer specific proposals.
Deterrence and Defense. NATO’s collective defense commitment, as stated
in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, is the core of the Alliance.
NATO plays an essential role in deterring and defending against attacks
on the transatlantic homeland, from whatever source. In recent years the
focus has been on terrorism, but since the Russian invasion of Georgia
there has been renewed concern among some members about the adequacy of
NATO planning and defense capabilities to deal with more traditional
threats by aggressor states. These concerns have prompted some allies to
entertain the need for separate bilateral security guarantees. A NATO
that continues to expand without having the capabilities to meet its
core obligation to defend an enlarged treaty area runs the risk of
becoming a hollow alliance. Moreover, lack of confidence in NATO’s
ability to carry out its fundamental commitment risks undermining
another key element of NATO’s purpose – to prevent the kind of
renationalization of European defense and conflicting security
guarantees that led Europe to disaster in the 20th century. Therefore,
Alliance 24 leaders should reaffirm their mutual defense commitment at
NATO’s 60th anniversary summit in Strasbourg/Kehl. They should also
ensure that Article 5 is not just a paper commitment but is backed up by
credible planning to determine the military requirements to carry it
out, as well as the means and political solidarity to implement it.
Transatlantic Resilience. At the same time, Alliance leaders should
consider the meaning of their Article 5 commitment to “ensure the
security of the North Atlantic area” in light of the challenges to
societal security our nations face today, and as we discussed in Section
I of this report. As we have stressed, there are major restrictions on
the role NATO can and should play in this area – many issues of law
enforcement, domestic intelligence, civil security and disaster response
are well beyond NATO’s area of competence, and are better handled in
national or bilateral channels, or in some cases between the U.S.,
Canada and the European Union. There are some areas, however, where NATO
itself, or NATO and the EU together, could complement other efforts and
do more to enhance transatlantic resilience. The Alliance has already
been called upon to help member and non-member governments with security
for mass public events and deal with the consequences of various natural
disasters. It could well be called upon to play a role in dealing with a
catastrophic terrorist event, particularly one involving agents of mass
destruction. NATO efforts to enhance societal resilience in the
transatlantic homeland would offer the Alliance both a 21st-century
approach to Article 5 and new meaning and credibility in the eyes of
NATO publics who are concerned about threats close to home. Alliance
leaders have the opportunity to articulate a strategic direction for
homeland defense and transatlantic resilience in the next Alliance
strategic concept. Relevant Alliance activities and capabilities need to
be adapted and better integrated to deal with these threats and support
the individual and collective efforts of member and partner countries to
enhance societal security. Europe Whole, Free and at Peace. NATO’s third
home mission is to contribute to overall transatlantic efforts to
consolidate democratic transformation in a Europe that is not yet whole,
free and at peace. The situation today is different than at the end of
the Cold War or when new members joined NATO in this decade.
Nonetheless, allies should be careful not to close their door to the
people of wider Europe, while at the same time working to deepen
practical security cooperation and create conditions under which the
question of integration, while controversial and difficult today, can be
posed more positively in the future. The West must keep its door open to
the countries of wider Europe. NATO governments must remain firm on the
Bucharest Summit commitments to Georgia and Ukraine and to follow
through on subsequent pledges of further assistance to both countries in
implementing needed political and defense reforms. In some cases NATO
may take the lead on efforts at integrated security and enlargement; in
other situations the EU may be a more relevant actor; and in still other
contingencies both organizations may play mutually supportive roles. 25
Away Missions Threats to allied security do not necessarily originate in
the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. Many are non-military and
asymmetric in nature. Yet they can pose a direct danger to allied
citizens and societies. These threats mean that NATO also has three away
missions: to engage in crisis prevention and response, including through
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; to perform stability
operations; and to improve the capabilities of partners and NATO’s own
ability to work effectively with them, whether they are nations,
intergovernmental or non-governmental institutions. These missions also
require better expeditionary capabilities and civil-military
cooperation; and they also cannot be addressed by NATO alone. Crisis
Prevention and Response. NATO’s role has evolved from its singular Cold
War focus on Article 5 defense of allied territory to a broader mission
set that embraces non- Article 5 missions to assist the international
community in crisis prevention and response. In some cases,
consultations within NATO or diplomacy by NATO can help prevent a crisis
from escalating. NATO also has a unique capability to respond quickly to
a wide spectrum of man-made and natural crises. The NATO Response Force
(NRF) can be used for missions requiring rapid reaction at strategic
distance. If the Alliance is to continue to play an effective role in
crisis prevention and response, including humanitarian assistance, NATO
must maintain an expeditionary capability and enhance its ability to
work well with civilian agencies (such as the UN and EU) and NGOs in a
crisis. Stability Operations. North American and European operations in
the Balkans, Africa and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for
lengthy, demanding stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions. As
conflict ends, peace depends on establishing public security, essential
services and basic governance. These tasks often fall to the military
forces at hand before competent civilian resources can be deployed
safely to take over. A lengthy period can then ensue where a combination
of civilian and military forces is required to stabilize the region and
lay a security foundation to enable the population to rebuild governance
and a secure society. These goals require allied forces to perform
demanding and often unfamiliar and unplanned tasks, such as fighting
terrorists and criminal gangs, pacifying ethnic violence, restoring
distribution of electrical power, water, food, and fuel, and rebuilding
armies, police forces, and other institutions of governance and law
enforcement. Sustaining such missions over time is politically and
operationally difficult. Future requirements for such missions could be
large. Working Effectively with Partners. NATO has an interest in
forging partnerships with others who face common security challenges.
Moreover, in many non-European operations NATO is unlikely to operate or
to succeed on its own; other partners are likely to want to add their
strength to that of NATO, and NATO is likely to need partners for its
own success. NATO efforts to train and build the capacities of other
countries and organizations offer a low profile way to develop closer
relations, help others cope with their own regional problems, and
perhaps even turn them into partners and force contributors. Allied
forces will also be better able to operate together, and with others, if
they have trained together and have similar operational doctrines and
procedures. 26 NATO’s patterns of multilateral training and joint
command structures provide a firmer basis for shared military actions
beyond Europe than any other framework available to the U.S. or any
individual ally. Thus, NATO will remain a critical vehicle for ensuring
interoperability between U.S. and European forces. Indeed, this may
prove to be one of its most important military functions. Moreover, in
both crisis response and stability and reconstruction operations, the
Alliance must be able to operate closely with civilian reconstruction
and assistance agencies. A so-called “comprehensive approach” to such
operations has been developed by NATO that focuses on both the civilian
and military challenges that come with crisis operations. The importance
of the Comprehensive Approach was acknowledged by NATO in its 2006 Riga
Summit and its 2008 Bucharest Summit. The core idea is that the mission
of restoring order and progress to damaged countries cannot be
accomplished by military forces alone. As seen in the Balkans and
Afghanistan, military action can secure space for civilian action in
complex crises, but militaries can not restore societies. A combination
of military forces and civilian assets are necessary, deployed in a
coordinated way. Civilian functions, in turn, cannot normally be
performed by a single institution. Instead, they must be performed by a
multiplicity of actors, including foreign ministries, development
agencies, the European Union, partner countries outside NATO,
international agencies such as the United Nations and OSCE,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, and
numerous civilian contractors. Fusing these civilian activities and
blending them with ongoing S&R missions of military forces is the
demanding purpose of comprehensive approaches. It requires more
structured relations between NATO, the UN, the OSCE, the EU and other
established international actors to allow them to be more proactive in
preventing future crises in the first place, and to work together more
effectively, including with NGOs, in restoring peace and stability in
crisis areas. NATO needs to retool to undertake more stability
operations elsewhere in the world, not just focus on ways to improve its
performance in Afghanistan. NATO’s support for the African Union in
Darfur, for instance, may be a model of global engagement for which the
alliance needs to prepare better. 27 Chapter 5 What’s Needed for NATO
NATO cannot successfully carry out the responsibilities we propose as it
is currently structured. Yet the Alliance is called to meet these
missions home and away. The good news is that NATO has a track record of
reform. In fact, NATO seems to be in a perpetual state of adaptation.
Given its high operational tempo, reforming the Alliance can be like
fixing a race car in the middle of the race. Nonetheless, NATO can do
better. Carrying Out NATO Missions at Home Deterrence and Defense: NATO
nations must be able to back up their political commitment to defend one
another with capability and will if they are to deter those who would
intimidate or attack any member. NATO’s ability to execute a timely
Article 5 response requires prudent planning, periodic exercises,
modified training and judicious infrastructure investment. All members
of the Alliance, and especially those along its periphery, should be
able to play their role in collective defense. To strengthen Article 5
preparedness NATO could: Restore the military capability of the NATO
Response Force (NRF) for the mission of “first responder” if a
demonstration of military force is required after Article 5 is invoked.
A fully capable NRF would be the symbol of the commitment of Allies to
meet their Article 5 commitment. Include in the Defense Planning
Process a robust scenario that includes reinforcement of Allied
territory. MC-161, NATO’s assessment of future threats, should also
ensure that “the full range” of possible threats is included. Exercise
plans for territorial defense where appropriate along NATO’s periphery.
Exercises should be fully transparent and sized appropriately. Direct
NATO military staffs to develop comprehensive plans for the timely
handover of national forces to NATO control. Invest in essential
infrastructure in appropriate Allied nations (especially in the newer
Allies) to receive NATO reinforcements. Consider infrastructure
upgrades in new member states in order to base NATO common assets, like
the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, or other common assets.
Consider the creation of another NATO multinational corps composed of
new members in central Europe. Transatlantic Resilience: NATO and its
members already possess noteworthy capabilities in these areas, but
their ability to act as a fully organized, capable alliance is not well
developed. NATO will need improved physical assets, strengthened
strategic planning and operating capacities. It will need to coordinate
closely with national governments, many of which view control of
societal security resources as vital manifestations of their
sovereignty, and have diverse constitutional approaches to domestic uses
of their military and to civil-military cooperation in crisis
situations. 28 Moreover, NATO engagement in this area will require a
fundamentally different relationship with the EU. Among the 21 NATO
allies and 5 Partnership for Peace nations that also belong to the EU,
there is strong support for housing within the EU a growing number of
common European capabilities related to societal security and emergency
response (such as customs, police cooperation, environmental security
and informationsharing). Indeed, the EU has undertaken a range of
activities and initiatives aimed at improving its military and civilian
capabilities and structures to respond to crises spanning both societal
defense and societal security, including cross-border cooperation on
consequence management after natural and manmade disasters. In short,
NATO is likely to be a supporting player in more robust overall efforts
at societal security in the North Atlantic space. Nonetheless, NATO
efforts could build on promising yet modest developments already under
way in several areas, to include:22 guarding the approaches and
enhancing border security for the NATO region enhancing early-warning
and air/missile defenses improving counterterrorism activities
strengthening transatlantic capabilities for managing the consequences
of terrorist attacks (including agents of mass destruction) or
large-scale natural disasters cyberdefense biodefense political
consultations on energy security incorporating transatlantic
resilience into the Strategic Concept creating a Civil Security
Committee Guarding the Approaches From its earliest days, NATO has
always guarded the approaches by sea and air to Alliance territory.
Today, the Alliance must supplement its efforts against conventional
threats with those geared to threats that are asymmetric and complex to
defend against. For instance, after 9/11 and after invocation of Article
5, NATO AWACS units were deployed to bolster North American air defenses
and a maritime task force deployed to the eastern Mediterranean to
monitor and intercept vessels that might be in support of terrorists.
Now known as Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), these maritime patrols
cover the entire Mediterranean and involve partners from outside the
Alliance. Russian and Ukrainian vessels have deployed to OAE and
Mediterranean Dialogue countries, including Algeria, Morocco and Israel,
have taken steps to become involved. OAE offers tangible evidence that
even Article 5 missions can be conducted in ways that facilitate
cooperation with Moscow and other non-NATO capitals. NATO’s extensive
air defense system, including AWACS, was used to provide air
surveillance at the Athens and Turin Olympic games in 2004 and 2006. The
NATO naval command in Naples, Italy, has worked with participating
governments in recent years to develop the Maritime Safety and Security
Information System (MSSIS), a network of 46 national collection sites
linked to central servers which 29 disseminate data to participating
countries to enhance maritime awareness. This increased information has
enhanced the ability of each participating country to protect the
security of its territorial seas and ports and has greatly improved the
effectiveness of NATO and cooperative maritime security activities in
countering terrorism. To protect the approaches to North America, the
United States and Canada agreed in May 2006 to renew indefinitely their
bilateral air defense cooperation under the North American Aerospace
Defense (NORAD) Agreement. Washington and Ottawa also agreed to initiate
integrated surveillance of the continent’s maritime approaches and
internal waterways to improve warning of terrorist and other
threats—with response remaining the responsibility of appropriate U.S.
and Canadian national authorities. At the 2002 Prague Summit, allied
governments agreed to study options for protecting populations against
ballistic missile threats. While the U.S. is pursuing deployment of
missile defense facilities with Poland and the Czech Republic on a
bilateral basis, most European governments are not prepared to deploy
missile defenses for protection of populations. At the 2008 Bucharest
Summit, allies recognized the contribution the U.S. system would make to
the common defense and asked the Council to develop options for a
comprehensive missile defense architecture to extend coverage to all
allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the U.S.
system, for review at the 2009 NATO Summit. Iran’s ongoing development
of missile delivery systems, if combined with nuclear weapons, would
present a direct threat to Europe of the sort that could build support
for fielding NATO missile defenses. The new strategic concept needs to
address NATO’s role in protecting alliance forces, territory, and
populations against missile threats. Counterterrorism Counterterrorism
within the NATO region remains primarily the responsibility of national
intelligence, interior and police authorities. NATO’s counterterrorism
activities since 2001 have consisted primarily of safeguarding allied
airspace and maritime approaches and intelligence sharing. The alliance
has established a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit to improve
intelligence sharing and analysis. NATO nations are developing
cutting-edge technologies to protect troops and civilians deployed on
NATO missions against terrorist operations—for example, in detection of
“improvised explosive devices.” NATO should consider and agree on
options for expanding intelligence sharing and its capabilities to
support the protection of critical infrastructure. This should include
the development of procedures and plans to ensure the prompt deployment
of special operations forces—useful in disrupting some kinds of
terrorist attacks—if national authorities ask NATO for this type of
assistance. NATO should apply its plans for securing pipelines,
offshore platforms and ports to assure energy supplies in wartime to the
new challenge of anti-terrorist protection of such critical
infrastructure. 30 Consequence Management There are precedents for NATO
involvement in disaster relief—Hurricane Katrina (2005); the Pakistani
earthquake (2005-6), and central European flooding (2004). In managing
the consequences arising from terrorist attacks, pandemics or
large-scale natural disasters, a range of alliance capabilities
(planning, logistics, operations) could provide unique support to
national and EU authorities in the NATO region. NATO countries are
jointly developing five nuclear, biological, and chemical-defense
initiatives. NATO established a Czech-led multinational chemical,
biological, nuclear, radiological (CBNR) defense battalion in 2004,
which has been succeeded by the Combined Joined CBRN Defense Task Force
to provide sophisticated detection and defensive technologies against
these agents of mass destruction. In this area, NATO has developed a
proposal on civil-emergency planning that calls for the development of
non-binding guidelines and minimum standards for the protection of the
civil population against these threats. Alliance capacity to conduct
relief operations after a catastrophic incident could be strengthened in
a number of ways, to include: planning and civil emergency exercises
with allied and partner governments and relief organizations; a study
and inventory of Allied national homeland-defense requirements and
capabilities and then an effort with individual nations and the EU to
determine how to fix capability shortfalls or flawed planning;
formation of a small, highly-ready force with military capabilities
oriented to homeland missions, including consequence management, perhaps
in the NRF; appropriate expansion of NATO defense or foreign minister
meetings, to include interior, finance, health or other ministers in an
effort to foster better understanding of transatlantic resilience
challenges and possible responses; expanding the terms of reference
for the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Plans and Policy to
include support for efforts to improve transatlantic resilience and
defend the transatlantic homeland. Cyberdefense The responsibility to
deter, detect, defend against and defeat a cyber attack rests primarily
with nations and their private sectors. But the severe impact a cyber
attack can have on a nation’s information structure, and its use in
recent military operations and intimidation campaigns, has implications
for Alliance security. Moreover, given the deeply linked nature of
societal networks, a cyber attack is unlikely to affect only one nation.
NATO has cyber defense capabilities to protect its own systems and a
small research center of excellence in Estonia. However, cyber attacks
in Estonia and Georgia signal that such campaigns can be expected.
Therefore, NATO should be prepared not only to defend its own systems
but to come to the aid of members when called upon. 31 Allies might
consider either bolstering the current center in Estonia or establishing
a Cyber Center, at NATO or elsewhere, but with significant NATO
participation, in partnership with nations and the private sector
(including NGOs). A cyber center could help organize such a coordinated
approach and develop ways to deter, detect, defend against and defeat
cyber attack. Biodefense Successful global approaches to biosecurity
must begin with the transatlantic community. Europe and North America
together represent the largest repository of resources, skills, talents,
leadership and international engagement to make health an integral part
of societal resilience. The U.S. and various European countries have
advanced domestic biodefense efforts, but relatively little has been
done to strengthen international biodefense. Efforts to adopt nuclear
nonproliferation regimes to the biological realm have been fraught with
difficulties and are of questionable merit. Areas for cooperation
include improved global biosurveillance capabilities; better early
warning and detection systems; robust information-sharing,
investigational and preparedness mechanisms; harmonized standards; and
medical countermeasures and stockpiles.23 This is not primarily an area
for NATO – health and interior ministries, as well as international
organizations such as WHO, are particularly challenged. Bilateral
cooperation, and more effective U.S.-EU and global collaboration,
including between scientists, is also key. But NATO has a role to play,
particularly in terms of developing more effective response and
mitigation capabilities and procedures, and refocusing Euro- Atlantic
Disaster Response Coordination Center (EARDCC) training and exercises to
place greater emphasis on intentional attacks instead of primarily
natural disasters. Political Consultations on Energy Security Actions by
both state and non-state actors to interrupt the flow of energy supplies
have become a new tool of political intimidation. They illustrate the
new risks to allied security via the critical functions of allied
societies. Russia has disrupted flows of gas to Ukraine and other
European countries in the context of several political and pricing
disputes and the PKK has attacked pipeline routes in Turkey. The
Alliance could contribute to intimidation deterrence through energy
infrastructure protection capabilities and regionally-focused
civil-military planning and coordination. There is some precedent for
such an effort. In the 1980s, allied governments took part in Operation
Earnest Will, a military operation designed explicitly to secure the
supply of oil and protect tanker traffic in the Gulf during the
Iran-Iraq War. It was not a NATO operation, but it provides an early
example of a coalition of the willing working to address energy security
issues. NATO discussions have already raised the possibility of
protecting tanker traffic and oil platforms in periods of conflict, and
using satellites to monitor developments in areas where energy resources
come under threat.24 A Transatlantic Forum on Energy Cooperation
(TFEC)25 could be established to include member nations of NATO and the
EU, as well as the European Commission and the NATO international staff.
The objective of the forum should be to establish common, compatible and
complementary energy strategies that 32 lessen dependency on a single
source and provide a “strategic reserve” that can be tapped by
energy-consuming nations subjected to energy intimidation. TFEC should
hold a series of dialogues to establish a clear understanding of
possible additional stockpiling and emergency sharing measures to
supplement those of the International Energy Agency’s oil security
system, as well as security measures, including any potential role for
military force, and specific responsibilities of national governments,
the EU and NATO in addressing energy security issues. Incorporate
Transatlantic Resilience into the NATO Strategic Concept The new NATO
strategic concept needs to examine the changing demands of transatlantic
homeland defense and societal security and outline the Alliance’s proper
role in dealing with these challenges. In particular, the document
should include a statement of principles on “Transatlantic Resilience”
aimed outlining new challenges and steps the Alliance might take to
complement national and EU efforts. Create a Civil Security Committee
within NATO to meet the challenges posed by the contemporary security
environment and to establish closer coordination and integration with
civilian organizations and agencies.26 Europe Whole, Free and at Peace:
NATO allies have an interest in consolidating the democratic
transformation of Europe by working with others to extend as far as
possible across the European continent the space of integrated security
where war simply does not happen. Yet the Partnership for Peace is now
smaller than the Alliance itself, and divided awkwardly between such
core partners as Finland, Sweden and Switzerland and the countries of
Central Asia. Post-communist applicants for NATO membership are weaker
than earlier aspirants and less well known to allied parliamentarians
and publics. A number are beset with historical animosities and have yet
to experience significant democratic reforms. Opinion leaders in
Washington and in European capitals will look closely at the nature and
pace of domestic reforms, and for evidence of a willingness and desire
to resolve historic conflicts, when they consider these countries as
potential partners and allies. In addition, Russia is opposed to further
extension of NATO into the post-Soviet space. Finally, as discussed
earlier, some allies question the current credibility of NATO’s
guarantees to its own members. They worry that continued enlargement,
without complementary efforts to bolster NATO defense, could simply
hollow out the Alliance. NATO’s April 2008 Bucharest Summit showcased
the intra-Alliance muddle over further enlargement. Even though Alliance
leaders could not agree to develop a Membership Action Plan (MAP) with
either Georgia or Ukraine, they announced that the two countries would
in fact be members some day. This decision offers important political
assurance to Georgia and Ukraine, but it threatens to undermine the
integrity of the MAP process; relieves applicants from undertaking the
tough reforms necessary to add capability and value to the Alliance when
they join; and sends the wrong signal to Moscow about its ability to
influence internal NATO decisions. NATO Foreign Ministers took positive
steps to clarify and correct this situation at the December 2008
Ministerial 33 meetings. Allied governments must remain firm on the
Bucharest Summit commitments to Georgia and Ukraine and to follow
through on subsequent pledges of further assistance to both countries
through the NATO-Georgia and NATO-Ukraine commissions and bilateral
programs in implementing needed political and defense reforms. Managing
these very different expectations will be difficult. Yet there is no
need to believe that EU and NATO enlargement must proceed in lockstep or
not at all. In addition, given these various challenges a strategy for
democratic transformation and collective security in the region is
likely to be more effective if its goals are tied to conditions rather
than institutions. Western actors should work with the states in the
region, and others, to create conditions by which ever closer relations
can be possible. Such an approach has the advantage of focusing effort
on practical progress. The West has an interest in promoting democratic
governance, the rule of law, open market economies, conflict resolution
and collective security, and secure cross-border transportation and
energy links, regardless the institutional affiliation of countries in
the region. In short, the West should be careful not to close the door
to the countries of the region, but it should focus on creating
conditions by which the question of integration, while controversial
today, can be posed more positively in the future. A new focus on
societal resilience, and transatlantic interest in projecting resilience
to neighboring countries, would offer an additional means to engage and
draw closer the nations of wider Europe in ways that strengthen overall
transatlantic security. “Forward resilience” could inform a wide set of
initiatives, from internal security sector reform to cooperation offered
by the EU and NATO on the types of proposals we have advanced for allied
nations themselves. It could be an attractive mission for the
Partnership for Peace. Carrying Out NATO Missions Away Crisis Prevention
and Response: Crisis prevention and response can often require a mix of
political and military tools. NATO’s role in such situations can range
from providing a forum for political consultations, to military
presence, peacekeeping or high intensity combat. This role can be part
of an effective effort at keeping crisis from forming or keeping it away
from Allies and partners. Unfortunately, Allies have only a shallow pool
of capable, deployable forces, and they are stretched thin today. NATO
forces are deployed in various missions on land, sea and in the air,
from combat-intense stability operations in Afghanistan, through
anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations, to air policing missions over
Allied territory. Double- and triple-hatting of the same forces for
concurrent EU and NRF missions also means that some force commitments
are hollow and cannot be met. The only way out is for allies to increase
the number of capable, deployable forces and to end the habit of double-hatting
them to fill two commitments at once. Because larger defense budgets are
unlikely, increasing the number of deployable forces may have to be made
affordable by terminating other parts of a nation’s force structure.
Denmark was able to do this, for instance, by phasing out its submarine
fleet and shifting funding to deployable forces. 34 Pooling forces and
developing niche capabilities are other ways in which NATO member states
have been able to leverage their defense investments. NATO’s Rapid
Reaction Force was designed to be a highly-ready,
technologicallyadvanced force capable of undertaking a full spectrum of
missions from crisis response, to show of force, to collective defense.
NRF was also envisioned as an engine of NATO transformation. To date it
has been used in missions to deter threats and to support disaster
relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the
2005 earthquake in Pakistan. Allied governments confront a difficult
dilemma, as many are having difficulty providing units for current
operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, let alone for various rotations
of the NRF. Yet if the NRF is not used, it will languish as an expensive
training facility rather than an effective tool for NATO action.
Maintaining the operational effectiveness of this ready and
highly-capable force seems essential to NATO’s credibility and should
not be beyond the means of allied governments. It is a question of
political will. NATO leaders must turn to this problem of deployable and
capable forces as a first priority for a reformed NATO. Whether it is
for territorial defense within the Alliance area, or it is a crisis
response operation out of area, NATO needs a deeper pool of forces that
are capable, deployable and sustainable, and there is no easy fix.
Either defense budgets must be increased for additional personnel,
training and equipment or spending on existing force structure, static
command structure or unnecessary agencies/field establishments must be
re-mixed to prioritize deployable forces and their enablers, especially
ISR and helicopters. Deployable force contributions from nations who
have not played a significant role in NATO operations should come under
special attention to make the changes so that their forces become usable
for the Alliance. Stability and Reconstruction (S&R) Operations: The
transatlantic community faces a permanent need for improved S&R
capabilities, especially to implement the “comprehensive approach” when
assisting post-conflict societies. S&R operations run by NATO and the EU
in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, for instance, had to be cobbled
together on an ad hoc basis. Although many of the necessary capabilities
-- civilian as well as military -- exist within the EU, NATO and the
Partnership for Peace, they are not organized into deployable assets
that can provide cohesive, effective response. Consideration should be
given to the creation of a NATO military Stabilization and
Reconstruction Force (SRF), capable of working well with civilian
resources of the EU, UN, OSCE and others, and formed into an integrated,
multinational security support component that would organize, train and
equip the military and police in stricken countries, and assist in
reconstructing government institutions, economies and infrastructure.
While a dedicated NATO SRF as well as Alliance civilian capabilities are
important, NATO is likely to play a supporting role in these efforts.
For example, the EU’s “civilian” Headline Goals 2010 -- little noticed
in the U.S. -- provide for new capacities in policing, the rule of law,
civil administration and civil protection, to enhance European
capability to provide comprehensive and integrated security support,
especially in the aftermath of conflict.27 35 While meeting requirements
for S&R during the initial stages of a post-conflict scenario will be
demanding, sustaining large S&R capabilities over a lengthy period is
far more daunting. It necessitates periodic rotation of civilian as well
as military personnel, creating the need for a substantial pool of
available and trained resources. For the military component - the
proposed NATO SRF - European military strength could be sufficient if
mission-tasked and modestly reoriented in terms of training and
equipment. European allies could provide the manpower and associated
capabilities to generate large S&R assets, including administrators,
trainers, military police, CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation),
construction engineers, and medical personnel. Steps to better organize
and prepare them are needed for both combat and non-combat
contingencies. Some European militaries (e.g. Britain and France) prefer
to remain focused on traditional war-fighting. Germany and others,
however, have oriented at least in part toward S&R missions. More will
be needed for S&R than is already planned, and NATO should provide
planning guidance to set priorities for members as well as for its own
commands. At its Riga Summit, NATO acknowledged the need to improve S&R
capabilities, but it took no steps to establish a deployable command or
a center of excellence to support the S&R mission or to identify the
size and characteristics of forces needed. Nor was anything definitive
said at NATO’s Bucharest Summit of 2008. More energetic guidance is
needed from NATO, as well as from the EU, in this critical arena.
Working Effectively with Partners: Not only does the strategic logic for
partnerships remain compelling, NATO’s operational effectiveness is
increasingly dependent on such partnerships. 16 non-NATO members are
involved in NATO operations, 15 of them in Afghanistan. NATO’s array of
partnership initiatives, however, has languished and needs greater
coherence. There is a notable lack of broad strategic direction and
harmonization. The multitude of partner groups constitutes a
disintegrated collage of good efforts without measures of effectiveness
or mutually supporting plans and programs. Moreover, NATO has yet to
establish a truly strategic partnership with the EU or a meaningful
partnership with the UN or such institutions as the OSCE or the African
Union. NATO should establish an Assistant Secretary General for
Partnership to give direction to all engaged staffs, and consider a
variety of improvements described below. Creating a True NATO-EU
Strategic Partnership Given the broader nature of the security
challenges we face, and that military means alone will often be
insufficient or irrelevant to address them, there is a compelling need
for improved cooperation between NATO and the EU, and between each and
the United Nations. The U.S. – EU relationship must become stronger and
more productive as well. NATO and the EU have complementary interests
and comparative advantages in developing rapid reaction capabilities and
improving civilian-military responses to a wide range of areas,
including disaster relief, conflict prevention, crisis management, and
postconflict stabilization and reconstruction. EU-NATO cooperation is
necessary for NATO missions home and away -- from efforts to strengthen
transatlantic resilience and forge a Europe whole, free and at peace, to
crisis prevention and stability operations far from the North Atlantic
area. 36 The two institutions have largely overlapping memberships. 21
countries are members in both organizations. All non-NATO EU member
states except Cyprus are members of NATO’s partner mechanisms, the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, and the
five non-EU NATO members (U.S., Canada, Iceland, Norway and Turkey) all
have important links to the EU. Although the two institutions are quite
distinct in terms of ambition, scope and decision-making, they have
demonstrated an ability to work together. The sheer weight of common
challenges and reduced resources should induce greater cooperation.
While coordination will remain challenging, aligning the EU’s extensive
civilian and budding military assets with NATO’s military capacity and
transatlantic reach would dramatically broaden the range and strength of
tools at the disposal of the transatlantic community. Without a change
in course, NATO and the EU will continue to evolve separately,
generating considerable waste in scarce resources, with growing areas of
overlap and increased potential for confusion and rivalry. It is time to
construct a new transatlantic security architecture that will strengthen
both institutions individually, while allowing them to be effective
partners. Initial steps have been made. A set of key NATO-EU cooperation
documents, known in the jargon as the "Berlin-Plus" package launched
during the Clinton Administration, was finalized after rather painful
and prolonged negotiations on March 17, 2003. Such arrangements focus on
how NATO could help the EU conduct military operations and how mutual
capabilities could be developed through cooperative defense planning.
However, NATO also needs EU assistance to execute missions where a
“comprehensive approach” is required for success. As James Dobbins has
pointed out, it is quite possible to envisage an EU-led operation being
completed without NATO involvement. It is much harder, however, to
conceive of future contingencies in which NATO is involved, but not the
EU. To paraphrase our colleague Simon Serfaty, it is time to move beyond
asking what NATO can do for EU, or the EU for NATO, and forge mutual
NATO-EU synergies. NATO and the EU may succeed each other in support of
UN-sanctioned operations, as happened in the Balkans and now in the
pirate-plagued waters off the Horn of Africa. From October to December
2008, NATO escorted UN World Food Program ships bringing food aid to
Somalia and conducted counter-piracy activities. On December 14, 2008,
the NATO-led Operation Allied Provider handed off to the EU-led
Operation Atalanta. NATO met the immediate appeal from the UN; the EU
will provide longer term support to the UN relief operation. France’s
re-entry into NATO’s integrated military structure offers an important
opportunity to build stronger NATO-EU ties. France today is the largest
contributor to the NRF, and it participates in all major Alliance
expeditionary operations, including Kosovo and Afghanistan. Washington
should offer clear support for stronger European security and defense
capabilities that can enable Europe to be a stronger partner for North
America and also tackle security challenges on its own as appropriate.
37 At times, the almost mind-numbing detail associated with efforts at
NATO-EU cooperation make it easy to reduce this issue to a policy wonk’s
nightmare: hopeless, but not serious. But NATO-EU cooperation is not a
marginal technical issue. It is emblematic of a central debate: how –
and whether – Europe and North America can align the grand experiment of
European integration with a strategic shift of the transatlantic
partnership to tackle together 21st century security challenges.
Unfortunately, past experience has seen squabbling over technical
details as the preferred substitute for allies’ reluctance to engage
this fundamental challenge in a more straightforward manner. Those in
Europe who believe that they must weaken NATO to strengthen the EU’s
Security and Defense Policy are only likely to achieve an insecure and
incapable Europe unsure of itself and its role in the world. If they
want Washington to support ESDP, they must produce real capabilities and
assume real peacekeeping responsibilities, as they have for instance in
Bosnia. Those in the United States who believe that strengthening ESDP
means weakening NATO are only likely to achieve a lonely superpower
unable to count on the added abilities and resources of its allies when
it comes to facing new threats and risks. If the U.S. wants European
support for U.S. initiatives, it must be willing to allow allies to
develop the capacity to offer that support, even if at times they employ
that capacity autonomously. Little progress is likely, however, unless
greater efforts are made help the parties involved achieve a settlement
to the Cyprus dispute. Differences among Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus over
this issue have blocked the strategic common good for too long and
impeded the development of a more viable NATO-EU relationship.
Overcoming this roadblock to a truly strategic partnership should be a
high priority.28 For the foreseeable future, NATO will remain the
transatlantic partnership’s premier military alliance for high-end
defense requirements, including force transformation, demanding
expeditionary missions, and major war-fighting. The EU does not aspire
to such high-end military operations, but it could help promote
armaments cooperation, common R&D and procurement, standardization and
interoperability, training, multinational logistics, and other
activities in ways that conserve scarce resources and thereby benefit
European and NATO defense preparedness. The EU is asking members to
acquire military forces and related capabilities for several security
and defense missions, including peacekeeping, training with foreign
nations, S&R, limited crisis interventions in such places as Africa, and
providing civilian assets for comprehensive approaches. While such
assets may be primarily intended for EU use, future collaboration could
perhaps result in them being assigned to NATO missions. We suggest
various initiatives to build a sound EU-NATO relationship:29 Develop
institutional capabilities to enable rapid coordinated NATO-EU response
to crisis. Such capabilities will provide the structure for a new
NATO-EU security partnership. These institutional capabilities must be
established and practiced in advance; otherwise they will be untried and
irrelevant when the need arises. 38 Consideration should be given to a
NATO-EU Crisis Management Center. As a crisis develops, having NATO and
the EU manage it together from the beginning could help determine the
most logical approach for which institution should have the lead, or
whether and how it should be handled together. Such a Crisis Management
Center could be part of the civil-military crisis center at the EU.
Fuller use could be made of the NATO and EU military liaison cells and
improved contacts between the EU’s Monitoring and Information Center and
the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC). NATO’s
Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Committee should be reestablished as a
joint NATO – EU committee to deal with civil emergency planning,
stability and reconstruction, and mission deconfliction issues when and
as required. This has the reform benefit of getting rid of a huge and
outdated NATO Committee, the CEP, to which most nations lend little
credibility. It recognizes that NATO does have a role in both civil
security and S&R while acknowledging the fact that as a crisis evolves
any military role is likely to be replaced by civilian authorities.
Joint planning. Both institutions could undertake joint planning in
appropriate areas, especially on the Comprehensive Approach. NATO should
welcome any EU planning capacity that strengthens capabilities to
undertake complex combined operations. An institutional home could be
found for a combined NATO-EU planning staff, where both institutions
could undertake, where appropriate, joint defense planning, force
planning, and doctrinal development of the Comprehensive Approach.
Either institution could also host a security concept working group
where both institutions could focus on security issues and how the EU
and NATO could address them, either together or separately. Joint
planning exercises should be held and could engage other parties, such
as the UN and non-governmental organizations, and include a sharing of
“lessons learned.” Joint operations command. In major operations where
the EU and NATO are both engaged, such as in Afghanistan, the operation
should be coordinated. One NATO Joint Force Command (as well as an EU
Operational HQ) should be designated an EU-NATO command for major joint
operations and could host EU planners to facilitate transparency and
joint operations. Force generation. A joint force generation mechanism
will be required to request assets from both EU and NATO members for a
combined operation. While force generation could be done separately, a
joint process that generates forces collaboratively could avoid NATO and
the EU competing for valuable capabilities. Create a new NATO-EU
partnership on WMD consequence management that delineates the role of
each organization in a crisis; creates links between each and the WHO
global health security network; and develops reliable channels for rapid
communication among health and security officials. Conduct regular
biosecurity response exercises among EU, NATO, WHO, and national and
local governments, with regular contact with the private sector. 39
Build compatible capabilities. NATO and the EU should ensure the NRF and
EU Battle Groups are successful and mutually reinforcing. European
governments should continue to make Battle Groups more effective. NATO
members should recommit to full NRF capabilities as called for at
Prague. NATO and the EU should conduct joint training exercises to
improve interoperability, work toward common standards for unit
certification, and harmonized rotation and exercise scheduling. The EU
should make Battle Groups and joint assets available for selected,
agreed NATO missions, and NATO should develop contingencies for the NRF
to reinforce EU operations when needed. Today, EU Battle Group
capabilities are oriented toward smaller, short duration, less combat
intense operations. NATO’s NRF/CJTFs are oriented toward larger, more
enduring missions that may readily include conventional combat. This is
a reasonable, non-mutually exclusive “complementarity of ambition” for
EU and NATO rapid response forces given present resources. If NATO and
the EU can calibrate capabilities and operational planning toward these
aims, including resolution of an Operations HQ at EU headquarters in
Brussels, both organizations will realize better use of resources and
see Battle Groups, the NRF, and other high readiness forces far better
prepared to meet operational requirements. Establish a strong
relationship between NATO and the EU’s European Defense Agency (EDA).
NATO’s Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD) and the
Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment should work more
collaboratively with the EDA to rationalize European procurement and
efforts by European governments to integrate military forces and
structures across national borders. The NATO-EU Capabilities Group
should be reinvigorated and closer collaboration developed between the
EDA and Allied Command Transformation. Facilitate joint or
complementary efforts to project “forward resilience” to partners.
Promote efforts at security sector reform, police and gendarmerie
training, civilian control of the military, economic reconstruction in
partner nations where appropriate. The EU could include public health-biosecurity
measures in aid packages for new member states and for accession
countries to improve their health security mechanisms. NATO could
include public health-biosecurity measures in ongoing work in the
Partnership for Peace, which includes Central Asia. NATO-UN Relations In
September 2008, after almost 60 years of coexistence, the UN and NATO
agreed for the first time to a formal relationship and a framework for
expanded consultation and cooperation.30 These organizations already
cooperate to safeguard Kosovo’s fragile stability and struggle together
in Afghanistan. NATO protects UN food aid shipments to Somalia against
the threat of pirate attacks. The United Nations has the most diverse
experience with peacekeeping operations, yet its record is uneven.
Further reform of the UN Department of Political Affairs and Department
of Peacekeeping Operations is needed to better enable them to lead
crisis management and peace support operations. 40 In 1992 NATO became
the first regional organization authorized by the Security Council to
use force. The UNSC has mandated almost all ongoing NATO operations. It
is a rare NATO operation where the UN is not engaged in some fashion.
There are many UN operations with no EU, NATO or U.S. involvement. There
are no EU, NATO or U.S. operations without some UN involvement.31
Despite its post-Cold War transformation, NATO depends on the capacities
and expertise of the UN and its special agencies in the political, rule
of law, humanitarian and development areas in places such as
Afghanistan. If progress lacks in these fields, the Alliance will not be
able to achieve its goals. Like the EU, the UN is becoming a key part of
the “Comprehensive Approach.” Its success in bringing civil assistance
can dictate how quickly military forces can disengage from conflict. The
EU has led several UN-mandated crisis management missions, and together
EU member states are the most important financial contributor to UN
peacekeeping. 32 The NATO-UN relationship, in contrast, has always been
ad hoc. There is no routine and consistent joint planning or common
crisis management. UN humanitarian bodies and agencies are concerned
that closer cooperation with NATO could jeopardize their neutrality and
impartiality in conflict areas and put their staff at risk, and NATO
nations have been reluctant to provide their troops and assets to UN
peacekeeping missions following the UN’s failure to stop violence in
Bosnia in the early 1990s. The NATO representation at the UN in New York
is small and unable to undertake consistently the advance planning
needed for NATO and the UN to work together efficiently. NATO needs to
build up its presence at the UN with additional planners to develop the
relationships and establish a routine planning capability; the UN should
have representation at SHAPE; and the NATO-UN agreement should be
operationalized. Partnership for Peace (PfP): NATO’s premier partnership
remains vital but is uneven in its relevance and effectiveness. For
traditional European non-aligned and neutral countries, PfP has remained
a valuable mechanism for political and operational cooperation with NATO
on mutual security concerns while deferring or avoiding the membership
question. Sweden, Finland and Austria, however, are looking to take
their partnership with NATO to the next stage, in particular through a
bigger political say in those NATO-led operations in which they
participate. For countries in the Balkans, Ukraine, and Georgia it has
remained a valuable tool for strengthening defense and advancing
NATO/Western integration goals. For the Central Asians, it has become
less useful as interest in NATO has waned, and resources are lacking.
PfP needs to be transformed, adequately resourced, and better integrated
with bilateral and regional efforts to address new security challenges.
NATO should look at developing new, tailored PfP programs, including on
military education and training, security sector reforms and “forward
resilience,” border security, and sub-regional military cooperation in
the Balkans, greater Black Sea region, and Central Asia. Successful
programs of subregional cooperation in Southeastern Europe could also be
adapted to the Black Sea, 41 and efforts should be pursued to develop
Turkey’s proposal for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.
Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI): Allied
interests in the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean and the
broader Middle East have increased greatly since these programs were
first created. Alliance security depends on the stability that can be
advanced through cooperation with these partners. NATO’s engagement in
Afghanistan and the training of Iraqi security forces have made the
alliance more relevant to security in the broader Middle East. NATO’s
role could grow should the Alliance be called upon to provide forces to
implement any future Palestinian- Israeli settlement – however unlikely
such an accord appears to be at present. NATO, the Gulf States, and
others in the region are also concerned about the implications of Iran’s
nuclear activities and missile programs, and have common interests in
energy security. At the Riga Summit, NATO governments launched a
Training Cooperation Initiative to expand participation by Middle East
partners and to explore joint establishment of a security cooperation
center in the region. Unfortunately, not much has come from this
initiative. It should be re-energized so that NATO can share its
expertise in training military forces to help partners build forces that
are interoperable with those of Allies. ICI countries and NATO need to
define future priorities, which might include combined peacekeeping
operations, cooperation on crisis management and missile defense. The
Alliance also needs a better public diplomacy strategy for the region.
Global Partnerships: In the process of taking on emerging global
challenges, NATO must deepen partnerships globally. Since 2001, NATO has
undertaken operational military cooperation with countries beyond
Europe’s periphery to counter terrorism and promote stability.
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea have either worked with
the Alliance in Afghanistan or supported stabilization efforts in Iraq.
The development of these relationships reflects NATO’s need for a wider
circle of partners beyond PfP to respond to complex global threats. At
the Riga and Bucharest Summits, allies recognized the value of global
partnerships with countries that share our values. There has been real
progress in building political dialogue and developing individual
Tailored Cooperation Packages. Given that some of these countries are
now offering to intensify their cooperation and to provide troops or
civilian resources to NATO operations, they need to be accommodated
through closer political and military ties. NATO needs to facilitate
routine political consultations; better integrate their armed forces
into the planning and conduct of those NATO-led operations where they
elect to participate; and improve their interoperability with NATO
forces. NATO also needs to intensify its political dialogue with other
major players, notably China, India and Pakistan. The need for flexible,
practical cooperation with the AU, OSCE, and other international
organizations seems likely to grow as the alliance responds to
increasingly complex global challenges that affect transatlantic
security. Operationalizing the Comprehensive Approach: This will take a
long time and much effort to implement effectively, as it requires not
just change at NATO but close cooperation with civilian institutions
such as the EU and the UN that do not necessarily have the civilian
capabilities and structures to link up with NATO military capabilities
in 42 a common operational approach. As outlined earlier, a first step
could be to establish a NATO-EU Working Group on the Comprehensive
Approach made up of professional staff from both institutions to flesh
out a division of labor and a concept of operations for both
organizations. This could be the work of the new “NATO-EU Civil
Emergency Planning and Stability and Reconstruction Committee” as
suggested above. At NATO, the integrated military command structure
should incorporate civilians (including those from the EU) into
appropriate parts of the command structure, not just at SHAPE, but at
the Joint Force Command HQs as well to provide for the civil side of
conflict management. The Berlin Plus agreement enables the EU to have
access to NATO military assets and capabilities for EU-led operations.
The EU should likewise be prepared to offer its civilian crisis
management capabilities in support of NATO operations. The Working Group
should consider how such a reciprocal arrangement for mutual support can
be established during S&R operations. This should include a reservoir of
law enforcement capacity, working closely with the UN and providing
access to police trainers, prison service professionals, and judges, as
well as public administrators and utilities and infrastructure
engineers.33 43 Chapter 6 Internal NATO Reforms In addition to
capacities tailored to specific mission requirements, reforms are
required in areas that cut across the mission spectrum. The Alliance
should change the way it makes decisions; change the way it spends
money; generate appropriate military capabilities; match missions to
means; and rethink functional and geographical “areas of emphasis.”
Change the Way NATO Makes Decisions The rules and procedures which guide
how NATO makes decisions – from voting in committees and in the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) to how the military and political staffs interact
-- have grown more complicated as NATO has grown larger. A NATO fit for
the 21st century should consider some decision-making changes. This
includes delegating authority to the Secretary General for internal
matters. Modify the consensus rule. NATO decision making at every level
of the Alliance has been governed by the consensus rule; all decisions,
large or small, are unanimous. While this is an important symbol of
unity, especially when the NAC votes to deploy forces, the consensus
rule also allows one nation to block the wishes of all others and also
leads to lowest-common-denominator decisions. It is time for a thorough
review, with an eye towards consensus decision-making only taking place
in the NAC and in budget committees, or perhaps only on certain
decisions, such as deploying forces or spending money. Qualified
majority voting, or upholding a simple majority, have each been
suggested as alternatives, especially in committees lower than the NAC.
Another important reform worth considering is allowing nations to opt
out of participating in an operation (even after joining consensus in
the NAC to approve an operation). In such a case, the opt-out nation
would not bear the cost of an operation, but also would not participate
in decision-making on how that operation is executed.34 Reform the NATO
Bureaucratic Structure: The International Staff and International
Military Staff (IS/IMS) are the backbone of NATO HQ, fulfilling many
important day-today functions to support decision-making in the NAC and
the Military Committee. However, both staffs have hardened into
bureaucratic stovepipes, often performing duplicative functions and
working in an uncoordinated fashion that undercuts efficiency. While
both staffs should be reviewed by an outside working group to determine
how they might be reorganized, a reform that could be undertaken now is
to increase the integration of the staffs at NATO HQ, which was begun on
an experimental basis a few years ago. Such a mix of civilian and
military staffs is key to implementing the “comprehensive approach.”
Revamp the NATO Military Committee (MC): In the past, the Military
Committee played an important role in providing military advice to the
NAC and in providing guidance to the Strategic Commands. However, in
recent years the MC has been used as an arena to fight political battles
better fought elsewhere, undercutting the MC’s 44 credibility. Today,
many question whether the MC is the best source for unbiased military
advice and whether it has been effective in motivating nations to
improve military capabilities and force generation. We are tempted to
recommend the abolition of the Military Committee to demonstrate the
degree of our concern about the slow, and sometimes politically-driven,
process by which the MC provides military advice. While we stop short of
such a recommendation, those who support the MC should be pressed to
explain why it would be more effective than alternatives. At a minimum,
the MC’s role, mission and processes should be closely reviewed. Review
Defense Acquisition: the creation of the EU’s European Defense Agency
(EDA) provides the potential for cooperation with NATO’s Conference of
National Armament Directors (CNAD). Both institutions share the same
capability shortfalls and lack of political will by their members to
increase defense budgets or otherwise improve capabilities. While there
is a NATO-EU Working Group on Capabilities, cooperation is largely
sterile. The role of the CNAD should be reviewed carefully by an outside
group made up of industry and acquisition officials to determine if NATO
acquisition procedures should be revamped, and to look for ways that the
EU and NATO could cooperate in meeting common capability shortfalls more
efficiently, as described above. Streamline the Command Structure: The
NATO command structure is in a perpetual state of reform, and has
transformed from the complex organization of the Cold War to a
configuration more suitable for expeditionary operations outside the
NATO region. However, as NATO evolves, so must its command structure,
and there is still some unfinished business. One criticism is that
SHAPE, despite being a strategic command, still has too much operational
control that should belong to the commander in the field. SHAPE should
remain principally a strategic level command. Second, NATO
headquarters are not standard, often complex and at times
incomprehensible. Command relationships can hamper rather than
facilitate command. Most of the NATO command structure is still
undeployable, necessitating the creation of ad hoc headquarters to serve
as KFOR and ISAF, while large staffs sit almost idle at fixed locations
in Europe. Finally, the role of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) as
an “engine for transformation” is also under the microscope. ACT is
criticized as having a weak impact on transformation, failing to have
acquisition authority, and lacking credibility at NATO Headquarters.
Some have always been concerned that the current arrangement – a dual-hatted
supreme commander as head of both ACT and U.S. Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) -- may not give that commander the time needed to devote to the
difficult transformation task at NATO. With these perspectives in mind
we propose a reorganized and reoriented three-level command structure.
45 The strategic level is Allied Command Operations (ACO) commanded by
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) who should remain an
American; and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) with a European
Supreme Commander and two Deputies, one in charge of defense planning
and acquisition and the other, a U.S. deputy who is dual-hatted as the
Deputy USJFCOM in charge of transformation. ACT’s duties would also
include developing doctrine and training for the comprehensive approach,
transatlantic resilience and defense, including the Atlantic approaches,
and with an element at USNORTHCOM in support of that mission. The second
level should be operational and comprised of three JFC headquarters in
Brunssum, the Netherlands; Naples, Italy; and Lisbon, Portugal. Each JFC
headquarters should have a geographic and functional focus. JFC Lisbon’s
geographic focus should be on the Mediterranean Sea and Africa, and its
functional priority should be NATO-EU collaboration. JFC Brunssum should
focus on southwest Asia/broader Middle East as a geographic priority and
the reappearance of a conventional threat as a functional priority. JFC
Naples should focus on southeastern Europe and transatlantic resilience.
Each JFC should be able to deploy a robust Joint Task Force, and there
should be at least two Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOC) with a
deployable CAOC capability. JFCs must be capable of operational
oversight of multiple missions. All JFCs must be capable of backing one
another, and must plan and exercise for Article 5 missions. The third
level of the NATO Command Structure should be comprised of three joint
deployable HQs that deploy to the mission area to conduct operations
(e.g. KFOR and ISAF). These HQs would replace most or all of the current
6 fixed component commands (2 air, 2 land and 2 maritime). If required,
the three deployable HQs could be supplemented by the High Readiness HQs
already in existence in some allied nations or other HQs at lower
readiness. Change the Way NATO Spends Money The way NATO spends money
for operations and infrastructure is opaque, complicated and does not go
far enough to lessen the financial burden on nations deploying on
missions. Changes are needed to improve financial efficiency, increase
military capability and cover costs that otherwise give nations an
excuse not to deploy on operations. Because additional common funding
contributions will not come easily from nations, greater effort must be
made to re-direct spending of common funds from political and military
bureaucratic structure to improving deployability and capabilities. This
is routinely done through such mechanisms as Peacetime Establishment
reviews, but they have not produced the needed results. The ISAF
experience has caused NATO to rethink how it funds operations. However,
more work needs to be done to permit the use common funds to cover
operational costs and to purchase common equipment. The “costs lie where
they fall” principle, which places the costs of participating in
Alliance operations on the nations actually taking part, has been under
attack for many years. Still, that principle is largely followed, making
it not only onerous to take part in deployments, but providing nations
an excuse not to 46 participate because they cannot afford to. The
financial crisis makes it imperative for NATO to develop a new approach
to funding operations and common equipment: Cost-share operations.
Although wealthier allies feel they already pay too much into common
funds and do not feel it is fair for them to increase their
contributions to common funding, poorer allies often cannot cover costs
to deploy on missions. If wealthier nations do not contribute more to
common funds, fewer allies will participate in Alliance missions.
Increase and broaden the use of common funds to procure common equipment
for operations. While the Alliance has increased the use of common funds
to procure common equipment for operations, such use is often blocked by
some nations who “do not want to pay for a capability twice.” Such a
short-sighted view makes it easy for some nations to avoid shouldering
the burden by pleading poverty. NATO military authorities should suggest
additional equipment that NATO could purchase and make available to
nations and so make it easier for them to deploy.35 Coordinate
equipment procurement with the EU. This has the potential for the
greatest efficiency, but is the hardest to implement. Both NATO and the
EU share common capability shortfalls that could be met more efficiently
if those shortfalls are met in a common procurement. Much of such
cooperation has been stalled by political issues, industrial base
issues, as well as by the sheer complexity that comes with common
procurement by nations. Most efforts, even on a small scale, have failed
miserably in the past. However, a new approach at cooperative
procurement should be considered by a working group that includes
representatives of transatlantic industry. Generate Appropriate Military
Capabilities If NATO is to reform along the lines we propose, it must
generate the appropriate capabilities to meet its missions. Without
credible capabilities, strategic concepts, treaty guarantees and summit
declarations mean little to allies or those who would confront them.36
NATO credibility rests on a demonstrable capability for timely military
response to threats to any member’s territory. Credibility also requires
the capabilities to carry out other missions that allies have agreed.
Every NATO Strategic Concept has had at its core clear guidance on
required military capabilities. A new Concept will have to address the
increasing demand for usable capabilities alongside the reality that
available resources will contract across the Alliance. NATO militaries
need considerable further restructuring to achieve far more availability
of resources. NATO itself needs greater efficiencies and better business
practices. I. Capabilities for Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions A.
Deployable Conventional Forces. Forces that cannot deploy are of almost
no use for Alliance missions, either Article 5 or non-Article 5
operations. About 70 percent of European land forces cannot deploy, due
either to obsolete equipment, lack of mobility assets, reliance on fixed
logistics, or a lack of plans or training for movement operations. 47
Many units suffer all these shortfalls. This situation is due to the
conscious decision by many allies not to invest in making more than a
faction of their forces deployable. Troop rotations mean that 30 percent
of forces that are deployable yield no more than 10 percent sustained
mission support. With a force almost half a million smaller, the U.S.
deploys well over twice as many troops as Europe. 1. Major Combat
Forces. Not only light forces must be deployable. Heavy armored forces
that would anchor land defense of the Alliance must be deployable,
strategically and operationally by aircraft, ship, rail or road. NATO
boundaries are hundreds, often thousands of kilometers from where forces
are located in the heart of Europe. Article 5 credibility is eroded by
the absence of plans and assets for forces to get where they may be
needed. Years of as yet unprogrammed investment in planning, training
and equipment acquisition are the cost of restoring Article 5
credibility. 2. Intervention Forces. The focus today is on Afghanistan,
as it must be, and on Kosovo, where security remains tense. These
interventions strain allied forces because the reservoir of deployable
lighter forces for non-Article 5 missions is just as inadequate as for
Article 5 missions. In Afghanistan national caveats by some allies
increase the demands on the forces of those allies without caveats.
Rotational schemes, essential to long operations by volunteer
militaries, exponentially increase force requirements. Europe has 1.3
million non-conscript land forces, yet in 2007 was only able to muster
on average deployment of less than 80,000 for all operations – NATO, EU
and national. As in the case of heavy armor, many lighter forces needed
in Kosovo and Afghanistan are simply undeployable and therefore
unavailable. 3. The NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF is the most
visible example of the shortage of ready, available forces, especially
to meet Article 5 missions. Yet for many reasons allies are reluctant to
meet force requirements. As a result, it has been scaled back both in
terms of capabilities and mission. Although the NRF is intended to be
NATO’s most prominent response capability, pressure has been needed from
the start to fill the modest NRF requirements of 25,000 combined land,
air and naval forces, especially a brigade of land forces representing
just 2,000-3,000. For example, in late 2008, just two months prior to
its mission window, the 13th rotation of the NATO Response Force was
reported to be at only 26% fill for land forces with no commitments for
helicopters or logistics. Shortfalls are due to the demands of meeting
troop requests for current operations, particularly ISAF in Afghanistan,
and many forces are simply unusable. The NRF must be kept robust and
able for an array of missions, including disaster assistance and
humanitarian relief. Downsizing the NRF from 25,000 to 10,000, as is
being considered, is not the right choice. 4. Special Operations Forces
and Stabilization Forces. Conflict regions like Afghanistan are
inherently complex, with warfare and stability operations inextricably
intertwined. Forces must understand their environment be able to work
with a host of partners. Short tours frustrate continuity among
multinational forces through turnover rates that destroy institutional
memory and expertise. Tours of at least 6 months should be the norm. All
allies maintain small contingents of Special Operations Forces (SOF) as
48 well as the military police, engineering, civil affairs
(CA)/civil-military (CIMIC), and medical units that are most needed to
conduct stabilization or crisis response operations. However these types
of forces are inadequate in number relative to the long nature of such
operations. B. Commonly Funded Force Enablers. Three critical sets of
force enablers or multipliers should be approved by NATO for common
funding under the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) or under the
Military Budget, as appropriate. These enablers are too costly yet too
critical to continue to depend primarily on national means. The dire
result of that policy can be seen in ISAF shortfalls today. 1. Strategic
and Theater Lift, including sealift and airlift as well as land movement
to Alliance borders, is essential to respond to Article 5 indications
and warnings as well as to crises well beyond NATO territory. While the
Alliance has organized its sealift capabilities, some sealift
capabilities should be NATO funded. Some airlift capabilities, including
aerial refueling, should also be NATO funded. Strategic response
requires mobility planning, training and exercises. Airfields and ports
should be surveyed and upgraded to handle appropriate vessels/aircraft
and numbers of movements. 2. Network Enabled Command, Control and
Communications (C3). Communications and information systems are
incompatible across NATO forces at the operational and tactical levels,
and far too much of both NATO and national network systems (especially
U.S. systems) remain non-interoperable. 3. Interoperable Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). National capabilities span a
wide, disparate range, and system incompatibility is far more common
than synchronous systems. There must be greater willingness to share
information across multinational elements; procedural obstacles –
especially in the U.S. -- are more daunting than technological ones.
Common-owned and -funded systems would do much to solve these problems.
If the Alliance is to be serious about common funding and procurement,
the U.S. must modify its technology transfer procedures and the “Buy
American” policy with respect to its closest allies. C. Missile defense
of both territory and deployed forces has emerged as a potentially
important requirement for future deterrence against missile threats from
Iran and possibly other countries. Should transatlantic diplomacy
succeed in stopping Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, interceptor
deployment may not be necessary. Yet current U.S. and allied efforts
should continue now for two reasons. First, such efforts are prudent
given the lead time necessary for deployment. Second, should diplomacy
fail and Tehran acquire nuclear weapons capability, a defensive response
is likely to be a more palatable and effective option than an offensive
military response. As NATO moves forward, it should seek to put missile
defenses in place without rupture to NATO-Russia relations. As a start
the new U.S. administration and European allies should commit to engage
with Russia on missile defense issues. The Alliance also needs to follow
through 49 on its 2008 Bucharest Summit commitments to explore how the
planned U.S. missile defense sites in Europe could be integrated into
current NATO plans and to develop options for a comprehensive missile
defense architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and
populations not otherwise covered by the U.S. system for review at the
2009 Summit.37 D. Nuclear Forces. We support the long-term goal of a
world without nuclear weapons. None of our considerations contradict
initiatives such as Global Zero. Yet when it comes to practical
implementation, it is important to keep in mind that historically, the
presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has been a preeminent symbol
coupling European and North American security. For this reason, a
unilateral U.S. decision to withdraw its nuclear weapons could be seen
in Europe as a U.S. effort to decouple its security from that of its
allies and thus question the very premise of the Atlantic Alliance. If
such a step is to be considered, therefore, the initiative should come
from Europe. If European allies are confident that European and North
American security is sufficiently coupled without the presence of U.S.
nuclear weapons in Europe, the U.S. is unlikely to object to their
removal. Alliance discussion of NATO’s choices should be framed by the
following: Careful consideration of future requirements in terms of
theater nuclear delivery capabilities, i.e., the appropriate number of
dual capable aircraft (DCA) and the number of devices to be prudently
associated with them. Close and reflective negotiations among all
allies, but especially those who store these weapons. Allies should keep
in mind that once withdrawn, it will be all but impossible politically
to return them. Redeployment in time of tension would readily be seen as
an act of war. If reductions or even elimination is considered, NATO
needs a strategy for negotiating an equivalent reduction by Russia, the
other holder of such weapons. Match Missions to Means A vision without
resources is a hallucination. And yet the gap between the missions NATO
is called to take on and the means it has to perform them is growing day
by day. Even as it conducts operations, NATO needs adequate capabilities
to continue the process of force transformation across the Alliance. The
capacity to train to higher standards on more tasks and to transform
forces and practices while conducting high operational tempo deployments
requires a larger proportion of usable forces. Even capabilities that
are ready to deploy, however, can be unavailable due to the high cost of
deployment itself. For example, European NATO members own approximately
1,000 attack and approximately 2,000 transport helicopters, but have
deployed no more than a small fraction of these to ISAF, where they are
urgently needed. The Alliance urgently needs to examine ways to
alleviate such costs through changes in how operations are funded or
essential capabilities are fielded. 50 NATO has tried the full array of
incentives and mechanisms to encourage its members to maintain
sufficient levels of ready forces and defense investment. In each case,
the initiative fell short – sometimes very short -- of agreed goals.
Moreover, we are in the midst of a deep economic crisis of indeterminate
length. For these reasons, we do not believe that NATO can expect any
growth in resource availability. The opposite is more likely --
declining defense resources on both sides of the Atlantic over a
sustained period. Generating political will to invest in military
capabilities is a unique national responsibility. Each member government
makes its own case to publics and parliaments. Some argue that such
investment is necessary to keep the Alliance strong; others stress
concerns over national security; still others point to countering
terrorism and instability in Afghanistan rather than dangers at home.
Whatever the rationale, member governments should make it clear that
modern defense capabilities cannot be regenerated from low levels in one
or two years’ time, should a threat suddenly come into public focus. Nor
should members rely solely on other allies while foregoing basic
defenses of their own. Political will also affects decisions to employ
capabilities already on hand. NATO commanders must constantly navigate
the nature of multiple national caveats, for instance, which represent
the conditions under which forces have been committed. NATO leaders need
to achieve as broad a consensus on missions as possible in order to
reduce the preference for national caveats. The only source of greater
capability in the near term is to improve what is already on hand. That
requires members to generate economies within current defense budgets.
The Alliance needs to make a number of major changes: Reconsider
NATO’s ambition of two large and six small operations simultaneously,
which it cannot fulfill for at least 10 years, and is not attuned to the
mission set we have set forth. Increase the usability of NATO’s 12,500
person formal command structure, none of which is deployable. Look for
capabilities where the pooling of assets by some members can be agreed,
such as the C-17 airlift initiative among 12 members and partners.
Reorganize where practical into multinational units comprised of
national component forces or even national niche forces. Expand
civilian capabilities available to NATO by energizing and implementing
the Comprehensive Approach. Renew emphasis on consolidating R&D
investment and sharing technologies. Look earnestly at collective
procurement or contracting for transport helicopters; intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; and centralized logistics,
along the lines of the consortium purchase of strategic airlift by a
group of NATO members described above. Redouble efforts to shift
spending away from personnel and infrastructure costs in national
defense budgets, and towards investment, training, and readiness. The
goal is smaller, better equipped, more deployable forces. Bolster
Alliance capacities to support member states’ national efforts to
safeguard against cyber attacks from whatever source. 51 Put teeth in
NATOs “Peacetime Establishment” (PE) Review to save military budget
funds by cutting static command structure or cost-sharing with other
institutions NATO’s Cold War era research facilities. Rethink Functional
and Geographic “Areas of Emphasis” For good reasons the Alliance has
resisted ‘divisions of labor,’ ‘role specialization’ and ‘niche
capabilities’ in the past. Yet, persistent low defense investments
create serious gaps that cannot be closed in the near term. Therefore
coordination along both functional and geographic lines, framed by the
notion of “lead” and “supporting” organizations, may be wise, with
central organizing principles and procedures. This could result in a
greater ability of the broader alliance to meet a widening array of
challenges. NATO could call on members to make the most of limited
investments by creating strong capacity in select areas without being
absolved of maintaining comprehensive forces at lower capability. The
focus should be on creating stronger, mutually reinforcing capabilities
from all allies. Functional areas of emphasis should be explored along
the lines of stability operations/irregular forces and major combat
forces. A geographic view might look at NATO and EU regions of emphasis.
For example, NATO is charged with responsibility for collective defense
of allied territory as well as operations in south Asia, particularly
Afghanistan. The EU has taken the lead on most crisis response
operations in Africa and is assuming more and more missions in the
Balkans outside of NATO itself. Neither functional nor geographic roles
should be considered exclusive domains. Rather these should be regarded
as lead and support domains, such that transatlantic partners reinforce
each other with an array of capabilities. 52 Conclusion Taken together,
these reforms promise to reinforce each element of NATO’s enduring
purpose, while repositioning the Alliance within a broader,
reinvigorated Atlantic partnership that is more capable of responding to
the opportunities and challenges of the new world rising. To succeed in
this new world, Europeans and Americans must define their partnership in
terms of common security rather than just common defense, at home and
away. This will require the Alliance to stretch. Depending on the
contingency at hand, NATO may be called to play the leading role, be a
supporting actor, or simply join a broader ensemble. Even so, NATO alone
-- no matter how resilient -- simply cannot stretch far enough to tackle
the full range of challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic community. It must
also be able to connect and work better with others, whether they are
nations or international governmental or non-governmental organizations.
And if NATO is to both stretch and connect, it will need to generate
better expeditionary capabilities and change the way it does business.
These changes must be grounded in a new consensus among Europeans and
Americans about the nature of their partnership, and guided by a new
determination on both sides of the Atlantic to work closely together on
a daunting strategic agenda. A new strategic debate, perhaps leading to
an Atlantic Compact, could help to engage our publics and breathe new
life into our institutions. Such an effort is likely to be moot,
however, if Europe and North America are unable to quell the threat
emanating from the Afghan-Pakistani borderlands, or to develop a common
approach to Russia. The trick is to combine the urgent with the
important, to forge the consensus needed to tackle current challenges
while keeping the longer term health of our Alliance in mind. We are
confident that we can do better—together. 53 Endnotes 1For views on this
approach see Daniel S. Hamilton, “Transforming Wider Europe: Ten Lessons
from Transatlantic Cooperation,” in Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen,
(eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005 (Copenhagen: Danish
Institute of International Studies, 2005); Ronald D. Asmus, ed., Next
Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea
(Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006). 2 See
Richard L. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk, Toward a New Transatlantic
Compact (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security
Policy, National Defense University, August 2008). 3See Daniel S.
Hamilton and Bradley T. Smith, “Atlantic Storm,” EMBO Reports 7, 4-9
(January 2006); Daniel Hamilton and Tara O’Toole, “Facing Up to the
Bioterror Threat,” International Herald Tribune, January 31, 2005; G.
Kwik, J. Fitzgerald, T.V. Inglesby, T. O’Toole, “Biosecurity:
responsible stewardship of bioscience in an age of catastrophic
terrorism,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 1, pp. 27-35, (2002). 4 For an
overview, see the 2008 report of the U.S. National Intelligence Council,
Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, available at
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf;
Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing the
Transatlantic Partnership by Gen. Dr. Klaus Naumann, Gen. John
Shalikashvili, Field Marshal The Lord Inge, Adm. Jacques Lanxade, and
Gen. Henk van den Breemen, with Benjamin Bilski and Douglas Murray,
available at
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/documents/3eproefGrandStrat(b).pdf;
and the Worldwatch Institute’s annual State of the World series,
particularly State of the World 2009: Into a Warming World and State of
the World 2006: Special Focus: China and India. For selected European
assessments, see The European Union’s A secure Europe in a better world:
European Security Strategy, 2003,
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/solanae.pdf; The French White
Paper on defence and national security, 2008, available at
http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/IMG/pdf/Livre_blanc_Press_kit_english_version.pdf;
The White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the
Bundeswehr, 2006, available at
http://www.bmvg.de/fileserving/PortalFiles/C1256EF40036B05B/W26UWAMT995INFOEN/W_2006_eng_DS.pdf?yw_repository=y
ouatweb. 5For comparisons of 11/9 and 9/11, see Daniel S. Hamilton, Die
Zukunft ist nicht mehr, was sie war: Europa, Amerika und die neue
weltpolitische Lage (Stuttgart: Robert Bosch Stiftung, 2001); and Daniel
S. Hamilton, “Reconciling November 9 and September 11,” in Christina
Balis and Simon Serfaty, eds., Visions of America and Europe: September
11, Iraq, and Transatlantic Relations (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2004). 6
For views, see Stephen Flynn, The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a
Resilient Nation (New York; Random House, 2007) and America the
Vulnerable (New York: HarperCollins, 2004); Thomas P.M. Barnett, The
Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York:
Berkley Books, 2004); Esther Brimmer, ed., Five Dimensions of Homeland
and International Security (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic
Relations, 2008); Daniel Hamilton, Bengt Sundelius and Jesper Grönvall,
Protecting the Homeland: European Approaches to Societal
Security--Implications for the United States (Washington, DC: Center for
Transatlantic Relations, 2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge,”
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009. 7 See Peter Barschdorff,
Facilitating Transatlantic Cooperation after the Cold War (Hamburg: Lit,
2001). Constitutive documents for an acquis Atlantique would include, in
addition to national documents, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949; the
Transatlantic Declaration of 1990; the Charter of Paris of 1990; the New
Transatlantic Agenda of 1995; and the Washington Declaration of 1999. 8
For European perspectives, see Alvaro de Vasconcelos and Marcin
Zaborowski, “The EU and the world in 2009: European perspectives on the
new American foreign policy agenda” (Paris: EU ISS Report No. 4, January
2009); Bertelsmann Foundation, “Trans-Atlantic Briefing Book,” November
2008. 9 See Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, The Transatlantic
Economy 2009: Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade and Investment between the
United States and Europe (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic
Relations, 2009), available at
http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/Publications/TE_2009_finaltext.pdf;
also Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, Europe and Globalization:
Prospering in the New Whirled Order (Washington, DC: Center for
Transatlantic Relations, 2008), available at
http://www.amchameu.be/Pubs/globalizationeuropeFINAL.pdf. 10Bengt
Sundelius and Jesper Grönvall, “Strategic Dilemmas of Biosecurity in the
European Union,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 2, pp. 17-23, (2004);
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 (HSPD-10). National Security
Presidential Directive 33 (NSPD-33). Biodefense for the 21st Century.
Washington, DC: The White House, 2004.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html; R. Danzig,
“Proliferation of biological weapons into terrorist hands,” in The
Challenge of Proliferation: A Report of the Aspen Strategy Group
(Washington, DC: Aspen Institute, 2005), pp. 65-81. 11 For further
details and recommendations, see Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen and Daniel S.
Hamilton, Transatlantic Homeland Security (London/New York: Routledge,
2006); Esther Brimmer, ed., Transforming Homeland Security: U.S. and
European Approaches (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations,
2006), Daniel S. Hamilton, “Transforming Homeland Security: A Road Map
for the Transatlantic Alliance,” in Brimmer, op. cit.; Antonio 54
Missiroli, ed., Disasters, Diseases, Disruptions: a new D-drive for the
EU, Chaillot Paper No. 83 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies,
2005). 12 For some further suggestions, see Tamara Cofman Wittes and
Richard Youngs, “Europe, The United States, and Middle Eastern
Democracy: Repairing the Breach,” Brookings Institution, Saban Center
for Middle East Policy, Analysis Paper 18, January 2009. 13 She made
these comments participating in Atlantic Storm. See Daniel S. Hamilton
and Bradley T. Smith, op. cit. 14 For further perspectives, see Daniel
Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott, The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st
Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives (Washington, DC:
Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008). 15 Currently, the U.S. and
the EU have no provision for mutual assistance. Some may raise concerns
about committing the EU’s non-aligned countries to such an agreement.
Yet all non-NATO EU members except Cyprus are members of the Partnership
for Peace, which does provide for consultation should any Partner
perceive “a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political
independence, or security.” Moreover, we suggest the clause be crafted
to allow each member to offer assistance “as it deems necessary.” 16 Our
colleagues Franklin Kramer and Simon Serfaty, for instance, have
suggested the formation of a new body – a Transatlantic Forum – composed
of the member nations of NATO, the member nations of the EU, plus the
Secretary General of NATO and the President of the European Commission.
This Transatlantic Forum would seek accord on processes and procedures
for decision making and policy implementation, including synergies among
institutions that take full advantage of transatlantic strengths. The
Transatlantic Forum could be limited to an annual summit, or could be
supported by working groups coordinated by a small staff. See Franklin
D. Kramer and Simon Serfaty, “Recasting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership,”
available at
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/csis_euroatlantic_feb07.pdf. If this
is a bridge too far, annual U.S.-EU and NATO summits could be held
back-to-back, or working level efforts could be initiated to seek
synergies across multiple avenues of action. For related ideas, see
Ronald D. Asmus, “New Plumbing, New Purposes – Rebuilding the
Transatlantic Alliance,” American Interest, November/December 2008;
Simon Serfaty, ed., A Recast Partnership? Institutional Dimensions of
Transatlantic Relations (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2008). 17For further
exploration, see “Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent
Action” (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, 2008),
available at http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/1/012808-
AfghanistanbriefwoSAG.pdf; F. Stephen Larrabee and Julian
Lindley-French, “Revitalising the Transatlantic Security Partnership: An
Agenda for Action,” a Venusberg Group/RAND Corporation project, November
2008; and the supporting paper by Seth G. Jones and James Dobbins,
“Stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan: Towards a Regional Approach;”
Daniel Korski, “Afghanistan: Europe’s Forgotten War,” (London: European
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2008), available at
http://ecfr.3cdn.net/c43ad7d70cf03ddadb_cem6bqqcx.pdf; Seth G. Jones,
“Getting Back on Track in Afghanistan,” Testimony presented before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and
South Asia on April 2, 2008, available at
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/Jon04022008.pdf; James F. Dobbins,
After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books, 2008); Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
(Arlington, VA: RAND, 2008); Leo Michel, “Euro-Atlantic Security
Cooperation and U.S.-French Relations,” forthcoming article as part of a
CTR/Robert Schuman Foundation project on the future of Franco-American
relations. 18 For further discussion, see Daniel S. Hamilton,
“Unsettled: The New Eastern Europe and the West After the
Russian-Georgian Conflict,” Welttrends, 63/2008; Celeste A. Wallander,
“American Priorities for a Transatlantic Strategy on Russia,”
forthcoming article as part of a CTR/Robert Schuman Foundation project
on the future of Franco- American relations; Celeste A. Wallander,
“Russian Transimperialism and its Implications” in Alexander T.J. Lennon
and Amanda Kozlowski, eds., Global Powers in the 21st Century:
Strategies and Relations (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2008), pp. 217-235;
World Bank, “Russian Economic Report , no. 17” (Moscow: World Bank
Russia Country Office, November 2008); Eugene Rumer, “Mind the Gap:
Russian Ambitions vs. Russian Reality,” in Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo,
and Andrew Marble, eds, Strategic Asia: Challenges and Choices
(Washington DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008), pp.
167-196; Stephen Sestanovich, “What has Moscow Done? Rebuilding
U.S.-Russian Relations,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 87, number 6
(November/December 2008), pp. 12-28; Julianne Smith, The NATORussia
Relationship: Defining Moment or Déjà vu? (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2008).
For commentary on Russian views on eastern Europe, see Angela Stent,
“The Lands In-Between: The New Eastern Europe in the Twenty-First
Century,” in Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott, eds., The New Eastern
Europe: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Washington, DC: Center for
Transatlantic Relations, 2007). 19 Russia is not the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, NATO history offers guidance. In the wise prescriptions
balancing deterrence and détente by the 1967 Harmel Report, and then
during the tense deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles first
by the Warsaw Pact and then by NATO in the 1980s, the Alliance ensured
military security while pursuing vigorous and ultimately productive
diplomatic engagement aimed at easing tensions and building a more
secure world. In both of these cases a dual track approach (diplomatic
and military) worked both to draw the alliance together and to deal
effectively with Moscow. We need a similar dual track approach now. 20
See President of Russia, “Speech at Meeting with German Political,
Parliamentary and Civic Leaders, Berlin June 5, 2008, available at
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml.;
55 President of Russia, “Speech at World Policy Conference, Evian
France, October 8. 2008, available at
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type82912type82914_207457.shtml.;
also “Speech by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at
MGIMO University, Academic Year, September 3, 2007, available at
http://www.sras.org/sergey_lavrov_speaks_at_mgimo. 21 See Daniel S.
Hamilton, “NATO Summit I: In area, or in trouble,” International Herald
Tribune, November 26, 2006, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/26/opinion/edhamil.php; Larrabee and
Lindley-French, op. cit. 22 For further exploration, see Dalgaard-Nielsen/Hamilton,
op. cit.; Brimmer, op. cit.; “Transatlantic Homeland Defense,”
CTNSP-INSS Special Report. Washington, DC: National University Press,
May 2006; Anne C. Richard, Role Reversal: Offers of Help From Other
Countries in Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Transatlantic Relations, 2006); Gustav Lindstrom, Protecting the
European homeland: The CBR dimension. Chaillot Paper No. 69 (Paris: EU
Institute for Security Studies, 2004); Esther Brimmer, “The ESDP and
Homeland Security,” n Sven Biscop and Johan Lembke, EU Enlargement & the
Transatlantic Alliance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008). 23B.T. Smith,
et.al., “Navigating the Storm: Report and Recommendations from the
Atlantic Storm Exercise,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 3, pp. 256-267
(2005); Marc L. Ostfield, “Strengthening Biodefense Internationally:
Illusion and Reality,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 6, pp. 261-267,
(2008). 24 See Paul Gallis, “NATO and Energy Security,” CRS Report for
Congress, March 21, 2006. 25 For details, see the forthcoming Atlantic
Council report by Franklin Kramer and John Lyman, “Transatlantic
Cooperation for Sustainable Energy Security: A Report of the CSIS Global
Dialogue Between the EU and the US,” January 2009. 26 See the report of
the NATO Defense College, NATO’s organizational evolution: the case for
a Civil Security Committee, November 2008. 27 For details, see
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian_Headline_Goal_2010.pdf.
See also Julian Linley-French and Robert Hunter, “Enhancing
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” CSIS, December 10, 2008;
Play to Win: Final Report of the Bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict
Reconstruction (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2003). For more on a NATO SRF, see
Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, “Needed: A NATO Stabilization and
Reconstruction Force,” Defense Horizons, September 2004. For its
relationship to transformation, see Daniel S. Hamilton, ed.,
Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century
(Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2004). 28During the
Berlin Plus discussions there was focus on the need for an EU
arrangement with Turkey on EU operations affecting Turkish interests.
Some arrangement is clearly necessary and certainly not beyond the reach
of creative and determined diplomacy. 29 For more, see Transatlantic
Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture (Washington,
DC: Atlantic Council of the U.S., March 2006), available at
http://www.acus.org/docs/0603-Transatlantic_Transformation.pdf; Esther
Brimmer, ed., The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role: ESDP and its
Implications for Transatlantic Relations (Washington, DC: Center for
Transatlantic Relations, 2002), available at http://transatlantic.saisjhu.
edu/PDF/publications/esdp_book.pdf; Julian Lindley-French, “NATO and the
EU: Terms of Engagement or Estrangement?” in Simon Serfaty, ed., A
Recast Partnership? Institutional Dimensions of Transatlantic Relations
(Washington, DC: CSIS, 2008); Daniel Hamilton, “American Perspectives on
the European Security and Defense Policy,” Danish Yearbook of
International Affairs (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International
Studies, 2004), available at
http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/PDF/articles/DH%20Article%20from%20Dannish%20Institute.pdf.
30 For an overview of the NATO-UN relationship and their recent
agreement, see Michael F. Harsch and Johannes Varwick, “Towards a
stronger role for regional organizations in international security?
United Nations and NATO’s joint declaration,” forthcoming in the
April/May 2009 issue of Survival. Also David S. Yost, NATO and
International Organizations (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2007). 31 See
James Dobbins, “NATO’s Role in Nation-Building,” NATO Review, Summer
2005, available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/art1.html; James
Dobbins et al., The UN's Role in Nation- Building: From the Congo to
Iraq (RAND, 2005). 32See Harsch and Varwick, op. cit. 33Various allies
have useful experience in this regard. For instance, Canada pioneered
the 3D concept (Defense, Diplomacy, Development) including through its
deployable civilian elements, CANADEM. Norway has NORDEM, a stand-by
roster of civilian human rights monitors and investigators. For more see
http://www.nrc.no/?aid=9160720. 34See Leo G. Michel, "NATO
Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?" Strategic Forum, 202,
INSS, National Defense University Press, August 2003, available at
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF202/SF202.pdf; Towards a Grand
Strategy, op. cit.; Gen. (ret.) Klaus Naumann, Inaugural speech, SHAPE
Lecture series, May 10, 2005, available at
http://www.nato.int/shape/opinions/2005/s050510a.htm. 35The Alliance
could also develop more creative approaches to financing or make tough
choices and cut existing infrastructure. For instance, savings can be
realized in the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) by enforcing
financial rules. NATOs “Peacetime Establishment” (PE) Review might save
military budget funds by cutting static 56 command structure or
cost-sharing with other institutions such Cold War era research
facilities such as the NATO Underwater Research Centre (NURC). 36 For
more, see Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World, op. cit. 37
The ten mid-course interceptors slated to be installed in Poland and the
narrow-beam X-band radar set for the Czech Republic would protect
European territory north and west of northern Greece to central Ukraine
against the sort of ICBM attacks of which Iran might be capable at some
point in the next decade. The site in Poland could not defend all of
Europe even if it worked perfectly. Areas south and east of the coverage
line, including all or part of Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, are
too close to Iran, the putative threat, to be attacked by long-range
missiles, but they could be attacked by shorter range systems. For a
discussion of the issues, see Walter B. Slocombe, “Europe, Russia and
American Missile Defence,” Survival, 50:2, 19-24. About the Authors
Daniel Hamilton is the Richard von Weizsäcker Professor and Director of
the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University; and
Executive Director of the American Consortium on EU Studies. He is the
host of The Washington Post/Newsweek International’s online discussion
feature Next Europe (www.washingtonpost.com/nexteurope). He has served
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, responsible
for NATO, OSCE and transatlantic security policy; U.S. Special
Coordinator for Southeast European Stabilization; Associate Director of
the Policy Planning Staff, and Director for Policy in the Bureau of
European Affairs. He was Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and Deputy Director of the Aspen Institute Berlin.
He has also taught at Berlin’s Hertie School of Governance, the Free
University of Berlin, and the University of Innsbruck and is a frequent
media commentator. Recent publications include The Transatlantic Economy
2009; The Wider Black Sea in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and
Energy Perspectives (2008); “The United States: A Normative Power?”
(2008); Europe and Globalization (2008); The New Eastern Europe:
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (2007); Transatlantic Homeland Security
(2005); Terrorism and International Relations (2005); Transatlantic
Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century (2004). Charles
Barry is a national security consultant and Senior Research Fellow at
the National Defense University’s Center for Technology and National
Security Policy. He has work with NATO as a U.S. military officer and
policy analyst for more than 20 years and since 1994 has published
numerous articles and books on transatlantic affairs. He earned his
Doctorate in Public Administration from the University of Baltimore.
Hans Binnendijk is Vice President for Research at the National Defense
University and Founding Director of NDU's Center for Technology and
National Security Policy. He has served as Senior Director for Defense
Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council, as Principal
Deputy Director and Acting Director of the State Department's Policy
Planning Staff, and as Legislative Director of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. 57 Stephen J. Flanagan is Senior Vice President and
Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS in June 2007, he served for seven
years as Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and
Vice President for Research at the National Defense University NDU). He
has held several senior positions in government, including Senior
Director for Central and Eastern Europe at the National Security
Council, National Intelligence Officer for Europe, and Associate
Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. He also has
held academic and research appointments at Harvard’s Kennedy School of
Government, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the
Council on Foreign Relations. He earned his A.B. in political science
from Columbia University and his Ph.D. in international relations from
the Fletcher School at Tufts University. He is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic
Studies. He is widely published and is co-editor, most recently, of
Strategic Challenges: America’s Global Security Agenda, 2008). Julianne
Smith is director of the CSIS Europe Program and the Initiative for a
Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, where she leads the Center’s research
and program activities on U.S.-European political, security, and
economic relations. She has authored or contributed to a number of CSIS
books and reports, including “The NATO-Russia Relationship: Defining
Moment or Déjà Vu?” (2008); “Understanding Islamic Charities” (2007);
“Muslim Integration” (2007); “Transforming NATO (…again)” (2006); “Five
Years After 9/11” (2006); and “America and the World in the Age of
Terror” (2005). She codirects the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism,
which examines U.S.-European disagreements over the causes of terrorism.
She is also an associate fellow at the Londonbased Royal United Services
Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). Earlier, Smith served
as deputy director and senior fellow in the CSIS International Security
Program, where she oversaw the management of more than 30
security-related projects and focused on a range of European security
issues, including European defense integration and EU-U.S.
counterterrorism cooperation. Prior to joining CSIS, she worked at the
German Marshall Fund as program officer for the Foreign Policy Program
and director of communications for the Project on the Role of American
Military Power. She has worked as a senior analyst on the European
security desk of the British American Security Information Council and
in Germany at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. She is a recipient
of the American Academy’s Public Policy Fellowship, the Robert Bosch
Foundation Fellowship, and the Fredin Memorial Scholarship for study at
the Sorbonne in Paris. She received her B.A. from Xavier University and
her M.A. from American University. James J. Townsend Jr. is a Vice
President of the Atlantic Council of the United States and is Director
of the Council’s Program on International Security. Before taking up
this position, he was the Principal Director of European and NATO Policy
in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, responsible for managing
the day-to-day defense relationship between the United States, NATO, the
EU and the nations of Europe and Canada. Prior to this assignment, he
was the Director of NATO Policy and the Director of the Defense Plans
Division at the U.S. Mission to NATO. He is an adjunct professor of
international 58 studies at American University and has lectured
overseas and in the U.S. at the War Colleges, National Defense
University, and the Foreign Service Institute. He has also provided
commentary in the international press on TV, radio and in newspapers. He
earned a B.A. from Duke University and an M.A. from the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). |