THE MAKERS OF WAR

Francis Neilson

C. C. Nelson Publishing Company
Appleton, Wisconsin
1950
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Printed by Badger Printing Company
Appleton, Wisconsin
Manufactured in the United States of America
FOREWORD

Many times since the summer of 1945, when I finished writing *The Tragedy of Europe*, my American and British friends have asked me to give them, in short compass, my ideas about the economic and political disturbances which caused the nations to destroy Europe. This was no easy task for a man of my age, because my mind was so full of the long history of the troubles that it was difficult to select the chief features of the terrible drama and give adequate account of them in brief space.

In putting together this synopsis of the political and diplomatic factors of each crisis, I have selected matter overlooked by many academic historians. Moreover, with some of the writers who treat of the First World War and the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, I notice a tendency to ignore many underlying causes that contributed to the strife. Difficult as it is to stand aloof and forget one's nationality and loyalty to a government or its chief minister, this must be done if the student is to form a clear idea about the causes of wars.

In future, the investigator in this branch of the art of historical literature must conduct his work in a manner as cold blooded as that of a biochemist in his laboratory. National prejudices and party loyalties ought to have no place in the task that has to be done. Indeed, it will be necessary for the students (and I think chiefly of them) to pursue the line of inquiry laid down by Lord Acton in his Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge University. The fact is the dominant of research, and the student must not be afraid of tracing it to its lair.

This was finished in February, 1950, before anyone dreamed of a war in Korea. What has taken place in the world since Hitler invaded Poland is not within
its compass. The volume is brought to a close with the end of diplomatic negotiations in September, 1939. It is intentionally provocative and, as a London publisher says, a forceful work. The purpose of the author is to rouse students out of their nationalistic attitude to these wars and, if they be interested in the matter at all, to force them to a deeper investigation of the events surveyed in this book, so that they may learn for themselves the influences and directions of men behind the scenes who instigate the crises that force governments to choose war rather than the humiliation of confessing they have blundered.

August 1, 1950
"The use of recriminations about the past is to enforce effective action at the present."

*Winston Churchill (1936)*
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I

Britain's Role in the Boer War

Near the center of the maze at Hampton Court two men met. One inquired: "'How do we get out of this mess?'" The other asked, "'How did we get into it?'" The first man replied, "'That's easy. We walked into it.'"

Looking back upon the condition of Europe after the Franco-German War, I think most men of my age would say that we did not walk into the European mess; we ambled into it, thoughtlessly. Few people took any interest in what are called foreign affairs. Millions who cast their votes at elections were ignorant of the ostensible policies of their governments; business men were concerned chiefly in the financial and commercial success of their undertakings. During the latter years of England's policy of "'splendid isolation,'" the foreign policies of the principal powers of the world did not work out so badly, but when British and French interests clashed in northern Africa, something sinister took place which led to animosities that became deep-seated. The interests of Great Britain in Egypt, of France and of Spain in Morocco, and of Italy in Tripoli suddenly appeared to be fraught with the dangers of war.

Underlying these disturbances of foreign policy there were many movements which the public knew little or nothing about. These were fostered by concessionnaires, great business combinations that planned to exploit the territories of so-called backward people. In every case it meant aggression, by "'peaceful penetration,'" if possible; and as friction increased, it meant also greater expenditure upon armies and navies.
When politicians are in control, as they are today, there are a hundred and one underlying motives that must be considered seriously if their proclaimed policies are to be estimated at their true value. For example, to what extent is a war scare necessary to keep men busy, who are employed in making munitions and other supplies for armies and navies? Another motive to be questioned is the desire of the politicians to keep the electors in as good fettle as possible, so that they will not vote for the opposition.

Bureaucracy today is a vested interest—the most powerful the world has ever known. In other respects, it is a job-making industry; every additional man or woman employed in its offices is an additional vote for the hirer. Moreover, the system of taxation of wealth bolsters the paper-making industry—paper money, paper bonds, restrictive forms, red tape, and, in America, the spoils traffic. The American Comptroller of Taxes declared that something like $50,000,000,000 of the cost of World War II went in graft.

Therefore, it is surely high time taxpayers should wake up and take some interest in their political fortunes. They should get a few facts, think them over, and set their minds sternly against the plausible nonsense poured out sickeningly by governing politicians. Electors ought to question them, and refuse to be put off by evasive replies; make them stick to the point.

Your English forefathers did all this. Do you think that meek and easygoing men could have won the Reform of 1832, wrung from Peel the abolition of the Corn Laws, brought about the extension of the franchise in 1867? It is a simple matter to trace the benefits that accrued to the British people, owing to the efforts of common men during the greater part of the last century. No one was hurt; not even the landlords who thrived on the high price of corn. You will gain grist for your thinking mill by learning how the men of the forties and fifties earned benefits for themselves—benefits they
thought you would enjoy and which would lead to better conditions, if you had the nous to know about them.

Now let us see how we got into the maze of European politics. We rambled into it fifty years ago, and we have been trying, without success, to find a way out of it since the end of World War I. The historian, J. A. Froude, tells us in Oceana that South Africa had long been a territory that attracted exploiters with no pastoral ambitions such as the Boer farmers were content to further in their settlement at Cape Colony. History now records how they were driven north to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

As the commitments of the British Government became more widespread and fraught with greater dangers to European peace, the continental powers watched with increasing anxiety her imperial policies and her growing military and naval needs for supporting them. The statistics of army and navy expenditure of the powers from the time of the last Boer War are most enlightening. The insane armament race began about 1897. Taking the ten-year period from 1887, Great Britain increased her expenditure by more than £9,000,000; France by £2,000,000; Russia by £2,000,000; and Germany by more than £2,000,000.

The visit of the French fleet to Kronstadt in 1892 and the return visit of the Russian fleet to Toulon in 1893 undoubtedly did much to provoke the armament race. Of course, there was another side to this, and that was the slackness of trade in the dockyards and the war scares that were fostered to make it easier to get the money from the taxpayers.

All the great naval powers were interested to some extent in the schemes of the principal munitions makers whose international organizations were influentially powerful. The directors of the Harvey United Steel Company Ltd. represented the interests of Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and had connections in the United
States. The Steel Manufacturers Nickel Syndicate (according to the certificate of the directors’ names, taken from Somerset House) comprised five companies from Great Britain, three from France, two from Germany, one from Italy, and one from Austria.

No clearer evidence of what the race for armaments really meant to the peace of the world can be found than that in a White Paper issued in 1905 by the British Government, which shows the naval expenditure of the great powers. Taking the year 1890 as a starting point, it covers a fourteen-year period up to and including 1904. Great Britain increased her expenditure by £23,000,000; France by more than £4,000,000; Russia by nearly £8,000,000; Germany by more than £6,000,000; and the United States jumped from £4,600,000 to more than £20,000,000.

There is another line of approach that must be taken into consideration for a proper understanding of the influences that aggravated the powers and affected the race for armaments. For a long period Great Britain had enjoyed the maritime carrying-service of the world. She was not only Mistress of the Seas so far as the navy was concerned; she was also mistress of them in trade and commerce. She had nothing to fear from France or Italy as competitors. But when Germany began to build her own ships and challenge England’s supremacy in the passenger and cargo trade of the world, she realized that her position was endangered and something had to be done about it.

This should not be overlooked in a search for the causes of the jealousies and frictions that arose among the powers fifty years ago. It was not so much the building of the German navy that caused anxiety in Great Britain as the growth of the maritime fleets of the North German Lloyd and the Hamburg-American lines.

The pressure of hard facts increased in many competitive fields. For a time, the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse was the largest and fastest ship on the Atlantic; and
she was followed in 1900 by the Deutschland, which crossed from Cherbourg in five and a half days. About the time that McKinley was elected President of the United States, America launched two passenger vessels—the St. Paul and the St. Louis—as a challenge to British monopoly of the Atlantic traffic.

The high-tariff legislation of the McKinley administration was another blow to her supremacy. The organization of the United States Steel Trust meant fewer imports of steel from Great Britain. Germany, too, was not slow to expand her steel industries, and the Ruhr and the Saar sprang into prominence as fierce competitors of the heavy industries of France and England.

Great Britain had been caught napping. The smug, complacent British manufacturers, depending largely upon the export trade, woke up a bit too late. When they realized that the engineering, the electrical, the dyeing, the optical, and other highly technical industries were competing for the markets of the world, they discovered that science had been called in by their rivals to invent new machinery, cultivate new methods of production, and make great savings in costs. There were many other important adjuncts, such as German commercial travelers speaking fluently the language of the countries they visited for orders.

When the South African War began in 1899, the ordinary expenditure of the British Government amounted to £143,687,000 and the national debt stood at £638,920,000. The income tax fifty years ago was 6d. in the £, and those with incomes of less than £700 a year were exempt. The laborer's shilling (when he had a chance to earn it) was worth 12d. for necessaries. However, he paid indirect taxes upon tea, tobacco, wines and spirits. Still, it must be remembered that Charles Booth's investigations into the conditions of the poor revealed the terrible fact that one-third of the population was living upon the poverty line.
Nevertheless, Britain had to fight a war in South Africa for the gold and diamond merchants. The excuse given to the electors for destroying the Boer Republic was quite different. Joseph Chamberlain and his supporters said the reason for the conflict was that the Kruger Government would not give a vote to the Uitlanders. These were "the greatest gang of circus-followers, pop merchants, and other ne'er-do-wells ever collected in a single area."

The military correspondent of the *Newcastle Chronicle*, in a letter which appeared December 5, 1899, reported as follows:

> It must be a great relief to the military commander in Natal to know that the 30,000 or 40,000 Uitlanders of Johannesburg had left that city before the outbreak of hostilities. Otherwise we should have had Cornishmen and Jew boys from "the golden city" whining and imploring our generals to come and save them. Nothing can exceed the contempt of the real Englishman for this veritable scum of the earth. It makes our blood boil to think that the pick of the British army is engaged in mortal combat to make things easy for the sharpers and swindlers who fatten on the illicit profits of the gold industry. . . .

The mass of the British people never knew the truth of this disgraceful business until long after the war was over. Captain March Phillips, in *With Rimington*, tells us:

> As for the Uitlanders and their grievances, I would not ride a yard or fire a shot to right all the grievances that were ever invented. The mass of Uitlanders (i.e. the miners and working men of the Rand) had no grievances. I know what I am talking about, for I have lived and worked among them. I have seen English newspapers passed from one to another, and roars of laughter roused by the 'Times' telegrams about these precious grievances. We used to read the London papers to find out what our grievances were; and very frequently they would be due to causes of which he had never even heard. . . .

One of the few books that gives a true account of the last Boer War was published in America, in 1902, and
it was written by Michael Davitt. It is called *The Boer Fight for Freedom* and is dedicated to the memory of General Philip Botha. Now that we have the third volume of the *History of The Times*, we know something of the real conspirators and what their object was.

The plot of Joseph Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes, and Sir Alfred Milner, together with the long directory of names of those who did not fight but gathered the spoil, is revealed in many works that have appeared since the war terminated. But Chamberlain was not always an enemy of the Boer. Indeed, at one time he spoke as a friend. At Birmingham, on June 7, 1881, he said:

They (the Boers) left their homes in Natal as the English Puritans left England for the United States, and they founded a little republic of their own in the heart of Africa. In 1852 we made a treaty with them, and we agreed to respect and guarantee their independence; and I say under these circumstances, is it possible we could maintain a forcible annexation of the country, without incurring the accusation of having been guilty, I will not say of national folly, but I say of national crime?

It was a national crime in 1881! Eighteen years later it was an imperial duty. Well might Lloyd George say after the First World War:

Wars are precipitated by motives which the statesmen responsible for them dare not assert. A public discussion would drag these motives in their nudity into the open, where they would die of exposure to the withering contempt of humanity.

What thinking man would now challenge that statement? But how many, fifty years ago, realized that the influences that brought about the Boer War were responsible for a complete change in England’s foreign policy? Long after the republics were destroyed, critics began to realize that, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the struggle was indicative of a grave decline of what went by the name of her moral viewpoint, and
that the Colonial Office had lost what little competency it had.

Some writers whose articles appeared in the monthly and quarterly reviews asked searching questions about Great Britain's industrial strength and her ability to meet the competition of mass production in the United States and the high technical development Germany had made. However, the threat of competitors east and west had not then been felt by British manufacturers. Indeed, during the controversies raised by Chamberlain's campaign for colonial preference, the statisticians proved that under free trade the country was holding her own and that her export trade seemed to be secure. The politicians did not take a long view, but American and German critics who visited England did not hesitate to say that it was time Great Britain woke up to the fact that her methods of production were old-fashioned.

A series of articles appeared in The Times during World War II under the title "Foreign Policy in Transition," and the writer summed up the position in clear-cut, telling sentences:

... In the 1890's the conditions which had given Britain an overwhelming and unquestioned supremacy in the world for three-quarters of a century were gradually passing away. The volume of British steel production was overtaken both in Germany and in the United States; and this significant landmark was in part cause, in part symptom, in part result, of a wider range of phenomena—the inevitable decline of British preeminence, due largely to Britain's long industrial start over the rest of the world, in technical efficiency, in scientific research, and in industrial organization. Industry was entering a new phase of large-scale production; and in this phase Britain, hampered by increasingly obsolete traditions and obsolete physical assets, no longer took the lead. Political repercussions soon made themselves felt. The South African War was widely interpreted as a symptom of faltering British supremacy.

The last sentence is significant, but its meaning was not plainly interpreted until many years after the con-
flict. Indeed, it may be said that most of the chief bankers and the greatest industrialists were satisfied with the general conditions of commerce. The trade unions and their members showed little knowledge of what was taking place in the world. They were chiefly concerned in promoting greater membership and raising nominal wage.
II

The Era of Secret Diplomacy

The South African War left Britain without a friend in Europe—indeed, in the world. Her political leaders began to realize that her days of "splendid isolation" were over and she had to seek alliances, public and secret, as props to support her decline. The reason she turned to France was that their interests conflicted in Africa. To put the matter in a nutshell, Great Britain wanted France out of Egypt, and France wanted a free hand in Morocco. It was foreign policy at its lowest ebb.

The Entente Cordiale was a diplomatic tour de force. Some Frenchmen went so far as to say that it was sheer huckstering, and the business transacted at Algeciras in 1906 revealed a state of affairs that made decent men squirm when they knew the facts. For the signatories of that Treaty to pledge themselves to maintain the integrity of the dominion of the Sultan and, at the same time, for Great Britain to agree secretly to the partition of Morocco by France and Spain was about as discreditable a proceeding as diplomacy has been guilty of.

In studying the expenditures of the great powers upon navies after the year 1904, those of France and Russia should be added to the British. The White Papers and Blue Books of that year show that Britain, France and Russia together spent about £67,000,000 and that Germany spent £11,659,000. Russia and France were bound by secret military and naval treaties, and Great Britain, linking her fortunes with France, was committed as their ally. The secret conversations between the British and French military staffs began at this time.
The taxpayer who footed the bill for the South African War (fought to gain diamonds and gold for the Wernhers, the Beits, the Barnatos, and their friends) had learned nothing from the past and was, therefore, totally ignorant of what was in store for him after the Act of Algeciras was signed. It is true that he complained about the rising expenditure and protested strenuously against Joseph Chamberlain’s proposals for colonial preference, which, to the working man, meant a tax on bread. Some members of Parliament, anxious about European affairs, did their best in the Commons to learn from Grey what was really taking place. However, they did not succeed in getting the truth out of him. When awkward questions were put to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he sometimes replied that “it was not in the public interest to give the information.”

The ink was scarcely dry on the signatures appended to the Algeciras Treaty when France and Spain went into Morocco to partition the country. Then came the cruelest hoax ever perpetrated upon the taxpayers. At the bidding of the interests represented by the Comité du Maroc, a French military force was sent to Fez where, it was said, a whole European French colony had suddenly been discovered living in anguish. A tale of horror was built up by the press servitors of the Comité, and the French papers Le Temps and Le Matin outdid their previous performances in deception and mendacity. Francis de Pressense, the most distinguished of the French publicists, tells the story of this “errand of mercy”:

\[...\] Already while the expedition was on its way, light began to pierce. Those redoubtable rebels who were threatening Fez had disappeared like the dew in the morning. Barely did a few ragged horsemen fire off a shot or two before turning round and riding away at a furious gallop. A too disingenuous, or too truthful, correspondent gave the show away. The expeditionary force complains, he gravely records, of the absence of the enemy; the approaching harvest season is keeping all the healthy males in the fields! Thus did the
phantom so dextrously conjured by the Comité du Maroc for the benefit of its aims disappear in a night. . . .

The horror of the plight of the colonists in Fez deeply affected a group of members of Parliament. Major Archer-Shee asked what steps the government proposed to take to safeguard British interests and subjects in Fez. He was told that there were ten persons residing there. The government admitted it had no information that would give cause for believing there was the slightest danger to Europeans. Both Major Archer-Shee and Mr. Remnant asked whether it was intended to cooperate with other governments, should it become necessary to send a large force to pacify Morocco.

John Dillon desired to know to what extent Britain was committed to "this ill-omened and cruel expedition," and he told the House that the affair was got up for the purpose of creating a scare. He questioned Grey about the expedition and inquired "whether the British Government had in any way approved or made itself responsible for this attack on the independence of Morocco." Grey replied:

His Majesty's Government have been informed by the French Government of the measures which are being adopted for the succour of Europeans in Fez, and they understand that information has also been given to other Governments. The action taken by France is not intended to alter the political status of Morocco, and His Majesty's Government cannot see why any objection should be taken to it.

There were men in the House who took the trouble to read French newspapers, who knew this reply contained some complicated lies. In the first place, the French Government did not know at the beginning of the enterprise anything about the rescue of the Europeans in Fez. Pressensé says: "The Government knew nothing, willed nothing of itself."

The second lie is about the political status of Morocco. If Grey did not know of the secret treaties for the par-
tion of the country, he was wholly unfitted to be Foreign Minister, for Lord Lansdowne gave his consent to the partition of the country before the Algeciras Conference took place. In November, 1911, after this crisis, the Paris papers got hold of the secret articles and published the British consent to the partition of the country between France and Spain.

The story, as it was known to independent French publicists, is told fully in Edmund Morel's book, *Morocco in Diplomacy*. Felicien Challaye in *La Revue du Mois* in January, 1912, said:

Honesty would in Morocco and the Congo have been the best of policies. France committed lamentable errors when, for the satisfaction of private interests, she violated in Morocco the Act of Algeciras, and in the Congo the Act of Berlin. . . . Under what influences have been committed these violations of the Act of Algeciras? Incontestably through the influence of private interests.

The private interests! Or, as they were afterwards called, 'the international gang.' Governments did their bidding. Still, in justice to some of the ministers who were not in the inner cabinets, it should be said that perhaps they had no more knowledge of what was going on than private members of the legislatures. French and English newspapers, in the spring of 1911, published lists of some of the powerful interests that were bleeding the taxpayers. One of these international combinations was the *Union des Mines*. Its founders and associates were manufacturers, bankers, and politicians of seven or eight different countries. In the list published by *L'Humanité*, we find:

The French "group" included the Cie. des Forges de Chatillon-Commentry et Neuves Maisons, Schneider et Cie. Banque française pour le commerce et l'Industrie, Count Armande, etc.; the German "group" included Krupps, the Metallurgische Gesellschaft of Frankfurt, the Nationalbank fur Deutschland of Berlin, etc.; the British "group" included A. E. Harris of Harris Dixon, Ltd., London, Mr. Bonar Law,
M.P., Mr. W. B. Harris, correspondent of the *Times* at Tangier, etc.; the Spanish "group" included the Marquis de Villa-mejor, and so on.

France and Britain were to pay dearly for the hoax. After the march on Fez, Germany complained because she said her interests were ignored. At length, she sent a small gunboat to Agadir, a place on the west coast of Africa, which no one had heard of before, and the clarions rang throughout Europe. The British Government took it as a personal offense, although she was supposed to have no territorial or commercial interests in Morocco. However, she had to stand by her allies. In the several houses of legislature, sheer mendacity became, for a time, the order of the day, and ministers were in sore plight when questioned about the commitments of the powers and what was expected of them in the way of military and naval aid if war took place. To add to the confusion, the bellicose newspapers stirred the fires of hate, and the warmongers, headed by Lord Roberts, breathed "fire and brimstone" against Germany.

The generosity of a democracy was never more noticeable than in the period between 1911, when the *Panther* visited Agadir, and the outbreak of war in August, 1914. In three short years the taxpayers were persuaded to shed their blood and reduce themselves almost to poverty in the interests of the munitions industries, the *Comité du Maroc*, and other gangs of exploiters.

During this time the diplomatic blunders of Germany only added fuel to the flames. The belligerent speeches of the Kaiser—never directed against England—were emblazoned in the popular prints. But the generous-hearted man in the street had no information from his government as to what was the real cause of the trouble. Pacific speeches from platforms in the country had little or no effect, for the penny papers that catered to the small gamblers and gave them the latest news about horses were the chief source of information for the proletariat.
Home affairs, both in England and in France, were disturbing enough without the prospect of a war. In England there were great strikes, the "mutiny" at the Curragh, in Ireland, over the question of Home Rule, the threatened revolt of Ulster under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson and F. E. Smith, to say nothing of Mrs. Pankhurst's Amazons on the warpath for votes. These were troubles enough for any government to contend with. France, too, had her strikes and other internal troubles. The condition of the army was seriously questioned, and stories of the jealousies of the generals were whispered in polite society.

When the Archduke was murdered at Sarajevo, the ministers of all the powers trembled. And well they might, for Russia was bound to the interests of Pan-Slavism in Serbia. Austria was determined that she would come to grips with the State that shielded the miscreants who had committed the crime. When the news first reached the western capitals of Europe, people generally were shocked, and sympathy was tendered to the aged Emperor, Franz Joseph. But in a short time it was realized in the chancelleries that far-reaching commitments were concerned in the matter. When the Austrian note was presented to Serbia, the diplomatists saw in it the seeds of war and that all the principal powers might be drawn into the conflict.

When Germany sided with Austria, Great Britain sided with France and Russia. The Italian Government did not reveal its hand until later, after bargaining for a bribe to desert the Triple Alliance. Then the passionate war patriots sharpened their pencils and, in writing about the intentions of the interested powers, surpassed all former attempts to delude the people. It was an orgy of mendacity gone raving mad. Although Grey told the House of Commons that Britain's interests in Serbia were nil, her commitments to France and Russia, long hidden from the taxpayers, had to be fulfilled.
III

War Patriotism and Propaganda

The war patriot and the party patriot were ready to send to the gallows anyone who dared to impugn the actions of men in whose hands the destiny of millions was held. In the House of Commons members who attempted to protest against the action of the government were howled down, and such epithets as "the craven crew" and "dastardly cowards" were thrown at them. Balfour designated their brief speeches as "the very dregs of the debate."

War patriotism is a madness for which there is no cure, and he would be a foolish optimist who imagined he could change the current of events, while a conflict was in action, by presenting facts to show the government had taken a wrong course. Who counts the cost when the blood is up? It is one of the great privileges of democracy to spill it and foot the bill in other people's quarrels. Another privilege, particularly at the end of a war, is to form processions of unemployed and to endure poverty in depressed areas.

It is marvelous what punishment the proletarians will take. Yet, sometimes they see the errors of their ways and cast their political idols down. Consistently they have dealt severely with men who won their wars. When they do have leisure to review the immediate past, their political sagacity revives, and when they go to the poll they show their displeasure. But as soon as they elect a different lot of statesmen, they seem to forget and forgive—thinking the old methods will not be practiced by the new men. Proletarians are friendly
sort of chaps and do not nurse grudges. They are too busy looking for jobs, picking a winner, and striking for higher prices. There was a time when the mass of men knew the difference between nominal wage and real wage. The housewives, when they kept budgets, knew to a ha'penny how much tax was paid on necessaries purchased for the larder. That time has gone.

The main point, however, is that the proletarian will not take the trouble to find out what ails him. He will spend hours, week after week, reading the training reports of horses, and the chances of his soccer team in the league championship, but as for spending a little thought on the amount paid for costly wars and prodigal governments, one might as well persuade him to read Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Short memories and the desire for relaxation (which usually means recreation, because of the monotony of his existence) are defects that he must remedy for himself. No one can help him in this respect. He is proof against counsel and, as generations pass, there is every indication that he will become the mere plaything of the bureaucrat and the victim of his own indolence and ignorance.

It was in the winter of 1907-08 that many men became alarmed at Germany's industrial achievements. At a meeting held in Caxton Hall, London, Haldane told an audience about the scientific and technical advances taking place in several industries. He had recently visited Germany and returned with information that was of immediate value. At several gatherings and in some illuminating articles in the monthlies, Sir Christopher Furness reported on what he had seen during his visit to America. Their warnings went unheeded; perhaps because, so far as plant was concerned, Great Britain was set in her ways. There were other indications that all was not well.

Arthur Balfour was anxious about the future. In the biography of Henry White, by Allan Nevins, it is recorded that Secretary Root of the American State
Department instructed White (who was American Ambassador to Italy) to go to London "to ascertain confidentially the views of the British Government as to the discussion of disarmament at the Hague." This referred to the conference that was to begin in June, 1907. Nevins says that White's "observations, as he talked with British public men, gave him a startled sense that Europe might be approaching a general war."

During this visit, White had several conversations with Balfour. One was overheard by White's daughter, who took it down:

**Balfour (somewhat lightly):** "We are probably fools not to find a reason for declaring war on Germany before she builds too many ships and takes away our trade."

**White:** "You are a very high-minded man in private life. How can you possibly contemplate anything so politically immoral as provoking a war against a harmless nation which has as good a right to a navy as you have? If you wish to compete with German trade, work harder."

**Balfour:** "That would mean lowering our standard of living. Perhaps it would be simpler for us to have a war."

**White:** "I am shocked that you of all men should enunciate such principles."

**Balfour (again lightly):** "Is it a question of right or wrong? Maybe it is just a question of keeping our supremacy."

White also had a talk with the Foreign Minister, and reported the gist of it to the Secretary of State [Root].

Not long after this, a reason was found for arming against Germany, who, in turn, had been arming against France and Russia. A naval panic was started on the false information given by Mulliner of the Coventry Ordnance Company, and the increase of German armaments against her foes east and west was interpreted by Mr. Balfour and his supporters as preparations for an attack upon Great Britain. Soon the platforms of England rang out with denunciations at every advance made by the German navy, and Asquith's Government
was shaken by the storm. The Tories went about howling:

Eight, Eight, Eight,
We won’t have less than Eight.
So we’ll smash them flat
If they won’t give us that;
We will have Eight.

It was one of the most disgraceful, cooked-up conspiracies the British public had known, and the editor of the *Navy League Annual*, in dealing with these panics, said the agitation was “one of the most portentous pieces of parliamentary humbug ever practiced upon the electorate.” Admiral Fisher, in his book, *Memories*, produces a letter that he wrote to the King, in which he said:

Now this is the truth: England has seven “Dreadnaughts” and three “Dreadnaught” Battle Cruisers . . . ; total, ten “Dreadnaughts” built and building, while Germany, in March last [1907], had not begun even one “Dreadnaught.” It is doubtful if, even so late as May last, a German “Dreadnaught” had been commenced . . .

The damage was done, and from that time preparations for war were speeded up. But the working man was not wholly convinced, for the Asquith Government was returned to power with a severely reduced majority in two general elections in 1910, saved by 40 Labor representatives and 82 Irish Nationalists. The Tories and Liberals made a dead heat of it. In 1906 Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had a majority of 354. The last election in 1910 gave his party a majority of 126, which included Labor and Irish Home Rulers.

The two principal questions put to the electors in these general elections were: the taxation of land values bill for England and Wales, which had been rejected by the House of Lords, and the Parliament Act. The sinister problem that haunted the minds of so many leading men was scarcely discussed. Land, the economic prob-
lem, and the veto of the House of Lords were of immediate concern.

After the Agadir affair, the Prime Minister sent Churchill to the Admiralty, and soon Asquith was to learn from the country what the working men of England thought about the move. The Liberals lost by-election after by-election until, in 1912, three seats were held by candidates who placed the taxation of land values in the forefront of their programs. Still, the government did not take the hint, which was obvious to many Liberal organizers and to many of the trade unionists.

Secretly, the Committee of Imperial Defence carried forward with great earnestness the plans for war, predicted by several "in the know" (including Admiral Fisher) to begin in 1914. Churchill left no stone unturned to make the navy as powerful as possible. He was sent to the Admiralty expressly to prepare for war with Germany, as he told his constituents at Dundee, and he performed his job as well as mortal man could.

It should be unnecessary here to go into the matter of the immediate causes of the war, because there are sufficient books written by investigators of the principal powers, which working men can read. Many of the severest critics belong to Allied nations. Those of France, Italy, Belgium, and the United States have exposed ruthlessly the stupid pretexts of the statesmen who were at odds with Germany. No historian of any repute today believes that Germany was solely responsible for the war. It has been said that the men who subscribed to that silly statement did not believe it themselves. But one lie breeds another, and those who were guilty of writing the Treaty of Versailles could not afford to lose face and appear in sackcloth and ashes.

That treaty, even at the time it was signed by the Allied ministers and the German plenipotentiaries, was denounced as a vindictive, war-breeding instrument that would engulf Europe in another conflict. Robert Lansing,
the American Secretary of State who was in Paris when
the treaty was drawn up, says in his book, *The Peace
Negotiations*:

The terms of peace were yesterday delivered [May 7, 1919]
to the German plenipotentiaries, and for the first time in
these days of feverish rush of preparation there is time to
consider the Treaty as a complete document.

The impression made by it is one of disappointment, of
regret, and of depression. The terms of peace appear immeas-
urably harsh and humiliating, while many of them seem to
me impossible of performance. . . .

It must be admitted in honesty that the League is an
instrument of the mighty to check the normal growth of
national power and national aspirations among those who
have been rendered impotent by defeat. . . .

The League as now constituted will be the prey of greed
and intrigue; and the law of unanimity in the Council, which
may offer a restraint, will be broken or render the organization
powerless. It is called upon to stamp as just what is unjust.

Unfortunately, books written by men like Lansing
find few readers. When a war is over, the ordinary
artisan is busy from morning till night, striving to
get back to the normal condition of things. No matter
how great a hero he has appeared to be in the con-
flict, no matter how his exploits have been lauded
by the sensational press while the war raged, he soon
finds he is quite another chap when he gets into mufti
and has to find ways and means of making a living.

The books that would give him some notion of how
he has been used by his statesmen scarcely ever reach
him because, for a certain period, the patriotic papers—
their editors and their reviewers—enter into what seems
like a conspiracy to hide the truth from him. A few
years must pass before it is safe to enlighten Tommy
Atkins or the American doughboy. Those who denounce
the enemy as liars, barbarians, and thieves are slow to
let the truth appear. They connive at the barbarity of
the economic system, which, because of the taxation of
wealth, is legalized stealing, as many of our economists tell us.

His efforts to save civilization are penalized by tons of paper money—Bradburys in Britain and "shinplasters" in the United States. The crowning folly of it all is that he has penalized his progeny for generations because the paper debt can only be paid from the wealth produced by labor. Still, his statesmen tell him that he has won prestige and honor in defeating his fellow-workers, who were his enemies and threatened to take the bread out of his mouth. And so the mad farce goes on, generation after generation, and the poor are still poor, and the weight of taxation has reduced the rich to the status of genteel paupers.
IV

The Search for Political Truth

One remarkable feature about the leading politicians of the west, since 1895, is the contempt they have shown for the proletariat. If anyone doubts this, all he has to do is to look back and read the pretexts given to the electors for going to war. British and European statesmen knew that the "age of enlightenment" had not sharpened the minds of the taxpayers. The warmakers befuddled the people with impunity.

The Boer War and World War I provided some historians with fascinating exercises for examining the advertised reasons for these direful adventures. The earlier generation had the benefit of the searching methods of Cobden and Bright about the true causes of wars of their day. The two Corn Law reformers did not believe the fire-eating gentlemen who occupied the front bench; with keen knowledge and incisive eloquence, they both riddled the flimsy pretexts of Palmerston.

The people, however, backed the Crimean War. It was popular. Peace-loving democracy could not permit Russia to take the Holy Places on the Bosphorus. When that war stopped for a while, Lord Salisbury said England had backed the wrong horse.

No one attempts to explain the extraordinary change that has come about since the early seventies of the last century, when education was hoped to be the means of improving the mind of the electorate. With the growth of schools and the extensions of universities, there has been noticeable an ominous decline in the political intelligence of the taxpayers.
Henry Ford said, "History is bunk." The lack of action on the part of the British and American masses makes one think that they would agree with him. Yet, it may be said in their defense that, since the turn of the century, the histories of wars have not been proper subjects for the classrooms. Certainly much that goes by the name of modern history needs ruthless revision. One stumbling block to such an effort is that it might not be patriotic to hold an autopsy on subjects that are not fit for decent burial.

The steady stream of books that have come from the pens of statesmen, editors, generals, and admirals since the end of the First World War, indicates that publishers think there is a large reading public desirous of information. In America since the close of World War II, some eighty or ninety books dealing with it have been published. Few of these were written by historians. To say that these works contain startling revelations (some, indeed, flatly deny the pretexts set out by the chief ministers of the Allied States) is an ordinary observation; but to what extent the reading public has digested the facts and views is quite another matter.

A well-known bookseller remarked that most of the readers look down a page, but they do not understand what they read. The statistics of illiteracy in America and in Britain bear this out. Like the aristocracy of Disraeli's day, people buy books, but they do not read. Who on earth could keep up with the immense flow of volumes that pass over the counters of the bookshops? So we may take it, I presume, that history is not for the proletariat, notwithstanding the inordinate mass of opinions upon these matters that come from the presses.

Influential sections of men in public positions in Great Britain and in the United States have already shown a desire to suppress the truth. In both countries, skeptical authors who wish to get their views before the public complain that publishers frown upon manuscripts which contain views contrary to official opinion. In a
recent review of a British general's work on the war, the
critic lamented pitifully that the author had dealt with
some political questions. In America the reviewers gen-
erally condemned George Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor*
because he proved from the documents that it was not
quite the unexpected blow that Roosevelt's admirers
imagined. The guns of many other writers have been
spiked in the same way. Two books that should be
read by every decent-minded person have been ignored
by the reviewers. They are: Montgomery Belgin's
*Victors' Justice* and Freda Utley's *The High Cost of Venge-
ance*. It is heaven help the poor author who has spent
long months in striving to expose the delusions of the
official broadcasters!

It is very difficult to get at the truth of anything
because opinion now is made for people. The man who
does his own thinking upon the evidence he gathers is
looked upon as kinsman. His patriotism is doubted; many
feel that his mission is to defend the enemy he fought,
when his only intention is to expose or accuse the enemy
at home.

The search for truth is the task of tasks. Perhaps only
in science is it less difficult than in any other branch of
thought. All true scientists are eager for the truth. In
the political and diplomatic realm it hides its head
under tons of dispatches, speeches of legislators, the
machinations of munitions makers, and millions of col-
umns penned by war-minded editorial writers. The
searcher who goes in quest of political truth should be
honored for the labor that he undertakes, if no other
honor is earned.

It may very well be that the proletariat thinks it is
not necessary to learn now that the gadget age has dis-
pensed with truth. There are so many labor-saving de-

tices that relieve a man from the arduous process of
thought, that he is quite content to let the broadcaster
for the soap manufacturer tell him any nonsense about
the news. It is only necessary to look at the front page
of the popular papers to understand clearly what the majority of taxpayers read. Advertisers have admitted that they must cater to the mind of a child of eight years.

Everything seems to be pre-digested for the intellectual processes of the millions who have been "educated." It costs billions to graduate them from the schools, and more billions are wasted upon their delinquencies. The cost of crime cannot be estimated. In 1944, J. Edgar Hoover, head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, reported that in the United States one was committed every 23 seconds. Later he stated that the nation was facing a potential army of 6,000,000 criminals—ten times the number of students in our colleges and universities.

During the past two years I have followed the correspondence in the columns of The Times upon child delinquency. I have no doubt that those who complain of the increase are informed persons. Still, no one asks if this is an asset of saving civilization. After the Boer War, the head of the New York police system made a study of the increase in crime in Europe and in America. He came to the conclusion that the war drills of immature youths were responsible for the appalling conditions.

There are many truths that should be placed before the public, so that they may have a notion of their responsibility, but the only way this can be done effectively is to get down to bed rock, or as near it as possible. So long as the few intellectuals who protest against the present condition of things are content to ignore the underlying causes of the general distress, they are merely beating the air. Their present method of admonishing the people will get them nowhere, and as it is not likely that statesmen and prelates will appear in sackcloth and ashes before the mobs, it devolves on intelligent laymen to undertake the task.

They did not do so badly when they got down to work a hundred years ago, and surely the men of today
—heirs of the wonders accomplished by their fathers—should be able to perform a similar feat. Yes, but it takes great courage. That is one of the chief things that truth seems to insist upon. Courage is her right-hand partner. Emerson said, "God will not have His work made manifest by cowards." That seems reasonable, even to an agnostic. But the man who is afraid of being accused of apologizing for the enemy is a coward, no matter what feats he has performed in the slaughter.

Let us consider the glorious wars for a minute or two. That wizard of wit and preacher of wisdom, Sydney Smith, in an article for The Edinburgh Review, said: "Alas! we have been at war thirty-five minutes out of every hour since the Peace of Utrecht." That was in 1827.

Consider what that means. England spent thirty-five minutes out of every hour at war, during a period of 113 consecutive years. Lord Acton said, "No Christian annals are so sanguinary as ours." Dr. Quincy Wright, in his volumes called A Study of War produces tables that show how the peace-loving democracies kept the peace. From 1800 to 1941 Great Britain fought 34 wars and, in the same period, France fought 29. Germany (Prussia) fought 10. Henry Labouchère said: "We are without exception the greatest robbers and marauders that ever existed on the face of the globe. We are worse than other countries because we are hypocrites also, for we plunder and always pretend to do so for other people's good."

The Radical member for Northampton knew his book. Millions in England approved of his relentless exposure of shams and organized hypocrisy. Doubts may be raised as to whether men now have stomachs strong enough to digest the political and economic nourishment our fathers fed on. Is it to be imagined that a Swift, a Cobbett, or a Hazlitt would be tolerated by our anemic leaders of opinion who take us from disaster to chaos? Where would a publisher be found today to issue such critical reviews of State affairs as William Cobbett wrote for the readers of the Weekly Register?
The slogans that we have been familiar with during the last two wars are merely variations of much older ones. A “war to end war” is by no means new, and we heard a great deal about “democracy” during the Boer War when Kruger refused to give a vote to the Uitlanders. Since Marlborough’s campaigns, Britain has always been ready to “save civilization” or “Christianity,” and sometimes both. The working man of today may be surprised to learn that nearly two hundred years ago the greatest statesman in England condemned the slogans of his day, root and branch. The Earl of Chatham said:

We have suffered ourselves to be deceived by names and sounds—“the balance of power,” “the liberty of Europe,” “a common cause,” and many more such expressions, without any other meaning than to exhaust our wealth, consume the profits of our trade and load our posterity with intolerable burdens. None but a nation that had lost all signs of virility would submit to be so treated.

The great slogan of World War II was “the common cause.” It was the rallying cry to get money out of the taxpayers’ pockets. Now that the war is over, the common cause is so bedraggled and tousled that no one thinks it worth while mentioning, and as for “balance of power,” the value of it cannot even be weighed because America and Great Britain presented Stalin with the scales.

But how the proletariat could be humbugged about the balance of power, after three or four generations of experience of its uncertainty and cost, is difficult to explain. An alert young student of eighteen who has read Britain’s history during the nineteenth century would easily find many examples of the scorn that was poured upon it by leading politicians. John Bright called it “the foul idol,” and at Birmingham in 1864 he said:

... It rises up before me when I think of it as a ghastly phan-tom which during one hundred and seventy years, whilst it has been worshipped in this country, has loaded the nation with debt and taxes, has sacrificed the lives of hundreds of
thousands of Englishmen, has desolated the homes of millions of families, and has left us, as the great result of the profligate expenditure it has caused, a doubled peerage at one end of the social scale, and far more than a doubled pauperism at the other. . . .

It is amazing to witness, in war after war, how the statesmen and diplomatists can bring out the old props that have done service and, by touching them up with a little bit of high-faluting eloquence, find the proletariat ready to kneel down and worship them.

In trying to drag a little truth from history, it is interesting to find a close similarity in the slogans of statesmen generation after generation. We need a Sydney Smith or a Jonathan Swift to point these resemblances out to us. Read this letter that Smith wrote to Lady Grey, the wife of the Reform Prime Minister of 1832:

For God’s sake, do not drag me into another war! I am worn down, and worn out, with crusading and defending Europe, and protecting mankind: I must think a little of myself. I am sorry for the Spaniards—I am sorry for the Greeks—I deplore the fate of the Jews; the people of the Sandwich Islands are groaning under the most detestable tyranny; Bagdad is oppressed; I do not like the present state of the Delta; Thibet is not comfortable. Am I to fight for all these people? The world is bursting with sin and sorrow. Am I to be champion of the Decalogue, and to be eternally raising fleets and armies to make all men good and happy? We have just done saving Europe, and I am afraid the consequence will be, that we shall cut each other’s throats. No war, dear Lady Grey!—No eloquence; but apathy, selfishness, common sense, arithmetic! I beseech you, secure Lord Grey’s swords and pistols, as the housekeeper did Don Quixote’s armour. If there is another war, life will not be worth having.

"May the vengeance of Heaven" overtake all the Legitimates of Verona! but, in the present state of rent and taxes, they must be left to the vengeance of Heaven. I allow fighting in such a cause to be a luxury; but the business of a prudent, sensible man, is to guard against luxury.

There is no such thing as a "just war," or, at least, as a wise war.
A fair sample of the language used by men before proletarians were "educated." The critical predecessors of Smith, since the time of George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, were more severe in their methods of exposing the delusions of statesmen and their victims. Savile said: "Religion is the foundation of government. Without it man is an abandoned creature, one of the worst beasts nature has produced."

Savile "is one of the most brilliant of politicians and expresses the racy good sense of his age. His maxims of state policy, so pithy, so modern, strike deep to the foundations of political practice in all times." So John Bowle writes in *Western Political Thought*, a book well worth close study. Alas, every political party in Britain and in America is in sad need of a Savile.

Anyone who took the trouble to search the speeches and letters of the men at the head of affairs since the days of Queen Anne would be amazed to find that they used the language we have heard so often since the Boer War. "The liberties of Europe," "the arrogance of tyrants," "republican upstarts" were words that fell trippingly from the tongues of statesmen. The leader of the enemy was painted in satanic colors, and he and the proletarians who fought with him had to be chastised by the lovers of peace, no matter what it cost. Sometimes the devil was a Spaniard; at other times he was an American or a Frenchman; recently he has been Dutch, then German; the last was an Austrian. When the Third World War takes place, the devil will be a Caucasian, if Stalin lives long enough to enter the fray.

Proletarians never seem to get tired of spoof. They are as ready to take it from their political idol as they are to take it from Marx or Laski. There is nothing like a violent change for breaking drear monotony. Life would be very drab and dull for the much-too-many to endure a long season of peace. One optimistic psychologist thinks it would take at least three full generations
of war-less days to eradicate from the race this itch for belligerent change.

Peace campaigns usually end in war. It was so before 1914; it was so before 1939. President Wilson was so sure, when he “kept the people out of war,” that none of his advisers could convince him that an American soldier would fight in Europe. Scarcely three months had passed after his second inauguration before he changed his mind.

Arthur Balfour crossed the Atlantic with Edward Holden and had a chat with him. And soon afterward the American President started a preparedness campaign. Balfour packed Wilson’s peace ideals in his dispatch box, and on the passage back to Britain, dumped it in mid-Atlantic.

President Roosevelt never dreamed of sending an American lad to fight in Europe. For over two years he promised the mothers of our youths that they would remain in America. The public opinion polls before Pearl Harbor revealed that between 70 and 80 per cent of the people questioned were against war. But long before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt was finding ways and means of getting into the strife. So it goes. It is an awful thing for proletarians when the liberties of Europe are in danger, whether a potentate—such as the Czar of Russia—or an upstart like Napoleon or Hitler is accused of the intention to destroy them.

Poor old proletarian! He never seems to get tired of saving something for others. When he wakes up to the fact that he had better save something for himself, there may be a change, but it will not last long, if the history of the chap is to be relied on.

The total bill for World War II exceeds the financial imagination of a King Midas. Official sources in Washington and a survey made by the American University, also in Washington, put the total military cost of the war to all belligerents at $1,116,991,463,084 and property damage at $230,900,000,000. The same sources esti-
mate the military cost to the principal belligerents as follows: United States, $330,030,463,084; United Kingdom, $120,000,000,000.

According to Whitaker's Almanack, the national debt of the United Kingdom in 1913-14 was just under £800,000,000. After the great wars, it had risen to more than £25,000,000,000. It has been a pretty costly business, and the worst of it is not yet, either for the British taxpayer or the American.

An article published in Newsweek for December 12, 1949, says:

Not one American in a hundred realizes that total tax collections now exceed the wartime peak. And not one in a thousand knows that hidden taxes—included in the price of everything he buys—will exceed $700 per family this year. In fact, the best-kept secret in the country today is the size of the tax load.

Small wonder shopkeepers complain of a consumer's strike against the high cost of commodities! The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation reports that the number of taxpayers enjoying an annual income under $3,000 a year amounts to 32,875,500. Should that lot get tired of subscribing to European aid, what would the British proletarian do? National bankruptcy is something he ought to think about, but whether it is nobler to be a civilized bankrupt than a barbaric totalitarian, only a lawyer born and raised in Philadelphia can tell.

No one seems prepared to face the music, but the band will play the fortissimo passages of the debt motive, with tubas and trombones going full blast, before we are many years older.

So long as the workers in Great Britain look to the government at Westminster to provide them with jobs, they will live precariously. Later on, rationing will become more and more meager, and restriction tighter. Already, keen observers who have surveyed the Euro-
pean scene return to the United States with doleful stories. One says that the great problem in Britain is how the present administration can save the bureaucracy. The same might be said by an Englishman who has visited the United States—that Truman’s principal effort is to save his administration.

No bureaucrat talks of saving the taxpayers, and the reason is that the workers who provide the funds for government are not tax conscious. It takes time and thought to make a study of the cost of government. In America where commodities are sold freely without ration tickets, the consumers may strike against high prices. In Britain the people have to take what they can get of the necessaries of life. But the Americans have not yet found out why prices are high and the purchasing power of the dollar is shrinking. It is now worth about 48¢. It is a baffling business for the rich and the poor, but there seems to be little hope that the taxpayers will set to work to learn for themselves why they are in distress.

The modern man we hear so much about has no time to work these things out for himself. The movie, the radio, and television are on the way to destroy thought. Perhaps the real reason why the people of a hundred years ago were able to better themselves is because they were not pestered from morning till night with the distractions of the machine age. When the artisan in Oldham or in Fall River reached home for his dinner, he had a chance to think things over. He was not worried about the payment of the next installment on some gadget that did his thinking for him. He had advantages of meditation the modern man knows little or nothing about. Science was something for the intellectual, and he did not bother much about it. He never dreamed of letting broadcasters have a mortgage on his mind. As for motor cars, buses, or bicycles to give him a lift for a few miles, he would have scorned them.
Perhaps he knew that walking was an aid to thinking, as poets and musicians discovered years ago.

Before the gadget age, the average man used his eyes, and what he saw set his mind to work. His descendant, who travels in a fast-moving vehicle, has no chance to see what he saw. The scenery goes by so fast that he cannot get a proper view of anything of consequence, and this is a very serious matter. For observation is a necessary exercise for the eyes. There were few bespectacled people when men walked. Today nearly every other person over thirty must have sight aids, and the number of people whose ears are decorated with tone amplifiers is increasing steadily. John Hervey, the great racehorse expert, remarked that the gas-pushers are breeding a race that will not know how to walk.

What, therefore, can be expected from a physically defective proletariat? And, yet, we are told that the health of the British and American people was never better. Upon what basis is such an assertion made? Merely that there have been fewer sick people. How comes it, then, that every hospital in the land is crying out for more funds and the State says that the health of the people is so serious that medicine must be nationalized?

"Thinking is a bore; the moron is a very happy person. I am one," said a lady who was entertaining the president, the dean, and two or three professors of a well-known college. There was no doubt about her being a moron, but she had to admit that she would like to know as much as her cook, who attended a night school twice a week. Thinking is in disrepute, and how the proletarians are going to save themselves from becoming chattel slaves of the State is a mighty problem.

Short-cuts to knowledge are the bane of education. Since the State has offered courses on a silver platter, the vast majority of youngsters look upon them with disdain. Educationists who are free to express themselves say that national education is one of the biggest rackets
practiced by the bureaucracies. It is undoubtedly so in the United States where illiteracy is fostered by the credit system. A well-known teacher of French was asked how many in her class would be able to write or speak the language when they left the university. She said, “About one per cent. Most of them are taking it merely for credits.”

The same may be said of other studies. The waste of time and money is appalling, and the number of new subjects being introduced in the universities turns the sorry business into a farce. Some American institutions of learning provide classes for cosmeticians, morticians, shoeticians, and dietitians. These are only a few of the new courses advertised by solemn faculties to attract reluctant students. Perhaps some instructor of youth will explain the success of such men as James Brindley, Sir Richard Arkwright, Sir Humphry Davy, Michael Faraday, Thomas Edison, and a host of other inventors and scientists who had little or no schooling in their early years. The education that made them eminent they got for themselves. When one scans the list of American and British manufacturers who built up great industries during the last half of the nineteenth century, one is amazed at what they did on the meager curricula of the schools of the period.

Since the introduction into our colleges of such studies as political science, we have had two world wars and many others of lesser dimension. Since civics has been a study for young people, statistics show that the increase in crime perpetrated by this group staggers the imagination. How the idealists reckon upon the products of such a system to deal successfully with the mighty problems that baffle the politicians is something no one pretends to explain. Therein, perhaps, lies the reason why politicians have things all their own way and go from one distressing blunder to another without compunction.
One of the strangest things today is the cry for more leisure for recreation which is heard everywhere, although the need for deep reflection was never so great. Of course, the study of essential problems calls for work, and with the millions today, work is doing what you do not like. The only reason why it is performed is because man must feed his belly. The loaf has become the god of appetite.

Read Chapter Five—"The Grand Inquisitor"—in Book V of The Brothers Karamazov. Dostoevsky says:

... In the end they will lay their freedom at our feet, and say to us, "Make us your slaves, but feed us." They will understand themselves, at last, that freedom and bread enough for all are inconceivable together, for never, never will they be able to share between them! They will be convinced, too, that they can never be free, for they are weak, vicious, worthless and rebellious. . . .

Is that what it all comes to? Was the author a prophet who estimated correctly the tendencies of the age? The book was published seventy years ago, and the prediction of the Grand Inquisitor is well-nigh fulfilled. It is not a nice prospect for the reflective man who has any thought for the future of his children.
Diplomatic Prelude to World War I

There is no confessional for the political sinner, probably because it is impossible to imagine a reason why he should be absolved. And now that hell has been abolished, he has little fear of the fire dreaded by those long ago who committed political sins which seem somewhat insignificant as judged by our present standards of morality. Perhaps the whitewash tub and a two-ply brush are all that are necessary to cleanse the sins of our legislators.

Certainly whitewash has been applied in excess since the last South African War. But a good deal of it has peeled off under the burning processes of thorough investigation, and the acts of our idols are now seen in their nakedness. Nietzsche said that perhaps one of the greatest crimes was stupidity. He meant political stupidity. Schiller, too, railed against it: "Against stupidity the very gods themselves contend in vain."

Stupidity in foreign affairs is not easily detected—not even by a watchful House of Commons or an alert Congress. It is not until long after the blunder has been committed, and the damage done, that the sin is brought into the light of day. No one knew the dangers of an error in diplomacy better than Disraeli, and he dealt with the matter in the House of Commons:

... If you make a mistake in your foreign affairs; if you enter into unwise treaties; if you conduct campaigns upon vicious principles; if the scope and tendency of your foreign system are
founded upon want of information or false information, or are framed with no clear idea of what are your objects and your means of obtaining them, there is no majority in the House of Commons which can long uphold a Government under such circumstances. A majority under such circumstances will not make a Government strong, but will make this House weak.

No one will quarrel with that statement. But the friends of the men at the head of affairs in Britain, America, and European countries have naturally sought to defend them against the severe strictures of hard-hearted critics. Hence, the whitewash tub and the twoply brush, used so lavishly on behalf of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. But in nearly every case these apologists have mistaken the politician for the man. Who could be more charming, in polite society, than Sir Edward Grey, Count Berchtold, Raymond Poincaré, or von Bethmann-Hollweg? They were gentlemen and had hosts of devoted friends. But as ministers of state, their acts affected millions of people and brought death and desolation to them.

Their excuses for the conflagration they started in August, 1914, have been shattered to pieces, and few students now believe them. The woeful work of secret diplomacy brought ruin to their countries, and an examination of the policies that were kept secret from the public reveals an unbelievable course of crass stupidity. The lies told to shield their secret policies entered the public mind as truth and bred nothing but hatred and disaster.

One of the chief reasons why progress in reconstruction is stalled is that the lies are perpetuated by their successors who know they are lies. Who expects a public which has been misinformed to assist in the work of peace, when the hatred they bear one another is born of a long series of palpable untruths?

There will never be peace in Europe until the lie that Germany was solely responsible for the First World
War is cleared out of the minds of the people of Britain, France, and America. The necessity for wiping that slate clean is obvious to any man who has followed closely the writings of present-day publicists. It infects their opinions, and it inoculates the minds of those who will have to bear the brunt of future wars. It poisons the atmosphere breathed by the delegates to the United Nations. It is perpetuated in articles written by some of the new historians, and unfortunately, a few of these people teach at important seats of learning. The youths who receive instruction from them were mere boys when the Second World War was fought. It is a dreadful state of affairs, and the worst of it is, it is fostered by statesmen and prelates who are baffled daily in the course of their respective pursuits.

Surely the peace of the world is of more importance than the reputation of a politician. With the object of learning what took place in the chancelleries of the Allies from the time the Austrian Archduke was murdered until Russia and France declared war, it is necessary to review, step by step, the sequence of events.

In taking up this task, students must understand that there were five editions of the British White Paper containing the diplomatic correspondence prior to the outbreak of the conflict. I doubt whether half a dozen men in the three Allied countries know about the first edition that was published on August 4th. I have a copy of it, but I have not heard of any other person who possesses one. It was so full of deliberate errors that after the war orgy in the House of Commons, when members tore their papers to shreds, the debris was swept up and burned.

Recently a new light has been thrown upon documents in the first White Paper, revealing a state of affairs which is unbelievably stupid.

In a letter to the writer from a well-known prelate, who was entertaining Lord Haldane after World War I, the story is told of "what happened on the evening of
Sunday, August 2, 1914. 'The following is taken from the letter:

Lord Haldane said: 'Grey and I were dining at Queen Anne's Gate when a man from the Foreign Office came with a red box. Grey opened it and said, 'The Germans are over the Belgian frontier. What are we to do?' I said, 'Let us go and tell Asquith.' So we went to Number 10. Asquith said, 'Give me five minutes.' We sat in silence till A. said, 'We must fight.' We said, 'We hoped you would decide that way.' ' (Italics mine)

Then, in the prelate's letter, the details are given about Haldane offering to attend to the mobilization of the expeditionary force that he had organized. No example of diplomatic blundering can be found that shows more clearly how men like Asquith, Grey, and Haldane are ready to jump to conclusions that are without substance.

In the White Papers published by the government, there is only one dispatch which informed Grey of an invasion of foreign territory by the Germans. That is the one Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador at London received from Viviani, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and is designated in the first White Paper as Enclosure 3 in Dispatch No. 105. Whether the English translation of this dispatch was made at the French Embassy or at the British Foreign Office is not clear, but there is no reference in it to the Germans crossing the Belgian frontier. Here is what it says:

The German Army had its advance posts on our frontiers yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated onto our territory.

This is an accurate translation of the first sentence of the French dispatch, which is as follows:

L'armée allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier vendredi; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire.
Belgium is not mentioned anywhere in this communication. Why Grey jumped to the conclusion that her territory had been invaded can be explained in only one way: the British and French preparations for the struggle were made solely from the viewpoint that if a conflict took place, Germany would attack Belgium first. Indeed, Belgium concentrated all her forces on her eastern frontier. This story, told by Haldane, is strange indeed, because one must infer that Grey did not show him the dispatch. For Haldane spoke and read French as fluently as he spoke and read English and German. Grey knew little or nothing about the Continent of Europe and was no French scholar.

Not long after the war broke out, suspicion was cast upon Viviani's dispatch, and when the war terminated, it was proved by French critics to be a fake. This was obvious to anyone who read the first White Paper with caution. The dispatch is dated Paris, July 31, 1914. It begins by saying: French frontiers were penetrated on Friday (yesterday). But "yesterday" was Thursday, July 30th.

However, there are stranger things than that about these documents. Turning to Dispatch No. 105, from Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie (the British Ambassador to France), we find that there were three enclosures: (1) Grey's letter to Paul Cambon, dated November 22, 1912, concerning the consultations which had been taking place in recent years between the French and British naval and military experts; (2) the letter in reply from Paul Cambon to Grey, dated French Embassy, London, November 23, 1912; (3) the one referred to above from Viviani. But how Grey could enclose a letter that left Paris on Friday, July 31st, in one that he sent from London the day before—July 30th—is incomprehensible.

Worse still, and far more difficult to understand, are the two letters that passed between Sir Edward Grey and Paul Cambon. They were Enclosures 1 and 2, which were sent in Dispatch No. 105 by the British Foreign
Minister to his ambassador in Paris, Sir Francis Bertie. No thorough, hard-headed student of these two letters has been able to reconcile them with the statements made in the House of Commons by Sir Edward Grey.

It must be noted that the first one is not from the French Ambassador, but from the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, who admits "from time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together." The date of this letter is November 22, 1912—sixteen months after the Agadir affair.

The only reason I can find for the exchange of these letters was the need to dispel the anxiety of those "in the know" in the House of Commons about the state of affairs aggravated by the Agadir crisis. Several speeches were made in the country during November, 1912, which indicated clearly that Sir Edward Grey was in for a showdown, as the phrase went. Earl Percy, at Queen's Hall, November 14, 1912, told his audience:

It would require courage to tell the country the truth that they are living in a "fool's paradise," and that it was not merely our Army but the army of France which was our present defence against German invasion. And it was a base betrayal of our obligations not to be able to support France with an adequate military force of our own.

Before the House rose, Mr. Amery moved to reduce the Army estimates, and in his speech he declared that it was agreed to send a force to assist France. Some foolish virgins behind the Treasury bench cried, "No! No!" Unconscious of sitting in the dark, they resented every petition made to Grey for light upon the question. Through that summer and autumn many critics of Grey's policy expressed themselves upon the necessity of informing the House and the public of the obligations implicit in the plans made by the French and British military and naval staffs.

But the speeches of Grey's critics are not sufficient to clear up the mystery, which envelops the exchange of
letters at that date. Many have searched for a reason, and some of the men associated with the Paris branch of the Union of Democratic Control came to the conclusion that the letters were written for the sole purpose of helping Grey in his address to the House on August 3, 1914—to assure members that the government’s hands were free.

That is the point that he insists upon in his memoirs. However, when he read the letters to the House, he omitted the final sentence in his own letter to Cambon, which is as follows: “If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.”

But every subterfuge failed to impress those who, for several years, had opposed the foreign policy of Grey. Many Conservatives, nearly all Irish Home Rulers, and about fifty Liberal backbenchers protested against the secrecy of the Foreign Office. Not a few of these men knew the government was heading for war. As for the Cabinet, only Asquith, Grey, and Haldane knew what the commitments were. Lloyd George says:

... There was a reticence and a secrecy which practically ruled out three-fourths of the Cabinet from the chance of making any genuine contribution to the momentous questions then fermenting on the Continent of Europe, which ultimately ended in an explosion that almost shattered the civilisation of the world. ...

He states in his War Memoirs that Lord Northcliffe, at a dinner at Lord Birkenhead’s house, told the company “quite bluntly that the editor of a great London journal was better informed about what was happening in the capitals of the world than any cabinet minister.”

The situation on Sunday, August 2nd, was desperate for the Cabinet. Lloyd George has said that there was a great difference of opinion, and several of the members threatened to resign. Later, Lord Morley and John
Burns sent in their resignations. However, a pretext for war was found in the old so-called Belgian treaties of 1831 and 1839, although it had been determined several times, particularly in 1887, that

(1) England is under no guarantee whatever except such as is common to Austria, France, Russia, and Germany; (2) that guarantee is not specifically of the neutrality of Belgium at all; and (3) [it] is given not to Belgium but to the Netherlands.

Taking another glance at the questions put to the government, and the debates in the House of Commons during the years 1912-13, one sees clearly how Grey strove to deceive the house, and that all his striving made the situation worse for him. There is a record of every question that was put to him on the matter of Britain’s commitments to France and Russia. John Dillon, Joseph King, J. W. Jowett, Lord Hugh Cecil, and others tried in vain to get from the Foreign Minister an explicit statement about the matter. The majority of the House believed firmly that British military and naval forces had to go to the aid of France if a war broke out. Grey neglected every opportunity the questioners gave him to clarify the situation. Wearied, at last, by making fruitless efforts to get the information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Hugh Cecil turned to the Prime Minister.

The passage taken from the official report is worth quoting in full:

Lord Hugh Cecil: "The right hon. gentleman [Asquith] made reference to foreign affairs, and there is one aspect of them, of not so controversial a character as others, on which I should like to say a few words. The right hon. gentleman and his colleagues are generally believed—I speak with the utmost diffidence in regard to allegations which may not be well founded—to have entered into an engagement, or, to speak more accurately, to have given assurances, which in the contingency of a great European war would involve heavy military obligations on this country. We do not suspect the
Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary of pursuing anything but a pacific foreign policy, and we are far from saying that their policy is in any way an aggressive one; but certainly we believe, if the stories current are true, the policy, if it is not to be regarded as an aggressive one, is adventurous."

The Prime Minister: "Will the noble lord define a little more definitely what he means?"

Lord Hugh Cecil: "I am only anxious not to use words which will convey anything but perfectly fair criticism in a matter of this sort, and any ambiguity in what I have said is due to the fact that I do not wish to go beyond the necessities of the case."

The Prime Minister: "I do not complain."

Lord Hugh Cecil: "There is a very general belief that this country is under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation arising out of an assurance given by the Ministry in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of this country to operate in Europe. That is the general belief. It would be very presumptuous of any one who has not access to all the facts in possession of the Government—"

The Prime Minister: "I ought to say that it is not true."

There were some who wondered whether Asquith himself was informed. After the war, I made it my business to look up the statements made by Haldane, Colonel Repington, and Colonel Huguet, the French military attaché at London, and I found that Asquith was privy to the arrangements consented to by Grey—to carry on meetings of the British and French military staffs. In his book, Before the War, Haldane says:

Sir Edward Grey consulted the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Asquith, and myself as War Minister, and I was instructed, in January, 1906, a month after assuming office, to take the examination of the question in hand.

Why, therefore, should Asquith try to deceive the House? There were two reasons: one was the fear of a revolt in the Liberal ranks, if they knew of the arrangement; the other was the fear of France and Russia ob-
jecting to a public announcement of the plans then being made. But in 1912 this pot of trouble came to the boil, and the French at the Quai d’Orsay became very uneasy, fearing there would be an explosion. Grey had to do something to make things easy for his ambassador at Paris, so he wrote the following letter to him:

My dear Bertie,

There would be a row in Parliament here if I had used words which implied the possibility of a secret engagement unknown to Parliament all these years committing us to a European war. But I send you a copy of the question and answer. I purposely worded the answer so as not to convey that the engagement of 1904 might not under certain circumstances be construed to have larger consequences than its strict letter.

E. Grey

It was T. P. Conwell-Evans who discovered this letter and published it in his book, Foreign Policy from a Back Bench. Most of those who have taken the trouble to look into this discreditable affair agree that there would have been no war in 1914 if Grey and Asquith had taken the House into their confidence. Indeed, in 1922, Austen Chamberlain declared in the Commons:

Suppose that engagement had been made publicly in the light of day. Suppose it had been read before this House and approved by this House, might not the events of those August days of 1914 have been different? If our obligations had been known and definite, it is at least possible, and I think it is probable, that war would have been avoided in 1914.

Now the proletarian may ask, “What is the good of raking up all that old controversy, and how is it going to help us to make a living?” A pertinent question. The reply is simple, however. The story is revived because it has become more and more difficult for you to live in peace with your neighbors. Ever since 1906, you have been threatened with war, and today the gigantic debt that has been incurred makes you as a producer a slave
of the State. The interest on the debt can only be paid for by the goods that you produce.

Now the military experts in America are preparing to fight another war. Do you think you can escape the call when the bugles blow? Do you not realize that when that moment comes you have little or nothing to say about it? Your commanders will not ask you whether you think it is moral to obey their orders; they will tell you to march and you will have to fight. It is all in the cards, my friends, so take heed and make your desires known to your representatives in Congress and in Parliament, and let them understand you do not want another war and have no desire to be driven to the slaughter like sheep. The time to take action is now—not when the trouble begins.

Do you know that the British army and navy estimates for 1948-49 amounted to more than £450,000,000? The net estimate of the navy is nearly equal to the sum the London Government must pay in interest and principal upon the post-war loan she got from the United States. The London financial correspondent of The New York Times says:

Under terms of the loan, Britain had the privilege of drawing on the $3,750,000,000 fund as needed. It was thought that the credit could stretch comfortably over five years or more. Events proved otherwise and within three years of the first advance England had used up the last penny of her American credit.

This was written on December 25, 1949. Such things have become more and more serious, and now they are getting out of hand. The difficulties that lie ahead for the proletarians are dreadful to contemplate. For they do not seem to realize that no miracle will take place to save them.

The importance of resurrecting the "old stuff" set out above should be clear to any thinking man. What has happened before may happen again. Do you think the
Atlantic Pact is to be relied on in an emergency? What became of all your other pacts? Was there ever a tighter, stronger one made than that which existed before World War I? And so sanguine were its makers that it would accomplish its purpose that Lord Esher said in August, 1915:

From the outset of the war I have been thrown into the company of practically every one of our leading statesmen, and I have found them all wrong in their forecasts without exception. They genuinely believed in a short war. They prophesied its conclusion in anything from three to nine months. They jeered at a less optimistic view, and hardly one of them but held that before now (August, 1915) the British Army, accompanied by political plenipotentiaries, would be marching through Berlin.

Never were men "in the know" so sure of a speedy victory as your leaders were in the autumn of 1914. However, when they discovered that it was going to be a long job, they began to paint the enemy in terrible colors and invent the yarns that made a reasonable peace impossible four years later. Germany was to be judged solely responsible for starting the war; and on the basis of that stupid notion, the vindictive Treaty of Versailles was signed at the point of the gun. Every suggestion of revision was rejected by the Allied Governments, but independent neutral committees investigated the causes of the war and declared that Germany was no more responsible than the Allies. Later—after the trials of the Russian generals—it was found that Russia began it. England was drawn in at the tail end of the chariots of France and Russia.

Perhaps no man in the House of Commons desired peace more than Sir Edward Grey, but every secret commitment that he had made defeated his aim. I do not agree with those who say that he desired war. After the demonstration that broke from members who welcomed his address on August 3rd, he relapsed into pitiable dejection; and when the declaration of war was
made a day or so later, he was a sad sight. The strain that he had been under since the middle of July was so severe that he never recovered from it.

There it is! The course that he had pursued since he took office in December, 1905, led to the most terrible disaster. It not only culminated in the war, but it destroyed the Liberal party. Grey's fate reminds one of William Pitt, and when I think of Sir Edward, I am reminded of several pages in Macaulay's essay on the British Prime Minister who waged war against Napoleon.
VI

Behind the Scenes

The reason why you have fallen so thoughtlessly into the toils of war should now be plain to you. You imagined that all you had to do as an elector was to send a representative to Congress or Parliament and let him do the political thinking for you. When you did this, your mind was chiefly occupied with immediate domestic problems, and no doubt the man you sent to represent you was ready to deal with them according to his election pledges. Maybe he was highly qualified for this purpose, but very likely his knowledge of the intricacies of foreign affairs amounted to no more than yours.

In 1920, Herbert Morrison was Secretary of the London Labor party. He felt he had been wrong during World War I, and he solemnly vowed, “Never again!” In an article he wrote:

All the governments of all the warring nations deliberately deceived their citizens and their fighting men. They founded propaganda departments for this special purpose, paying men out of public funds to deceive their fellows by the spoken and written word. The government suppressed truth, newspapers, books, and organizations, and imprisoned good men and true.

Therefore, he called on all trade unionists to say:

Never again shall leaders of labor or their rank and file be so ill-informed and so lacking in a sense of responsibility as to accept without critical analysis the statements of governments (of whatever party) who desire to lead the country into war.
Clement Attlee also felt that he had been wrong. In 1920 he was Mayor of Stepney, and confessed, courageously:

When we entered this war we were too credulous—we believed the Government. We should have been wiser if we had listened to the Union of Democratic Control, and less to the other voices. I am proud today, as a man who has fought in the war, to stand on a Union of Democratic Control platform with those who always protested against the war and told us we were deceived. They were right and we were wrong.

In 1939 these men were politicians. Both were members of the House of Commons, but no one heard them say, “Never again!” Were they too credulous? Did they know any more about the real causes of World War II than they did about the causes of its predecessor? Not a bit! Yet, they went into it and took their people with them.

Ask your grandfather about the situation as he found it before the First World War. Ask him how much his representative knew in July, 1914, about the onrushing conflict, the disastrous storm that broke in a few short weeks over Europe, and caused irretrievable havoc. Why, on Sunday, August 2nd, when British troops were moving to the stations of the southern railways, members of Parliament in the National Liberal Club, London, were firmly convinced there would be no war. Yet, two members of Parliament, who had gone to a Liberal demonstration at Swindon the day before, spent nearly five hours on that short journey, because of the movement of troop trains going to the ports. At four o’clock on Sunday afternoon, a friend learned from an Under-Secretary of State in Downing Street that war was unthinkable.

Lloyd George says, in his War Memoirs, that on Sunday, August 2nd, the Cabinet was “hopelessly divided on the subject of Britain entering the war.” Furthermore, he tells us: “Even then I met no responsible
minister who was not convinced that, in one way or another, the calamity of a great European war would somehow be averted. But the most startling commentary on the whole thing was his statement:

... The world was exceptionally unfortunate in the quality of its counsellors in this terrible emergency. Had there been a Bismarck in Germany, or a Palmerston or a Disraeli in Britain, a Roosevelt in America, or a Clemenceau in authority in Paris, the catastrophe might, and I believe would, have been averted; but there was no one of that quality visible on the bridge, in any great State. Von Bethmann-Hollweg, Poincaré, Viviani, Berchtold, Sazonow and Grey were all able, experienced, conscientious and respectable mariners, but distinctly lacking in the force, vision, imagination and resource which alone could have saved the situation. . . .

If, then, cabinet ministers, other members of Parliament, and the great mass of the electors in such a crisis knew so little about the true reason for it, why do peace societies now organize and pass resolutions against war? The fact is that there are undercover movements always at work instigating ministries, editors, clergymen, and other influential bodies to further their interests. None of this work is done directly. Indeed, scarcely anyone in the groups mentioned above has known how he has been influenced. Disraeli was one of the few who was conscious of the extraordinary power of these people who work in the dark. He makes that fact plain in his novel, Coningsby.

Bismarck knew them well, but I cannot find a direct reference of his to their work in Europe. Still there is on record the conversation he had with Conrad Siem in 1876, which referred particularly to the American Civil War. Urbain Gohier published it in his magazine, *La Vieille France*, March, 1921. Strangely enough, Lincoln knew the real influences at work behind the Civil War, and when it was over, he said:

As a result of the war, corporations have been enthroned and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the
money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until wealth is aggregated in the hands of a few and the Republic is destroyed. I feel at this moment more anxiety for the safety of my country than ever before, even in the midst of the war.

But how is the elector to know what goes on behind the scenes? When he has a job, he works eight or ten hours a day, and when he reaches home, his mind turns not to study, but to recreation. Even if he knew a bit about essential things, he would feel he could not live in a world of skepticism from morning till night, doubting the men in his government and distrusting his representative in Congress or Parliament. He might very well point out that the great pundits and learned journalists who write books on political history and supply his newspapers with editorials know no more about it than he does.

The proletarian may ask what chance he has to educate himself upon these subjects. The only reply that can be made is that he had better take time off to study a bit, so that when the opportunity occurs, he will be better equipped to make his protest. This he must do for himself. No college, no university, will help him to improve his mind in that way. No one in a university, during the past fifty years to my knowledge, has touched upon this question. The professors seem to be removed from actuality, and when a crisis arises in international affairs, they are swept like the proletarians into the maelstrom.

Yet, it is possible for an intelligent man to get some light upon these matters. After the First World War was over, a libel action was brought against the Paris newspaper, L’Humanité, and at the trial the evidence revealed some startling facts. A Rhodes Scholar, C. K. Streit, was so impressed by the revelations that he wrote a remarkable study of the operations of the Comité des Forges and kindred associations in Germany, which he called The Assassins of the People. It was afterwards
published under the title, *Where Iron is, There is the Fatherland*. When the pamphlet was circulated in New York, many working men read it and learned more about the real interests of munitions makers than any historian dared to publish.

Shortly after the pamphlet was issued, another trade depression set in. Men were out of work, larders were empty, and time had to be given to that most discouraging pursuit of all—looking for a job. That knocked the bottom out of interest in historical treatises. The facts revealed by Streit were summed up by Senator Gaudin de Villaine, a Conservative member of the French Parliament:

I formally accuse the big cosmopolitan banks, at least the owners of mining rights, to have conceived, prepared, and let loose this horrible tragedy with the monstrous thought of world stock-jobbing. I accuse these same money powers to have, before and since the war, betrayed the interests of France.

I cannot remember reading in a single work by an academic historian, who dealt with the First World War, a reference to the facts given from the documents by Mr. Streit.

The speeches of ministers of state and the dispatches of diplomats to their Ministers of Foreign Affairs by no means tell the whole story. One has only to read the Monypenny and Buckle *Life of Disraeli* and check its account of events of that period with Moritz Busch's *Our Chancellor* and *Bismarck, Some Secret Pages of His History* to discover how different interpretations of foreign policy conflict and cannot be reconciled. It is a pity that someone has not endowed a chair of modern history at a university for the sole purpose of dealing specifically with foreign policy and the powers that have influenced it since Waterloo.

In such a course some light might be thrown upon the sinister influences that make for war. After the
panic of 1908, there was only one man of prominence who had the courage to speak his mind upon this matter. Lord Welby, who was once the head of the British Treasury, said:

We are in the hands of an organization of crooks. They are politicians, generals, manufacturers of armaments, and journalists. All of them are anxious for unlimited expenditure, and go on inventing scares to terrify the public and to terrify Ministers of the Crown.

He was in a position to gather the facts and know what he was talking about.

In the United States in the past few years there have been scores of articles written upon atomic warfare and the probability of another conflict. Long books, too, have been published on these subjects. The student gleans from all this literature that many of the readers are anxious about the future and wish to know what should be done to avert war and the use of the bomb. No satisfactory reply comes from the authors who spill so much ink. There has been no enthusiasm for the Atlantic Pact. Most people who know anything about it shrug their shoulders and say, "Just another treaty." Some of the curious ask, "Are we to fight Russia because she is spreading Communist propaganda or because, in Germany, she is west of the Oder, where the secret treaty of the Allies, of the First World War, promised she should stand?"

No one attempts to make a direct reply to this, and I do not see how one can be given. The long speeches delivered by delegates at the United Nations meetings at Lake Success do not enlighten the people, and there is a feeling that time and money are being wasted there just as they were at that great temple of peace in Geneva—the hall of the League of Nations.

The pretext of defending Belgium in the First World War was ridiculed when it was announced. The Spectator said frankly that Britain was pledged to go to war,
whether the Germans invaded Belgium or not. And Leo Maxse, the belligerent editor of The National Review, said it was to salve the consciences of the timid Liberals in the Cabinet that the pretext of defending Belgium was found. Many similar statements were made before the war was six months old.

It was a commercial war, planned chiefly by Delcassé (the French Foreign Minister), Sazonov (the Russian Foreign Minister), and Izvolsky (Russian Ambassador to France in 1914). As for Great Britain, John Maynard Keynes points out in his book, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, that “England had destroyed, as in each preceding century, a trade rival.”

Underlying all the frictions and animosities of the powers interested in northern Africa were the gangs of concessionaires associated with the Comité du Maroc and the international combinations of the heavy industries—the makers of munitions. The exploitation of the natural resources of backward peoples, the search for new markets, the development of railways and harbors, and other imperialistic schemes were the aims of rival powers, but few representatives of the parliaments of the great States knew anything about the real causes until it was over. Delcassé had been on the war path before the conference at Algeciras in 1906. According to Le Gaulois, on July 12, 1905, he said:

Of what importance would the young navy of Germany be in the event of war in which England, I tell you, would assuredly be with us against Germany? What would become of Germany’s ports or her trade, or her mercantile marine? They would be annihilated. That is what would be the significance of the visit, prepared and calculated, of the British squadron to Brest, while the return visit of the French squadron to Portsmouth will complete the demonstration. The entente between the two countries and the coalition of their navies, constitutes such a formidable machine of naval war that neither Germany, nor any other Power, would dare to face such an overwhelming force at sea.
The only man in the French Chamber of Deputies who knew what Delcassé and his associates were up to was Jaurès who, so it is alleged, exposed the whole thing to Prime Minister Rouvier. When the war broke out in August, 1914, Jaurès was shot. He had to be murdered, for he knew too much. But he was not the only one who knew that it was a trade war that had been provoked by exploiters using the backstairs of the chancelleries.

When Woodrow Wilson returned to America for the last time, he was an enlightened man. He had seen all his great ideals scattered like chaff; he had even lost faith in the Covenant. In an address at St. Louis, September, 1919, he said:

Why, my fellow-citizens, is there any man here, or any woman—let me say, is there any child here—who does not know that the seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry? ... This war, in its inception, was a commercial and industrial war. It was not a political war.

At St. Paul, in the same month, he said:

The German bankers and the German merchants and the German manufacturers did not want this war. They were making conquest of the world without it, and they knew it would spoil their plans.

It did more than "spoil the plans" of the German bankers and manufacturers. It quite upset those of the British and American proletarians, for it saddled them with an enormous debt and mortgaged the labor of their heirs for generations to come. Within ten years both countries suffered two of the severest depressions the modern world has known. The dole had to be given to British working men to keep them quiet, and in America after the crash of 1929, the dole was used as a Democratic ballot ticket, and the grafters made billions out of the schemes launched by Roosevelt to give the impoverished work. It was a wonderful war, and "the
glory and prestige earned by the men who survived the fighting were not worth a patch on a laborer’s blue jeans.”

In cutting down a trade rival, Great Britain discovered she had not only wounded herself as an exporter but that she had raised up competitors who would make financial and commercial life a burden for her. So shortsighted were the men who thought the First World War would be short and sharp and that everything would be “hunky-dory” when Germany was licked! So far as trade was concerned, British statesmen snapped at the shadow and dropped the bone. Keynes, in his book, reminds us:

The statistics of the economic interdependence of Germany and her neighbors are overwhelming. Germany was the best customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary; she was the second best customer of Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark; and the third best customer of France. She was the largest source of supply to Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Roumania, and Bulgaria; and the second largest source of supply to Great Britain, Belgium, and France.

In our own case we sent more exports to Germany than to any other country in the world except India, and we bought more from her than from any other country in the world except the United States.

A rather cruel wit, during the Peace Conference at Paris, observed that the men at the head of affairs in Europe had never run a bank or manufactured an article for sale. In Britain there were two lawyers, a solicitor, and a fisherman on the Treasury bench, and Mr. Balfour as the leader of the opposition. How were they to know that the destruction of Germany as a trade rival would injure every country in Europe?

The Treaty of Versailles was a catastrophe from which Great Britain has never recovered. France—because of her millions of peasant proprietors—was hurt least of all by it. About a hundred years before, a far more able
set of men than Great Britain boasted in 1914 had waged a war against Napoleon. When it was over, the London News told its readers:

The situation of this country at the successful close of a long war is singular, and worthy of observation. It is a fact that peace, instead of having brought us security, retrenchment, relief from burthens, or extended commerce, to enable us to bear them, has left us all the expenses of war, without gaining to us the friendship of the very Powers for whom we undertook it. Of all the countries, that one against which we fought has come out of the contest with the least harm; and that which set all the rest in motion has suffered in the highest degree.

Where are Britain's friends today? Outside the Commonwealth they would be hard to find, for you cannot call a money-lender a friend, particularly when there is no chance whatever of repaying the debt you owe him. There is more suspicion and fear today than there has been at any time in the history of the world. And unfortunately, no statesman has the stature necessary for attempting to dispel the suspicions and fears that hang like a dreadful pall upon us all. After Napoleon was sent to St. Helena, it took forty years for the Continent to recover. Several European countries were shaken by revolution, and blood-stained ways were paved for the coming of Marx.

Put your thinking caps on and commune with yourselves! You will never get out of the mess until you know how you got into it. You are like the folks lost in the maze. And, yet, we read week after week that there are optimists who imagine everything will turn out all right if we have patience. The language used by these people to impress the mob differs little from that written by their predecessors after the First World War.

The cold-blooded pessimist who is dealing with facts is a kill-joy and is liked no better now than he was then. Optimism is the luxury of the thoughtless, and it
is no intention of mine to deprive him of the slightest moiety of it. Still it must be remarked that there were no pessimists among the gentlemen who were responsible for either war. And those who said that civilization was beyond saving in 1914 might point out that there was less chance of saving it in 1939.

Anyway, suppose we grant that you saved it: what are you going to do with it? You can’t eat it; you can’t wear it, and I should be the last to advise anybody to smell it. Why, even the great men in Parliament, in Congress, at Lake Success do not know what in the dickens to do with it now they have their laps full of it. The scientists, too, are confounded by it and confess it is a far more difficult problem to understand than Einstein’s latest mathematical formula embracing gravitation and the electromagnetic field. At the recent meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, a learned professor read a paper in which he declared: ‘The primary task of every society is to civilize the thousands of young barbarians born into it each day.’

There we are! That gentleman hit the nail squarely on the head. We have to stop breeding barbarians, and the best way to impress our enemies that we mean business is to set the example. If, as we are told, the totalitarian countries would educate the young people to conduct themselves according to the rules laid down by their dictators, there seems to be no reason why the peace-loving countries should be unable to civilize their barbarians. In the past we thought that education would make men use their faculties for their own good. Philosophers believed that reason was the peculiar endowment of man and distinguished him from the brute. Something has gone wrong, however, with reason in politics and social affairs. Perhaps men have been so busy they have had no time to use it, and it has gone rusty and will not work. Whatever the explanation be for the lack of it, our own critics, the pessimists, the
kill-joys, do not hesitate to say that it is scarcely noticeable in the things we do.

Years ago, John Watson, the behaviorist, told us that we had only to hear men speak and see them act to know they did not think. And Herbert Spencer wrote, July 17, 1898:

Now that the white savages of Europe are over-running the dark savages everywhere—now that the European nations are vying with one another in political burglaries—now that we have entered upon an era of social cannibalism, in which the strong nations are devouring the weaker—now that national interests, national prestige, pluck, and so forth are alone thought of, and equity has utterly dropped out of thought, while rectitude is scorned as unctuous, it is useless to resist the wave of barbarism. There is a bad time coming, and civilised mankind will (morally) be uncivilised before civilisation can again advance.

When the division bell rings and the tellers have made the count, the Speaker will say, ""The pessimists have it.""
Some of you, if prompted, will remember the maze of entanglements into which the peace-loving statesmen of the Allies rambled after they tried to put the punitive clauses of the Treaty of Versailles into practice. You may recollect the joy-riding that took place from spa to spa, and the complexities of finance and debt that Owen Young and Charles Dawes attempted to solve. I shall not harry your feelings by telling you all I know about that discreditable business. All I shall say is that one of the experts in the Dawes entourage told me, when he returned to America, that the business was a hopeless mess. Later efforts of the American experts confirmed that gentleman's conviction.

When we consider what German politicians passed through in the rigmaroles conducted by Allied statesmen, we can only imagine that their minds must have been like whirling dervishes from morning till night. They tried as best they could to bring some order out of the chaos into which domestic affairs had fallen, but nearly every action was blunted by the thousand and one directions, restrictions, and prohibitions laid down in the treaty.

I spent some months in Germany in 1921, and on almost every hand I was told that the treaty was ruining Central Europe. The last time I saw Walther Rathenau—a few weeks before he was murdered—he said that the Ebert Government was incapable and that the Economic Committee (over which Rathenau presided) could have been of some practical use at home and better
prepared to deal with the Allies, if it were free to do so. I had a long chat with him on how the financial and commercial disorder of Central Europe affected British trade.

Returning to London, I told some of my friends—politicians and business men—of what I had learned, but I might as well have made my remarks to a hitching post. The men I conversed with were full of the propaganda yarns, and most of them thought that Germany deserved her fate. They were blind to the fact that English business had been severely injured by the disruption of trade in Central Europe. In Germany the Social Democrats held the Kaiser and his associates responsible for the war. Georg Bernhard, the editor of the Vossische Zeitung, with whom I had had several interviews, declined to have anything to do with a petition for revision of the treaty. His last words to me were: "We are now on top and we intend to stay there."

The men who thought as he did were many and had great influence in the Reichstag. The British and American Ambassadors in Berlin saw the trouble clearly, but they were powerless to bring the governments at home to their senses. The chief reason for that was the obdurate attitude of the French. When men in London and Paris were told that their countries could not solve their debt problems unless Central Europe was put to work again, they suspected the informer of being a pro-German. Never was there a clearer example of indolent stupidity. Anyone who thought about the best interests of Britain, but was not in accord with the popular notions, was looked upon as a traitor.

Wherever I went in Europe, from Vienna to Bordeaux, I was shocked to find the only people who had any sense were those who had no influence whatever. This refers to the natives of the countries I visited. That summer, Berlin was taken over by Americans who were having the time of their lives buying old masters, royal jewelry, tapestries, furniture, and other objects of art thrown
upon the market by collectors who saw the mark dwindling in value day after day and nothing but poverty staring them in the face.

My other visits to Germany before the rise of Hitler were in 1925 and 1928. Perhaps the political nous that I inherit acted clairvoyantly, and I could see that a desperate change was taking place. I warned my friends in London and Paris but failed to convince them that something should be done to avert another war.

One of the most significant things I noticed, month after month, was the hiking hordes of youths, from sixteen to twenty-one, moving from village to village. In the year 1925 I must have seen from thirty to forty of these bands on the road or in a small town cleaning up. All were dressed in shorts and wore heavy hobnailed shoes—both girls and boys. They carried knapsacks and staffs. They lived from hand to mouth, but a more cheerful lot of wayfarers one could not wish to meet. There was always someone in the group who could speak English fluently, and willingly he or she would chat about their condition and life in the open.

I spoke to my friends in Munich about these hikers, but they knew little or nothing about them. I was told there was not much of that taking place in Bavaria. There had been few changes there. The people, however, were poor, and many of my old friends connected with the opera, the theater, and painting were gone. Twenty years had passed since my first visit there to see the opening of the new Festspielhaus. Strange to say, nobody spoke much of political disturbances, but some told me Marxism was making rapid strides among the poorer people. I realized that was to be expected, for the repressions of the Treaty of Versailles and the stupidity of Allied statesmen were creating the mobs that would be easily infected with the virus of Marx.

I have not been able to explain to myself or to anyone else why I knew so little about the Hitler movement in the years between November, 1923, when his followers
were shot in the courtyard of the War Office in Munich, and the time while he was writing in prison the first volume of *Mein Kampf*. There had been so many revolts after the close of the war that perhaps I thought the Munich revolution was just one more like those that had petered out in Berlin. I do not remember hearing much about Hitler then; certainly nothing of a nature that would rivet my attention.

Three years after his first volume was published, I thought so little of the remarks of my friends in Germany about it that I was not prompted to inquire for a translation. Truth to tell, I did not read it in its entirety until the only unexpurgated version in English was produced in the United States, in 1939. Translations of the work began to appear after 1933, but very soon it was rumored that these were not complete. I read a copy of one of them, but when a German-American friend told me it was not a reliable translation, I put it aside. It was a version of the work to be read as the editor of it desired.

However, there was so much bitter controversy against what had appeared that I thought I had better defer judgment until I could study the whole book. Nevertheless, I do remember I was amazed to find it praised extravagantly by one section of readers and bitterly denounced by another. Then people who had not read it, but had seen some of the controversies about it published in the newspapers, began to make translations of their own, and as collaborators they inserted statements which became current in the gossip about the work.

When the unexpurgated edition appeared in English, the inventions of those who had not read the former editions had too long a start to be overtaken by Ludwig Lore’s excellent translation; and to this day these stories linger in the minds of the majority of British and American people. The translator of the unexpurgated version has been roundly condemned by unprejudiced students for his preface. It undoubtedly shows on which
side of the fence he stands. As a Jew, he naturally resents Hitler’s idea of a superior race, and that disposition colors a great many of his fulminations in the preface. But this must be said to his credit: nowhere in the book itself does he attempt to direct the mind of the reader, either in a parenthetical passage or in a footnote. He leaves his translation free of editorial comment.

As a matter of record, however, it was not any part of the doctrine expressed in Mein Kampf that stirred the statesmen of the Western Allies to action. It was the success of Hitler’s experiment in Germany. Indeed, it was not a statesman who began the crusade against Hitler; it was a New York lawyer who had never contested a seat for Congress.

I fully appreciate the difficulties one must encounter in making an attempt to put known facts in their order and present a view of the case that is contrary to popular notion. I remember what happened to such attempts in Britain, in the United States, and in France after the First World War. Like a formidable redoubt stand those who have been hoodwinked by propaganda. They take pride in maintaining their delusions and frown upon anyone who would deprive them of them. Members of legislatures told me after World War I that they did not wish to go into the matter of the causes of the war or who was to blame for it. I met in Italy, in 1925, two peers who had been members of the House of Commons, who could not bear to hear the matter referred to.

But the greatest obstacle one has to surmount is the reviewer who must consider the editorial policy of his paper. Perhaps I have known more of these people intimately than any man who is not a practical journalist. I pity many of them who do not like the job of giving scant notice to works which privately they consider worthy of serious study. But the-press is the press, and the chief thing to be considered is the effect that fair criticism of such works will have upon advertisers. No paper can afford to set up the backs of the men who make
publication possible. There have been some few instances of newspaper proprietors overriding their objections, but in the main the prosperity of a newspaper depends upon those who advertise.

Some papers permit popular columnists to print what is in their minds without fear of resentment from their advertisers. They serve a useful purpose, and very often information comes to light that would have no chance whatever of appearing in a book review or in an editorial.

Here it should be clearly understood that the propaganda given out under the official stamp during a war sinks in at a time of severe distress, and it is very difficult indeed to eradicate it when the conflict ends. The person who is not susceptible to the deleterious effect of such propaganda must have a tough spirit and a clear head.

He has a hard road to travel during a war. The patriots look upon him with disfavor, and if he should make a remark that questions the wisdom of the affair, somebody is sure to think that he is in the pay of the enemy. Men have been lodged in prison without charge for consorting with people who were under suspicion. Men who have had the courage to voice their opinions from the platform have been hounded by the riffraff of freelance journalism. It is not necessary to recall the names of the men who, with the consent of the governments, suffered persecution at the hands of persons who were well paid for the job of smearing them. The smear campaign in America was one of the most disgraceful proceedings of World War II.

Now that the fighting is over for a while, these animosities should be forgotten and attention should be paid to the problem of how another war is to be averted. Never was it so difficult to know what to do to keep the peace as it is at this time. One reason for this is that the mass of people do not take the trouble to learn what caused the other war. So long as they look to their
politicians for guidance, they will be left in the dark. That means they will have to find out for themselves. However, few will be inclined to make an effort to learn how they have been humbugged.

Somehow war-time myths sink deeper into the consciousness of a man than any that gain currency. They are poured into his mind day after day during the conflict, when he is totally unfitted, mentally and spiritually, to question them. Upon these myths his judgment is formed, and to give them up is like deserting an old friend who has aided him in distress. This may be the reason why it is so easy, generation after generation, for politicians to revive the old slogans and capture the intelligence of the people. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon us at this time to examine closely the myths of the last war and expose the methods by which they were implanted in the minds of the people.
VIII

Outstanding Problems in Europe

After the resumption of the old wars, interrupted in November, 1918, statesmen of all parties seemed to enter into competition for a prize to be given to the one who would be first to warn the people that it was to begin again. There were warnings enough, but the politicians had been misinformed to a man, and they ignored all those "croaking" prophets who, after the Treaty of Versailles, predicted another great conflict. They had had about twelve years, in and out of office, to rectify the injustices which many of them admitted were obvious in the treaty. Nothing was done, and often annoyance was shown by those at the head of the Allied Governments when suggestions of a practical nature were made to relieve the deepening distress of Central Europe.

However, all were agreed upon the necessity of defending themselves against unarmed Germany. Churchill, in the House of Commons, May 13, 1932, reminded the government about his remarks the year before, concerning the disarmament discussions at Geneva:

They have been a positive cause of friction and ill-will, and have given an undue advertisement to naval and military affairs. They have concentrated the attention of Governments in all countries, many of them without the slightest reason for mutual apprehension or dispute, upon all sorts of hypothetical wars which certainly will never take place.

A statesman out of office is a very different person from one in office. When he is on the opposition bench,
he has a feeling of freedom and enjoys a lack of administrative responsibility. The same man holding a Cabinet position is quite another person, for he is not free—not by any means; and so long as he remains there, he is bound, hand and foot, by the policy of the government of which he is a member.

Should a taxpayer care to understand this difference, he might take up a book of speeches put together by Churchill’s son, Randolph, and there he will find this astonishing difference which I have pointed out before Notwithstanding his attitude taken in 1931—eighteen months before Hitler assumed control in Germany—Churchill was busy enough tilting at the MacDonald disarmament plan, criticizing severely the air defenses, and sometimes touching upon an injustice of the Treaty of Versailles. In the debate on the adjournment, April 13, 1933, he said:

... Many people would like to see, or would have liked to see a little while ago—I was one of them—the question of the Polish Corridor adjusted. For my part, I should certainly have considered that to be one of the greatest practical objectives of European peace-seeking diplomacy. ... (While England Slept)

I find no reference, in his speeches delivered while he was in office, to the Polish Corridor or to any of the other stupid arrangements the treaty imposed on a defeated foe. A long book could be written upon the difference between Mr. Churchill in office and out of office. But it would be an easy matter, if one had leisure, to take any of the statesmen of our time and show that the political mind is built on shifting sands. The warning of the hour is often submerged by the calm incoming sea of the morrow. Everything depends upon how the domestic tide is running.

There were warnings—very definite ones—based on firsthand information, which went practically unnoticed for years. I do not refer to the so-called "croakings" of
the revisionists that were heard on every hand for five years after the treaty was signed at the point of a gun. I have perhaps a dozen books written not by statesmen but by men eminently fitted to investigate the political and economic conditions of Europe before Hitler became Führer. Here I shall deal with only one. It is called Thunder Over Europe, and its writer is Colonel E. Alexander Powell, an American soldier, who before the war saw more of all the countries of Europe than anyone who has recorded his impressions.

The work was published in the United States in April, 1931. To what extent it was read, I do not know, nor do I know if an English edition was issued. Even today, it is an amazing document, and as a warning to the governments of what was likely to take place if practical measures were not instituted to heal the sores of Europe, there is nothing to be compared with it. The author takes in hand nearly all the important crises in each country, which statesmen of the period were afraid to examine. So conscious were they of the gravity of their own stupidities that they had not the courage to admit them and face the consequences. British statesmen, in dealing with Hitler’s entry into the Rhineland, conveniently overlooked Poincaré’s invasion of the Ruhr. Colonel Powell describes the consequence of that reckless blunder in a short paragraph:

Then came the invasion of the Ruhr. To that adventure, engineered by the vindictive and relentless Poincaré, might aptly be applied the cynical words of Talleyrand: “It was worse than a crime; it was a mistake.” It gained nothing for France; it did much to alienate English sympathy; it all but completed the wreck of Germany; and it set back the hands of Franco-German understanding by many years.

I think Powell was the first man to take the Nazi movement seriously. His chapter on it is prophetic, and his estimate of Hitler and the task that faced him is correct. The chapter is full of warning, and it must
have been written quite two years before Hitler won his victory at the polls. It appeared in print at a time when the comic cartoonists and the silly penmen were giving an utterly false impression to the people about the man who, in eight years, was to turn the world upside down. Powell said: "The inescapable fact remains that the Nazis must be reckoned with whether the rest of the world likes it or not."

As I shall have something to say about Germany rearming, it is appropriate that I should refer to the respective figures of forces and equipment of France and Germany, taken from The Statesman's Year-Book for 1930. In some very instructive passages upon the attitude of the average German, Powell says that in voting for the Nazi party, he did so because it was "the only way open to him to register his dissatisfaction with the prevailing disorder of things." He then goes on to say that this average German

refuses to believe that the French stand in perpetual fear of another German onslaught. Fully aware of the defenseless and enfeebled condition of his own country and the overwhelming military strength of France, the very idea is to him preposterous.

And it must seem equally preposterous to anyone who compares the military establishments of the two nations.

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<tr>
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<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry regiments</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aviation squadrons</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balloon companies</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total peace establishment</td>
<td>541,154 men</td>
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"The trouble with France," a distinguished American soldier remarked to me not long ago, "is that she is suffering from an inferiority complex."
The ground covered by Powell in his peregrinations extended from Russia to France and from the Balkans to the North Sea. In each country visited, he met officials and diplomats. He names about a dozen of these men to whom he was indebted for information. While statesmen were confined to their bureaus and diplomats inured in the chancelleries, depending upon information gathered secondhand, Powell was coming face to face in the separate States with the actual contingencies of their policies. In the foreword, he denounces forthrightly the system that makes for friction and animosity:

The most discouraging feature of the whole business is the moral cowardice and lack of vision of the European statesmen, who, with a few notable exceptions, are only politicians, and of mediocre intellectual caliber at that. They are cowards because they are afraid of public opinion. That is, they are afraid of losing votes. They have neither the unselfishness nor the moral courage to avert war by backing down.

What Europe needs, and needs desperately, is a political housecleaning. She should sweep out her hidebound diplomats and professional politicians and replace them with experienced, hard-headed business men who recognize the value of compromise, who know how to give and take, who think that maintaining the balance of power is not nearly so important as balancing the budget. "Votes be damned!" such men would say. "Let's get together and work out an arrangement which will be reasonably fair to everyone concerned." That would end the danger of war overnight.

So long as the diplomatic system exists, there will be trouble. In private, this has been admitted by the diplomats themselves. One has only to read Dr. Moritz Busch's books on Bismarck to realize that his master had nothing but contempt for them. Disraeli, too, was not backward in expressing himself severely upon their shortcomings. Someone said, after the First World War, that if consuls could take the place of diplomats, most of the differences that cause war could be settled over a cup of tea. This I believe to be
true. A round table of business men of the various States concerned in the crisis would be an effective way of bringing them face to face and putting a stop to the dispatching business.

One thing is certain now—there is no way of checking the information sent by ambassadors to their Foreign Ministers. The colored books of the First World War, when carefully analyzed, revealed an almost unbelievable abundance of downright mendacity. Dispatches were mutilated—some of them faked—others omitted; secret treaties unearthed; and when the Bolsheviks published the versions they found in the Russian archives, a conspiracy was revealed which made a dreadful smell.

The agitation for open diplomacy, which followed the Treaty of Versailles, petered out unfortunately, and those in the various countries who had worked to give the people accurate information became immersed in the domestic political broils of their own States. An excellent organization in Britain dissolved when most of the men who had been working along non-party lines joined the Socialist party. Herbert Morrison and Clement Attlee, among dozens of others, lamented that they had been misinformed, and newspaper editors admitted they had lied to their readers because the country was in danger and the morale of the people had to be sustained.

Was there ever a more ignominious example of the danger of this system than the one of Woodrow Wilson admitting before the Senate that he knew nothing of the secret treaties? In October, 1939, Vandenberg, referring to World War I, told the Senate:

Before we ever fired a shot, the spoils of our joint victory had been pre-pledged in sordid, secret treaties concerning which neither our people nor even our Congress knew a single thing. It was a "shell-game" in more than one meaning of that phrase.
Abolish diplomatists and appoint consuls, business men, and they will be interested chiefly in the balance of revenue in the taxpayers’ pockets and not the balance of power. But it will take an informed public to bring about such a change. So long as taxpayers are satisfied with the present system, they will be sacrificed on the battlefield, and those who survive will have to pay the cost and be glad to get a ration ticket for a meal.
IX

German Rearmament

Mr. Churchill wrote a letter to himself on May 1, 1936, which will be found in his book, *Step by Step*. This is entitled, "How Germany is Arming," and in it he says: "I give my warnings, as I have given some before. I do not deal in vague statements. I offer facts and figures which I believe to be true."

He then asks the question: "How much is the Hitler regime spending upon armaments?" His reply to his own question is: "I declared several months ago that Germany spent upwards of £800,000,000 sterling on warlike preparation in the calendar year 1935 alone."

Now it must be remembered that this letter was not made public in America until the war began. The preface to the book is dated by the author May 21, 1939. When it was read by intelligent persons, it caused some consternation because the ordinary expenditure of the United Kingdom for the year 1934-35 amounted to £688,879,000.

When I read this letter, a few days after it was published, I searched in vain for the declaration he said he had made "several months ago." I could not find it in any of his speeches. How, within two short years, a bankrupt country like Germany could find such a sum of money to spend on "warlike preparation" was a miracle unknown in the world of wild finance.

Now by the time that he published these letters to himself, he had had ample leisure to check his figures. Had he been careful enough to do this, he would have
discovered from many sources that the money was not spent on "warlike preparation." In the report he took from the Bulletin of the Reichskredit Gesellschaft, issued at the end of 1935, it is stated that the expenditure was for buildings, equipment and stores, less amounts spent on residential buildings. There is nothing to justify the assumption that the whole, or even half, of this sum was spent upon armaments.

Toward the end of this letter, he gives the German imports, since 1932, of raw materials used for the making of munitions, and he says:

All this has gone into making the most destructive war weapons and war arrangements that have ever been known; and there are four or five millions of active, intelligent, valiant Germans engaged in these processes, working, as General Goering has told us, night and day.

It must be remembered that this was written to himself, and doubtless the information he gave to himself convinced him that Germany, laboriously emerging from bankruptcy, was dead set on another war. Perhaps that was the reason why he badgered Prime Minister Baldwin and other men in his Cabinet about the state of the British military, naval and air forces, without any reference at all to the armaments of France and the Little Entente. Curiously enough, seventeen months later, when Germany had more cause to arm than she had in 1935, Churchill wrote to himself: "I declare my belief that a major war is not imminent, and I still believe there is a good chance of no major war taking place again in our time."

A taxpayer wishing to understand the vagaries of the mind of a statesman should not miss reading the letters in Step by Step. It is a difficult job trying to follow Mr. Churchill's in-and-out reasoning and to reconcile his assumptions with the knowledge we now possess. He runs the gamut of contradiction, and as a political historian of events since World War I, his presentation
of facts and his errors of judgment have already been severely criticized. Of course, now—long after these events—we can quote facts and figures from unprejudiced investigators which flatly contradict many of the statements in Churchill’s books and speeches.

Let us take a volume published in 1937, about two years before the war began, written by a man who made it his special business to live in Germany from November, 1935 to March, 1937. This work is The House that Hitler Built, written by Professor Stephen H. Roberts of the University of Sydney, Australia. He tells us in the preface:

Owing to a fortunate conjunction of circumstances, I was afforded unusual facilities in Germany. The Nazi authorities did everything possible to aid my investigations, although they knew from the outset that my attitude was one of objective criticism. Indeed, they had even filed copies of all my articles and summaries of my wireless and other talks on Germany over a period of years. Despite this, no request of mine was too much for them, and the only refusal I encountered in the whole of Germany was in being denied access to their collection of banned literature.

Roberts declares himself to be a democratic individualist, and there is no doubt that his skepticism of the apparent success of the Nazi movement was unshaken during the period when he visited Germany. And yet, he is eminently fair in showing gratitude to the people who gave him the opportunity to further his quests. He says:

I must also pay tribute to the ordinary people of Germany who made my investigations such a great pleasure. Although we motored many thousands of miles through every German province but one, and although we showed what must often have been a disconcerting persistence in trying to find out what tinker and worker, professor and farmer thought, we met not the slightest discourtesy and found everywhere a striking eagerness for friendship with Great Britain.
It is interesting to read the information presented by Professor Roberts on the position of Hitler’s army at the time when Mr. Churchill said Germany had spent £800,000,000 sterling on “making the most destructive war weapons and war arrangements that have ever been known.” Roberts tells us that von Seeckt did not want a national levy of men, that he preferred a relatively small professional army. The idea of expanding the army to 600,000 men in 1935 caused dissatisfaction among the General Staff. Perhaps this marks the beginning of the troubles that arose between Hitler and some of his generals. The situation described by Roberts at that time is so unlike anything Churchill had in mind that I must quote two paragraphs:

Their [the General Staff’s] problem was a difficult one—to change a specialized army of 100,000 men enlisted for twelve years into a national force of 600,000 conscripts forced to serve for a year or two. The necessary cadres could not be built up in a moment, and, even when the organization was provided, there was a shortage of everything—arms, equipment, officers, barracks. The greatest difficulty was the shortage of instructors, especially in the new aerial and mechanized units. At one stage, aeroplanes were lying idle for lack of trained pilots, because, despite Göring’s efforts, Germany had been so poverty-stricken for years that there were few civilian pilots on whom to draw.

It became obvious, then, that it would take years to give practical effect to the law of March 16th. The thirty-six divisions did not exist even on paper when Hitler issued his decree on May 21st, and it was not until the misty morning of November 7th, 1935, almost eight months after Hitler’s first announcement, that the first conscripts were called up and the new Nazi war-flag hoisted for the first time. . . .

This statement from an unprejudiced observer can scarcely be reconciled with Churchill’s notions of what was taking place. But suppose there were some truth in what he said. It might be asked: “Why was she arming?” You can examine Churchill’s speeches and writings under a microscope, and you will not find a sentence
devoted to the reasons why Germany was preparing to defend herself. Think of the war preparations of her neighbors!

Here are figures taken from the League of Nations Armaments Year Book for the year 1936: the total German war strength was 3,650,000; the Little Entente, including Rumania, Poland, Jugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia—all pledged by treaty—amounted to 7,000,000 men; to this enormous war strength of the Little Entente should be added 6,900,000 for France.

Professor Roberts tells us that "France and Czechoslovakia, feeling themselves threatened by Germany's new foreign policy, signed pacts with Russia (May 2nd and 16th, 1935)." This meant that Germany was completely encircled. Of course, it is not quite polite to ask why Germany should not arm while the Little Entente, along with Russia, was arming to the teeth.

Another question that may be resented by the thoughtless is: Why should not Hitler break treaties when the Allies did so? Why anyone should expect Hitler to submit like a plaster saint to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and its injustices has never been explained. He did not roam the Elysian fields; he lived in a political world, and knew what others had done and were doing.

The taxpayer who really desires information about the events prior to the outbreak of war should seek it in as many sources as are open to him. The day is gone when the war patriot can sniff, snort, and then denounce a man for quoting from anything but his own official record. There are now open to the inquirer hundreds of books dealing with the years 1932-1939, if the taxpayer has the desire to look at them. Professor Roberts' work should be studied closely because it was written by an eyewitness. Another one by an eyewitness is Hitler Germany by Cesare Santoro, a foreign press correspondent who made a prolonged stay in Germany. In speaking of himself and his colleagues in Berlin, he says:
The present international situation, which is so complicated and uncertain and full of perils, imposes on every journalist who is conscious of his mission the duty of devoting his whole strength to the work of mutual enlightenment, of removing as far as possible all cause of friction based on misunderstanding between nations. It is his duty to encourage mutual comprehension founded on the notion of a real international community.

Unlike Professor Roberts, the democratic individualist, Santoro seems to me to be in sympathy with the domestic aims of Hitler. His name leads one to think he might have been an Italian Fascist. No matter what his political opinions were, his book is filled with essential information. The first edition appeared in Berlin, in 1937, and I daresay a translation of it never reached the English masses. But one was issued in America in 1939—too late to have any effect.

Historically this book is invaluable. The statistics alone are worth preserving. To read the story of the reconstruction of the Wehrmacht (the totality of Germany’s fighting forces) is most enlightening, to say the least. I have looked in vain in other works to find a statement as clear and as reliable as the one provided by Santoro. Many will be surprised to learn the following:

A few days after the announcement of Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in October, 1933, the Reich Government proposed in a Memorandum that Germany should be authorised to maintain an Army of 300,000 men. On the basis of a British Memorandum of January 22, 1934, which was presented simultaneously in Berlin, Paris, Rome, Brussels, and Warsaw, direct negotiations in view of an agreement concerning armaments took place repeatedly. The British Memorandum welcomed Hitler’s proposals on the ground that they not only deals with technical questions of disarmament, but also with the question of political guarantees against aggression.

But already on March 17, the French Government, in its reply to the British Memorandum, expressed a number of reservations regarding Germany’s proposal. A second note of
The French Government of April 17 declared further negotiations on the subject to be useless. (Italics mine)

There are books enough to enlighten men who wish to be enlightened, and in my library there must be fully a dozen written by British authors during the six years before the war began, which contain information never touched upon in the debates in the House of Commons, or mentioned in Mr. Churchill's letters to himself. There is no reason now why anyone who wishes to know should remain in ignorance of the chief causes of the war.

In America, a staff study, made under the direction of Major-General C. F. Robinson, was published in October, 1947. In reviewing this work, Hanson W. Baldwin, the military correspondent of The New York Times, said in that paper, on May 8, 1948:

German industry and German aircraft production facilities—contrary to official and popular impression—were not by any means fully mobilized for war when Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, according to a comprehensive official study and report prepared for the Secretary of the Army.

The work is called, "Foreign Logistical Organizations and Method." It is an astonishing analysis of the British and German production of war machines:

The report reveals that in 1938 Germany produced only 3,340 combat aircraft, or 5,235 aircraft of all types, including trainers and non-combat types. In 1939, when Britain was producing 8,000 military aircraft of all types, combat and non-combat, Germany produced only 4,733 combat planes, or 8,295 of all airplane types, including civil aircraft.

The report is far too long to be dealt with adequately here, but it will certainly surprise a good many people to learn that

... Germany was not prepared in 1939—contrary to democratic assumption—for a long war or for total war; her eco-
nomic and industrial effort was by no means fully harnessed: her factories were not producing war materiel at anything like top capacity.

The report shows that Germany in the four months after the war started, produced only 247 tanks and self-propelled guns, when the British produced 314 tanks. In *The Gathering Storm*, Churchill writes:

> It is probable that in this last year before the outbreak, Germany manufactured at least double, and possibly treble, the munitions of Britain and France put together, and also that her great plants for tank production reached full capacity.

Still, it may be said that Mr. Churchill is not the first statesman to make the taxpayer’s flesh creep by producing figures of munitions that did not exist. Similar statements were made during the Boer War and in the First World War. Taxpayers over the age of fifty will remember the Mulliner scandal and the false reports made by that gentleman, which brought about the naval panic of 1908.

Other investigations by soldiers and sailors of authority also take sharp issue with Churchill on Germany’s preparations for war. These are to be found in the war stories of the campaigns, written by men who took part in the conflict.

Let us now take a glance at what was happening in England two or three years after Hitler came to power. I have several books written by British authors during that period, and the history that they set out is most illuminating. Take one at random, for it covers much of the ground the others traverse; indeed, it is typical of the opinion of many who took time off to observe events and form their own judgment of the political tendencies of men of affairs. *Left Wings Over Europe* by Wyndham Lewis was published in June, 1936. In the foreword he tells us:
There are some people who consider that the only way to attain to a good peace (and there is no one who would be so mad as to say that this is a good peace) is to have another good war. We must have another, bigger and better, war....

Stanley Baldwin was Prime Minister, but Churchill was not in his Cabinet. To think of plain Stanley, the mild ironmaster of Bewdley, in the armor of Mars is enough to make anyone who knew him smile. And to see him on the war-path, brandishing a scabbard, when the vast majority of the subjects of his country wished to live in peace, is mirth provoking, to say the least. However, it was not so funny as it appeared. In fact, Baldwin meant business, although his forces were not prepared to carry it out. Wyndham Lewis says:

As far as Great Britain is concerned, there is, in 1935, not a shadow of reason for war with anybody—Hun, Yank, Chink, or Frog. It is because there is no concrete reason whatever, that abstract reasons have had to be thought up and trotted out.

Strange as this statement must read to men of today, it really does describe the position in England for the years after Hitler became Führer. Not only was there no reason for a war; there was really no valid reason why there should not be peace, for Hitler had offered to the powers the most comprehensive scheme for peace in Europe that had ever been devised. This gesture served only to infuriate those who were looking for war. Of course, it was annoying for the leading politicians in Britain to learn that Hitler was solving the unemployment problem and putting the people of his country on their industrial feet again.

All these reforms meeting with success in Germany, at a time when financial and industrial affairs in England were traveling a rough road, provoked the leading statesmen on the Treasury bench and made them realize their efforts to solve Britain’s problems were somewhat futile. Hitler’s successes got under the skin of Baldwin
and Churchill, and the Führer became, from that time forth, the figure upon whom the warmongers volleyed their fiery orations.

Wyndham Lewis tells us that Churchill's speeches were like putting a pistol to the head of a great neighboring State, and that his unceasing attacks upon Germany were deliberate. It is remarkable that Baldwin and Churchill seemed bent upon saying everything they could to irritate Hitler, when he was exerting all his power to keep the peace. This was the position two years before Munich.

In My New Order Roussy de Sales gives us most of Hitler's speech on his peace proposals. The date is May 21, 1935. Toward the close of that remarkable appeal to the powers, he said: "Whoever lights the torch of war in Europe can wish for nothing but chaos."

The press reports, with few exceptions, were favorable. Le Temps said: "Now every government concerned must weigh its responsibilities in the light of the policy Germany has announced and reaffirmed."

*The Times:*

... The speech turns out to be reasonable, straightforward and comprehensive. ... There are no greater enemies to the peace of Europe than those who would spread an atmosphere of suspicion about an important and long-awaited pronouncement of this kind. ... 

Then one of the most interesting bits of information appears in this editorial of *The Times*, indicating quite clearly that there were people flatly opposed to the suggestions of the Führer:

In the present case the mere probability that Herr Hitler's attitude might on the whole be conciliatory and pacific has led in the last few days to a good deal of interested propaganda to the effect that any olive branch from such a quarter must be poisoned and that any pleas from Germany for a respite from competition in armaments can only mean that its author is not yet ready
for war. Even if this view were well founded at this moment it will be a crime against peace to make it the basis of a permanent policy. (Italics mine)

The New York Times would have no truck with Hitler, and treated his offers contemptuously. The usual reason for doing this was that he had scrapped the treaties. But that is just what he said he would do. His fixed policy was to repudiate the Treaty of Versailles, but millions of British people were in favor of doing this before they ever heard the name of Hitler. Indeed, Ramsay MacDonald advised the electors that, if he were a German, he would never subscribe to its provisions.

The proletarian who really desires to know how he was tricked should keep in mind, while reading the comments which precede the speeches in My New Order, the important fact that the editor (writing about 1940) was influenced by the events then taking place. The Low Countries had been overrun and France had been conquered; so it seems natural that a French correspondent would show his resentment.

Writing about the plebiscite in the Saar, January 13, 1935, de Sales says:

Now that the world has been conditioned—so to speak—to Hitler’s technique of violating all engagements and breaking his own pledges with an absolute cynicism, it is difficult to recapture the astonishment and indignation which spread through the pre-war world when Hitler first gave proof of his faithlessness. . . .

What such a comment has to do with anything that took place in January, 1935, no one can say, but this is the way that history generally has been put together by the journalists. De Sales makes no reference to the French march into the Ruhr, for which Poincaré was censured by the majority of the British and American people. That was one of the most unpopular acts of the period.
Moreover, it is not for de Sales to talk about faithlessness on the part of Hitler. When an author sets out to publish the speeches of a politician, he ought to draw the reader's attention to those from which he deletes large sections. Take a flagrant example of omitting a most important statement given by Hitler to the Reichstag, in March, 1936. The subject was the military alliances made by France before the conclusion of the Locarno Treaty.

A lengthy summary of this speech appeared in the Evening Standard. Hitler pointed out that, before the Locarno Treaty, France had signed military alliances with Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Germany accepted them without challenge, for she believed they were of a purely defensive character. Then France constructed great fortifications along her frontier and concentrated enormous numbers of troops there. Germany had no aggressive intentions and raised no objections. Meanwhile, France made another military treaty with the Soviet Union, and before this was consummated, Germany was hemmed in by France, Great Britain, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

It should be remembered that this statement was made in March, 1936. Hitler pointed out that the Allied Powers had broken the Locarno Treaty and that he was justified in going into the Rhineland. Had he reason to fear the war preparations of what Lloyd George called "the circle of death," which Germany saw taking shape all round her borders? What politician of an armed power would have been indifferent to this terrific gathering of warlike forces? What would Mr. Baldwin or Mr. Churchill have done, had one or the other been in Hitler's shoes? Would he have watched the assembly of such strength and have taken with equanimity the sinister threat all these preparations signified? I doubt it.

All Mr. Churchill could say to the signatories of the Locarno Treaty was that they should take their com-
plaints to the League of Nations. Had he been in Hitler’s position, he would have said that this was adding insult to injury.

The French occupation of the Rhineland was not forgotten. The horror of what the Black or Brown troops of France did there so shocked the Rhineland Commissioner of the United States, Mr. Pierrepont B. Noyes, that he wrote in his book, *While Europe Waits for Peace*:

\[\ldots\text{During the 14 months in which I worked as a member of the Rhineland Commission, I became daily more shocked that any responsible man should be willing to curse the world with such a hatred and war breeding institution as this.}\ldots\]

He denounced it as a hostile military occupation and said that from his personal observation it was brutal, provocative, and a continuation of the war.

However, in all such matters as these, the other side has no case. The evidence that abounds in book after book—much of it written by observers on the spot—was ignored by the peace-loving statesmen of the western powers. I wrote at the time, “These chickens will come home to roost,” and now the powers know they did so with a vengeance.
Who Makes Wars?

Wars have a long beginning before the first shot is fired by a soldier. Indeed, the invasion of a country follows several years after political and diplomatic proceedings have prepared the ground for it. No one can deny that the work of the chancelleries has been largely responsible for the conflicts that have taken place in this century. On November 26, 1912, an editorial writer of The Times, in a lucid moment, asked the direct question: "Who, then, makes war?" We should consider his reply gravely:

... The answer is to be found in the Chancelleries of Europe, among the men who have too long played with human lives as pawns in a game of chess, who have become so enmeshed in formulas and the jargon of diplomacy that they have ceased to be conscious of the poignant realities with which they trifle. And thus will war continue to be made, until the great masses who are the sport of professional schemers and dreamers say the word which will bring, not eternal peace, for that is impossible, but a determination that wars shall be fought only in a just and righteous and vital cause.

In searching for someone upon whom we may place the blame for preparing the ground for World War II, we can ignore the statesmen then in power in all countries, pass by the chancelleries of the capitals of Europe, and reject all the theories of the broadcasters. The man who made the first call to arms was neither a statesman nor a diplomatist. He was a New York lawyer, Samuel Untermeyer, who presided over the World Jewish Economic Federation at Amsterdam in the summer of 1933.
The declared purpose of the conference was "to rescue 600,000 Jews residing in Germany."

When Untermeyer returned to America, he said in a broadcast, published in full by The New York Times, August 7, 1933:

I deeply appreciate your enthusiastic greeting on my arrival today, which I quite understand is addressed not to me personally but to the holy war in the cause of humanity in which we are embarked. Jews and non-Jews alike, for we are equally concerned that the work of centuries shall not be undone, and that civilization shall not be allowed to die. (Italics mine)

In this address Untermeyer stated, "The Jews are the aristocrats of the world," and he called for an "economic boycott against all German goods, shipping and services."

It will seem strange to an English reader that a New York lawyer, although he had acted as president of a very important conference, would have the influence to call the people of America to fight a "holy war" against any State. One reason why he might think it strange is that he does not know America. Another is that he seems to be totally ignorant of the underground forces that work havoc with States.

Just over 100 years ago Disraeli pointed out that strange people had power to direct the actions of governments. Sidonia, one of the characters in his novel, says: "So you see, my dear Coningsby, the world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes."

Untermeyer was so much behind the scenes that he stood in the prompt entrance and rang up the curtain on the tragedy which, six years later, was to embroil the nations of the world in utter disaster. His campaign was really started in April, 1933, when it was launched unofficially at a meeting to dedicate a memorial theater as part of the Hebrew University in Palestine.
It took a few weeks, however, to work up the propaganda to fever heat, and it was not until he made his radio speech in August that some people in America realized that Untermyer seemed bent upon provoking a war. He tried to whip up the general interest by telling of the "fiendish torture, cruelty and persecution that are being inflicted day by day upon these men, women and children," and saying that when their full story was known it would present a picture "so fearful in its barbarous cruelty that the hell of war and the alleged Belgian atrocities will pale into insignificance as compared to this devilishly, deliberately, cold-bloodedly planned and already partially executed campaign for the extermination of a proud, gentle, loyal, law-abiding people."

Not a few Jews found these and many other statements far too strong for them to swallow. They were so startling that some American associations set to work and made direct inquiries. Judge John Payne, chairman of the American Red Cross and of the League of Red Cross Societies, had received an unsolicited report from the German Red Cross, which said:

... The reports of atrocities which have been spread abroad for reasons of political propaganda are in no way in accordance with the facts. Arbitrary and unauthorized acts, a few of which occurred in the first days of the national revolution, have been effectively stopped by energetic measures on the part of the government.

The Central Union of German Citizens of Jewish Faith had issued a long statement on March 25, 1933. Referring to the stories of atrocities published in the newspapers, it declared:

All such reports are pure inventions. The Central Union states emphatically that German Jewry cannot be held responsible for these inexcusable distortions which deserve the severest condemnation.
Chambers of Commerce and other societies in Germany sent similar denials to America. All these can be found in The New York Times, which newspaper during the year 1933 printed more stories about Untermyer than it did about Hitler.

To whose advantage was it that so many newspapers in the world published these reports and very seldom found room for denials? The cautious Jew in America, who was despised by Untermyer, became suspicious. Some of them protested against his stories of atrocities. The situation was then so serious that Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, communicated with the American Embassy in Berlin and asked for a report. In a statement issued March 27, 1933, Hull announced:

A reply has now been received indicating that whereas there was for a short time considerable physical mistreatment of Jews, this phase may be considered virtually terminated. ... Hitler in his capacity as a leader of the Nazi party, issued an order calling upon his followers to maintain law and order, to avoid molesting foreigners, disrupting trade, and to avoid the crisis of possible embarrassing international incidents.

In the autumn of 1933 there were many in Washington who knew that strange forces were at work. No one could say exactly what they were or how they exerted their power.

It serves no purpose at all to trace back the history of this matter from the year 1945 to 1933. The investigator must try to place himself in the position of a witness who watched the drama unfold from the time that Hitler became the head of the Reich and Roosevelt President of the United States. It is almost impossible for a mind packed with the dreadful stories of the war and the revelations of the Nuremberg trials to do this. The vision is blurred, and events are not seen in their sequence by him whose soul has been revolted by the history of the war itself. Difficult as such a process may be, it is necessary, if we are to know what to avoid in the future.
Now it would be absurd for anyone to think that Untermeyer was acting upon his own initiative. Those who knew him intimately in his domestic and business life would not choose him for the champion of a crusade. He was a man who loved his home, and home bodies are seldom given to stumping the country as rabblerousers. Rich as he was, his business interests were never dimmed, for they were vocation and avocation for him. Hence, the question that was asked by some of his friends: "Who has set Sam in motion?"

In America it is not unusual for shrewd observers of the political system to ask such questions. No one would doubt his belief in the stories of the ill-treatment of the Jews. But, as we all know, there is a certain type of mind that wants to believe in unauthenticated reports. Such persons studiously ignore information that contradicts what they believe. In Untermeyer's case, he rejected with contempt all the denials that came from Germany, and went so far as to say that the government forced people to make them. However, there was another source of information that he ignored, and that was the reports of unprejudiced persons, who had recently been in Germany. Not one I came in contact with denied the stories of ill-treatment of Jews, but each repudiated the notion that the government was responsible for the disorders.

In several of the large cities of America, similar occurrences had taken place. Some of the outrages perpetrated upon the Jews were of a shocking character. Yet, no one thought of calling for a boycott or a "holy war" against the instigators. Worse still, the attacks upon Negroes did not stir the Jews to indignation. The year 1933 in the United States was one of many riots and cruel outrages.

In reviewing the speeches that Hitler made during the first six months he was in power, I cannot find a single reference to the Jews. The investigator must go back to the early ones to find his bitter denunciation of
them. But little or no action was taken against him until the spring of 1933. The inference to be drawn from this is that as leader of the German people, he would have the power to carry out his threats. That may be one of the reasons why a "holy war" was to be waged against him.

In tracing the ammunition used by Untermyer at the beginning of his campaign, I find the following account of atrocities as early as March, 1933:

According to German newspaper accounts, certain foreign newspapers are disseminating reports alleging that the mutilated bodies of Jews are found regularly at the entrance to the Jewish cemetery at Weissee, a suburb of Berlin; that Jewish girls have been forcibly herded into public squares, and that hundreds of German Jews are arriving in Geneva, of whom nine-tenths, including many children, have been maltreated.

Now who were the people disseminating such horrible reports? Some organization must have had extraordinary power and influence to succeed in having stories of this character published, and must have known what would be the effect upon the readers of the journals that gave them space. Some of the leading newspapers published denials, but these were ignored by Untermyer. Even the circular issued by the Patriotic Society of National German Jews was scorned by those who were preparing for the "holy war." One paragraph from that circular is as follows:

Let us take an energetic stand against everybody attempting criminally to influence the shaping of Germany's future through foreign newspapers. If in the United States, Poland, Holland and other countries attempts are made by Jewish and non-Jewish circles to coerce the national government of Germany into any course of action or any omission, we, as Germans must oppose such blackmail attempts with the same decisiveness and intensity as any of our fellow non-Jewish countrymen.
How can it be explained that no reference is to be found in these grave matters in any of the speeches Hitler delivered at the time the atrocities were supposed to have taken place? There is no reference to them in the speech that he made on May 10, 1933 to the Congress of the German Work Front, nor is there a word to be found about Jews or atrocities in the address that he gave to the Reichstag one week later.

The effect of these stories in America was to create grave concern. According to The New York Times, the German Foreign Office issued the following statement:

In order to reassure the Jews of New York City who are anxious as to the fate of the Jews of Germany, we wish to state that the German Government is earnest and determined in its desire to guarantee safety and order for all its citizens, and it has no intention of making any unjustified experiments.

The date of this declaration is February 3, 1933, only four days after Hitler assumed the leadership in Germany.

Notwithstanding denials from German societies, Dr. Weizmann, at a dinner to the Friends of Palestine in the House of Commons, March 2, 1933, told the guests:

[The] economic and political existence of all Jews is imperiled by the policy which has inscribed anti-Semitism in its most primitive form as an essential part of its program.

One is amazed in searching through the articles published in The New York Times to learn how widespread this campaign was. It appeared like a carefully planned conspiracy in Britain and America, and the havoc that it wrought in the minds of the people was the cause of outbreaks in New York, London, and Paris. These were censorious demonstrations of an ugly character, in which were sown the seeds of war that came to maturity in September, 1939.

I know several Jews who left Germany—taking all their belongings with them—after Hitler came to power.
One was the head of a big German bank, whom I had known for many years. He told me in London, when I saw him last, he had not been molested, but that he felt there were evil times ahead and, for the sake of his family, he should take precautions. In America I met Germans who had gone back on visits, and I questioned them about the stories. They admitted unofficial outbreaks, such as those which had taken place in the United States, but nothing had occurred, they said, that gave any reason for the shocking reports appearing in the newspapers. It was a sad state of affairs, but it should be an example of prime importance of how those behind the scenes work their will.

The record shows clearly how the campaign made pace and how the governments in London and in Washington were affected by it. The demand for a boycott of German goods became insistent, and the American Federation of Labor called for one in October, 1933. It would be an exaggeration to say that the House of Commons was in sympathy with the campaign urged by Untermyer, but it is significant that Dr. Weizmann was entertained at dinner in March of that year by the Friends of Palestine in the Commons, when one hundred members were present. Those behind the scenes evidently had their tentacles stretched afar, and politicians of influence were caught in their clutches.

Many people will never be able to understand why a war was necessary to rescue the Jews in Germany. Russia had been at work exterminating people since the Revolution in 1917, without any "holy war" outcry against Lenin or Stalin. The concentration camps in Russia were as shocking as such places can be; yet, the British and the American Governments seemed to tolerate what was being done. There were men connected with the government at Washington who looked to Russia for lessons on how to remake the world, and Britain was not averse to wooing her as an ally. France had been successful in reaffirming the old Czarist treaties
and, as Britain was committed to France (and, therefore, indirectly to the Little Entente), there seemed to be no political reason why Russia should be ignored.

There were rumors that Russia had the greatest air force in Europe and that in case of war, she would keep the Germans busy in the east, thus making it easy for the French onslaught in the west.

The speeches of Mr. Churchill in 1933, some of which are given in *While England Slept*, are most instructive. One, delivered February 7th of that year, is entitled “Prepare!” He lamented the disarmament conference, which he considered had “become a cancer.” He referred to “the sudden uprush of Nazism in Germany, with the tremendous covert armaments which are proceeding there today.” It may be asked if such speeches make for peace.

In July of the following year, he delivered a speech on “The Value of the League.” It is a gem of Churchill’s method in opposition. In referring to Russia, there is not a point he raises in her favor that could not be extended to Germany. He said:

> ... I must say that I do not see how anyone who wishes to induce Germany to come back to the League, as she has a perfect right to do at any moment, can possibly find reasons for objecting to Russia also joining that body. The statement which the Foreign Secretary has made about the welcome which would be extended to Soviet Russia in the League of Nations is one about which there will be no dispute in this country, even among those who have the greatest prejudice against the political and social philosophy and system of government which the Russian people have, I will not say chosen for themselves, but found it necessary to adopt. (Italics mine)

Mr. Churchill’s mind is a puzzle. Yet, the House of Commons seemed to take him seriously. Maybe the members had lost their sense of humor in the fogs of foreign affairs. In extending a welcome to Soviet Russia to join the League of Nations, he must have forgotten that he had said:
Bolshevism is not a policy, it is a disease. It is not a creed, it is a pestilence. It presents the characteristics of a pestilence. It breaks out with great suddenness, it is violently contagious; it throws people into a frenzy of excitement; it spreads with extraordinary rapidity; the mortality is terrible.

When the "pestilence" did not fit into his design, it was fit to be quarantined. When he wished it to fit into his scheme of preparing for war, he disinfected it with rhetorical antitoxin.

There were some informed critics who firmly believed that Churchill knew the people behind the scenes who were looking for war. His friendship with Bernard Baruch was the cause of much suspicion. When the park-bench politician sailed for Europe, July 21, 1933, he told the press, "I am not going to London because if I did someone would twist it around and call me a delegate or something. On my way back I may call at London to see my old friend, Winston Churchill, but remember he is out of the government now."

The New York Times of September 10, 1933 informed us that Baruch kept his promise and that, at a dinner given by Churchill, there were "twenty-five guests, including such old friends as Mr. Baruch, the Duke of Marlborough, Lord Pembroke, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes; finance and industry were represented by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, who will soon go to Washington on the debt question, and Lord Melchett."

Now that might have been an innocent social gathering, having no ulterior purpose, but it would be hard to convince some of the critics of war policy that Baruch and Melchett were not affected by Samuel Untermeyer's campaign for a "holy war." Lord Melchett was one of the prime movers in the plan to develop the resources of the Dead Sea. Churchill was Colonial Minister when the grant to exploit them was given to Moise Novomeysky.

Roosevelt was inaugurated at the beginning of that sinister year, and he gathered about himself the most
curious set of reformers there is on record. They had remedies blueprinted for all the ills of society, which for three years had been struggling to emerge from the shocking depression. Reform after reform was launched on schemes that required enormous expenditures, but not a dent was made on unemployment. The make-work schemes were recruiting grounds for democratic votes, and became a laughing stock.

In Germany Hitler began his series of reforms with speed and certainty of touch. While Roosevelt and his Brain Trust were trying futile experiments, the totalitarians were working wonders in Germany. Such methods as Hitler practiced, of course, could not be tolerated in a democratic society, and the neo-liberals lamented grievously that men were not free to do as they liked. In three short years, this Austrian upstart, who had been the butt of the comic cartoonists for years, changed the whole outlook for the German people. Their triumph was so startling that Winston Churchill wrote, in Great Contemporaries: "Whatever else may be thought about these exploits, they are certainly among the most remarkable in the whole history of the world." The tribute was written in a work published in 1937.

I do not know to what extent this portrait of Hitler, penned by Churchill, has been read by the British people. Perhaps the time has come when a new edition would find many readers. The author says in a footnote that it was written in 1935, but the vast achievements to which he refers were not consummated at that time. It was quite two years later before the work that astonished everybody was near completion. Still, Churchill’s extraordinary tribute, penned early or late, is the most unusual one ever paid to the head of a foreign State.

In a passage exposing the follies of the French and British Governments during the years before Hitler took his place at the head of the Reich, Churchill says:

While all those formidable transformations were occurring in Europe, Corporal Hitler was fighting his long, wearing
battle for the German heart. The story of that struggle cannot be read without admiration for the courage, the perseverance, and the vital force which enabled him to challenge, defy, conciliate, or overcome, all the authorities or resistances which barred his path. He, and the ever-increasing legions who worked with him, certainly showed at this time, in their patriotic ardor and love of country, that there was nothing they would not do or dare, no sacrifice of life, limb or liberty that they would not make themselves or inflict upon their opponents.

Apart from Mein Kampf, there is no better source of information about the early campaigns of Hitler than the collection of his speeches in the work of Raoul de Roussy de Sales, called My New Order. It was published by Reynal and Hitchcock in 1941. These speeches explain the man and his mission. The book is now very difficult to obtain, and it is indispensable for the historian who will some day give us an accurate account of what took place in Germany during the years Hitler "was fighting his long, wearing battle for the German heart." Roussy de Sales was New York correspondent of the Paris Soir, and it is not surprising that his introduction and his comments given before the speeches reveal his utter dislike for everything that went by the name of Nazi. Here is an example of his critical method:

Hitler's speeches are no models of oratory. His German is sloppy and often full of grammatical errors. The sentences are long, full of clichés and bourgeois smugness. His voice is not pleasant and he often shouts himself hoarse. The substance of his speeches is usually confused and repetitious. Especially in his early years, his method consisted in repeating and rehashing indefinitely the same theories, in hurling the same accusations at his opponents, and in drowning his audience under an avalanche of words. In no other country but Germany, where orators are rare, could Hitlerian eloquence be tolerated by an average audience, with an average taste and an average endurance.

Yet, this extraordinary man performed the miracles that won the admiration of Churchill. The curious
thing about the criticism, quoted above, is that such an unattractive person should restore the self-confidence of the German people. However, it was not the first time that rough and ready eloquence and severe denunciation of opponents had stirred the masses. I remember the time when Lloyd George was held up to scorn as a tub-thumper and a rabble-rouser. Yet, no one appreciated his method of speech-making better than Hitler himself. In *Mein Kampf* he pays a glowing tribute to the Welsh crusader.

The speeches in Roussy de Sales’ volume begin in April, 1922 and end with the proclamation of June 22, 1941. Whether or not Hitler is worth consideration at this time, it is just as well for people in America and Great Britain to recognize the fact that the events that brought about the war cannot possibly be understood without the information contained in these speeches. Whether we like it or not, they set forth ideas that live and are of greater danger to the generations to come than all the atom bombs that can be manufactured by America and Russia. Indeed, compared with them, Fabianism, Communism, and Socialism are notions that come and go; that change from day to day; operations of expediency that are tried to fit the crisis of the hour. We would be precious fools to neglect to give them deep consideration now, for if a world depression takes place, another Hitler might arise and ask the people to support him to do what Adolf Hitler did. Let us remember Churchill’s words in *Step by Step*: “If our country were defeated, I hope we should find a champion as indomitable to restore our courage and lead us back to our place among the nations.”

Such an indomitable champion as Churchill hoped for might be a person with an unpleasant voice, shouting himself hoarse. It is just as well for us to recognize that the bureaucracies of the democratic systems are meat for totalitarian dictators. Who knew that fact better than the old Fabians? They knew how the vote could be
used. The vote did not save Germany from National Socialism of the Hitlerian brand. Truth to say, it does not matter much what you call your system. The important point is the operation of it—how, and with what effect, it works. When the workers are crushed under a load of debt and every effort they make is penalized by bureaucrats, the term "democracy" will not save them from the miseries of a depression. Desperate men, hungry and ill-clad, have always flocked to the banner of the man who promised them a loaf.
Totalitarian Experiments

During World War I, Lloyd George said it was impossible to argue with a cyclone. It was not an apt simile for the occasion, but it served his purpose. In North Wales cyclones are rare disturbances, but in America when one occurs, those who are able, make for the cellar, but folks who are in the open take what cover they can find. People who have witnessed the wreckage where there was once a community living under free conditions know that to re-establish order there must be totalitarian rule.

Usually a dictator appears and tells the people what they must do and what they must not do. Perhaps the Johnstown flood and the San Francisco earthquake are examples of totalitarian methods used to bring order out of chaos. Our sentimental liberals, with their contradictory notions of demanding the liberty of the individual, on the one hand, and of distributing sops of ameliorative legislation, on the other, are totally unfitted for such tasks.

In the First World War several European countries were visited by the cyclone Lloyd George had in mind. France, Belgium, Italy, and Austria felt the full force of the blast in several districts. The Balkans did not escape, and later, Russia was shaken by a fierce revolution. Allied countries have not yet recovered from the damage wrought by the first cyclone. They were free to make necessary repairs, but Germany was restricted under the treaty, and for some twelve to fourteen years her financial and commercial position was wrecked.
For about ten years the Weimar Government struggled to recover from the punitive restrictions imposed upon her by the victors. Although help was finally given by foreigners, little progress was made. Poverty and unemployment were rife everywhere in the towns and great cities. The procedures of a "free" constitution failed to bring better conditions. Spasms of hope were followed by dreary months of despair.

The political cyclone which arose at Versailles utterly dismantled the economic life of the country. The housing problem in Berlin and other great cities was complicated by the tens of thousands of refugees who flocked into them. Old residents, impoverished by the fall of the mark, took to the cellars. For years the specter of hunger stalked through every home of the working class. Foreign loans only served to aggravate the weakened condition, for the interest on them was a deduction from the earnings of the workers. The world crash that took place in 1929-30 further demoralized economic affairs which keen observers had imagined were at their worst.

The financial and commercial cyclone of twenty years ago was a lesson, on how not to do things, for liberal politicians and their supporters. But it was not learned. I crossed from England to the United States several times during the early thirties, and saw their political machines attempting to bring order out of chaos. The Fabians were sure they knew how to deal with an economic disturbance.

At the time of the advent of Roosevelt, many books were published informing the taxpayer about the technique of changing economic distress into industrial happiness. Rexford Tugwell gave us The Industrial Discipline; George Soule described A Planned Society; and Stuart Chase, in 1932 pictured A New Deal. These authors had taken their text from the experiments of the Soviets. Indeed, Chase asked, "Why should Russians have all the fun of remaking a world?"
Textbooks for Fabians, written by Fabians, came from the presses in a steady stream, and so plausible were some of the recommendations that not a few sensible business men thought the prescriptions were worth trying. Many were tried, with the result that bureaucratic departments sprang up like mushrooms. Housing accommodation was severely strained in Washington to take care of the armies of job-seekers who invaded the capital. The political Fabians were in a hurry to do something to save society, but the speed given to the job never quite satisfied their eagerness to accomplish wonders. By 1949 the number of government bureaus in Washington had increased to 1800, and there were nearly 2,000,000 government employees battening upon the taxpayers of the country.

It was not so easy in Great Britain to move toward a utopian goal. The coalition government of Ramsay MacDonald had a difficult field to hoe. Even the Fabians themselves were wise enough to acknowledge that some of the obstacles were almost insurmountable. I spoke to MacDonald and Lloyd George in the summer of 1932 about world affairs. They were eager to learn what I knew of conditions in America and what hope there was for better times. My pessimism disturbed them both. However, they were good enough to grant that I would not try to cheer them up by giving them false hope.

The Fabians in England and in America failed signal-y, and the machinery of most of their efforts was stalled by simple, natural laws which politicians willfully neglect to recognize. "Keep wages up!" "Prosperity is just around the corner," and other such slogans were repeated, month after month, by the crisis-manipulators, without effect. Then in 1933 two dictators appeared upon the scene—one in America and the other in Germany. The former, with the assistance of his Brain Trust of utopia-planners, inaugurated an era of what was called "must" legislation.
The march out of the Egypt of Republican idolatry was led by an odd assortment of newly fledged politicians. They were to take the people of America into the Promised Land they knew nothing about, for geographically it had no place upon their chart. Messrs. Frankfurter, Cohen, Corcoran, Morgenthau, Moley, Rosenman, and Tugwell were among the President’s chief advisers, and the people of the country gladly supported them because they believed the newcomers could do what the old-timers could not. The “must” legislation was put through at top speed, and soon we had the National Recovery Administration and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration turning the country upside down. General Hugh Johnson was put at the head of the former, and his totalitarian policy was to “crack down” on all who did not obey the codes of his department.

After a few months, conditions were worse than they had been before Roosevelt was elected. Johnson could not very well take the swastika for a badge to be worn by good industrialists, because Hitler had pre-empted it. So he invented the blue eagle, which was soon to become a cruel joke. One senator dubbed it “the Soviet duck.” Strikes broke out in all parts of the country, and the new era for the industrial democrats began to fade from view. Some of the “must” proposals were dropped into the ash can of political failures.

Then came “Harry the Hop,” who soon earned the title of Field Marshal of the Shovel Brigades. He was famous as a boondoggler and at distributing other people’s money. One who had known him intimately in the days when he was running a New York charity organization called him the “Duke of the Dole Bums.”

Meanwhile, Congress had surrendered its constitutional power and had given Roosevelt the authority of a dictator. It was scarcely fair to accuse the ambitious amateurs, who gathered round the President, of bungling the job when they were permitted by Congress to try any and every experiment to lead the people into the
new Canaan. Moreover, it should be understood that great opportunities of graft went with the patronage open to docile members of the legislature. Those who protested were to suffer from an electoral purge, two of which took place; but to the surprise of the White House, they were not successful.

The new President had a subservient Congress. Restrictive laws became the order of the day. Soon the country was peopled by his agents who poked their noses into affairs they knew nothing whatever about, and hampered the efforts of industrialists to restore normal conditions. At the same time, the organizers of the great victory of November, 1932, used the plight of the people for the purpose of making the Democratic party machine more powerful. The history of that period can be read in several books, and it is not necessary here to go into it deeply. However, it may be pointed out that after eight years, the Department of Labor at Washington announced there were still 11,000,000 unemployed.

In Germany, Hitler took hold of the reins of government at about the same time. Having learned of the bungled experiments of the so-called liberals, he boldly declared for a totalitarian State. Before his rise, no one had collected such a reference library of failure as the one the political democracies had written for him.

From the first, he meant business, and within two years his schemes for the regeneration of the German people astonished everyone. While the Ship of State in America was lumbering rudderless in stormy seas, Hitler was steering his bark into comparatively calm water at home. Never was such a feat excelled, and he drew from Churchill and many others praise never before given to a European politician.

But some gentlemen were out to have his blood, because he had set his face against foreign loans. Having no gold and little or no credit, he instituted the primitive system of barter, and that was what shocked Bernard Baruch. Financially it was a worse threat to the
banking interests of the powers than the navies of America and Britain were to the world. Again, as in 1907, Germany was getting too strong. General Robert E. Wood, testifying before a Senate Committee, said he had lunched with Churchill at his flat in London in November, 1936. At that time Churchill remarked: "Germany is getting too strong and we must smash her."

Hitler had been at work nearly three years then, and Germany was well on the road to recovery. His speech delivered in September, 1936, confounded the imagination of every utopian optimist who believed in reconstruction. In four years he had reduced unemployment from 6,000,000 to 1,000,000. Germany's total national income rose from 41 billion marks to 56 billions. The German middle class and the German trade experienced a period of prosperity; 640,000 tons of new shipping were under construction in German yards. The production of automobiles of all kinds rose from 45,000 to nearly a quarter of a million, and the deficits of the cities and provinces almost disappeared. These are only a few of the achievements that had been performed.

This startling contrast to the totalitarianism of Washington was too much for the amateurs who had bungled the job in America. In 1937, in a Chicago speech, Roosevelt talked about "quarantining the aggressors." On the occasion of presenting Bernard Baruch with a gold medal, at the annual dinner of the National Institute of Social Sciences, General George C. Marshall told the gathering that, in 1938, Baruch had said: "We are going to lick that fellow Hitler. He isn't going to get away with it."

It was obvious that the Austrian housepainter was breeding a pimple on his nose that someone had to lance, and many who admired his achievements began to think there was going to be trouble. When Hitler consummated the union with Austria, he was roundly condemned for breaking his pledges, which was no new thing in the political world. When the Munich crisis
arose, in 1938, for a few weeks it looked like war. The relief that went up in all the countries when Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini, and Hitler decided to agree, indicated that the peoples themselves desired peace.

In looking back a few years, we may be able to understand what really took place and why Hitler concentrated his attention upon armaments. Shortly after he became head of the Reich, he appealed to the powers. In a speech delivered to the Reichstag May 17, 1933, he said:

... Germany will be perfectly ready to disband her entire military establishment and destroy the small amount of arms remaining to her, if the neighboring countries will do the same thing with equal thoroughness.

... Germany is entirely ready to renounce aggressive weapons of every sort if the armed nations, on their part, will destroy their aggressive weapons within a specified period, and if their use is forbidden by an international convention.

... Germany is at all times prepared to renounce offensive weapons if the rest of the world does the same. Germany is prepared to agree to any solemn pact of nonaggression because she does not think of attacking anybody but only of acquiring security.

This was not even acknowledged by Great Britain and France. As Lloyd George emphasized, one of the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles was the reduction of armaments. No one really disarmed, although Churchill severely criticized Britain for trimming the budgets of the armed services.

The best summary of the situation is to be found in Lloyd George's speech delivered in the House, February, 1936. He pointed out that France, Italy, and the United States were increasing their armaments, but that all the signatories to the treaty were pledged to reduce them to the lowest minimum compatible with security. He called attention to the fact that between 1925 and 1932 the armaments of the world increased by 50 per cent. Further on in his speech, he said:
The final protocol of the Locarno Conference declared the intention to hasten disarmament, but the figures of armaments have nearly quadrupled since. Then came the Stresa Conference, which was summoned to call attention to a definite repudiation of a treaty by Germany. The representatives of three Great Powers passed a resolution declaring that the scrupulous respect of treaty obligations was a fundamental principle of international law and an essential condition of the maintenance of peace. The chairman of the conference, Signor Mussolini, drafted that resolution.

No respectable firm of solicitors would write complaining of the breaking of a clause in an agreement unless their clients meant action. It was inconceivable to Germany that three Great Powers (Britain, France and Italy) should have passed a resolution of the kind which was passed at Stresa and do no more about it. . . . As far as Germany was concerned it meant, “You have broken a treaty and these three Great Powers are going to deal with the matter.”

Germany was entitled to believe that those three Great Powers meant to take action. They probably meant business, but every month there was delay, until at last it became impossible to do anything. *We are responsible for creating the atmosphere of fear. Is it not possible to break this circle of death before it is too late?* (Italics mine)

Now who was to blame for the action that was taken by Hitler? It was the opposition of the League of Nations that was the cause of the breach. It declared that Germany must pass through a period of probation before it would be possible to discuss with her the question of the disarmament of the other countries. So much for the promises of disarmament of all the powers! After waiting for five months for something definite to be done, Hitler gave up the League of Nations as a bad job and began to realize that he had better be prepared for the consequences. Yet, shortly afterwards he put a new proposal before the powers, in which he asked for “full equality of rights” and that “the European nations guarantee one another the unconditional maintenance of peace by the conclusion of non-aggression pacts, to be renewed after ten years.”
He might as well have tried to convince the heavenly powers that he had no political ambitions as convince the League of Nations that he desired peace and disarmament. Still, he did not give up his plan. Although he had introduced conscription in March, 1935, he declared in the following May: "The German Government is ready to take an active part in all efforts which may lead to a practical limitation of armaments."

There was no response. His efforts having failed, he occupied the Rhineland in March of 1936, for by that time the powers had convinced him that he was a marked man.

The amazing thing about this extraordinary history is his persistence to bring the powers to their senses on the question of disarmament. Once more he returned to the peace attack, and on March 31, 1936, he set forth the most comprehensive non-aggression pact ever to be drawn up. It contained nineteen clauses, together with the proposal for setting up an international court of arbitration.

Those whose memories are still full of the horror of the war itself will read his suggestions with amazement. In his peace plan of March, 1936, he declared the following to be the immediate, practical tasks of the conference:

1. Prohibition of dropping gas, poison, or incendiary bombs.

2. Prohibition of dropping bombs of any kind whatsoever on open towns and villages outside the range of the medium-heavy artillery of the fighting fronts.

3. Prohibition of the bombarding with long-range guns of towns more than 20 km. distant from the battle zone.

4. Abolition and prohibition of the construction of tanks of the heaviest type.

5. Abolition and prohibition of artillery of the heaviest calibre.

What an irritating person, to propose such changes when all the powers were preparing to destroy him!
Was it conceivable that peace-loving democracies would agree to anything that was proposed by an upstart who had repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, occupied the Rhineland, declined to take foreign loans, and had instituted the system of barter? The prestige of the powers had to be preserved, particularly the prestige of France and America. So the “circle of death,” as Lloyd George called it, had to come full.

Now, the taxpayer did not know much about this business. But suppose he had followed the interchanges that were made at that time between Hitler and his enemy powers, would there have been a war, no matter what he thought of Hitler as an unreliable man? I doubt it. Think back a bit and remember what Bonar Law and Austen Chamberlain said after the First World War—that if Grey’s commitments had been laid before the House, they doubted whether it would have taken place. André Tardieu said practically the same thing.

Who was to blame for the disaster? Despite the fact that the taxpayer had no chance to learn about the sinister powers making for war, he could have taken sufficient interest in foreign affairs to insist on knowing what his government was doing.
XII

Democracy

During the First World War a question was asked that puzzled many people: "What is democracy?" Perhaps for the first time they were conscious they had not thought of what it meant. The Oxford dictionary defines it as: "(State practising) government by the people, direct or representative." This does not carry us very far in determining the most important problem connected with it, which is: How does it operate in the interests of the people?

It has been well said that the political power of the electorate ends when the poll closes. All they have done is to choose legislators to represent them. Perhaps the vote is the significant factor, and that is all the franchised masses care about. What the representatives do when they go to the legislature is quite another matter. Indeed, since the turn of the century, we have seen parliaments elected by the people, which have been more or less subservient to a democratic dictator or, in the case of Britain, an inner cabinet of four or five men who conduct the chief business of the State, irrespective of the political issues discussed on the platforms in the preceding election.

There were never such democratic tyrants as those who reigned during the French Revolution. Madame Roland, on her way to the guillotine, cried, "Oh liberty! liberty! how many crimes are committed in thy name!" However, the crimes committed in the name of democracy are for us to consider without compunction, for they are so patent that we have become used to them.
Every pledge given to the electorate in the American presidential election of 1932 was broken, save that of the repeal of prohibition. In my books, *Control from the Top* and *Sociocratic Escapades*, I dealt fully with the promises announced in the Democratic party platform while the depression was at its worst. As for France, the governments change too rapidly for election pledges to be kept by the deputies. Where money rules, the governments obey. The people may vote and choose as they will, but once a new parliament is convened, influences other than those familiar to the people decide what is good for the electors.

The great landslide in 1906 that gave political power to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman meant little or nothing so far as ameliorating the economic and industrial distress of the people was concerned. He lived only two years, and then the reins of government were taken in hand by Asquith. All the rosy promises of the first years of that parliament faded away, and the petals of legislation were strewn over the graves of buried hopes when the House of Lords exercised its veto.

Nevertheless, the vast majority of the people consider they are free, so long as they have a vote, no matter with how little judgment they use it. But are they free—free to do what? They can come and go, so long as they observe the rules that govern the system of the taxation of wealth. They do not understand that this fiscal system is really a tyranny that is responsible for most of their woes.

Indeed, their demand for deficit legislation shows quite clearly that they do not know what hurts them. Most of them think that the revenue comes only from the pockets of the rich, the well-known financial magnates, and the great industrial corporations. If an economist attempted to show that you cannot tax the wealth of the rich without ultimately impoverishing the poor, they would not know what to make of it. They under-
stand far less about the consequences of imposing taxes upon wealth than their grandparents did.

The popularity of the slogan—"Soak the rich"—led them all astray. When super taxes were advocated in Britain, and the people were warned that the time would come when income tax would be levied upon the earnings of the very poor, no one believed it. The excuse for imposing greater burdens on incomes, when I was a politician, was that the State had to provide for old-age pensions and insurance for sickness; and, as John Burns said, "the erection of palaces for bureaucrats." Many of the so-called humanitarians of that day were deeply offended when reminded that the workers would have to produce the wealth from which the money for the schemes would be taken by government.

After all the lessons that could have been learned from British experience, Woodrow Wilson's first government imposed an income tax upon the wealth-producers of America. From that day to this, the purchasing power of the dollar has sunk lower and lower. Democracy has not learned that a tax on wealth can be shifted. They may grumble at the rise in the price of commodities and sometimes strike, as consumers, against high prices, as they have done recently in America. But against deficit spending they make little or no protest because they do not know that every new issue of paper is a lien upon the products of labor.

Without going too deeply into the iniquities of this system, it should be plain to the taxpayer that he is a serf of the State. Most of them think they are working for what they call corporations, combinations of great capitalists who try to keep wages down. They do not realize that it is government that is responsible for the unequal distribution of wealth. Add up the cost of war services and the enormous expenditure on other bureaucratic departments, and it will be seen that most of the money goes to parasites who batten upon the produce of labor and capital. From this, it may be inferred that
a democracy is, in the main, an aggregation of illiterates, incapable of studying the defects of a system that penalizes their effort; and that the vote as exercised by them is no talisman that will lift their burdens.

A vast change has taken place in two generations. Fifty years ago it would have been difficult to find a man who would have valued the vote as a thing in itself. A people without knowledge of the power that the vote carries with it might as well not have it. The old law of redress of grievance before supply seems to be utterly forgotten. The more colleges, the more universities, the less political nous. Is it not true that illiterate democracies are meat for tyrants? Our classics taught us that when we went to school, but now in the system of education, vocational education and teaching a lad how to make a living have supplanted the fundamentals of learning, with the result that our colleges are turning out youths who fail to pass simple army tests. The statistics of illiterates published during the war amazed everybody, and these people become the voters who make "democratic" governments that oppress them.

I think it is safe to say that if the old trade union leaders were alive today and knew what was taking place, they would be amazed at the state of affairs. The abolition of the old system of apprenticeship has made unskilled youths easy prey for trade union dictators.

So long as the masses think they are free, there is no political reason why they should be converted to think otherwise. They seem content with freedom to breed, to pick and choose the newspapers they wish to read, to hear the mind-molders of the radio, to see the movies and enjoy the other delights that tickle their fancy. They are content to be huddled in the towns, to live in cubicles, to spend hours in the subways, to watch football and baseball games, and to go occasionally to the races. They seem happy to breathe the filth and smut that poison the atmosphere of the towns. (An air pollu-
tion test taken in New York recently states that the lungs of residents of the city are gray to black from breathing the atmosphere.) Still, the people love their cities, and no matter how much they enjoy a holiday in the country or at the seaside, they seem to be glad when they return to the ghettos where they spend most of their lives.

Democracy seems to be able to adapt itself to any conditions. One of the great tests of its intelligence is to be sought in the statistics for crime. Reports of murder, rape, burglary—to mention only three of the listed offenses—are served up in the newspapers morning and evening, regularly.

Kennedy Jones, who was undoubtedly an authority on what people read, says in his book, *Fleet Street and Downing Street*, that a war, a State funeral, or a first-class murder will sell more papers than anything else. In America, murder is so common that a person does not have time to devote attention to one in particular. In 1949, more than $94,000,000 was expended by the New York City police department. The larger the police force, the greater the increase in crime.

Efforts to educate democracy show few encouraging results. The expenditure on schools—attendance and teachers—in the United States for the year 1947 amounted to more than $3,000,000,000. This does not include the enormous cost of private colleges and universities. One would think such an immense outlay would tend to make a better showing. Chancellor Hutchins says it costs a lot of money to make a decent citizen. Of course, there are people in the United States who band themselves together in organizations for the purpose of maintaining civil liberty, suppressing crime, and other excellent endeavors. But their efforts seem to be a drop in the bucket, and the civic dream of do-gooders is still in the clouds. When Solon was asked what city was the best to live in, he replied: "That city in which those who are not wronged, no less than those
who are wronged, exert themselves to punish the wrong-doers."

Our instructors might learn a great deal from the classics, but they are quite out of fashion now. Many of our mentors would sidetrack the failings of democracy, and there are not a few of them who insist on setting forth whatever virtues it possesses, to the exclusion of the vices. It was so with the Athenian democracy, and Plutarch tells us:

... The ancient Athenians used to cover up the ugliness of things with auspicious and kindly terms, giving them polite and endearing names. Thus they called harlots "companions," taxes "contributions," the garrison of a city its "guard," and the prison a "chamber." But Solon was the first, it would seem, to use this device, when he called his cancelling of debts a "disburdenment"...

So it is in Britain and America. Soothing names are found for deleterious things. The inference to be drawn from this is that we dare not face the ugly facts of life. Surely this is obvious to anyone at all familiar with the methods of politicians in time of war.

How the concepts "freedom" and "liberty" became associated with the term "democracy" is difficult to understand. There is an anachronism somewhere, and we may well ask ourselves: How is it possible for a political democracy to be free? When men without an alternative are driven into the labor market and must compete with one another for jobs, they become wage slaves; and under a system of trade unionism, they fall into the hands of tyrants who enact Draconian laws.

With millions, it is a case of a union card or starve. But even for members in good standing, we learn privately that there is a kind of inquisition at work that makes life very uncomfortable for those who have some wit of their own. Freedom for the man with a card is permissible if he keeps in step with the herd. Think of what has happened in recent years among the higher-ups in the unions. It is only necessary to mention the infil-
tration of Socialists and Communists, and the bitter animosities revealed at the labor congresses. There seems to be profound dissatisfaction with the organizations among those who do some thinking for themselves. For the vast majority, the rank and file of the unions, it seems all right.

How many escape who believe their merits can earn for them a better position in life? Few indeed. Once in the union, it is hard to get out. Therefore, initiative is checked. Above-the-average intelligence is frowned upon, and the desire to live in a world where hope of better things might be realized is dashed. Yet, for the mass it seems to be the only earthly paradise. A free democracy in which equality of opportunity would be open to all would require no trade unions. No one knew that better than Thomas Burt and many of his school. But the ranks of labor do not produce such men today. Trade unionism has become a tyranny.

So long as political democracy satisfies the mob, the worker will have no alternative but to enter the labor market and put his chains on. He will be at liberty to strike against conditions, when he is permitted by his tyrant. He will strike for a rise in nominal wage, thus increasing the cost of commodities against himself. But somehow his ideas of freedom do not permit him to realize that a new strike indicates the failure of the old one.

Under schemes of nationalization he is no better off than the fellow in the closed shop of a corporation. He pays the cost of nationalizing railways, mines, road transport, and other services taken under the aegis of the State. Under a political democracy, it is well-nigh impossible for any of these ventures to bring benefits to the workers, and it will be as necessary to strike for higher nominal wage as a servant of the State as it was when the institution was in private hands.
It may be that he has become inured to the handi- 
caps of his existence, and when he uses the term "democr-
cacy," it simply means the humdrum existence he fol-
lows from morning till night—plus the franchise badge, 
a vote. In all probability the cage-bred canary thinks 
it is free. At any rate, it sings as if it were at liberty.
Mr. Churchill, having tried his fortunes in the Con-
servative party twice and in the Liberal party once, 
should know something about the fitness of men and 
women in a democracy for exercising the ballot. He 
has asked for the votes of the electors in at least six 
constituencies—an extraordinary record for a politician 
who has changed his political opinions as often as he 
has done. Therefore, he is qualified to speak as an au-
thority on the subject of democracy at the polls, and the 
qualifications of the electors in selecting men to represent 
them in Parliament. With characteristic courage, born 
of the vicissitudes of victory and defeat, he has expressed 
his views of the political system. In his book, Amid 
These Storms, he writes:

It is indeed a descent almost to the ridiculous to contem-
plate the impact of the tremendous and terrifying discoveries 
which are approaching upon the structure of Parliamentary 
institutions. How can we imagine the whole mass of the 
people being capable of deciding by votes at elections upon the 
right course to adopt amidst these cataclysmic changes? Even 
now the Parliaments of every country have shown them-
selves quite inadequate to deal with the economic problems 
which dominate the affairs of every nation and of the world. 
Before these problems the claptrap of the hustings and the 
stunts of the newspapers wither and vanish away. Democracy 
as a guide or motive to progress has long been known to be 
incompetent. None of the legislative assemblies of the great 
modern states represents in universal suffrage even a fraction 
of the strength or wisdom of the community. Great nations 
are no longer led by their ablest men, or by those who know 
most about their immediate affairs, even by those who have a 
coherent doctrine. Democratic governments drift along the 
line of least resistance, taking short views, paying their way 
with sops and doles and smoothing their path with pleasant-
sounding platitudes. . . .
We may infer from this forthright criticism of democracy that it is incapable of acting electorally in its own interest. But, somehow, the critic finds, occasionally, it has its beneficial uses. In *Step by Step*, he says:

... The massive common sense of the only long-trained democracy—apart from the United States—has established a spacious and predominant middle zone within which the class adjustments of the nation can be fought out, and from which the extremities at both ends are excluded. . . .

Mr. Churchill is, of course, at liberty to change his mind to suit the prevailing tendency of the hour, even in an "incompetent" democracy.

It is rather difficult to comprehend the lights and shadows of his thoughts on this grave problem. We are not assisted in our groping about to find a clear notion of his peculiar dilemma, concerning the worth of democracy as a form of statecraft, for in July, 1937, he wrote a letter to himself in which he said:

The Socialist-Labor Party, not only in its extreme varieties, but in its most moderate forms, seems to have reached the limits of its expansion. . . . The program of giving the State, that is to say the politicians who have obtained a majority at an election, autocratic control of all the means of production, distribution, and exchange, would never commend itself to the strong individualism of the British race. . . .

Still, Mr. Churchill is not the first statesman to find himself baffled by the whims and follies of a democracy. As long ago as the Peloponnesian War, his political predecessors, Cleon and Alcibiades, commented sternly upon the idiosyncrasies of *demos*. 
XIII

Muddled Statesmanship

Taxpayer, do you realize what simpletons some of your statesmen make themselves out to be, by admitting that Hitler was a wonderful man who achieved great things, but that when he armed (because others did not keep their promise to disarm), he was denounced by these same statesmen as a lying trickster, a breaker of treaties, and a danger to Europe? How was it possible for you to let such people conduct your affairs? From their own statements, we gather there was not one among them who had the wit to take the correct measurement of the Führer. All were deceived, hoodwinked, bamboozled.

Somehow, this does not make sense. One or two, who had not a good word to say for him at any time, thought he was a "bluff," and would crumple up when the British fleet was mobilized. But this enigmatic creature, containing most of the political virtues and defects, never turned a hair at the heroic threats showered upon him, until Roosevelt came to the rescue of British, French, and Belgian politicians. Surely history will say his greatest achievement was in deceiving the lot.

What do you really think of statesmen of the first rank falling victims to an unprincipled knave? Was it because he had the charming manner that Mr. Churchill describes? Was it his persuasive eloquence that deceived them? A gentleman performing the three-card trick has a plausible manner, but the wary do not try to find the Queen of Hearts.
Now the deplorable fact concerning this political and diplomatic trick is that the player of it told his victims that, if he got the chance, he was determined to do just what he did. Indeed, up to the time he attacked Poland, there is not one territorial question that is not included in his policy of uniting the scattered German people and of abolishing frontiers that kept them apart. In Mein Kampf he declares to the world in unmistakable terms this fixed intention. There never was a work as blatantly frank as Mein Kampf. On page after page he hammers in the aims of his purpose. He says: “Frontiers of States are made by men and changed by men.” The foreign policy of the Nazis is “to secure for the German people the land and soil that is due to them on this earth.” Could any statement be clearer than that?

Yet, great men of cabinet rank in Britain and France failed signally to estimate the purpose and force of Hitler. Probably the cartoonists and the screech writers were to blame for this, although one would think that their illustrations and articles were meant for the illiterate masses and that politicians would not be deluded by them. Yet, this demented knave, who was pictured in the daily press for years, was supposed to be arming battalions to overthrow the democracies of the world.

For an utterly wicked man, who candidly set forth the extent of the wickedness of which he was capable, to achieve such political feats of organization and reconstruction, as Mr. Churchill acknowledges in his books, staggers the imagination and leaves the investigator utterly mystified. He did for his people in Germany what the politicians of Britain and France failed to do for theirs. He had studied their failures and learned from them what to avoid. Out of practically nothing he created a State in which the workers were busy full time—putting savings by, enjoying holiday trips, without the assistance of trade unionists, of strikers, of feather-bedding, or of sabotage. Amazing man!
When Lloyd George returned to England after a visit to Hitler, in September, 1936, he said: "I have never seen a happier people than the Germans. Hitler is one of the greatest of the many great men I have ever met."

The whole business of this affair is so strange that one wonders if there be not some truth in the old saying, "Whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad." But these are only a few of the delusions under which the politicians of Britain and France labored for four years after Hitler appeared as Reichsführer. Perhaps the most preposterous delusion of all was that of the politicians of the west persuading themselves that the issue was democracy versus Nazi totalitarianism. They persisted in this stupid notion all through the war. And, yet, it is perfectly plain now that at no time after Hitler took control of Germany was the issue anything but one between two entirely different brands of State control.

Democracy was a side issue of no particular significance. It never amounted to more than a mere propaganda device. Those who saw clearly, after the Anschluss and the Munich crisis, what was really pending were never fogged by the nonsense talked about democracy as an issue. Why should Britain wait for nearly twenty years to fight totalitarianism as practiced in Germany, when the Russian brand was going full swing and the agents of Stalin were making hay in the democracies of the west? How can it be said that the wonderful politicians of democratic States saw no danger to themselves coming from east of the Vistula? In Mein Kampf, Hitler sets down in plain terms what he thinks about Russia:

We must not forget that the rulers of the present Russia are low, blood-stained criminals, that here we are concerned with the scum of humanity, which, when favored by circumstance in a tragic hour overran a large state, killed and rooted out millions of its leading intelligentsia in a wild thirst for blood, and which now for almost ten years has exercised the most cruel rule of tyranny of all times...
It is disturbing, to say the least, that Hitler completely understood the situation so far as Russia was concerned. He went into the matter thoroughly and the consequences of a Russian-German combination. In this connection he laid it down: "An alliance whose goal does not embrace the purpose of a war is foolish and valueless. Alliances are made solely for the purposes of battle."

Then think of this stupid knave having the wit to realize that

... Either a German-Russian alliance would merely take place on paper, in which case it would be neither of purpose nor value for us, or it would be transferred from the letter of the treaty into visible actuality—and the rest of the world would be warned. How naive, to think that England and France, in such a case, would wait a decade until the German-Russian alliance would have completed its technical preparations for war. No, the storm would break out over Germany with lightning rapidity.

Thus, indeed, in the formation of an alliance with Russia lies the direction for the next war. Its result would be the end of Germany. (Italics in Mein Kampf)

Even so, Stalin was to be coddled, wooed, and mollified by Britain. Why? Because she was a friend of France, and France had created the Little Entente. It was for this reason that the politicians of the west never had a notion of ridding the earth of the totalitarianism of Stalin's brand. Great Britain could not take up arms against Bolshevism on her own. Such a thing was unthinkable.

The pact that stunned the world was the one made by Hitler and Stalin before the onslaught on Poland, in September, 1939. So paralyzed were the politicians of the west at this amazing shift in policy that not one of them, in or out of office, understood why it was done. The facts are now known, and of course it is easy, long after the event, for people to display their wisdom by saying it was the political thing to do at the time. Those
who knew what it meant at the beginning of the war were frowned upon when they dared to offer suggestions about it. It is simple now to say that Hitler knew he had to fight, and that it was policy for him to make an alliance with Russia because he was not prepared for total war. He knew that Stalin wanted the Baltic provinces and Poland as far as the Bug. And this is the deal that was made.

Now some of our generals and diplomatists can write sagely about Hitler knowing that he would have to fight in the west and that if he conquered Poland, he would have to withdraw his battalions to reinforce the line of the Rhine. So it was wise political and military policy to make terms with Russia, by letting her take into her maw Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania for the sake of keeping her quiet. The lull that took place after the Polish matter was settled, until the invasion of the Low Countries occurred, gave Hitler the time he so badly needed to prepare for dealing with France and Great Britain. The so-called "phony war" period will be reckoned by the historians of the future as the costliest one of inaction the world has ever known.

The harder one tries to find a reason for thinking that the issue was democracy versus totalitarianism, the farther away it recedes and dissipates into thin air. The deeper one goes into the record, the more striking is the fact that the statesmen of the west were under the influence of a power not represented in the cabinets or the legislatures of democracies.

The American agents of Stalin in Washington were disturbed when they heard of the Russo-German pact. But they were not shocked, and never for a moment did they relinquish their efforts to prepare for the day when Roosevelt would send the troops to Europe. The scandals unearthed by congressional investigating committees, in the trials of spies and Communists, have let in a flood of light on the activities of paid servants of the State and their undercover friends. More and far more
is to be revealed in forthcoming sessions. It is already said quite openly that the trail leads straight to the White House.

So far, the record shows that many people in high positions were in sympathy with the totalitarianism of Stalin and bitterly opposed to that of Hitler. What a curious medley it was! The American totalitarians taking orders from the god of the Kremlin, when he was associated with Hitler in destroying Poland! The attack on Finland was scarcely forgiven. The absorption of the Baltic provinces scarcely caused a sigh of regret.

So that the taxpayers may have an idea of what was taking place in the land of the free, I should like to quote an interesting bit of information published in *The Sign* for February, 1950, an influential Catholic monthly. The article is written by Richard L. Stokes, who for many years covered the State Department for the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. He tells a story about Adolf A. Berle, Jr., who was Assistant Secretary of State at the time. Berle saw Roosevelt at the White House and told him that Stalin had set up an espionage apparatus in America with pipelines into its most treasured secrets.

His informant, said Berle, was Whittaker Chambers, Communist go-between, whose "contact," a protégé of Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter, was assistant to the State Department's adviser on political relations. The name was Alger Hiss.

President Roosevelt was far from diverted. As soon as he caught the drift of the warning, he broke in upon it with his iciest accents of dismissal.

"Adolf," he grated, "it's a beautiful, sunshiny morning. Take a walk around the block, and you'll feel better."

This is only a sample of what is now known to have taken place. A friend, who is a journalist of some reputation and is familiar with the information received in the editorial department of a great newspaper, informed me that the record is so black that he doubts whether
the American people will ever learn the truth of what was going on.

The story told by Helen Lombard in the last chapter of *While They Fought* is surely black enough to damn the lot. But such is the pressure of the departments in Washington that only very few people who were fortunate enough to get a copy of the book have the faintest conception of what was done. Well, taxpayer, you certainly put up with a lot! And to me it is amazing that they let you know as much as I record here.

The gentlemen who have been looking after your affairs have made a mighty mess of them, and if you do not wake up, they will make a worse mess for your children. Bernard Baruch announces that industry is mobilized, and Marshall Andrews tells us, in *Disaster Through Air Power*, that we had better be prepared for squalls. Here are some of the things that have been withheld from the public, according to Andrews:

1. air force neglect of tactical air development;
2. plans against naval aviation;
3. abandonment of our allies in Western Europe;
4. undermining of army morale.

This book purports to give information hidden from the public on the chaotic state of affairs in some of the departments at Washington. There is plenty of evidence contained in volumes that can be bought in any book-seller’s shop, which will improve your mind, if you will take the trouble to do a bit of reading. The muddle in Washington is no greater than that in London. The statesmen in both capitals are dodging realities day in and day out without success.

As for a positive foreign policy, it exists nowhere. Many of the ideas of what should be done have been abandoned. The fact is our statesmen have a lap full of trouble with which they are incompetent to deal. It would take a political genius such as the world has never known to see his way through a tenth of the
problems that engage the attention of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Perhaps the best foreign policy in these circumstances is to have none at all; let things develop in their own way, and hope for the best. One great trouble with the statesmen is that not one has been educated to recognize the real problems that have brought about the present state of affairs. Of course, it is not to be expected that politicians at this period should qualify as historians. Yet, it would not do them any harm if they looked into the international problems of forty or fifty years ago and learned how they were worked out. If they did this, they might gather information that would be of some use to them. But that is a consummation devoutly to be wished. The road that leads from Algeciras to the hydrogen bomb calls for a courageous wayfarer to foot it. Muddled statesmen would be wearied before they reached the outbreak of the First World War.
XIV

Churchill’s Delusions

Mr. Churchill’s forte is that of a critic unburdened by a practical idea of how to amend or remove the defects of the policy he condemns. In *While England Slept* there are forty-one selections from speeches he delivered over a period of ten years. Most of them are devoted to arms, danger, and the probabilities of strife. Seeing red as a rule, he fails to distinguish between amber and the green light of safety. He balks when the signal changes, which beckons him on to cross to the island of compromise.

How anyone could sleep through the rattle of his alarms is a mystery insoluble. Perhaps the people took opiates in self defense, for he offered nothing but appeals to the League of Nations, which had shown its utter inability to justify its existence. Sometimes he is conscious of this and deplores its weakness. In February, 1938, in a letter to himself, Churchill said: “The League at the present time is not strong enough to undergo a surgical operation. It would die under the knife. Even the chloroform might prove fatal.”

Still, he held his faith in it. With all his compliments to the Germans about their bravery and skill, he was nonetheless determined to keep them defenseless and financially and commercially crippled.

How could one who aspired to be something of a historian persuade himself that any “overwhelming force” of other European powers would be able to repress the natural desires of 80,000,000 people? If he had taken the trouble to refer to his Swansea speech of August,
1908, he might have learned from it that he once knew it could not be done. Ponder this elogium:

... I say we honour that strong, patient, industrious German people, who have been for so many centuries divided, a prey to European intrigue and a drudge amongst the nations of the Continent. Now in the fulness of time, after many tribulations they have by their virtues and valour won themselves a foremost place in the front of civilization....

Was he conscious then of the fact that Germany had kept the peace of Europe for forty years? Did he know, when he made the speeches published in While England Slept, that Gladstone, Disraeli, Salisbury, and other British statesmen paid tributes to Bismarck for his policy of keeping the peace during that period and also for the assistance he gave to Britain in several grave crises? He could have gathered that information from Bismarck's Relations With England 1871-1890, published in 1928.

His latter-day notions of the importance of Britain controlling the balance of power are scarcely worth serious consideration, for the Entente with France proved conclusively that Britain no longer dominated the European stage. The Boer War left England discredited by every power in the world. Keen British observers realized that her campaigns in South Africa revealed weaknesses too plain to be ignored. Moreover, the Entente and the work performed secretly at Algeciras drew Britain into the troubles of intricate adventures of concessionaires and committed her to support their secret policies. She was told plainly not only by Lord Rosebery but by English and French students that her alliance would lead to war.

Churchill's belief in the vigor of France as a political and military power was not shared by some wise foreigners who saw clearly the nature of her steady decline as a world force. Philosophers had pointed this out years before he was born. Renan had said: "France is dying; do not disturb her death struggle."
When I visited France for the first time, in 1897, I was astonished to hear dramatists, actors, and singers complain bitterly of the great changes that had taken place in their day. Someone said, "We are nearing the end. The soul of France has departed from Paris." Many times since then I have noticed the grievous changes that shocked her thinking people. One has only to read such a work as Tragédie en France by André Maurois to understand the disasters that enveloped her when she was invaded in 1940.

It should be a lesson to Mr. Churchill and his friends at this time, when there is so much talk about the next war. In order that the mistakes that he made when he wrote the letters to himself in Step by Step about the recuperative powers of France may not be repeated, I should like to remind him that in the summer of 1938, Auguste Detoeuf, a French industrialist, wrote the following description of his country, in Nouveaux Cahiers:

If France were still a "great" country she would not have trembled for fifteen years in the face of a disarmed Germany.

... If France had been a "great" country (when the World War ended, that is, and France was victorious) she would have concluded a generous peace with a defeated Germany. . . .

It is impossible to go on being weak and yet to play at being strong. It is impossible to go on threatening, only to yield at the very moment at which the threat is to be carried out. It is impossible for a country of 40 millions in disarray to have the armaments of a country with a population of 70 to 80 millions who are on a war footing.

It is impossible to be mighty while working only 40 hours a week when next door they are working 60; while eating our fill when next door they make do with a beggar's rations; while insisting on the comforts of well-being when next door they are content with stage gesticulations; while arguing when next door they obey; while avoiding fatherhood when next door they forbid celibacy; while exporting our cash when next door the penalty for exporting funds is death; while being on a peace footing when next door they have martial law. . . .
In his letters, Churchill tells us that he was convinced that France would surmount her industrial and labor troubles "with an actual accretion of moral and material strength," and he wrote: "It will take a lot to convince me that the qualities and devotion which have made and preserved the greatness of France have suddenly departed from the French people."

It is inconceivable how a politician should insist on deluding himself. Perhaps self-delusion does not matter much, so long as it affects only the individual who cultivates it, but when a statesman becomes addicted to this vagary, it may be highly dangerous to the lives and property of millions of people, as it was in this case. To fly in the face of the opinion of well-informed Frenchmen was certainly not wise.

Now let us consider the matter of the virtues of an enemy people, which Mr. Churchill praised so highly. I have often wondered if he had the slightest comprehension of wherein the strength of Germany lay and what the struggle was that molded her to overthrow the French in 1870, to come within an ace of winning the First World War, and cause such terrific demoralization of the British, French, Belgian, and Russian forces in World War II. There are many instructive books written by Englishmen and Americans, in which the story is told of how "the drudge of Europe" rose superior to the most difficult national and international disabilities and became a first-class power. Perhaps the historians who have become propagandists are not aware of the volumes of information that pertain to this amazing adventure in statecraft. Before it can be properly understood, it is essential that the student should take a map and note the geographical position of Germany. She has always had foes east and west and had to fight on two frontiers in the world wars.

The next important matter to be remembered is that this achievement could not have been accomplished unless the people were ready to act under the strictest
discipline. Long-suffering made them realize that, if they were to survive, they had to act as a unit. Indeed, they are the only people in the world who submit to strict obedience demanded by their superiors. No people ever made so many sacrifices to attain the ambitions of their rulers. From Frederick the Great to Hitler, they responded to the command to save themselves. It is nonsense to imagine that they craved the duress imposed upon them. It was a case of "what else can we do?" Always on short commons, the great mass of the people were ready to surrender themselves to State regulation to make Germany great. Call it tyranny, a dictatorship—what you will—there is no denying that over and over again it worked. But it was not all hardship.

I never found anywhere within her frontiers the hopelessness and despair of the submerged masses of Great Britain and America. There were no such slums and hovels in her cities as were to be seen before World War I in London, Liverpool, Glasgow, New York, and Chicago.

Think of Washington, where there are statesmen who are busy sending men to educate the Germans! An article has recently been published by Howard Whitman in the *Woman’s Home Companion*. He made a slum survey in the capital and found that nearly 50 per cent of the dwellings there are substandard. The National Capital Housing Authority confirms this. Here is a paragraph from his article, which describes the living conditions of human beings:

Would you expect to find outhouses in Washington, D.C.—within sight of the Capitol? The courts and alleys are full of rows of ramshackle privies, some with slats broken out and doors that don’t close, sitting in the garbage-cluttered back yards, emitting a horrible stench. The slum dwellings, occupied by Negroes mostly, have neither steam heat nor running water. Kerosene lamps and candles provide light; coal stoves provide heat—for those who can afford to buy coal. In the yards there are water spigots, one to half a dozen
families. Some are cross-connected with toilet plumbing so there is no telling when bacteria from the toilet wastes pour out in the drinking water.

The report of the State Housing Board of Illinois, in 1945, is just as revolting. More than 700,000 dwellings have no private bath; more than half a million have outside toilets; and more than 400,000 have no running water. Surely, there is enough to be done in the United States to house its citizens decently to keep all the men we send to Germany at home to attend to their own affairs.

I knew Charlottenburg before the great renovations took place, and when I saw that area years afterwards, I could scarcely believe there was once a slum there. I spoke to a leading banker about the changes round about Berlin, and he told me that proper living conditions for the people pay high dividends. So they do, but many visitors to Germany from America and Great Britain had never been in the slum districts of their own cities and did not know what they were like.

What the Germans did in the way of cultivating the arts, even in small towns, by having their drama and their opera, their art galleries and museums, could not be matched in any other country. It might enlighten some of the new historians if they took some leisure to read works by British and American authors, written before World War I, about the life and art of the German people.

Of course, I realize the difficulty of doing anything of this nature now, because the atmosphere has been charged with the deadly poison of hate and vindictiveness. Still, we should realize that war cannot destroy the German people and that the day may come—whether or not the hydrogen bomb is dropped—when the British folk will cleave to them again and seek their aid. What has been done in the past might be good policy to follow in the future. The very fact that the Allied Powers are
attempting to form a western bloc, in which parts of Germany will be included, is sufficient indication to make us think deeply of what the future holds in store.

A very old Constitutional Radical makes no apology for presenting these facts. For fifty-three years he has worked constantly to bring about a cordial relationship between the peoples who speak Shakespeare's tongue, and he thinks he has as much right, as an American, to remind the reader of this as he had when he asked the suffrages of the British electors who sent him to Parliament. I did not quail then to tell the people what was in my mind, and now that I am eighty-three, I do not hesitate to write what I am thinking. I have not changed through the years, and the old spirit is just as strong as ever it was.

To me, war is the most abominable notion that can enter the mind of man. It lowers him beneath the standard of the beast, warps his soul, and curses him with a dread that nothing now can remove. I have always believed that we were endowed with our faculties in order to make God's earth a paradise. That seems to me to be the only reason why mind and spirit have been bequeathed to us. If we cannot use them for our well-being, then it does not matter much what happens to us; we are not worthy of the high estate we were meant for.

The old Bishop of Durham, the great Joseph Butler, who gave us The Analogy of Religion, put the matter in a nutshell:

... I know not that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but by the means of our own actions. And by prudence and care we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet; or, on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And many do please to make themselves extremely miserable—i.e., to do what they know beforehand will render them so.
Mussolini’s march on Rome in 1922 was an event of deeper significance for Europe than Brunswick’s retreat from Valmy. Not even the wisest of the neo-liberals realized what it meant when Benito was made Prime Minister by the King of Italy. As for the statesmen who had followed the well-established grooves since the uprisings of 1848, they knew less than any of the political factions about the revolutionary change that had begun. They were not familiar with the literature on the movements of Lombardy and the Piedmont. Perhaps they knew less than village parsons of what was meant by Syndicalism and a Corporate State.

However, when Mussolini set to work and quickly brought some order out of chaos, the politicians of the democracies began to sit up and rub their eyes. The Fascist experiment attracted the attention of governments and the chancelleries whose countries were suffering from the effects of the war. Poverty, discontent and disease were everywhere. Unemployment was increasing, and in Britain the dole had to be given to keep the people from revolt. The contrast between the state of Italy and other European countries, after two years of Mussolini’s rule, was so startling that he was hailed as one of the great men of Europe.

Sir Austen Chamberlain paid a visit to Rome in 1924 and told the Italians: “Signor Mussolini is a wonderful man and a formidable worker.” Lord Rothermere, in his newspapers, paid great tribute to him. Winston Churchill was in Rome in 1927, and he told the Italian
and foreign press that he was charmed with Mussolini and impressed by his gentle and simple bearing. He recognized that the Fascist leader thought of nothing but the lasting good of the Italian people. It is reported that Churchill said: “If I had been an Italian, I am sure that I should have been wholeheartedly with you from the start to finish in your triumphant struggle against the bestial appetites and passions of Leninism.”

I had watched closely the revolt of the workers in Milan and Turin during the early autumn of 1920, and in September of that year I wrote an editorial for The Freeman in which I dealt with the strike. I predicted that the metal workers would fail. In the article I said:

Here is another case of industrial revolution apparently doomed to defeat, because it is begun at the wrong end of the economic scale. The Italian industrial revolution will almost surely end disastrously; and those who will be hit hardest will be the workers themselves, for they have done just what the French did on several occasions, and what the Russians also did. They have made their start by taking over the factories, without first dealing with the landlord, who is the supreme ruler of the natural resources from which labor has to draw all raw materials, and the landlord will reveal a power, over their revolution, far more effective than the power that any government can exert or that the co-operating employers and the technicians can exert.

Mussolini was in Milan at the time, and he must have learned the lesson taught by the metal-workers’ strike. Perhaps he realized, then, that nothing but chaos would follow such futile experiments. The conditions in Turin and Milan after these revolts of the workers made things worse. Their wretchedness deepened, and the misery of their families was visible everywhere.

The Freeman was well informed about what was going on in Italy. Its correspondents gave it information that other journals either did not receive or thought was not worth publishing. Norman H. Matson wrote from Rome in 1920:
Thus, slowly, Italy moves toward revolution; by familiar steps and not all-at-once and painlessly. In countless villages the peasants march under the red flag to occupy and work the acres of the big owners. . . . The recently elected Socialist mayors of villages and towns (there are more than 2000 of them) decide in convention at Milan to "abstain" from flying the National colours on prescribed feast days and to raise the red flag on all days of proletarian celebrations. . . .

He then goes on to describe the conditions in Rome, and says that a shaft of light from an electric lamp was a poor substitute for the customary illumination denied by the strike of the powerhouse workers. Butter, milk, and eggs were for the gentry, and the cost of living was six times higher than before the war.

Socialists of the different factions were making no progress. They were all crying for the workers to strike off their chains, but the wretched people knew it would be no easier, as things were, to get a meal even if their ankles were untethered. A professor whom I met in Rome, later, told me that the so-called liberals were Socialists, and he said very pointedly: "Not unlike your Fabians who call themselves Liberals when they want to gain a political advantage."

I was in Italy during Holy Year, 1925. I had not been there for many years. My recollections of the country were still lively, but things had changed and the contrasts I noticed were somewhat bewildering in their impressiveness. So striking were they that I began to doubt my memory of what I had seen before.

The first place I visited was Naples, where I arrived from Greece. Before my wife and I left the ship, we learned from a friend who came on board to welcome us that we might not get our baggage for several days, as a Communist order to strike had reached the trade unions concerned in shipping. The news disturbed us because we had ordered a car from Rome to take us there after a week in Naples. On the quay, Signor Spanier, a friend of Mussolini, met us and whispered in Eng-
lish: 'Don't worry about your trunks. You'll have them at the hotel before dinner.'

During lunch at the Esplanada, I noticed that the waiters were too busy running to the windows every now and then to give proper attention to the guests. I asked what the excitement was about, but could get no reply. Suddenly I heard the roar of heavy trucks passing by. Jumping up from the table and going to the window, I saw three big lorries, each with a machine gun and soldiers, pass by the castle and take the road down to the docks.

Later in the afternoon, I learned that the military expedition had come from Rome and that it traveled the full length of the wharves, turned without pulling up, and went back to Rome. Needless to say, we had our trunks long before dinner, and there was no more heard about a strike.

Such drastic methods reminded me of instances in England when local magistrates called upon soldiers to assist in keeping order. I liked the Fascist method no better than I liked the English one of quelling disturbances. Yet, I had to admit that it worked.

During that week, I had the chance of discussing the affair with Spanier and two members of the House of Lords, who had sat in the Commons before the war—Lord Ashton of Hyde and Lord Cawley. Reluctantly, my friends agreed that order had to be maintained; otherwise it meant a return to such troubles as those that had occurred in Turin and Milan, to the detriment of everyone.

It was my first visit to Naples, and I knew only what I had read about the conditions in the city before the war took place. When I looked for the poverty and beggary, which were particularly disagreeable features noticed by travelers, I was amazed to find, as I went about the town, no one pestering me for alms. Perhaps owing to the influx of tourists, business had never been so good, some of the shopkeepers informed me.
Motoring to Rome, we saw roads being improved and people busy on the land. The chauffeur told us that in the villages the peasants were much better off. And all this was attributed to the Fascist rule of Mussolini, who, to some people we knew, appeared to be a political god. The tributes paid by English statesmen were only echoes of those that Benito regularly received from his supporters. I asked a well-informed professor what the opposition amounted to. He said it had disappeared and that the Liberal minority at no time numbered many and that it was incapable of doing anything effective for the workers; in truth, I was informed that in the north the vast majority was composed of Syndicalists and Communists.

Rome was not the same place I had visited many years before. Everything was going full swing. It was Holy Year and thousands of pilgrims were in Italy. Most of them, however, were very poor folk, and frequently I saw large groups—men and women—carrying knapsacks. In society, there was pleasure from morning till night. This visit was spoiled by banquets. One Sunday night when I went to hear Pirandello read a play and to see a short piece of his performed, the ladies were so richly costumed and wore such marvelous jewels that I thought I was back at Covent Garden at a gala performance.

During the weeks that I was there I counted four peers of the realm and three members of the Commons. For host, guide, and counsellor, I had my friend, the Marquis di Calvatone. He was an encyclopedia of necessary information and knew nearly everything that was being done. Italy was on the road to recovery. The wise ones admitted there were still awkward problems to be dealt with, but they placed their faith in Benito and had little fear for the future.

Now this was Fascist totalitarianism, and England had so little fear of it that most of her statesmen showed no concern at all. Even the story of Matteotti, whose
death was attributed to Mussolini, failed to change the opinion of his admirers.

In the political world it really does not matter what label is placed upon a government’s work. The chief thing is: Is the operation of the scheme effective? The failure of the new Liberalism, introduced under Asquith’s Government after the death of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, was lesson enough for dictators about how to go to work to make reforms in the practical affairs of the activities of life. Old age pensions and insurance for sickness, milk for babies and soup kitchens, doles and make-work schemes, such as England had had in plenty before and after World War I, were regarded as vote-catching schemes. Indeed, the resolute Socialists who were not afraid of being Socialists had, for many years, denounced such palliatives as capitalistic dodges to keep the people quiet. They were so foreign to the ideas of the early Radicals—and even the Liberals up to the time of the Boer War—that it is hard to believe that any of them in that period would have voted for one of them.

The Liberal critics of Mussolini’s methods of grappling with industrial chaos have never yet told us how they would deal with such a situation as that which arose in northern Italy. British political humanitarians seldom went beyond the dole, as a means to relieve the unemployed. But in Italy there was no money for a dole; indeed, many of the people who were considered by the Socialists to belong to the capitalist class would have been glad to enjoy one. Yet, in two years Mussolini’s policy brought such an extraordinary change for the better that he was congratulated by British statesmen. He really did put the vast majority of the able-bodied men to work.

The question, then, that arises in the mind is: When social questions become desperate, as they were in Italy, do they call for a dictatorship? John Stuart Mill thought they did, and the author of the essay On Liberty was no
Socialist. No one has suggested a practical method of relieving the misery in any other way. Suppose when things were bettered to a certain degree, a Mussolini felt it safe to return to free enterprise, re-establish trade unions, and re-institute parliamentary government. What certainty would there be of maintaining the order established under a dictatorship? None.

Since the publication of *The Communist Manifesto* and the emergence of the political Socialist, free enterprise has gone from bad to worse. The only country that has withstood the shocks of Socialist propaganda in political affairs is France, and the reason for that is she has from six to eight million peasant proprietors. Landlordism, as it was known in Great Britain and in Italy, did not exist there when the revolts took place in the forties and fifties of the last century. Anyway, dictators, once they have reached power, are loath to relinquish it, and it does not matter whether the tyrant has been a Liberal or a Tory, a Labor man or a Socialist, power is the crown of his effort and he fears to entrust it to others. No one appreciated this fact so keenly as Mr. Churchill himself. He says, in *Their Finest Hour*:

At the top there are great simplifications. An accepted leader has only to be sure of what it is best to do, or at least to have made up his mind about it. The loyalties which centre upon number one are enormous. If he trips, he must be sustained. If he makes mistakes, they must be covered...

Mussolini was not satisfied with the eminence he had gained and the tributes he had received from statesmen. He must seek imperial glory. He picked Abyssinia for the adventure, and that was his undoing. Perhaps he thought of the triumphs that Britain and France had gained and that there was no reason why he should not have a go. He forgot that a good many people in London regarded the Mediterranean as a British lake and that it would be dangerous to have a naval power stationed near the entrance to the Red Sea. Stupid man!
All the rosy compliments that he had received for what he did in Italy faded within a day or two, and he learned that he was very much disliked for his imperialistic ideas. Only Britain could do such things with impunity, temporarily, and the cost was more easily borne by the English masses than the Italian. It is an awkward world for a dictator when he cuts athwart what are called "British interests."
XVI

The Press and Lying

No man cares to bear the humiliation of learning he has been fooled, and that is the reason why politicians are permitted, generation after generation, to deceive the electors. Perhaps there was never a time in the history of States when liars were so plentiful in official positions as they have been since the armament race began. It is true that they have had the powerful assistance of the press. Still, the editorial writers and special correspondents, who shape public opinion, are often totally ignorant of the forces that influence their views.

The third volume of The History of The Times is a momentous revelation of the credulity of gentlemen who tell us what we should think. That Pigott could foist the forged Parnell letters upon the editors of The Times is indicative of the mental deficiencies of men in control of the news.

The story of Flora Shaw in her association with Chamberlain and Rhodes is the example par excellence of the weakness of men at the head of affairs. The attitude of the public in London, when the case of Rhodes was investigated, astounded those who knew the story of the Jameson raid. Rhodes was popular; the people cheered him; they thought he was a hero. Was he not doing great things for the Empire, countering Pan-Germanism by planning the All-Red Route in Africa? Was he not the author of the idea of a world empire for Britain?

As an American would ask “How did they get that way?” Did the morning and evening papers shape their minds and impose upon their credulity?
But, comparatively, these were side shows. The principal performances were then only taking shape in the minds of the dramatists who were to produce the tragedies of the two great wars.

It would be wrong to think that politicians at the head of affairs lie because they like it. Few really desire to deceive the people; it is the force majeure of office that is largely responsible for the notorious falsehoods that are part of the daily round of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Continuity of policy—with all its implications and secret dealings—must be maintained. Perhaps a new minister undertaking the position knows little or nothing of the commitments of his predecessors. Soon he finds out that he is the victim of the history of the department, and he learns he must either carry on the tradition and deceive the electors, or resign. Voluntary resignations, alas, are few. Office is so hard to obtain that when it comes to an ambitious politician, he thinks it is worth keeping.

Power and the emoluments that go with it are hard to resist. A halo of dignity shines about the person who is at the head of one of the first departments of State. Ribbons and stars, uniforms and medals are attractive baubles for some men, and even Americans—particularly ambassadors—are not averse to wearing orders received from other States. A Foreign Secretary once caught in the toils of the affairs of his department usually lies in the interests of his country, and these are shaped by policies which perhaps he had no part in initiating. No matter how honest he may desire to be, he has to consider the interests of the country, which have been formulated by his predecessors. It is impossible for him to give the show away.

Therefore, when the opposition "'tents him to the quick,"' he seeks refuge in the device, "'It is not in the public interest to give the information.'" The biographies of such men as Bismarck, Disraeli, Metternich, Granville, and Salisbury are mines of information on this
subject. Even the truth may cover a lie; as Bismarck said, "My policy is to tell the truth because I know it will not be believed." But the practice of falsehood in the houses of legislature ceased to be a fine diplomatic art before the turn of the century, and since that time it has been vulgarized to such an extent that the term "art" cannot be applied to it.

Since the end of the First World War, books have come from the pens of many writers who were closely associated with that disaster and its consequences. I have studied several that deal principally with propaganda. Among others there are: England’s Holy War, by Irene Cooper Willis; The Neuroses of the Nations, by Caroline E. Playne; Propaganda for War, by H. C. Peterson; and Words That Won the War, by James R. Mock and Cedric Larson. Government officials and their servitors in the press frown upon these works and suspect people who read them. They shake their heads gravely, look sad, sigh, and strike an attitude of pity. It is an old dodge, but sometimes it is quite effective. However, when they bump up against somebody who knows the tricks of the business, a swift change of demeanor takes place, and then one should be prepared for the remark, "Ah, yes, of course. It was rather unfortunate, but we had to think of the interests of the country."

In the preface to England’s Holy War, J. A. Hobson, well known to the men of a generation ago, wrote as follows:

Much has been written about the part played by Press Propaganda during the war and the period of so-called peace-making that followed. The related arts of skilled mendacity and facile credulity were a new revelation of human faculties. Most of this work was done by politicians, journalists and other literary gentlemen who deemed it to be their patriotic duty to suspend the ordinary canons of truth in the interests of victory, and to allow their inventive imagination a license fitted to the needs of the situation. . . .
If any student desires to know what war can do to the minds of men who have held high positions in literature and journalism, he should read England’s Holy War. It is a revolting exposure of minds gone mad. In comparison, picking butterflies off wall paper was the harmless pursuit of a crazed person, but to learn that those in charge of the liberal press of a country were, day after day, for four long years, smoking tobaccoless pipes and blowing imaginary rings to put their fingers through is not exaggerating the sort of dementia that affected them.

No one objected to sane efforts to save the country. Millions of people averse to the war did all they could to help the forces get it over as quickly as possible. But when the desire to crush an enemy subverts a man like A. G. Gardiner, editor of the Daily News, to write column after column of utter nonsense, one must conclude that he was bereft of all sense of his own dignity.

Irene Willis’ study of this one individual is cruelly amusing. But they are lessons that should be heeded, for from them we should learn how an attack of war fever will throw a man, who is sane on Monday, completely off balance on Tuesday, and render him a fit subject for a lunatic asylum.

The journalists, however, did not have it all to themselves. The orators escaped from the bounds of reason and indulged in flights of imagination that eclipsed all former efforts to maintain a war fever. In this business Lloyd George led the van. He ate his pre-war speeches as a schoolboy eats tartlets. He made promises that could not be kept, and turned Biblical text after text to the purpose in view, and tried to soar to an ideal heaven he knew no one was fit to enter.

In America, Woodrow Wilson, desperate to find a pretext to enter the war, found it at last in a story of the “sinking” of the Sussex, in mid-channel. Someone had invented the yarn that American lives had been lost. With this excuse he went to Congress for a declara-
tion of war. Afterwards, the navy found that the *Sussex* had not been sunk, and no American lives were lost.

All this shocking turmoil of their minds was evidence that conscience was at work and felt the twinge of guilt. Why should men, sure of their mission, lose their reason? A scientist ought to take up Nicolai’s work and give us another *Biology of War*. Here is a suggestion for the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Investigations of modern data on the subject will be startling. You may ransack volumes on the past—as far back as Thucydides and Polybius—but not until you come to the nineteenth century will you find anything comparable to the awful mental riots indulged in day after day by the men of that period.

It has been said by some of the defenders of the campaign of mendacity that most of the speakers and writers were not conscious of what they were doing; that in the heat of the struggle, they had neither the time nor the means to examine the reports that appeared in the press. That may be true, but they raised no voice against the summary treatment meted out to those who protested against the propaganda of the governments and their journalists. Then it must be admitted that, in such a disturbance, many men are prone to think the worst of the enemy and to imagine they are on the side of the righteous. Millions were affected in that way.

All of us will admit that exaggeration is as common as eating, and that we are guilty of it many times a day. Lying is not unknown to most of us, for we use that trick frequently to save ourselves a little trouble. But the lies that only affect the individual and do no harm to others are in quite another category. Those engendered by war fever not only do harm to the enemy, but also to the individual who utters them. And perhaps the gravest part of it all is that they permanently lodge in the conscience of those who are called upon to fight for truth, justice, and "democracy."
Lloyd George admitted, after Versailles, that the propaganda had made a decent peace impossible. Francesco Nitti, then Prime Minister of Italy, expressed the same notion. In his book, *The Wreck of Europe*, he has much to say on that particular point:

The recent treaties which regulate, or are supposed to regulate, the relations among peoples are, as a matter of fact, nothing but a terrible regress, the denial of all those principles which had been regarded as an inalienable conquest of public right. President Wilson, by his League of Nations, has been the most responsible factor in setting up barriers between nations.

Such a statement from an ally may surprise some people, but it is mild in comparison with many that were made by officials in the entourage of Wilson. Dr. Fred Howe, when he returned from Paris, told me what some of his colleagues thought about the treaty. Many of their remarks are unprintable. However, Nitti puts the matter in a nutshell:

... It will remain forever a terrible precedent in modern history that, against all pledges, all precedents and all traditions, the representatives of Germany were never even heard; nothing was left to them but to sign a treaty at a moment when famine and exhaustion and threat of revolution made it impossible not to sign it.

That was the consequence of the campaign of hate. Lie to win the war and kill the peace! By raising up barriers of hate, it really means that the advertised objects of the war are certain to fail. Nitti says:

... In the old canon law of the Church it was laid down that every one must have a hearing, even the devil: *Etiam diabulus audiatur* (Even the devil has the right to be heard). But the new democracy, which proposed to install the society of the nations, did not even obey the precepts which the dark Middle Ages held sacred on behalf of the accused.

But the biggest jamboree of lying and disseminating yarns that breed hatred took place in America when
George Creel organized his Committee on Public Information—the infamous C.P.I. The story is told with considerable restraint in *Words That Won the War*, by Mock and Larson. Few will remember the sensation that was caused by the publication of the Sisson documents. These purported to give the history of what was called the German-Bolshevik conspiracy. *The New York Times* came out with a headline, “Documents Prove Lenin and Trotsky Hired by Germans.” For years after the war was over, the controversy about their authenticity flared up, and to this day there are men who say that they believe they were not forgeries, although as late as 1928, Professor Frederick L. Schuman, in his book, *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*, said:

They were pronounced forgeries by Soviet representatives soon after their appearance and have been regarded as such since, even in many anti-Bolshevist circles. . . . While perhaps not entirely spurious, they show many evidences of crude fabrication and their genuineness is most questionable.

This was only one of hundreds of fakes seriously considered and published by the C.P.I. for the sole purpose of inflaming the minds of the American people. Some of George Creel’s friends raised the question whether he himself believed any of the yarns disseminated by his department.

What does it matter to ask such a question? Creel wished to win the war. The peace could look after itself. Anyone who put a verbal obstacle in the way of the war chariot was a traitor. The dear public, fighting for right against might, democracy against Kaiserism, had to swallow the hate screeds given to them for daily consumption, or else—. And all this was done by a well-known liberal—one as liberal as President Wilson himself.

With what result? I turn again to Nitti because he was intimately concerned in the making of the peace:
I believe that Europe is threatened with decadence more owing to the Peace Treaties than as a result of the war. She is in a state of daily increasing decline, and the causes of dissatisfaction are growing apace.

We now know the kind of monster the Treaty of Versailles gave birth to, and the havoc that it has raised in the world.

And what has been gained by all the lying, by implanting hate in the minds of men? Is it too much to say that the conquerors have vanquished themselves? They repeated at Potsdam the same egregious blunder they made at Versailles. Peace is farther away today than it was in the winter of 1938-39. To strike down totalitarian Germany and raise up totalitarian Russia was a feat of statesmanship that surpasses in crass stupidity all recorded military victories. What Pyrrhus would say of it, heaven only knows! If he were here and saw what had been done, I doubt whether he would have had the power of speech to express himself.

One British editor, after the war was over, published a confession: "We had to lie because the country was in danger." But it might be asked, "Why should a man gain a war and lose his own soul?" There are other dangers far more grave than military conquest. Indeed, the history of slaughter points quite clearly to this fact. No matter how much courage and nobility have been shown in the struggle by assailants and defendants, something precious has been lost that can never be regained. Remember, Nemesis saw defeat in victory, and her statue at Sunium was raised to remind the Greeks of that terrible probability.

Ancient and medieval philosophers believed firmly that man was intended to be a contemplative creature; that he was responsible for his acts; and that mind was given to him to weigh the consequences of his deeds. Shakespeare epitomized in a few sentences the problem with which a man has always to wrestle. Knowledge
of a defect in his nature gives him pause to think twice before he acts. Hamlet was conscious of this:

So, oft it chances in particular men,
That for some vicious mole of nature in them, . . .
Oft breaking down the pales and forts of reason, . . .
Carrying, I say, the stamp of one defect, . . .
Their virtues else, be they as pure as grace,
As infinite as man may undergo,
Shall in the general censure take corruption
From that particular fault: the dram of eale
Doth all the noble substance of a doubt,
To his own scandal.

"The dram of eale!" Would it were possible for us to discover this defect! Think of the people who still believe Germany was solely responsible for the First World War! In books and articles written even at this time of day, that awful lie is perpetuated. Churchill is guilty of this in *The Gathering Storm*, and no one knows better than he that there is no truth in it.

The historians of first rank and many of the best-known publicists have protested against this preposterous notion, but once a lie of that nature is sent abroad, it is almost impossible for truth to overtake it. The man who, perhaps, was in a better position than anyone else to know the facts concerning the outbreak of World War I was Sir Arthur Nicolson, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, who represented England at the Algeciras Conference. He had had the experience of over thirty-five years in European diplomacy. In the life of his father, *Lord Carnock. A Study in the Old Diplomacy*, Harold Nicolson says:

He [Sir Arthur] followed the peace negotiations with interest and apprehension. He was appalled by the Treaty of Versailles. Particularly did he resent the paragraph which obliged Germany by force to admit that she was solely responsible for the war. He considered that paragraph both undignified and meaningless. . . .
For over thirty years that lie has not only made the path to peace a muddied rut; it blocks every endeavor of those people who still believe it, but who wish "to forgive Germany so that everybody can turn over a new leaf." It is like that drop of blood on Lady Macbeth's hand—the "damnèd spot" will not out. It remains to torture the conscience of all those who desire to make the world a better and safer place to live in.

The treaty that was based upon it was a poison that entered the arteries of every political and social system in this world. As an indication of the terrible effect it had upon the statesman of the powers before the outbreak of World War II, I could quote passages from many authors, which reveal the spiritual havoc of its working at that late period. Collin Brooks, the discerning editor of *Truth*, said in his work, *Can Chamberlain Save Great Britain?*

We are not here concerned to argue the rightness of either viewpoint. We are concerned only to note the indisputable fact that, whatever the guilt of Germany in 1914 and whatever the state of her armies in 1918, she accepted an armistice on terms that were afterwards deliberately broken.

The "Treaty" was handed to her, metaphorically, on the point of a bayonet. It was, therefore, not a treaty at all, since the very word means an agreement reached by negotiation. The German Empire was stripped of its overseas possessions. These were the two most glaring breaches of faith which rankled in the bosoms of the German people long after the War had ended. That Germany should be disarmed while her small and vindictive neighbors were strongly arming rankled only less bitterly.

Nemesis! Europe is slowly dying from the poison of that lie.
I am not a political internationalist. Having had an experience of more than sixty years in America, in Great Britain, and on the Continent, it is impossible for me to see how federation is practical in Europe on a political basis. When people cite the example of the United States of America as one that the Old World might follow, they overlook several important conditions which made that union possible. First, there were no frontiers such as there are in Europe, and having none, there were no armies, tariffs, or passport restrictions.

The nucleus of the thirteen original States was strengthened by men who were determined not to commit the errors of governments they and their sires had left behind them. In principle, they were of one mind and, although their forebears were British, German, Dutch, and French, they all had the advantage of the same religious and cultural history. The success of the original federation, with the additions that were made from time to time, may be attributed to the fact that it had none of the problems which thwart such a plan for Europe. There were differences of opinion about the form of the federation, but these were resolved, for they were not complicated by a thousand and one alien matters.

It is unnecessary to go into the series of changes that have taken place—departing far from the original idea—since the Civil War. The point that I wish to make is the simple one that the work of federation was com-
paratively easy for men in the time of Washington and
Jefferson. No one would be so foolish as to imagine
that a United States could evolve from such conditions
as exist on the old Continent. Each State there has its
own national, political, and economic problems to
encounter. There are no armies on the frontiers of the
States in America, no customs officers, immigration re-
strictions, or other impediments that harass travelers
going from one country to another in Europe.

Years ago when I preached an economic and cultural
United States of Europe, I frequently placed before an
audience a map of America on the blackboard and
showed that the State frontiers were free, from Canada
to the Gulf and from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Upon it
I would afterwards place a map of Europe and describe
the difficulties of a merchant traveling from one State
to another there, when looking for orders.

In America the currency is the same in every State;
the dollars and cents of New York are equal to the dol-
lars and cents of California. In Europe each State has
its own currency, and today one of the greatest diffi-
culties for the man of commerce looking for trade is to
know, from one month to another, what the pound,
the krone, the lira, or the franc will be worth.

The problem of federating the European States has
not been thought out by the politicians who recom-
mend it. One of the prime difficulties is the language
question. There would have to be a central government,
I suppose, and each nation would send delegates. Eng-
lishmen are notoriously bad linguists, and French poli-
ticians do not shine as German scholars. The Dutch
language is not often heard in Italy, the Polish is seldom
spoken in Madrid. Esperanto is not in the running at
all. Therefore, we can imagine what the sessions would
be like.

They are quite bad enough at Lake Success where the
magnificent orations of members lose the glow of elo-
quence when the translators try to make them under-
standable to those who speak English. If one language is to be spoken by the delegates of a federated Europe in council, which one will be chosen? French was supposed to be the language of diplomacy, but I cannot imagine any full-blooded Englishman consenting to such an indignity as that of having to listen to foreign delegates speaking French.

But which capital would be chosen for the Parliament? The choice is between two—London and Paris. Again, it seems to me that no Frenchman would suffer the slight of having to live in London.

The experience at Geneva and at Lake Success should serve as examples of the futility of attempting such experiments along nationalistic, political lines. Nationalism is here to say, and there is no possible way at present of creating a United States of Europe, for no one is thinking along economic and cultural lines. Moreover, no one suggests that the frontiers, bristling with armies, should be abolished.

There is some talk about free trade, but it is being recommended by agents of the power that has the highest tariff of all, behind which she isolates her trade and makes her taxpayers pay the penalty of protection, which was initiated to give her infant industries a chance to thrive sixty years ago. If we were all not so sad about the political afflictions that beset us, we might smile at the comedy that is being played. One of the very funny scenes in the production is that of America educating Europeans, either in morals or in merely secular knowledge.

But no one laughs. Although each year brings innumerable books to our notice, indicating that the American system of education is a sheer racket fostered by bureaucrats, there are do-gooders at Washington who are ready to offer their advice to the British and continental peoples on how they should conduct themselves. The bunkum that is written about our way of life is supposed to impress European politicians and educa-
tionists with the notion that all is well in the schools and universities. Yet, it is pointed out by shrewd observers (whose books, of course, are not read, and seldom reviewed) that Americans generally know less about the real Europe now than they did at the time of the Civil War.

The cultivated European, after spending a few weeks in the States, either for pleasure or business, will tell you, privately, that the people he meets in commerce and society are unforgivably ignorant of what is going on in Europe. To my mind, it is utterly impossible for an Englishman who does not live in America to know the country. I have met many Americans who have lived in England and, although most of them, to use the phrase of Ambassador Page, have fallen for the silkstocking business and the society of the nobility, they have revealed a lamentable lack of knowledge not only of English history but also of the condition of the English masses.

Let us be frank with ourselves and admit that there is no useful reason why men of either country should, in the gadget age, know these things. They could not use the knowledge in their business, and why should they store it if they had the chance to gather it? This is a workaday world; it is not a university library. This is the day of easily swallowed food, masticated information, and second-hand pleasures, such as phonographs, radio, and television. People now dispense with the real thing; most of our delights are proffered synthetically.

We are all pupils in the School of Nonsense. Only a small percentage in Britain and in America escape from it into the laboratories of the scientist and the studios of the technocrat. Having in mind the billions spent upon education, the percentage of youths who free themselves from the ordinary courses is absurdly small. Those who choose medicine, dentistry, and law make a better showing in number than the former class. But
even they complain, after a few years' practice, that they regret they had no chance to equip themselves with a cultural background. A highly skilled physician, speaking about the culture of Sir William Osler, once asked me: "Where the hell did he get the time to study Greek?" Specialization in the service professions is responsible for the defects so noticeable in social intercourse.

A difficult question to answer is: Will America be represented in a United States of Europe? It is a pertinent inquiry because all are more or less subservient to Washington for parish relief, and the fear is that the man who pays the piper will call the tune. America is now committed, in Europe, up to her neck, and she cannot very well withdraw from the problems she has created in that sphere. Her power and influence over Britain and the Continent are feared by the politicians of every State there. And well they might be!

Marshal Foch was a very wise man when he told Wickham Steed, the editor of The Times, that "he feared what he called an 'American peace' if the war [of 1914-18] should go on throughout the winter. American forces were still reaching Europe in large numbers, and might have been numerically superior to those of France and Britain in the spring of 1919. Then, Foch imagined, the United States would insist on taking over the supreme command." Steed revealed this very interesting information in an article published in Picture Post, January 23, 1943.

If Foch had reason to fear the American forces then, British and European politicians have more reason to fear the financial and commercial forces upon which the old countries now depend. It would be stupid to overlook the possibility of another President of the United States saying, as Coolidge did, "They hired the money, and why shouldn't they pay it," or at least as much as can be ground out of them? Have we not seen fights for freedom that have ended in slave conditions more severe than those that caused the revolt?
It is best to be brutally frank about these matters. Nothing can be gained by soft-pedalling the loud passages of the tone poem. It is just as well for the brass choir to make itself heard distinctly. America is in Europe, and her commitments—entirely apart from those of what is called charity—are immense. Access to the Near East is necessary, and in this respect the Mediterranean is no longer a British lake, for many other products besides oil are indispensable to the exploiters of natural resources. The sums of money that have been sunk in projects extending from the coast of Palestine to the Persian Gulf must be enormous. Moreover, if Truman is to develop the backward areas, he will want the best terms he can get in the way of fixity of tenure and privilege to exploit them. It is neither here nor there to say that he is ready to do beyond his shores what he might do within his own area, where, so far, natural resources have been only scratched. The low cost of labor in the backward countries is one of the most attractive features that draw American concessionaires to develop far-off foreign lands.

To what extent bona fide Americans are concerned in the mineral values of the Dead Sea is not known. But it may easily be surmised that they have not been left out in the cold, for the first Lord Melchett devoted much time to the matter of placing before his American friends the advantages of getting in on the ground floor. These are only a few of the stakes in the Near East that are worth considering before the next war begins. There is enough dynamite in them to blow the world to smithereens. The fact that America is in Europe to stay should be considered gravely by the western bloc before it commits itself to some insane pledge to assist America to pick the plums, when she is ready to make the harvest.

Those of us who matriculated in the School of Nonsense, which began its courses toward the end of the nineteenth century, are now honor students. We have
taken our certificates *cum laude*. On entering a new world crisis, we forgot what we had learned in the past one, and had to repeat the same old course, and earn the same old certificate of stupidity. Because we do not benefit by the instruction of experience, the doors of the School of Nonsense will remain wide open to enroll pupils generation after generation.

It is just as well that Britishers and continentalists should ponder the difference between political internationalism and economic and cultural internationalism. They are poles apart. The old saying voiced by Renan, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Victor Hugo, and many others—"Europe must be one"—was not a State aim, and had nothing whatever to do with national sovereignty in a political sense. These men meant economic and cultural unity, the abandonment of armies and navies, the removal of tariff barriers and all the impediments which restrict the free intercourse of people. Cobden expressed it in his famous pamphlet, entitled *Russia*, published in 1836: "As little intercourse as possible betwixt the Governments, as much connexion as possible between the nations of the world."

Those who today are flirting with the phrase, "Europe must be one," are neither honest with themselves nor with the people they address. Politicians of high rank who have been guilty of this offense know that it is impossible to place the ideals of Bakunin, Renan, and Tolstoy before the people. They have used the subject for a mere talking point, and perhaps their auditors guess this is the case, for there has been no public response whatever to any appeal that has been made.

How is it possible for anyone to be so simple-minded as to imagine that, at this time of day, national frontiers will disappear and with them the armies of the powers? Hitler is the only person who was in a position to make such a suggestion, and that was set forth before he began to rearm Germany. The Great Powers could not even give it serious consideration. For them to abandon
their armies and all the impedimenta of war would mean an industrial crisis leading to revolution. So long as the State dominates the lives of the people, armies and navies will be necessary, for it is born of conquest and its survival depends on force. Political nationalism is the enemy of cultural union.

The powers that ruled the affairs of state a hundred years ago feared the people. Today the same powers fear them more than ever. That is why they have educated them to the view that a loaf given by the government is far more precious than the right to have the opportunity to earn it.

Hungry people nowadays have not the understanding to demand the right to use the source from which bread may be produced, so when they revolt, they have no constructive aim in view; they become forces of disruption. No one knew that better than Lenin. How, then, is it possible for the people of Europe, or the western bloc, to give deep consideration to such a purely intellectual and spiritual aspiration as a United States of Europe? The idea is so foreign to the mobocracies of the world today that we may as well make up our minds that the present preaching of the apostles of a United States of Europe is nothing more than a confession of inability to do anything constructive for Europe. It serves as a meaningless text for a sermon of hoary platitudes.

All these expedients and make-shifts are proffered in lieu of a restoration of rights. Two generations ago the American and British peoples would have made a lively response to the demand of Isaiah to be "a restorer of paths to dwell in" and to "build the old waste places." All the prophets of old realized that the problem of prime importance was poverty, and this has been the burden of the complaint civilization after civilization. Aristotle said, "Poverty is the parent of revolution and crime."
The Fathers of the Church recognized the truth of that. Through medieval times, and in many periods after the so-called Renaissance, it was the specter that haunted the minds of philosophers and politicians. Its ugly head was raised again after the so-called Industrial Revolution and the specter is with us still. And, now, both Church and State seem impotent to deal with it.

Every expedient has been tried to banish it from the thought of men, but alas, war after war, the frightful thing possesses our minds. Poverty is the enemy of the politicians of the west. It threatens them with extinction, as it did in Russia, as it is doing in many countries behind the iron curtain. Communism thrives upon it; all Socialist tenets would die of inanition without it. It is the greatest of all the problems that now confront the men of the west, and yet there is not one man of political influence who has the faintest conception of how to rid his people of its dread presence.

A leading British general told me in 1949 that nothing but a domestic disaster would bring the people to their senses. I think he was right. Certainly the indifference of the crowd to the matter of studying the causes of their plight is about as discouraging as anything that is taking place.

It is quite a new idea that Englishmen should be victims of parish relief. When I was a boy, a robust man or woman who could not fend for himself or herself was looked upon as a ne'er-do-well. In that day the State did little or nothing for the incapable. The sick, the blind, and the halt, to a great extent, were cared for by individuals and their institutions. Now the prevalent idea seems to be that the State owes a robust person a living. This notion is at variance with every one held by our grandfathers.

And how has it come about? Why, by taking the first penny for assistance. And the excuse is that we had to fight a war to save civilization. Does it not seem strange
that civilization calls for a very costly outlay in morals, dignity, and wealth when it has to be saved?

Let us be quite clear about this relief business and estimate it at its true value. Loan relief and Marshall aid are not charitable endeavors to help continental peoples. The chief reason for food and other commodities being sent to Europe is that America must offload its surplus of these things. Under mass production, it is necessary to export about 10 per cent of what is produced in America in order to avoid unemployment. The wheels of industry must be kept spinning and the machinery geared to turn out an approximately fixed volume of goods. Such has been the case since the adoption of the high-tariff system nearly sixty years ago.

Now, however, much of the surplus is bonus produced, particularly in the case of foods. The bonuses are financial cocktails to keep prices high. America must get rid of her surpluses, because she cannot afford to have full barns and packed warehouses. A stored plenitude would mean bad trade, unemployment; and at the elections, voters might desire the opposition to take the place of the administration. That is one of the chief reasons why every nefarious trick is utilized to keep the voter in a good humor.

Suppose there were a great drought next year in America. What would happen to the European relief business? There are millions today in the States who do not get sufficient food to maintain health. What would occur if the American people had to go short, owing to a bad harvest? Have Europeans thought about this? It is worth turning over in their minds, because there have been droughts and floods that have caused much misery through hunger. Is it wise to rely on a beneficent patron, thinking there is no bottom to his purse? Is it not better for a man to fend for himself than to rely on others to keep him going?

There is another side to this matter that should be considered, and it is important. How many realize that
the American taxpayer has to foot the cost of the relief that goes to Europe? The administration does not produce; it does not store the wheat in barns and pile the machinery into warehouses. The administration is a parasite; it lives upon the taxpayer, and any gifts it makes come from the earnings of labor and capital.

Washington reports:

The new fourteen-member Foreign Agricultural Trade Policy Advisory Committee today heard a complete resume of the mounting threat of domestic surpluses, chief problem confronting this group of experts.

Figures compiled on the status of government price-support programs of October, 1949, show that over three billion dollars are tied up in farm commodities. These surplus products are not for the American consumer to enjoy. They cannot be put on the market to depress prices. They must be given away, but the democracy in America does not know that it is not only paying for the abundance to go to charity but that it will have to foot the bill for freight and insurance when it is sent abroad.

Yet, there are people in Britain today who blame many of their woes upon the way the tricks of the business are played by the politicians in Washington. Some of the London newspapers accuse Congress and Wall Street of conspiring against recovery in England. They might reflect a moment and ask themselves where England would be, had not the generosity of the American taxpayers saved her from defeat.

The situation in America has become so desperate that scarcely a day passes without some reference in the financial columns to the scarcity of risk capital. What does that mean? It is difficult for industry to expand and to equip itself with new machinery. Long articles written by financial experts appear in the press, and the statements made by banks warn the government of the dangers of excessive taxation.
No one, of course, would dream of British and continental people offering a vote of thanks to the American taxpayer for the generosity that most of them know nothing about. They are like the roped bull; they do not know why they go round and round the stake. But if a drought should come or a trade depression, they might suddenly realize that they have the strength to pull the stake up and cut loose. Then there would be trouble.

Twenty years ago there was a world crisis in trade, and the administrations tried every dodge ever invented by Satan to stem the untowardness of events and the general woe. Each trick failed. Shortly before the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor, the labor bureau at Washington estimated that there were eleven million unemployed in the country. For more than eight years Roosevelt and his coterie tried every bureaucratic device to solve the problem, without success. And he had the assistance of what was called a “Brain Trust,” a selected band of Fabians who were adepts at the blueprint business and at planning utopias for working men. Yet, all the brains and all the plans failed to lift the depression and its consequences.

The Japanese, by dropping bombs upon the fleet at Pearl Harbor, did more in a short hour to set the wheels of American industry going again than the academic Fabians had done in eight years. It is just as well to remember some of the things that happened in the past. From them we may gather a few hints of what might occur in the future. The man who thinks he can rely upon the administration in power, or his representative in the legislature, is deluding himself. He ought to realize by now that for the past fifty years his political idols have been suffering from trench foot. The makers of cabinets and assemblies who put their faith in politicians are not historically minded. Perhaps it is too much trouble to learn what ails them.
When the ordinary elector has an aching tooth, he generally goes to a dentist. But when the purchasing power of his pound or his dollar dwindles, and it is more difficult for his wife to fill the larder, he does not take the trouble to find out why life is so hard for him. Probably the reason for this is that he lives in a democracy—a democracy that is socialistic. But whether one or the other, a bureaucracy is battening upon his produce. And so satisfied is he with this crippling business that, when the bugles sound and the drums rattle, he girds on the instruments of warfare and goes out again to save civilization.
XVIII

The Anschluss

The underlying grievances of European States drawn into the First World War were seldom discussed either in the legislative bodies or by authors whose books appeared after the race for armaments began. The leading journals of the various countries of Europe dealt with the war-froth but seldom referred to the sediment at the bottom of the jug. The Parisian press was well paid by Russia to put her side of the case and suppress anything that would give the people an inkling of the real causes of friction between the powers. The liberal press in England, mainly pacifist, dealt with the dangers of the growth of armaments and the foreign policy of Sir Edward Grey. The far deeper questions about the cause of the commercial rivalries between Great Britain and Germany, on the one hand, and the "security" of the heavy industries of France, on the other, were not even sketched in lightly in editorial or article from the time of the Agadir crisis.

As for Austria and the underground work of the Pan-Slav in the Balkans, little or nothing was said that would enlighten the public about the true state of affairs. Two of the most important matters were completely hidden from the people. These were: the Franco-Russian secret treaties of the nineties, and the secret conversations of the British and French staffs.

Now, in dealing with the events that led up to the invasion of Poland in 1939, we find that the record shows the same policy of suppression of vital facts maintained by Britain, France, Poland, and the Little En-
tente. Indeed, Europe went to war in September, 1939, over problems that most of the statesmen knew very little about. Consider the Anschluss. If they did know the actual feeling of the people of Austria, they failed to give the information to their parliaments. In the reports made by British and French ministers I find no reference at all to the endeavor of the Austrians to cement a customs union with Germany in 1931—two years before the appearance of Hitler. It is true the Hague Court of International Justice decided by a majority of one that such an agreement would be illegal. A year after Hitler became head of the Reich, there was a revolt of the Austrian Nazis. It was reported that 20,000 of them were imprisoned and some tens of thousands took refuge in Germany.

The French Government, acting in the interests of the international bankers, was determined to do everything in its power to defeat the Anschluss. France had withdrawn her credits from Austria and Germany, causing the failure of many banks in both countries. The powers behind the politicians had gathered in force to impose their will upon the legislatures. Great Britain and France made threats they knew they could not carry out—threats which aggravated the dissentients in Austria.

The Encyclopaedia Britannica says:

... A new Government was now formed under Dr. Buresch, who was succeeded on May 20th, 1932, by Dr. Dollfuss. The Government had a majority of only one vote, but in August just secured the adoption of the Lausanne Protocol which gave Austria a new loan of £9,000,000 under humiliating conditions, including the renunciation for 20 years of a customs union with Germany, and strict financial control. (Italics mine)

The most important business transacted appeared to be that of loans; but the gentlemen who wished to perpetuate that system did not know that many Austrians had learned something about it and its power since the breakup of the empire.
I was in Vienna in 1921, 1928, and 1929, and had the opportunity of learning how the people generally felt about the conditions which had reduced so many to poverty. Luckily I knew Gentiles and Jews. From one and all with whom I came in contact I was told: "This state of affairs cannot be endured." Another remark often heard was: "The Allies are strangling us!"

The Socialist party was split into three opposing sections, and the great mass of the workers and small shopkeepers did not know to which one they should give their support. I saw clearly that the mental tumult meant no good for the Western Allies and that, if their policy was not radically changed in the near future, there would be nothing left for Austrians to do but look for support from Germany.

What occurred ten years later was no surprise to me. Indeed, I had been looking for it for a long time. As far back as April and May, 1921, an indication of what would happen, if the people were free to vote, was shown in the plebiscites that took place in the Tyrol and at Salzburg. The votes in the former were over 140,000 for the Anschluss and only 1,794 against. In Salzburg, more than 100,000 voted for union, and only 800 against. This was twelve years before Hitler became Reichsführer.

When Schuschnigg announced his plebiscite in 1938, after breaking his promise made at Berchtesgaden, Hitler marched into Austria without the crack of a gun. He was welcomed everywhere as a savior, and when the Schuschnigg announcement for a plebiscite was revoked and Hitler's substituted for it, the Austrian people voted 99 per cent in favor of reunion with Germany.

It was not necessary for Hitler's army to fire a shot. The Germans of Austria surrendered without a pang. They had waited eagerly for the day of emancipation, and many of them had so much faith in the slogans of the peace-loving democracies that they thought their act of self-determination would be welcomed joyfully.
Foolish Austrians! They did not know that the chatter about self-determination was mere chatter and nothing else.

Let us now consider how these events were regarded by the statesmen of France and Britain. Many of the newspapers of the Western Allies spoke of "the rape of Austria." Their readers were told that the electors of the country had been bludgeoned to the poll. Allied statesmen convinced themselves that 99 per cent of the people had been coerced, and that the great reception given to Hitler in Vienna was a demonstration of an "unwilling mob got up by Nazi agents." On March 24, 1938, Churchill spoke about "standing by to see Czechoslovakia poleaxed or tortured as Austria had been."

There seemed to be no limit to the self-delusion of Allied statesmen. All the twaddle about self-determination was forgotten. They willfully overlooked the fact that there were present in Vienna at the time journalists who knew the truth, and that Austrians corresponded with people in various countries and sent versions of the plebiscite, which flatly contradicted the reports in so many of the newspapers.

The fact about the achievement of the Anschluss was that the chancelleries of the Western Allies never believed it was possible, and gave information to their Foreign Ministers which was manufactured for them by Schuschnigg and his friends. They swallowed whole the diplomatic propaganda especially fabricated for them. We now know how that was done, and how the gullible statesmen were led astray.

Whether the taxpayer thinks it was right or wrong for Hitler to go into Austria, reject Schuschnigg's announced plebiscite, and substitute one of his own, is neither here nor there. The matter that concerns us now is: what actually happened, why it happened, and what was accomplished, because we want to learn from the past what to avoid in the future. The men who are in
charge of affairs for the Western Allies at the present time are just as likely to be taken in, when another crisis looms up, as their predecessors were. The chancelleries are working full blast, the international bankers are busy again, and the heavy industries are putting in the last rivets of the machine to be used in the next war.

When your neighbor asks, "Are you defending Hitler?" do not be afraid. It should not be possible for that old dodge to be worked now.

The question, in such cases, is often put as a defense, thrown up to shield the doubts lingering in the mind of the war patriot. Stand your ground and do not let the inquiry be sidetracked by such a palpable device! Hitler was a protagonist, the leader of the Nazis, and his actions must be considered with the same searching criticism as those of any other person engaged in the quarrel. This inquiry is not for the purpose of defending this or that politician, but solely to learn what happened and whether it was possible to avert a war.

Hitler appeared first as an agitator, and the impression that he made upon statesmen did not amount to much, because he was portrayed by the cartoonists and the press as something of a bewildered, slapstick comedian. However, when he became a protagonist, some politicians of the western powers were seriously disturbed. But he made his appearance at the head of the German people in the last acts of the drama that was working speedily to its dénouement. No one seemed to realize that the situation in which he played a part was all made for him. He did not make it.

Now consider Churchill. When he was in opposition, the Conservative party could not find a cabinet position for him. He played a lone hand for many years. Therefore, Hitler as an agitator and Churchill, on an opposition bench, were playing small parts with very little likelihood of leading the cast.

None of the chief characters can be isolated and judged apart from the events that shaped the European drama.
We might never have heard of Hamlet if the ghost had remained in his prison house. And surely Othello is the creation of Iago. One cannot be thought of without the other. Reasoning this way, it is easy for us to see that Hitler at the head of the German people was Churchill’s political adversary. History provided the schema in which both enacted their roles. Without Hitler and the background of the events that spurred him to act, Churchill might never have held office again. Only by examining the nature of the roles of the principals in the cast of characters is it possible to see the drama as a whole and understand the long series of events that made it possible.

This notion will surprise his supporters, but in his third volume, The Grand Alliance, he states, quite frankly: “I have only one purpose, the destruction of Hitler, and my life is much simplified thereby.”

“Only one purpose!” For Churchill it was simply a personal affair.

In reading the notes inscribed by Fate when this tragedy was put together, one is struck with the startling fact that the events were greater than the players. Sometimes they seem like marionettes, whose strings are pulled by some unknown manipulator. Often enough, they are victims of their own devices, and are thrown into situations that they would have avoided at all costs, had they known what the future held in store for them. But Fate moves on relentlessly and holds them in her grip. Her verdict is, “All are guilty.”

The matter that concerns us is not a question of whether this man or that man was responsible for creating a crisis, but whether our statesmen were capable of averting a war. Remember, there are in the three chief allied countries the same types of men conducting affairs now that were dominant during World War II. The delegates of the United Nations are of the same class of men who made the League of Nations a laughing stock. Therefore, it is far more important to fix the mind upon
whatever facts can be gathered about the underlying causes of World War II, than to waste time on finding reasons for blaming this or that particular person for our present condition.

A lesson of how not to do things of this character may be learned from the speeches of Churchill, collected in a volume called *While England Slept*. The first one is dated October, 1928, and the last one March, 1938. They all deal with questions of European armament; but only the fringes of the strange events that were taking place in European countries are touched upon. The burden of the lamentations is, "Arm for peace."

It will, of course, be difficult for a British reader to disregard the fact that most of Mr. Churchill's statements upon the arming of the Nazis were based upon information which is now rejected by American military staff experts. His belief in arms as a preventive of war is one of the most curious aberrations that ever haunted the mind of a politician. Perhaps it would not signify much if these notions of his were expressed by a neophyte, but he had the whole experience of World War I to draw upon. It is impossible to imagine forces better prepared for war than those that stood up against Germany and Austria thirty-six years ago. Indeed, so sure were the military experts that their armies and navies were fully prepared that, as I have remarked before, Lord Esher said he did not meet a man in 1914 who did not believe the war would be over in six months.

So little did Churchill heed the experience of World War I that, in his speech of March 26, 1936, he said: "I desire to see the collective forces of the world invested with overwhelming power."

At that time France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and the Balkans were armed to the teeth, combining an "overwhelming power" against some 300,000 German soldiers. The reason why he wanted these gigantic forces was "to have an opportunity of a settlement which will heal the wounds of the world."
Nowhere can one find a practical statement of what the wounds were. Save for mentioning one or two of the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles (references thrown off lightly to appease the enfeebled Liberals in the House), he shirks the exploration of any avenue that would lead to an adjustment of grievances. It would be impolite even to think that he did not know of the many petitions that had been made, over and over again, to the League of Nations to consider the complaints of the enemy. He was a statesman and a great supporter of the League; it may be taken for granted that he was interested in the questions with which it had to deal.

Never once does he come to grips with the matter of healing the wounds, and one may infer that he had good political reasons for not doing so; one is that it would have given offense to the French chauvinists and their satellites. The Bullitt-Mandel combination in Paris was dead against any "healing-of-the-wounds" business, and the obdurate Beneš, in Prague, had provoked the minorities (which comprised nearly 50 per cent of the people of his State) to such lengths that they were eager for any event that would free them from his clutches.

Yet, Churchill never seems to be aware of the conflict of opinion with France about the wisdom of interfering in the quarrels of opposing factions in Austria and Czechoslovakia. The French masses showed no war feeling. They were more concerned about domestic problems. Perhaps, in March, 1938, the French artisans knew more about the Anschluss and how it had been brought about than Mr. Churchill did. I do not find in any of his speeches that I have read upon this matter a glimmer of light, which reveals his having any true knowledge of the question.

Here is his description:

... The public mind has been concentrated upon the moral and sentimental aspects of the Nazi conquest of Austria—a
small country brutally struck down, its Government scattered to the winds, the oppression of the Nazi party doctrine imposed upon a Catholic population and upon the working-classes of Austria and of Vienna, the hard ill-usage of persecution which indeed will ensue—which is probably in progress at the moment—of those who, this time last week, were exercising their undoubted political rights, discharging their duties faithfully to their own country.

Did he take the trouble to check the information upon which this statement was based? He was not there; he was not a witness. And, therefore, he must have relied upon hearsay. I have several books written by eyewitnesses, who were no friends of the Nazis, which tell an entirely different story. Who is to be believed—the man who was in London or the witnesses on the spot, who corroborate one another? Perhaps Mr. Churchill, when he made this statement in the House of Commons, thought he was doing something to ‘‘heal the wounds of the world.’’

Did he know that he was playing into the hands of warmongers and their press? Did he realize for a moment that he was giving false information to the taxpayers? But this is only one instance of many such performances of his.

Every demand he made for more arms was accompanied by a series of well-worn moral platitudes. He was always very strong on political ethics and the morality of the peace-loving nations. A dangerous autocrat by nature—as he was often described by his friends before World War I—he seemed to be conscious that the best way he could disarm his opponents in Britain was by wrapping up his real intentions in moral script. Let it be said to his credit, as a parliamentarian, that his methods were usually successful.
XIX

The Czechoslovak Minorities

The more one studies the complications of the many-sided crises which arose in Austria and in Czechoslovakia, the more difficult it is to understand how statesmen in London and in Paris succeeded in deceiving the people about the underlying causes of these upheavals. How any man could think the wounds of the world were to be healed by ignoring the truth about the desires of the minorities, and the hope of the Austrians for a union with Germany, is a conundrum that cannot be answered.

It would be absurd to say that the statesmen of Great Britain and France were ignorant of the facts; but those who accuse them of willfully ignoring them have made a case that stands on cross examination. There are now books enough to which the student may turn to find a totally different version of the Anschluss—one that flatly contradicts the views of the popular press circulated in the spring of 1938. Major Francis Yeats-Brown, who published European Jungle in 1940, is one author who was present at the time of Hitler's plebiscite, who may be consulted. His story of what happened corroborates those of other eyewitnesses.

Mr. Churchill's desire to do something to heal the wounds of the world was thwarted by his notion of what had taken place in Austria. I have read his writings and speeches carefully, but in none of them does he meet the situation with a practical suggestion of how it was to be done. Some of his friends will resent this imputation and be ready to point out that in the speech
referred to above (delivered March 24, 1938), he suggested “the League of Nations, or some other body” to consider the Sudeten question. The League of Nations! He must have known, when he made the suggestion, that the minorities in Czechoslovakia had sent petition after petition to Geneva without serious consideration being given to them. The situation in April, 1920, was as follows:

... More than five million Germans, Magyars, and people of other nationalities have not a single representative in this National Assembly, and all claims advanced by them have been waived aside by the Czechs. All the fundamental laws concerning the Constitution, and the language to be used in its administration, as regards social reform, the expropriation of land, etc., have been determined by this arbitrarily formed National Assembly without a single German-Bohemian or Magyar having been allowed a voice. . . .

A full report, corroborating earlier advices about the conditions under which the Germans, the Slovaks, and the Hungarians lived in Czechoslovakia, was published in *Foreign Affairs*, in April, 1920. Similar information came from many sources. The last sentences of the *Foreign Affairs* article contain a warning that neither Mr. Churchill nor the British and French Prime Ministers heeded:

... Unless the Czechs completely alter their policy, Central Europe will in the near future again be prostrate and ruined by the ravages of war, revolution, and economic disorganisation, and Czech imperialism in its turn will be overthrown, as German and Russian imperialism have been.

It was never said that the information came from untrustworthy sources. For eighteen years the minorities in Czechoslovakia petitioned the League of Nations to consider their grievances. When at last their disaffections brought about the crisis of 1938, Mr. Churchill had nothing to suggest but another petition to the League of Nations!
Professor Roberts, in *The House that Hitler Built*, states that the Germans "in their resentment lodged nineteen petitions before the League of Nations in six years but without much result." The attitude taken by Mr. Churchill shows, as I read his writings and his published speeches, that he did not take the trouble to gather information about the matter. If he did, he kept it to himself. Two months after he delivered his speech in the House of Commons, Erich Posselt published an article in *The American Mercury* for May, 1938, upon the problems of the minorities in Czechoslovakia, which contained much knowledge that had been hidden from the British and American taxpayers.

The Sudeten affair had been a burning question in Central Europe ever since Beneš became responsible for the fate of the minorities. These, and the Anschluss, were long-standing matters calling for consideration. They did not suddenly spring up after Hitler became Führer. The Western Allies, informed perhaps by Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. Eden, and other high priests of the temple at Geneva, let things slide. They probably thought that the wounds would heal themselves.

It is only when the international boil nears the lancing stage that the diplomatic doctors bestir themselves. Then poultices, fomentations, and salves are prescribed without avail. When the horrible thing bursts, their governments present them with stars and ribbons. The incompetency of ministers of state, their delegates to the League of Nations, and their diplomatists in the chancelleries, is an evil that has struck down Europe. Politicians have no one but themselves to blame for the afflictions their peoples have to bear.

The greatest blunder of all was made at Munich. There the opportunity was given to bring Hitler down to brass tacks, and it was missed. Presumably Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini were so glad to have the Sudeten matter "settled" that they did not think of the outstanding questions which the Munich agreement would
bring to the fore. What was considered the most ridiculous thing done by the men at Versailles was overlooked. The Danzig Corridor affair was then as sinister as the Sudeten question had ever been. Imagine neglecting to deal with it, when they had the chance! They were three against one and did not know their strength. Of course, one can never say in this political world when anything is settled, but there is no excuse whatever for neglecting the opportunity of making an attempt to clear the air, if nothing else were done.

I have spent several hours in going once more through 400 pages of Chapters IX and X in the second volume of *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, published by His Majesty's Stationery Office. I realized the first time I read these dispatches and reports from diplomats to the London Government that Hitler, if met fairly and squarely, could have been nailed down to reasonable agreement about the settlement of these questions. The very fact that he met the proposals of Chamberlain and Daladier was sufficient to convince me that he could be brought round to an amenable position. With all his impatience, bluster, and show of temper, he was never quite sure of himself. The psychology of the thing is most interesting.

So uncertain was he, according to these dispatches, that it seems to me he wished to be saved from himself. I am not a psychologist, but for years in my early days while reading plays for production, I had to perform diagnoses that would puzzle a trained psychologist, if there be such a person. This assertion may be treated lightly by those who have no idea of the work that has to be done by a producer before he puts a play into rehearsal. To know every character, all the elements of his mental make-up, why he is actuated to do certain things, and how he imposes upon people to make them victims of his will is a study in psychology that few men experience in their clinics.
Let us read the two conversations in the documents listed as No. 1118 and No. 1129. These took place between Sir Horace Wilson and Herr Hitler on September 26, 1938 and September 27, 1938, respectively. What is to be made of the following:

Herr Hitler then asked whether it meant that we had abandoned our role of intermediary when we put forward the idea of direct Czech-German negotiations.

Sir Horace Wilson said it did not and that we still hoped to exercise a useful influence with the Czechs and we believed we could push through a quick agreement in accordance with the basic German requirements.

Herr Hitler then asked if he might put another question. Could he publish the fact that the Czechs had rejected his memorandum, or was it confidential?

Sir Horace Wilson and Sir Nevile Henderson explained that it was confidential because we still hoped to move the Czechs in the direction of a settlement. We hoped that in his speech Herr Hitler would not slam the door.

Herr Hitler replied that he hoped that Sir Horace Wilson would be present at the Sportpalast, where he could sense the feelings of the German people.

Sir Horace Wilson said that he doubted if he would have time to go, but he would certainly listen on the wireless.

Herr Hitler said that he must go in person or he would not get an impression of the intense feeling animating the German people.

Anyhow it was no use talking any further. The time for action had come.

Sir Horace Wilson said he would think over the position and would ask to be received again on the following day.

Herr Hitler indicated assent.

No strong men would shift about in that way. Here is the portrait of a temperamental creature in an agony of doubt. No man sure of himself and the rightness of his case would have postponed, in such circumstances,
mobilization for twenty-four hours, even at the request of a Mussolini!

It may be asked to what extent Hitler was affected by the British press and the warmongers in the House of Commons. Sir Nevile Henderson wired from Berlin, on September 28, 1938, to Halifax: “Issue is still in balance. I need not urge importance of appealing to House of Commons not to aggravate the situation by attacks on Herr Hitler and National Socialism.”

Yes, the attacks referred to did a lot to heal the wounds of the world!

Now strong men, when they meet face to face to discuss a matter of deep importance, realize the meeting is useless unless they come to an understanding. The period for bluffing is gone. Each knows that the other desires a settlement in his own way, if possible; but if not, a compromise. Otherwise, the meeting has been in vain.

Unfortunately for the European States, the strong men since Bonaparte can be counted on one hand. Up until the time of the Moroccan affair, they were free of international obligations and had only the interests of their own countries to consider. But the politicians of our time have been entangled in alliances and secret understandings that have frustrated their efforts to keep the peace. They have been handicapped by provisions of secret treaties, the work of concessionaires, and such organizations as the Comité du Maroc. They have not been free agents.

Considering them from the other standpoint of readers of character, they would fail to pass a fourth-grade test.

The make-up of a dynamic person is not only shaped by his own spiritual power; it owes much to the accumulated national tradition of which he is a scion. Environment molds him and, at the same time, provides the avenue along which he will move toward his desire. Right or wrong in his mission, he is himself—plus the
circumstances of the past and the immediate crisis that has evolved from them. The drama of history makes the actor. However, when he is assailed by the conflicting forces his action has aroused, he soon becomes a victim of a hundred heterogeneous problems he never dreamed would block his path.

Hence, only four men within the past two hundred years have risen superior to the impediments of opposition. They were: Washington, Bonaparte, Lincoln, and Bismarck. But what a cruel jade is time! Think of all the work they strove to accomplish and the ruin under which their hopes lie buried!

Some Acton of the future, when he sets to work upon the real history of these fifty years, will make a merciless exposure of the stupidities of the men responsible for the present woe. Already there is an abundance of material upon which he can set to work, notwithstanding the destruction of documents that took place during the war. It startles one to read the various sources and find evidence of the utter misunderstanding for which ministers and journalists were responsible.

Perhaps it will be said that the distorted presentment of Hitler’s portrait was the most profound mistake made, and that it thwarted every well-intentioned effort to keep the peace. Churchill’s astonishing encomiums were publicized when it was far too late for them to have effect. There were many others, not so lavish but sincerely offered, that were utterly ignored. I could mention more than a dozen well-informed observers, who had little or nothing to do with politics, who met the man face to face; although they were utterly opposed to him as a totalitarian, their remarks show a person quite foreign to the one presented to the masses.

Let us take one delineation of this enigmatic creature, which is similar to others. In reading Professor Roberts’ chapter on “The Riddle of Hitler,” I can scarcely believe such a person he describes had anything in common with
the creature depicted by propagandists. Roberts, after a shrewd analysis of his character, says:

... He applies a general principle of an intuitive solution to a question complicated by centuries of history and arrives at some delusively simple outcome. Mein Kampf gives him away in this. After its publication he could never again claim subtlety of analysis or breadth of vision. His own autobiography reveals his mental processes to all mankind.

But he is transparently honest. He believes what he is saying, and throws every ounce of nervous energy into all that he says or does, even when he is answering the most casual question (this stands out as my keenest impression when I spoke to him in the Deutscher Hof). Nobody can doubt his utter sincerity. He cannot help himself; he cannot restrain himself. He is completely absorbed in the statement or policy of the moment. That explains why he carries the crowds with him—because he believes so utterly, so appallingly, in what he is saying. (Italics mine)

Such was the person Roberts encountered two years before the European conflagration took place.

Perhaps one of the most interesting documents in the volume I have been dealing with is No. 1228: "Note of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and Herr Hitler, September 30, 1938, at the latter’s Flat in Munich." The record was made by Dr. Schmidt, the interpreter. It was sent to Mr. Chamberlain after he had left Munich, and was generally confirmed by him. But the editors add: "This confirmation cannot be taken as an acceptance of the verbal accuracy of the record."

Nevertheless, it was not contradicted. This conversation is a revelation of what is possible when two men—even when they do not know each other’s language and are dependent upon an interpreter—sit down to discuss the most serious questions without the slightest animus.

Toward the end of the meeting, Chamberlain told Hitler that he had ventured to draft a short statement concerning agreement between them on the desirability of better Anglo-German relations. He proposed that the
Führer and himself should sign the document. The report says: Hitler "ejaculated at intervals, 'Ja! Ja!' " and he said he would certainly agree to sign it.

Then he asked: "When did the Prime Minister wish to do so?"

The Prime Minister: Immediately.
Herr Hitler: Then let us sign.

At this point, they both rose, went to a writing table and, without any further words, appended their signatures to the document (copy attached as Appendix), of which the Prime Minister handed Herr Hitler one copy to keep and retained the other.

APPENDIX to No. 1228

We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting to-day and are agreed in recognising that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe.

(Signed) A. Hitler.
(Signed) Neville Chamberlain.

September 30, 1938.

Here again was another opportunity lost. Both Chamberlain and Hitler understood that there were other questions to be dealt with and that consultation should be the method adopted by both, should a crisis arise. The Munich settlement concerned chiefly the Germans in the Sudeten area. The question of what would happen to Czechoslovakia when the other minorities threw off the yoke of Beneš was not thought of. As for the Danzig Corridor, no one then seemed to think about it. These
were two sores that had been festering for many years, and our wise statesmen of Britain and Europe never so much as suggested the application of a salve to heal them. What a chance was lost at Munich to pin Hitler down and deprive him of all grievance of his minorities!

Chamberlain must have known there were other wounds that required attention. In his speech at Birmingham, March 17, 1939, referring to the settlement at Munich, he reminded the people he “had to deal with no new problem.” He then added a statement which should be deeply considered by those who desire to heal the wounds of the world:

... This was something that had existed ever since the Treaty of Versailles—a problem that ought to have been solved long ago if only the statesmen of the last twenty years had taken broader and more enlightened views of their duty. It had become like a disease which had been long neglected, and a surgical operation was necessary to save the life of the patient.

Although the people of Britain and France demonstrated joyfully when the settlement of Munich was made known to them, there were gentlemen in the British Parliament who were bitterly disappointed at what had been done. Churchill, Eden, Duff Cooper, Harold Nicolson, Cripps, Greenwood, and Morrison severely criticized Chamberlain’s efforts to keep the peace. Churchill was deeply distressed about the settlement. At the beginning of his speech in the Commons, he said:

... I am sure it is much better to say exactly what we think about public affairs, and this is certainly not the time when it is worth anyone’s while to court political popularity. ... I will, therefore, begin by saying the most unpopular and most unwelcome thing. I will begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore or forget but which must nevertheless be stated. ... It might be asked: “What would Churchill have done if he had been in Chamberlain’s shoes—declare war on
Germany and ignore the claims of the minorities? Surely not, for England has never been in the position—since the fall of Calais—to fight alone a land war against a European State. Marlborough had allies on the Continent. So had Pitt. Britain also had allies when she fought Russia in the Crimea; and her allies in the First World War assisted her in the east, the west, and the south. The navy, of course, could have shelled the northern coast of Germany. But so far as a land army is concerned, the First World War provided a disastrous lesson that Churchill never appreciated.

At the time of the Munich crisis, France had not the slightest inclination to fight for the Little Entente, which she had created. If there be any doubt about that, all that is necessary to remove it is to read the volumes of *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, referred to above. In them will be found sufficient information to convince anyone that little or no help would be given by France in a war against Hitler.

The attitude that Churchill took up in the debate on the Munich settlement was one of sheer opposition, without a single practical suggestion of what he and his friends would have done if they had been in office. And there was no one in the House at that time who had the courage to point out to him that England could not fight a land war on the Continent against Germany without the full aid of France.

The criticism of the opponents of Chamberlain in the Munich debate was as unwise as it was untimely. Every blow aimed at Chamberlain landed on Hitler’s nose, and somehow the opposition convinced him that he should do what Churchill asked the British Government to do. He had backed down six times in ten days. This bloodthirsty person who was out to conquer the world had actually revealed himself to the British Prime Minister as an amenable creature. Again, somehow this does not make sense. At any rate, it indicates that opportunities were lost to settle the outstanding questions.
But when—at any time—did Churchill make a practical attempt to solve the problems that had not sprung up in Hitler’s day, but were obvious many years before he came upon the scene?

Did he know that the German Parliamentary Association in the new republic drafted a petition, which was presented to the Czechoslovak House of Representatives as early as June, 1920? That petition pointed out that the Treaty of St. Germain could not be accepted by the minorities and that it represented “A permanent threat to the peace of Europe.”

The Germans of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia and the Germans of Slovakia never had the intention to unite with the Czechs. . . . Thus, the Czechoslovakian Republic is the result of a one-sided Czech act of will, and these German districts were unlawfully occupied by force of arms. . . . Even the scant protection which the Allied and Associated Powers had intended the German people has been brought to naught by the brutal acts of the Czechoslovakian Revolutionary Assembly. . . . Thus we declare solemnly that we recognize none of these laws as binding us. . . .

Is there any record of Churchill springing to action when the League of Nations ignored petition after petition sent by the minorities? He was in a supreme position for five years, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, to persuade Bonar Law’s Cabinet to do something to redress grievances. Why did he not act then? Because the British Government was afraid of upsetting the French chauvinists. In Great Contemporaries he castigates the Allies and refers to them as “the complacent, feeble, and purblind victors.” Was he not one of them?

Eighteen years after the petition referred to above was ignored by Beneš, we find Mr. Churchill in the Munich debate saying:

... We have been reduced from a position of safety and power—power to do good, power to be generous to a beaten foe, power to make terms with Germany, power to give her proper redress for her grievances, power to stop her arming
if we chose, power to take any step in strength or mercy or justice which we thought right—reduced in five years from a position safe and unchallenged to where we stand now.

Surely this is childish. Hamlet would say, "Words, words, words." It savors of a nursery complaint: "Everybody was to blame but me."

Where is the record to be found of a warning that Mr. Churchill gave to the British and French Governments before 1933? In his speech on European dangers, delivered November 23, 1932, he made a slight reference to one of the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles: "It would be far safer to reopen questions like those of Danzig Corridor and Transylvania." But as this was embedded in an oration devoted to his pet subject, he did not bring it to the surface for practical consideration.

I doubt very much if he really knew what was taking place in Germany. A year before, Colonel Powell had written that the strength and significance of the Nazi movement should cause the gravest alarm, for "it is spreading across Germany like a fire in dry grass. To underestimate it is folly. To deride it is insane."

Churchill was in opposition for ten years but there is no record of his moving the adjournment of the House to discuss a matter of public importance. Nor can I find any pertinent questions that he put to the government on the outstanding grievances and the disaffections of the minorities. Year after year the burden of his complaint was, "Arm, arm, arm!"

Did he realize, when he told the House, "I will, therefore, begin by saying the most unpopular and the most unwelcome thing," that while he was speaking, other minorities than the Germans were liberating themselves from the rule of Beneš?

Now see what happened in Czechoslovakia after the Munich settlement. The political state speedily fell to pieces; when the minorities pulled out, there was nothing left but Bohemia. During the First World War, Lloyd George called Austria-Hungary a "ramshackle
empire." The State that was created for President Masaryk was not worthy even to be called "ramshackle." It had rickets when it was born and never recovered from its infantile afflictions. Therefore, when the minority props were taken away, Bohemia was left without crutches to support itself. And the population there was rendered almost impotent in financial and industrial chaos. Neither Chamberlain nor Hitler had thought of what would happen after the Sudeten crisis was resolved.

There have been many articles in American and French reviews on the conditions in Bohemia in the early months of 1939. Some of them are not in accord with the stories told by the broadcasters about the actions of Hitler and the occupation of Prague. These have been traced to Robert Coulondre, the French Ambassador at Berlin. He circulated the report of "the shocking scene which took place" when Dr. Hacha (the President of Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement) and Dr. Chvalkovsky, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Hitler in Berlin. Whether the Coulondre story is true or not, it helped to spread the poison that was eating into the minds of the masses in America, Britain, and France, and did a good deal toward making a European war inevitable. There is only one thing to be said about that: Coulondre was not present at the interview, and the only persons who could have informed him of what had taken place were Dr. Hacha and Dr. Chvalkovsky.

After the "rape of Austria," followed the "rape of Bohemia." But let us put aside for the moment the moral or ethical questions raised by Hitler's actions and look at the matter solely from the standpoint of the political and military situation. Would it have been sound policy to leave Bohemia exposed to a French advance from the west? I know nothing about military strategy, but experts have told me that it was the only thing for him to do, as a consequence of the Munich
settlement. What an utterly disreputable game it is when the forces of war are once set in action!

On March 15, 1939, Lord Halifax received the text of the German-Czech agreement. The last two sentences read as follows:

... The President of Czechoslovakia declared that in order to bring about this aim and a general pacification, he placed the destiny of the Czech people and their country in the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich with full confidence. The Fuehrer accepted this declaration and expressed his resolve to take the Czech people under the protection of the German Reich and to assure them an autonomous development of their national life in harmony with their national characteristics.

It is difficult to make head or tail of this matter, for we are supposed to believe that this was wrung from two men who had been browbeaten by Hitler and von Ribbentrop. My only object in presenting this is to give another instance of the difficulty in finding a light passage in the labyrinth of European murk.

The occupation of Prague was a shocking blow to the prestige of Chamberlain. It gave his adversaries in the House an opportunity to gather strength. A few days after Hitler's overt action in entering Bohemia, Mr. Chamberlain spoke at Birmingham (March 17, 1939):

... Nothing that we could have done, nothing that France could have done, or Russia could have done could possibly have saved Czechoslovakia from invasion and destruction. Even if we had subsequently gone to war to punish Germany for her actions, and if after the frightful losses which would have been inflicted upon all partakers in the war we had been victorious in the end, never could we have reconstructed Czechoslovakia as she was framed by the Treaty of Versailles...

One week before Chamberlain made that declaration, America learned that Stalin told the Communist Party Congress that England and France tried to foment a
German-Soviet war. I do not know whether this was known in London at that time, but the editorial offices in New York heard that Chamberlain started to negotiate with Moscow in order to rally Stalin to the cause of peace. This was referred to by Raoul de Roussy de Sales in My New Order.

To what strange lengths are politicians pushed in their plight for succor! If there were any truth in these rumors, it is very strange they did not know as much in London as was known in New York; that Stalin, deeply impressed by the bloodless conquests of Hitler, was regarding him with favor. Fate drove them on with remorseless tenacity. And Chamberlain’s adversaries in the House of Commons did all they could to assist her efforts.

Surely it was a world gone mad! And perhaps the craziest example of it was Hitler’s hope of an alliance with England and the expression of his respect for the colonizing work that she had done.

A month later, after all this snarling and bitter vituperation, he was to say to the Reichstag (April 28, 1939):

Now, there is no doubt that the Anglo-Saxon people have accomplished immeasurable colonizing work in the world. For this work I have sincere admiration. . . .

A genuine, lasting friendship between these two nations is conceivable only on the basis of mutual regards. . . .

All the turmoil through which the parliaments and chancelleries of Europe passed during the winter of 1938-39 indicated that Chamberlain’s adversaries in Britain and France would leave no stone unturned that would hinder them on their way to war. The documents of the various countries show clearly that Chamberlain was no longer master of the situation; he had suffered a severe defeat when Prague was occupied.

Who it was that provoked the rumors about Hitler’s “war-like intentions” with regard to Poland is not
revealed in the history of the case. This is an important point. I have studied the matter carefully in the colored books and also in the speeches of Churchill and Hitler. Recently, in English reviews of works dealing with the preliminaries of the conflict, I have noticed that some people are under the impression that, early in the spring of 1939, Hitler unexpectedly brought forward the Danzig-Corridor question as an excuse for going to war. This is not so. That problem, which concerned Poland and Germany, was under negotiation at the time when the Sudeten crisis, because of its immediacy, dominated all others.

The Polish Ambassador and the German Foreign Minister met at Berchtesgaden on October 24, 1938 to discuss the matter. In offering a solution of the Danzig-Corridor affair, the German Foreign Minister set before Josef Lipski the same suggestions afterwards incorporated in those drawn up by the Reich in April, 1939. All through the winter the negotiations were carried on from time to time, and the documents show that there was no change of policy on the part of Germany. There was, however, an ominous shift in the policy of the Allies. For suddenly in March, 1939, the attack was shifted to Poland and Rumania. From one source it appears that this new line of attack started at Paris in February, when there were rumors circulated of the revival of the Franco-Polish alliance, and the intention of allowing German-Polish relations to become gradually worse. The campaign grew rapidly in intensity, and on March 31st, Mr. Chamberlain was forced to tell the House of Commons: "His Majesty's Government have no official confirmation of the rumors of any projected attack on Poland and they must not, therefore, be taken as accepting them as true."

Nevertheless, he was driven to admit that certain consultations were proceeding with other governments:

... In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consul-
tations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.
The pledge of aid to Poland was a green light for the warmongers to go ahead. It was a signal to Josef Beck and to Field Marshal Smigly-Rydz to "turn on the heat," as one journalist put it, and make things uncomfortable for the people of Danzig. I do not know when a statesman had such a precipitous fall in so short a time as did Mr. Chamberlain. The pledge was like a white flag of surrender. It was announced on March 31, 1939, which will ever be remembered by the peoples of Europe as the day when their lives and fortunes were sacrificed on the altar of Moloch.

The Bullitt-Mandel combination in Paris, acting with the British warmongers, dragged him from his pinnacle and turned the temporary triumph he had achieved at Munich to a sordid defeat. He was powerless after that day to prevent a European catastrophe. He, who had been scourged for his policy of appeasement, was now a prisoner of those who were exerting every effort to appease Stalin. And so little did they know what the consequences of their acts would be, that they did not dream of the possibility of Stalin deciding to join forces with Hitler. They did not even know the reason why he did so. Yet, there was good evidence at hand, if they sought to use it, that would make them suspicious of the game to be played by the Kremlin.

Did they imagine Stalin would welcome a victory over Germany, gained by the armies of bourgeois States? Was it reasonable that he would help them to extend their power east, perhaps to the borders of the Ukraine?
There was no desire, then, in Moscow to strengthen the "money marts of London and Paris." The weaker Great Britain and France became the better for the policy of Bolshevism. As for the United States, Stalin's agents were working night and day, and had ensconced not a few in important positions in the bureaus at Washington. His war of propaganda and infiltration had been winning all along the line since 1933. Euphemistically, it bore the label, "A New Deal."

In the month of April, 1939, we learned from questions asked in the House of Commons that "Lord Halifax is keeping in close touch with the Soviet Ambassador." And, later, Chamberlain was certain that Halifax intended to remain in close contact with Ivan Maisky. The Havas Agency declared in Paris, April 15, 1939:

The negotiations with the U.S.R.R. are also being continued, in an equally satisfactory manner, with a view to defining the limits of co-operation which Soviet Russia is prepared to undertake in connection with the system of mutual assistance now being developed.

The amazing complications into which the British warmongers thrust themselves should have been a warning to them that perhaps they did not know where they were going. Here is an instance of the difficulties that beset them. It is taken from a Note in the Documents on British Foreign Policy, volume II. On September 26, 1938, General Gamelin, after an interview with the British Prime Minister, attended a meeting presided over by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence:

On the subject of Russian aid General Gamelin said "that one could not count on effective help from Russian land forces, even if Russia took the political decision to intervene, owing to the certain opposition of the Poles and the no less probable opposition of the Roumanians to the path of Russian troops, but on the other hand, he thought it likely that Roumania would let Russian aeroplanes pass on their way to Czechoslovakia. . . ." (Italics mine)
Estimating the realities of the surprising situation, it will be seen that British information about what the Poles would do and how the Russians would act was in doubt a year before the war began. Did the British warmongers take these difficult problems into consideration? It seems not. There is no evidence that they took a long view of what they were doing. Yet, amateurs in this business judged correctly that Poland was not to be trusted by any of the powers.

There was a long history to this suspicion that lurked in the minds of the people at the Kremlin. In a debate in the House of Commons in 1923, a member gave a comprehensive report upon the arming of the Little Entente. France had lent huge sums to Poland and other States, to be spent on armaments made in France. Poland received some 400,000,000 francs, and at the time this information was published, Marshal Foch was in Warsaw arranging the details of a new military convention between Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Moscow watched closely the making of the Little Entente. A powerful, military Poland was not to her liking. Moreover, Stalin had not forgotten the part Churchill played in the counter-revolution. There were many reasons for the wily men at Moscow to notice every move made by the western powers.

In March, 1939, when the pledge of aid to Poland was given, there was no possibility whatever of Great Britain and France together saving her from invasion, if diplomatic negotiations between Warsaw and Berlin were broken off. It also meant that if Russia came into a war, she would be the sole victor in the end. This statement is not made on knowledge gained since the close of the war. In October, 1939, I cabled Lloyd George: “Stop Stalin now! Tomorrow may be too late!” This was a few weeks after the conflict began. And on October 16, 1939, I wrote in The Tragedy of Europe: “Stalin is sure to win if the war continues much longer.”
To whom was the pledge of aid given? History tells us that governments are not always reliable agencies to carry out important decisions. Here is what an expert told us in 1931 about Poland. Colonel Powell said:

The danger lies in the fact that the Government in Warsaw is not the real power in Poland. It is merely a camouflage, a screen, which serves to conceal what is really going on in Poland from the outside world. The real power is in the hands of a group of ambitious, predaceous and unscrupulous men, many army officers, who will stop at nothing to achieve their ends.

I had friends who had spent several weeks on an estate not far from Danzig. Later, when Hitler broke loose, they were caught in Königsberg. After their return to the United States, I had dinner with them, and they told me of their experiences and what their Polish friends thought of the government and the condition of the people. Their report corroborated that of Colonel Powell. This impresses me with the fact that it is just as well to make sure who your friends are and what they will do when you come to their assistance. Sentiment often leads one astray, and we know, as Burns did, that "the best laid schemes o’ mice and men gang aft a-gley." We might turn for a moment to consider what was happening in the United States. In December, 1938, Anthony Eden came to New York and spoke before the National Association of Manufacturers. Who was responsible for this visit? No satisfactory answer was given to the question it raised. The report of his speech says:

In a world where "force is for many the only instrument of policy," the democracies (Great Britain and the United States) must champion their ideals and their faiths with equal strength "or others which we abhor will take their place."

This gave an inkling of the purpose of his trip to those who had been somewhat bewildered by it. It
would not have been according to diplomatic procedure for the President to invite a Member of Parliament who had recently resigned from Chamberlain's Cabinet to visit him at the White House officially. Therefore, the meeting arranged by the Manufacturers' Association was considered to be merely a blind. Only a few people thought the matter of any consequence; but they had a feeling that it meant no good for the United States.

However, it is alleged that before returning to England, Mr. Eden called upon Roosevelt. The interest of the President in the affairs of Europe "pepped up a good bit." The following is a summary taken from press reports and The World Almanac for 1940:

The British and French press credited the President with having said that the eastern frontier of the United States was France. The controlled German press expressed anger over dispatches asserting that the President had told the Senate Military Affairs Committee that he favored rearmament aid to the democracies. It accused him of trying to convert France and Britain into a battlefield and called him the "head of war agitators." Italian papers charged the President with "warmongering pessimism." Herbert Hoover, in a radio broadcast from Chicago, charged that the Roosevelt foreign policy could lead to economic sanctions and thence to war.

On January 31, 1939, the United States Senate Military Affairs Committee conferred secretly with President Roosevelt on his foreign policy. Congress attacked this method of secrecy the next day.

Democracy should take notice of this, because 80 per cent of the people of the United States were opposed to war.

An inquiry into the strange business of how wars are made is interesting. Would Chamberlain have given the pledge to Poland unless he had been informed that Roosevelt would aid Britain? What message did the gentleman who addressed the meeting of the manufacturers take back to London from the White House? How little was known by the masses in England! And
what did the members of the House of Commons know about what was going on behind the scenes? Of course, indignation at Hitler’s bloodless triumphs was generally expressed, but the vast majority of people did not know what they could do about them. They had never stopped to think of the long, unseemly history that lay behind each step taken since the making of the Entente Cordiale and the Algeciras Act.

History plays little part in the action of politicians, when a crisis arises. There is no time to study the intricate events that bring it finally to a head; and the sincere people who consider the rights and wrongs of the immediate problem become the victims of the leaders who take a headlong course which ultimately ends in war.

To say the air was thick with rumors at the time the pledge was given to Poland would be no exaggeration, but as it was so often in the past, few people gave serious consideration to their importance. The war party in the United States became very busy after the turn of the year, and in the halls of Congress, the pressure groups revealed an activity that puzzled many of the senators and representatives. The bees swarmed as if they had never known a hive. The gentlemen at the back of the Untermeyer campaign, which had begun six years earlier, were particularly active. Robert Sherwood tells us in his book, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, that when the latter visited Baruch, March, 1939, on his estate in South Carolina,

Baruch was not inclined to give much attention to political prospects or business conditions at home. His concern was with the gathering calamity abroad. He scoffed at a statement made on March 10 by Neville Chamberlain that “the outlook in international affairs is tranquil.” Baruch agreed passionately with his friend, Winston Churchill, who had told him, “War is coming very soon. We will be in it and you [the United States] will be in it. You [Baruch] will be running the show over there, but I will be on the sidelines over here. . . .”
Thus, an important member of the British democracy designated a man (never elected by the American democracy) to run the show. It is astonishing what can be done in the name of *demos*. But the masses seem to like the terrible farce that is played, although they do not laugh when the bill is presented to them.

In this matter, history repeated itself. Neither the British nor the American people during the First World War knew that Colonel House, according to Professor Seymour, was "the only foreigner who had ever been given the use of the British Foreign Office cypher code." Nor did Congress know that House "for all practical purposes was a member of the British Cabinet."

The sudden shift in British and French policy signified little to the masses in America and Great Britain. The workers in France seemed not to be disturbed by it. Their minds were given to domestic economic distress. It was only in America that some keen students of affairs who had kept themselves informed about the trends of policy, with some knowledge of what was taking place behind the scenes, guessed the reasons why the pledge was really given. It must be remarked here that, in this strange war of political and diplomatic struggle, the very leaders in the houses of legislature were perhaps totally ignorant of the forces that were actuating them to take irretrievable steps.

No one I have read or spoken to believes for a moment that Chamberlain and his cabinet thoroughly understood what the pledge to Poland meant or why it was made. Did Mr. Churchill know, when he told Baruch, "War is coming very soon" and that the park-bench politician would "be running the show over there"? There were two reasons why a few men suspected the action taken by Chamberlain: (1) Hitler had dispensed with foreign loans; and (2) his system of barter had, for the time being, achieved some success. All the hopes of Samuel Untermyer and his friends had been dashed.
In his third volume on the war, *The Grand Alliance*, Mr. Churchill says, referring to events in the summer of 1941: "The British Government were in a dilemma from the beginning. We had gone to war with Germany as the direct result of our guarantee to Poland."

This statement will be challenged by historians in the days to come. It is altogether too simple. It will be found, on examination, that Great Britain went to war with Germany for the causes that made her give the pledge of aid to Poland—quite another matter. Long before the Polish question arose, Mr. Churchill himself had told General Robert E. Wood that Germany was getting too strong and that it was time to smash her. Moreover, in 1938, Bernard Baruch said to General Marshall: "We are going to lick that fellow Hitler. He isn't going to get away with it."

There are other such expressions that were uttered before the winter of 1938-39. Sometimes they were wrapped up in diatribes against the totalitarian State, but none of the gentlemen who used them explained why an attack on totalitarianism had been delayed so long, for Russia had been in the business for more than twenty years and Italy for over fifteen years.

Therefore, the chatter about totalitarianism was beside the point, and no one knows that better than Mr. Churchill. That is plain, for who gave greater praise to Hitler and Mussolini for what they had done as totalitarians than Winston Churchill himself? It was Hitler's determination to take no more foreign loans and to institute a system of barter that brought Great Britain into the fray.

Let us take a backward glance and fix our minds again upon the nature of the campaign started by Untermeyer. He spoke at Youngstown, Ohio, on August 27, 1933, and, according to *The New York Times*, predicted the downfall of Hitler and his régime in Germany within six to twelve months. Here are some of the statements that he made on that occasion:
The more Jews the Hitler regime can outlaw, as it is now doing, the more money it will be able to steal to replenish its bankrupt treasury.

And it is indeed mad for resorting to such desperate, despicable means, for Germany is literally "hanging by the eyelids" on the brink of an economic crash. It has an infinitesimal gold reserve of only 11 per cent with which to support its camouflaged pretense of maintaining the gold standard for the present mark, which it issued when the now worthless billions upon billions of the people's hard-earned money had been thrown by it into the junk heap without a penny of compensation to the holders...

It is difficult to understand how Germany was then on "the brink of an economic crash," when only three weeks before, Untermeyer had blamed Jewish bankers for lending money to Germany. In the speech broadcast on his return from Amsterdam, he had said:

... It is in part their money that is being used by the Hitler regime in its reckless, wicked campaign of propaganda to make the world anti-Semitic. With that money they have invaded Great Britain, the United States, and other countries where they have established newspapers, subsidized agents and otherwise are *spending untold millions* in spreading their infamous creed.

His anger at the anti-Semitic Jews reached the fever-pitch. "They are traitors to their race," he said, and one he designated as "the king-pin of mischief-makers, junketing around the Continent engaged in his favorite pastime of spreading discord."

Untermeyer had as much trouble with his recalcitrant Jews as he had with Hitler's purge. At Youngstown, he deplored the stand of the World Zionist Organization in Prague for negotiating with the Hitler "bandits" for "permission" to take out of Germany as many Jews as Palestine could absorb, and to permit them to take their money and belongings with them.

It was an amazing campaign, and small wonder that many of his friends—particularly Rabbi Wise—asked
what it was all about. However, there were Jews who whispered in private that the fate of those in Germany was not a first charge upon the good intentions of Untermyer. Many, indeed, were seriously disturbed by the effects of the boycott, and thought that the "holy war," which Untermyer sometimes called the "sacred war," would terminate in a disaster.

There were, about that time, striking echoes reaching America from British Socialists, which sounded very much like the demands Untermyer shouted from his platform. Here is one: Dr. Hugh Dalton, in 1933, criticizing a Labor party resolution on disarmament, said:

My only criticism of the drafting would be that the resolution does not carry us perhaps quite far enough, that it does not commit us to the economic and financial boycott of any warmongering State—Hitler, or any other person who may disturb the peace and murder the workers of the world. (Italics mine)

Had certain members of the British Labor party been "tipped off" by the Untermyer groups at work in London and America? Protest disturbances in England and in America synchronized.

Yet, none of the important predictions of this oriental Savonarola came true. Germany managed to get along, in spite of all opposition, for six years after the "holy war" started. Hitler, however, knew what it was all about. In Mein Kampf, anyone can read how his program would be carried into effect, if he got the chance to rule the German people. One of the most illuminating chapters in that work deals with the problem of foreign loans.

How much did Chamberlain know about what was taking place in America? Did he know as much as Baruch and Churchill? Certainly he was quite ignorant of what the forces were behind Untermyer, and I may suggest he was not informed about the work of the warmongers carried on at the American Embassy in Paris. I have read carefully several times the dispatches
from Sir Eric Phipps to Downing Street, but I have not found any reference to the evidence that has been unearthed since the war concerning the alleged work of William Bullitt and the Polish Ambassador to France.

When Neville Chamberlain told the House on March 31st that aid was to be given to Poland, the documents show that no new issue had arisen to create a serious breach in the negotiations between Germany and Poland, about the Corridor. Although Hitler is supposed to have said at the Sportpalast, on October 5, 1938: "This is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe," the British Ambassador at Berlin and the French Ambassador also knew that the negotiations about Danzig were not broken off.

I have searched the speeches in My New Order and other volumes of documents, and cannot find in any of them the statements of Hitler which Mr. Chamberlain referred to. Even the editor of The British War Blue Book takes an excerpt from the Sportpalast speech, but there is nothing there about "no more territorial problems in Europe." Still, let us suppose for a moment that Hitler made these declarations, and the promises Mr. Chamberlain refers to, was it wise to trust a politician who had pledged himself to bring Danzig back into the Reich, and enlarge the territory of Germany, so that more food could be produced for her people?

Think of all the promises made by the French, with British support, to maintain the integrity of the State of Morocco! And while we are at it, we might give a passing thought to the promises that were made by the British about the occupation of Egypt. When it comes to the matter of politicians breaking promises, a list as long as Downing Street itself could be filled in small print with their remains.

Sir Ernest Bennett, M.P., compiled a list of thirty broken pledges in England's account for only eight years—1915-23. These were principally concerned with territorial questions in and about the Middle East. He
did not list the scores of war-aim pledges given to the people during the conflict. The old saying: "Respect a diplomatist but never trust him," still holds good.

The analysis of The British War Blue Book that is to be found in The Tragedy of Europe stands. It was made in November, 1939, a week after the book was published. In it I showed clearly, I hope, that the questions raised about the pledge, and the necessity of giving it, were so difficult and grave that the editor, to make it easy for the British Government, juggled the order of the documents:

It must be obvious to the intelligence of the man in the street that the editor of The British War Blue Book was in something of a fix because the critics of the Prime Minister suggested that it was his pledge of armed support given to Poland, which was the cause of heightening the friction between the two Powers. Therefore, the only way that he could attempt to make a case for Mr. Chamberlain was by inserting documents dated April and May out of chronological sequence, and putting them in the Blue Book before the speech of Mr. Chamberlain, which announced the pledge to Poland given before the end of March.

The document dated April 28, 1939 was the Memorandum of the German Government sent to the Polish Government about Danzig and the Corridor. That of May 5th—one week later—was the reply of the Polish Government to the German Memorandum of April 28th. But Mr. Chamberlain had made his pledge to Poland a month before the first Memorandum was sent.

To stiffen Josef Beck’s spine and muscle his arm by promising aid was a fatal error. Moreover, the phraseology of Mr. Chamberlain’s declaration to the House of Commons on March 31st left it open to Josef Beck to decide when he considered Polish independence "threatened" and "considered it vital to resist with their [Poland’s] national forces."

It is unnecessary to take the reader through the tortuous days when the dispatching business was speeded
up, because any inquiring student can buy *The British War Blue Book* and read it. So I shall come to those unforgettable days at the end of August, before the cyclone struck Europe.

The shadiest bit of business concerns the German proposal of August 30th to the Polish Government about the appearance of a Polish representative in Berlin. It is alleged that this document was not given to Josef Beck or his deputy.

After the sad mess made by the editors of the White Papers containing some of the dispatches exchanged before the First World War, it would be too much to expect a better job would be made of publishing essential information about the events of the last week of August, 1939. *The British War Blue Book*, *The French Yellow Book*, and *The German White Book* may be checked one against the other, but it is a mighty tedious business to do this, and no Foreign Office has been known to undertake such a work in the interests of the taxpayers.

Those who wish to know what happened have to find out for themselves, and it is surprising to learn how many do. But the sole reward is self-satisfaction, and that certainly does not take one very far toward the goal of peace and good will. If all the schools decided to teach only the history of the past fifty years, something practical might be gained. Of course, the instructors would have to be specially educated for the job, and that puts the suggestion out of court at once. Little boys must be shaped into willing taxpayers, no matter to which party they may belong when they get a vote.

The sad part of the terrible diplomatic chaos was the defeat of the efforts to keep the peace, on the part of His Holiness the Pope, President Roosevelt, the King of the Belgians, the King of Italy, and the Oslo Group of Powers assembled in conference at Brussels. To every appeal, thanks were tendered, but—all too late, for the military machines were on the move. Poland had been
mobilizing for a month and declared full mobilization on August 30th at 5:30 P.M. Germany was all prepared for the fray, and the dispatching business was speedily coming to an inglorious end.

All might have been well, for a short period, perhaps, if Josef Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Berlin, had turned up in time to confer with the leaders of the Reich. This notion has been put forward by many people who have studied the situation, but I think it was a species of wishful thinking. I find nothing in the documents to convince me that anyone in the chancelleries, at that time, concerned with the crisis looked for peace. At dawn, September 1st, Germany invaded Poland.

The dispatches in The British War Blue Book reveal a poignant lesson to all on the cumbersome, preposterous methods of Foreign Offices and diplomats in dealing with the grave problems that affect the lives of millions. On September 2nd, the Italian Ambassador delivered the following communication to the German Foreign Office:

For your information Italy communicates to you, naturally leaving every decision to the Fuehrer, that she is still in a position to seek the consent of France, England and Poland to a conference on the following basis:

1. An armistice, leaving the armies where they now are.
2. The calling of a conference within two or three days.
3. A solution of the Polish-German conflict, which, as matters stand today, would certainly be favorable to Germany.

This idea, which originated with the Duce, is today particularly advocated by France.

To many people this seemed to be a sensible suggestion, but those who thought so were not diplomats or statesmen. Peacemakers have ever been sanguine, impractical persons who do not appreciate what honor and prestige mean to those who make war. Still, the people and the committees who sent such earnest appeals
for peace before Poland was invaded were of the same mind after the event.

Strange to say, the Havas Agency reported on September 2nd:

The French Government as well as several other Governments have yesterday been informed of an Italian proposal for a settlement of the European difficulties. After discussing the proposal the French Government gave a reply in the affirmative.

Such proposals were not practical. Lord Halifax stated: "His Majesty's Government would not find it possible to take part in a conference while Poland is being subjected to invasion."

Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador at Berlin, reminded the German Foreign Office:

... Unless the German Government were prepared to give His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom satisfactory assurances that the German Government had suspended all aggressive action against Poland and were prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would without hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland.

And that ended the matter for diplomatic negotiation! The pledge of aid to Poland was a fatal mistake. It was based upon hopes without any real substance. Let us suppose that Anthony Eden returned to London with an encouraging message from the President about aid to Great Britain and France in case of a war. And let us suppose that later in the winter of 1938-39 the prospect of Russia joining a western combination was rosy. In that case, who would take the initiative, should Germany invade Poland? The Little Entente was smashed beyond recovery. There was no possibility of Great Britain sending a land army, then, to fight on the Continent. America, so far as direct aid was concerned, was not in the picture. Therefore, it would devolve upon France to take the initiative.
The record shows that Great Britain undoubtedly relied upon her to lead the van. Mr. Churchill said, "Thank God for the French army," and in his letters he repeats several times his belief in the spiritual and material resilience of the French people and the army. In this connection I may be permitted to quote from The Private Diaries of Paul Baudouin a passage which supports my estimate, given in The Tragedy of Europe, and also in a previous chapter of this book:

The General [Weygand] repeated to me what he had said that very morning in the Premier’s room, namely that France had gone to war without the means of carrying it on, without tanks, anti-tank guns, aeroplanes, D.C.A. or a solid Eastern Front. There was neither military nor diplomatic preparation. "It was criminal," he said, "in these circumstances to have declared war on September 3rd. It is inconceivable that whoever was responsible for the French army at that time did not tell the Government that the state of the army did not permit it to fight." I told General Weygand that it was not only the material means that were lacking but also the soul....

A British gentleman who knows all about war, and who is considered a great authority on foreign affairs, said to me, "I have never been closely associated with any political party, but I am now seriously considering the probability of joining the anarchists."

When I resigned from Parliament in 1915, I dropped all my old political affiliations. And now, when I look back, I am astonished that I had the temerity to give so many of my years to politics, for I knew the old English party system could never recover from the tragedy of the Boer War. After it was over, there were only half a dozen of the old heads left, and they were on their way out. The new men had strange ideas about the stamina of the British folk. A gospel was preached which meant to me that the people must be coddled; that they could not help themselves; that they had to be treated as children.
Certainly the economic woe afflicted millions. But it was the first time in English history that faith had been lost in the desire of the masses to help themselves—if they were given the chance to do so. Sentimental liberalism took a text from the village handbook of Tory patriarchalism. A grave change had taken place, and sop legislation became the order of the day.

Since that time, it has been dole and ration. If anyone had said fifty years ago from a British platform that the day would come when a British housewife would be obliged to stand in line to get an egg or a bit of beef, the speaker would have been hooted from the meeting. Such is the consequence of war!
The Pursuit of Peace

How is it we are making so little progress in our search for peace—progress that will satisfy the politicians of the different States? The United Nations has been at work for more than five years, without achieving anything to raise the hopes of the people. To my mind, the chief reason for the discouraging reports of the proceedings at Lake Success is that Allied politicians had not worked out formulas of peace when the armies ceased fighting. The only thing that concerned them was to defeat the enemy. The delusive word "victory" crowded every other idea out of their minds.

Unconditional surrender and the Morgenthau plan seemed to be all they could think of, and the agreement made at Potsdam revealed clearly to those who were not carried away by the enthusiasm of a military success that Churchill and Roosevelt had not given a thought to the future of Europe.

So far as peace was concerned, the men who met at Potsdam had very different ideas of what it should be. Not one desire of the United States and Britain fitted into the Russian scheme. Nearly all of Europe, east of the Elbe, had been absorbed by Stalin, who, owing to the shortsightedness of his allies, was enthroned monarch of nearly a third of Europe beyond his pre-war frontiers.

America's chief interest was financial and commercial. Her policy was decided in September, 1939, when Bernard Baruch released a report of his interview with Roosevelt, in which he said: "If we keep our prices
down, there is no reason why we shouldn’t get the customers from the belligerent nations that they have had to drop because of the war. In that event Germany’s barter system will be destroyed.”

This was the dominant idea in those business circles that supported Roosevelt’s policies. Britain was left out in the cold, and the fact that she was bankrupt, and would have to rely on the American taxpayers for assistance, put her in the position of being a very poor relation. Peace, in the sense of a restoration of order, could not find a niche in the minds of the men who made the Potsdam agreement.

The editor of *The Economist* (August 11, 1945) discussed that declaration in a prophetic article, which was deeply resented by many people in an official position in America. The last paragraph is worth reading again:

> The conviction that the peace proposed at Potsdam is a thoroughly bad peace is not based on any sentimental softening towards Germany. It is based on the belief that the system proposed is in the fullest sense unworkable. It offers no hope of ultimate German reconciliation. It offers little hope of the Allies maintaining its cumbersome controls beyond the first years of peace. Its methods of reparations reinforce autarky in Russia and consummate the ruin not only of Germany, but of Europe. Above all, it has in it not a single constructive idea, not a single hopeful perspective for the post-war world. At the end of a mighty war fought to defeat Hitlerism, the Allies are making a Hitlerian peace. This is the real measure of their failure.

Then, to top the madness, the United States and Great Britain had to keep large occupying forces in the territory allotted to them, and America had to make loans to Britain and other countries that had not sided with the Nazis; all this, together with European aid and many other schemes to help the distressed, were burdens thrown upon the taxpayers.

A few days after the Potsdam agreement was reached, the British electors turned the Churchill Government out and put Clement Attlee in, at the head of a great Social-
ist majority. Before the war it was said by shrewd observers that scarcely a man in Neville Chamberlain’s Cabinet knew Europe. What could be said of the cabinet Mr. Attlee put together? What did they know of the intricacies of finance and commerce of continental States? Tragic as the situation was, it must have been rather amusing for Stalin, “sitting pretty,” watching his allies in the west sink deeper and deeper into the European quagmire.

When one thinks of the men who gathered at Vienna after the defeat of Napoleon, our lot look like Lilliputians. But the problems they had to deal with seemed small in comparison with those which confront the statesmen of today. The principal powers were represented by Castlereagh, Talleyrand, Stein, Metternich, and other notable personages who had had many years’ practice in diplomacy. However, they had no such Europe to deal with as we have today. In place of Alexander I of Russia we have Stalin. The United States was not a factor in the affairs of the Continent. The destruction caused by the Napoleonic wars was comparatively light. Indeed, it may be said that the work at Vienna in 1814-15 was reconstructive whereas that which the Allies have undertaken has been destructive. No one at that time thought of doing to “the criminal nation” what has been done to Germany and Austria. Nobody thought of destroying a French factory. Not many years were to pass, after the diplomats went back to their capitals in 1815, before the discontent of the people flared up in revolts that broke out intermittently for the next forty years.

The history we know is full of lessons that we neglect, and the errors made by our statesmen since the turn of the century significantly indicate that these lessons have taught our leaders nothing. If the men who gathered at Vienna could not solve the problems of European States after the intimate experience they had during the Napo-
leonic wars, how can it be expected that the gentlemen who meet at Lake Success can make progress with them?

I think the chief reason for our failures, so far, is that the people generally have lost interest in foreign affairs, and have no faith in their representatives who conduct them. They have been so badly mauled by war propaganda that their intelligence has been blunted. They have been repressed by war edicts for so many years that they fail to realize they may show their displeasure at what is taking place. Is it not curious that nowhere has a man appeared who can speak for them, arouse them out of their torpor, and make them understand that those who pay for wars have the right to make the peace? The apathetic acceptance of the Atlantic Pact is convincing evidence of their indifference.

There must be a radical change in the emotions and the minds of the people. We must break down the barriers of hate that keep communities apart, and the only way that this can be done is to learn as much as possible of the truth of what has occurred, and disseminate the information in every country. This is the task men are called upon to undertake, and they must start upon it now, while there is time to avert another cataclysm.

Already there are faint signs of the people coming to their senses. There is an undercurrent of skepticism moving in widening circles. It is possible now to talk to people sensibly about World War II. Even some of the rabid interventionists, who would not tolerate the slightest observation that questioned the actions of their leaders during the strife, listen like reasonable beings when the causes of the tragedy are discussed. This is a good sign. It has been long in making its appearance, but now that we see it, we should welcome it.

Let us ask ourselves: What should be the object of peace? We are thinking not of an interlude between wars, but a riddance of violence as a means of settling international disputes. It seems to me the chief object should be to remove discontent from the mind and soul of the
masses, and the way to solve this problem is to level the barriers that separate peoples, to encourage their industry, and to foster their cultural relationships. It is hard to imagine that this can be done through the media of politics and diplomacy. To carry it into effect, other methods would have to be employed, such as for example, international meetings of national groups formed for the purpose of seeking a way to world peace. Such a mission would have to be organized by the people themselves.

Trade unionists in other days gave us the idea of how this might be accomplished. They had such meetings in various capitals of Europe. The Congress of the International Federation of Trade Unions was held in Rome in April, 1922, and at that time representatives of twenty-four million workers voted against war.

There are several ways of starting such a movement. If the churches were as free from State entanglements as they were in the Middle Ages, they might be the prime movers in such a mission. The differences between the denominations would have to be set aside, and all of them act in unity for one clear purpose. Already there have been great gatherings of religious bodies in one assembly happily combining to draw up programs of peace. The Manifesto of Human Rights is an instance of what can be done.

It is not sufficient, however, to let such work rest on the table. It is absolutely necessary for thousands of men and women to place its principles and provisions before the people, year in and year out, until they understand it means their security from rapine, and the way to insure the welfare of their children.

When one thinks of what could have been done with some of the money that has been wasted in explosives and the destruction they have caused, the mind is filled with a hopelessness, a despair of rational beings acting in their own interest. A few of the billions Great Britain has spent on the futile wars would easily have covered
the cost of reclaiming millions of acres of land submerged by the sea. For over a hundred years she has known she must import food and, yet, her politicians and landlords have done scarcely anything to use English land to produce a granary of her own. The waste lands of England, Scotland, and Wales still stretch their uncultivated length in county after county. It is no excuse to say, as the Marquis of Tullibardine said years ago, "They wouldn’t feed a goat." There are areas in England and Wales that were once heath and waste, which before World War I were cultivated profitably by small holders.

But now that the masses are gathered in the towns, an extension of the Small Holders Act would not go far to solve this problem. Wide areas might have been prepared for the growing of cereals. What if it took five or ten years to experiment, crop after crop, until the land yielded what was needed? An agricultural expert said in 1908 that the proper use of the land of England and Wales would provide sufficient to feed the people. So it would now! But it would take millions of pounds to do that, and long, patient, steady work of determined men. Before the First World War, when more and more revenue was taken from the taxpayers to build navies and equip armies, it was a hopeless business to get one’s leaders interested in this matter.

Is it too late now to do something practical for England and rid her people of the dread of poverty? Frankly, I believe it is, unless the people themselves realize the awful situation in which they are placed. Few would care to venture along the path to this goal that was followed by the Nazis, even though the adventure was successful. No matter what type of democrat we call ourselves, we hate compulsion, particularly political compulsion.

Still, if it were necessary to introduce conscription—National Service—to fight totalitarianism, why should it be frowned upon when it is a matter of the future of the British people? Certainly it would entail years of
hardship, but it would be worth it. There is a zeal in the mind and heart of British folk that overcame many periods of suffering in the past, and when I review some of them, I find that the people themselves—without assistance from government—wrestled with their problems and made things easier for their progeny. The record of the fifty years after Napoleon went to St. Helena is one of the most amazing stories of the resurgence of spiritual and industrial effort to be read in any history.

During my sojourns in England in 1948 and 1949, I was frequently told that there were twelve millions too many people in Great Britain. This complaint was made by men who looked upon their problems gravely. That they should harbor such a notion affected me deeply, and I strove to make them realize that something could be done to enable the old country to take care of its population. When I learned that two million young folks were eager to get abroad, if they could find ships to take them, it seemed to me that not much thought had been expended upon the difficulties which lay in the path of such a desire. Where would they go? The trade unions of other countries do not want an influx of job-seekers; and town-raised men will certainly wish to settle in another country in places where the bright lights glow at night and the paltry recreations are nearby.

If, on the other hand, they have the intention of starting a small farm, they will have to begin on uncultivated land. But, if given the opportunity, they could do that at home. Why should they prefer the hardship in a colony or in the United States to that which they might undertake in the land of their birth? To what strange pass these wars have brought us! The land that was to be made "fit for heroes to live in" cannot find room for its present population. So when someone puts up two fingers in the shape of a "V," it might be said that it is the first letter of the word "vacate."
If I were a young man, rather than go to the colonies for a job, I would start in England on an acre and a hut, taking all chances of survival, because I should feel at home there, and united with those who had faith in her institutions. Many a thrifty family has been raised on such a plot of England’s land, without State aid, and often I have sat at tea in a humble cottage and heard the story of the family’s fight to overcome economic adversity and win contentment by their own labor.

Let us not forget what simple, peaceful, English folk have done. Their work is built into the very fabric of all that is good in the centuries of toil.

Would that some Carlyle should come forth and tell us once again what Englishmen have done! In *Past and Present*, the Sage of Chelsea wrote:

... This Land of England has its conquerors, possessors, which change from epoch to epoch, from day to day; but its real conquerors, creators, and eternal proprietors are these following, and their representatives if you can find them: All the Heroic Souls that ever were in England, each in their degree; all the men that ever cut a thistle, drained a puddle out of England, contrived a wise scheme in England, did or said a true and valiant thing in England. I tell thee, they had not a hammer to begin with. . . .

The question of food arises spectrally from the problem of discontent; it is the primal object of ensuring a lasting peace. It is, indeed, the haunting fear of all people; even those in the United States, where today tens of millions of dollars are invested by government in commodities that have to be given away so that prices may be maintained. Hence, the wretched consumer is hit both ways—in the market for what he buys, and through the bonus collected from him and given to the farmer.

When Roosevelt started his career as a New Dealer, he said that one-third of the population of America was "ill fed, ill clothed, and ill housed." The same conditions prevail now, and though there is a surplus
of 50,000,000 bushels of potatoes, the government cannot permit them to be thrown onto the general market for fear of depressing prices. How the people are to be better fed, better clothed and decently housed under such conditions, no one pretends to say. But the time is coming to an end when destruction of crops and European relief will be tolerated by the voters. Should there be a slump, there may be a revolution of thought among consumers. They are learning slowly they have power to modify to some extent the sale price of the commodities they need.

What a mighty force they would make if they were to combine and insist upon politicians heeding their demands! Every man seeking a seat in the legislatures would then have to toe their line. There would perhaps be two years of unemployment and considerable hardship. But the gain would be worth it. Yet, when all is said about the virtue of proposals for a war-less peace, the thought is colored by a little skepticism.

If all these things were accomplished by the people of this generation or the next, how long would they last? Scanning the record of reforms in Great Britain and the United States, I find that little confidence can be placed in the permanence of changes for the better. In Great Britain the longest term runs to about sixty years. In the United States, all the great hopes inspired by Woodrow Wilson in 1912 "are in the deep bosom of the ocean buried."

What, then, is necessary to keep them to the sticking point? This question drives us back to the oldest one of all—faith in the goodness of the Creator. The belief that God has provided everything necessary for the welfare of man is the fundamental of his happiness. Once he loses that faith, he sets himself adrift upon a boundless sea of trouble. When men were conscious that the Creator had denied them nothing that they could use for their well-being, they did wonderful things. Indeed, every great forward movement of the spirit in overcoming material disabilities was inspired by deeply religious men.
Years ago, people would have laughed at the absurdity of blaming God for poverty, disease, and the thousand and one distresses that affect us in the daily round. How individuals, endowed with faculties to be trained for the purpose of solving their problems, could blame the Creator for their miseries has never been explained by our modern philosophers. Those who imagine that God bungled the job have never been able to make a case that would stand analysis. The trouble has been, perhaps, that there have been far too many people trying to collaborate with Him, as if He had overlooked some necessary provisions. They forget the history of the civilizations of the past, which tells us quite clearly that there is scarcely a problem today that occupies the attention of man that was not considered by Plato.

The long, shameful story of enclosure, by force and statute, is extant. A youth may read it in many volumes. It is an ancient method of reducing free cultivators to economic slavery, by taking from them the alternative to entering the labor market, in which they are forced to compete with their fellows for work. Enclosure marks the beginning of the low-wage system, and to it we attribute the overcrowding of towns and the growth of cities where poverty and crime stalk, year after year, in increasing horror.

Materialistic civilization and megalomania (mass production, the desire for bigness) are symptoms of the crime of enclosure, and thrive upon a congested labor market, in spite of all trade unions can do to remedy the defects of the industrial system. Discontent and disunion prevail, and if these evils are not laid, this civilization, notwithstanding all science can do, will go the way of Greece and Rome.

Materialistic civilization is the canker which eats into the root of a culture. Megalomania, as exemplified in great cities, is the antithesis of the gradual, patient development of art from the countryside. The urbanization of millions enclosed in cubicles of bricks and mortar
denotes the loss of economic freedom and the perfection of a system of wage slavery under which the toilers are despoiled by taxes levied upon the wealth they produce.

Who expects culture to thrive in an atmosphere of poverty and grime? It is a growth of sunlit fields, of hills and dales, of brooks, the kine, the birds and singing children. Virgil and Horace describe the landscape, and every poet, from Elizabeth’s day to the beginning of this century, who survives in a cultured mind, weaves in simple Saxon line the melody of the lovely scene.

Culture is a twofold expression of the yearning for orderliness and beauty. Those who themselves are not creative artists seek it in the productions of others who build cathedrals, paint pictures, chisel marbles, make missals, compose music, and write songs. The men who produce these enduring gifts are creators in the sense that their works take form in their minds as tributes to the glory of the First Artist, who endowed them with genius to be used in beautifying the world they live in.

Art is the handmaid of religion—religion which binds man to an invisible Creator—and it can flourish only in the springtime of an age, when growth is virile and imagination untrammeled. When we see and study the wonders created and produced by men thousands of years ago, we stand in awe before them because nothing of our day can compare with them. We are silent in admiration of a majesty in art that has disappeared, and a loneliness chills us as we become conscious that there is little chance of a renaissance for us. Youth in the spring of a culture was a chalice of hope, life an open road to fame. Laurels there were for the few, but those who did not win a crown were proud to belong to a community from which the artist came.

Who can read the description of the building of Chartres cathedral, given by Henry Adams in his great book, *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*, and fail to recognize its true meaning—that all were imbued with
spiritual aim? Powerful princes, nobles, and the rich united with the folk of all orders to build one of the greatest monuments of Christendom. "They bent their proud and haughty necks to the harness of carts," so the Abbot wrote to the Bishop of Amiens in the twelfth century.

There it stands today, the glorious symbol of religion and art united; just as Lincoln, Wells, and other exquisite creations of artists stand in England's ancient shires. "At the voice of the priests who exhort their hearts to peace, they forget all hatred, discord is thrown far aside, debts are remitted, the unity of hearts is established."

Now, after seven centuries, many of the States of the world cry out for food. Progress has failed the millions. Science lags far behind human need. The reason for our anxieties and woe may be sought in a direction few are inclined to explore. If we were to examine the causes of discontent and disunion, we might find the key that would open the door of despair and let in the bright light of reason and a purer atmosphere. It is discontent and disunion that have brought us to our present pass, and these disorders of the mind and soul must be driven away before we can live again. What men seek is justice—divine, eternal justice. They are not fully conscious of this, but they undoubtedly have a feeling that they have been abused by their political masters.

How strange it is that their grandfathers sought justice and could explain what they meant by the term. They knew their Bible, in which it is one of the chief themes running from the Pentateuch to the first two gospels. Today one seldom finds a work that deals with divine justice. We have no Hooker, no Joseph Butler to give us illumination. And what would it be worth if they were here to preach to a people who seem to have lost all sense of what religion did for their sires, and how the Bible was a guiding influence in their lives for long generations?
Perhaps it is not so much food for their stomachs that people require as food for their souls. The old cry, "Back to the land!" will be of little use unless it is accompanied by the cry of "Back to the Bible!" The pursuit of peace is essentially a religious mission.

What, then, can be done to change the system? Every expedient has been tried over and over again for at least 2500 years. Jacques and Robert Lacour-Gayet, in their book, *De Platon à la Terreur*, examine the political remedies adopted by States to alleviate social distress since the days of Pericles, and find the same blunders repeated century after century. There is no new suggestion forthcoming. Therefore, we must look back and try to find out how man fared before the political State was imposed upon him.

The law of natural economic pressure, i.e., producing to satisfy his desires and needs, was the force with which he had to contend and which drove him to use the earth for his food, clothing, and shelter. Before a politician, a capitalist, a trade union leader appeared, this natural law was obeyed by him. His needs forced him to learn how he could produce them with the least exertion, and in the process he invented capital for that purpose. There were no politicians, then, to penalize his efforts, by taxing away a share of his produce. He enjoyed the work of his hands.

As Isaiah says: "They shall not build, and another inhabit; they shall not plant, and another eat." Perhaps if we take up the Bible and study it afresh, we shall find it is the most comprehensive work on political economy that was ever compiled. The whole basic problem which confounds the politicians and trade unionists of every State is presented by the prophets of Israel, all the way from Deuteronomy to Malachi.
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