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(U) According to the DIA, the U.S. 75* Exploitation Task Force and the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) visited the suspect facility in the spring and summer of 2003 respectively. Inspectors “reported a walled probable government compoundwith multiple security posts. Samples collected from the site tested positive for naturally occurring uranium and U.S.-origin depleted uranium consistent with samples collected elsewhere in Iraq and reflecting probably local soils and contamination from U.S. depleted-uranium munitions. The samples did not reveal any enriched uranium or non-U.S. depleted uranium.” No evidence was found tosupport intelligence assessments that the site may have been involved in nuclear IYJ Staff interview with CIA analysts, April 2 1,2006. Page 50 Page 54 related work. The ISG also visited several other sites identified by Source One and was able to confirm Source One’s information pertaining to those facilities.144credibility issues with Source One, Intelligence Community elements brought Source One to Iraq. When taken to the location Source One had described as the suspect facility, he was unable to identify it. According to one intelligence assessment, the “subject appeared stunned upon hearing that he was standing onthe spot that he reported as the location of the facility, insisted that he had never been to that spot, and wanted to check a map.” Source One maintained that thefacility was in the area, and repeatedly pointed to the location on the map where he said it was located. Intelligence Community officers confirmed that they were standing on the location he was identifying.145 m During the same visit, when taken to a second facility Source One had identified before the war, he was able to quickly identify a specific room where he said he had worked. The Intelligence Communitv was able to (U) A CIA nuclear analyst told Committee staff that when he visited the site it was very much as Source One described it. He said he did not know how to explain why Source One did not recognize the facility. He, and other officials 144 DIA Information Paper on Suspect Nuclear Site, Iraq, Ott 27,2005, and Committee staff interviews with CIA,Bd DIA. CIA Counterintelligence review of NFN800761, July 12,2004, section II.B.l. 14’ CIA Memorandum,and Committee staff interviews with CIA and DIA. Page 5 1 Page 55 fi-om the CIA and the DIA assessed that Source One may have been provided information about the facility second hand.‘47uring questioning, Source One with the INC’s Washington Directoracknowledged contact but denied that the Washington Director directed Source One to nrovide anv false information. Staff interview with CIA analvsts. Page 52 Page 56 m A July 2004 CIA review concluded that “while the subject hasprovided a good deal of generally corroborated information relating to military infrastructure and conventional facilities, his limited reporting on WMD-related matters remains questionable and, on a nuclear facility m, demonstrably incorrect. In the absence of any further [information from Source One we are] left uncertain about the extent to which the INC influenced intelligence information subject passed to the USG.““’(U) An earlier CIA study on possible Iraqi opposition deception efforts,dated March 8,2004, said that there were misconceptions about Source One’sreporting that were related to possible “extrapolations” by analysts and caseofficers.*52 The CIA study cited a February 5,2004 memorandum prepared by CIA analysts who had participated in Source One’s debriefings from late Januaryto early February 2002. The memorandum stated that Source One did not provide direct reporting on Iraqi WMD programs, but did provide reporting on Iraq’smilitary-industrial facilities, many of which were assessed as capable of supporting a WMD effort. The analysts wrote that Source One “did not [repeat]not claim that any facility produced or worked on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Those WMD connections were made by analysts and at times DIA officers writing and disseminating the reporting.” The memorandum said thatSource One “never claimed any knowledge of nuclear weapons program-relatedwork at the facility. He simply identified what he thought was a suspect facility and claimed that he saw engineers from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission there.” In addition, the memorandum noted that Source One had said he thoughthe had seen something like uranium hexaflouride cylinders only after being shown 15’ CIA review, m, July152 CIA internal memorandum, 12,2004, conclusions. , March 8,2004, Page 53 Page 57 a picture of them by another CIA analyst, “one of the best, documented examplesof how [Source One] was asked leading questions by debriefers.” Thememorandum cites several instances of reports that described Source One as having worked on “several Iraqi WMD sites” although the sites were not known tohave been WMD-related.‘53(U) In the memorandum, the analysts admitted that they knew of no effort to correct the mischaracterizations of Source One’s reporting. They said that the“daily press of business and the fact that-with one well-known exception-hisreporting was not used in finished DI products, we did not fight to correct how [his] reporting was characterized by collectors.” The memorandum did note thatthere was one instance in which an effort was made to correct a factual error in one of the reports. One of the CIA analysts told Committee staff that after returning to Washington, he reviewed a report that incorrectly described the length of a missile or rocket as ten meters long when Source One had said it was six meters long and wrote to DIA about the error. The analyst did not know whether the correction was made.ls4 The memorandum also discussed Source One’s connectionsto the INC, noting that at the time of the debriefs he was: up front about his ties to the INC, describing how the INC helped him escape from Iraq, got him in contact with [DIA]B, made him do an interview with [the press], and then abandoned him. He explained that some of his earlier reporting was much more inflammatory because that was what the INC told him to do, but during our debriefs he carefully explained what he knew, did not 153 CIA internal memorandum, Februrary 5, 2004 and staff interview with CIA analysts. Is4 Staff interview with CIA analysts, November 28, 2005. Page 54 Page 58 know, and what he suspected, and why. We believed he was credible because much of his information could be corroborated and his information did not go beyond his purported access nor did he try to embellish his reporting.‘55(U) Finally, the analysts’ memorandum commented that Source One’sprolific reporting was “not due to his wealth of knowledge, but partly to aconscious effort to produce as many reports as possible . . . even if it meant splitting up reporting on a particular topic.” The analysts told Committee staffthat they did not intend to suggest that Source One did not have a wealth of knowledge, just that his wealth of knowledge did not pertain to WMD. The analysts said they did not believe that breaking up the reporting hampered the reporting and said “it didn’t really change anything.“ls6(U) DIA officers dispute the analysts’ assertion that DIA collectors alonewere responsible for incorrectly characterizing Source One’s reporting. They toldCon-n&tee staff that DIA and CIA analysts were part of the debriefing team because they were the subject matter experts. These analysts worked side by side with the collectors, “collaboratively producing the reports, and before the reportswere released to us or before the reports were released for dissemination as formal IIRs and they were [coordinated] by CIA . . . , there was a lot of scrutiny that went into that reporting.” They told Committee staff that the source description whichsaid Source One worked on “several Iraqi WMD sites” was written overseas bythe debriefing team of analysts, collectors, and a reports officer.157 DIA officers also said the reason analysts were asked to split Source One’s reporting into many155 CIA internal memorandum, vebruary 5,2004. CIA internal memorandum, February 5, 2004 and staff interview with CIA analysts. 157 Staff interview with DIA offkers, November 2005 and staff interview with DIA offkers, February 10, 2006. Page 55 Page 59 reports was that DIA attempts to write one report on one subject. The DIA codes its reports to link them to specific collection requirements, so that one report will respond to one specific requirement. The DIA officers said this was not an effort to inflate report numbers for Source One.15* (U) The CIA analysts told Committee staff that the analysts were not involved in writing source descriptions or summaries. The analysts drafted the main text of the reports and the DIA reports officer would take that text and cut and paste it into a template for the intelligence report. The analysts said that after they submitted the text, they did not have access to the reports again until they were disseminated.‘59m Regarding the overall authenticity of Source One’s reporting, theDIA and the CIA agree with the conclusion of the CIA review that “there is littledoubt that subiect was in fact a lcontractor who worked at several Iraai facilities1 conventional facilities, areas that are cornrnensurate with his access, has generally been corroborated.” The agencies believe that Source One had never been to thefacility they identified as the suspect facility and some believe he may have been provided with information about the facility by someone else. The Intelligence Community has never deemed Source One to be a fabricator and has not recalled his reporting. 15* Staff interview with DIA officers, February 10,2006. 159 Staff interview with CIA analysts, November 28,2005. Page 56 Page 60 2. Source Two m Source Two former Iraqi major, was referred to DIA on February 8,2002. According to the DIA, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence had been contacted by former DC1 James Woolsey who said that the INC had access to a potential source. The Principal Deputy passed the information on to the DIA.16’ DIA officials met with INC representatives toestablish contact with Source Two. (U) In February 2002, the CIA notified DIA that a private researcher had interviewed Source Two earlier in the month. The CIA provided the DIA with a copy of Source Two’s interview transcript which was reviewed by DIA analysts.The interview contained information related to Iraqi biological, chemical, and missile programs. DIA analysts prepared an assessment which noted that the “source does not appear to have direct access to new Iraqi CW programinformation” and “we question the source’s credibility on the CW-related activityunless he can provide more compelling evidence to support his claim on chemical weapons.” Regarding biological weapons, the assessment said, “the sourcereported no new information on Iraq’s BW program. This source appears to haveinformation that-if deemed credible-may corroborate previous reporting indicating Iraq employs transportable production trailers and mobile R&D laboratories in its BW program.” The assessment said the source provided somenew reporting on a recent al-Abbas missile location and that the missile is weaponized with VX, a claim considered suspect by the chemical analysts.‘6’I60 DIA response to questions from Committee staff, December 14, 2005 (SSCI# 20054899). Mr.Woolsey did not recall making this referral to the Department of Defense but did not rule it out. Staff interview with Mr. woo g$y. 1 DIA, Analyst Review - webmary 2002 Iraqi National Congress Interview Transcript. Page 57 Page 61 (U) DIA debriefed Source Two in the Middle East in late February 2002. Source Two told DIA debriefers he was involved in procuring dual-use technology in support of Iraq’s WMD program. During these debriefings, DIA asked SourceTwo to refrain from talking to the media.162 (U) After several meetings with Source Two, the DIA debriefer began to have concerns about his reliability, in particular that he may have been coached and had embellished information, The DIA debriefer told Committee staff that Source Two acted strangely and seemed “affected.“163 These concerns promptedDIA to conduct a polygraph, which Source Two successfully passed.‘64(U) In March 2002, with the DIA debriefer’s original concerns partlyallayed by the polygraph results, DIA disseminated two intelligence reports based on Source Two’s inforrnation.‘65 One of the reports relayed information about theactivities of a department in the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) charged with developing foreign business contacts willing to sell prohibited goods and equipment to Iraq and to develop methods to secure hard currency in order to finance illegal procurement. lfx The other report stated that in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile biological research laboratories to evade United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections. The report contained information on the planning, acquisition, manufacture, and storage of mobile biological laboratories in Iraq and organizations and individuals involved in these 162 Staff interview with DIA officers, February 20,2004. 163 Staff interview with DIA officer, March 3 1,2006. 164 Staff interview with DIA, February 20,2004; CIA, SPWR, Assessment of the Iraqi defector m m\pril 2002; and Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts f?om DIA and CIA, January 27, 2004.,65 Staff interview with DIA officer, March 3 1,2006. I’6 DIA intelligence report, -arch 6,2002.Page 58 Page 62 processes. The report did not state that the research pertained to biological weapons research, just biological laboratories.‘67 Source Two’s DIA debriefer toldCommittee staff he had the impression that Source Two was saying that the purpose of the mobile biological labs was for weapons, but said that he is confident the intelligence report said exactly what Source Two told him.‘68m In both reports, Source Two was described as an “Iraqi-officer with direct access. First-time reporter who is considered to be reliable.” In the report on Iraq’s mobile biological research labs the commentsection also noted that the “source passed a [DIA]-administered polygraphregarding information included in this report.“‘69In mid-March 2002, the Intelligence Community learned that the (U) On March 18,2002, the CIA told the DIA that, during a liaison meeting earlier the same day, a foreign government intelligence service informed the CIA that it had debriefed Source Two in December 2001 and believed he was largely unreliable and partially fabricated the information he provided. The foreign service reported that Source Two was unable to provide specific details on his chain-of-command or the facilities where he claimed to have worked. The foreign service said it did not publish any intelligence reports resulting from these 167 DIA intelligence report, -arch mOO2. {ii Staff interview with DIA officer, March 3 1,2006. DIA intelligence report,arcoo2. Page 63 debriefings.‘70 On March 20,2002, the DIA directed that all contact with SourceTwo cease.17’(u) In March 2002, CIA’s Directorate of Operations notified CIA BWanalysts in an e-mail about the DIA and the foreign service’s concerns aboutSource Two. All three CIA BW analysts told the Committee that they either received the e-mail or knew about the concerns.‘72m In April 2002, the CIA published two assessments on Source Two. The first assessment, titled noted that DIA debriefings of Source Two “ceased because of recent disclosures tothe press of the defector’s name and location and his relationship with the U.S.Intelligence Community.” The assessment noted that the CIA assessed that someof Source Two’s information may be accurate, especially regarding Iraq’sprocurement and construction of mobile laboratories, but added that he could have learned that information from press reports. The assessment said that Source Two passed a DIA administered polygraph, but the DIA debriefer had expressed concern that Source Two was being coached by the INC to further its goals.‘73m The second assessment was more expansive, stating that the DIA had “terminated contact with Source Two after four meetings because ofsuspicions he was a fabricator and because Source Two, against direction of his handlers, continued to cultivate a public profile after the media disclosed his ‘70I 7l DIA Information Memo-bebruary mOO4. CIA, Assessment of the Iraqi defector AprilmOO2; NIC Memorandum, The Zraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, p.4; and CIA internal memorandum , March 8,2004- :GfCIA response to questions from Committee staff, July 18,2006. CIA, Iraqi defector in April 2002. Page 60 Page 64 contact with the U.S. Intelligence Community.” The assessment noted that theforeign intelligence service also debriefed Source Two and assessed that he fabricated at least some of his information.‘74 The assessment stated:Source Two demonstrated a general understanding of Iraq’s WMDinfrastructure and procurement networks both in his public statements and in his debriefings, but much of his information was in the public domain. lacked sufficient detail to verifv his access. or was incorrect. His position as a midlevel -officer suggests that he would not have had direct access to a broad spectrum of compartmented weapons programs. We have not used his information in finished intelligence products.“175(U) In May 2002, after lengthy coordination with the CIA’s Iraqi OperationsGroup and Counter-proliferation Division, the DIA issued a “fabrication notice”which said “we have determined that [Source Two] is a fabricator/provocateur”and advised consumers that “his information is assessed as unreliable and, in someinstances, pure fabrication. We have determined that he had also been coached by Page 61 Page 65 the Iraqi National Congress (INC) prior to his meeting with western intelligence services.“‘77 DIA disseminated the fabrication notice to the all of the analyticagencies that received the original intelligence reports on Source Two, including CIA, DIA, and State INR, and cited the source identification numbers, reference numbers, and titles of both original intelligence reports.‘78(U) The DIA did not recall the original intelligence reports or reissue them with a warning that Source Two was believed to be a fabricator. The DIA told Committee staff, “we sent out a fabricator notice, not to necessarily recall theinformation but to warn the intelligence community that some of his information was suspect, that he may have been coached, and, . . . what his modus operandi was.“‘79(U) A July 2002 NIC Memorandum on the INC defector program also outlined the Intelligence Community’s concerns about information from SourceTwo, noting that DIA and the foreign intelligence service believed his information was unreliable. The paper said that “although intelligence reporting on the mobilelabs was favorably received, this information is now considered suspect.“lsO(U) Despite the warning from the Directorate of Operations in March 2002, the April 2002 CIA assessments, the May 2002 DIA fabrication notice, the July 2002 NIC Memorandum all suggesting Source Two may have fabricated information, and the fact that Source Two’s intelligence report never actually saidthe labs were for biological weapons, Source Two was cited specifically in five : ti DIA fabrication noti DIA fabrication noti I79 Staff interview with DIA officers, February 20,2004. ‘*’ NIC Memorandum,The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, p.3-4. Page 62 Page 66 CIA intelligence assessments and the October 2002 NIE, as corroborating other source reporting about a mobile biological weapons program. @) One of the assessments, published in October 2002, WMD Association at Presidential Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, did not cite Source Two by name or note an INC-affiliation. The information from Source Two said, “mobile BW laboratories, managed by key BW figure Rihab Taha, in 1998 werestored in the Republican Palace garage when not in use, according to a former Iraqi officer.“‘*’m The other four assessments: Iraq: Expanding BW Capabilities inJuly 2002; Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat in August 2002; Iraq’s BW Capabilities in October 2002; and Lessons Learned From Iraq’sPast Efforts to Mask Its B W Program in November 2002, and the NIE, used almost identical descriptions of Source Two’s information. The language in thepapers said that in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile laboratories for BW agent research to evade UNSCOM inspections, according to -Source Two, an Iraqi defector associated with the Iraqi National Congress.“* The two papers described Source Two by name.(U) Source Two was also one of the four HUMINT sources specifically referred to in the part of Secretary Powell’s February 2003 speech before the UNSecurity Council that discussed the mobile BW production units. Although a DIA Division Chief, who was aware of the fabrication notice, attended two of the 18’CIA, WMD Association at Presidential Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, October 11, 2002.182 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October2002, p. 43. (SSCI# 2002-4188); CIA IA, Lessons Learned From Iraq s Past Efforts to Mask Its B W Program, November 11,2002, p, 6.; CIA IA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 1, 2002, p. 6; and CIA, Iraq: Expanding B W Capabilities, July 15, 2002; and CIA, W&ID Association at Presidential Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, October 11,2002. Page 63 Page 67 Powell speech coordination meetings on February 2 and 3,2003, he told Committee staff that he was unaware that the source mentioned in the speech was the same source about whom the fabrication notice had been issued and, therefore, he did not raise any concerns about it. He told Committee staff that he was not provided with the speech until he arrived at the meeting, that the source was not specifically discussed, and that the speech did not indicate that the source was a DIA source. He was later asked to clear about twenty reports for declassification, including the Source Two report, but said he and a DIA declassification team only examined the reports to determine whether their release would expose sources and methods and did not notice that the report was the one on which the fabrication notice had been issued.‘83(U) The Iraq BW analysts from CIA, DIA, and State INR all acknowledged that the fabrication notice was available in their message handling systems, but they all said they did not see the notice. A joint CIA/DIA notification to the Committee on January 27,2004 said that the fabrication notice had not come to the attention of relevant analysts from the DIA or the CIA when Source Two’sinformation was included in the NIE and Secretary Powell’s speech.184(U) Two CIA analysts, one who was involved in coordinating the Powell speech, said although they were aware in early 2002 that DIA and the foreign intelligence service had concerns about Source Two’s reporting, they believed thatthe reporting about the mobile labs remained plausible. They said that even fabricators will usually have some truth in their stories. They said that if the reporting has not been recalled, as long as the information was used with appropriate caveats, it could continue to be used in finished intelligence reporting. When asked why the caveats were not included in the Powell speech or explained 183 Staff interview with DIA offkers, June 3, 2004. 184 Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from DIA and CIA, January 27,2004. Page 64 Page 68 to Secretary Powell, the analyst who coordinated the speech said that “we lost thethread of concern . . . as time progressed I don’t think we remembered.” A CIAsupervisor noted that, “clearly we had it at one point, we understood, we hadconcerns about the source, but over time it started getting used again and there really was a loss of corporate awareness that we had a problem with the source.“185(U) The analysts also noted that the original reporting was not recalled and was not altered in any way to reflect the fact that a fabrication notice had been issued. In addition, there was not a practice in Intelligence Community at the time of electronically attaching a fabrication notice to the original reporting. As a result, when analysts searched their electronic files even after the fabrication notice had been issued, there was no indication of the notice.ls6 (U) The CIA and the DIA told the Committee in the January 2004 joint notification that the May 2002 fabrication notice, “was intended to warn analystsreviewing the IIRs that the source may be unreliable. Regrettably, the fabrication notice overstated the reservation DIA had about the source.” The notificationadded that the decision to issue the notice was based on a “determination he hadbeen coached by the INC,ls7 the fact that he was conveying similar information to the news media, and the foreign intelligence service concerns, regarding the veracity of Source Two’s reporting based on its prior experience with him, DIAdebriefers believed further questioning was appropriate.““’ Since Operation IraqiIs5 Staff interview with CIA analysts, July 26,2006, (2006-3248). Is6 Staff interview with CIA analysts, July 26, 2006, (2006-3248). ’ 87 The DIA officer who debriefed Source Two told Committee staff that he believed Source Two showedindications of having been coached, but that he had not assessed that the INC had coached him. Staff interview with DIA offi?%\ March 3 1,2006. Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts horn DIA and CIA, January 27,2004. Page 65 Page 69 Freedom, the Intelligence Community has been trying, unsuccessfully, to locate Source Two to seek further clarification of his reporting.‘893. Source Three m On September 27,200 1, former DC1 James Woolsey contacted the Director of the DIA to advise him that the INC had information about a possible former Iraqi mfficer who had served as a liaison between Iraqi intelligence and the Fedayeen Saddam from 1998 to 2000 and had information on terrorist training in Iraq.19’ At the same time a Washington representative of theINC contacted the CIA to alert them about the source and the source’s claim thathe had information on another individual from the training camp who was now living in the United States. m On September 28,200 1, DIA officers met with the INC’sWashington representative; Haydr al Bandar, an INC employee who had spoken to the defector on the telephone; and Dr. Chalabi.“’ According to both DIA officialsand Dr. Chalabi, at the meeting, Bandar provided DIA with the details about the source, -Source Three, based on his phone call. Bandar said that Source Three was a former Iraqi-lieutenant colonel who conducted training of 70 non-Iraqi Arab terrorists at a special Iraqi training facility at Salman Pak. Bandar said that Source Three observed the trainees receiving training on aircraft hijackings. Bandar also reported that Source Three observed frogmen training to blow up mock-ups of U.S. Navy vessels using underwater explosives and booby traps at a separate facility. Following this training, 34 terrorists departed Iraq for the UAE. These 34 terrorists were not identified by Bandar as 189 Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts f?om DIA and CIA, January 27,2004. :if) DIA operational cab1 Septembem2001. DIA operational cab1 September E200 1. Page 66 Page 70 non-Iraqi Arabs.‘92 Later the same day, DIA officers sent a request to a CIAstation requesting the station’s opinion on meeting with Source Three in theEmbassy to debrief him on possible terrorist related information.‘93(U) Using the information from al Bandar, the DIA disseminated two intelligence reports. Both reports described the information from Bandar as from “a former Iraqi citizen, [who] received this information from a subsource. Sourceand subsource’s credibility have not been determined.” The reports did notindicate that the source was a member of the INC or that the subsource was Source Three. 194 (U) The first report, disseminated on September 29,2001, stated that Iraq trained terrorists in hijacking operations at the Salman Pak intelligence training facility and that seventy non-Iraqi Arabs trained at the camp, also in hijacking procedures. The report said that the Iraqis used a second camp at Lake Tharthar for underwater demolition training and that 34 individuals from this camp were sent to the UAE in the winter of 2000. The report also said that Faruq Hijazi was the liaison between Saddam and the terrorists and noted that Hijazi had met Usama bin Ladin in Khandahar in December 1998.‘95 It is unclear if the report wassuggesting that Hijazi was Saddam’s liaison to the training camp terrorist orterrorists in general. The second report from Bandar provided only one paragraph of text identifying an Egyptian businessman who maintained a relationship with the Iraqi intelligence service. 196 192 DIA operational cabl- September E200. 193 C I A o p e r a t i o n a l c a b l e , - , Septembem00 1. 194 DIA intelligence reports, September and October 2001 196 DIA intelligence report, DIA intelligence report, Page 67 Page 71 (U) DIA analysts used the first intelligence report in which Source Three was the subsource in a Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary (DITSUM) on September 30,2001, titled Terrorists Allegedly Training at Iraqi Camps.‘g7 TheDITSUM said “Salman Pak was purportedly used to train non-Iraqi Arabs inhijacking operations while underwater demolition training took place at Lake Tharthar.” The DITSUM comment noted that “there is presently no otherindication that terrorists are training at these facilities.“lg8(U) On October 3,200 1, a CIA station which had been contacted about Source Three by both the DIA and the CIA, asked CIA headquarters to have the INC’s Washington representatives instruct Source Three to come to the U.S.embassy in that country for an interview. On October 4,2001, the INC’sWashington representative went to the Department of State to discuss Source Three. A CIA officer also attended the meeting. The INC’s Washingtonrepresentative again noted that Source Three had information about an Iraqi officer who had worked at a terrorist training facility, Salman Pak. An operations cable about the meeting said, “this officer specialized in training non-Iraqi Arabs in hijacking civil aircraft” and had relocated to the United States.“’ Atthe meeting, the Department of State provided the INC’s Washingtonrepresentative with the telephone number of the FBI Legal Attache in the same foreign country, with the direction that the INC’s representatives in that countrycontact the Attache.200 (U) On October 5,2001, U.S. embassy officials received a Department of State e-mail outlining Source Three’s information about the individual living in‘g7 DIA, DITSUM,Terrorists Allegedly Training at Iraqi Camps, September 30,200l. : ii DIA, DITSUM, Terrorists Allegedly Training at Iraqi Camps, September 30, 200 1. 2oo CIA operational cable, CIA operational cable, Page 68 Page 72 the United States. The e-mail said the FBI Legal Attache should expect a call from an unnamed INC representative who had information on “Iraqi efforts totrain non-Iraqi Arabs to conduct airplane hijackings and other terrorist acts against Americans.“201 Later that morning, an INC representative called the FBI LegalAttache. The INC representative said he only had second or third hand knowledge of the defector’s information and said his role was only in brokering anintroduction. The two made arrangements for a debriefing of Source Three.202 m On October 10,2001, the FBI Legal Attache debriefed Source Three. According to the FBI reports about the debriefing, Source Three told the FBI that he had worked for was not a member of the IIS. The FBI, which had primacy on the debrief because of Source Three’sinformation on the individual in the United States, did not continue to pursue discussions with him, noting that he was unable to provide specific information pertaining to terrorist training activities. (U) The FBI referred Source Three to the CIA and the DIA because he demonstrated “a great deal of knowledge about Iraqi politics.“203 The FBI didcontact the individual in the United States who had been identified by Source Three. The results of those interactions and other FBI and CIA contact with that individual are outlined in the next section of the report. (U) The CIA and the DIA continued to debrief Source Three about information related to the Fedayeen Saddam organization and training. In response to questions from the debriefers about INC attempts to coach Source Three, he told the debriefers that his INC handler did not prime him with :ii CIA operational cable,OctobeOOl. CIA operational cable, 203 FBI, October 9,200l. -0ctobemOO 1. Page 69 Page 73 information or suggest topics to discuss with any U.S. authorities. Source Three also told the debriefers that he had the impression his INC handler “cared more forthe U.S. than for his own INC.” 204(U) In mid-October 200 1, following these debriefings, the DIA disseminated an additional three reports based directly on Source Three’sreporting. The reports described him as a “high-ranking Iraqi public official withdirect access to reported information. First time reporter who appeared reliable.”None of the reports discussed Iraq’s suspected WMD programs.205(U) The first report said that Kuwaiti prisoners were being held in two separate locations in Iraq and identified Iraqi intelligence personnel responsible for the prisoners.206 The second report discussed a special 520 member unit of the Fedayeen Saddam, al-Qarai’a Force, which received specialized training incommando skills, including airborne operations, underwater demolition, hand-to- hand combat, explosives and sabotage. The report included the names of the top 30 members of the unit who were given UAE passports and were to deploy to the UAE under the supervision of Iraqi intelligence. The report noted that the source had no information on the mission or ultimate location of the unit members and that as of October 2000 they had not deployed.207 The third report described Fedayeen Saddam training at the IIS training facility Salman Pak and said Source Three observed individuals he believed to be non-Iraqi Arabs training in an abandoned aircraft shell. He believed they were either Egyptians, Gulf Arabs, or a mixture of the two, based solely on their dialect and appearance. The report provided additional information on the Qaria’a force, stating that the recruits204 CIA operational cable, m, Octobem00 1. 205 DIA 2002 206 intelligence reports DIA intelligence report 2002,m. 207 DIA intelligence report 2002, Page 70 Page 74 received training in “explosives to booby-trap vehicles, preparation of suitcasebombs, and aircraft security operations” which Source Three believed involvedboth defensive and offensive training.208 The DIA told the Committee that analysts determined the intelligence reports related to the Fedayeen Saddam organization and training were “of value.”(U) In November 200 1, the CIA published an assessment of the Salman Pakfacility titled Iraq: Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training Facility. The assessment noted that since the September 11 attacks, defectors of questionable reliability claimed that Salman Pak was used to train non-Iraqis. The report included Source Three’s information that:Approximately 520 Special Operations recruits of the Saddam Fedayeen were permanently based at Salman Pak, where they received training on the use of explosives to booby trap vehicles, preparation of suitcase bombs, and aircraft security operations. The same source indicated that in 2000 he observed non-Iraqi Arabs - reportedly Egyptians or Gulf Arabs- training on the abandoned aircraft at the facility. 209 (U) The report concluded that “since the Salman Pak facility is used by anumber of different organizations-and various reports have indicated foreign activity at the site in the past-the reports of non-Iraqi Arabs receiving training cannot be discounted.“210208 DIA intelligence report 2002,m. $ CIA, Iraq: Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training Facility, November BOO 1. CIA, Iraq: Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training Facility, NovembemOOl Page 71 Page 75 (S) On December 6,200 1, a foreign intelligence service told the CIA that their Iraqi contacts in m said that the CIA was working with Source Three. The foreign service noted that they had previously obtained intelligence from him which had been shared with the CIA.212 In a written response to questions from Comrnittee staff about this reporting, the CIA said the foreign service usually does not provide the name of their sources. The CIA was able to find four reports from the service dated from March through October 2001 that are sourced to a Fedayeen Saddam officer who left Iraq in late 2000 and whose reporting was similar to Source Three’s. All three reports were disseminated by the CIA as intelligencereports. 211 i:: CIA operationalcable,-, December1200 1. Page 72 Page 76 response from CIA’s Counterterrorism Center stated that theinformation would not be disseminated because the information was previously reported in DIA channels. The response added that Source Three “is under thePage 73 Page 77 influence/control of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not considered to be very credible.“220m Following his debriefings with U.S. intelligence, Source Three’sstory began to appear in the press. The CIA judged the press reports to be more sensational than the accounts provided to the Intelligence Community. In January 2002, the CIA published an intelligence assessment which described the Intelligence Community’s contact with Source Three and a description of thecontents of a media story. The assessment said, “the information Source Three provided to debriefers was less sensational,more detailed, and more credible than depicted in recent [press].” The assessmentpointed out several discrepancies between the two accounts: The magazine reported that Source Three was a Brigadier General in the Iraqi intelligence service who personally directed a special operations unit in Saddam’s Fedayeen, the al-Qarai’a Force, whichtrained to conduct airborne operations, underwater demolition, sabotage, and VIP security. Source Three told debriefers that he was never an intelligence officer and never controlled these forces. The magazine indicated that the al-Qaria’a force consisted of 1,200personnel stationed at the IIS’s Salman Pak special operations facilitywho were trained for suicide missions. Source Three told debriefers that the al-Qaria’a force was composed of only 520 personnel capableof unconventional warfare missions but trained more as an internal security force. He opined that perhaps two men out of a hundred would actually perform suicide missions if directed, Page 74 Page 78 The intelligence assessment concluded that: Source Three’s claim that the Fedayeen has a special unit trained forspecial operations, is consistent with other intelligence reporting, but the precise mission, size, location, equipment, and intended targets of this unit are unclear. [Other intelligence] -shows a special operations training facility hat includes a village mock-up, a derelict aircraft, and string of three railcars identified by Source Three. - Several Iraqi security organizations use the-facility. Source Three’s report of non-Iraqis training there is possible, butSource Three was clear that he had no firsthand information linking activities at [the facility] to 11 September.223 intelligence report based on information from Source Three about suicide i:t CIA, Iraq: Defector CIA, Iraq: Defector m, Januaa 2002. ’January I, 2002.Page 75 Page 79 commandos preparing for missions abroad in 2000, this time from a station contact.224 An operations cable accompanying the report said that the station contact attributed the information to a subsource, Source Three, and noted that headquarters had previously decided not to disseminate comparable information from the same subsource. CIA operations cables do not clarify whether the station contact obtained the information directly from Source Three, or from press accounts of Source Three’s information. The station contact said that he was notaffiliated with the INC, but was a member of the Officers Movement for Salvation of Iraq, a separate Iraqi opposition group. He said his group was being actively courted by, but had not joined with, the INC. (U) On February 6,2002, CIA’s Iraq Operations Group (IOG) disseminateda cable attempting to surnmarize the Intelligence Community’s variousinteractions with Source Three and the station contact. The cable outlined the IOG’s conclusion regarding Source Three that:Although we can verify a few elements of his story, we have determined that much of his information is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S. (and probably western) policy on Iraq. The fact that he has reiterated this same story to numerous audiences-including the media-had further damaged his credibility with our service a. Mistaken Identity (U) On June 7,2002, another CIA station requested a name trace on a former Iraqi military officer, According to a station ii;’ CIA operational cable, mebruary mOO2.CIA operational cable, mebruary 12002. Page 76 Page 80 asset, the individual fled Iraq to Europe miaa number of other countries. The same day, the CIA’sIraq Operations Group responded to the station that headquarters “is quite familiarwith subject . . . whose name is [Source Three.] . . . [Two other CIA stations] are likewise very familiar with Source Three, and we find it rather telling that he neglected to mention to the Immigration Service [in the country where the station was located] that he has been debriefed in both of those locations. We have no information that he has spent any time in [one of the countries mentioned in the cable], and we assess his story in ref to be entirely fabricated.” The cable advisedthe station against any contact with him.226 In a response to Committee staff questions about why the Iraq Operations Group was so certain that the station contact was the same individual as Source Three, especially considering that the personal data and the reporting from the two did not match, CIA noted that “inhindsight, it is possible that there were in fact two individuals, as Arabic names are often very alike.“227(U) Similarly, in August 2002, a CIA domestic station wrote to CIA headquarters requesting assistance in accessing or interviewing an unnamed defector discussed in the media. The station noted that an FBI office was very interested in information the defector was said to have on the Muiahideen e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group .228 The CIA’s IraqOperations Group responded on September 6,2002 that “the individual referred toin ref is [Source Three], a former Iraqi Fedayeen Saddam officer who did, in fact, flee to Europe in mid-2001 .” The Iraq Operations Group outlined its assessment226 CIA operational cable, m, June& 2002. 227 Responses to Additional Requests Concerning the Iraqi National Congress, February 28,2006. 228 CIA operational cable, August a, 2002. Page 77 Page 81 that Source Three embellished his access and.advised against further contact.229 In fact, the subject of the media article was not Source Three, it was Source Two. b. Intelligence Assessments (U) CIA analysts included Source Three’s information in three extensiveassessments about Iraq’s links to al-Qa’ida, a June 2002 paper, Iraq and al-Qa ‘ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, and September 2002 and January 2003versions of Iraqi Support for Terrorism. All three assessments noted that reporting surged after September 11,200 1 from Iraqi defectors claiming that al- Qa’ida and other non-Iraqi Arabs engaged in special operations training at SalmanPak.230 The two Iraqi Support for Terrorism papers more explicitly described the information as: Press and sensitive reporting about al-Qa’ida activity atSalman Pak-ultimately sourced to three Iraqi defectors-surged after 11 September. The defectors claimed that al-Qa’ida and other non-Iraqis engaged inspecial operations training at Salman Pak. It was subsequently determined, however, that at least one of these defectors, whose story appeared in [the media], had embellished and exaggerated his access. The other two reported similar information but apparently did not have 229 CIA operational cabl-, September mOO2. 230 CIA, Iraq and al-Qa ‘ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship,June 2 1,2002, p. 6; CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 19,2002, p. 14; and January 29,2003, p. 17-18. Page 78 Page 82 first-hand access to it. No al-Qa’ida associates detained since 11 Septemberhave said they trained at Salman Pak.231 (U) All three defectors referenced were affiliated with the INC. The first of the three defectors, described as having embellished and exaggerated his access, is Source Three. CIA officials told Committee staff that the comment that he had “embellished and exaggerated” his access referred to the press stories, not to hisdebriefings with the Intelligence Community. In addition, these officials acknowledged that they do not know that it was Source Three who exaggerated, only that they believe the press story was an exaggerated verison of what Source Three told his Intelligence Community debriefers.232 The second of the three defectors referenced in the paper was also debriefed by the Intelligence Community agencies and is described in further detail below as Source Four. m The Intelligence Community did not debrief the third defector and does not know his identity. The CIA paper’s reference to his reports refers toinformation from the defector that appeared in media stories. When asked by Committee staff how the CIA could judge that this defector “apparently did nothave first-hand access” when no CIA nersonnel had ever snoken to him. CIA23’ CIA, Iraqi Supportfor Terrorism, September 19,2002, p, 14 and January 29,2003, p. 17-18. The lastsentence y&the September version stated “no al-Qa’ida associates detained since 11 September reinforced them.”233 Interview with CIA officials, February 2006.Interview with CIA officials, February 2006. Page 79 Page 83 (U) Despite the assertion in Iraqi Support to Terrorism that the “defectorsclaimed that al-Qa’ida and other non-Iraqis” trained at Salman Pak, Committeestaff found no reports from these defectors claiming that it was members of al- Qa’ida who received the training. In fact, Source Three and Source Four (who isdiscussed below) specifically told their debriefers that they did not know whether the non-Iraqi Arabs were al-Qa’ida members.236@ The Intelligence Community did not have any further direct contact with Source Three after Intelligence Community has no information on his location after that time. 237 “’ CIA intellieence reDor&.237 CIA operatyonal cable,-, Septembea 2002. Page 80 Page 84 4. Source Four (u) In October 2001, -SourceFour, a former Iraqi Fedayeen Saddam captain, living in the United States, was referred to the Intelligence Comrnunity by Source Three as someone who could confirm Source Three’s story. He provided Source Four’s name, address and telephonenumber to the debriefers. m Before the any members of the Intelligence Cornmunity met with Source Four, the INC arranged a meeting between him and a U.S. journalist. During the meeting, an INC member acted as the interpreter and several INC officials participated in the discussion. The CIA received an advance copy of a draft media article based on the interview with Source Four. According to a CIA cable about the article, it said Source Four was an Iraqi terror school instructor and said that the methods used at the training school, in mraq, were similar to those used by September 11 hijackers. A CIA cable discussing the draft article Page 85 noted that CIA debriefers had been notified about Source Four from another Iraqi defector, Source Three (see previous discussion), who had referred Source Four because he was -Commander’s deputy at the training camp andwould have a good overview of the training there. Source Three said that Source Four had no terrorist connections. 239 d> The FBI and the CIA debriefed Source Four in October 2001. The FBI report from the interview says that Source Four was an Iraqi army Captain who brought his personnel to-he camp as part of their training in 1995. The FBI report said that the purpose of the Fedayeen, according to Uday Hussein, was to strike against America and American interests. Source Four said the camp had a train, a bus, and a Boeing 707 aircraft to train in hijacking operations. Source Four was not a terrorist instructor, but did provide his soldiers with weapons training.240 (U) The FBI report said Source Four saw the hijacking training of his soldiers which included training to gain control of the cockpit using any type of weapons they could get, including guns, knives, sticks, or toy guns. Source Four said Iraqi intelligence also trained non-Iraqi Arabs in hijacking techniques at this facility. Source Four told the FBI that he had no specific information that tied the training he observed directly to the September 11 attacks, but said the training he saw was nearly identical to the methods used by the September 11 terrorists.24’m The CIA has not provided the Committee with contemporaneousoperations traffic that discusses its interview with Source Four. The CIA did disseminate three intelligence reports from Source Four’s debriefs prior to239 CIA operational cable, mctober mO01. 240 FBI Interview of Source Four, October 30,200 1. 241 FBI: Interview of Source Four, October 30,200l. Page 82 Page 86 Operation Iraqi Freedom, however. The first report, dated October 3 1,2001, said that the former Fedayeen Saddam captain said U.S. news accounts of his activities at the training camp ad been distorted because the INC translator involved in the press interviews had distorted what he said. This was the only mention of the source’s DE-affiliation in any of the three disseminatedreports.242 The report said that Source Four had never provided training in terrorist techniques. He oversaw two groups of Fedayeen Saddam trainees, taking care of their administrative needs and providing rifle and pistol training. He was at the camp for only eight months, but did observe Iraqi intelligence trainers teaching techniques for hijacking aircraft, buses and trains. The report also said he occasionally observed men he believed to be non-Iraqi Arabs receiving terrorist training in these tactics. He observed between 70-75 non-Iraqi Arab trainees, He could not evaluate their nationalities, nor whether any of them participated in the September 11 attacks. The source description said Source Four was “a contactwith excellent access who spoke in confidence but who does not have an established reporting record.“243(U) The second report described details of a typical training day at the camp. The report described a typical camp hijacking scenario which would involve a five-member team, two to control the crew and three to control the passengers. The report said that between 1994 and 1995 approximately 75 non- Iraqi Arabs or Arab extremists trained at the camp.244 The third report provided information on the Fedayeen Saddam and locations associated with the Fedayeen Saddam and the Ba’ath Party in Baghdad and another Iraqi city.245242 In a response to questions from Committee staff, CIA said it omitted Source Four’s INC affiliation fromits report&q because CIA did not know how much, if any, support Source Four had received t?om the INC. 244 CIA intelligence report, CIA intelligence report, 245 CIA intelligence report, Page 83 Page 87 m The CIA included reporting from Source Four’s debriefs in theassessment on the -facility describing him as a former Iraqi Saddam Fedayeen captain who observed 70-75 non-Iraqi Arabs receiving terrorist training at Salman Pak from October 1994 to May 1995. “According to the former captain,his role has been distorted in open source accounts, which described him as training members of Saddam’s Fedayeen to conduct kidnappings, assassinations,and hijacking operations. He insists his duties were strictly administrative in nature, aside from instructing recruits in marksmanship training.“246(U) The CIA case officer who debriefed Source Four told Committee staff that Source Four did not say that he knew his remarks had been distorted, rather that Source Four believed he had been distorted because after some of Source Four’s short responses, the INC translator would speak in English for longperiods.247 (U) Committee staff reviewed a tape recording of a press interview with Source Four in which several INC officials participated and an INC member translated. A U.S. government contract translator reviewed the tape recording and told Committee staff that the defector was not mistranslated. In a few cases the translator added “definitely” to the defector’s response and added “all over theworld” to his comment that the terrorist training was intended to target Americaninterests and the American military. Neither Source Four, nor the translator, ever claimed that the defector provided the terrorist training himself, only that he was at the camp where such training was provided and that he was at the camp for only a year. In several instances the translator responded to the reporter’s questionswithout actually asking the defector, most often because the defector had already 246 CIA intelligence assessment, EOOl a?& CIA, I rag and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murb Relationship,June 2 1,2002, p 6. Staff interview with CIA officer. ovember Page 84 Page 88 responded to the question previously. Much of the interview involved the INC officials providing information about another INC-affiliated source.248 (U) The CIA included the intelligence reports from Source Four’sIntelligence Community debriefs in three comprehensive assessments about Iraq’slinks to al-Qa’ida that included Source Three’s information: the June 2002, Iraqand al-Qa ‘ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, and September 2002 andJanuary 2003 versions of Iraqi Support for Terrorism. 24g m Source Four is one of the two “other” defectors cited in the IraqiSupport for Terrorism papers as follows: [Three] defectors claimed that al-Qa’ida and other non-Iraqis engaged in special operations training am mt was subsequently determined, however, that at least one of these defectors, whose story appeared in the media had embellished and exaggerated his access. The other two reported similar information but apparently did not have first-hand access to it.250 (U) Because Source Four’s source description said he had “excellentaccess,” Committee staff asked for the basis for saying in Iraqi Support toTerrorism that he “apparently did not have first-hand access to” the information.248 24g Source Four press interview. CIA, Iraq and al-Qa ‘ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship,June 2 1,2002, p 6. 250 CIA, Iraqi Support to Terrorism, September 19,2002, p. 14 and January 29,2003, p. 17-18. Page 85 Page 89 CIA officials told Committee staff the description was meant to indicate that he did not personally provide the training.251 m In October 2002, the CIA published an assessment titled, Terrorism: Question About the Two Iraqi Defectors. The assessment noted that the CIA and the FBI debriefed Source Four in October 2001and found him to be “forthcoming and cooperative and assessed he was a dedicated regime opponent.”The assessment outlined Source Four’s account to debriefers that media stories ofhis activities at -he training camp “were distorted because hisstatements had been mistranslated by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).“252m The CIA and the FBI continued discussions with Source Four until and during Operation Iraqi Freedom, particularly for assistance in contacting other former Iraqi military officers.253 The CIA stopped contact with Source Four for several months when Source Four moved in March 2002 -intending to work for the INC. Source Four returned to his original location in December 2002, saying he had become disillusioned with the INC and “its hollow promises of meaningful employment.“254(U) In January 2003, Source Four told CIA and FBI debriefers that he had received menacing phone calls from an individual he believed was Iraqi intelligence requesting unspecified assistance. The individual called for a third time on February lo,2003 and asserted that he was calling on behalf of the Iraqi government which wanted a peaceful resolution to tensions with the U.S. Source Four speculated that the Iraqi believed Source Four had a relationship with the 25* Staff interview of CIA officials, February 6,2006. 252 CIA, Terrorism: Question About the Two Iraqi Defectors, October 12002. 253 CIA operational cable, 254 CIA operational cable, , February 12002. , December mOO2. Page 86 Page 90 U.S. government through which he could articulate his or Iraqi government views.255 @ On February 17,2003, he same Iraqi asked for Source Four’s assessment of American views of war with Iraq and asserted that “Iraq wasproviding true and accurate information to the UN inspectors and noted that Iraq was ready for war.“256 A CIA domestic station requested a response from CIAheadquarters regarding continued interest in gauging the Iraqi intelligence officer’s interest in meeting with U.S. government officials.several concerns referenced in a separate cable, including Source Four’s pastexposure in the media and his employment with the INC, “we do not have anyoperational interest in further pursuing [the suspected Iraqi intelligence officer] at this time.“257a. Postwar Information on Salman Pak (U) A November 2003 assessment from DIA noted that postwar exploitation of the facility found it “devoid of valuable intelligence.” The assessment addedthat CIA exploitation “found nothing of intelligence value remained and assessedthe Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) cleaned it out.” The DIA assessment concludedthat “we do not know whether the ex-regime trained terrorists on the aircraft atSalman Pak. Intelligence of the Salman Pak facility in late April 2003 indicated ::i CIA operational cable, February mOO3. 257 CIA operational cable, February mOO3. CIA operational cables, mebruary 12003 and February mOO3. Page 87 Page 91 the plane had been dismantled. DIA and CENTCOM assess the plane was sold for scrap.“258(U) In a June 2006 response to questions from Comrnittee staff, DIA said it has “no credible reports that non-Iraqis were trained to conduct or supporttransnational terrorist operations at Salman Pak after 199 1. DIA assessed that following Operation Desert Storm, Salman Pak became well known to the general public as a center for terrorist training, weapons of mass destruction storage and other sensitive activities. As a result, “fabricators and unestablished sources whoreported hearsay or thirdhand information created a large volume of human intelligence reporting. This type of reporting surged after September 2001 and continued well after the capture of Salman Pak.“259(U) In June 2006, CIA told the Committee that: There was information developed after OIF that indicated terrorists were trained at Salman Pak; there was an apparent surge of such reporting. As with past information, however, the reporting is vague and difficult to substantiate. As was the case with the prewar reporting, however, the postwar sources provided few details, and it is difficult to conclude from their second-hand accounts whether Iraq was training al-Qa’ida members, as opposed to other foreignnationals. Postwar site exploitation of Salman Pak has yielded no indications that training of al-Qa’ida linked individuals took placethere, and we have no information from detainees on this issue.260 258 Director for Intelligence (52) Memo to DEPSECDEF, The Salman Pak Facility, November 10,2003. 259 DIA Response to SSCI Question, June 7,2006. 260 CIA notes on Committee draft report, June 2006. Page 88 Page 92 (U) The Iraq Survey Group found that an Iraqi intelligence directorate, M 14, which was responsible for training and special operations missions, used the Salman Pak facility to train Iraqis, Palestinians, Syrians, Yemeni, Lebanese, Eqyptian, and Sudanese operatives in counter-terrorism, explosives, marksmanship, and foreign operations.261 5. Source Five m Source Five -as referred to the DIA by the INC through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The Assistant Secretary of Defense did not recall making this referral to DIA. According to the DIA, Source Five had been smuggled out of Iraq by the INC. The DIA debriefed the source from late September through October 2002 and produced sixteen intelligence reports based on Source Five’s debriefs on leadership atmospherics, routines, and various socialactivities.262 (U) The source descriptions in the intelligence reports varied to some extent. Most described Source Five as “a naturalized Iraqi citizen with directaccess to the highest levels of the Iraqi leadership. Source reliability has not yet been determined.” Some of the reports added “information may be intended todisinform.“263261 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DC1 on Iraq’s WMD, Regime Strategic Intentsection a& 78. 263 DIA response to questions from Committee staff, December 14,2005. DIA intelligence reports,-. Page 89 Page 93 One DIA report described a debrief with Source Five in which the source claimed to have seen Saddam meeting with a man, who Uday Hussein identified as bin Ladin. Uday told Source Five he was there to discuss training of some of his people in Iraq.265 Source Five passed a DIA administered polygraph in which the source was questioned about provided reports, including the report on having seei bin Ladin meeting with Saddam.266 (U) The comment section of the bin Ladin meeting report noted that it appeared to the reporting officer that Source Five may have reconsidered how the bin Ladin information was presented during the public disclosures and in the interim, had prepared for the reporting officer a careful, somewhat circumscribed, delivery of this part of the story. “Based on a preliminary examination, [SourceFive’s] travel documents appear to support the basic facts of how [Source Five]left Iraq. The documents neither confirm nor deny the claim of long-term close personal access to Saddam and his inner circle. Significant further vetting of source is appropriate.“267that Source Five’ bin Ladin story appeared to be more or less cogent, but wasperhaps contaminated with pockets of coached fabrications. DIA administered a polygraph of Source Five in November 2002 in which the source was assessed to and staff interview with DIA officers, Novemb005 DIA intelligence report,-, September 12002. Page 90 Page 94 believe what the source said to be true. Test administrators indicated that the source had emotional and psychological issues which could affect test reliability and the source’s perception of past events. DIA said that in light of the aboveinformation, DIA officers included in disseminated reporting the notification that Source Five was connected to the Iraqi opposition, was aware information was being provided to the U.S. government, and that Source Five’s comments mayhave been intended to influence as well as inform decision makers.268 (U) The bin Ladin-Saddam meeting report was the only terrorism related report from this source. Source Five’s other reports focused on Saddam’s familyand associates and identified multiple facilities associated with the senior regime leadership and security services. None of the reports related to w&ID.269 @ Following Source Five’s media appearance in 2002, CIA published anassessment, he assessment noted that Source Five’s reports of a meeting between Saddam and binLadin “have not been corroborated.” The assessment added that “sensitivereporting of meetings between senior Iraqi officials and al-Qa’ida membersprovide no indication that Saddam and Bin Ladin have met each other.“270(U) CIA published another assessment after the DIA debriefed Source Five. CIA noted that the source provided documents which substantiated the basic framework of the story that Source Five lived and fled from Iraq. Source Five provided telephone numbers, some of which were determined to be accurate and showed familiarity with members of Saddam’s family. The assessment noted thatSource Five’s claims to DIA about meetings between Saddam and bin Ladin268 DIA, Response to questions fi-om Committee staff, April 27,2006. 26g DIA, response to questions from Committee staff, September 30,2005. 270 CI September pOO2, p. 1. Page 91 Page 95 “differ from [media accounts] in terms of time, place, and number of meetings.The [DIA] team says [Source Five’s] body language in this part of the debriefingsuggested [the source] was uneasy with the topic; team members assessed [the source] might have reconsidered the statements to the press and prepared a careful story for the [DIA] interview.“27*6. The Would-Be Defector m In July 2001, Ahmed Chalabi told an individual in the Department of Defense272 he had information from an intermediary that a senior Iraqi diplomat in Europe anted to defect to the United States. DIA officers met with Chalabi to discuss- thediplomat’spossible defection. Chalabi informed the DIA that thediplomat had been directed by the Iraqi government to return to Baghdad with his family in the next few weeks or possibly days because of an ongoing dispute with the IIS station chief who was displeased with the diplomat’s refusal to do “nastythings.” and because the Iraai rrovernment was disnleased with the diplomat’s iob(U) The CIA Iraq Operations Group informed the DIA that it had no interest in supporting resettlement of the diplomat because his academic background and limited government experience indicated that he would be of no value to the Intelligence Community. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,and Intelligence and the DIA concurred that the diplomat was not likely to have secrets that were of high intelligence value. The 27’ CIA,ctobea 2002, p. 2. 272 DIA records do not indicate which o&e or who specifically at DOD made this referral. 273 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, p.4 and DIA response to questions from Committee staff, December 14,2005. Page 92 Page 96 diplomat never defected and neither CIA nor DIA officers ever met with him.274 No reporting resulted from this referra1.275 C. INC Reporting During DIA’s Management of the ICP(U) As noted previously, the DIA officially took over management of the ICP from the Department of State in late October 2002. Between that time and before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DIA disseminated reporting from fourteen other sources who were either members of or were associated with the INC. In addition to the fourteen individuals, the DIA also disseminated four prewar intelligence reports from a source number assigned to the INC organization itself. The reports assigned to this source number resulted from CIA and DIA meetings with several INC officials who “provided composites of what the INCICP had on hand concerning Iraq. . . . [DIA] is unable to attribute the reporting to any single source within the INC’s ICP.“276(U) According to the DIA, reporting from sources provided by the ICP “covered a myriad of information and was not uniform in quality, accuracy, andutility. In some cases it provided solid intelligence leads, corroborated other information, and contributed to our knowledge base. In other cases, the information was of low or no value.“277 DIA said its “experience with INC ICPsources is similar to that with many HUMINT sources.“278274 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, p.4. 275 CIA response to questions from Committee staff, January 18,2006. 276 DIA response to questions fi-om Committee staff, March 2006. 277 DIA Response to Questions for the Record, March 23,2004. 278 DIA Response to Questions for the Record, March 23,2004. Page 93 Page 97 (U) Three of the four reports sourced to the INC organization identified the reporting as from “a member of the Iraqi opposition who was aware hisinformation would reach the U.S. government and who may have intended the comments to influence as well as inform.“279 One of the reports did not includethis warning, but did indicate that the source had “indirect access whose reliabilityhas yet to be determined.” This report, disseminated in November 2002, providedinformation about the establishment of a “crisis management committee” in Iraqwhich was responsible for preserving the life of Saddam and his family, protecting Baghdad and other vital locations, and the “use of weapons of mass destruction.”The report stated that Iraq possessed several thousand chemical weapons shellsfilled with VX and mustard, as well as 320 biological shells filled with ebola and anthrax.280 According to the DIA, the reference to the chemical weapons stockpile was considered credible by DIA analysts and was included in threat briefings as an example of reporting on the existence of a CW stockpile in Iraq. It was not cited in any written assessments.281 (U) Two of the three reports which did note the source’s oppositionaffiliation, both disseminated in December 200 1, provided a database and handwritten charts depicting Saddam Hussein’s genealogy and a documentdescribing key personnel in Iraq’s intelligence and security services.282 The lastreport, which also noted the source’s opposition affiliation, was attributed to asubsource of undetermined reliability. The report said that Saddam Hussein had told his closest friends and family members to stockpile water because he was preparing to poison the water supply in Baghdad and Kurdish-controlled northern 279 DIA intelligence reports, 2003, , DIA, response JoCommittee staff request. DIA intelligence report, sovember mOO2, DIA, response to Committee staff request. 281 DIA response to questions from Committee staff. 282 DIA intelligence reports, 2003]. Page 94 Page 98 Iraq. The exact contaminant was not identified, but “is believed to be a biologicalagent, possibly anthrax or a derivative of anthrax.“283(U) The fourteen other sources reported on a variety of topics including regime biographic and personality information, Saddam’s palaces, tribe loyalties,Iraqi concealment efforts, prohibited procurement, the Fedayeen Saddam, military order of battle, Iraqi intelligence, the movement of prohibited weapons, and the locations of suspect WMD facilities.284 (U) According to DIA, the impact of reporting from INC-affiliated sources varied substantially by issue. The quality and impact were higher for leadership tracking, prisoners of war, and identification of medical facilities as compared to military issues and WMD.285 INC sources in some cases provided verified and useful information that directly supported contingency planning and operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom. In other instances, the information was vague, incorrect, or unverifiable.286 (U) INC-affiliated reporting was “highly useful,” according to the DIA, inidentifying important medical facilities. Reporting confirmed facility locations, identified new facilities, and providing a means for de-conflicting previously erroneous geographic coordinates provided by other sources. Most of the information was used for no-strike targeting to avoid civilian casualties.287 283 DIA intelligence report, manum003. 284 DIA, response to Committee staff request. 285 DIA response to Committee staff questions, February 2004. 286 DIA, Iraq: INC Source Pre-War Intelligence Reporting, Response to SSCI request, December 13,2005. 287 DIA response to Committee staff questions, February 2004. Page 95 Page 99 (U) Information provided by INC-affiliated sources was used to identify key leadership residences, office locations, and clubs frequented by Saddam and his sons. The information also helped analysts establish behavior patterns, in particular, for the two sons. Reporting from several sources on Iraq’s internalsecurity apparatus was corroborated by either open or classified sources of information and contributed to the Intelligence Community’s baselineunderstanding of this issue. According to the DIA, information on internal security was largely accurate.288 m Source Six an Iraqi-born businessman, provided twenty-three reports, almost exclusively on regime biographies and personalities. One such report, in December 2002, identified an individual said to be in charge of Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear programs. It provided no other WMDrelated information.289 Another report, in February 2003, discussed Saddam Hussein’s confidence in Faruq Hijazi for intelligence assessments. A sourcecomment noted that if Saddam wanted to build a relationship with bin Ladin, “hewould have picked Hijazi as his representative.” The report did not indicate thatSaddam did want to build a relationship with bin Ladin. (U) The only report from Source Six that did not discuss regime personalities, dated February 2003, said that some of the Iraqi population is excited about the idea of removing Saddam Hussein from power and replacing him with improved leadership. Source Six said the Iraqi people expect a U.S. operation to take about four weeks, and understand that a short U.S. presence after that will be necessary. He said if the U.S. stays too long it may be viewed as an occupation and said the U.S. should work closely with local officials to avoid that :ii DIA response to Committee staff questions, February 2004. 290DIA intelligence report, DIA intelligence report, Page 96 Page 100 perception. The source said the Iraqi people will want a new government created from officials in Iraq, not from Iraqi exiles who may “be seen as spies that are notloyal to Iraq and are placed into a position by the USG as a puppet government.“291The CIA included this report in a March 13,2003 paper, Iraq: Diaspora Brings Tensions, Hope, as one of many sources used to support the judgment that Iraqis would be threatened by an exile-led transitional authority. The citation said, “anIraqi businessman with high-level contacts inside Iraq says most Iraqis prefer a new government composed of those now living in the country.“292thirteen prewar reports on a variety of topics including a three part report on prominent Iraqi tribes, Iraqi smuggling of prohibited materials, Iraqi intelligence assassination teams sent to kill Iraqi opposition members, infighting within the INC, and two reports on Iraq’s missiles. Source Seven is described in thereporting as a Middle Eastern businessman with indirect access to the information. After the first three reports, which did not indicate Source Seven’s INC affiliation,all subsequent reporting carried the comment, “the source of this report is amember of the Iraqi opposition who was aware that his/her comments would reach the U.S. government and who may have intended the comments to influence as well as inform.“293(U) An October 2002 report from a Source Seven subsource said three Iraqi Scud missile systems had recently deployed to Mosul, Iraq. The subsource reported that the Scuds were capable of delivering chemical or biological warheads and that the units were believed to have orders to fire on Turkey in the staff. :ii DIA intelligence report,sebruary 12003. CIA, Diaspora Bring Tension, Hope, March WOO3 and CIA response to questions from Committee 293 DIA intelligence report,Bctober mOO2. Page 97 Page 101 event of U.S. hostilities with Iraq. A November 2002 report, also from a subsource, said that Qusay Hussein, Saddam’s son, had assumed control of Iraq’sstrategic rocket forces from the Iraqi army. The subsource believed Saddam made this change because he did not trust the army to follow his orders and fire on designated targets in neighboring countries in the event of an attack on Iraq. The comment section of the report stated that the “source is unvetted. He is a memberof an Iraqi opposition group, and admittedly part of a faction that favors finding a surgical means to remove Saddam Hussein and purge his close followers, instead of achieving regime change through a large-scale attack. He therefore may have intended his information to persuade that a military attack on Iraq could be too risky.“294m The DIA disseminated eight reports, all in late October and early November 2002, from Source Eigh logistics specialist for the Iraqi military production agency. All of the reports described Source Eight as a member of the Iraqi opposition. Source Eight reported almost exclusively on Iraqi conventional weapons production facilities and told debriefers that he had no knowledge of chemical, biological, or missile-related production, storage or hide sites.295 He reported that a business associate told him Iraq was smuggling “sanctioned” materials to Syria, which the individuals driving the materialsbelieved to be chemical and biological weapons.296 Another report from Source Eight, attributed to a subsource, said that Iraqi intelligence officers provided “bearded fundamentalist terrorists” in Kuwait with small arms and explosives inthe summer of 2002 to be used against U.S. forces in Kuwait.297 294 295 DIA intelligence report, 296 DIA intelligence report, 297 DIA intelligence report, DIA intelligence report, Page 98 Page 102 m Source Qa’ida travel patternbut none of the reported activities involved Iraq. The reports included a number of enclosures All of the reports from Source Nine described him as a member of the Iraqi opposition.2g8 m The DIA disseminated two prewar reports from Source Ten m . Both reports described him as a member of the Iraqi opposition, in one case, a senior member. The first report, dated November 2002 reported on Iraqi purchasing agents in Jordan acquiring dual-use materials for Iraq. The report said Iraq had also successfully obtained refurbished T-72 tank engines, anti-tank missiles, helicopter engines and night vision goggles.2gg The second report, dated January 2003, was from a subsource who allegedly worked on two Iraqi nuclear facilities described in the report, Tuwaitha and Ameriyah. The report said unspecified nuclear activity was rumored to have been occurring at the facility for two years, but was “definitelyoperating” between April and June 2002 when radiation levels were aboveacceptable safety standards.300 m The DIA disseminated one report from Source 1 mroviding the alleged daily routine of Uday Hussein. The report specified that the source was “connected with the Iraqi opposition and was aware thathis/her comments would reach the U.S. government. He/she may have intended the comments to influence as well as inform.“3o1298 2ggDIA intelligence report, yovember 2002. 3oo DIA intelligence report, 301 DIA intelligence report, DIA intelligence report, Page 99 Page 103 m The DIA disseminated twenty-eight prewar intelligence reports from Source Twelve an INC handler. All _^_ of the reports identified Source Twelve as a member of the Iraqi opposition.‘“’Sixteen of the reports provided information from 1998 regarding Hussein familyresidences, security at the residences, and the activities of the Hussein family at the residences. One report identified the exact location where Saddam parked his car within the Republican Palace, while visiting Uday.303 Another report identified a security signature inside the Republican Palace that indicated when Saddam was in the general area.3o4 The DIA told the Committee these reports were verified A through Bother intelligence reporting prior to the war.3o5 (U) Source Twelve also provided twelve reports from the translation of a 100 page Arabic document providing extensive order of battle information and Iraqi government structure information including on Iraqi border forces, Republican Guard Corps, the Special Security Organization, the General Security Directorate, and Military Intelligence Directorate. These reports also described the source as a member of the Iraqi opposition.306 Source busine b The DIA disseminated approximately 50 prewar reports from : Thirteen ho conducted ss with Uday Hussein and other senior Iraqi officials About half of the reports, describe the source as a member of the Iraqi opposition. The reports largely focused on the Saddam family, in particular Uday Hussein’s lifestyle and habits, and Hussein302 DIA. resDonse to Committee staff reauest. reDor& fi-om Source Twelve. 311; DIA response to questions from Committee staff. DIA, response to Committee staff request, reports fi-om Source Twelve. Page 100

Page 101 Page 105 m The DIA disseminated three reports from Source Fifteen m -described as an Iraqi citizen with direct access to the information. One report identified four Iraqi Intelligence Service officers serving in Iraqi embassies in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. m.3” The other two reports, dated late January and early February 2003,discussed Iraqi smuggling efforts of prohibited items including missiles, military spare parts, small arms, computer equipment and tools for the previous two years. One of the reports included enclosures of tender bids for an Iraqi company involved in the smuggling efforts.312 (U) In January 2003, the DIA disseminated two reports from two different sources containing information that was over ten years old. One report provided information from 1985 on the construction of fifteen underground arsenal facilities near Tikrit Iraq.313 The other report provided information from 1990 about a nuclear facility located north of Salman Pak. The source did not provide information about the type of nuclear facility he was describing.314 Neither report noted the sources’ opposition affiliations.m The DIA disseminated two reports from Source Sixtee- m, a former Iraqi army officer and U.S. citize-. The source description identified the source as a member of the Iraqi opposition and Free Iraq Force (FIF) member. The first report from Source Sixteen provided information from 1989 about a project to produce chemical protection masks and possibly suits. The report included hand drawings of the facility.315 The second report said 311 3 1 2 DIA intelligence report, DIA intelligence reports danu4 2003. 313 DIA 314 intelligence report, DIA 315 intelligence report, DIA intelligence report, Page 102 Page 106 that the leader of the a Kurdish tribe in northern Iraq was willing to support U.S. efforts to topple Saddam Hussein in return for weapons and money. The report provided background information and a description of the tribe leader, including photographs316 m The DIA disseminated one report from Source Seventeen m U.S. green card holder and member of the Free Iraq Force (FIF). The report was attributed to a subsource who claimed that members of the Special Republican Guard were prepared to fight to the death alongside Saddam Hussein. The report said Saddam had some units which were dressed as U.S. and British troops and were prepared to “execute chemical-biological warfare” on Iraqicitizens so the world would blame President Bush.3*7 1. CIA Debrief of INC-walk in (Source Eighteen) m While the DIA was officially managing the ICP program, the CIA facilitated the debriefing of one INC-affiliated source DIA officer was detailed to the meam and participated in the debrief.318 In early February 2003, an INC representative brought Source Eighteen to a CIA base -for a short meeting with CIA and DIA staff that was to be followed later with a more extensive debriefin- egarding his reported access to Iraq’s nuclear program. While meeting with the INCrepresentative and Source Eighteen, the CIA case officer received a phone call 316 3 1 7 DIA intelligence report, DIA intelligence report, 3’8 Interview with DIA offkers.arch mOO3. arch mOO3. Page 103 Page 107 from local source who said that on the way to the meeting he heard the INC representative tell Source Eighteen to “deliver the act ofa lifetime.” The case officer said that he did not act on the information,“understanding the level ofjealousy/animosity between the INC and the [localsource] .“319 The next day, the CIA and DIA debriefed Source Eighteen. SourceEighteen was supposed to have a nuclear engineering background, but was unable to discuss advanced mathematics or physics and described types of “nuclear”reactors that do not exist. Source Eighteen used the bathroom frequently,particularly when he appeared to be flustered by a line of questioning, suddenly remembering a new piece of information upon his return. During one such incident Source Eighteen appeared to be reviewing notes.320 m The case officers judged that Source Eighteen was a fabricator. The Intelligence Communitv had no further contact with him and did not results of the meeting, and DIA concurred with CIA’s intent to discontinuecontact.321 3 19CIA operations cable, mebrua, :fy CIA operations cable, 2003. ebruary m 2003. CIA operations cable, ebruary DO03 and CIA responses to questions from Committee staff, May 25, 2006. Page 104 Page 108 IV. ALLEGED INC-LINKED SOURCES A. CURVE BALL (U) The Senate Intelligence Committee’s July 2004 report, the US.Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, examined therole of a foreign liaison service source, code named CURVE BALL, in the Intelligence Community’s judgments about Iraq’s biological weapons program.CURVE BALL was the source that led the Intelligence Community to judge in the 2002 NIE on Iraq’s WMD capabilities that “Baghdad has mobile facilities forproducing bacterial and toxin BW agents.“322 There were three other sources whothe Intelligence Community believed corroborated CURVE BALL’s reporting323,but CURVE BALL was the Intelligence Community’s primary source on the B-Wprogram, providing more than 100 reports on Iraq’s alleged BW program while theother sources provided one each. As one analyst described to Committee staff, without CURVE BALL, “. . . you probably could only honestly say that Iraqwould be motivated to have a mobile BW program and that it was attempting to procure components that would support that.“324(U) The Committee noted in its July 2004 report that uncertainties about CURVE BALL’s reliability had been raised in CIA operations cables but were notdisseminated to analysts outside the CIA. Despite these warnings, and perhaps in part because of the limited dissemination of those warnings, the Intelligence 2002. 322 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 323See pages 148-161 of the Committee’s July 2004 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on theU.S. Intelligence Community s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq for a discussion of all four sources and their role in th I 826 telligence Community’s judgments about a mobile biological weapons program.Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s PrewarIntelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 9,2004. Page 105 Page 109 Community judged CURVE BALL to be “credible” or “very credible” in itsreporting. The Committee concluded that uncertainties about his reliability should have been taken into account by operations officers who provided the initial judgment of his credibility, should have made the analysts who were aware of them wary about relying so heavily on his reporting, and should have been noted in the NIE. In addition, these concerns should have been passed on to policymakers, who used CURVE BALL’s information publicly. 325(U) Following publication of the first report, the Committee learned of additional prewar concerns about CURVE BALL’s reliability within the CIA.Those issues are discussed briefly in the accuracy section of this report and are the subject of a continuing Committee inquiry. (U) In the summer and fall of 2003, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) investigated whether Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program as part of its overall investigation into Iraq’s WMD capabilities. The primary focus wasinvestigating sites and individuals identified by CURVE BALL and later, CURVE BALL himself. The ISG located and debriefed over sixty individuals who could have been involved in a mobile program, were linked to suspect sites, or to CURVE BALL. Many of the individuals corroborated some of the reporting on personnel and some legitimate activities CURVE BALL claimed were cover activities, but none provided evidence to substantiate the claim of a mobile BW program.326 Inspections of the facilities CURVE BALL had described also did not support his story. A CIA assessment dated May 26,2004 states that “investigations since the war in Iraq and debriefings of the key source indicate helied about his access to a mobile BW production project.“327 The CIA and DIA3251d. at pp. 188-l 89. 3261d. at p. 74. 327CIA, Key Mobile B W Source Deemed Unreliable, May 26,2004 Page 106 Page 110 jointly issued a congressional notification in June 2004 noting that CURVE BALL was assessed to have fabricated his claimed access to a mobile BW production project and that his reporting had been recalled.328 (U) During the ISG’s investigation of CURVE BALL, the group learnedthat CURVE BALL had a close relative who had worked for the INC since 1992, for at least some period in a senior position.32g This revelation, combined with the fact that CURVE BALL was determined to have fabricated substantial portions of his reporting, led to suspicion that CURVE BALL may have been coached on his story by the INC.33o (U) According to a March 2004 CIA review, in the fall of 2003, CURVE BALL’s close relative, then working in INC offices in Iraq, willingly met withISG officers. CURVE BALL’s close relative stated that he had contacted CURVEBALL in 2001 on behalf of the INC to ascertain whether CURVE BALL, in the course of his employment with Iraq’s Organization of Military Industry, had anyinformation on secret or sensitive projects that would help boost the case against Iraq at the UN. CURVE BALL told his close relative he did not. The close relative also said that he had minimal contact with CURVE BALL since CURVE BALL defected to a European country, which the CIA says is consistent with mecords they have been able to locate.331 (U) When the CIA was finally given access to CURVE BALL in March 2004, CURVE BALL refused to discuss anything about his family. In a response to questions from Committee staff, the CIA said its officers did not ask about Page 107 Page 111 CURVE BALL’s close relative’s INC connections, fearing that CURVE BALLwould terminate discussions with the CIA. CIA never asked CURVE BALL about any affiliation with the INC, judging that he would have terminated the discussion if they had.332 (U) The CIA believes that CURVE BALL’s close relative’s connection tothe INC is coincidental, and is not an explanation for his fabrications. The CIA told Committee staff in a written response to questions that CURVE BALL’sdefection did not fit the pattern of the typical INC-influenced defection in that the INC did not broker his introduction to the Intelligence Community and did not put him in front of the media.333 In 2003, a CIA analyst told the Cornrnittee that CURVE BALL was located when he sought asylum in a European country, when officials reviewed his asylum paperwork, noticed that he was an Iraqi chemical engineer, and approached him to be interviewed. The analyst said CURVE BALL did not come forward with information himself. In explaining why she did not think CURVE BALL was affiliated with the INC she said that the INC would “shop their good sources around town, but they weren’t known for sneakingpeople out of countries into some asylum system. This isn’t the way they wereknown to operate. It would have been more blatant if the INC-at least in our estimation-had been putting him forward.334 (U) A study of possible Iraqi opposition deception efforts against the U.S. noted that CIA has never formally collected against the INC and has no information on their processes and procedures for disseminating information, a key element to assess potential deception programs and tactics.335 However, CIA 332 CIA response to questions from Committee staff, January 10,2006. 333 CIA response to questions ii-om Committee staff, January 10,2006. :E Interview with CIA analysts, December 4,2003. CIA internal memorandum, March 8,2004. Page 108 Page 112 officials told Committee staff that they were able to observe how the INC operated openly and that the judgments about CURVE BALL were made from those observations.336 The CIA acknowledged that there is no concrete evidence that CURVE BALL was not working at the behest of or influenced by the INC, but assessed that “CURVE BALL’s connection to the INC was coincidental.“337(U) Ahmed Chalabi and two other INC officials have told Committee staff that the INC had no involvement with CURVE BALL and, to this day, they do not know who CURVE BALL is. Chalabi said that the INC had done their own investigation to find out “who he was” and whether there was any truth tosuggestions that he had a close relative in the INC. Chalabi said the investigation did not turn up anyone in the INC who had this close relative in the European country, where CURVE BALL resides. CIA officers told the Committee that it was hard to believe that no one Chalabi knew in the INC did not have this close relative in the European country. One officer added, “I find that a non-crediblestatement.” When asked if they had any examples of any INC officials who dohave this close relative in the European country in question, a CIA officer said, “we didn’t follow the INC with that kind of detail so I can’t answer that.”(U) Chalabi and two other INC officials denied ever attempting to bring anysources to the Intelligence Community, or anyone else, without openly identifying the INC’s involvement.338336 Interview with CIA officers, July 20, 2006. :ii CIA response to questions fi-om Committee staff, January 10,2006. Staff interviews with INC officials. Page 109 Page 113 B. Source Nineteen m On February 27,2002, Source Nineteen an Iraqi defector,- in to a third country m Embassy in the Middle East-. Officers from both the CIA and the third country’s intelligence servicedebriefed him four times. Source Nineteen claimed to have worked as a civilian employee in the IIS from 1988 to 200 1, initially as a driver. He claimed that he was aware of four trucks in Iraq that carried biological and nuclear material and that in 1995 al-Qa’ida sent some of its members to receive training at a Baghdadintelligence school. He also provided the names of individuals he said were Iraqi intelligence agents posted abroad. The July 2002 NIC Memorandum noted that he “provided somewhat sensational information on subjects to which he seemedunlikely to have access,” including Iraqi involvement in terrorist training, IISassassination techniques, locations of biological and nuclear weapons material, subsonic bullets, and a secret weapon that fired poison darts. He was also unable to provide basic organizational information on the IIS that would show familiarity with the organization.33g (U) Operations traffic regarding Source Nineteen said that while he “has notapparently been associated with the Iraqi opposition, his purported access to the several areas of sensational information reminds us of another high-profile case that was run . . . by the INC. There may be no INC angle to this case, but subject’sclaims regarding al-Qa’ida and Iraqi atrocities could easily wind up in the press.”Another operations cable noted that Source Nineteen did speak with a journalistfrom an unnamed Iraqi opposition newspaper while in the Middle East m, but said he broke contact because the journalist refused to pay him for interviews. 33g NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, p.3. Page 114 m Following the debriefings, a separate foreign intelligence service -detained and interviewed him. The foreign intelligence service told the CIA that while in the Middle East m, prior to his arrival in their country, he met with four members of various Iraqi opposition groups who he thought could help him. He said that he also called Ahmed Chalabi, who told him to travel to their country m and to walk in to the U.S. Embassy. Source Nineteen told the foreign government he was nervous about the large securitv nresence at the U.S. Embassv and decided to walk in to the third countrv embassy-.mstead.‘The CIA ceased contact with Sourced Nineteen after his interaction with the foreign intelligence service. m Source Nineteen’s information was included in one intelligencereport disseminated to analysts. The report described the Iraqi Intelligence Service’s skill at exploiting potential refugees by recruiting them incountries when they applied for refugee status. The report provided an example of an individual Source Nineteen claimed was working for the IIS in the third (U) The July 2002 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, included Source Nineteen as one of five defectors referred by the INC, although there is no indication that his interaction with the CIA was facilitated by the INC other than his assertion to the foreign government service that he contacted Chalabi and that Chalabi told him to walk in to the U.S. Embassy. There is no other indication that Source Nineteen had any other contact with Chalabi or any member of the INC. Committee staff was unable to specifically ask Chalabi about Source Nineteen’s allegation because of340 CIA intelligence report 2002, Page 111 Page 115 classification restrictions, but asked Chalabi if he had suggested that anyone walk- in to a US. Embassy. Chalabi did not recall making that suggestion to any defectors.341 34* Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1,2006. Page 112 Page 116 V. CONCLUSIONS (U) Conclusion 1: False information from the Iraqi National Congress (INC) -affiliated sources was used to support key Intelligence Community assessments on Iraq and was widely distributed in intelligence products prior to the war. Information provided by INC-affiliated sources resulted in the production and distribution of a large body of intelligence reports and assessments on Iraq prior to the war. The DIA produced and disseminated over 250 intelligence information reports on the debriefings of INC-affiliated defector Source One alone. Information provided by these sources was used by the Intelligence Community to support key judgments about Iraq’s nuclear andbiological weapons programs in the Intelligence Community’s October 2002National Intelligence Estimate, the CIA’s 2002 and 2003 widely-distributedassessments about Iraq’s support for terrorism and alleged links to al-Qa’ida, andSecretary of State Powell’s February 2003 speech before the United NationsSecurity Council. (II) Conclusion 2: The Iraqi National Congress (INC) attempted to influence United States policy on Iraq by providing false information through defectors directed at convincing the United States that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had links to terrorists. According to INC officials interviewed by the Committee, the INC had an aggressive “publicity campaign” prior to thewar to bring defectors to the attention of “anyone who would listen,” whichincluded the media, the Congress, members of the Intelligence Community, and other U.S. government agencies. The Committee found that the INC brought six defectors to the attention of the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community met with and debriefed five of the six individuals. m A July 2004 CIA Beviewconcluded the intelligence reporting of INC-affiliated defector Source One on weapons of mass destruction Page 113 Page 117 facilities in Iraq “remains questionable and, on a nuclear facilitw,demonstrably incorrect.”February 2004,Source One appeared deceptive questions related to his continued contact with the INC, whether the INC provided him with information to give to the U.S. government, whether the INC provided him information on the suspect facility to give to the U.S. government, and whether the suspect facility even existed. (U) Three separate Intelligence Community assessments from April to July 2002 suggested INC-affiliated defector Source Two fabricated information he provided the Intelligence Community, which included a claim that in 1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile biological weapons laboratories to evade United Nations inspections. In two separate April 2002 assessments on Source Two’s reporting,the CIA reported the concerns of the DIA debriefer that Source Two was being coached by the INC and stating that the DIA had terminated contact with Source Two because of suspicions he was a fabricator. In May 2002, the DIA issued a fabrication notice on Source Two stating that “his information is assessed asunreliable, and, in some instances, pure fabrication. We have determined that he had also been coached by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) prior to the meeting with western intelligence services.” A July 2002 National Intelligence CouncilMemorandum also outlined the Intelligence Community’s concerns aboutinformation from Source Two, and no&d that a foreign-intelligence service m elieved his information was unreliable. (U) INC-affiliated defector Source Three told Intelligence Community officials in October 2001 that he observed non-Iraqi Arabs training in abandoned aircraft shell at the Salman Pak training facility in Iraq in 1994- 1995. Haydr al Bander, the INC’s Washington representative and the person who referred Source Three to theIntelligence Community, told DIA officers that the non-Iraq Arabs that Source Three observed were terrorists and that they were receiving training on aircraft Page 114 Page 118 hijackings. In December 200 1, a CIA intelligence report stated that Source Three “is under the influence/control of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is notconsidered to be very credible.” In February 2002, the CIA’s Iraq OperationsGroup concluded that: “Although we can verify a few elements of his story, wehave determined that much of his information is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S. (and probably western) policy on Iraq.”m During his debriefings in October 2001, Source Three referred SourceFour, an Iraqi -Ideputy to the -commander of an Iraqi training camp, to the Intelligence Community as someone who could confirm Source Three’s story about the training of non-Iraqi Arabs at the facility in 1994-1995. Later that month, Source Four was debriefed by Intelligence Community officials and said Iraqi intelligence trained Iraqis soldiers and 70-75 non-Iraqi Arabs in highjacking techniques at the Braining facility. In October 200 1, the CIA reported that Source Four complained that his earlier accounts to the press about terrorist training had been distorted and mistranslated by the INC translator involved in the interviews. The CIA’s Iraqi Operations Group lostoperational interest in Source Four, citing, in a February 2003 cable, Source Four’s past exposure in the media and his employment with the INC.m During debriefings with the DIA during September and October 2002, INC-affiliated defector Source Five claimed that being smuggled out of Iraq by the INC. Source Five claimed to have seen Saddam Hussein meet with Osama bin Ladin in the early 1990’s and thatSaddam Hussein’s son, Uday, told Source Five that bin Ladin was in Iraq todiscuss training some of his people in Iraq. The DIA’s preliminary examination ofSource Five’s travel documents appeared to support the basic facts of how thesource left Iraq, but neither confirmed nor denied the source’s claim of long-termclose m access to Saddam Hussein and his inner circle. Initial reports from the DIA warned that the source’s reliability had not yet been determined and thatPage 115 Page 119 the information Source Five was providing “may be intended to disinform.” Atthe DIA’s request, the CIA conducted a -evaluation of Source Fivein October 2002 which indicated the bin Ladin story appeared more or less cogent, but was perhaps contaminated with pockets of coached fabrications. Following the test, the DIA terminated its relationship with Source Five and included in disseminated reporting that Source Five was connected to the Iraqi opposition and that the source’s comments may have been intended to influence as well as informU.S. government decision makers. m Conclusion 3: The Intelligence Community’s use in intelligenceThe use of the Source Two information came after three Intelligence Community assessments raised questions about his reliability as a source and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issued a fabrication notice. Despite two April 2002 CIA assessments, the May 2002 DIA fabrication notice, and the July 2002 National Intelligence Council assessment warning that Source Two may have been coached by the INC and fabricated information to his debriefers, the Source Two reporting was cited specifically in three subsequent CIA intelligence assessments issued from July 2002 to November 2002 and the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, as corroborating othersource reporting about Iraq’s mobile biological weapons program. Source Twoalso was one of the four human intelligence sources specifically referred to in the part of Secretary of State Powell’s February 2003 speech before the UnitedNations Security Council that discussed mobile biological weapons production units. This use of the Source Two information constituted a serious error. (U) The continued use of Source Two’s information was also a systemic failure.Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Intelligence Community did not have a Page 116 Page 120 standard Intelligence Community-wide system in place to notify intelligence personnel of incomplete, misleading, or false information contained in intelligence reporting. The DIA’s decision to issue a fabrication notice, rather than recall thereporting, left the original Source Two reporting available for analysts to search and locate in the message handling system. Some analysts, who missed the fabrication notice but were aware of the underlying concerns about Source Two, believed that it was acceptable to continue to use the information as long as the concerns were noted in their assessments and as long as the reporting had not been recalled. The Committee believes that once a source has been identified to have fabricated information, continued use of the source’s reporting is risky.Furthermore, in this case, even if analysts believed that they could use the information, the concerns about the reporting were not included in their assessments, which included the NIE and the information provided to Secretary Powell. (U) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has initiated an effort to provide guidance on standardization of terms and procedures and improved use of information technology to ensure that information from sources judged to be fabricators is not used in intelligence assessments in the future. The Committee encourages the ODNI to ensure that this reform is completed and fully instituted across the Community. Page 121 (U) Conclusion 5: The July 2002 decision by the National Security Council Deputies Committee directing the renewed funding of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) Intelligence Collection Program under Defense Intelligence Agency @IA) management was ill-advised given the counterintelligence concerns of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and warnings of financial mismanagement from the Department of State. At the time it assumed responsibility for funding and managing the INC’s collection effort inOctober 2002, the DIA cautioned that the INC was penetrated by hostile intelligence services and would use the relationship to promote its own agenda. Beginning in March 2000, the Department of State entered into an agreement with the INC, amended over time, to fund the Intelligence Collection Program (ICP), a program established to collect evidence on Saddam Hussein’sregime and promote human rights and democracy in Iraq. A September 200 1 State Department of Inspector General audit of the program found financial management and internal control weaknesses. State Department officials were concerned about the lack of financial accountability and the potential of fraud in the program. In addition, State Department began to doubt the value of the information the INC was providing and was unable to judge the program’sPage 118 Page 122 effectiveness due to the INC’s refusal to grant State Department officials access toICP materials. Based on these concerns, the Department of State ceased funding the program in May 2002. On July 25,2002, the National Security Council directed that funding of the program should be continued under the Department of Defense, and on October 25,2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency assumed formal responsibility for funding and managing the INC’s collection effort.Funding of the ICP was continued in October 2002 despite warnings from both the CIA, which terminated its relationship with the INC in December 1996, and the DIA that the INC was penetrated by hostile intelligence services, including the Iranians, and that the INC would use the relationship with the Intelligence Community to promote its own agenda. (U) Conclusion 7: The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency were inconsistent in identifying their reporting from INC-affiliated defectors and INC members as opposition-affiliated reporting. DIA collectors, who disseminated reporting on most of the INC-affiliated defectors, told the Committee that they used the “opposition group disclaimer”Page 119Page 123 only on the sources who were members of the INC. However, in some cases, the DIA neglected to describe even INC members as members of an opposition group in their reporting. In some reports the DIA would describe a defector as a member of the Iraqi opposition, while other reports about the same defector would not. This suggests that the failure to identify the defectors in some reports as members of the opposition was not the result of concerns about identifying the source, but was probably the result of carelessness. It is even more surprising that CIA collectors, who were extremely skeptical of INC sources and even resisted dealing with them due to lingering concerns from the agency’s mid-1990s relationshipwith the INC, failed to identify a INC-linked defector’s opposition affiliation in itsdisseminated reporting. (U) The Committee believes that a source’s opposition affiliation, whether amember of an opposition group or referred by a member of an opposition group, should be characterized in a report’s source description. In its July 2004 Iraqreport the Committee explained the responsibility of intelligence analysts to clearly convey to the policymaker what they know, what they do not know, what they think, and to make sure the policymaker understands the difference. Intelligence analysts will never succeed in this task if they remain uninformed about significant source information, such as the source’s affiliation with anopposition group. Such information will help analysts understand the source’smotivation for providing information. In the INC-affiliated defector cases, the failure to identify the sources as affiliated with an opposition group was largely inconsequential because extensive media reporting about the INC-affiliated defectors alerted intelligence analysts to their INC-affiliation. Nonetheless, collectors cannot rely on the media to provide information about their sources to intelligence analysts and must, therefore, ensure that they provide all pertinent information to the analysts. Page 120 Page 124 m Conclusion 8: There is insufficient basis to determine whether or not CURVE BALL, the Intelligence Community’s primary source of intelligenceabout Iraq’s alleged biological weapons program, provided his information atthe behest of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Beginning in 2000, CURVE BALL provided information to a foreign liaison intelligence service alleging that Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program. CURVE BALL was the key source that led the Intelligence Community to judge in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s WMD capabilities that “Baghdad has mobilefacilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents.” The Iraq Survey Group’s(ISG) investigation of CURVE BALL’s information in the summer and fall of2003 revealed that CURVE BALL provided false information to the Intelligence Community prior to the war. The ISG also discovered that CURVE BALL had a close relative who had worked for the INC since 1992. for at least some neriod as to initial suspicion in the Central Intelligence Agency that CURVE BALL may have provided false information at the INC’s behest.The CIA has since concluded that CURVE BALL’s close relative’sconnection to the INC was coincidental. The CIA based its conclusion, in part, on the fact that CURVE BALL’s close relative said he maintained minimal contactwith CURVE BALL but that he did call CURVE BALL in 2001 on behalf of the INC to ascertain whether CURVE BALL had any information on secret or sensitive projects in Iraq. The CIA says this account is consistent with m records they have been able to locate. According to the close relative, CURVE BALL said he had no information to provide. The CIA did not ask CURVE BALL himself about this conversation or whether he had been coached or directed by the INC, believing that CURVE BALL would terminate contact if the CIA questioned him about his family. While the Committee believes the CIA should have asked him, in the end, an admission or denial in this regard would not have been dispositive. Page 121 Page 125 (U) The CIA also assessed that CURVE BALL’s defection did not fit the patternof the typical INC-influenced defection in that the INC did not broker his introduction to the Intelligence Community and did not put him in front of the media. In addition, three INC officials have told the Committee that the INC had no involvement with CURVE BALL, does not know who CURVE BALL is, and has never attempted to bring sources to the intelligence community, or anyone else, without openly acknowledging the INC’s role. However, the CIA told theCommittee it never formally collected on the INC itself, and, therefore, has no information on the INC’s processes and procedures for disseminating information,a key element to assess potential deception programs or tactics. (U) Given the fact that the Intelligence Community does not understand why CURVEBALL provided false information and only has a superficial understanding of CURVEBALL’s contacts with his close relative and other INCofficials, the Committee believes the question of whether he was provided his information at the behest of the INC remains open. Page 122