back   US Justice Department unclassified AIPAC espionage file ... U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D. C. 20535 September 9,2009 MR. GRANT F. SMITH IRMEP CALVERT STATION POST OFFICE BOX 32041 WASHINGTON, DC 20007 FOIPA Request No.: 1135944- 000 Subject: AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITIEE (1999 OR EARLIER) Dear Mr. Smith: ~ This acknowledges receipt of your Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request to the FBI. The FOIPA number listed above has been assigned to your request. o For an accurate search of our records, please provide the complete name, alias, date and place of birth for the subject of your request. Any other specific data you could provide such as prior addresses, or employment information would also be helpful. If your subject is deceased, please include date and proof of death. o To make sure information about you is not released to someone else, we require your notarized signature or, in place of a notarized signature, a declaration pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1746. For your convenience, the reverse side of this letter contains a form which may be used for this purpose. o If you want the FBI's Criminal Justice Information System (C..IIS) to perform a search for your arrest record, please follow the enclosed instructions in Attorney General Order 556-73. You must submit fingerprint impressions so a comparison can be made with the records kept by CJIS. This is to make sure your information is not released to an unauthorized person. We are searching the indices to our Central Records System for the information you requested, and will inform you of the results as soon as possible. o Processing delays have been caused by the large number of requests received by the FBI. We will process your rcquest(s) as soon as possible. Your request has been assigned the number indicated above. Please use this number in all correspondence with us. Your patience is appreciated. Very truly yours, David M. Hardy Section Chief, Record/lnformation Dissemination Section Records Management Division u.s. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535 September 7,2010 MR. GRANT F. SMITH IRMEP CALVERT STATION POST OFFICE BOX 32041 WASHINGTON, DC 20007 Subject: FRANKLIN, LAWRENCE A. ET AL. FOIPA No. 1135944- 002 Dear Mr. Smith: The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a: Section 552 D(b)(1) O(b)(2) D(b)(3) _ O(b)(4) D(b)(5) ~(b)(6) O(b)(7)(A) O(b)(7)(B) :8l(b)(7)(C) D(b)(7)(D) ~(b)(7)(E) O(b)(7)(F) D(b)(8) O(b)(9) Section 552a O(d)(5) 0(j)(2) O(k)(1 ) D(k)(2) O(k)(3) D(k)(4) D(k)(5) o(k)(6) O(k)(7) 405 page(s) were reviewed and 405 page(s) are being released. D Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been: o referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you. o referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished. I8l You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 1'1050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified. . o The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the sUbject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which mayor may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit. I8l See additional information which follows. Sincerely yours, David M. Hardy Section Chief Record/I nformation Dissemination Section Records Management Division Enclosure(s) Pursuant to Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.11 and/or 16.49, there is a fee of ten cents per page for duplication. No fees are assessed for the first 100 pages, upon receipt of these documents, please 'submit a check or money order payable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the amount of $30.50 for released pages. To insure proper identification of your request, please return this letter or include the FOIPA number(s) with your payment. Failure to pay for this release within (30) days, will close any pending FBI FOIPA requests from you. Nonpayment will also cause an automatic denial of any future FOIPA requests. Please send payment to FBI, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602-4843. EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552 prosecutions if such expected to endanger the life or (b)(l) foreign (b)(2) (b)(3) (b)(4) (b)(5) (b)(6) privacy; (b)(7) security (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order; related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion onissue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be physical safety of any individual; (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells. SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding; (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals; (k)(l) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods; (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss ofa right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence; (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056; (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records; (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure ofwhich would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence; (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process; (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence. FBI/DOJ ~. ~ ~aShingtOnpos(¢Om: Mee\lngJcf"::::::~:<;:::~::.fJei'CofuinnE) washingtonpost.com HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED , DATE 07-2~'-2010 BY 60324 uc baT..:r/sab/lsg Meetings With Iran-Contra Arms Dealer Confirmed By Bradley Graham and Peter Slevin Washington Post StaffWriters Saturday, August 9, 2003; Page AOI Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld acknowledged yesterday that Pentagon officials met secretly with a discredited expatriate Iranian arms merchant who figured prominently in the Iran-contra scandal ofthe mid-1980s, characterizing the contact as an unexceptional effort to gain possibly useful information. While R~sfeld said that the contact occurred more than a year ago and that nothing came ofit, his aides scrambled during the day to piece together more details ~mid other reports that Rumsfeld's account may have been incomplete. Last night, a senior defense official disclosed that another meeting with,the Iranian arms dealer, Manucher Gh9rbanifar, occurred in June in Paris. The official said that, while the first contact, in late 2001, had been fonnally sanctioned by the U.S. government in response to an Iranian government offer to provide information relevant to the war on terrorism, the second one resulted from "an unplanned, unscheduled encounter." A senior administration official said, however, that Pentagon staffmembers held one or two other meetings with Ghorbanifar last year in Italy. The sessions so troubled Secretary ofState Colin L. Powell, the official said, ~at he complained to Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's national security adviser. Powell maintained that the Pentagon activities were unauthorized and undermined U.S. policy toward Iran by taking place outside the terms defmed by Bush and his top advisers. The White House instructed the Pentagon to halt meetings that do not conform to policy decisions, said the official, who requested anonymity. The Defense Department personnel who met with Ghorbanifar came from the policy directorat,e. Sources identified them as Harold Rhode, a specialist on Iran and Iraq who recently served in Baghdad as the Pentagon liaison to Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi, and Larry Franklin, a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst. State Department officials were surprised by news ofthe latest meeting with Ghorbanifar. Tension runs d~ep in the Bush administration between State and the Pentagon, which under Rumsfeld has aspired to a powerful role in foreign policy. The two agencies have sparred repeatedly over strategy toward Iran and Iraq. \ The United Stat~s does not have fonnal relations with Iran, although a small number ofsanctioned . meetings between U.S. and Iranian officials have taken place, most notably to address U.S. war plans in :~ ~c Afghanista~ and Iraq. . r&:. . The Bush administration has struggled to develop a coherent and consistent approach to Iran. In his t1 State ofthe Union address last year, Bush characterized Iran as being part ofan axis ofevil, along with --' AirIraq and North Korea, and administration officials have repeatedly accused Iran ofsupporting terrorist. II ~ _ ~1/S-/U~ . - - . _. . .' " <\0--" L ~. http://www.washingtonpost.comlac2lwp-dynlA36669-2003Aug8?language=printer l{'2-1/C'~ 8/12/2003 ·.Page.2 of3 groups and of seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. While broad agreement exists within the administration favoring changes in Iran's Islamic government, officials differ on how to accomplish tnem. More than two years after the administration began drafting a national security presidential directive on Iran, the policy document remains unfinished. While the State Department favors increased dialogue and engagement with potential reformers inside Iran, prominent Pentagon civilians believe the policy should be more aggressive, including measures to destabilize the existing government in Tehran. The Iran-contra scandal erupted over, a decision by the Reagan administration to s,ell weapons to Iran in an effort to win the release ofU.S. hostages in Lebanon. The proceeds ofthe arms sales were illegally funneled to contra fighters opposing Nicaragua's leftisrSandinista government. Ghorbanifar was enlisted in the effort, helping to arrange the delivery by-Israel of 508 TOW antitank missiles to Iran. The White House had drafted him as an intermediary despite warnings from the CIA that he was a cheat and had failed lie-detector tests. The intelligence agency had instructed its operatives not to do business with him. News ofthe Pentagon's contact with Ghorbanifar was first reported yesterday by Newsday, and Rumsfeld was asked about the story when he emerged with Bush from a meeting at the president's ranch in Crawford, Tex. Saying he had just been told ofthe Newsdayarticle by a senior aide. and by Rice, Rumsfeld acknowledged that "one or two" Pentagon officials "were approached by some people who had information about Iranians that wanted to provide information to the United States government." He said that a meeting took place "more than a year ago" and that the information received was circulated to various federal departments and agencies but did not lead to anything. "That is to say, as I ~nderstand it, there wasn't anything there that was ofsubstance or ofvalue that needed to be pursued further," he said. Asked if the Pentagon contact was intended to circumvent official U.S. exchanges with Iran, Rumsfeld replied: "Oh, absolutely not. I mean, everyone in the interagency process, I'm told, was apprised of it, and it went nowhere. It was just _. this happens, ofcourse, frequently, that in -- people come in, offering suggestions or information or possible contacts, and sometimes they're pursued. Obviously, if it looks as though something might be interesting, it's pursued. If it isn't, it isn't." ' Standing by Rumsfeld's side, Bush was asked ifthe meeting was a good idea and ifhis administration wants a change in government. "We support the aspirations ofthose who desire freedom in Iran," the president said, then took a question on a different subject. According to the account given later by the senior Pentagon official, the contact in 2001 occurred after Iranian'officials passed word to the'administration that they had information that might be useful in the global war on terrorism. Two Pentagon officials met with the Iranians in several sessions over a threeday period in Italy. Ghorbanifar attended these meetings, "but he was not the individual who,had apprQached the United States or the on~ with the information,It the official said. What h~s role W3:S, however, the official did not know. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36669-2003Aug8?language=printer 8/12/2003 :Page :3 013 . The official said the June meeting involved one ofthe two Pentagon representatives who had been present at the 2001 meeting, buthe declined to say which one. Staffwriter Dana Priest contributed to this report. © 2003 The Washington Post Company http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36669-2003Aug8?language=--printer 8/12/2003 Page l'ofl Iraq War Planner Downplays Role Conservative Strategist Denies Running Stealth Intelligence Operation By Thomas E. Ricks Washi~gton Post Staff Writer Wednesday, October 22,2003; Page A27 In normal times, the chiefofthe Pentagon's office for Middle Eastern policy toils in obscurity, a third-level functionary hardly noticed inside the building, let alone outside it. Not so Deputy Undersecretary William 1. uti. The day..to-day manager ofthe Defense Department's Irag policy, he has the highest profile ofanyone to eve old his post. Arecent Google search uncovered 1,340 Internet hits mentioning him; many ofthem depicting him as a stealthy Svengali ofIraq policy, operating at the center ofa network connecting Vice President Cheney, former House speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) and Undersecretary ofDefense for Policy Douglas J. Feith -- all people for whom Luti has worked in the past seven years. Some Web sites associated with fringe political player Lyndon H. LaRouche Jr. attack him in lurid terms as an lIignoble liar" and "Satan." The critics are especially suspicious ofhis Office ofSpecial Plans, which was created last year. The purposely ambiguous title -- it was an office to work on policy for invading Iraq -- gave rise to speculation that Luti was running a shadowy intelligence operation intended to second-guess the CIA and provide the Pentagon with findings that supported its policies. The office has since been closed. IIrhe conspiracies out ofthis are quite stunning," Luti said in a recent interview in his crowded office in an unfashionable inner corridor ofthe Pentagon. "We are a consumer ~f intelligence rather than a provider." He insists that he is not as influential as some of his critics suspect. liTo paraphrase Mark Twain, the rumors ofmy power are greatly exaggerated," he said. He has been attacked, he said, because "we work tough issues, we work controversial issues.." But he insisted he does not preside over a secret miniature version ofthe CIA. "For the umpteenth tiine," he said, showing a bit of exasperation, "we do policy work.II What that means, he said, is developing defense policy options and monitoring their implementation -- not collecting intelligence, planning wars or implementing policy. But he also seems to have attracted attention because ofhis zealous manner. "I know he's a lightning rod,".said Richard Shultz, Luti's doctoral thesis adviser at Tufts University. "That's partly because he is so passionate, and partly because he is so devoted to policies that have been divisive." Defense intelligence experts say Bruce Hardcastle, a senior Def~nse Intelligence Agency official for Middle Eastern ~ffairs, began avoiding meeting with Luti after sharply disagreeing with him over the past 12 months about the imminence ofthe threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. "It'syery ?ifficult to inf0:m people who already know it all," said op.e Pentagon official familiar with the strained ,;I relationship between Lutl and Hardcastle. r 1u "Basically, he [Luti] didn't like other.people's information ifit didn't agree with his opinion," a former DIA an~ls.t ~ ~ . 00~ Hardcastle declined to copunent for thisarticle.' . irIP ~\vtl b6 b7C \ ' washitlgtonposlcom: IraqWar PlannOownPl~YS Role .... . 0 Over~I:Luti said ofhis critics, they are· 'either confuse4, malicious, or both.'" - Page 2 of.3·, He added, "Policy people and intelligence analysts perform different functions, but what's important is that they work !ogether, not that they agree on everything." Those critical views are hardly universal. John Trigilio, a fomler DIA official who works with Luti on defense policy issues, described him as "a straight shooter, professional, honorable," and called the notion that he manipulated intelligence "ridiculous." Adm. William 1. Fallon, who commanded Luti when Luti was skipper ofthe USS Guam, remembers him as an extremely competent leader who did not skew data. "I've heard the allegation, and I've kind ofchuckled at it," said Fallon, who recently became commander ofthe Atlantic Fleet. "I never saw anything along those. lines." Luti's 26-year Navy career was an unusual mix ofsea duty and high-level Washington policy positions. After serving as a weapons officer for EA-6B Prowlers -- aircraft thatjam enemy electronics -- he studied strategy and diplomacy at Tufts University. He went there for a master's degree, "but he was such a damned good student that we admitted him to the doctoral program," recalled Shultz, an authority on international politics and military operations. In the early 1990s, while deputy director ofthe chiefofnaval operations' executive panel, a civilian advisory group, Luti became interested in the views ofone member, strategy guru Albert Wohlstetter. A mentor to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, Defense Policy Board member Richard N. Perle and several other prominent conservative defense thinkers, Wohlstetter became Luti's entree into their world. From there, while still in the Navy, Luti became.a congressional fellow in the office ofthen-Speaker Gingrich. His time there, in part spent working on legislation related to arming and training Bosnian Muslims, again brought him into contact with interventionist conservatives. "We were talking with people like Perle and Wolfowitz about doing the right thing in Bosnia," recalled Randy Schuenemann, who then was a foreign policy aide on the Hill, and later, as a lobbyist for an organization that advocated toppling Hussein, worked with Luti on Iraq issues. Gingrich, who has stayed in touch with Luti through meetings of the Defense Policy Board, described his former employee as "very smart, very aggressive, slightly impatient, and ... with a very deep feeling that the world is more dangerous than many ofhis colleagues in the Pentagon, in the services, understand." Luti's last major Navy assignment was as captain ofthe USS Guam, an aging helicopter carrier with a crew of 700. "Guam was one of!he oldest ships in the. fleet," recalled Fallon, but Luti kept it in "marvelous condition.1I When the Bush administration came into office, Luti was asked to work for Cheney on Middle East-policy. Afew months later, he retired from the Navy to take his current position. He was in Cairo on Sept. 11, 2001, and, with commercial traffic stopped, got back to the United States aboard an Air Force KC-135 refueling jet. On the way home, he recalled, the plane flew over New York City, escorted by F-16 fighters, and the pilot lowered a wing so those aboard could get a full view ofthe smoke plume rising from the rubble ofthe World Trade Center. When the jet finally landed, he recalled, "we had this war on our hands.,11 Since then, he has had a total of 12 days off. C 2003 The Washington Post Company washillgtOP.l;.ost.conl~ In Profile· . ,v ~ washingtonpost.c.~m In'Profile Wednesday, October 22,2003; Page A27 William J. Lut; Title: Deputy undersecretary ofdefense for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. Age: 49. Education: Bachelor's degree in history, the Citadel; master's degree in national security and strategic studies, U.S. Naval War College; master's and doctorate in international relations, Tufts University. Career highlights: Served abm~rd the USS John F. Kennedy during the 1991 Persian Gulf War; congressiont;ll fellow, office ofHouse Speaker Newt Gil1grich (R"Ga.), 1996-97; commander, USS Guam, 1997-98; special adviser to Vice Pre~ident Cheney for national security affairs (Middle East), 2001. Pastime: Golf. ' © 2003 The Washington Post Company ADVERTISER LINKS Shipmates Old Comrades. Ships. Friends Family & Good memories OldOppos.us Essex Carrier Models Recreate the·ship you served on. Build an American aircraft carrier. http;/Iwww.modelshiDbuil~ing.Com.- . . wa')~i~l&to~P'ostco~n: Iraq War Planp~owllPlayS Role waSbirigtonp9st.com . AI.L HJP"OnH1..TI m'1 CONrAINED HEREIN IS TJIYICLAS"-tED ..' . DATE 07-29-.2010~oi24 u~ baw/seb/ l~g Page·! of3 Iraq War Planner Downplays Role Conservative Strategist Denies Running Stealth Intelligence Operation By Thomas B. Ricks Washington Post StaffWriter Wednesday, October 22, 2003; Page A27 In normal times, the chiefofthe Pentagon's office for Middle I;astern policy toils in obscurity, a third-level functionary hardly noticed inside the building, let alone outside it. Not so Deputy Undersecretary William J. LutL The day-to-day manager ofthe Defense Department's Iraq policy, he has the highest profile ofanyone to ever hold his post. Arecent Google search uncovered 1,340 Internet hits mentioning him, many ofthem depicting him as a stealthy Svengali ofIraq policy, operating at the center of a network connecting Vice President Cheney, former House speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) and Undersecretary ofDefense for Policy Douglas J.Feith-- all people for whom Luti has worked in the past seven years. Some Web sites associated with fringe political player Lyndon H. LaRouche Jr. attack him in lurid terms as an "ignoble liar" and "Satan.1I The critics are especially suspicious ofhis Office ofSpecial Plans, which was created last year. The purposely ambiguous title -- it was an office to work on policy for invading Iraq -- gave rise to speculation that Luti was running a shadowy intelligence operation intended to second-guess the CIA and provide the Pentagon with findings that supported its policies. The office has since been closed. liThe conspiracies out ofthis are quite stunning,II Lutisaid in a recent interview in his crowded office in an unfashionable inner corridor ofthe Pentagon. IIWe are a consumer ofintelligence rather than a provider." He insists that he is not as influential as some of his critics suspect. liTo paraphrase Mark Twain, the rumors ofmy power are greatly exaggerated,II he said. He has been attacked, he said, because "we work tough issues, we work controversial issues.II But he insisted he does not pres.ide over a secret miniature version ofthe CIA. "For the umpteenth time," he said, showing a bit of exasperation,'''we do policy work.II What that means, he said, is developing defense policy options and monitoring ~heir implementation -- nof collecting intelligence, planning wars or implementing policy. Buthe also seems to have attracted attention because of his zealous manner. "I know he's a liglitning rod," said Richard Shultz, Luti's doctoral thesis adviser at Tufts University.. "That's partly because·he is so passionate, and partly because " he is so devoted to policies that have been divisive." Defense intelligence experts say Bruce Hardcastle, a senior Defense Intelligence Agency official for Middle Eastern affairs, began avoiding meeting with Luti after sharply disagreeing with him over the past 12 months about the imminence ofthe threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. "It's very difficult to inform people who already know it all," said one Pentagon official familiar with the strained relations4ip between Luti and Hardcastle. uw~ \. 4'S~~. • ~~"'S-'t-.\C.....b6 <{1~\C1;)1 I."'-=z&==«"./ b 7C Hardcastle declined to comment for this article. "Basically, he [Luti] didn't like other people's information if it didn't agree with his opinion,1I a former DIA analyst agreed. wasliiDgtonpostcom: Iraq War Plann~ownplllYS Role, ' . 0 ovttian, Luti said ofhis critics, they ~either conftlSedll tnalicious, or both." Page2.of3 ' He added, "Policy people and intelligence analysts perform different iUnctions, but what's important is that they work together, not that they agree on everything." Those critical views are hardly universal. John Trigilio, a former DIA official who works with Luti on defense policy issues, described him as "a straight shooter, professional, honorable," and called the notion that he manipulated intelligence "ridiculous." Adm. William J. Fallon, who commanded Luti when Luti was skipper ofthe USSGuam, remembers him as an extremely competent leader who did not skew data. "I've heard the allegation, and I've kind ofchuckled at it," said Fallon, who recently became commander ofthe Atlantic Fleet. "I never saw anything along those lines." Luti's 26-year Navy career was an unusual mix ofsea duty and high-level Washington policy positions. After serving as a weapons officer for EA-6B Prowlers -- aircraft that jam enern,.y electronics -- he studied strategy and diplomacy at Tufts University. He went there for a master's degree, "but he was such a damned good'student that we admitted him to the doctoral program," recalled Shultz, an authority on international politics and military operations. In the early 1990s, while deputy director ofthe chiefofnaval operations' executive panel, a civilian advisory group, Luti became interested in the views ofone member, strategy guru Albert Wohlstetter. A mentor to Deputy Defense Secretiuy Paul D. Wolfowitz, Defense Policy Board member Richard N. Perle and several other prominent conservative defense thinkers, Woh~stetter became Luti's entree into, their world. From there, while still in the Navy, Luti became a congressional fellow in the office ofthen-Speaker Gingrich. His time there, in part spent working on legislation related to arming and training Bosnian Muslims, again brought him into contact with interventionist conservatives. "We were talking with people like Perle and.Wolfowitz about doing the right thing in Bosnia," recalled Randy Schuenemann, who then was a foreign policy aide on the Hill, and later, as a lobbyist for an organization t4at advocated toppling Hussein, worked with Luti on Iraq issues. Gingrich, who has stayed in touch with Luti through meetings ofthe Defense Policy Board, described his former employee as "very smart, very aggressive, slightly impatient, and ... with a very deep feeling that the world is more dangerous than many ofhis colleagues in the Pentagon, in the services, understand." I Luti's last major Navy assignment was as captain ofth~ USS Guam, an aging helicopter car.rier with a crew of 700. "Guam was one ofth~ oldest ships in the fleet," recalled Fallon, but Luti kept it in "marvelous condition." When the Bush administration came into office, Luti was asked to work for Cheney on Middle East policy. A few months later, he retired from the Navy to take his curre!1t position. He was in Cairo on Sept. 11,2001, and, with commercial traffic stopped, got back to the United States aboard an Air Force KC-135 refueling jet. On the way home, he recalled, the plane flew overNew York City, escorted by F-16 fighters, and the pilot lowered a wing so those aboard could get a full view ofthe smoke plume rising from the rubble ofthe World Trade Center. When the jet finally landed, he recalled, "we had this war on our hands." Since then, he has had a total of 12 gays off. © 2003 The Washington Post Company w~hingttlnpost.com: In Profile· w8ahingtonpost.conl In Profile Wednesday, October 22,2003; Page A27 William J. Lut; . ALl, INFmU'ihT'J,Cl:i C01:.l'I'AUIED , ~IN IS Ul\iT;LAS 51FIED ' '" 'CIn 07-<:::9-2010 BY 60324 UC, baTff!Seb/'f.ii! . , Page 1of1 Title: Deputy undersecretary ofdefense for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. Age: 49. Education: Bachelor's degree in history, the Citadel; master's degr~e in national security and strategic studies, U.S. Naval War College; master's and doctorate in international relations, Tufts.University. C~reer highlights: Served aboard the USS John F. Kennedy during the 1991 Persian Gulf War; congressional fellow, office ofHouse Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), 1996·97; co~ander, USS Guam; 1997-98; special adviser to Vice President Cheney for national security' affairs (Middle East), 2001. Pastime: Golf. © 2003 The Washington Post Company ADVERTISER LINKS Shipmates . Old Comrades. Ships. Friends Family & Good memories OldOppos.~s Wtafsthis? Essex Carrier Models Recreate the ship you selVed on. Build an American aircraft carrier. ~ttp:/1www ,modelshipbuild!ng.comZ r.1 '_'_"~-~-_'.~,,,,...,,.,.,.,",. . _. __..._-_.... ,.,~., _..._.._......_.-:.;;::::.)i;,).."":_'_.. _.~ .._.... ,,.,..-.,.._._- Q~. ·~~~f' :--' ,,--;,'" "..t!.~ ...... b6 b7C B~ Though Feith would not be officially confirmed until July 2001, career military and civilian officials in NESA began to watch his office with concern after Rhode set up shop in Feith's office in early January. Rhode, seen by many veteran staffers as an ideological gadfly, was officially assigned to the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment. an in-house Pentagon think tank headed by fellow neocon Andrew Marshall. Rhode helped Feith lay down the law about the department's new anti-Iraq, and broadly anti-Arab, orientation. In one telling incident. Rhode accosted and harangued a visiting senior Arab diplomat, telling him that there would be no "bartering in the bazaar anymore.... You're going to have to sit up and pay atlention when we say so." Rhode refused to be interviewed for this story, saying cryptically, "Those who speak, pay." According to insiders, Rhode worked with Feith to purge career Defense'officials who weren't sufficiently enthusiastic about the muscular anti-Iraq crusade that Wolfowitz and Feith wanted. Rhode appeared to be "pulling people out of nooks and crannies of the Defense Intelligence Agency and other places to replace us with," says a former analyst. "They wanted nothing to do with the professional staff. And they wanted us the fuck out of there." The unofficial, off-si~e recruitment office for Feith and Rhode was the American Enterprise Institute,'a right-wing think tank whose 12th-floor conference room in Washington is named for the dean of neoconservative defense strategists, the late Albert Wohlstetter, an influential RAND' analyst and University of Chicago mathematician. Headquartered at AEI is Richard Perle, Wohlstetter's prize protege, the godfather of the AEI-Defense Department nexus of neoconservatives who was chairman of the Pentagon's influential Defense Policy Board. Rhode, along with Michael RUbin, a former AEI staffer who is also now at the Pentagon, was a ubiquitous presence at AEI conferences on Iraq over the past two years, and the two Pentagon officials seemed almost to be serving as stage managers for the AEI events, often sitting in the front row and speaking in stage Whispers to panelists and AEI officials. Just after September 11, 2001, Feith and Rhode recruited David Wurmser, the director of Middle East studies for AEI, to serve as a Pentagon consultant. Wurmser would be the founding participant of the unnamed, secret intelligence unit at the Pentagon, set up if1 Feith's office, which would be the nucleus of the Defense Department's Iraq disinformation campaign that was established within weeks of the attacks in New York and Washington. While the CIA and other intelligence agencies concentrated on Osama bin Laden's AI Qaeda as the culprit in the 9/11 att.acks, Wolfowitz and Feith obsessively focused on Iraq. It was a theory that was discredited, even ridiculed, among intelligence professionals. Daniel Benjamin, co-author of The Age of Sacred Terror, was director of counterterrorism at the National Security Council in the late 1990s. "In 1998, we went through every piece of intelligence we could find to see if there was a link between AI Oaeda and Iraq," he says. 'We came to the conclusion that our intelligence agencies had it right: -There was no noteworthy relationship between AI Qaeda and Iraq. I know that fora fact." Indeed, that was the consensus amqng virtually all antiterrorism specialists. o In short, Wurmser, backed by Feith and Rhode, set out to prove(what didn't exist. IN AN ADMINISTRATION devoted to the notion of "Feith-based intelligence," Wurmser was ideal. For years, he'd been a shrill ideologue" part of the minority crusade during the 1990s that was beating the drums for war againstlraq. Along with, Perle and Feith, in 1996 Wurmser and his wife, Meyrav" wrote a provocative strategy paper for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu called "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm." It called on Israel to work with Jordan and Turkey to "contain, destabilize and·roll back" various states in the region, overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq, press Jordan to res'tore a scion of the Hashemite dynasty to the Iraqi throne, and, above all, launch military assaults against Lebanon and Syria as a "prelude to a redrawing of the map of the Middle East which would threaten Syria's territorial integrity." In 1997, Wurmserwrote a column in the Wall Street Journal called "Iraq Needs a Revolution" and the next year co-signed a letter with Perle calling for all-out U.S. support of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an exile group led by Ahmad Chalabi, in promoting an insurgency in Iraq. At AEI, Wurmser wrote Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein, essentially a booklength version of "A Clean Break" that proposed an alliance between Jordan and the INC to redraw the map of the Middle East. Among the mentors cited by Wurmser in the book: Chalabi, Perle, and Feith. The purpose of the unnamed intelligence unit, often described as a Pentagon "cell," was to scour reports from the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other agencies to find nuggets of information linking Iraq, AI Oaeda, terrorism, and the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In a controversial press briefing in October 2002, a year after Wurmser's unit was established, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that a primary purpose of the unit was to cull factoids, which were then used to disparage, undermine, and contradict the CIA's reporting, which was far more cautious and nuanced than Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith wanted. Rumsfeld particularly enjoyed harassing the CIA staffer who briefed him every morning, using the type of data produced by the intelligence unit. 'What I could do is say, 'Gee, what about this?'" Rumsfeld noted. "'Or what about that? Has somebody thought of this?'" Last June, when Feith was questioned on the same topic at a briefing, he acknowledged that the secret unit in fact looked at the connection between Iraq and terrorism, saying, "You can't rely on deterrence to deal with the problem of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of state sponsors of terrorism because [of] the possibility that those state sponsors might employ chemical weapons'or biological weapons by means of a terrorist organization proxy...." Though Feith, in that briefing, described Wurmser's unit as an innocent project, "a global exercise" that was not meant to put pressure on other intelligence agencies or create skewed intelligence to fit preconceived policy notions, many other sources assert that it did exactly that. That the White House and the'Pentagon put enormous pressure on the CIA to go along with its version of events has been widely reported, highlighted by visits to CIA headquarters by Vice President Cheney and Lewis Libby, his chief of staff. Led by Perle, the neocons seethed with contempt for the CIA. The CIA'S analysis, said Perle, "isn't worth the paper it's printed on." Standing in a crowded hallway during an AEI event, Perle added, "The CIA is status quo oriented. They don't want to take risks." That became the mantra of the shadow agency within an agency., Putting Wurmser in charge of the unit meant that it was being run by a pro-Iraq-war ideologue who'd spent years calling for a pre-emptive invasion of Baghdad and who was clearly predisposed to find what he wanted to see. Adding another layer of dubious quality to the endeavor was the man partnered with Wurmser, F. Michael Maloof•. Maloof, a former aide to Perle in the 1980s Pentagon, was twice stripped of his high-level security clearances-once in late 2001 and again last spring, for various infractions. Maloof was also reportedly involved in a bizarre scheme to broker contacts between Iraqi officials and the Pentagon, channeled through Perle. in what one report called a "rogue [intelligence) operation" outside official CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency channels. o As the momentum for war began to build in early 2002, Wolfowitz and Feith beefed up the intelligence unit and created an Iraq war-planning unit in the Pentagon's Near East and South Asia Affairs section, run by Deputy Undersecretary of Defense William Luti, under the rubric "Office of Special Plans,,"or OSP; the new unit's director was Abram N. Shulsky. By then, Wurmser had moved on to a post as senior adviser to Undersecretary of State John Bolton, yet another neocon, who was in charge of the State Department's disarmament, proliferation, and WMD office and was promoting the Iraq war strategy there. Shulsky's OSP, which incorporated the secret intelligence unit, took control, banishing veteran experts-including Joseph McMillan, James Russell, Larry Hanauer, and Marybeth McDevitt-who, despite years of service to NESA, either were shuffled off to other positions or retired. For the next year, Luti and Shulsky not only would oversee war plans but would act aggressively to shape the intelligence product received by the White House. Both Luti and Shulsky were neoconservatives who were ideological soulmates of Wolfowitz and Feith. But Luti was more than that. He'd come to the Pentagon direct,y from the office of Vice President Cheney. That gave Luti, a recently retired, decorated Navy captain whose career ran from combat aviation to command of a helicopter assault ship, extra clout. Along with his colleague Colonel William Bruner, Luti had done a stint as an aide to Newt Gingrich in 1996 and, like Perle and Wolfowitz, was an acolyte of Wohlstetter's. "He makes Ollie North look like a moderate," says a NESA veteran. Shulsky had been on the Washington scene since the mid-1970s. As a Senate intelligence committee staffer for Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, he began to work with early neoconservatives like Perle, who was then an aide to Senator Henry Jackson. Later, in the Reagan years, Shulsky followed Perle to the Pentagon as Perle's arms-control adviser. In the '90s, Shulsky co-authored a book on intelligence called Silent Warfare, with Gary Schmitt. Shulsky had served with Schmitt on Moynihan's staff and they had remained friends. Asked about the Pentagon's Iraq intelligence "cell," Schmitt-who is currently the executive director of the Project for the New American Century-says that he can't say much about it "because one of my best friends is running it.," According to U. Colonel KWiatkowski, Luti and Shulsky ran NESA and the Office of Special Plans with brutal efficiency, purging people they disagreed with and enforcing the party line. "It was organized like a machine," she says. "The people working on the neocon agenda had a narrow, well-defined political agenda. They had a sense of mission." At NESA, Shulsky, she says, began "hot-desking," or taking an office wherever he could find one, working with Feith and Luti, before formally taking the reins of the newly created OSP. Together, she says, Luti and Shulsky turned cherry-picked pieces of uncorroborated, anti-Iraq intelligence into talking points, on issues like Iraq's WMD and its links to AI Oaeda. Shulsky constantly updated these papers, drawing on the intelligence unit, and circulated them to Pentagon officials, including Rumsfeld, and to Vice President Cheney. "Of course, we never thought they'd go directly to the White House," she adds. Kwiatkowski recalls one meeting in which Luti, pressed to finish a report, told the staff, "I've got to get this over to 'Scooter' right away." She later found out that "Scooter" was none other than Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Cheney's chief of staff. According to KWiatkowski, Cheney had direct ties through.Luti into NESA/OSP, a connection that was highly unorthodox. "Never, ever, ever would a deputy undersecretary of Defense work directly on a project for the vice president," she says. "It was a little clue that we had an informal network into Vice President Cheney's office." Although Feith insists that the OSP did not seek to gather its own intelligence, Kwiatkowski and others sharply disagree. Staff working for Luti and Shulsky in NESA/OSP churned out propaganda-style intelligence, she says. As an example, she cited the work of a U.S. intelligence officer and Arabic specialist, Navy Lt. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, who was a special assistant to Luti. "His job was to peruse the Arabic-language media to find articles that would incriminate Saddam Hussein about terrorism, and he translated these.II Such raw intelligence is usually subject to a thorough vetting process, tracked, verified, and checked by intelligence e o professionals. But not at OSP-the material that it produced found its way directly into speeches by Bush, Cheney, and other officials. According to Melvin Goodman, a former CIA official and an intelligence specialist at the National War College, the OSP officials routinely pushed lower-ranking staff around on intelligence matters. "People were being pUlled aside [and being told], We saw your last piece and it's not what we're looking for,'" he says. "It was pretty blatant." Two State Department intelligence officials, Greg Thielmann and Christian Westermann, have both charged that pressure was being put on them to shape intelligence to fit policy, in particular from Bolton's office. ''The AI Oaeda connection and nuclear weapons issue were the only two ways that you could link Iraq to an imminent security threat to the U.S.," Thielmann told the·New York Times. "And the administration was grossly distorting the intelligence on both things." BESIDES CHENEY, key members of the Pentagon's D~fense Policy Board, including Perle and ex-House Speaker Newt Gingrich, all Iraq hawks, had direct input into NESAlOSP. The offices of NESA were located on the Pentagon's fourth floor, seventh corridor of 0 Ring, and the Policy Board's offices were directly below, on the ttaird floor. During .the run-up to the Iraq-war, Gingrich often came up for closed-door meetings with luti, who in 1996 had served as a congressional fellow in Speaker of the House Gingrich's office. As OSP got rolling, Luti brought in Colonel Bruner, a former military aide to Gingrich, and, together, luti and Bruner opened the door to a vast flow of bogus intelligence fed to the Pentagon by Iraqi defectors associated with Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress group of exiles. Chalabi founded the'lraqi National Congress in 1992, with the help of a shadowy CIA-connected publicrelations firm called the Rendon Group, one of whose former employees, Francis Brooke, has been a top aide to Chalabi ever since. A scion of an aristocratic Iraqi family, Chalabi fled Baghdad at the age of 13, in 1958, when the corrupt Iraqi Hashemite monarchy was overthrown by a coalition of communists and the Iraqi military. In the late 1960s, Chalabi studied mathematics at the University of Chicago with Wohlstelter, who introduced him to Richard Perle more than a decade later. Long associated with the heart of the neoconservative movement, Chalabi founded Petra Bank in Jordan, Which grew to be Jordan's third-largest bank by the 1980s. But Chalabi was accused of bank fraud, embezzlement, and currency manipulation, and he barely escaped before Jordanian authorities could arrest him; in 1992, he was convicted and sentenced in absentia to more than 20 years of hard labor. After founding the INC, Chalabi's bungling" unreliability, and penchant for mismanaging funds caused the CIA to s0l.!r on him, but he never lost the support of Perle, Feith, Gingrich, and their allies; once, soon after 9/11, Perle invited Chalabi to address the Defense Policy Board. According to multiple sources, Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress sent a steady stream of misleading and often faked intelligence reports into U.S. inteUigence channels., That information would flow sometimes into NESA/OSP directly, sometimes through Defense Intelligence Agency debriefings of Iraqi defectors via the Defense Human Intelligence Service, and sometimes through the INC's own U.S.-funded Intelligence Collection Program, which was overseen by the Pentagon. The INC's intelligence "isn't reliable at all," according to Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA chief of counterterrorism. "Much of it is propaganda. Much of it is telling the Defense Department what they want to hear, using alleged inform~nts and defectors who say what Chalabi wants them to say, [creating] cooked inform~tion that goes right into presidential and vice presidential speeches." Bruner, the aide to Luti and Gingrich's former staffer, ''was Chalabi'shandler," says Kwiatkowski. "He would arrange meetings with Chalabi and Chalabi's folks." she says, adding that the INC leader often brought people into the NESA/OSP offices for debriefings. Chalabi claims to have introduced only three actual defectors to the Pentagon, a figure Thielmann considers "awfully low." However, according to an investigation by the los Angeles Times. the three defectors provided by Chalabi turned up exactly zero useful intelligence. The first. an Iraqi engineer, claimed to have specific information about biological weapons, but his information didn't pan out; the second claimed to know about mobile labs, but that information, too, was worthless; and the third, who claimed to have data about Iraq's nuclear program, proved to be a fraud. Chalabi also .. • • t G - claimed to have given the Pentagon information about Iraqi support for AI Oaeda. 'We gave the names of people who were doing the links," he told an interviewer from PBS'S Frontline. Those links, of course, have not been discovered. Thielmann told the same Frontline interviewer that the Office of Special Plans didn't apply strict intelligence~verification standards to "some of the information coming out of Chalabi and the INC that OSP and the Pentagon ran with~" In the war's aftermath, the Defense Intelligence Agency-which is not beholden to the neoconservative civilians at the Pentagon-leaked a report it prepared, concluding that few, if any, of the INC's informants provided worthwhile intelligence. SO FAR, DESPITE ALL of the investigations underway" there is little sign thatany of them are going to delve into the operations of the Luti-Shulsky Office of Special Plans and its secret intelligence unit. Because it operates in the Pentagon's policy shop, it is not officially part of the intelligence community, and so it is seemingly immune to congressional oversight. With each passing day, it is becoming excruciatingly clearer just how wrong U.S. ~ntelligence was in regard to Iraqi weapons and support for terrorism. The American teams of inspectors in the Iraq Survey Group, which has employed up to 1,400 people to scour the country and analyze the findings, have not been able to find a shred of evidence of anything other than dusty old plans and records of weapons apparently destroyed more than a decade ago. Countless examples of fruitless searches have been reported in the media. To cite one example: U.S. soldiers followed an intelligence report claiming that a complex built for Uday Hussein, Saddam's son, hid a weapons warehouse with poison-gas storage tanks. "Well," U.S. Army Major Ronald Hann Jr. t~ld the Los Angeles Times, "the warehouse was a carport. It still had two cars inside. And the tanks had propane for the kitchen." Countless other errors and exaggerations have become evident. The thousands of aluminum tubes supposedly imported by Iraq for uranium enrichment were fairly conclusively found to be designed to build noncontroversial rockets. The long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, allegedly built to deliver bioweapons, were small, rickety, experimental planes with wood frames. The mobile bioweapon labs turned out to have had other, ,civilian purposes. And the granddaddy of all falsehoods, the charge. that Iraq sought uranium in the West African country of Niger, was based on forged documents-documents that the CIA, the State Department, and other agencies knew were fake nearly a year before President Bush highlighted the issue in his State of the Union address in January 2003. "Either the system broke down," former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who was sent by the CIA to visit Niger and whose findings helped show that the documents were forged, told Mother Jones, "or there was selective use of bits of information to justify a decision to go to war that had already been taken." Edward Luttwak, ~ neoconservative scholar and ~uthor, says flatly that the Bush administration lied about the intelligence it had because it was afraid to go to the American people and say that the war was simply about getting rid of Saddam Hussein. Instead, says Luttwak, the White House was groping for a rationale to satisfy the United Nations' criteria for war. "Cheney was forced into this fake posture of worrying about weapons of mass destruction," he says. "The ties to AI Qaeda? That's complete nonsense." In the Senate, Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) is pressing for the Intelligence Committee to extend its investigation to look into the specific role of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans, but there is strong Republican resistance to the idea. In the House, Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) has introduced legislation calling for a commission to investigate the intelligence mess and has collected more than a hundred Democrats-but no RepUblicans-in support of it. "I think they need to be"looked at pretty carefully,II Waxman told Mother Jones when asked about the Office of Special Plans. "lid like to know whether the political people pushed the intelligence people to slant their conclusions." Congressman Waxman, meet Lt. Colonel Kwiatkowski. -T' AI.L nJFOPH.~TION CONTAn-rED 0 HEP.EHI IS TJ1JCI,P..Z5IFIED DAn 07-'29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg' Document 8 of 8 Page 1of2: I" -. t1 • Copyright 2003 The Washington Post The Washington Post June 15, 2003 Sunday Final Edition SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A20 LENGTH: 1448 words HEADLINE: Pressure Builds for President to Declare Strategy on Iran BYLINE: Michael Dobbs, Washington Post Staff Writer BODY: Soon after George W. Bush took office In January 2001, his advisers began drafting a strategy fo'r dealing with Iran, a radical Islamic state long suspected by Washington of supporting International terrorism and pursuing weapons of mass· destruction. More than two years later, the national security presidential directive on Iran has gone through several competing drafts and has yet to be approved by Bush's senior advisers, according to well-placed sources. In the meantime, experts In and outside the government are focusing on Iran as the United States' next big foreign policy crisis, with some predicting that the country could acquire a nuclear weapon as early as 2006. Critics on the left and the right point to the unfinished directive as evidence the administration lacks a coherent strategy toward a country Bush described as a key member of the "axis of eVil," along with North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Ir~q. "Our policy toward Iran Is neither fish nor fowl, neither engagement nor regime change," said Flynt L. Leverett, a Bush adviser on the Middle East who left the National Security Council staff In March and Is now with the Brookings Institution. The Bush·admlnlstratlon has yet to formulate a true Iran policy, agreed Michael A. Ledeen, a Middle East expert with the American Enterprise Institute. With other neoconservative Intellectuals, Ledeen has founded the Coalition for Democracy In Iran, which Is looking for ways to foment a democratic revolution to sweep away the ~ullahs who came to power In 1979. Senior administration officials refused to talk about the status of the Bush polley directive on Iran, on the grounds that It Is classified, but they say they have had some success In mobilizing International opinion against Iran's nuclear weapons program. As eVidence, they cite recent threats by Russia to cut off nuclear assistance to Tehran and moves by the International Atomic Energy Agency to censure Iran for failing to report the processing of nuclear· materials. While the officials have stopped short of embracing a policy of "regime change" In Iran, U.S. officials from Bush down have talked about prOViding moral support to the "reform movement" In Iran In Its struggle against an uneleeted government. As defined by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, the U.s. goal Is to speak directly to the Iranian·people "over the heads of their leaders to let them know that we agree with them.n The Internal and external debate about what to do about Iran.has been brought to a head by recent revelations suggesting the Iranian nuclear weapons program Is much further along than many suspected. Tomorrow, the IAEA Board of Governors In Vienna Is to discuss findings shOWing that Iran has a wide range of options for producing fissile material for a nuclear bomb, from using heavy water reactors to produce plutonium to experiments In uranium enrichment. U.S. officials have also accused Iran of harboring members of the al Qaeda terrorist network who escaped from Afghanistan after the fall of the Tallban In December 2001. Th~y say some al Qaeda supporters hiding In Iran appear to have known In advance about recent terrorist attacks In Saudi Arabia, although there Is no direct evidence of operational ties between the Iranian government and al Qaeda. The escalating Iranian nuclear threat and suspicions of Iranian ties to terrorists have sharpened long-standing divisions In the administration over how to deal with Tehran. In the past, the State Department has put the emphasis on opening a dialogue with r~forF!.llst elements In the .~ranla~ leadership while the Pentagon has been more Interested In looking for ways to destabilize the authoritarian Islamic government. '---- Page2of2 ----:0-------_ 1';' ...~-:" .;:.;. Pr~nt ~ . ,.0. I .'\;,7.. I BU,reaucratlc tensions have reached the level where eac~ s!de has begun accusing the other of leaking unfavorable stories to the •mpdla to block policy Initiatives. "The knives are out,1I said a Pentagon official, who criticized national security adviser Condoleezza Rice for failing to end the dispute by Issuing clear policy guidelines. Powell, meanwhile, Insisted to Journalists that there has been no change In policy on Iran, despite what he depicted as frenzied media speculation "about what this person In that department might think or that person In another department might thlnk." The Iran debate goes back to a failed attempt by the Clinton administration to open an "unconditional dialogue" with Tehran. Even though the Iranians rejected the U.s. offer of unconditional talks, some Bush administration officials led by the State Department's director for policy planning, Richard N•. Haass, favored making renewed overtures. The proposals for a dialogue with Iran were partly Inspired by the 1994 framework agree~ent With North Korea under which the North Korean government agreed to accept International controls over Its nuclear program In return for economlc,asslstance, Including the construction of a civilian nuclear reactor. But the State Department approach ran Into strong opposition from the Pentagon and Vice President Cheney's.office, and was shot down In Interagency meetings at the end of 2001. While there would be no "grand bargain" with th!! Iranian leadership, the Bush administration agre,ed to a more limited diplomatic dialogue, focusing on specific areas such as the war In Afghanistan or cooperation over Iraq. Several rounds of such talks took place In Geneva and Paris, with the Involvement of a special presidential envoy, Zalmay Khalllzad, but were suspended after the bombings In Saudi Arabia on May 12. The administration debate has been echoed by a much more public debate among Middle East analysts, nuclear proliferation experts, and leaders of the Iranian dlaspora. Congress has also weighed In with legislation sponsored by Sen. Sam Brownback (RKan.) that would funnel more than$ 50 million to Iranian pro-democracy Initiatives, Including prlyate California-based satellite television and radio stations set up by Iranian exiles. "We are not calling for a military attack on Iran," said Brownback, whose proposed IraI') Democracy Act has drawn bipartisan support but Is opposed by the leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee. The goal,he said, Is to support Iranian democracy activists, Including students Who took to the streets of Tehran again last week to protest the closure of opposition ne~spaper and the jailing of dissidents. Just how far the United States should go In supporting the protests Is the subject of heated argument Inside and outside the government, even among conservatives. Some argue Iran Is ripe for revolution. Others contend there Is little guarantee of radical change In Tehran In the three-year period some Independent proliferation experts estimate it will take before Iran could acquire nuclear weapons, and the United States should be thinking about other options, including preemptive action against suspected nuclear sites. "The Internal democratic forces In Iran are real and growing,. but they're not going to save us from having to think about what we • are going to do about theJranlan nuclear program and support for terrorlsm," said Reuel Marc Gerecht, a CIA case officer for Iran now with the American Enterprise Institute. Some analysts say that U.S. financial and propaganda support for the Iranian democracy movement could be counterproductive. lilt allows the hardliners to argue that there Is an external threat, and they must crack down In the name of national unlty," said Kaveh Ehsanl, an editor of the pro-reform journal Dialogue In Iran, now visiting the United States. ''There Is a kind of an unholy alliance between the Bush administration and the Iranian hardllners." • "We have tried appeasement, we have tried containment, and we h'ave tried engagement," countered S. Rob Sobhanl, a co-founder of the Coalition for Democracy In Iran and adjunct professor of government at Georgetown University. "All these policies have failed. What have we got to lose by empowerment?" The White House has avoided taking a position on the Brownback legislation and has restricted Its encouragement of democracy In Iran to verbal broadsides against the mullahs. In comments Thursday, Rice described Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction as "not acceptable" and said that the United States "cannot tolerate circumstances In which at Qaeda operatives come In and out of ' Iran." She also accused Iran of stirring up trouble among ShIIte communities In southern Iraq. "We have to stand with the aspirations of the Iranian people which have been clearly expressed," she told a meeting in los Angeles, as thousands of Iranians took to the streets of Tehran In anti-government protests. LOAD-DATE: June 15, 2003 - -- ~ ~.g:; ;I ~ t"' HH 02l~ ~ "'l IHO t6~~ ~~>-l on H .... 1:"'0 olJoo2l ~ ttI~n "'lHO m~~ of'l'llJoo Wt'H ~ iii '=' ~ fl . b' ~ "-. ~ I - ...~ I ~1~.JH~IU!fnr:iGtilf.~~I·lt"i;rrf'!~~!'n!t~,m!riii fHf~-nmrJliUt!U!t!!!fmUliijfU:fflII ,f411·: l!l trr I "I ID·(' 11 tllSIr. .Iel.!ltf I f ill;:' ·~i(.!i! 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:>"~ P. UNCLAsSIFIED o WASHINGTON JOURNAL C-SPAN 7:45 AM JANU~RY 1,2004 U.S. Intelligence in Iraq ALL INFOP.NATION C01JTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 07-2~-2010 BY .60324 uc baw/sab/lsg CONNIE BROD: Robert Dreyfuss is a contributing editor for Mother Jones and the January-February edition ofMother Jones has the hit cover story by him called, liThe Lie Factory.1I What is the lie factory? ROBERT DREYFUSS [Contributing Editor, Mother Jones]: Well, I called the lie factory. It's kind ofbroader than"that. There was lies, but also distortions and exaggerations. I'm referring to the unit inside the Pentagon that prepared intelligence reports and talking papers for senior U.S. officials in the period going up to the war with Iraq. Now, that the war is over and we know that we found exactly zero evidence ofties between Iraq anp. al Qaeda and zero evidence of tie~ between Iraq and weapons ofmass destruction, it's way past time that we went back and looked at how did they get this so wrong? The administration is already trying to change the subject, as you know, they're saying, well, it wasn't about weapons ofmass destruction, Saddam was a bad guy and the world is safer now. I guess I'm amazed that he's been able to get away with that so far, the President. BROD: You went all the way b~ck to the day after the President took office to begin this story about this office. What happened that day? DREYFUSS: Well, one day after the President was sworn in they had a meeting oftheir national security team. And one ofthe top items on the agenda ofthat meeting -- this was nine months before 9/11 was regime change in Iraq. And ofcourse there's a reason for that, many ofthe senior officials who took up places in the Bush administration have long been on record, some ofthem for as long as a decade going back to the first GulfWar that the United States had a responsibility to go in militarily and get rid ofSaddam Hussein. So there had been a drumbeat from afairly small but well organized group offormer U.S. officials, many ofthem intelligence people, and, ofcourse, the Iraqi exile groups that they were associated with to bring about regime change. And that meeting that you referred to UNCLASSIFIEDo UNCIJASSIFIED o really was the first ofmany efforts to start to focus this administration on Iraq. And they started to putting into place the people in various parts ofthe Pentagon~ especially who would undertake tnat. And ofcourse it wasn't until after 9/11 that the political will suddenly materialized and they realized thatthey could sell this policy, first of all to the President and then second of all to the America~ people. BROD: Some ofthe figures who you talk about in here are very well known -- Newt Gingrich,.Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, but you also concentrate a lot on a gentleman who may not be as well known, Douglas Feith. Who is he? And what was his role in this office -. secret office set up? DREYFUSS: Well, Doug Feith works directly under Paul Wolfowitz as the person at the Pentagon in charge ofpolicy. He's a senior official at the Pentagon, a civilian, not a military person. And he and Wolfowitz both have long roots in the neo-conservative movement. Doug Feith's law firm, Feith and ZeU, which had been around for the years before the administration took power, has a big Israeli office . and a lot ofties to the right wing Israeli government, the settler movement in Israel, and so forth. And Feith was a leading advocate in the 1990s for going to war in Iraq long before the Bush administration took office. So he was kind of an ideblogue and it was his job to put.together the team that would undertake the actual war planning inside the Pentagon and not just war planning in a technical sense, but also the policy and propaganda aspects ofhow to justify that war. BROD: Now,_ you talk -- this office, was it physically an office? Could people go the~e? DREYFUSS: Well, it was physically an office. What happened was under Doug Feith there is a second office which is sort ofthe . regional planning components ofthe Pentagon, there's one for each part of the world, and the Near East and.South Asian affairs office, which is called NESA, was headed up by a man named Bill Lootey, who is a former N~wt Gingrich aide who is also a longtime neoconservative and a U.S. Navycap~ain, former captain. And:.Bill Lootey headed up the office called NESA. And that was because Iraq is located in Near East, or Middle East. That was the office that Feith used to build up and create as the Office ofSpecial Plans. They gave that name to it in 2002 because they didri't want to tip their hand that they were definitely planning a war, so they gave it a meaningless name, special plans. But it was really the office for Iraq plans. BROD: And how did the office work? 2 UNCLASSIFIED \ UNCLASSIFIED o DREYFUSS: Well~ it started out actually as an intelligence group ofjust two or three people and it expanded to four or five people, but it started out right after 9/11 in 2001 when Doug Feith and a man named Harold Rhode, who'is another Pentagon official and a neo~onservative Middle East expert who speaks many languages from the region. And some others started putting ,together a team to try to link Iraq to what happened on 9/11. As we all knoW now, there was no connection between Iraq and 9/11. But they brought in a man named David Wormser who was at the time the head ofMiddle East Policy at the American Enterprise Institute. Now, AEI, American Enterprise Institute is where people like-Newt Gingrich and Richard Perle and many other neoconservatives and other conservatives sort ofhang out and use as their exile foreign policy shop. Wormser was brought in along with a guy named Mike Maloofand they were the first two p~ople who set up this little intelligence unit in the Pentagon that eventually grew and expanded and started churning out all ofthe misleading and distorted apd exaggerated efforts -- pieces ofinformation that were then handed to the various U.S. officials to run the propaganda to justify the war. They wanted to go into Iraq for grand strategic reasons, but they couldn't just say that and get the public behind them and certainly not Congress behind them. So they had to create the idea that Iraq was an imminent threat and the only way to do that was to say that Iraq was tied to terrorists who were planning to strike us and that Iraq had weapons ofmass destruction that could strike us. So Wormser and Maloofand then some ofthe other people who were brought into this job under Bill Lootey, under a guy named Abe Shulsky"who was later brought in.to run the Office ofSpecial Pl~ns, not only started picking and choosing among all the intelligence that's available, you know, there are tens ofthousands ofbits ofintelligence that go into a con~lusion. Well, they discarded the ones they didn't like and they seized on the ones that justified the cause that they were trying to pursue. And they would write up talking points in papers and so forth, which were not real intelligence, in fact, none ofthese people were intelligence professionals; they were ideologues, they were people who had a mission. And there's no disputing this, in other words, you can disput~ whether the war was a good thing or a bad thing and you can dispute whether Bush is kind ofa dunce or a genius. But you can't dispute the fact that this office was made of people who were first of all not intelligence professionals and who purged -- fired, transferred a number ofpeople who were intelligence professionals because they disagreed with the conclusions that these ideologues were coming to. 3 UNCLASSIFIED \ o UNCLASSIFIED They brought into this office as it expanded into probably a couple ofdozen people with maybe 50 or 100 people who would pass in · and out ofit as contractors and helpers and supporters, they brought into people who were committed ideologically to the cause and who would come up with the conclusion they wanted. So all ofthe information that we later heard from people like Vice President Cheney and even the President about the aluminum tubes, about the uranium from Niger, about tlie unmanned aerial vehicles that could strike the United States, about thousands oftons ofterrible gasses and chemicals that were stored in Iraq, about its reconstituted nuclear program, about biological mobile labs, none ofthis existed. It was all a complete mythology. BROD: This is a complicated story and you have laid out the kind ofthe flow chart for this office in your piece and ifour camera could just go down you'll see some ofthe names ofthe people that youhave talked about. Our phone lines are also open. You can start dialing now if you're interested in talking with Mr. Dreyfuss. My question to you is: Who are your sources for this? DREYFUSS: Well, many ofthe people we talked to, we talked to on the record and they are quoted in there. I think the most courageous person of all is Lieutenant Colonel Karen Ketkowsky who is now retired, but she served in the Office ofNESA, the Near East and South Asian affairs office for about a year and saw this up close. And she described to me in detail sitting on a wood porch in her farm now, she lives out in western Virginia. She described to me in detail how people she knew were purged and forced into - retirement in this office and how people were encouraged to come up with the kind of conclusions that the President and the Vice President seemed to want. She talked about how Vice President Cheney had his staff working directly with this Pentagon office, which is highly unusu~l. In otl!er words, this office was four levels down in the Pentagon. Normally its work would go to Bill Lootey, and then to Doug Feith, and then to Paul Wolfowitz, and then to Secretary ofDe(ense Rumsfeld. But, in fact, you had people like Newt Gingrich coming in constantly, people like Richard Perle and people like Vice President Cheney and his office, who were tasking this unit, saying what about this and what about that? And getting reports from, them. I mean it's highly unusual for the Vice President's office, which is not part ofthe Pentagon, as we know to have a direct working relationship with an office in the bowels ofthe Pentagon's civilian bureaucracy. 4 UNCLASSIFIED 'I I rt '\ \ UNCLASSIFIED o BROD: Let's get-to some phone calls for you, first off, Westwood, New Jersey, Republican. Good morning. CALLER: Connie, happy New Year to you and Robert. DREYFUSS: Thank you. CALLER: I'm very, very interested in your flow chart and I'm a veteran of World War II. My parents taught me never to lie. And so lies are very important to. me. The big lie at the present time, I think, is that judges have the right to make laws and I think you should be more interested in that because that has more far-reaching effects on everything, including what you're talking about. The big lie is that, for example, in Roe v. Wade. BROD: Caller, I'm sorry, but this is really way offthe subject ofwhat we're talking about this morning. We're going to let you go and try to stay on topic this morning. Burlington, Massachusetts, Democrat. , CALLER: Hi, good morping, Robert Dreyfuss. DREYFUSS: Good morning. CALLER: Fantastic subject this morning. Very similar to really an awesome chapter in the AI Franken book about lies and how that was -- when that administration came in it seemed like they were really trying to warn them about terrorist activities and they were trying to ignore it and ignore it and put their own thing into place and I'm sorry I don't have the book in front ofme, but it's a fantastic chapter right next to which you're talking about and I think everybody should read it. BROD: Have you read it, Mr. Dreyfuss? DREYFUSS: I haven't read AI's book yet, but it's on my list ofNew Year's reading. BROD: Greenville, South Carolina. Republican. CALLER: Good morning, how are you? BROD: Great. CALLER: I think that his whole premise is ajoke. And I think that you're just trying to grasp with straws to put down President Bush who is doing a.greatjob by the way I might add. BROD: Grasping at straws, Mr. Dreyfuss? 5 UNCLASSIFIED (/ \ o UNCLASSIFIED o DREYFUSS: That's a silly comment. The President may be doing a great job or not doing a great job. This is a story about whether' ... there were weapons ofmass destruction in Iraq, which was the main rationale for mobilizing our entire nation to go to war. And the things weren't there and I thi~ we're going to ask why and what happened and why was ,. the President so wrong? I mean Senator Bill Nelson from Florida said the other day that he was told in a closed briefing that Iraq had unmanned aerial vehicles that can carry chemical weapons and biological weapons to the East Coast ofthe United States. Things like this are simply not true. When we finally got there we found these rickety old Wright brothers looking planes that couldn't have gotten out ofBaghdad airport, which were not ' really military by the way at all. So the kinds ofexaggerations and distortions that got into the President's speeches, he said that in Cincinnati in a modified way about these vehicles that could attack the United States are ludicrous. And I'm just stunned at the fact that even supporters ofthe President and Republicans in Congress just dismissed this and say, well, Iraq is better off, so why are we bothering even to talk about these weapons when that was hammered and hammered and hammered for months that Iraq was an urgent threat to the·United States. BROD: Besides writing for Mother Jones as a contributing editor, Mr. Dreyfuss is also a contributing editor for The Nation magazine and a contributing writer for The American Prospect and a frequent contributor to Rolling Stone. 6 UNCLASSIFIED rt --' ' _._-----..,-_._--- --- ( TheJ.,ie FactofY e http://delphi.dia.ic.gov/admiDJEARf..,YBIPJ)!040106ls2(\0401062ti65Z0.html o UNCLASSIFIED - FOUO Mother Jones Magazine January/February 2004 Pg.34 , "•" ~:.,;' :J,~':( ~ :-~;~..~.~~~t·~~~:t:~V!1{af:~D~~ariill~iif~ftle~~1f~r~' - ·w .. ~ .... ...f"tt"",~_\:;'.1~~~J.,~,..-l""~=:=;) ... ,."............."~"'Z~~ .. \,,,II. ~ PIA HomeIWhat's New IProduetsJ)y T)3)el Products by Re8ionI~ I&1R. ALL FBI INFORMATION CbNTAINED HEREIN IS TlNCLASSIFIED DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg The Lie Factory Only weeks after 9/11, tile Busl, administration set up a secret Pelltagon unit to create ti,e case for invading Iraq. Here is ti,e inside story for I,OW tlley puslied disinformation and bogus intelligellce and led ti,e nation to war. By Robert Dreyfuss and Jason Vest It's a crisp fall day in western Virginia, a hundred miles from Washington, D.C., and a breeze is rustling the red',and gold leaves ofthe Shenandoah hills. On the weather-beaten wood porch ofa ramshackle 90-year-old farmhouse, at the end ofa winding dirt-and-gravel road, Lt. Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski is perched on a plastic chair, wearing shorts, a purple sweatshirt, and muddy sneakers. Two scrawny dogs and a lone cat are on the prowl, and tne air is filled with swarms So far, she says, no investigators have come knocking. Not from the Central Intelligence Agency, which conducted an internal inquiry into intelligence on Iraq, not from the congressional intelligence committees, not from the president's Foreign·Intelligence Advisory Board. All ofthose bodies are ostensibly looking into the Bush administration's prewar Iraq intelligence, amid charges that ~he White . House and the Pentagon exaggerated, distorted, or just plain lied about Iraq's links to Al Qaeda terrorists and its possession of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons., In her hands, Kwiatkowski holds several pieces ofthe puzzle. Yet she, along with a score ofother career officers recently retired or shuffled offto other jobs, has not been approached by anyone. . Kwiatkowski, 43, a pow-retired Air Force officer who served in the Pentagon's Near East and South Asia (NESA) unit in the year before the invasion ofIraq, observed how the Pentagon's Iraq war-planning unit manufactured scare stories about Iraq's weapons and ties to terrorists. "It wasn't intelligence-it was propaganda," she says. "They'd take a little bit ofinteIligence, cherry-pick it, make it sound much more exciting, usually by taking it out ofcontext, often by juxtaposition oftwo pieces ofinfonnation that don't belong together." It was by turning such bogus intelligence into talking points for U.S. officials-including ominous lines in speeches 1?Y President Bush and Vice President Cheney, along with Secretary ofState Colin Powell's testimony at the U:N. Security Council last February-that the administration pushed American public opinion into supporting an unnecessary war. - Until now, the story ofhow the Bush administration produced its wildly exaggerated estimates ofthe threat posed by Iraq has never been revealed in full. But, for the first time,a detailed investigation by Mother Jones, based on dozens ofinterviews-some on the record, some with officials who insisted on anonymity-exposes the workings ofa secret Pentagon intelligence unit and ofthe Defense Department's war-planning task force, the Office ofSpecial Plans. It's the story ofa close-knit team of ideologues who spent a decade or more hammering out plans for an attack on Iraq and who used the events of September 11, 2001, to set it into motion. _SIX MQNTHS AFTER THE END ofmajor combat in Iraq, the United States had spent $300 million 10f7 313012004 1:31 PM - I ~ ---------_.._-_._-_._--_._-----_._---_..._---_.__._- _._._.__._--_.•_----_.._--_..._------ r 111e:Lie FactoI)' http://deiphi.dia.ic.gov/adminlEARL.,yBIRD/040106l.~OO40J06246S20.html .r ·0 0 " trying to find banned weapons in Iraq, and President Bush was seeking$600 million more to extend the search. Not found were Iraq's Scuds and other long-range missiles, thousands ofbarrels and tons of anthrax and botulism stock, sarin and VX nerve agents, mustard gas, biological and chemical munitions, mobile labs for producing biological weapons, and any and all ~vidence ofa reconstituted nuclear-arms program, all ofwhich had been repeatedly cited as justification for the war. Also missing was evidence ,ofIraqi collaboration with Al Qaeda. The reports, virtually all false, ofIraqi weapons and terrorism ties emanated from an apparatus that began to gestate almost as soon as the Bush administration took power. In the very first meeting ofthe Bush national-security team, one day after President Bush took the oath ofoffice in January 2001, the issue of invading Iraq was raised, according to one ofthe participants in the meeting-and officials all the way down the line started to get the message, long before 9/11. Indeed, the Bush team at the Pentagon hadn't even been formally installed before Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary ofDefense, and Douglas J. Feith, undersecretary ofDefense for policy; began putting together what would become the vanguard for regime change in Ira~. Both WolfoWitz and Feith have deep roots in the neoconservative movement. One ofthe most influential Washington neoconservatives in the foreign-policy establishment during the Republicans' wilderness years ofthe 1990s, Wolfowitz has long held that not taking Baghdad in 1991 was a grievous mistake. He and others now prominent in the administration said so repeatedly over the past decade in a slew of letters and policy papers from neoconservative groups like the Project for the New American Century . and the Committee for the Liberation ofIraq. Feith, a former aide to Richard Perle at the Pentagon in the 1980s and an activist in far-right Zionist circles, held the view that there was no difference between U.S. and Israeli security policy and that the best way to secure both countries' future was to solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem not by serving as a broker, but with the United States as a force for "regime change" in the region. Called in to help organize the Iraq war-planning team was a longtime Pentagon official, Harold Rhode, a specialist on Islam who speaks Hebrew, Arabic, Turkish, and Farsi. Though Feith would not be officially confirmed until July 2001, career military and civilian officials in NESA began to watch his office with concern after Rhode set up shop in Feith's office in early January. Rhode, seen by many veteran staffers as an ideological gadfly, was officially assigned to the Pentagon's Office ofNet Assessment, an in-house Pentagon think tank headed by fellow neocon Andrew Marshall. Rhode helped Feith lay down the law about the department's new anti-Iraq, and broadly anti-Arab, orientation. In one telling incident, Rhode accosted and harangued a visiting senior Arab diplomat, telling him that there would be no "bartering in the bazaar anymore.... You're going to have to sit up and pay attention when we say so." Rhode refused to be interviewed for this story, saying cryptically, "Tho~e who speak, pay." ~ According to insiders, Rhode worked with Feith to purge career Defense officials who weren't sufficiently enthusiastic. about the muscular anti-Iraq crusade that Wolfowitz and Feith wanted. Rhode appeared to be "pulling people out ofnooks and crannies ofthe Defense Intelligence Agency and other places to replace us with," says a fonner analyst. "They wanted nothing to do with the professional staff. And they wanted us the fuck out ofthere." The unofficial, off-site recruitment office for Feith and Rhode was the American Enterprise Institute, a right-wing think tank whose 12th-floor conference room in Washington is named for the dean of neoconservative defense strategists, the late Albert Wohlstetter, an influential RA~·analyst and University ofChicago mathematician. Headquartered at AEI is Richard Perle, Wohlstetter's prize protege, the godf~ther ofthe AEI-Defense Department nexus ofneoconservatives who was chairman of 2of7 .313012004 1:31 PM o http://delphi.dia.ic.gov/adminlEARLYBIRD/040106ls20040I06246S20.html o the Pentagon's influential Defense Policy Board. Rhode, along with Michael Rubin, a former AEI staffer who is also now at the Pentagon, was a ubiquitous presence at AEI conferences on Iraq over the past two years, and the two Pentagon officials se~med almost to be serving as stage managers for the A.EI events, often sitting in the front row and speaking in stage whispers to panelists and AEI officials. Just after September 11,2001, Feith and Rhode recruited David Wurmser, the director ofMiddle East studies for AEI, to serve as a Pentagon consultant. ~: The J.,ie Factory Wurmser would be the founding participant ofthe unnamed, secret intelligence unit at the Pentagon, set up in Feith's office, which would be the nucleus ofthe Defense Department's Iraq disinfonnation campaign that was established within weeks ofthe attacks in New York and Washington. While the CIA and other intelligence agencies concentrated on Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda as the culprit in the 9/11 attacks, Wolfowitz and Feith obsessively focused on Iraq. It was a theorY that was discredited, even ridiculed, among intelligence professionals. Daniel Benjamin, co-author ofThe Age ofSacred Terror, was director ofcounterterrorism at the National Security Council in the late 1990s. "In 1998, we went through every piece ofintelligence we could find to see if there was alink between Al Qaeda and Iraq," he says. "We came to the conclusion that our intelligence agencies had it right: There was no noteworthy relationship between Al Qaeda and Iraq. I know that for a fact!' Indeed, that was the consensus among virtually all anti-terrorism specialists. In sh~rt, Wurmser, backed by Feith and Rhode, set out to prove what didn't exist. IN AN ADMINISTRATION devoted to the notion of '·Feith-based intelligence," Wurmser was ideal. For years, he'd been a shrill ideologue, part ofthe minoritY crusade during the 1990s that was beating the drums for war against Iraq. Along with Perle and Feith, in 1996 Wurmser and his wife, Meyrav, wrote a provocative strategy paper for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu called"A Clean Break: ANew Strategy for Securing the Realm." It called on Israel to work with Jordan and'Turkey to "contain, destabilize and roll back" various states in the region, overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq, press Jordan to restore a scion ofthe Hashemite dynasty to the Iraqi throne, and, above all, launch military assaults against Lebanon and Syria as a "prelude to a redrawing ofthe map ofthe Middle East which would threaten Syria's territorial integrity." In 1997, Wormser wrote a column in the Wall Street Journal called "Iraq Needs a Revolution" and the next year co-signed a letter with Perle calling for all-out U.S. support ofthe Iraqi National Congress (INC), an exile group led 'byAhmad Chalabi, in promoting an insUrgency in Iraq. At AEI, Wurmser wrote Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein, essentially a book-length version of "A Clean Break" that proposed "an alliance between Jordan and the INC to redraw the map ofthe Middle East. Among the mentors cited by Wurmser in the book: Chalabi, Perle, and Feith. The purpose ofthe unnamed intelligence unit, often described as a Pentagon "cell," was to scour reports from the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other agencies to find nuggets ofinformation linking Iraq, Al Qaeda, terrorism, and the existence ofIraqi we~pons ofmass destruction (WMD). In a controversial press briefing in 0ctober 2002, a year after Wurmser's unit was established, Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that a primary purpose ofthe unit was to cull factoids, which were then used to disparage, undermine, and contradict the CIA's reporting, which was far more cautious and nuanced than Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith wanted. Rumsfeld pa~icularly enjoyed harassing the CIA staffer who briefed him every morning, using the type of~ata produced by the intelligence unit. "What I could do is say, 'Gee, what about this?'" Rumsfeld noted. "'Or what about that? Has somebody thought ofthis?'" Last June, when Feith was questioned on the same topic at a briefing, he acknowledged that the secret unit in fact looked at the connection between Iraq and terrorism, saying, "You can't rely on deterrence to deal with the problem ofweapons ofmass destruction in the hands of 30f7 313012004 1:31 PM o http://delphi.dia.ic.gov/admiIVEARl...YBrrmf040106/810040106246S20.html o 4of? s~te sponsors ofterrorism because [of] the possibility that those state sponsors might employ chemical weapons or biologicatweapons by means ofa terrorist organization proxy...." Though Feith, in that briefing, described Wunnser's unit as an innocent project, "a global exercise" that was not meant to put pressure-on other intelligence agencies orcreate skewed intelligence to fit preconceived policy notions, many other sources assert that it did exactly that. That the White House and the Pentagon put enonnous pressure on the CIA'to go along with its version ofevents has been widely reported, highlighted by visits to CIA headquarters by Vice President Cheney and Lewis Libby, his chief ofstaff. Led by Perle, the neocons seethed with contempt for the CIA. The CIA'S analysis, said Perle, "isn't worth the paper it's printed on." Standing in a crowde~ hallway during an AEI event, Perle added, liThe CIA is status quo oriented. They don't want to take risks.," That became the mantra ofthe shadow agency within an agency.. Putting Wurmser in charge ofthe unit meant that it was being run by a pro-Iraq-war ideologue who'd spent years calling for a pre-emptive invasion ofBaghdad and who was clearly predisposed to find what he wanted to see. Adding another layer ofdubious quality to the endeavor was the man partnered with Wurmser, F. Michael Maloof. Maloo~ a former aide to Perle in the 1980s Pentagon, was twice stripped ofhis high-level security clearances-once in late 2001 and again last spring, for various infractions. Maloofwas also reportedly involved in a bizarre schemeto broker contacts betweenJraqi officials and the Pentagon, channeled through Perle, in what one report called a "rogue [intelligence] operation" 'outside officiai CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency channel~. As the momentum for war began to build in early 2002, Wolfowitz and Feith beefed up the intelligence unit and created an Iraq war-planning upit inthe Pentagon's Near East and South Asia Affairs section, run by Deputy Undersecretary ofDefense William Luti, under the rubric "Office ofSpecial Plans," or OSP; the new unit's director was Abram N. Shulsky. By then, Wunnser had moved on to a post as senior adviser to Undersecretary of State John Bolton, yet another neocon, who was in charge ofthe State Department's disarmament, proliferation, and WMD office and was promoting the Iraq war strategy there. Shulsky's OSP, which incorporated the secret intelligence unit, took control, banishing veteran experts-including Joseph McMillan, James Russell, Larry Hanauer, and Marybeth McDevitt-who, despite years ofservice t9 NESA, either were shuffled offto other positions or retired. For the next year, Luti and Shulsky not only would oversee war plans but would act aggressively to shape the intelligence product rece~ved by the White House. Both Luti and Shulsky were neoconservatives who were ideological soulmates ofWolfowitz and Feith. But Luti was more than that. He'd come to the Pentagon directly from the office ofVice President Cheney. That gave Luti, a recently retired, decorated Navy captain whose career ran from combat aviation to command ofa helicopter assault ship, extra clout. Along with his colleague Colonel William Bruner, Luti had done a stint as an aide to Newt Gingrich in 1996 and, like Perle and Wolfowitz, was an acolyte ofWohlstetter's. "He makes Ollie North look like a moderate," says a NESA veteran. Shulsky had been on the Washington scene since the mid-1970s. As a Senate intelligence committee staffer for Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, he began to work with ~arly neoconservatives like Perle, who was then an aide to· Senator Henry Jackson. Later, in the Reagan years, Shulsky followed Perle to the Pentagon as Perle's arms-control adviser. In the '90s, Shulsky co-authored a book .on intelligence called Silent Warfare, with Gary Schmitt. Shulsky had served with Schmitt on Moynihan's staffand they had remained friends. Asked about the Pentagon's Iraq intelligence "cell," Schmitt-who is currently the executive director ofthe Project for the New American Century-says that he can't say much about it "because one ofmy best friends is running it." .3130120041:31 PM (1 The Tie,Factory L. f"" http://delphi.dia.ic.gev/admfnlEARLYBIRD/040106/s200~0106246S20.html o 50f7 According to Lt. Colonel Kwiatkowski, Luti and Shulsky ran NESA and the Offi~e of Special Plans with brutal efficiency, purging people they disagreed with and enforcing t~e party li~e. "It was organized like a machine," she says. "The people working on the neocon agen~a had a narrow, well-defined political agenda. They had a sense of mission." At NESA, Shulsky, she says, began "hot-desking," or taking an office wherever he could find one, working with Feith and Luti, before formally taking the reips ofthe newly created asp. Together, she says, Luti and Shulsky turned cherry-picked pieces ofuncorroborated, . anti-Iraq intelligence into talking points, on issues like Iraq's WMD and its links to Al Qaeda. Shulsky constantly updated these papers, drawing on the intelligence unit, and circulated them to Pentagon officials, including Rumsfeld, and to Vice President Cheney. "Ofcourse, we never thought they'd go directly to the White House," she adds. Kwiatkowski recalls one meeting in which Luti, pressed to finish a report, told the staff, "I've got to get. this over to 'Scooter' right away." She later found out that "Scooter" was none other than Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Cheney's chief ofstaff. According to Kwiatkowski, Cheney had direct ties through Luti into NESAlOSP, a connection that was highly unorthodox. "Never, ever, ever would a deputy undersecretary ofDefense work directly on a project for the vice pre.sident," she says. Illt was a little clue that we had an informal network into Vice President Cheney's office." Although Feith insists that the OSP did not seek to gather its own intelligence, Kwiatkowski and others sharply disagree. Staffworking for Luti and Shulsky in NESAlOSP churned out propaganda-style intelligence, she says. As an example, she cited the work ofa U.S. intel1~gence officer and Arabic specialist, Navy Lt. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, who W8;S a special assistant to Luti. "His job was to peruse the Arabic-language media to find articles that would incriminate Saddam Hussein about terrorism, and he translated these.II Such raw intelligence is usually subject to a thorough vetting process, tracked, verified, and checked by intelligence professionals. But not at aSP-the material that it produced found its way directly into speeches by Bush, Cheney, and other officials. According to Melvin Goodman, a former CIA official and an intelligence specialistat the National War College, the OSP officials routinely pushed lower-ranking staffaround on intelligence matters. "People were being pulled aside [and being told], 'We saw your last piece and it's not what we're looking for,t1t he says. "It was pretty blatant.II Two State Department intelligence officials, Greg Thielmann and Christian Westermann, have bot~ charged that pressure was being put on them to shape intelligence to fit policy, in particular from Bolton's office. tithe Al Qaeda connection and nuclear ~eapons issue were the only two ' ways that you could link Iraq to an imminent security threat to the U.S.," Thielmann told the New York Times. IIAnd th~ administration was grossly distorting the intelligence on both things.It BESIDES CHENEY, key members ofthe Pentagonls Defense Policy Board, i!1cluding Perle and ex-House SpeakerNewt Gingrich, all Iraq hawks, had 4ir~ct input into NESAlOSP. The offices ofNESA were located on the Pentagonls fourth floor, seventh corridor of0 Ring, and the Policy Board's offices were directly below, on the third floor. During the run-up to the ;Jraq war, Gingrich often came up for closed-door meetings with Luti, who in 1996 had served as a congressional fellow in Speaker ofthe House Gingrich's office., As OSP got rolling, Luti brought in Colonel Bruner, a former military aide to Gingrich, and, together, Luti an4 Bruner opened the door to a vast flow ofbogus intelligence fed to the Pentagon by Iraqi defectors associated with Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress group ofexiles. Chalabi founded the Iraqi National Congress in 1992, with the help ofa shadowy CIA-connected public-relations firm called the 313012004 I:31 PM rr The,Lie Factory http://delphi.diaic.gov/a.dminlEARLYBIRD/0401061520040106246520.htmt G 60f7 Rendon Group, one ofwhose former employees, Francis Brooke, has been a top aide to Chalabi ever since. Ascion ofan aristocratic Iraqi family, Chalabi fled Baghdad at the age of 13, in 1958, when the corrupt Iraqi Hashemite monarchy was overthrown by a coalition ofcommunists and the Iraqi military. In the late 1960s, Chalabi studied mathematics at the University ofChicago with Wohlstetter, who introduced him to Richard Perle more than a decade later. Long associated with the heart ofthe neoconservative movement, Chalabi founded Petra Bank in Jordan, which grew to be Jordan's third-largest bank by the 1980s. But Chalabi was accused ofbank fraud, embezzlement, and currency manipulation, and he barely escaped before Jordanian authorities could arrest him; in 1992, he was convicted and sentenced in absentia to more than 20 years ofhard labor. After founding the INC, Chalabi's bungling, unreliability, and penchant for mismanaging funds caused the CIA to sour on him, but he never lost the support ofPerle, Feith, Gingrich, and their allies; once, soon after 9/11, Perle invited Chalabi to address the Defense Policy Board. According to m!1ltiple sources, Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress sent a steady stream ofmisleading and often faked intelligence reports into U.S. intelligence channels. That information would flow sometimes into NESA/OSP directly, sometimes through Defense Intelligence Agency debriefings ofIraqi defectors via the Defense Human Intelligence Service, and sometimes through the INC's own U.S.-funded Intelligence Collection Program, which was overseen by the Pentagon. The INC's intelligence "isn't reliable at all," according to Vjncent Cannistraro, a former CIA chiefofcounterterrorism. "Much ofit is propaganda. Much of it is telling the Defense Department what they want to hear, using alleged informants and defectors who say what Chalabi wants them to say, [creating] cooked information that goes right into presidential and vice presidential speeches." Bruner, the aide to Luti and Gingrich's former staffer, "was Chalabi's pandler," says Kwiatkowski. "He would arrange meetings with Chalabi and Chalabi's folks," she says, adding that the INC leader often prought people into the NESA/OSP offices for debriefings. Chalabi claims to have introduced only three actual defectors to the Pentagon, a figure Thielmann considers "awfully low." However, according to an investigation by the Los Angeles Times, the three defectors provided by Chalabi turned up exactly zero useful intelligence. The first, an Iraqi engineer, claimed to have specific informatio~ about biological weapons, but his information didn't pan out; the second claimed to know about mobile labs, but that information, too, was worthless; and the third, who claimed to have data about Iraq's nuclear program, proved to be a fraud. Chalabi also claimed to have given the Pen~gon information about Iraqi SliPport for AI Qaeda. "We ga~e the names ofpeople who were doing the links," he told an interview~r from PBS'S Frontline. Those links, ofcourse, have not been discovered. Thielmann told the same Frontline interviewer that the Office ofSpecial Plans didn't apply strict intelligence-verification standards to "some ofthe information coming out ofChalabi and the INC that OSP and the Pentagon ran with... In the war's aftermath, the Defense Intelligence Agency-which is not beholden to the neoconservative civilians at the Pentagon-leaked a report it prepared, concluding that few, if any, ofthe INC's informants provided worthwhile intelligence. SO FAR, DESPITE ALL ofthe investigations underway, there is little sign that any ofthem are going to delve into the operatidns ofthe Luti-Shulsky Office ofSpecial Plans and its secret intelligence unit. Because it operates in the Pentagon's policy shop, it is not officially part ofthe intelligence community, and so it is seemingly immune to congressional oversight. With each passing day, it is becoming excruciatingly clearer just how wrong U.S.. intelligence was in regard to Iraqi weapons and support for terrorism. The American teams ofinspectors in the Iraq Survey Group, which ha_s employed ~p to 1,400 p~op~e to scour the country and analyze the findings, have not _313012004 1:31 PM been able to find a shred of evidence ofanything other than dusty old plans and records ofweapons apparently destroyed more than a decade ago., Countless examples offruitless searches have been reported in the media. To cite one example: U.S. soldiers followed.an intelligence report claiming that a complex built for Uday Hussein, Saddam's son, hid a weapons warehouse with poison-gas storage tanks. "Well," U.S. Army Major Ronald Hann Jr. told the Los Angeles T~mes, "the warehouse was a carport. It still had two cars inside. And the tanks had propane for the kitchen." tr..i.t.. The }t.ie Faetoty " - http://delphi.dia.ic.gov/adminlEARLYBlRD/040106/82004010624 o 7of7 Countless other errors and exaggerations have become evident. The thousands ofaluminum tubes supposedly imported by Iraq for uranium enrichment were fairly conclusively found to be designed to build noncontroversial rockets. The long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, allegedly built to deliver bioweapons, were smal~, rickety, experimental planes with wood frames. The mobile bioweapon labs turned out to have had other, civilian purposes. And the granddaddy ofall falsehoods, the charge that Iraq sought uranium in the West African-country ofNiger, was based on forged documents-documents that the CIA, the State Department, and other agencies knew were fake nearly a year before President Bush highlighted the issue inhis State ofthe Union address in January 2003. "Either the system broke down," former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who was sent by the CIA to visit , Niger and whose findings helped show that the documents were forged, told Mother Jones, "or there was selective use ofJJits ofinformation to justify a decision to go to war that had already been taken." Edward Luttwak, a neoconservative scholar and author, says flatly that the Bush administration lied about the intelligence it had because it was afraid to go to the American people and say that the war was simply about getting rid ofSaddam Hussein. Instead, says Luttwak, the White House was groping for a rationale to satisfy the United Nations' criteria for war. :'Cheney was forced into this fake posture of worrying about weapons ofmass destruction," he says. liThe ties to Al Qaeda? That's complete no.nsense." In the Senate, Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) is pressing for the Intelligence Committee to extend its investigation to look into the specific role ofthe Pentagon's Office of Special Plans, but there is strong Republican resistance to the idea. In the House, Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Cali£) has introduced legislation calling for a commission to investigate the intelligence mess and has collected more than a hundred Democrats-but no Republicans-in support ofit. "I think they need to b~ looked at pretty carefully," Waxman told Mother Jones when asked-about the Office ofSpecial Plans. "I'd like to know whether the political people pushed the intelligence people to slant their conclusions." - Congressman Waxman, meet Lt. Cololl:el Kwiatkowski. 3130120041:31 PM i_, ~ -I; ~1I .~ ~-- ALL INFOR}~TION CONTAI~mD HEREIN IS VNCLASSIFIED DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg The United States and Shi'ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba'thist Iraq Juan Cole In post-Saddam Husayn Iraq, Shi'ite militias rapidly established their authority in East Baghdadand other urban neighborhoods ofthe south. Amongthe various groups which emerged, the Sadr Movement stands out as militant and cohesive. The sectarian, anti-American Sadrists wish to impose a puritanical, Khomeinist vision on Iraq. Their political influence is potentially much greater than their numbers. Incorporating them into a democratic Iraq while ensuring that they do not come to dominate itposes a severe challenge to the US Administration. In planning the war on Iraq, the American Defense Department and intelligence organizations appear to have been unaware that millions of Iraqi Shi'ites had joined a militant and puritanical movement dedicated to the establishment of an Iran-style Islamic Republic in Iraq, even though these developments had been detailed in many Arabic-language books-and articles.. On February 18, 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave an interview on National Public Radio in which he maintained that "The Iraqis are . '0 • by and large quite secular.. They are overwhelmingly Shi'a which is different from the Wahabis of the peninsula, and they don't bring the sensitivity of having the holy cities of Islam being on their tenitory.~'1 Even more disturbingly, this quote shows that Wolfowitz did not realize that religious Iraqi Shi'ites are extremely sensitive about foreigners in their shrine cities such as Najafand Karbala, or that these cities are religious power centers of great symbolic potency. YS Defense Department leaders such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputies, Wolfowitz and Douglas F~ith, mistakenly thought that the middle and lower strata of the Ba'th bureaucracy, police, and army would survive the war, and that they could simply hand it over to secular expatriate figure Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress. Although from a Shi'ite background, Chalabi was largely unknown in Iraq and was wanted in Jordan on embezzlement charges. The CIA and the State Department broke with Chalabi late·in 2002 when he proved unable -Juan Cole is Professor ofModern Middle Eastern and South Asian History at the University of ~ichigan. He is editor of the International Journal of Middle Bast Studies, and author of numerous books and articles. His recent works include Modernity and the Millennium (NewYork: Columbia University Press. 1998) and Sacred Space and Holy \Var.· The Politics, Culture and History ofShrite Islam (London: I.B. Tauris. 2002). . 1. "Deputy SecretaryWolfowitz Interview with National Public Radio:' February 19,2003 at http:/ Iwww.washingtonfile.netl2003IFeblFeb21IEURS09.HTM. MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL*VOWMES7. NO.4,AUI"UMN2003 IL II CoIeFlnaLp65 101&'2003. 4:00PM -"'~~ IL 544*MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL to account for about $2 million of the$4 million they had given his Iraqi National Congress. The major religious Shi'ite groups with which the Americans were negotiating were part ofChalabi's group and included-the Tehran-based Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the London branch of the al-Da'wa Party, and the J{hoei Foundation, of which only al-Da'wa had much popularity on the ground in Iraq. The US was ignorant of the Sadr Movement, the main indigenous Shi'ite force.. This ignorance was to cost the US great political capital in the first mont~s of the occupation. When the Ba'th fell on April 9, 2003, Shi'ite militias seemed suddenly to emerge and take control of many urban areas in the south of the country, as well as in the desperately poor slums of East Baghdad. The moral authority of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and his more quietist colleagues in Najaf had been known to the US, but it transpired that other ayatollahs and leaders had more political clout. The rank and file of Iraqi Shi'ites in the urban areas was far more radicalized by the last decade of Ba'th rule than anyone on the outside had realized. These developments alarmed Washington, given that some 60% to 65% of Iraqis are.Shi'ites, and this group would therefore predominate in a democratic Iraq. The religious groups constitute only one section of the Shi'ite population, perhaps a third or more, but they are well organized and armed. - My thesis here is that the Sadr Movement is at the moment the most important tendency among religious Shi'ites in post-Ba'thist Iraq, and that it is best seen as a sectarian phenomenon in the "sociology of religions" sense. It is· primarily a youth movement and its rank and file tend to be poor•. It is highly puritanical and xenophobic, and it is characterized by an exclusivism unusual in Iraqi Shi'ism. To any extent that it emerges as a leading social force in Iraq, it will prove polarizing and destabilizing. In spring and summer of 2003 its leadership had decided not to challenge actively the coalition military. In contemporary theories of the sociology of religion, a "sect" is characteri~ed by a high degree of tension with mainstream society, employing a rhetoric of difference,antagonism, and separation.2 The "~igh-tension" model of the sect predicts that it will attempt strongly to demarcate itself off from the mainstream of society. It will also cast out those members who are perceived to be too accommodating of non-sectarian norms. That.is, it demands high levels of loyalty and obedience in the pursuit of exclusivism. IRAQI SHI'ISM IN HISTORY Under the Ottomans, a Sunni political elite flourished in what is now Iraq, with political ties to Istanbul. Shi'ism remained vigorous, however. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many tribespeople of the south converted to-the Shi'ite branch of Islam, under the influence of missionaries sent out from the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala, where Shi'ite holy figures Imam 'Ali and Imam Husayn were int~rred. -2. Rodney Stark an~ William Sims Bainbridge, The Future ofReligion (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press, 1985), pp. 19·34, 135. -+ 1~4:00PM • ",!, ~ ..J f 1~-:crQru IL THE US AND SHI'ITE RELIGIOUS FACTIONS IN IRAQ*545 'Ali was the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Muhammad, and Husayn was the prophet's grandson. This tribal conversion movem~nt appears to have been a protest of the weak, a way of using religion to resist the power of the Sunni Ottoman bureaucracy•. Over time, it created a Shi'ite majority in what was to become Iraq. This region also witnessed the victory among Shi'ites in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of the Usuli ,school ofjurisprudence, which held that all lay believers must follow or "emulate" a learned ShiCite jurisprudent with seminary training. They are to implement the rulings of this "object of emulation" (marja t al-taqlid) with regard to disputed points of Islamic law. They can only follow a living jurisprudent or mujtahid, however, with regard to any new issues that arise after the old one's death. The Usuli school gave to Shi'ite clerics a leadership position much more powerful and central than typically was bestowed by Sunni Muslims on their clerics.3 The British conquered Mesopotamia during World'War' I, and created out of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra provinces (Arabic wi/ayat) a colonial state they called Iraq, which became formally independent in 1932..They cobbled together a big Kur4ish community in the north, $ome Thrkmen tribespeople, Sunni townspeople of the cen' ter, and the Shi'ite tribes and settled urban and rural groups of the south, into a new state. The Shi'ite majority probably grew larger in the course of the 20th century, but Sunnis remained in control politically and economically, under the monarchy, then the officers-ruled republic of 1958-.968, and then the Ba'th (Arab nationalist) regime of 1968-2003. The.Ba'th massively persecuted the religious Shi'ites of the south. It especially feared the aI-Da'wa al-Islamiyya Party, founded around 1958, which aimed at establishing a 'Shi'ite-dominated Islamic state. 4 The rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1978-79 frightened the Ba'th , which launched a war against the Khomeinist state there, and simultaneously, cracked down hard on the radical Shi'ite clerics in Iraq such as Muhammad Baqiral-Sadr (d. 1980), who theorized an Islamic state.. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, "Sadr I," was executed alorig with many -3. For the historical background ofmodem Iraqi Shi'ism, see Pierre-Jean Luizard, Lafonnation de l'Irak contemporain [The Fonnation ofContemporary Iraq] (Paris: Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1991); Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is 'of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); MeirLitvak, Shi'ite ScholarsofNineteenth Century Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Juan Cole,SacredSpace andHoly War: The Politics, Culture, andHistoryofShi'ite Islam (London: I. B.. Tauris, 2002), and Faleh Abdul-labar, ed., Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues (London: Saqi Books, 2(02). • 4. Sal~ al-Khursan, Hiw al-Da'waal-Islamiyya: Haqa'iq wa watha'iq [The Islamic Da 'wa Party: Facts and !Jocwnents] (Damascus: al-Mu'assassa al-'Arabiyya li'I-Dirasat wa'I-Buhuth aJIstratijiyya, 1999); RUhaimi; '7he Da'wa Islamic Party:' in Abdul-Jabar, Ayatollahs, pp. 149-161; Keiko Sakai, "Modernityand tradition in the Islamic movements inIraq:'AmbStudies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No.1 (Winter2001), pp. 37-52; MahanAbedin, "Dossier: HezbaJ-Daawaal-Islamiyya: Islamic Call Party:' Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 5, No.6 (June 2003) at: http://www.meib.orglaniclesl 0306Jraqd.htm; HannaBatatu,"Shi'iteOrganizations in Iraq: AI-Da'wah al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin:' In Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie,.eds., Shi'ism andSocial Protest(New Haven: Yale University PreSs, 1986), pp. 179-200; Joyce N. Wiley, The Islamic Movement ofIraqi Shi'ites (Boulder, Co.: LynneRienner, 1992). -+-. --+- 1~4mPM ).' \0 ,; " .~ IL. .-<;r 546*MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL other activists.5 The al-Da'wa Party g~ve birth to splinter groups like the Suprem~ Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (founded by expatriates in Tehran in 1982) and the Sadr Movement, while remaining a separate party in its own right. In contrast, the mainstream Najaf clerical tradition in Iraq, exemplified by Abu al-Qasim alKhu'i (d. 1992), tended to be quietist and to reject Khomeini's theory that the clergy should rule (vilayat-e faqih).6 But unbeknownst to the outside world, many Iraq! Shi'ites, inspired by al-Sadr and his suc~essors, were being radicalized by the eP ample of Iran and by the brutality of the Ba'th persecution. THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF IRAQI SHrISM The Iraqi Shi'ites come from a number of distinct social niches. Over two million dwell in the poor neighborhoods of aast Baghdad, constituting some 8% of the total Iraqi population (est. at 24 million in 2003) and 13% ofthe Shi'ites. This quarter was called alThawra( URevolution") Township when it was founded by military dictator 'Abd alKarim al-Qasim in the early 19608, and was renamed Saddam City by the Baeth. It was settled by Shi'ite villagers who emigrated from the hardscrabble farms of the South, often retaining their tribal identities, customs, rituals and ties in their new environment. Some young people there even go back to their villages to consult with their tribal chieftains from time to time.? The new generation quickly became in important senses urban in outlook. As soon as the Ba'th fell in spring of 2003, its inhabitants renamed it Sadr City, areference to Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr ("Sadr II"), who had been assassinated by Saddam's agents in 1999.. The residents of East Baghdad live under appalling social and economic conditions, with little access to basic necessities such as sewerage, clean water, and decent housing. Unemployment is high. The quarter suffered dreadfully from Ba'th party repression, with many killed in uprisings in 1977, 1991 and 1999. East13aghdad is thus a fertile ground for Shi'ite radicalism and populism, and its residents seem largely to· favor the Sadr nMovement. Shi'ites predominate in Basra, Iraq's second largest city, which ha~ a population of about 1..3 million.. Basra is often said to be more cosmopolitan and secular than other Shi'ite areas, and its mayor under the British administration in the post-Ba'th period, Wa'il 'Abd ai-Latif, is a secular court judge. Still, religious factions are organizing there, and eyewitness accounts suggest that by.summer of 2003 even Christian women felt forced to veil when they went out of the house because of pressure from hard line ·Shi'ites.8 Basra has been a center of a breakaway faction of the al-Da'wa Party, Tanzimal-Da'wa, which rejected Khomeini's theory of clerical rule. It also has .5. TaIib Aziz, '7he PoliticalTheory ofMuhammad Baqir Sadr:' in Abdul-labar, pp. 231·244; Chibli Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr, Naja/. and the Shi'i International (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 6. YusifAl-Kho'i,"GrandAyatollahAbu aI-Qassim aI·Kho'i:' inAbdul·labar, pp. 224-230; Jawdat aIQazwini, ''The School ofNajaf:' in Abdul-labar, pp. 243·264. 7. Hazim aI-Amin, "'Baghdad allati lam talal hi 'asha'iriha rna talaluhu al-mudun hi'!- 'asha'ir" ["Baghdad which Has Not Dealt with its nibes as Other Cities Don], A/.Ba)'at, July 10, 2003. 8. "Christians Under More Pressure in Postwar Iraq: Intemew with Marie Angel Siebrecht ofAid to the Chun:hinNeed:' ZenitNewsAgency,July4,2003athttp://www.zenit.org!englishlvisua!izza.phtml?sid=38309. -<;r- ~I • CoItFN1p65 _ -<;r- 10r'B.'2003. 4:00PM -I r.- •• IL THE US AND SHI'lTE RELIGIOUS FACTIONS IN IRAQ*541 substantial numbers of followers of the Sadr Movement, and of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, about which more below. A little over a fifth of Iraqi Shi'ites therefore live in the big cities. Another important stratum lives in important towns in the south. These towns average populations between 100,000 and about 600,000 persons. They include al-Zubayr (l74,000), Samawah (128,000), Nasiriyya (560,000), 'Amara (351,000), Kut (400,000), Diwaniyia (443,000), Hillah (548,000), Kufa (119,000), Najaf (585,000), Karbala (572,000), and Baquba (295,000). Samarra' (207,000), a northern town with a Shi'ite quarter, can also be listed here.9 These substantial towns accounted for nearly 4.5 million residents in 2003, largely Shi'ites, and therefore for about a third of the Iraqi Shi'ite population. Many Shi'ites Jiving in them are merchants and shopkeepers, insofar as government employment Was often denied to them or seep as undesirable by them under the Ba'th.lo The towns differ among themselves in character. Najaf, KarbaIa and Samarra stand out in being shrine cities, where Imams are buried that Shi'ites consider rightful heirs and successors to the prophet Muhammad. They also have seminary establishments, training clerics. The clerics of Najaf in particular enjoy great prestige in Iraq and throughout the Shi'ite world, and in the twentieth century outside Iran the co.nvention has been tharthe most senior grand ayatollah in Najaf is the chief legal and religious authority for lay Shi'ites. Each town has a different religious and political orientation. The al-Da'wa Party ,seems particularly strong in Nasiriyya. Baquba and Kut, in the east near Iran, are under the influence of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).u This group had its origins in the al-Da'wa Party but became a separate organization in 1982. In 1984, Muhammad Baqir aI-Hakim came to head it" and he remained at the helm thereafter, until his assassination in the car bombing outside the Shrine of 'Ali in Najaf on August 29, 2003.12 SeIRI was based .in Tehran for two decades.. Kufa, like. East Baghdad, is a stronghold of the Sadr Movement. Some other substantial towns are more tied to the tribes and the rural areas, and have seen recent large influxes of marsh Arabs and other political refugees from the countryside. These relatively newly settled townspeople are used to being armed, and so for them, the Anglo-American troops' a~tempts to confiscate their rifles have produced a great deal of tension. Another large proportion of Shi'ites lives in small towns and villages in the countryside. The rural Shi'ites are now a minority. They tend to be organized by tribe though few are any longer pastoral nomads, and to practice a folk Shi'ism at variance .-9. Population statisticsare from Stefan Helder, "WorldGazetteer:'athnp:l!www.world-glll.etteer.com! frlfr_iq.htm; an imponant recent overviewofShi'ite currents in Samma' is Hazim aI-Amin, IiSamarra' wa Ikhwatuha," ["Samarra' and its Sisters"] AI-Hayat, IS July 2003. 10. Ma'd Fayyad, ~~Shahid 'ala Rihlatal-Khu'i ilaal- ~lraq." [Witness to the Journey ofaI-Khu'i to lraq"],AI-Sharq al-Awsat, April 28, 2003. - 11. Juan Cole, "Mariage mal assoni entre les radicaux chiites irakiens et les Etats-Unis:' ["Mis~ matched Marriage Between Radical Shi'ites and the US"], Le Monde Diplomatique (July 2(03). 12. Mukhtar aI-Asadi, AI-Taqsir al-Kabir bayna ai-Salah wa al-Islah [Mere Passive Goodness Falls FarShort ojActiveRejorm](Beirut: DaraI-Furat, 2001). -" CoIeFN1.p65 _ 547 1MWOO3" 4:00 PM Ii -I '-..J I 1-----·:cQm ·i IL 548*MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL with the more scholastic and bookish Shi'ism of the seminary cities. They invest their tribal shaykhs with great authority, and often with some religious· charisma, as well (the shaykhs often claim to be Sayyids or Sharifs, i.e., descendants of the prophet.) On July 8,. a convention was held by Iraqi tribal leaders, representing the rural Shi'ite tribes of the center and south of Iraq called ''The' Bloc of Democratic Iraqi tribes." They 'aimed at ensuring they have a voice in the governance of Iraq. The convention chair, GhaIib al-Rikabi, insisted that Iraqis themselves draft the new constitution and demanded early elections for an Iraqi govemment.13 A subset of the rural Shi'ites is the so-called marsh Arabs, said to be about 500,000 strong. They once dwelled in the swamps of southern Iraq, working as fishermen, hunters, farmers and smugglers. In the 1990s, the swamps were used by Iranbased paramilitary organizations of Iraqi expatriates to infiltrate into Iraq and strike at Ba'th targets, and the marsh Arabs themselves often resisted Ba'th rule. They were organized politically and militarily by the Iraqi Bizbu'llah, a radical group that fought a guerrilla war against the Iraqi·state. The Ba'th found it difficult to operate in the .marshes and therefore drained them. The marsh Arabs were forced to settle in poor southern towns such as Majar al-Kabir, or to go to small cities like Amar:a, where they largely subsisted in poverty, having lost their livelihoods. In the aftermath ofthe second GulfWar, 'Abd aI-Karim Mahmudal-Muhammadawi, a marsh Arab who had fought guerrilla actions against the Ba'th under the nom de guerre ofAbu Hatim, emerged as an important civic leader in Amara. He provided security with . the help of his tribal militia (presumably Hizbullah). Although an observant Shi'ite, he decries "religious fanaticism" and urges tole~tion. In early July 2063, he was also insisting on the quick formation ofan indigenous Iraqi government and an early end to what he caIled American occupation.14 The tragic clash between British troops and residents of Majar al-Kabir on June 23 and 24, in'which six British trQOps were killed, came about in large part because the British insisted on disanning the population. Arab tribesmen origi., nally from the marshes saw this step as a way of dishonoring them and rendering them defenseless. for people who had lost everything, being without arms to protect their families was afrightening prospect.IS Muhammadawi himself played an important role in calming tensions after the clash.16 Of all these groups, the urban religious Shi'ites are the most highly networked for political and crowd action. Najaf, the chief shrine city, provides much of the leadership and organization, whereas the slum dwellers ofEast Baghdad can easily be bused as foot soldiers to the center of Baghdad for rallies. Other urban populations -13. Ai-Bayat, July 8, 2003. 14. Patrice Claude, "Dans Ie sudde l'Irak, Ie 'Seigneur des marais', hiros de la resistance cOnlre Saddam, aspire II la paix," ["{n southern Iraq, the 'Lord ofthe Marshes', Hero ofthe Resistance against Saddam, Hopes for Peace"], Le Monde, July 3, 2003•. IS. PatrickCockburn in MajaraI-Kahir, "MarshArabs threaten to resist 'Anny ofOccupation,'" The Independent (London), June 27, 2003.at http://news.independent.co.uk/worldlmiddle!."'eastl story.jsp?story=419367. 16. Michael Howard and Jamie Wilson, "British forces try to mend fences in town where six soldiers died,"The Guardian, June 28,2003. -  The result of this perceived success was that the ayatollahs appeared more willing than ever to oppose US and Western demands. For th~e Iranian leadership, the effective suppression of the protests had served as a much-needed victory against the US and the West. Whether the West actually saw events in these terms was immaterial; in the run-up to st1:date Year="200311 Day="9" Month="7" July 9, 2003 , particularly.during the protests of June 2003, state-run Iranian media made clear in stark terms that the anti-Government demonstrators did not represent the Iranian people and were instead agents of the US or other Western "dlsruptors". On st1:date Year="2003" Day="18" Month="7" July 18, 2003 , the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported that i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal"Ayatollah Ahmad Jannatl had told worshippers attending Friday prayers at Tehran University that stl:date Year=1I2003tl Day="9" Month="7- July 9, 2003, was "a day of disgrace for the US and its agents, as their efforts did not succeed" and characterized the July 9 protests as "minor" and "Insignificant"_. This style of rhetoric served more than one purpose for the Iranian Government. While these comments served to minimize the support base of the protestors they also gave the ayatollahs an opportunity to finally win a battle against the West. Iran had proved incapable of denying Western victories in Afghanistan or Iraq and appeared, by late July 2003, to have grown increasingly frustrated with the Islamic world's inability to respond to the US-led Coalition invasion of Iraq with significant attacks on the Western home front. Thus, while efforts to rectify these situations were well underway by June-July 2003, the "defeat" of the stl:date Year="2003" Day="9" Month="7" July 9, 2003 , protests served as a welcome interim victory, and doubtless a morale booster amongst the Iranian leadership. Iran's aggressive strategic stance toward the US , Israel, and the West was emphasized on stl:date Year=12003" Day="2011 Month="7" July 20, 2003 , when the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Hoseini-Khamene'i, officially Inaugurated the Shahab-3 ballistic missile. The Shahab-3 reportedly has a range of between 1,300 and 1,500 kilometers and Is capable of carrying a 1,000-760 kilogram https:/Iw3.lexis.comllawenfsolutions_secured/searchforms/doBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=... 11/18/2004 .. .. D,. ocumen-t Results o Page 3 of4 L " warhead. The Iranian Government and Western media had reported since early July 2003 that the missile had been successfully tested in June 2003. The July 20, 2003 , ceremony marked the missile's entrance into operational service, according to i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal"Ayatoliah Khamene'I, who remarked: "Today our people and our armed forces are ready to defend their goals anywhere." However, the authoritative Middle Eastern web-based information service, Debka.com, which clearly has strong sources within the Israeli intelligence community, stated in astl:date Year="2003" Day="23" Month="7" July 23, 2003 , dispatch that the missile had, in fact, failed its most recent test. According to the Debka.com report, Iranian officials were, as of late July 2003, in North Korea attempting to expedite shipment plans for new engines in hopes of fixing the i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal"Sh a i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal"hab-3 's remaining defects. It remained unclear whether the st1:date Year="20031 ' Day="23" Month="7" JUly 23, 2003 , report of North Korean-Iranian missile shipments was linked to the arrival of a large Iranian cargo ship to a North Korean port at Haeju Harbor. in the Yellow Sea during early July 2003. On st1:date Year="2003" Day="9" Month="7" July 9, 2003 , an unnamed South Korean official had speculated to the South Korean JoongAng Daily that the Iranian cargo ship had taken on small patrol boats. [The Iranian Navy maintains at least/three Zafar -class (North Korean built Chasho -class) FAC(G) patrol boats purchased from North Korea in the early 1990s. Western intelligence agencies believed that an additional six patrol boats had been shipped to Iran In December 2002 in a package sale including two gunboats and five semi-submersibles capable of carrying two torpedoes each.] Thus, with uncertainty as to the current strategic viability of the Sh a hab-3 missile, what appeared most evident by late JUly 2003 was the Importance which the Iranian Government continued to place on propaganda and the projection of force. The message of the missile test -- failed or otherwise -- had been aimed directly at the US , Israel, and the West. And, though, the test gained only the passing attention of most US and European media, Israeli news outlets paid close watch, with the daily i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal"Yedioth Ahronoth blaring across its front page during mid-July 2003: "The Iranian threat -- the missile that can hit every house In Israel". The importance of the missile test, insofar as achieving a strong Iranian front to the West, could not be overstated. Iran had long depended on the threat of Widening any US-led war in the Middle East to include Israel as a major deterrent to US action against the Tehran-Damascus-Baghdad axis.US Pres. Bush had proved willing to risk that eventuality to achieve US strategic goals in removing the Iraqi Administration of former Pres. Saddam Hussein. With this US decision, the Iranians had hoped for Saddam to make good on this long-promised threat, not only to punish Israel, but also to deter further US action against Iran or its staunch ally Syria • The Iraqi inability to widen the war to Israel made the clerics recognize, more than ever, the necessity for a demonstration of the Iranian capability to strike Israel. The some 10,000 medium-to-short range rockets in Southern Lebanon, controlled jointly by Tehran, Damascus, and, to a degree, HizbAllah, were well within the Iranian sphere of influence, yet, Tehran's Willingness to rely on its neighbors to attack Israel if necessary appeared to have waned in the wake of the Iraqi failure. US efforts in June 2003 to'sway the HizbAllah from the Iranian sphere of influence, though fruitless by late July 2003, may also have raised the attention of the Iranian leadership. Thus, Tehran sought to warn the US against taking action toward "regime change" In Iran by reminding Washington that it retained the ability to widen any conflict with the US to include Israel by means within its own borders. Although perhaps unnecessary, this should have registered in Damascus as a reminder that Syria remains str~tegically dependent on Iran, and not the other way around. Notably, Cuba's blocking of US-based satellite feeds into Iran, which continued as of July 24, 2003, signaled that Havana continued to pay close attention to Tehran's policies vis-a-vis the US as an indicator for its own relations with Washington. Initially, following the September 11,2001 , attacks, Havana had shown a more conciliatory attitude toward the US, most notably by remaining relatively acquiescent to the US use of Guantanamo Bay as a detention camp for al-Qaida detainees. The Russian closure of the Lourdes Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) facility follOWing the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US, though begun in August 2001, also seemed to indicate a more amiable Cuban posture. Yet, Iran's unflinching stance in the face of the US pressure to end support for terror groups, abandon its indigenous nuclear weapons program, and.begin a process of political and economic liberalization appeared to have affected Havana's strategic approach. By late July 2003, it seemed clear that Cuba would continue a policy of overt hostility. towards the US • This was evidenced by the Cuban decision to help Iran block US satellite feeds into Iran, particularly at a time as sensitive as the stl :da~e Year="2003" Day="9" Month="7" July 9, 2003, protests, for which the US had voiced support. A denial issued by the Cuban Foreign Ministry on Juty 19, 2003, made no attempt to mask this hostile tone, https:/Iw3.1exis.comllawenfsolutions_secured/searchforms/doBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=... 11/18/2004 Document Results o Page 4 of4 declaring: "This is a new campaign of anti-Cuban lies ••• adding to a long list of hostile and aggressive actions that the imperial administration of George W. Bush has taken against our country." So, as July 2003 came to a close, Iran's aggressive stance came, unintentionally, with intense political pressure on the.U5 Bush Administration,' The Democrats, the US opposition party, continued to pursue Pres. Bush on the question of the Iraq War's legitimacy, the continuing (although low) US death toll In US-occupied Iraq, and the US economy. Damascus, Pyongyang, Havana, and Tripoli, thus, seemed to have one eye on the emboldened Iranians and another on Pres. Bush's slipping poll numbers. Tehran and its allies appeared ever more confident that in spite of the US-declared "war on terror" their respective governments might yet outlive the US Bush Administration. . Footnote: 1. The US Central Intelligence Agency "confirmed" to US media company ABC that al-Qaida senior military figure Saif al-Adel was being held by Iranian authorities. However, GIS sources in Tehran indicated that the "detention" was, if it could be described as that, was almost certainly symbolic. Egyptian authorities have for some months been demanding the extradition of Salf al-Adel, an Egyptian national, for trial. However, reports surfaced on July 24, 2003, that because·he was "of Libyan origin", Libya had requested his extradition to Tripoli for trial. Given the close Iranian-Libyan relationship -particularly given the fact that Libya essentially has taken responsibility for the Iranian-managed bombing of Pan Am PA103 flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 -- it seems almost certain that this move was a canard designed to demonstrate "Iranian compliance" in the "war on terror", while still ensuring that Saif al-Adel was able to be safeguarded. 2. International pressure on Iran's clerics is, however, far from over. The Canadian Ambassador to Tehran was recalled on July 23, 2003, over Canadian protests that Iranian-born Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi was tortured, possibly raped, and th~n killed by Iranian officials. See also: Defense & Foreign Affair~ Daily, ~uly 10, 2003: Iranian Protests Take Place Despite Massive Suppression; Worldwide Expatriate Protests Against Clerics • LOAD-DATE: July 24, 2003 View: L1s.t I Full < p..t.ex, Document 10 of 28 ne_~t> Edl,t...S.ea(ch. I ~e.w...S.ea(cb. frJpt 1.Q.o~lQad. - About lexisNexis I ])mns and Qmditions I Privacy POlicy ~..Y.{1ght 2004 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. ~ttps:/lw3.lexis.comllawenfsolutions_ secured/searchformsldoBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=... 11/18/2004' ~ J , . i ·t DEB~file- Iran-Based Al Qaeda Threat Much Closer than Shehab-3 Page 1 of2 " 0 ALL INFOPHATImr CONT&' HEREIN IS LmrCLASSIFIED DEBKAfile - We start where the media stop DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg Iran-Based AI Qaeda Threat Much Closer than Shehab-3 DEBKAflle Special Analysis JIIly 22, 2003, 9:30AM(GMT+02:00) Israel has more cause for concern from the presence ofsenior alQaeda operatives in Iran than from the prospect of Iran shooting a Shehab-3 medium-range missile any time soon, despite the handover ceremony Iran's bellicose spiritual leader Ali Khamenei staged with Iran's Revolutionary Guards on July 20. According to DEBKAjile's military experts, the missile is not yet operational; neither is it precise enough or capable ofdelivering an unconventional warhead. The Shehab-3 will need another two years at least to be ready for service. Only then, will Israel's anti-missile Arrow missile system be required to live up to the Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz's encomium, that the Arrow is Israel's answer to the Iranian missile. 'r:{ I1f,.;' .: • .~ r', '-.f. :.... ,< ~ Mussab Zarqawi - At .. Qaeda's ticking bomb in Iran Meanwhile, the Shehab-3 is meanwhile grounded by two daunting obstacles: A. The fmal version ofthe missile's engine is far from complete; tests are still mnning on various North Korean versions including the Nodong-l upgraged with Russian technology and Iranian improvements. DEBKAjile's intelligence sources report that Iranian missile engineers and operators went to North Korea at the end ofJune to speed delivery ofthe new engine parts ordered and paid for last year, after the first version engine proved faulty. Some ofthe missiles test-fired crashed shortly after launch. While pressing for delivery of the engine parts, Tehran is cocking an anxious ear to the war ofwords flying between Washington and Pyongyang. Iran's leaders fear that sooner or later the disputants will come to an understanding over North Korea's nuclear weapons program rather than letting it slide into outright confrontation. For Iran's program, this spells curtains in more than one way. 1. The moment North Korea's nuclear program accepts a regime ofcontrols and limitations, the full blast of international heat, especially from Washington, will veer round to compel the Iranians to fall in line and give up the development ofa nuclear bomb. 2. North Korea will be bound under such an agreement by non-proliferation clauses banning the export ofnuclear and missile technologies alike. Once the Pyongyang door is slammed, Iran can forget about North Korean assistance in bringing its ballistic missile engines up to scratch. Tehran is therefore racing to get what it can out ofNorth Korea before Pyongyang resoles its dispute with the Washington. B. The Iranian program faces another major hurdle. Their twin object is to produce enough enriched uranium for the manufacture ofnuclear bombs and warheads by the latter halfof2005, also completing the development ofdependable engines for their ballistic missiles in the same time frame. Ifall goes according to plan, Tehran will by that date have a nuclear weapon plus several missiles for delivering it. However, it is hard to imagine the United States and/or Israel allowing the Islamic RepUblic to reach that point unopposed These difficulties place the Shehab-3 menace in the middle distance and bring the Iran-based al Qaeda threat to the Middle East including Israel into much sharper focus. TIle thinking in Jerusalem is that since the Islamic theocrats did not semple to give al Qaeda logistical backing from their towns for the May 12 string ofsuicide attacks against Riyadh, they will be as willing to help the same terrorists mount strikes against Israel. Tuesday, July 22, Tehran again denied granting the network's leading lights sanctuary, contradicting President GeorgeW.. Bush's accusat~on the day before that Syria and Iran harbored and assisted terrorists. He also warned them they would be held accountable. http://www.debka.com/article..print.php?aid=527 11/29/2004 D'. BBKAfile ~.·'I'i.an-.Based Ai 'f'\baeda.Threat Much Closer tha.n Shehab-3G> Page 2'of2 .I, . '1 ~o one~ows for',sure ifIran:~ al Qaeda "guests" ~~e enjoying a comfortable fonn ofdetention or are preparing the next wave ofteriorist' attacks with local connivance. (See also earlier DEBKAftle story on this page.) The theory going round some circles in Washington is that Iran's logistical aid in the Riyadh attacks was meant to hint to the US government at the extent ofdamage the Iranians are capable ofcausing US interests in Iraq and other parts ofthe Middle East if the heat is not reduced on the nuclear issue. Israel is keeping a very close eye on the Jordanian-born terror master Mussab Zarqawi, who just before the Iraq War was assigned; according to Israeli security'sources, with executing ~ 9/1 I-scale attack in Israel. Six months ago, Zarqawi was sighted several times in Damascus, Beirut and places in Western Europe. He always went back to Iran after what are believed to have been t:ecruiting missions for the atta~k from among the al Qaeda group sheltering in southern Lebanon and operatives who infiltrated I~f'lel and the West Bank. ' Zarqawi could not have move~ around south Lebanon without the knowledge and assent ofSyrian army intelligence and the Iran-backed Hizballah. There is nothing to say that Zarqawi b~ck in Iran ever gave up preparing for his Is~el assignment. Ifsuch an operation is indeed afoot, then the Iran-based al Qaeda would be a greater and'more tangible threat to Israel than any semi-functioning Iranian missile. US-Israel Postscript DEB~jile's Washington sources disclose tha! President Bush's accusations against Syria and Iran on Monday we~ also mea!!t for the ears ofIs~aeli prime.mini~ter Ariel Sharon, who has been invited for talks in the White House on July 29. On Friday, July 25, the Palestinian prime minister Mahmoud Abbas will be received by the US president in Washington for the first time. He is coming with ashopping list, at the top o(which is a demand that Israel free a large number ofterrorists from its prisons, including terrorists "with blood on their hands" and Hamas andJihad Islami members. Sharon, limited by government decisions from setting the latter categories loose, sought to create a diversion by developing an independent peace channel to Damascus. By attacking Syria as a sponsor ofterrorists, Bush effectively blocked Sharon's ploy. The implication is that if the Israeli leader is not too squeamish to do ~usiness with ~ard.line regimes like that ofBashar Assad which-harbor al Qaeda and Hamas and Jihad Islami command centers, it can certainly bring itselfto make concessions to t~e non-terrorist Abb~s and his interior minister Dahlan. - There are indications that the Bush administration is cross with Sharon for his Syrian initiative and, to make things worse, using aUN official, Middle East envoy Terje Roed-Larsen as his go-between. Bush ha,s no great love for UN officials and even less for silrprises, especially when they come from Sharon who until now worked in perfect harmony with the White House. . .. From the us capital, the israeli prime minister is seen to be' shutting out ofhis counsels his defense and foreign ministers, Shaul Mofaz and'Silvan Shalom - both,ofwhom he has found indiscreetly forthcoming to the media on govemmentpoJicy, an~ barri~adi!lg himselfbehind a hard shell in readiness for his White House talks. Quite aside from the real concerns posed by al Qaeda in Iran, Syria and Lebanon, Bush advisers are intent on cracking the Israeli leader's shell so as to bring him round to advancing the concessions on the list brought by Palestinian leaders. ' Coprright 2000-2004 DEBKAfile. All Rights Reserved. ". http://www.debka.com/article-print.php?aid=527 11/29/2004 'I Search Within Results: L:~=:: ~ : :::.. ~J mD -...i Document Results ALL INFORMATION CONTAI~mD ~REIN IS UlJCLASSIFIED ~ \JITE 07-29-2010 B?:t 60324 1J.C baW/Sab/W Page 1 of8 .EcUt_S~ea[cl1l N~w...S_ea(ch frJnt I Qo..wl')lQ.a~d. View: J..lst I Full < pr.e~ Document 10 of 33 J1~~t > ¥ Tag for Print & Download Copyright 2004 Gale Group, Inc. ASAP Copyright 2004 Middle East Forum Middle East Quarterly March 22, 2004 SECTION: No.2, Vol. 11i Pg. 45i ISSN: 1073-9467 IAC-ACC..NO: 118416733 LENGTH: 5232 words HEADLINE: How to tame Tehran. BYLINE: Berman, IIan BODY: Over the past year, Iran has become a major cause of concern in Washington. The Islamic Republic has been discovered to possess a robu'st nuclear program, of a scope well beyond p~evious estimates. It has also made substantial breakthroughs in its ballistic missile capabilities. Less noticed, but equally significant, has been Tehran's growing activism in the Persian GUlf, the Caucasus, and Iraq. There is a vision and a method to Iran's policies. In the words of Mohsen Reza'i, secretary"of Iran's Expediency Council, Iran believes it is destined to become the "center of international power politics" in the post-Saddam Hussein Middle East. (1) Iran's new, more confrontational strategic doctrine even has a name: "deterrent defense." According to foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi, this national security concept is designed to confront "a broad spectrum of threats to Iran's national security, among them foreign aggression, war, border Incidents, espionage, sabotage, region.al crise~ d~rived from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), state terrorism, and discrimination in manufacturing and storing WMD." (2) Under the rubric of "deterrent defense," Iran is exploiting U.S. preoccupation with Iraq to build capabilities that will establish its hegemony in its immediate neighborhood and enhance its role across the Middle East. Iran's moves, if unchecked, will create a grave and growing challenge to U.S. aims in the region. At stake are nothing less than the geopolitical balance in the Middle East and the long-term achievement of U.S. goals, from stability in Iraq to regional peace. How has Iran's policy changed? And what can the United States do to thwart Iran's new drive? STRATEGIC AMBITIONS For years, policymakers in Washington had suspected Tehran's rulers of pursuing an offensive nuclear capability. They had viewed with alarm the growing strategic ties between Iran and Russia and had publicly expressed concerns that the centerpiece of that cooperation, the$ 800 million light-water reactor project at Bushehr, could lead to significant Iranian nuclear advances. Then, in the summer of 2002, an Iranian opposition group disclosed the existence of an extensive uranium enrichment complex at Natanz in central Iran. This revelation and a series of subsequent discoveries by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--ranging from advanced clandestine nuclear development to the presence of trace weapons-grade uranium-"revealed the true extent of Iran's nuclear endeavor. This effort turns out to have been far broader and more mature than originally believed. Iran is now https:/Iw3.lexis.com/lawenfsolutions_secured/searchfonns/doBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=... 11118/2004 Document Results o o Page 2 of8 thought to have some fourteen other facilities, including heavy- and light-water reactors in Isfahan and Arak, and suspect sites In Fasa, Karaj, "and Nekka. Together, these constitute all the makings of an ambitious national effort to develop nuclear weapons. (3) Iranian officials, meanwhile, have hinted at the existence of still other, as yet u-ndisclosed, facilities essential to the country's nuclear program. (4) Iran appears to have agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment activities under an October 2003 deal with France, Germany, and Great Britain. Similarly, international pressure succeeded In prompting Iran to sign the Additional Protocol to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), permitting snap inspections and invasive monitoring of segments of Iran's nuclear sector by the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, two of Iran's main atomic suppliers,' Russia and China, wield veto power on the United Nations Security Council, making it improbable that Iranian nuclear violations would result In meaningful censure. And in fact, ongoing IAEA deliberations have so far failed to yield decisive international action, despite mounting evidence of Iran's atomic breaches. There is also a lingering uncertainty over Tehran's nuclear time line. While informed American observers contend that Iran is still some two years (and possibly longer) away from an offensive nuclear capability, (5) others believe that an Iranian bomb could materialize much sooner. In November 2003 testimonybefore the Israeli parliament's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Mossad chief Meir Dagan warned that Iran could reach a "point of no return" in its nuclear development by mid-2004, following which time an Iranian offensive capability would become a virtual certainty. (6) President Bush has himself warned that the United States "will not tolerate" a nuclear-armed Iran. (7) But if estimates are off, even by a few months, Iran could present the world with a nuclear fait accompli. At the same time, major breakthroughs in Iran's strategic arsenal have made it an emerging missile power. In June 2003, the Islamic Republic conducted what it termed the final test of its 1,300" kilometer range Shahab-3 ballistic missile. The launch was a success, confirming Iran's ability to target U.S. allies Israel and Turkey, as wen as U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. Since then, with great fanfare, the Islamic Republic has inducted the advanced rocket Into its Revolutionary Guards (the Pasdaran). (8) This potential for proliferation is hardly the only worry. If recent signals are any indication, the Shahab3 has already evolved well beyond its.officially declared capabilities. In September 2003, at a military parade commemorating the anniversary of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the Shahab-3 was officially described as possessing a range of 1,700 kilometers. (9) Additionally, opposition groups have charged that Tehran's overt missile development actually masks a much broader clandestine endeavor-.-one that includes development of the 4,OOO-kllometer range Shahab-5 and even a follow-on Shahab-6 Intercontinental ballistic missile. (10) Such efforts have only been strengthened by Iranian perceptions of U.S. policy. The Bush administration's rapid dispatch of Saddam Hussein's regime, and its contrasting hesitancy in dealing with a newly nuclear North Korea, has had a profound impact on Iran's calculus. North Korea's nuclear maneuvers, and its ability to successfully stymie U.S. strategy, have led Iranian officials to express their admiration for Pyongyang's resistance to U.S. "pressure, hegemony and superiority.II (11) There has indeed been some internal debate in Iran about the risks of stepping over the nuclear threshold. Yet even leading Iranian reformers appear to have gravitated to the notion that nuclear weapons are necessary to shift the regional "equilibrium." (12) CHARM OFFENSIVE These strategic advances, however, are only part of the picture. In tandem with Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile breakthroughs, a significant transformation has also begun in Iranian foreign policy. For Tehran, the overthrow of Hussein's regime has only fueled mounting fears of a danger0t!s str~tegic encirclement. The U.S. destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had already ensconced the proWestern-- albeit fragile--government of Hamid Karzai In Kabul. For Iran, the extremist Sunni Taliban posed an ideological threat, but a U.S. foothold on Iran's eastern border is regarded as even more threatening. Regime change In Baghdad, therefore, confronted officials in Tehran with the two-fold danger that Iran could be pinioned between two U.S.. client-states, and that Iraq's fall might be a prelude -to a similar U.S. drive to transform their country. In response, Iran formulated its new strategic doctrine of "deterrent defense." In practice, this has entailed a major expansion of Iran's military capabilities. Heavy defense expenditures, and ongoing strategic partnerships with both Russia and China, have made possible a far-reaching national military https:/Iw3.1~xis.comllawenfsolutions_secured/searchfonns/doBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=...11118/2004 J?ocument Results o o Page 3 of8 ,: rearmament. Defense acquisitions made over the past several years have steadily broadened Iran's strategic reach over vital Persian Gulf shipping lanes, to the point that Tehran now possesses the ability to virtually control oil supplies from the region. (13) Iran has also increased its diplomatic activism In the region, redoubling its long-running efforts to erect an independent security framework as a counterweight to the expanding U.S. military footprint. (14) As part of this effort, in February 2004, Iran codified an unprecedented military and defense accord with Syria"-one formally enshrining an Iranian commitment to Syria's defense in the event of a U.S. ~r Israeli offensive. Iranian officials have subsequently made clear that these mutual defense guarantees also extend to Lebanon-and to the Islamic Republic's most potent regional proxy: Hizbullah. (15) Iran has also raised its military and diplomatic profile in the Caucasus. In April 2003, foreign minister Kharrazi embarked on a diplomatic tour of the region intended to marshal support for a common regional security framework for Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran, and Turkey as an alternative to cooperation with "external forces." (16) But lukewarm regional responses have prompted the Islamic Republic to nudge these·countries into alignment through less subtle means. In mid-October 2003, Iran commenced large-scale military maneuvers In its northwest region, near Azerbaijan. The exercises, reportedly the largest conducted by Iran in recent memory, massed troops on the Iranian-Azeri border in a Clear show of force aimed at dissuading the former Soviet republic from expanding cooperation with the United States. (17) A corresponding Iranian naval buildup Is now visible In the Caspian Sea in response to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan's growing military relationships with Washlngton~ U.S. advances in the region are regarded by Iran as potential threats, but paradoxically they have also presented Iran with opportunities that it has been quick to exploit. * The coalition campaign against ~addam Hussein's regime succeeded in eliminating the threat posed by Tehran's most Immediate adversary, thereby cementing Iran's dominant regional standing, Iran has exploited'the postwar political vacuum In Iraq to foment Instability through a variety of measures, ranging from political support of radical Shi'ite·elements to an increase in drug trafficking. (-18) This broad offensive has reportedly included the Infiltration of hundreds ,of Pasdaran operatives into Iraq where they"have engaged in active recruitment,·influence operations, and assassinatlons--at a cost to Iran of some $70 million per month., (19) * Hussein's overthrow has also effectively defanged a lingering threat to Tehran: the MUjahldeen-eKhalq Organization (MKO), a wing of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Since the spring of 2003, coalition forces under a U.S.-imposed cease-fire have curtailed the anti-regime group's operations In Iraq. And a subsequent December decision· by Iraq's new governing council has labeled the MKO-preViously tolerated and even supported by the Baathlsts--as a terrorist organization. (20) * To Iran's east, meanwhile, the fall of the Taliban has removed an ideological competitor for Muslim hearts and minds while lingering factionalism and tribal rivalries have allowed Iran to perpetuate Afghanistan's instability. Iran Is clearly determined to remake its strategic environment in its favor. Iran J'las mobilized its technological resources to give it greater reach and has used political, economic, and military clout to encourage a tilt in its direction in its immediate neighborhood. Paradoxically, the United States, by breaking up the old order in states neighboring Iran, has given Tehran hitherto unimagined opportunities to influence the reg ion. FALSE STARTS Can International diplomacy deflect Iran's newe~t drive for regional hegemony? It hardly seems likely. From 1991 to 1997, the European Union (EU) engaged in a "critical dialogue" with the Islamic Republic, attempting to moderate Iran's radical policies through trade. But by 1997, critical dialogue had actually achieved exactly the opposite result, infusing Iran with much needed currency while failing to alter Tehran's support for terrorism, its pursUit of WMD, and its violations of human rights. Diplomacy has had a limited effect because the EU countries have allowed their economic interests to· undercut their diplomatic efforts. For example, in late 2002, In the midst of revelations regarding Iran's advanced nuclear development, the EU signaled its intention to commence new negotiations with the Islamic Republic on a sweeping trade and cooperation pact. (21) The United States has also wavered in its application of diplomatic pressure. The May 1997 election of https://w3.1exis.comllawenfsolutions_securedls~archforms/doBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=... 11118/2004 Document Results o o Page4of8 soft-line cleric Mohammad Khatami to the Iranian presidency--and his subsequent, much-publicized "dlalogue of civilizations" intelView on CNN--convinced many in Washington that Iran was moving toward pragmatic accommodation. Since then, U.S. policymakers, despite reiterating their continued commitment to containment of Iran, have time and again qualified Iran's membership in the "axis of evil." Most notably, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in a February 2003 interview with the Los Angeles Times, distinguished between Iran on the one hand and North Korea and Iraq, on the other-on account of Iran's "democracy." (22) This, too, is an illusion. The Islamic Republic In recent years has engaged in a widening governmental campaign of domestic repression--one that includes stepped-up crackdowns on the press and the brutal persecution of regime opponents. The repression reflects a governmental effort to grapple with the groundswell of political opposition that has emerged among Iran's disaffected young population in response to the country's rising unemployment and economic stagnation. At the same time, Iran's theocrats remain deeply antagonistic to all U.S. overtures. This was demonstrated most recently by the· quiet contacts between Washington and Tehran in the aftermath of the devastating December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran. Despite deep support for dialogue among reformist parliamentarians, clerical hard-liners opposed to such a rapprochement ultimately cut short the contacts. (23) If the United States wants to alter Iran's behavior, It cannot expect results from the tried-and-failed approaches of "critical dialogue," "dialogue of civilizations," and other false starts. U.S. OPTIONS Yet a policy that reassures allies, deters Iranian aggression, and curbs Iran's expansionism is more than feasible. It requires the United States to do four things: broaden containment to include counterproliferation; revive Gulf defense alliances; mobilize Turkey; and woo the Iranian people. Expanded containment. Far and away the most urgent task now facing Washington is arresting Iran's nuclear progress. Over the past year,· U.S. policymakers have expressed increasingly vocal concerns over the corrosive global potential of an Iranian nuclear breakout, ranging from a nuclear arms race in the Middle East to Tehran's growing capacity for nuclear blackmail. Yet the United States could assume a more proactive role In preventing nuclear technology transfers to Iran. This is the concept behind the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the counter-proliferation partnership launched by President Bush In May 2003. (24) Since Its inception, the PSI--designed to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by rogue nations through more aggressive intelligencesharing and interdiction efforts--has already charted some notable successes vis-a-vis North Korea, inclUding a clampdown on illicit North Korean smuggling operations by both Australia and Japan. And recent maneuvers by PSI-member nations in the Coral Sea and the Mediterranean suggest a growing role fpr the alliance in the Middle. East, both as a mechanism to intercept illicit WMD trafficking in the Persian Gulf and as a means to target proliferation networks (such as the recently unearthed nuclear ring led by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan) now active in the region. But the PSI is not the only tool In Washington's arsenal. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, the United States Is quietly moving ahead with Caspian Guard, an initiative designed to bolster regional security through expanded maritime patrolS, aerial and naval sUlVeillance, and border protections. As part of this effort, the United States has stepped up military exercises with Azerbaijan and has committed some$ 10 million to strengthening the former Soviet republic's naval capability and border security. This includes beefing up Azerbaijan's communications infrastructure and helping to carry out counter-proliferation operations. (25) SimilarlyI' under a five-year defense accord signed with Kazakhstan in 2003, Washington has bankrolled the construction of a Kazakh military base In tl)e Caspian coast city of Atyrau and has allocated millions to equipment and training for the Kazakh army, maritime and border-patrol forces. (26) Central to this effort is the prevention of WMD proliferation through the region, not least the transfer of technology from Russia to Iran. The early successes of the PSI and Caspian Guard suggest that both initiatives can and should be expanded to address more comprehensively the threat from the Islamic Republic. https:/Iw3.1exis.com/lawenfsolutions_securedlse~rchforms/doBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=... 11/18/2004 D. ocument Results o o Page 5 of8- Reviving Gulf defense. Over the past several years, fears of a rising Tehran have begun to drive many Arab Gulf countries toward accommodation with Iran. For example, such concerns led Oman to establish a modus vivendi with the Islamic Republic through the codification of a sweeping agreement on military cooperation in 2000 (albeit one that has since been denied by Oman). (27) Kuwait subsequently followed sUit, striking a similar bargain In October 2002., (28) Even Saudi Arabia, preViously a strategic competitor of Iran, capitulated on a long-discussed framework accord with Tehran in late 2001, in the wake of two multi-billion-dollar Russo-Iranian defense accords. (29) But for many of these countries, such bilateral partnerships are a product of necessity--a function of ttie inadequacy of national defenses and regional alliances In addressing Iran's rising expansionism. The distrust of Iran still runs very deep. As a recent editorial in London's influential·Arab-language Ash-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper emphasized, Iran now poses a threat to "Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, which share with Iran a land border of 5,400 kilometers and a sea border of 2,400 kilometers .,. The Iranian nuclear danger threatens us, first and foremost, more than it threatens the Israelis and the Americans!' (30) \, Such worries have prompted the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, to initiate a feasibility study for an alliance-wide antimissile system. At the same time, individual countries in the Arab Gulf (most notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) have initiated efforts to upgrade their individual missile defense capabilities. (31) Recently uncovered nuclear contacts between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan suggest that at least one of Iran's neighbors has begun to actively contemplate the need for a strategic deterrent against the Islamic Republic. (32) All this suggests that a U.S. strategic initiative toward the Arab Gulf may find ready customers. On the one hand, a deepening of Washington's bilateral military dialogue and defense contacts with individual Gulf nations might lessen regional dependence not only on .Iran but on an increasingly volatile and unpredictable Saudi Arabia as well. (33) On the other hand, the creation of a formalized American security architecture over the region could reinvigorate Washington's regional partnerships while excluding and isolating Iran. (34) Common to all of these efforts is the need to prOVide Tehran's neighbors with the tools to counter its growing potential for nuclear and ballistic missile blackmail. Talking Turkey. Ties between the United States and Turkey have been tepid since Ankara's unexpected refusal to grant basing rights to U.S. troops on the eve of the spring 2003 Iraq cam'paign--a move that torpedoed U.S. plans for a northern front against Hussein's regime. Since then, however, policymakers in . both countries have begun to mend fences. As· part of that process, the United States should insist that Turkey do more to hedge Iranian ambitions in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Unfortunately, Turkey's historic role as a strategic competitor of Iran has been substantially eroded. Indeed, over the past two years, Ankara has steadily drifted toward a new relationship with Tehran. Much of this movement has been underpinned by energy. Turkey's growing dependence on Iran--which could provide roughly 20 percent of total Turkish natural gas consumption by the end of the decade (35)--has diminished Ankara's economic leverage vis-a-vis Tehran. But politics play an important role as well. Since Its assumption of power in November 2002, Turkey's Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has gravitated toward closer ties with its Muslim neighbors under the guise of an '·independent'· foreign policy, Iran has been one of the chief beneficiaries of these overtures, and bilateral contacts and economic trade between Ankara and Tehran have ballooned over the past year. This political proximity has only been reinforced by common worries over Iraqi instability in the aftermath of Hussein's ouster. Nevertheless, Ankara's deep ethnic and historical ties to the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia make it a natural counterweight to Iranian-sponsored religious radicalism In those regions. Given Turkey's deep interest in expanding trade and development in the Caspian, Turkey also remains suspicious of Iran's maneuvers there. Meanwhile, Tehran's ongoing sponsorship of terrorism, including the Kurdish variety, has put Iran and Turkey on very different sides of the war on terrorism. These commonalities have led observers to suggest that Turkey's most constructive role might be as a force multiplier for U.S. interests in its "northern neighborhood." (36) In fact, Ankara and Tehran's divergent strategic priorities--on everything from Central Asian Islam to Caspian energy to the future political composition of postwar Iraq--suggest that Turkey and Iran could become competitors again. The United States should encourage such competition by creating incentives for Turkey to play Its historic https:/lw3.1exis.com/lawenfsolutions_securedlsearchfonns/doBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=... 11118/2004 I;>ocument Results role. o , Page 6 of8 Wooing the Iranians. One of the Bush administration's most enduring challenges in prosecuting, the war on terrorism has been effectively communicating its goals and objectives to a skeptical Muslim world. Over the past two and a half years, that need has spawned an expanded public diplomacy effort. This has included media outreach on the part of top administration officials like National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Iran, however, has been included only belatedly in these plans. More than nine months after September 11, with U.S. officials saturating the airwaves of Arabic networks like Qatar's al-Jazeera, not one highranking U.S. official had granted an inteaview.to a Persian-language television outlet. (37) (This is despite the existence of dissident channels, such as the Los Angeles-based National Iranian Television [NITV], capable of effectively carrying the U.S. message.) Even when the United States did finally overhaul its public diplomacy toward Iran with the launch of the Persian-language Radio Farda in' December 2002, the station's entertainment-heavy format led criti~ to complain that the United States had diluted its democratic message. (38) Since then, broadcasting to Iran has continued to be funded at minimal levels, despite Congressional. efforts to expand outreach. Such a lackluster effort reflects continuing confusion within the U.S. government about' exactly whom to engage within Iran. In fact, the success of, public diplomacy hinges upon a clear American vision of Iran's desired direction and the sustained political will to assist Iran in reaching that goal. In that light, there should be only one answer to the question of whom to engage: the nascent democratic opposition. The United States should demonstrate its support for that opposition by expanding expatriate and government-sponsored broadcasting, using it to highlight and criticize Tehran's bankrupt clerl~al rule. (1) Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), Mar. 5, 2003. (2) Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi, cited In Saisat-e Rouz, Feb. 18, 2003. (3) Defense News, Jan. 12, 2004; Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Programs," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at ht.tp:llwww,mglb.grg@rtlclgs/0203 irnl._btm~ (4) Ahmad Shlrzad, Iranian member of parliament, Nov. 24, 2003, remarks before legislative session, RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) Iran Report, Dec. 8, 2003. (5) "Iran: Breaking out without QUite Breaking the Rules?" Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, May 13, 2003, at ~tp.;.lIwww.DP_e~eb....o.mLP..aQ..esLk~w.J1tm. (6) Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), Nov. 18, 2003. Israeli officials have further threatened to t~ke.preemptive military action, if necessary, to prevent this from happening; Agence France-Presse, Dec. 21, 200~. (7) The New York Times, June 18, 2003. (8) Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, July 20, 2003. (9) Agence France-Presse, Sept. 22, 2003. (10) Middle East Newsline,Oct. 25, 2002. (11) IRNA, Dec. 14, ,2003. (12) The Washington Post, Mar. 11, 2003. (13) Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Defense Intelligence Agency director, "Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States," statement for the record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 11, 2003, at http.;Uwww!fsts~o.rglIr~/congress/2003_hr/021103jacoby.html. (14) M. Javad Zarif, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, commentary in The New York Times, May 10, 2003. (15) IRNA. Feb. 27 and Feb. 29. 2004; Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), Feb. 29, 2004. https://w3.Iexis.com/lawenfsolutions_secured/searchfonnsldoBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=... 11/18/2004 .. D, ocument Results o Page 7 of8 \ (16) !tar-TASS (Moscow), Apr. 29, 20Q3. (17) Uch Nogta (Azerbaijan), Oct. 22, 2003. (18) See, for example, AI-Hayat (London), Nov. 28, 2003, and Jan. 5, 2004. (19) Ash-Sharq al-Awsat (London), Apr. 3, 2004. (20) The New York Times, Dec. 19, 2003. (21) Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), Dec. 12,2002. (22) Los Angeles Times, Feb. 16, 2003. (23) Mohsen Armin, deputy chairman of the National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, Iranian Islamic Consultative Assembly (majles), Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA), Jan. 4, 2004. (24) Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States currently make up the core membership of the PSI, while over sixty other nation--including Turkey--have voiced their backing for the initiative. (25) Associated Press, Jan. "3, 2004. (26) Radio Free Europe, Oct. 8, 2003. (27) Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network I, Apr. 10, 2000. (28) Xinhua News Agency, Oct. 2, 2002; Reuters, Oct. 3, 2002. (29) Middle East Newsline, Apr. 18, 2001. (30) Ash-Sharq AI-Awsat (London), Oct. 8, 2003. (31) Defense News, May 23 and Dec. 1, 2003. (32) the Washington Time, Oct. 22, 2003. (33) For more on existing defens~ ties between the United States and the Gulf states, as well as the potential for their expansion, see Simon Henderson, The New Pillar: Conservative Arab Gulf States and U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003). (34) See, for example, Kenneth Pollack, "Securing the GUlf," Foreign Affairs, July-Aug. 2003, pp. 2-15. (35) "Turkish Energy Policy,'1 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at .I:)ttp:l!www·mfa,gO\£.trlgrypS'/aO/goUcy,htrn· (36) Soner Cagaptay, "United States and Turkey in 2004: Time to Look North," Turkish Policy Quarterly, Winter 2004, at http_:lLwww.wa.shlngt.9ni_~stitu_t~...!.o..rgll1.lepJ9Lca.9~pJacyalgaptay020204.pdf. ' (37) Interview with Iranian dissident, Washington, D.C., July 2002. (38) See, for example, Jesse Helms, "What's 'POpl in Persian?" The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16, 2002; Jackson Diehl, "Casey Kasem or Freedom?" The Washington Post, Dec. 16, 2002• . REGIME CHANGE The United States has been guilty of sending mixed signals to Iran over the past few years. Most significantly, it has apologized for the Central Intelligence Agency's role in the coup of 1953--an early case of regime change--and it has declared Its goal in Iran to be behavior modification rather th~n regime change. The mixing of signals simply reflects a confusion·of policy--a confusion that has become positively dangerous, both to U.S. interests and the security of Iran's neighbors. https:/lw3.lexis.comllawenfsolutions_secured/searchfonns/doBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=... 11118/2004 ..'. . D.ocument Results o o Page 8 of8 '. In fact, the U.S. objective in Iran is closer to the regime change it imposed on Iraq than to the behavioral change it brought about in Libya. The Iranian regime is not one mercurial man, whose behavior can be reversed by determined action. Iran has a ruling elite with many members, a shared sense of history, and a consistency of purpose that has been tested in revolution and war. This regime will not change, which is why the ultimate objective of U.S. policy must be to change it. That should not be forgotten, even if regime change in Iran cannot be pursued by the military means used in Iraq. Short of military intervention, the United States needs a comprehensive strategy to block Iran's nuclear progress, check Iran's adventurism in the Persian Gulf and the Caucasus, and give encouragement to the Islamic Republic's nascent domestic opposition. Through a strategy that bolsters Iran's vulnerable regional neighbors, rolls back its military advances, and assists internal political alternatives, Washington can blunt the threat now posed by Tehran--and set the stage for the later pursuit of its ultimate objective. Hijab Couture TEHRAN -. Since Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979, hijab, the obligatory dress code, has required women to wear clothes which disgUise the shape of the body and cover the hair. Fashion shows are normally held secretly In private homes. But last month the Iranian authorities allowed designer Mahla Zamani to hold one in public. It. was an all-female affair and photographers were banned. The snow was denounced by Tehran's conservatives as a plot to undermine Islamic values. lilt is a hypocritical attempt to realize the evil aims of foreigners by snatching the Islamic covering from Muslim' Iranian women," thundered the conservative Jomhuri-ye Eslami daily. Zamani introduced a collection of traditional Persian designs that may augur a sartorial sea-change In what is Islamically permissible. "It is a cultural endeavor to revive traditional costumes. Why shopld we get fashion from the West?" she said. But another patron thought the designs did not match up to those of Western designers. "The patterns are not elaborate and complex enough to be compared with Western designs, especially couture,n said Leela, a 25-year-old aerobics Instructor. Reuters, Nov. 20, 2003 IIan Berman is vice president for policy at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C., where he directs research and analysis on the Middle East and Central Asia. IAC-CREATE-DATE: August 18, 2004 LOAD-DATE: August 19, 2004 View: .L1st I Full < p.r...e.Y. Document 10 of 33 next> J:dit_S_ea.o:b I tie!iLS.eAtch PrlQt I .P..o.rmlOjl~ct ~b_out.Lexis.N~~is I Ier:m:;_all.d_~odltJo.ps I P.dY.~cy_e.oJ{~ ,Copyogllt 2004 lexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. https://w3.lexis.comllawenfsolutions_secured/searchforms/doBrowse.asp?SearchInfoID=... 11118/2004 o ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED f':\ DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baW/~lSq Dec. 5, 2004 0:09 JUpdat~d Dec. 5, 2004 12:00 Exclusive: How the FBI set up AIPAC By JANINE ZACHABIA AIPAC, the powerhouse pro·Israel lobby currently embroiled in allegations of spying for Israel, was set up by the FBI, The Jerosa/em Post has learned. FBI agents used a courier, Pentagon analyst larry Franklin" to draw two senior AIPAC officials who already knew hil'!'l into accepting what he described to them as "classified" information, reliable government and other sources intimately familiar with the investigation have told the Post. One of the AIPAC pair then told diplomats at the Israeli Embassy in Washington about the "classifiedt • information, which claimed Iranians were monitoring and planning to kidnap and kill Israelis operating in the Kurdish areas in 1J0rthern Iraq, the Post has been told. It is unclear whether the "classified" information was real or bogus. AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee) denies any wrongdoing. Knowingly transferring classified information to a foreign power can be a breach of US~ espionage statutes. Legal experts have told the Post that passing on bogu~ ctassified information may be used to demonstrate intent to violate the law but does not itself constitute a crime. Frank~in, an Iran expert, was already under investigation by the FBI for allegedly passing classified information to AIPAC when, the Posts sources say" FBI counterintelligence agents approached him to play a central role in the setup operation this past summer. The FBI had been monitoring AIPAC's activities for some two years when, last year, its agents observed two AIPAC official~, Steve Rosen, director of foreign policy issues" and Keith Weissman, a senior Middle East analyst with the lobby, at a lunch meeting with.Franklin in Washington. At this lunch, it has been widely reported, Franklin allegedly briefed the AIPAC pair on the content of a draft national security presidential directive on Iran. Details of the draft, which included proposed measures the US could employ to destabilize the Iranian regime" were already circulating a! the time. According to some reports, an Israeli diplomat at the embassy in Washington, Naor Gilon, was also present at the lunch. Earlier this year, the FBI informed Franklin that, as a consequence of the lunch meeting, he was under investigation. The Pentagon analyst, hoping for leniency" agreed to cooperate with FBI agents in what would become the setting up of AIPAC, a process designed to bust the lobby for passing secrets to Israel. 4ll~~/f-; G~\t'\JJ~~~l~-!JC- .~~c ~_8MV_I~ . The FBI agents told Franklin to request a meeting with Rosen and Weissman. He initiated contact with the AIPAC pair,_and told them that he needed to discuss a ticking-bomb situation. ,. r o Franklin was then dispatched to meet the two AIPAC officials and outline the alleged threat to Israelis in northem Iraq, the Post has been,told. Saying his access to the White House was limited, Fran,klin also expressed concern that the Bush administration was underestimating the extent to which Iranian agents were operating in Iraq and asked the AIPAC officials to stress this point in their meetings with US officials. The agents' hope, plainly, was that the AIPAC pair would be so troubled by the apparent life-and-death content of the information from Franklin as to risk a breach of US espionage statutes and transfer ~hat they believed to be classified material to a foreign power" Israel. And that, the Post has been told, Is precisely what happened. Franklin, according to news reports, cooperated with the FBI until about two months ago. In early October, he abruptly stopped working with authorities, dropped his court-appointed attorney and sought the legal counsel of Plato Cacheris, a prominent Washington defense la~er who has represented numerous accused spies. Continued "Obviously his was a bad deal," says one source familiar with Franklin's decision to stop cooperating with the bureau. News of the initial Franklin-AIPAC lunch broke last summer: CBS led its August 27 Nightly News broadcast with a report of a "full-fledged espionage investigation underway," saying the FBI was about to "roll up" a suspected Israeli "mole" in the office of the secretary of defense in the Pentagon. CBS reported that, using wiretaps, undercover surveillance and photography, the FBI had documented the passing of ~ classified presidential directive on Iran from the suspected mole to two people who work at AIPAC. Sources familiar with the matter, however, said no documents exchanged hands. CBS's sensational allegation immediately conjured up memories of the Pollard affair, the 1985 arrest and SUbsequent conviction in 1987 and life imprisonment for espionage of US naval intelligence analyst Jonathan Pollard for passing classified information to Israel. The investigation into Franklin and the AIPAC officials continued qUietly, with IitUe subsequent media coverage, i!" recent months. No indictments were issued and most reports scaled back the accusations aJJainst Franklin from alleged espionage to mishandling of classified evidence. But the"investigation burst back into prominence last Wednesday, when FBI agents made their first visit to AIPAC's Capitol Hill offices since Augu~t. Armed with a warrant, the agents seized computer files relate." "'. ]'"' , L._..-(_ao._--__, NOW€J . -Advanced Search_ E-Delivery ~ [9JSe .• .::~. . , I· t~ J.. ' http://www.jewishjournal.com/homttlpreview.php?id=13528 1114/2005 FBI.Stings Seen as Part of Policy 'War' by Edwin BI~ck, Jewish Telegraphic Agency Franklin, who never had phoned. before, asked .Perle to "convey a message to Chalabi" in Iraq, according to. sources aware of the call. Ahmad Chalabi is the embattled p'resident of.the Iraqi National Congress. He is currently at the vortex of'a Pentagon-intelligence community conflict ov~r pre- ~nd post-war policy"but is stili endorsed by,neoconserVatives, such a~ Perle• In the recent past, Perle had only encountered Frankliria few times in passing, the sources said. Perle became "impatient" to end his brief . conversation with Franklin, and finally just declined to pass a message to. Chalapi.or to cooperate in.any w.ay, accor~ing to the sources. Perle refused to coma:nent. Last June, leading neoconservative Richard Perle received an unexpected phone call at his home. It was Larry Franklin calling. Franklin is' the veteran Ira~ specialist in the Pentagon's Near ,East So~th Asia office and the key Iraq War planner who had been'pressured by the FBI into launching aseries of c9unterintelligence stings. Perle, a former chairm?,n of the Pentagon's Defense Policy' Board, was' an architect of the 2003 Iraq ~~. . Wolle the purpose of the·mysterious call to Perle is still.unclear, a source with knowledge of Franklin's calls suggested t~at: Franklin might have been trying to warn· Perle and Chalabi that conflict between the counterintelligence community alJd the neoconservatives and the Chalabi camp was spinnil)g out of control. . ~( ~~ • ~ ~ CI ~ ~\~f f' .~••- ).1 Unbeknownst to Franklin, the FBI was listening. rJ C- A'- .. . ~ :'\.Uf:~~b 3~·r-_... ~\(.~. .Something about Franklin's unexpected call struck Perle as "weird," according to the sources. Why was Franklin calling? want to pick up a -FREE Jewish Journal? OR Home Order" Subscribe Now! Get the weekly :Jewish.Journalon your door step. E-Subscribe Now! Receive FREE weekly e· mail updates with news links nnd ovents. Personals Classified Calendar Newsletter Main Page Cover Story Nation 8r. World The Arts Search by zip code! SECTIONS The Jewish Journal OfGreater Los Angeles o o Page ~ of5 Editor"s Corner First Person OpinionCommunity, Up Front Torah, Torah, Torah My Jewish Library The Single Life The Circuit Tommywood Letters Obituaries Spirituality Kids Page GOOD STUFF BarIBat Mitzvot Candiellghting Singles Resources FORUM - Join Usl JEWISH LA GUIDE Kosher EATS! Schools Congregations Celebrations Event Calendar Sports ORANGECOUNTV The Jewish Journal of Orange County is available. By the tiQ'le Franklin phoned Perle, Franklin had been under surveillance for at least a year by the FBI's counterintelligence division, which is led by controversial counterintelligence chief David Szady. Franklin had been monitored since a meeting June 26, 2003, at the Tivoli Restaurant in Virginia, where he discussed a classified Ira~ policy document with officials of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). He also was monitored late last May while responding to a routine media inquiry by CBS reporters about Iran's intelligence activities in Iraq, according to multiple sources. The CBS call was pivotal. Among the reporters who spoke to Franklin In late May, according to multiple sources with direct knowledge of the call, was former CIA attorney Adam Ciralsky, who had joined CBS as a reporter. During that call, Franklin purportedly revealed classified information, according to the sources. ,. In late June, Szady's FBI counterintelligence division finally confronted a shocked·Franklin with evidence of his monitored calls. The bureau arranged for Franklin to be placed on administrative leave without pay, and then threatened him with years of imprisonment unless Franklin engaged in a series of stings against a list of prominent Washington targets, according to multiple sources with direct knowledge of the FBI's actions in the case. . Terrified, needing to provide for a wheelchair-bound wife and five children and without the benefit of legal representation, Franklin agreed to ensnare the' individuals on the FBI sting list, the sources said. The list might include as many as six names, according to sources. In a special Jewish Telegraphic Agency' investigation, this reporter first revealed Franklin's stings and the circumstances surrounding them. AIPAC was stung July 21. That day, Franklin met an AIPAC official in a Virginia mall and urged that information be passed to Israel that Israelis operating In nqrthern Kurdlstan were in dang~r of being kidnapped and ' killed by Irallian intelligence, according to multiple sources. That information - the validity of which has been questioned - was reportedly passed to the Israeli Embassy, thereby providing the FBIwith a basis for search warrants and threats of an 'espionage prosecution against AIPAC Policy Director Steve Rosen and AIPAC Iran specialist Keith Weissman, according to the sources. " AIPAC officials contacted declined to comment. Attorneys familiar with FBI security prosecutions identified Sec;tlon 794 anCi 798 of the Espionage Act as ideally suited to the FBI's sting strategy. Section 798, titled, "Disclosure of Classified·Information,"- applies to "whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes [or] transmits .::.. for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information - concerning the communication of intelligence activities of the United States or any fo~eign government." The sweeping statute would cover classified information not only about America but also about Iran aQd Iraq. Reporter Janine Zacharia first revealed initial news of the July AIPAC sting in The Jerusalem Post. http://www.jewishjourna1.comlhomelpreview.php?~d=13528 1114/2005 ,The Jewish Journal Of Greater Los Angeles o o Page 3 of5 After the AIPAC sting on or about Aug. 20, Franklin - still without.legal representation - was directed by his FBI handlers to launch a sting against ChalabJ's Washington-based political adviser, Francis Brooke, according to multiple sources with direct knowledge of Franklin's stings. At the time, Washington intelligence circles were accusing Chalabl of passing sensitive American intelligence code-breaking information to Iranian intelligence. The charges agail1st Chalabi have since fallen from view. Brooke, a southerner who lives in a Washington-area home owned by Chalabl, .took the August call from Franklin on the kitchen phone. "Franklin called," Brooke related, "and said, 'You have a real problem on you'r hands with Iran and Chalabi.' I told him, 'It Is all horse--.' Larry got very angry at me. He said it was 'deadly serious.' I said, 'What the hell, if you say it is serious, OK. But we have no information about American code-breaking of Iranian intelligence.'" "So Larry says, 'I am talking to a bunch of media people, and I can spin this - but you need to level with me to get this straight,'" Brooke recalled. "This was not very much like Larry, and I just said, 'There is nothing to spin.'" Brooke dismissed the entire effort as part of a "vendetta against Chalabi organized by [then-CIA Director George] Tenet and others at the CIA." Franklin refused to comment. In August, Franklin, still without legal counsel, was also directed by the FBI to call Ciralsky, who by this time had moved from CBS to NBC, where he . was working on security developments in Iran, according to multiple sources with direct knowledge of Franklin's calls. Franklin tried to set up a • meeting with Ciralsky, but no such meeting ever occurred, according to sources familiar with the call, because shortly thereafter, on Aug. 27, the FBI's AIPAC raids were leaked to CBS. Franklin actions were now public. Before joining CBS, reporter Ciralsky was working as an attorney for the CIA but was allegedly forced out in 1999 during the course of an inquiry into his family background and his Jewish affiliations. Ciralsky later filed a harassment lawsuit against the CIA that is still pending. The man who supervised much of the CIA investigation of CJralsky and then the FBI's investigation of Franklin following the May conversation with Ciralsky was Szady. In a JTA investigation, this reporter revealed exclusively his involvement ~ith Ciralsky. Critics of the current investigation point to Szady's involvement in the probe of Ciralsky a decade ago to raise questions about a possibly larger agenda. One q~estion involves the media. Because Ciralsky is a reporter with NBC, some critics raised the specter of Szady's FBI counterintelligence division consciously trying to entrap a member of the media engaged in routinely contacting sources. One source with direct knowledge of Franklin's stings said it amounted to an "enemies list." http://www.jewishjoumal.com/home/preview.php?id=13528 1114/2005 ·The Jewisli Journal OfGreater Los Angeles o Ciralsky refused to comment. o Page 4 of5 FBI officials repeatedly refused to discuss the Franklin stings. The bureau also refused to respond to questions about whether members of the media - including those at CBS, NBC and even this reporter - are under surveillance as part of their investigation. But at one point, a senior FBI official with knowledge of the case finally stated, "I cannot confirm or deny that Information [due to] the pending investigation." Some Washington insiders believe that the FBI's multiple stings are far from routine counterintelligence but represent a "war" between the counterintelligence community and policymakers, especially neocons. One key insider explained the war this way.: "It ,is two diametrically opposed ways of thinking. The neocons have an interventionist mindset willing to ally with anyone to defeat world terrorism, and they see the intelligence community as too passive. The intelligence community sees the neocons as wild men Willing to champion any foreign source - no ,matter how specious - if it suits their ideology." . Leading neoconservative figure Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise. Institute added ~is own thought. "This is a war of the intelligence community vs. the neoconservatives," Rubin observed. "It involves both the right and the left of the· intelligence community. It is a war about policy, the point being, the CIA must not be involved in policy. The CIA's role is to provide intelligence. and let the policymakers decide what to do with it, and it appears they are not sticking to that role - and that is a dangerous situation." "This is the politicizing of intelligence," he continued. "But the CIA, by its establishing principle.s, is not to be involved in politics." Rubin added that the sting effort "against AIPAC is the culmination of a 20- year witch-hunt from a small corps within the counterintellige'nce • community" that Rubin labeled "conspiracy theorists." He added, "What is the common denominator between the Ciralsky case and the AIPAC case? David Szady.," .Szady, who has been decorated twice by the CIA for distinguished service, answered one critic, writing, "I am not at liberty to comment on pe~ding investigations." Szady had issued a statement to this reporter earlier that he "has no anti-Semitic views, has never handled a case or investigation based upon an individual's ethnicity or religious views and would·never do so." One neoconservative at the center of the counterintelligence war said: "This is just the beginning. Nobody knows where this war is going." Edwin Black is the author of "IBM and the Holocaust" (Crown, 2001). Black's current best seller is "Banking on Baghdad" (Wiley), which chronicles 7,000 years ofIraqi history. This article first appeared in the. Forward. Let's talk about it... CS> http://www.jewishjoumal.com/home/preview.php?id=13528 111412005 TheJewish JQurnal OfGreater Los.~geles o Page 5 of5 RelltJUcha.r..d-E..erle_OJL.CJ). er..~.y. fOLTro.RRs_Jita~_elel~ We rent" audio books on co. Free delivery. -Unique Camouflage Rubber Bracelets Show Free Trial. Your Support and Buy Several! Ads by Goooooogle Home I About Us I FAQ I Advertise I Subscribe I Archive I Forum I Contact UsI Privacy Policy © 2004 The Jewish Journal; All Rights·Reserved http://www.jewishjournal.com/home/preview.php?id::;13528 1114/2005 ~ AIPAC Comes Under Scrutiny as FBI Continues Israel Espionage Probe ~ e ALL INFORMATION CONTAI1JED 0 HEREIN IS mrCLASSIFIED " DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg Page 1of5 J C!~ PRINTTHIS WASHINGTON REPORTONMIDDLEEASTAFFAIRS Washington Report, December 2004, pages 22-23, 25 Israel and Judaism AIPAC Comes Under Scrutiny as FBI Continues Israel Espionage Probe By Allan C. Brownfeld It has been widely reported that the FBI Is Investigating the possibility that Lawrence Franklin, a Pentagon analyst, passed c1asslfted material to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which then handed the Information over to the Israeli Embassy In Washington (see November 2004 Washington Report, p. 26). Reported the Sept. 4 economist: "The unfolding saga surrounding Lawrence Franklin Is•••that he gave classified documents on Iran to Israel. But there Is groWing speculation that the FBI Investigation of Mr. Franklin Is the tip of an Iceb~rg. The reported anger of federal agents at the leaking of the story Indicates a bigger probe that may have been under way for at least a year•••Mr. Franklin allegedly passed draft: documents on American policy toward Iran to AIPAC, a hugely Influential lobbying group In Washington, which In tum allegedly passed them to Israeli officials. Both AIPAC and Israel have denied any wrongdoing. The Israelis. maintain that they have been ultra-careful since the huge embarrassment In 1985 when Jonathan Pollard, an American Intelligence analyst, was caught spying for Israel•••The scandal Is difficult for Israel, which wields considerable Influence on American foreign policy•••It Is hard to put a positive spin on a spy In the Pentagon, even If he Is talking to your frlends.&rdquo Janes Intelligence Digest noted on Sept. 10 that, "Shortly before he retired In June as CIA director, George Tenet alleged on more than one occasion that an Israeli agent was operating In Washington. Tenet was challenged to Identify the agent, but for reasons that were never explained he did not do so. Nonetheless, the episode underlined grOWing unease In some quarters In Washington about the Influence Israel's right wing has In the Bush administration through the pro-Ukud neoconservatives-largely In the Pentagon-and the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and Its associated organizations such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.&rdquo Four of the leading neoconservatives have been accused in the past of illegally providing classified information to Israel. The document.alleged to have been passed to AIPAC al1d the Israelis relates to U.S. policy.toward Iran. According to Jane's, "U.S. officials are concerned because that document was being debated by pollcymakers at the time, possibly putting the Israeli government lobbyists In a position to Influence the final directive. U.S. policy toward Iran Is crudal to the Israelis, who have drawn up plans to launch pre-emptive strikes against Iran's nuclear Installations to prevent the Islamic Republic acquiring nuclear weapons that could be used against Israel.&'rdquo 4° Philip Glraldl, a former CIA officer, wrote In the.Oct. 11 Issue of The American Consentatlve that, ~ tl~ljocS' http://Wrmea~printthiS.clickabilitY .cOinlptlcpt?actioti=tpt&title=AlPAC+Comes+Under+Scr... 1~812005 .) '" . " - - . - - ~ .- - - - GSQ.-VJ~_~6~l>-1" L ~'C..~~ . ... AIPAC Comes U~der Scrutiny as FBI Continues Israel Espionage Probe Q) 0 "The Franklin case stems from Investigations of Israeli diplomats that developed from the prosecution of spy Jonathan'Poliard. Pollard's conviction In 1987 provided little In-the way of a resolution: the Israeli government never cooperated In the Inquiry and did not provide an Inventory of the documents that Pollard had stolen. The FBI also knew that a second spy, believed to be In the Pentagon, passed Pollard classified file numbers that were desired by the Israelis. Hoping to catch the second spy,.the FBI continued its probe. Two years ago, the Investigators began to suspect that highly sensitive National Security Agency documents' were winding up In IsraeJrhands, possibly wlth"t1'ie connivance of AIPAC. In the judgment of counterintelligence specialists, the Israelis did not wish a repeat of the Pollard case, so they decided against recruiting another U.S. official and turning him Into a salaried spy. Instead, they opted to establish relationships with friends In the government who would voluntarily provide Information•••AIPAC would have served as a useful Intermediary or 'cut out' In such an arrangement, limiting the contact between the American government official and the Israeli Embassy.&rdquo Four of the leading neoconservatives have been accused In the past of illegally providing classified Information to Israel, though none was ever prosecuted. In 1970, the FBI recorded Richard Perle discussing classified Information with an Israeli Embassy official. Stephen Bryen, then a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member and later Perle's deputy at the Department of Defense, narrowly avoided Indictment In 1979 after he was overheard offering classified documents to an Israeli Embassy official. Douglas Feith, who In a position paper prepared for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for a "clean break from the peace process,H was fired In 1982 from the National Security Council on suspicion of passing confidential docum~nts to the Israeli·Embassy. He was Immediately re-hlred by Richard Perle at the Pentagon. 'Paul Wolfowltz--was InveStigated In 1978 over charges that he had provided a classified documel1t to the IsraeU-embassy'by'way of AIPAC. While AIPAC has long been·viewed as one of Washington's most effective lobbying groups, It has become Increasingly controversial, both within the Jewish community and In the larger society. Many have objected to Its close ties to the Ukud Party. In one Widely publicized exchange, Israeli Prime Minister Yltzhak Rabin asked AIPAC to concentrate on lobbying Congress and leave pollcymaklng and the.Whlte House alone. The current affair, wrote Orl Nir In the Sept. 3 Forward, "has cast light on the fine line that AIPAC walks between advocating a strong American-Israeli alliance and as acting as the representative of a foreign government. Both activities are legal, but serving a foreign government requires registration with the Department of Justice and entails severe legal restrictions, not applied to pro-Israel groups, Including AIPAC.&hellipAIPAC enjoys the support, admiration and even awe of Jewish organizational officials, many of whom raced to AIPAC's defense. Stili, some pro-Israel activists In Washington are privately suggesting that the current scandal prOVides AIPAC with a chance, In the words ofone communal official, for 'some soul-searching and reappraisal' regarding Its general modes of operatlon.&rdquo According to Nlr, "Critics also have accused AIPAC of adopting an agenda that too clearly mirrors the hawkish agenda of neoconservatives In the Bush administration, thereby fueling conspiratorial notions that President Bush was duped, Into Invading Iraq In order to advance Israeli Interests. Now, critics say, with Its Increasing fOC;us on Iran, AIPAC risks fueling the claims of those who would accuse the Jewish community of working with Washington neoconservatives to convince the White House to pursue regime change In Tehran.&rdquo Several Jewlsh'communalleaders complain that AIPAC officials have not done enough to maintain a clear wall between the lobbying group and Israel. AIPAC officials have reft the organization to serve In the Israeli government. Lenny Ben-David, formerly known as leonard Davis, for example, worked at AIPAC for 25 years-first In Washington, then in Jerusalem-before he was tapped by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1998 to be the deputy chief of mission In Israel's Washington Embassy. AIPAC and some of Its supporters have suggested that the FBI and the CIA are pursuing a vendetta against Israel, the Pentagon, neoconservatives, and possibly Jews In general. The neoconservatives have lashed out In a memo drafted by Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute, alleging that the probe Is motivated by anti-Semitism. The memo criticizes the White House for not refuting press reports on the FBI investigation. "If there Is any truth to any of the Page 2 of5 http://wrmea.priiltthis:clicKabilitj:comlptlcpt?action=cpt&title=AIPAC+Comes+Uhder+Scr...1/8/2005 AIPAC Comes Under Scrutiny as FBI Continues Israel Espionage Probe Q 0 \ accusations, why doesn't the White House demand that they bring on the ev~dence?On the record," the memo stated. "There's-an Increasing anti':Semltlc witch hunt.&rdquo Continued Rubin, a former member of the Pentagon's policy planning staff who dealt with Iran policy: "I feel like I'm In Paris, not Washington. I'm disappointed at the lack of leadership that let things get where they are, and which Is allowing these bureaucrats to spin out of control.&rdquo The role played by AIPAC has produced some soul-searching within the organized Jewish community. "Several Jewish activists, speaking on condition of anonymity, cautioned against what they described as a defiant reaction on the part of some communal leaders who raised the specter of anti-Semitic conspiraCy," the Sept. 10 Forward reported. "'If every single time we get Into trouble we cry anti-Semitism, no one Is going to believe us when we confront the real·problem of anti-Semitism,' a senior official of a Jewish organization said. Another organizational official said: 'It's ridiculous to react like that before you know what happened there. In the absence of accurate knowledge, any comment Is Just sllly.'&rdquo The fallout for AlPAC, wrote Doug Bloomfield In the Sept. 9 WashIngton Jewish Week, could be serious: "There have been persistent charges•••that AIPAC directs the network of pro-Israel political action committees (PACS); campaign finance bundlers and Individual contributors. AIPAC has successfully fought such accusations all the way to the Supreme Court to avoid being designated a PAC because of the Impact that would have on the way It operates and raises money. The current probe could renew calls from the organization's critics for new Investigations by the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) and demands to know what has been uncovered by the FBI•••There will be questions about AIPAC's operations and Internal accountability. A penchant for hubris and Institutional mlndset of secrecy-reflected In Its hostile and contentious relationship with the media-add to the suspicion that there Is something to hlde•.,&rdquo Shortsighted Strategies The problems facing AIPAC come not only from Its enemies, argued the Sept. 3 Forward, but also are "partly a result of shortsighted strategic decisions by Israel's advocates. Faced With a shifting landscape, they have gambled on a risky strategy that may be blOWing up In their faces. For years, Israel's friends In this country have operated on the principle that Israel could not be held responsible for Its troubles. They have maintained that whatever Israel's mistakes, Palestinian hostility could not be blamed on Israel's policies. More recently, they've. broadened the principle to Insist that Arab and Muslim hostility to the U.S. cannot be blamed on its support for Israel. Both positions are becoming ,hard to maintain. GrOWing numbers of Israelis, up to and Including the military chief of staff, are openly acknowledging that Israeli actions can raise and lower the level of Palestinian rage and violence. As for the global terror war, the Idea that It Is related In part to America's reiatlonshlp to Israel Is now thoroughly mainstream. You can read It In the report of the 9/11 Commission•••As the urgency of discussion grows, resentment seems to mount against those who dedare the discussion illegitimate. It's a dangerous position to be In.&rdquo AIPAC's role has been controversial for many years. In 1995, Jonathan Mitchell, regional vice president for Southern California AIPAC, chastised a senior Israeli official for argUing that Congress and American Jews should not concern themselves with Palestinian behavior. Mitchell called Deputy Israeli Foreign Minister Vossl Beilin "absurd and arrogant" for comments he made In Jerusalem at a meeting With the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. Beilin countered by accusing Mitchell of "trying to be more Israeli than the Israelis." Beilin was critical of those who urged an end to aid to the PlO, and said, "It Is not the business of JeWish organizations, not AIPAC's, not the American Jewish Congress' and not of any other country In the world except the State of Israel. The kind of people who are trying to be more Israeli than the Israelis themselves are causing damage to the pure national Interests of the State of Israel.&rdquo . In March 2003, about 5,000 AIPAC actiVists met In Washington and embarked upon a lobbying blitz against the Bush administration's "road map" for Middle East peace. AIPAC was not happy with speeches at Its meeting by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell dedaring that Israel must freeze settlement activity In the territories once the Palestinian Authority takes serious steps to curb terrorism. "Settlement activity Is simply Inconsistent with President Bush's two-state Vision," Powell said, draWing Jeers from some AIPAC members. Page 3 of5 http://Wrmea.printthis.clickability.conilptlcpt?action=epf&title=AIPAC+Comes+Under+Sci... 1/8/2005·- • AIPAC Comes Under Scrutiny as FBI Continues Israel Espionage Probe o 0 A number of Jewish leaders spoke In support of the Middle East peace plan and In criticism of AIP,,"C and other groups who'were opposing It;In-a letter toCongn!ss, these leaders said they wanted to "express our concern over recent efforts to sidetrack Implementation of the 'road map.' While the plan Is neither perfect nor a panacea, as 'passlonate supporters of Israel, we also know that the Jewish state needs this kind of energetic American dlplomacy.&rdquo Among those signing this statement were Edgar M. Bronfman, president of the World Jewish Congress, and current past presidents of the national United J~wlsh Appeal and Its successor the United Jewish Communities, Including Stanley Chesley, Lester Crown, Irwin Field, Alex Grass, Marvin Lender, Peggy Tishman and Larry Zucklln. Henry Siegman, once a leader In the American Jewish Congress and now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, charges that many ~merlcan Jewish organizations, such as AIPAC, have substituted blind support for Israel for the traditional Jewish search for truth and justice. "We have lost much In American Jewish organlzatlonalllfe,R Siegman says., "I was a student and admirer of Rabbi Abraham Heschel. I read his books. We were friends. We marched together In the South during the civil· rights movement. He h~lped me understand the prophetic passion for truth and justice as the keystone of Judaism. This Is not, however, an understanding that now animates the American Jewish communlty••.Amerlcan Jewish organizations confuse support for the State of Israel and Its people with uncritical endorsement of the actions of Israeli governments,even when these governments do things that In' an American context these Jewish organizations would never tolerate. It was Inconceivable that a Jewish leader In America 20 or 30 years ago would be silent If a political party In the Israeli government called for the transfer of Palestinians-In other words, ethnic cleansing. Today, there are at least three such parties, but there has never been a word of criticism from American Jewish organlzations.&rdquo The fact that many Jewish groups and leaders are rushing to AIPAC's defense before all of the facts are known Is hardly unexpected. These same groups have campaigned for manyyears on behalf of convicted spy. Jonathan Pollard, whose guilt Is well known-and was admitted. While AIPAC's guilt or Innocence In this particular case remains to be seen, the probe Is moving forward. A federal grand Jury is expected to begin Interviewing people In connection to the Investigation. What we do know Is that AIPAC has used Its considerable influence to shape U.S. foreign policy in a manner that appears to have been harmful to long-term U.S. Interests In the Middle East and harmful, as well, to prospects for'peace between Israel and the Palestlnlan~. Whether AIPAC Is guilty of espionage or not, It must bear responsibility for advancing a narrow agenda which may be pleasing to Israel's right wing, but which misrepresents the views of both the majority of Israelis and the majority of American Jews. American Jewish groups would be wise to walt until all the facts are in before rising to AIPAC's defense-something they seem reluctant to do. The evidence that AIPAC Is not worthy of such support Is Widespread-and growing. Allan C. Brownfeld is a syndicated columnist and assodate editor of the Uncoln Review, a journal published by the Uncoln Institute for Research and Education, and editor of Issues, the quarterly Journal of the American Council for Judaism. Find this article at: http://www.wnnea.comlarchiveslDecember_2004/0412022.html CJ Check the box to indude the list of links referenced in the article. Page 4 of5 ~ttp:l/wrme~~print!his.~lic~abili!y.com/ptJcpi?action=Cl?t&tit1e=AIPAC+Comes+Uilde1+Scr... 1/8/2005 ~: ALL INFOP.MATImr CONTAINED ~ ~ i:;\ EEPEIN IS mrCLASSIFIED 0 ~ DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw ~ Ilsg www.haarcrz.eom Last update. 16:062510312005 Pentagon analyst Franklin retur~s to work By Nathan Guttman, Haaretz Correspondent WASHINGTON - Pentagon analyst Larry Franklin was reinstated a few weeks ago, ~er sitting at home for half a year and being barred from returning to his job on the Iranian desk in the Department of Defense's policy division. Franklin was at the center ofa lengthy FBI investigation after suspicions arose that he transferred classified information about U.S. policy on Iran to members ofthe pro-Israel lobby AlPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee). In the seven months since the affair made headlines on the CBS evening news, the investigation has been kept under tight wraps, but its ramifications are already being felt. While Franklin is back at work, and, say well-placed sources, is expected to reach a plea bargain, the spotlight has moved to the AlPAC officials- two senior members were suspended for the duration ofthe case and four other senior officials were forced to testify at length before the special investigative jury in Virginia, whose proceedings are classified. Even if the investigation is nowhere near completion, it has definitely reached a crossroads, at which investigators must decide on the suspects in the case- Larry Franklin alone; Franklin and two AIPAC officials, Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman; or whether, on top of those three, the entire AIPAC organization has acted unlawfully. AlPAC refused to say anything about the possibilitY ofa plea bargain. Sources close to the investigation suggested recently that it would end in a plea bargain. Franklin would plead to a lesser crime of unauthorized transfer of information, Rosen and Weissman would be charged with receiving classified information unlawfully, and AIPAC would remain unstained. Franklin's lawyer, Plato Cacheris, Thursday denied the reports, stating: "We have not entered any plea ofdefense with the Justice Department." ~)Il~~r< As for Franklin's reinstatement, a Pentagon spokesman, Maj. Paul \r -"'4~__ 65'Q,vJt=-~~15-,uL ,k.ej!1~ . -«n'.\.. 1 o o dinner expected to. be .att~nded by some 5,000 people at which~AlPAC leaders shout out the names of dozens of congressmen and'Cabinet officials present..;.. nearly 200 last year. If a significantly lower number show up this year, it could be embarrassing. Franklin, an Iran analyst who lives in Kearneysville, W. Va., was released on a $100,000 bond after appearing at U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Va. A preliminary hearing was set for May 27. "He intends to plead not guilty" and expects to be vindicated at trial, said his attorney, John Thorpe Richards. The criminal charge sheet was the first official accounting of a case that first made headlines last August, when FBI agents raided AIPAC's Washington headquarters and confiscated.files.belonging"'to Rosen and Weissman. "The information Franklin disclosed relating to potential attacks upon U.S" forces in Iraq could be used to the injury of the United States or to ,the advantage of a foreign country," special agent Catherine Hanna said in drafting the complaint. The'damage, she said, could arise from "jeopardizing the viability of the sources and methods." The information was from a document classified as "top secret," Hanna said. While the June 2003 lunch appears to be the linchpin of th~ criminal charges, there are other allegations, including that Franklin leaked classified information to journalists and to an unidentified "foreign official," and that he kept three decades' worth of classified information on his computer hard disk at home. Reports have suggested that Franklin also met with an Israeli Embassy official. The reference to a "foreign official" might point in that direction. However, the FBI has not gotten in touch with the Israeli Embassy, representatives say, and Israeli officials continue to maintain that they would never participate in illicit information gathering in the United States. IIlsrael does not carry out any operation in the United States that would be liable,. God forbid; to harm its closest ally," Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom told Israel Television. "Therefore all the brouhaha around this matter has nothing to do with the State of Israel." The United States, he added, "is a nation with which we conduct very intimate ties, with exchanges of the most classified kinds of information. So anyone who thinks we were involved - this is completely bogus." The complaint suggests answers to two major questions that have surrounded the investigation: Who is the target? And to what degree is AIPAC in danger? The question of a target arose after last.year's.raids,.when it emerged that agents had watched Rosen, Weissman and Franklin chatting over a meal at Tivoli in June 2003. Was the FBI agent in the restaurant following Franklin, or Rosen and Weissman? The arrest Wednesday lends support to the theory that Franklin had been the target of an investigation that reportedly was at least a year old at thatlunch meeting. Franklin's enthusiasm for a tough line against Iran had drawn the attention of colleag~~s in t!l~ Pentag.on. ~ •.:. ~-r '1 - .~ JTA previously has reported thatFranQhad"been under sClUtiny since he 0 allegedly met i~ December 2001 with former Iranian spy and arm~ merchant Manucher Ghorbanifar, who was on a CIA "burn lisr of people who could not be contacted, according to intelligence community sources. AlPAC could take heart from the fact that the criminal complaint did not mention the organization, or even suggest any organizational affiliation for the two "U.S. Persons" Franklin met with. ' Still, the complaint raised at least as many questions as it answered: '. • What now for Rosen·and Weissman? Leaking classified information has much clearer legal ramifications than receiving it, since reporters in Wa~hington routinely receive and relay classified information to their readers•. The complaint makes clear that the exchange in the restaurant was "verbal." It's unclear what, if any, charges could be brought against Rosen and Weissman for simply listening to Franklin unload. - On the other hand, the FBI had a clear interest in Rosen and Weissman, evidenced by the August raid at AIPAC headquarters and another one in December, and by the appearance earlier this year oftop AIPAC staffers before a federal grand jury. It was information arising out of the grand jury encounters that led AIPAC to fir~ the two men, AIPAC has said.. Rosen's lawyer said in a statement that no documents were exchanged, which dovetails with the FBI's claim that the exchange was verbal. "Steve Rosen never solicited, received or passed on any classified documents from Larry Franklin, and Mr. Franklin will never be able to say otherwise," Rosen's lawyer, Abbe Lowell, said in a statement. • U.S. Attorney Paul McNulty convened a grand jury in the case; why didn't he bring an indictment instead of a criminal complaint, which carries less weight? One answer could be that the FBI and Justice Department have been burned by reporting that depicts the case as a politically motivated jeremiad against Jewish lobbyists and/or neoconservatives such as Franklin. Indictments often are sealed. but a criminal complaint allows the FBI to explain at length why it feels charges are justified. • Finally, what did Rosen and Weissman learn at the Tivoli lunch? Until now, sources close to the two have suggested that the information related to White House policy on Iran - which, after all, was the specialty of both Franklin and Weissman - and that it had a relatively low secrecy classification. Hanna. the FBI special agent, alleges that the information was top secret, and related to dangers posed to U.S. troops in Iraq. A former FBI official said the complaint suggests a larger investigation, butgives few clues about where the probe starts and ends. "My best estimate is this was part of an already existing investigation, and from their perspective, they got lucky," the former official said. "They were either following Franklin or they were following these two guys," he said, referring to Rosen and Weissman. mPrint This Story Back to top A i"'!\t INFORHATION CONTAINED 0 ~IN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1s:g Pentagon Analyst In Israel Spy Case Is Call'ed a 'Patriot' BY ELI LAKE - Staff Reporter ofthe Sun May 27, 2005 URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/14523 WASHINGTON - APentagon analyst charged with mishandling classified information at first cooperated·with an FBI probe oftwo lobbyists for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee when he allowed the bureau to surveil a meeting with Aipac lobbyist Keith Weissman in July 2004. Plato Cacheris, the lawyer for the Pentagon Iran analyst Lawrence Franklin, ~old The New York Sun yesterday that the FBI persuaded his clie~t to set up a meeting with Mr. Weissman on July 9, 2004, before being threatened with jail time. "They appealed to his sense ofpatriotism, and he cooperated,II Mr. Cacheris said 1n an interview. The charges against the two lobbyists, Mr. Weissman and Steven Rosen, will hang on their July 9, 2004, meeting with Mr. Franklin when he allegedly shared information verbally with Mr. Weissman - while under FBI surveillance - that American soldiers and Israeli agents in northern Iraq were under threat from Iranian Revolutionary Guard units. Mr. Rosen, after receiving the information from his colleague, Mr. Weissman, then allegedly shared it with the Israeli Embassy and the Washington Post. Sources familiar with the FBI's case said that the Justice Department is prepared to charge that Mr. Rosen passed the classified information on to the embassy and the newspaper. Until August 2004, Mr..Franklin was unaware that the FBI was prepared to chargehim with a crime, Mr. Cacheris said. It was after he voluntarily told the bureau that he had kept 83 classified documents at his home in West Virginia and had agreed to convey the intelligence to Mr. Weissman that the FBI said that it would press charges and arranged for a court-appointed attorney for Mr. Franklin. Originally, the bureau, according to Mr. Cacheris, asked Mr. Franklin to plead guilty to espionage, specifically under section 794 ofthe U.S. Code forcriines of IIgathering or delivering defense information to aid a foreign government.,', Notorious Soviet spy Aldridge Ames was charge4 under this section ofthe U.S. Code, which carries a maximum penalty ofexecution or life in prison. Mr. Franklin sought Mr. Cacheris out, the lawyer said, after he was asked to admit that he was a spy. Mr.. Cacheris, who represented Mr. Ames as well as Monica Lewinsky, agreed to take the case free ofcharge. "I feel the government is overreaching in this case. I think he's a patriot and a loyal American who intends no harm to this country," Mr. Cacheris said. ;-l-\~ Following Mr. Cacheris's agreement to defend Mr. Franklin, the bureau offered a deal whereby Mr. Franklin would plead guilty to the lesser charge ofmishandling classified material, or section 793 oftlie U.S. Code. The lesser charge carries a maximum penalty ~ ~~ G~-\»f-- adl?~\5~~~ \L~ - o o " of 10 years in prison. Mr. Cacheris said he refused the deal and that he intends to take the' case to trial. Despite turning down the offer and ceasing to cooperate with the FBI, Mr. Franklin was charged with ~nly mishandling, not espionage, on Tuesday. Mr. Cacheris likened Mr. Franklin's conduct to that ofa fonner national security adviser, Samuel Berger, who was recently charged with a misdemeanor for stealing documents from t:Qe National Archives in his socks, and a former CIA director" John Deutsch, who had taken classified material'to his home. In both these cases, Messrs. Berger and Deutsch were charged with misdemeanors. "We don't think Mr. Franklin's conduct was any more egregious," Mr. Cacheris said. Mr. Cacheris told the Sun yesterday that he believed the FBI did not originally intend to investigate Mr. Franklin. "We believe there was a pre-existing investigation that Larry Franklin is not involved in," he said yesterday. While Mr. Cacheris refused to discuss the details ofthe meetings, other sources familiar with the case told the Sun that Mr. Franklin first approached Messrs. Rosen and Weissman in February or March 2003 for a meeting at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Pentagon City, Va., with the intention ofpassing on threat information regarding Iran's plans for American soldiers in Iraq. According to one source familiar with the case, Mr. Franklin was told by an aide to an undersecr~tary ofdefense, Douglas Feith, that the two Aipac lobbyists could get the threat information to the National Security Council. Mr. Rosen, in particular, has a reputation for high-level contacts with policy-makers in the executive branch. According to sources familiar with the case, the three men at this 2003 meeting discussed passing the threat information to National Security Council official Elliott Abrams. By March 2003, the Bush administration had decided to work with Iranian-sponsored opposition groups to build an interim government in Baghdad. Indeed, the recently elected prime minister, Ibrahim Jafari, was initially a leader of an Iranian-supported party, Dawa, and was included in the first Iraqi Governing Council. At the same'time, American envoys were holding intensive negotiations about Iraq with the Iranians under the auspices ofa U.N. multicountry group designed to coordinate Afghanistan policy. These developments, according to Mr. Franklin's former colleagues and other government officials, worried the Pentagon ~alyst, who, in tum, attempted to reverse what he saw as a disastrous policy decision. Mr. Franklin had, in his work on Iran at the Pentagon in late 2001, identified what one source described as "Iranian hunter-killer teams" in Afghanistan that were threatening American Special Forces. By the spring of 2003, he believed American forces in ~raq would be under a similar threat from units of Iran's Revolutionary Guard and that this information had to get to the White House. On June 26, 2003, Mr. Franklin held a second lunch with Messrs. Weissman and Rosen and discussed, among other things, developments in the formation ofan Iran policy paper and new threats he had learned about in Iraq. In that meeting, Mr. Cacheris said he provided the two lobbyists with a list ofevents and names ofIranian officials that he had compiled personally elaborating the threat to American soldiers. IINo classified o documents were passed," Mr. Cacheris said. '~A lis~ ofevents and names on Iran arid Iraq was'passed in the June 2003 meeting." Mr. Cacheris emphasized that this list was neither a classified nor official document. Mr. Franklin would not meet with Mr. Weissman again for more than a year, when he would meet him in northern Virginia under :fBI surveillance on July 9. A grand jury convening in Alexandria, Va., is expec~ed to relea~e a formal indictment ofMr. Franklin today. · - ... Message ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED O HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED A DATE 07-29-2010' BY 60324 uc ba~Jlsg Page 1 of3 • ~~ KRAMARSIC, BRETT M. (WF) (FBI) From: PORATH, ROBERT J.(WF) (FBI) Sent: Friday, June 03,20057:59 AM To: FORTIN,'BRIAN G. (WF) (FBI); DOUGLAS, STEPHANIE (WF) (FBI); KRAMARSIC, BRETT M. (WF) (FBI); HANNA, CATHERINE M. (WF) (FBI); MCDERMOTT. WILLIAM R.(WF) (FBI); BRIDGES, TRACEY J. (WF) (FBI); ODONNELL, THOMAS J. (WF) (FBI); ANDERSON, JESSICA T. (WF) (FBI); PAULLING. SCOlT M. (WF) (FBI); LOEFFERT, JANICE S. (WF) (FBI); MARKLEY, JAMES S. (WF) (FBI); LURIE, ERIC S. (WF) (FBI); FALLER. LARISSA (WF) (FBI); THOMAS, KIMBERLY J. (WF) (FBI); JOHANSEN, MARK D. (CD) (FBI); WRIGHT, SUSAN C. (CD) (FBI); BUTlER, MJ. (CD) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); GAY. SUSAN (WF) (FBI) Subject: article .uNCLASSIEIEQ NON.RECORQ FBI Tapped Talks About Possible Secrets Case Against Ex-AIPAC Officials Could Focus On Several Contacts With Defense Analyst The Washington Post By Jerry Markon June 3, 2005 ARLINGTON, VA --In July 2004, a Defense Department analyst and a senior official from an influential pro-Israel lobbying group met at the Pentagon City mall in Arlington. Amid the stores and shoppers, the-analyst warned that Irjlnian agents were planning attacks against American soldiers and Israeli agents in Iraq, sources familiar with the meeting said. Alarmed, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee official, Keith Weissman, left the mall and went to the office of colleague Steve Rosen. The-two men then relayed the information to the Israeli Embassy in Washington and a reporter for The Washington Post. What the AIPAC officials did not know, the sources said, was that the fBJ was listening in -- to both the meeting and their subsequent phone calls •• and that the Pentagon analyst, Lawrence Franklin, was cooperating in an investigation of whether classified U.S. information was being passed on to the government of Israel. That meeting and those phone calls are a focus of a criminal case ~~washipgtonp?st.com: U.S. Ey~ressing Uprising In Iran JI U Page 2 of3 the Sept. 11,2001, attacks, Iran~has turned over al Qaeda officials to Saudi Arabia and Afgha~stan. ~n talks, U.S. officials had repeatedly warned Iranian officials thatifariy al Qaeda operatives in Iran are implicated in attacks against Americans, it would have serious consequences for relations between the two countries. Those talks, however, were held with representatives ofIran's foreign ministry~ Other parts ofthe Iranian government are contr911ed not by elected reformers, but by conservative mullahs. A senior administration official who is skeptical"of the Pentagon's arguments said most ofthe al Qaeda members -- fewer than a dozen -- appear to be located in an isolated area ofnortheastern Iran, near the .border with Afghanistan. He described the area as a drug-smuggling terrorist haven that is tolerated by key members ofthe Revolutionary Guards in part because they skiqt money offsome ofthe activities there. It is not clear how much control the central Iranian government has over this area, he said. "I don't think the elected government knows much about it;" he said. "Why should you punish the rest of Iran," he asked, just because the government cannot act if! this area? Flynt Leverett, who recently left the White House to join the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, said the administration may be taking a gamble. "It is imprudent to assume that the Islamic Republic will collapse like a house of cards in a time frame that is going to be meaningful to us," he said. "What it means is we will end up with an Iran that has nuclear weapons and no dialogue with the United States with regard to our terrorist concerns." Ever since President Bush labeled Iran last year as part ofan "axis ofevil" -- along with North Korea and Iraq ~- the administration has struggled to define its. policy toward the lslamic republic, which terminated relations with the United States after Iran's i 979 revolution. The administration never formally adopted a policy of"regime change," but it also never seriously tried to establish a dialogue. In July, Bush signaled a harder line when he issued a strongly worded presi~ential statement in which he praised large pro-democracy street demonstrations in Iran. Administration officials said at the time that they had abandoned any hope ofworking with President Mohamm.ad Khatami and his reformistallies in the Iranian government, and would tum their attention toward democracy supporters among the Iranian people. But the prospect ofwar with Iraq reopened some discreet contacts~ which took place under U.N. supervision in Europe. The contacts encouraged some in the State Department to believe that there was an opening for greater cooperation. In an interview in February with the Los Angeles Times, Deputy Secretary ofState Richard L. Armitage drew a distinction between the confrontational approach the administration had taken with Iraq and North Korea and the approach it had adopted with Iran. "The axis ofevil was a valid comment, [but] I would note there's one dramatic difference between Iran and the other two axes of'evil, and that would be its dem09racy. [And] you approach a democracy differently," Armitage said. At one ofthe meetings, in early January, the United States signaled that it would target the Iraq-based camps ofthe Mujaheddin-e Khalq (MEK), or People's Mujaheddin, a major group opposing the Iranian government. - The MEK soon became caught up in the policy struggle between the State Department and the Pentagon. http://www._washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dynlA35772-2003May24?language=printer 6/7/2005 •.ili"i\Vashitjgtonpllst.com: u·s· Eye<:5eSSing Uprising In Iran o Page 3 of3 After the camps were bombed, the U.S. military arranged a cease-.fire with the -group, infuriating the Iranians. Some'Pentagon officials, impressed by the military discipline and equipment ofthe thousands ofMEK troops, began to envision them as a potential military force for use against Tehran, much like the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. But the MBK is also listed as a terrorist organization by the State Department. Under pressure from State, the White House earlier this month ordered the Pentagon to disarm the MEK troops -- a decision that was secretly conveyed by U.S. officials to Iranian representatives at a meeting in Geneva on May 3. Nine days later, the suicide bombers strock in Saudi Arabia. © 2003 .The Washington Post Company Advertising Links What's this? LendingTree.com - Official Site . Lendingtree - Find a mortgage. refinance, home equity 9r auto loan now. Receive up to four loan offers within minutes. When banks compete, you win. www.lendingtree.com Refinanco Rates Hit Record Lows Get$150.000 loan for $720 per month. Refinance while rates are low. www.rowermybills.com RealEstate.com - Official Site Find a real estate agent. search online listings. request financing options and more at our full·service real estate resource. Buying or se.lling a home? It's all here. W\WI.realestate.com http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35772-2003May24?language=printer 6/7/2005 ALL INFORlIATION CONTAINED ~REIN IS lrMCLASSIFIED ~ \:;.lATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/s~ Page 1 of2 Document 1 of 1 Copyright 2003 Saint Paul Pioneer Press All Rights Reserved Saint Paul Pioneer Press (Minnesota) Ma,Y 231, 2003 Friday SECTION: MAIN; Pg. SA LENGTH: 778 words Pdnt)yindqw I pqse Window HEADLINE: Bush advisers weigh undermining Iran regime BYLINE: BY WARREN P. STROBEL; Washington Bureau BODY: WASHINGTON .... Prompted by evidence that Iran Is harboring top al-Qalda operatives linked to last week's suicide bombings In Saudi Arabia and fears that Tehran may be closer to bUilding a nuclear weapon than previously believed, the Bush administration has begun debating whether to try to destabilize the Islamic republic, U.S. officials said Thursday. Officials In Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's office are using both Issues to press their view that the United States should adopt overt and covert measures to undermine the regime, said the officials, who are Involved In the debate. Other officials argue that such a campaign would backfire by discrediting the moderate Iranians who are demanding political. reforms. Although one senior official engaged In the debate said "the military option Is never off the table," others said no one was suggesting an Invasion of Iran. However, some officials say the United States should launch a limited alrstrlke on Iran's nuclear weapons facilities If Iran appears on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon. By. some estimates, Iran could have a nuclear weapon within two years. ' Some Pentagon officials suggested using the remnants of an Iranian opposition group once backed by Saddam Hussein, the Mujahedeen el..Khalq (MEK), to Instigate armed opposition to the Iranian government. U.S. military forces In Iraq have disarmed the roughly 6,OOO-strong' MEK, which Is on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist groups. But the group's weapons are In storage, and It hasn't disbanded. However, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and other top officials rejected the Idea, saying that while some might consider the MEK freedom fighters, "a terrorist Is a terrorist is a terrorist," according to officials Involved In the debate. Bush has designated Iran a member otan "axls of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea. But until now, he's pursued a middle course with Iran, approving talks on Issues of common concern such as Afghanistan, while not trying to-re-establlsh diplomatic ties. A formal statement of U.S. policy toward Iran, called a National Security Presidential Directive, has been on hold about a year because of Internal administration debates and the war In Iraq, American officials said. The document Is being resurrected, they said. Bush's senior foreign-polley advisers were to have met at the White House on Thursday to discuss Iran policy, said a knowledgeable administration offiCial, but the meeting was postponed until next week to give Iran several more days to meet U.S. demands that it turn over the suspected al-Qalda terrorists.· If It doesn't, Washington Is likely to react with harsher measures, the official said. The United States has suspended a series of meetings between U.S. and Iranian diplomats In Geneva at which the two countries .... which have no formal diplomatic relations .... have been discussing terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq. https://w3.Iexis.com/lawenfsolutions_secured/print/doprint:asp?SearchInfoID=42077432-46... 6/7/2005 o Page 2of2 'rhe suspension followed Intelligence data, Including intercepted telephone calls, Indlcatlr)g that an al-Qalda cell based In Iran helped organize the bombings In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which were apparently part of a larger alQalda plot that was partially foiled by saud,l authorities. The bombings killed 34 people. The cell of 10 or so al-Qalda members Is run by top al-Qalda operative salf al Adel, who Is third on the U.S. government's list of most-wanted al-Qalda'ieaders, following Osama bin Laden,and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri. "There's no question but that there have been and are today senior al Qalda I~aders In Iran, and they are busy," Rumsfeld said this week. Iranian officials have denied harboring al-Qalda fugltl~es, and U.S. officials acknowledge that Iran has turned over some al-Qalda suspects to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and blocked others from entering Iran. On Thursday, a close aide to Iranian President Mohammad Khataml demanded that Washington prove Its charges. Saeed Pourazlzl said In Tehran that It was Iran's pollc{to crack down on al-Qalda -- not support It·- and that the network "I~ a terrorist group threatening Iran's Interests." "Its extremist Interpretation of Islam contradicts the Islamic democracy Iran Is trying to promote., There Is no commonality of anything between us." The senior U.S. Intelligence official said It wasn't clear whether al-Adel's group, which Is believed to be In an area of southeastern Iran near the Pakistan border, was operating with the acqUiescence o,f at least part,of the Iranian government. ' Advocates of regime change want to bolster popular opposition In Iran to the religious leadership. The Associated Press contributed to this report. LOAD-DATE: May 23, 2003 https:llw3.lexis.comllawenfsolutions_secured/ptintldopri~t.asp?SearchInfoID=42077432-46... 6/7/2005 ~ ~EXIS®-NEXIS® View Printable Page .-1.' ." .. rA\L INFORRATION CONTAINED 0--, r.r #I. ~REIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw!sab/lsg Copyright 2003 The Washington Post Qrbt Wtl5f)iugtonf$M wQshingtonpost.com The Washington Post June 15,2003 Sunday Final Edition SECTION: ASECTION; Pg. A20 LENGTH: 1448 words HEADLINE: Pressure Builds for President to Declare Strategy on Iran BYLINE: Michael Dobbs, Washington Post StaffWriter BODY: Page 24 of26 Soon after George W. Bush.took office in January 2001, his advisers began drafting a strategy for dealing with Iran, a radical Islamic state long suspected by Washington ofsupporting international terrorism and pursuing weapons ofmass destruction. More than two years later, the national security presidential directive on Iran has gone through several competing drafts and has yet to be approved by Bush's senior advisers, according to well-placed sources. In the meantime, experts in and outside the government are focusing, on Iran as the United States' next big foreign policy crisis, with some predicting that the country could acquire a nuclear weapon as early as 2006. Critics on the left and the right point to the unfinished directive as evidence the administration lacks a coherent strategy toward a country Bush described asa key member ofthe "axis ofevil,tI along with North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. "Our policy toward Iran is neither fish nor fowl, neither engagement nor regime change," said Flynt L. Leverett, a Bush adviser on the Middle East who -left the National Security Council staff in March and is now with the Brookings Institution. The Bush administration has yet to formulate a tme Iran policy, agreed Michael A. Ledeen,a Middle East expert with the American Enterprise Institute. With other neoconservative intellectuals, Ledeen has founded ,the Coalition for Democracy in Iran, which is looking for ways to·foment a democratic revolution to sweep away the mullahs who came to power in 1979. Senior administration officials refused to talk about the status ofthe Bush policy directive on Iran, on the grounds that it is classified, but they say they have had some success in mobilizing international opinion against Iran's nuclear weapons program. As evide~ce, t~ey cite recent threats by Russia to cut offnuclear assistance to Tehran and moves by the International Atomic Energy Agency to censure Iran for failing to report the processing ofnuclear materials. https:/lwww.nexis.com/researchlsearchlsubmitViewTagged 6/7/2005 ,~ LEXIS®-NEXIS® View Printable Page /'" ~,.. i 0 -F'. o Page 25 of26 While the officials have stopped short ofembracing a policy of"regime change" in Iran, U.S. officials from Bush down have talked about providing moral support to the "reform movement" in Iran in its struggle against an unelected government. As defined by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, the U.S. goal is to speak directly to the Iranian people "over the heads oftheir leaders to let them know that we agree with them.II The internal and external debate about what to do about Iran has been brought to a head by recent revelations suggesting the Iranian nuclear weapons program is much further along than many suspected. Tomorrow, the lAEA Board of Governors in Vienna is to discuss findings showing that Iran has a wide range ofoptions for producing fissile material for a nuclear bomb, from using heavy water reactors to produce plutonium to experiments in uranium enrichment. u.s. officials have also accused Iran ofharboring members ofthe al Qaeda terrorist network who escaped from Afghanistan after the fall ofthe Taliban in December 2001. They say some al Qaeda supporters hiding in Iran appear to have known in advance about recent terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, although there is no direct evidence ofoperational ties between the Iranian government and al Qaeda. The escalating Iranian nuclear threat and suspicions ofIranian ties to terrorists have sharpened longstanding divisions in the administration over how to deal with Tehran. In the past, the State Department has put the emphasis on opening a dialogue with reformist elements in the Iranian leadership while the Pentagon has been more interested in looking for ways to destabilize the authoritarian Islamic government. Bureaucratic tensions have reached the level where each side has begun accusing the other of leaking unfavorable stories to the media to block policy initiiltives. "The knives are out,1I said a Pentagon official, who criticized national security adviser Condoleezza Rice for failing to end the dispute by issuing clear policy guidelines. Powell, meanwhile, insisted to journalists that there has be~n no change in policy on Irail, despite what he depicted as frenzied media speculation "about what this person in that department might think or that person in another department might think." The Iran debate goes back to a failed attempt by the Clinton administration to open an "unconditional dialoguell with Tehran. Even though the Iranians rejected the U.S. offer ofunconditional talks, some Bush administration officials led by the State Departmentts director for policy planning, Richard N. Haass, favored making renewed overtures., The proposals for a dialogue with Iran were partly inspired by the 1994 framework agreement with North Korea under which the North Korean government agreed to accept international controls over its nuclear program in return for economic assistance, including the construction of a civilian nuclear reactor. But the State Department approach ran into strong opposition from the Pentagon and Vice President·Cheney's office, and was shot down in interagency meetings at the end of200l. While there would be no "grand bargain" with the Iranian leadership, the Bush administration agreed to a more limited diplomatic dialogue, focusing on specific areas such as the war in Afghanistan or cooperation over Iraq. Several rounds ofsuch talks took place in Geneva and Paris, with the involvement ofa special presidential envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, but were suspended after th~ bombings in Saudi Arabia on May 12. The administration debate has been echoed by a much more public debate among Middle East analysts, https://www.nexis.com!research!searchlsubmitViewTagged 6/7/2005 ,1 'LExIS®-NEXIS® View Printable Page ".' • i 0 j);;~~<,~}y o Page 26 of26 nuclear proliferation experts, and leaders ofthe Iranian diaspora. Congress has also weighed in with legislation sponsored by,Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.) that would funnel more than $50 million to Iranian pro-democracy initiatives, including private California-based satellite television and radio stations set up by Iranian exiles. "We are not calling for a military attack on Iran," said Brownback, whose proposed Iran Democracy Act has drawn bipartisan support but is opposed by the leadership ofthe Foreign Relations Committee. The goal, he said, is to support Iranian democracy activists, including students who took to the streets of Tehran again last week to protest the closure of opposition newspaper and the jailing ofdissidents. Just how far the United States should go in supporting the protests is the subject ofheated argument inside and outside the government, even among conservatives. Some argue Iran is ripe for revolution. Others contend there is little guarantee ofradical change in Tehran in the three-year period some independent proliferation experts estimate it will take before Iran could acquire nuclear weapons, and the United States should be thinking about other options, including preemptive action against suspected nuclear sites. "The internal democratic forces in Iran are real and growing, but they're not going to save us from having to think about what we are going to do about the Iranian nuclear program and support for terrorism," said Reuel Marc Gerecht, a CIA case officer for Iran now with the American Enterprise Institute. Some aQalysts say that U.S. financial and propaganda support for the Iranian democracy movement could be counterproductive. "It allows the hardliners to argue that there is an external threat, and they must crack down in the name ofnational unity," said Kaveh Ehsani, an editor ofthe pro-reform journal Dialogue in Iran, now visiting the United States. "There is a kind ofan unholy alliance between the Bush administration and the Iranian hardliners." "We have tried appeasement, we have tried containment, and we have tried engagement," countered S. Rob Sobhani, a co-founder ofthe Coalition for Democracy in Iran and adjunct professor ofgovernment at Georgetown University. "All these policies have failed. What have we got to lose by empowerment?" The White House has avoided taking a position on the Brownback legislation and has restricted its encourage~ent ofdemocracy in Iran to verbal broadsides against the mullahs. In comments Thursday, Rice described Iran's pursuit of weapons ofmass destruction as "not acceptable" and said that the United States "cannot tolerate circumstances in which al Qaeda operatives come in and out ofIran.II She also accused Iran ofstirring up tro~ble among Shiite communities in southern Iraq. "We have to stand with the aspirations of the Iranian people which have been clearly expressed," she told a meeting in Los Angeles,as thousands ofIranians took to the streets ofTehranin anti-government protests. LOAD-DATE: June 15, 2003 https:/lwww.nexis.com/researchlsearchlsubmitViewTagged 6/7/2005 ,.'i J:;EXI~®-NEXIS® View Printe Page J' nrFOPHATION COlITAINED ~ HEREIN IS Lrn!CLASSIFIED DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/1sg Copyright 2003 The Washington Post ~t Wtl5f)inghm ~g.Gt wa~hingtoripost.com The Washington Post August 9, 2003 Saturday Final Edition SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. 1\01 LENGTH: 1059 words HEADLINE: Meetings With Iran-Contra Arms Dealer Confinned BYLINE: Bradley Graham and P~ter Slevin, Washington Post StaffWriters BODY: Page 21 of26 Defense Secretary Donald H.Rumsfeld acknowledged yesterday that Pentagon officials met secretly with a discredited expatriate Iranian arms merchant who figured prominently 'in the Iran-contra scandal ofthe mid-1980s, characterizing the contact as an unexceptional effort to gain possibly useful infonnation. While Rumsfeld said that the contact occurred more than a year ago and that nothing came of it, his aides scrambled during the day to piece together more details amid other reports thatRumsfeld's account may have been incomplete. Last night, a senior defense official disclosed that another meeting with the Iranian anns dealer, Manucher Ghorbanifar, occurred in June in Paris. The official said that, while the first contact, in late 2001, had been formally sanctioned by the U.S. government in response to an Iranian government offer to provide information relevant to the war on terrorism, the second one resultedfrom "an unplanned, unscheduled encounter." A senior administration official said, however, that Pentagon staffmembers held one or two other meetings with Ghorbanifar..last year in Italy. The sessions so troubled Secretary ofState Colin L. Powell, the of~cial said, that he complained to Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's national security adviser. Powell maintained that the Pentagon activIties were unauthorized and undennined U.S. policy toward Iran by taking place outside the terms defined by Bush and his top advisers. The White House instructed the Pe,ntagon to halt meetings that do not conform to policy decisions, said the official, who requested anonymity. The Defense Department personnel who met with Ghorbanifar came from the policy directorate. . Sources identified them as Harold Rhode, a specialist on Iran and Iraq who recently served in Baghdad as the Pentagon liaison to Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi, and Larry Franklin, a Defense https:/Iwww.nexis.comlresearch/search/submitViewTagged 6/7/2005 '\ l.EXIS®-NEXIS® View Prin~ Page #' U Intelligence Agency analyst. Page 22 of26 State Department officials were surprised by news ofthe latest meeting with Ghorbanifar. ren~ion runs deep in the Bush administration between State an~ the Pentagon, which under Rumsfeld has aspired to a powerful role in foreign policy. The two agencies have sparred repeatedly over strategy toward Iran and Iraq. The United States does not have formal relations with Iran, although a small number ofsanctioned meetings between U.S. and Iranian officials have taken place, most notably to address U.S. war plans in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Bush administration has struggled to develop a coherent and consistent approach to Iran. In his State ofthe Union address last year, Bush characterized Iran as being part ofan axis ofevil, along with Iraq and North Korea, and administration officials have repeatedly accused Iran ofsupporting terrorist groups and ofseeking to acquire nuclear weapons. While broad agre~ment exists within the administration favoring changes in Iran's Islamic government, officials differ on how to accomplish ili~. ' More than two years after the administration began drafting a national security presidential directive on Iran, ilie policy document remains unfinished. While the State Department favors increased dialogue and engagement with potential reformers inside Iran, prominent Pentagon civilians believe the policy should be more aggressive, including measures to destabilize the existing government in Tehran. The Iran-contra scandal erupted over a decision by the Reagan administration to sell weapons to Iran in an effort to win the release ofU.S. hostages in Lebanon. The proceeds ofthe anns sales were illegally funneled to contra fighters opposing Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista government. Ghorbanifar was enl~sted in the effo~, helping to arrange the delivery by Israel of508 TOW antitank missiles to Iran. The White House had drafted him as an intermediary despite warnings from the CIA that he was a cheat and had failed lie-detector tests. The intelligence aget).cy had instructed its operatives not to do business with him. News ofthe Pentagon's contact with Ghorbanifar was first reported yesterday by Newsday, and Rumsfeld was asked about the story when he emerged with Bush from a meeting at the president's ranch in Crawford, Tex. Saying he had just been told ofthe Newsday article by a senior aide and by Rice, Rumsfeld acknowledge4 that "one or two" Pentagon officials "were approached by some people who had information about Iranians that w~nted to provide information to the United States government." He said that a meeting took place "more than a year ago" and that the information received was circulated to various federal departments and agencies but did no~ lead to anything. "That is to say, as I understand it, there wasn't anything there that was ofsubstance or ofvalue that needed to be pursued further,II he said. . Asked ifthe Pentagon contact was intended to circumvent official U.S. exchanges with Iran, Rumsfeld replied: "Oh, absolutely not. I mean, everyone in the interagency process, I'm told, was apprised ofit, and it went nowhere. It was just -- iliis happens, ofcourse, frequently, that in -- people come in, offering suggestions or information or possible contacts, and sometimes they're pursued. Obviously, if it looks as https:/lwww.nexis.com/researchlsearch/submitViewTagged 6/7/2005 •. ;''\ LEXIS®-NE,XIS® View Prin~ Page / U 0 though something might be interesting, it's pursued. If it isn't, it isn't." Page 23 of26 Standing by Rumsfeld's side, Bush was asked ifthe meeting was a good idea and ifhisadministration wants a change in government. "We support the aspirations ofthose who desire freedom in Iran,1I the president said, then took a question on a differentsubject. According to the account given later by the senior Pentagon official, the contact in 2001 occurred after Iranian officials passed word to the administration that they had information that might be useful in the global war on terrorism. Two Pentagon officials met with the Iranians in several sessions over a threeday period in Italy. Ghorbanifar attended these meetings, "but he was not the individual who had approached the United States or the one with the information,II the official said. What his role was, however, the official did not know. The official said the June meeting involved'one ofthe two Pentagon representatives who had been present at the 2001 meeting, but he declined to say which one. Staffwriter Dana Priest contributed to this report. LOAD-DATE: August 9, 2003 https://www.nexis.com/research/search/submitViewTagged 6/7/2005 '\'{"EXIS@-NeXIS@ViewPrintablePageALLINFORl'lATION COlITAHrED Q" ~?~ <::> HEREIN IS lfMCLASSIFIED DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc aw/sab/1sg Copyright 2003 Guardian Newspapers Limited The Observer August 10, 2003 SECTION: Observer News Pages, Pg. 22 LENGTH: 863 words Page 17 of26 HEADLINE: IRAQ CONFLICT: Make Iran next, says Ayatollahs. grandson: Khomeini calls US freedom the best in the world from base in occupied Baghdad BYLINE: by Jamie Wilson, Baghdad BODY: SAYYID Hussein Khomeini is sitting cross-legged on a sofa inside a garish palm-fringed mansion nestled on the banks ofthe Tigris. It is the very heart ofAmerican-occupied Baghdad, not the frrst place that you might look for the grandson ofAyatollah Khomeini. The late Iranian leader built his Islamic revolution on a deep hatred ofeverything associated with the Stars and Stripes. But then very little about the younger Khomeini is quite what might be expected. 'American liberty and freedom is the b~st freedom in the world,' he said, puffing on a cigarette and sipping a glass ofsweet tea. 'The freedom for the individual that is 'written into the American Constitution you do not see in such concentration in any other constitution in the world. The Americans are here in Iraq, so freedom is here too.' It is an extraordinary statement from a man whose grandfather labelled the US 'the Great Satan', but what Khomeini has to say about the current situation in Iran is even more radical: 'Iranians need freedom now, and if they can only achieve it with American interference I think they would welcome it. As an Iranian, I would welcome it.I Not surprisingly, Khomeini, 45, has caused something ofa stir in Baghdad, with the US media beating a path to the door ofthe house where he is staying. According to his armed bodyguards, the luxurious house has been taken over by an Iraqi cleric, who shares Khomeini's view that religion and state should be separated. It used to belong to Izzat Ibrahim, vice-chairman ofthe deposed Revolutionary Command Council and one ofSaddam Hussein's closest advisers. The King of Clubs on the list ofmost wanted Baathists, Ibrahim remains at large, although he is unlikely to return to evict the current tenants. There is, however, plenty to remind the visitor ofthe previous owner. Ablack Rolls-Royce with a golden grill is gathering dust in the drive, while the sitting room, with its three gold-trim. sofas, is also home to a couple ofenormous glass tanks containing dozens oftropical fish and several cages ofcanaries, chirping away merrily. Wearing a black turban - a piece ofclothing that marks him out as a descendant ofthe Prophet Muhammad - Khomeini dismisses. as 'nonsense' a question about whether his grandfather would approve ofhis support for the Americans. 'He is not here, and in this case we cannot predict what position he would take,' he said. As for Iraqi resistance to the US occupying forces - or liberators as Khomeini insists on calling them - in his opinion there is none. https://www.nexis.com/research/search/submitViewTagged 6/7/2005 4-~~'LEXIS®-lfflXIS® View Printable Page ;~.~. 0 () , - Page 18 of26 'The pe~sons·who are carrying out the attacks have been paid previously to attack the US and the Americans arejust in a position.of defending themselves,' he said. So what is a man whose grandfather cemented the Islamic theocracy in Iran by exploiting the 1979 US Embassy hostage crisis doing espousing views that could 'have come straight from an American ,foreign policy briefing or have been written by the press office ofthe Coalition Provisional Authority situated in the former presidential palace a couple ofmiles down the road? Exactly how close Khomeini's ties are with the US is not clear, but the cleric has met officials from the CPA on several occasions. 'He's.my favourite Khomeini!', one senior US official joked at a dinner the other night. A spokesman said that they found his ideas about the separation ofreligion and state 'interesting'. Although he does not command a wide following, the very fact ofwho he is could in time make him a significant player, while any voice helping to dilute calls from some Iraqi'Shia leaders fora system of clerical rule in Iraq will be welcomed with open arms by the Americans. But'the US might just have bigger plansJor Khomeini. He spent 14 years ofhis life in Iraq, between 1964 and 1979, while his grandfather was plotting the Islamic revolution and conducting a campaign"of snapping at the,heels ofthe Shah from the holy city ofNajaf. Listening to his grandson condemning the current situation in Tehran, it is difficult not to get a sense that perhaps history is repeating itself. The Bush administration, which includes Iran in its diminishing axis ofevil, has repeatedly accused the country ofsupporting terrorist groups and seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. But apart from general agreement that a change of government in Iran would be a good thing, there is no broad consensus within the administration about how'best to achieve that aim. It is two years since the State Department began drafting it national security presidential directive on Iran, but the document remains . unfinished. Doves in Colin Powell's State Department are said to favour increased dialog':le with potential reformers in the country, while Donald RumsfeId's Pentagon is thought to be intent on pursuing aggressive destabilisation tactics towards Tehran. Whatever way the administration decides to play it, Khomeini could be useful to both sides. Asked when he thought he might return to Iran, Khomeini replied 'Inshallah' - Jt is God's will. But some observers might argue that it is just as"likely to be the Pentagon's. LOAD-DATE: August 14,2003 https://www.nexis.com/research/search/submitYiewTagged 6/7/2005 ~ ...... ·~The Herald-Mail ONLINE - Franklin case goes to grand jury (print view) -OO'R-. '- ~ sa ALL INFO~~TION CONTAI~D . The Herald-Mail ONLINE HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg http://www.herald-mail.com/ Page 1 of2 MARTINSBURG, W.Va. - Probable cause was found Thursday at the U.S., District Courthouse in Martinsburg to send to a grand jury a charge that a Pentagon analyst illegally took classified government documents to his Kearneysville, W.Va., home. pepperb@herald-mail.com Friday June 10, 2005 Franklin case goes to grand jury by PEPPER BALLARD The charge against Lawrence Anthony Franklin, 58, who holds a doctorate in Asian studies and taught history courses at Shepherd University for the past five years, will be referred to the next grand jury, U.S. Magistrate JUdge David J. Joel said Thursday after his finding at the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. Lawrence Franklin, center, surrounded by his attorneys, leaves U.S. District Court in Martinsburg, W.Va., Thursday. (Photo credit: by Kevin G. Gilbert I Staff Photographer) "Dr. Franklin knowingly and unlawfully possessed classified documents in a place he was not permitted to keep them," Joel said. "He admitted he possessed these'documents." Franklin faces up to 10 years in prison and a$250,000 fine if convicted of the charge. A June 30, 2004, search of Franklin's home turned up 83 classified documents, 37 of which were classified as top secret, meaning the release of which would cause "exceptionally greatdamage" to national security, and 34 of which were classified as secret, meaning the release of which would cause "great damage" to national security, FBI Special Agent Thomas Convoy, who spe9ializes in counterterrorism and espionage, testified Thursday. The charge centered on six documents, written between Oqtober 2003 and·June 2004, which included CIA docum.ents about al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden, terrorism documents and an Iraq memorandum, Convoy testified., Franklin was authorized to carry classified documents in Maryland, Virginia and ~ ~ Washington, D.C., but not in West Virginia, Convoy testified. '4 r Convoy testified that Franklinwas a member of the Department of Defense since 197'...If" j and held top-secret clearance since then, but it since has blilen revoked. ~1tlt.a,JV http://www.herald-mail.coml?module=displaystorj&stoty-...:.icJ=114919&format=print _ ,6/19120qS;. - f2SR....WF- ~3·)S ... J\1·~ ~'c..~~ ~ ~,~e Herald-Mail ONLINE - Franklin case goes to grandjury (printview) Page 2 of2 ~....,' ~ -... 0 0 F:ranklin'.$attorney, Plato Cacheris, contended that his client was inappropriately charged. "There is no allegation in this complaint that he intended to injure the U.S.," Cacheris said. He said that such an allegation would have needed to support the claim that Franklin unlawfully held the documents. Franklini wearing a dark suit, sat. behind Cacheris' chair throughout the hearing, nearly motionless. Cacheris said Franklin "had those documents in his home because he was preparing for an interview" for a government position. Convoy testified Franklin was under surveillance prior to the search., "Did you see him transmit those documents to any unauthorized people?" Cacheris asked Convoy. "No, I did not," he responded. u.S. AttomeyThomas E.. Johnston, of West Virginia's northem district, said Franklin "was not authorized to retain these documents, at least at his home." "There is no evidenc~ he delivered them to the employee or officer of the U.S. intended to receive the,m," he said. Johnston said Cacheris' contention that he had to show intent to cause injury to the country "does not apply to this particular charge.II Joel, 'in announcing his finding, said, "\Nhether or not the government properly charged" Franklin is "a matter for another day." In May, Franklin was charged with providing top..secr~t information about potential attacks against U.S.. forces in Iraq to two executives of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the influential pro-Israel lobbying group. Already out on$100,000 bond on the May charge, Franklin was released after this mostrecent charge on $50,000 bond. Joel ordered Thursday that Franklin continue on his present bond. The Associated Press contributed to this story. CopyrightThe Herald-Mail ONLINE hup:/Iwww.herald-mail.com/?inodule=displaystory&story_id=114919&format=print 6/10/2005 Cheers for Wolfy Foundation for Defense of Democracies> In the. Me9ia > Cheers for Wolfy ALL INFOPRATION CONTAINED HEPEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sabJ1sg The New York·Post May 31, 2003 http://www.nypost.com/seven/05312003/postopinion/opedcolumnists·/35893.htm Page'! of2 Last Sunday saw a remarkable event in Washington - one that defied stereotypes about Muslims,and the Bush administration's "hard-liners": Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, widely identified (and denounced) as the main architect of America's Iraq intervention, won 'multiple standing ovations from an audience of hundreds of Muslims He praised the coalition's use of force to remove evil. and he hailed the new reality in Irag. For the first time in 26 years, he said. Shia Muslims had freedom to observe their Arbaeen f~stival in Iraq., The room exploded in applause. The venue~ the first-ever national convention of Shia Muslims from the United States and Canada. Wolfowitz is said to be ~he hardest of neoconse.rvative hardliners. The Shias h~v.e a reputation as the most extreme. anti-Western, ultraradical Muslims. Yet they came'together through the ideal of freedom, and the principle of liberation through the exercise of U.S. military power. Pundits and experts have been wrong about both Wolfowitz and his Shia hosts. Most of the media paint Wolfowitz as an arch-conspiratorial fanatic. Yet the truth. as anybody who has met with him quickly learns•. is that he has an extensive apd nuanced understanding of Islam. He served as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia for three years under President Ronald Reagan. He is also a defender of democracy. taking pride in his key role in helping change the Philippines in the 1980s. He supported the removal of dictator Ferdinand Marcos and the triumph of democratic champion C6razon Aquino. Shia Muslims. for their part. are typically described as extremists in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini -' dismissed with claims that all Shias everywher~ support the Lebanese radicals of Hezbollah. The most recent dire prediction is that the Shia majority in Iraq will establish a rigid Islamic order. But Shias are victims of mass murder in Pakistan, where followers of the Saudi-backed Wahhabi sect hunt and kill them relentlessly. When the Pakistani group Sipah-e-Sahaba (Order of the Prophet's Companions) murdered American reporter Daniel Pearl, he was their first victim who was not a Shia Muslim. Before him, the group had slain hundreds of innocents. I~ addition, Shia Muslims, including a con~idera,b!e,community in the New York are~, are better educated than many other Muslims. Their dedication to self-improvement often makes them a target. In Saudi Arabia, wh~re they are the majority in the oil-rich Eastern Province, they are also an ~conomic elite. But within the Saudi kingdom, they still suffer extraordinary cruelties at the hands of the Wahhabis, who teach in Saudi schools that Shia Islam is the product of a Jewish c9nspiracy. Life is tough forShi8;s, a, minority of 200 millio~, or 15 percent of the world's Muslims. In America, where estimates of the total Muslim popUlation vary from 2 million to 10 million, one in four is Shia. Most came here from Pakistan and Iraq to escape violence. T.h.e Shia na.tion_al cor:tyention.in. Wa~shington, h~ld ~y the Universal MusOm Association o(America http://www.defenddemocracy.orglcnlib/custom_tags/contentlprin~_ email_doc.htm?action=p... 6/9/2005 Foundation for Defense OfDe~' }.r:J~ · .• . ocracies - In theMedia n Page 2 of2 (UMAA) with 3~OOO participants, epresented a new trend in American Musli~e. Until now~ the discourse on Islam in America was dominated, from the Muslim side. by the "Wahhabi lobby" - groups toeing the extremist line of the Saudi regime. The "Wahhabi lobby" includes such entities as the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). These groups have skewed discussion of Islam and Muslims in this country, by presenting America as an aggres~ive power internationally and as an enemy of Muslims. Shia Muslims living in America see the world in very differef}t t~rms. Agha Shaukat Jafri, a Shia community leader in New York and organizer of the UMAA convention~ said~ "We see America as our homeland and ourselves as American Muslims. We consider ourselves an integral part of its body politic. We condemn all forms of terrorism, and we consider these so-called Muslim fighters, who carry out terror, as enemies ofour faith.i ' He described the reception for Wolfowitz as "very warm." He added: 'We should thank the Bush administration for liberating the Shias of Iraq. I think Dr. Wolfowitz understands our viewpoint and our deep opposition to extremism. We were thrilled to have him attend and to hear his words." Others, including non-Muslims, who attended the event were struck by the enthusiasm shown to Paul Wolfowitz. But Jafri put the emphasis in the right place: liThe convention inaugurated a n~w period in the history of American Muslims, of heightened awareness of our responsibilities to the country we live in and hope for the future flourishing of Islam and democracy. At our convention next year, we would like to have President Bush as a guest." And why did a story like this go unreported in the rest of our media? Stephen Schwartz is author of "The Two Faces ofIslam: The House ofSa'ud From Tradition to Te"or, "published by Doubleday, and director ofthe Islam and Democracy Program at the Foundation for the Defense ofDemocracies. Media Type: Print & Online [~~!lt] I[C~ose t~is.~.ndow] @ Copyright 2005 The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies an iaPRs site http://www.defenddemocracy.org/cnlib/custo~_tags/contentJprint_~mail~~oc.htm?action=p... 6/~/2905 ~L INFOrotATION CONTAHJED Q - REIN IS lTMCLASSIFIED ,ATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sabJ sg For Official Use Only FOREIGN MEDIA PERCEPTION SUMMARY Tuesday, July 22, 2003 ITerrorism I Afghanistan I I Iraq aZ) lIZ-North I IZ-Centrall IZ-South I I IZooWMD I IZ-RegimelPoIiticall IZoo Humanitarian Issues I IYemenlHorn of Africa I Iran IGCC I IndialPakistan I Central Asian States I Disclaimer: The articles presented in the Foreign Media Perception are derived entirely from open sources in and around the CENTCOM AOR. The articles selected are a"representative sample of the local media vie\vs and interpretations of current events. The "GeneralThemes" section is a summary of the most prevalent messages and is not an endorsement ofthe validity of the information contained in the articles. General Themes: A foreign media source in the CENTCOM AOR reported that an organization calling itself AI-Jihad Brigades Organization called on the Iraqis not to deal \vith the ne\v provisional Governing Council. They threatened to kill anyone who supports the Governing Council and the coalition forces occupying Iraq. Foreign media sources report that the Iraqi Christian Democratic Party has refused to recognize Iraq's transitional Governing Council, describing its members as administrative 'workers \vithout po\vers. Foreign sources report that Pakistan is seriously considering sending troops to Iraq as a result of the formation of the Governing Council should the Iraqi people request support. 13. Jedda Arab News (Saudi Arabia): Tis the Season to Be Worried Paul Wolfowitz, in the latest Vanity Fair, basically justified using a "convenient" argument, i.e. weapons ofmass destruction, to achieve the great goal:, Iraqi oil. Such politically vulgar messages are not new from Wolfo\vitz and his neo-con gang, but they spread reasonable doubt regarding America's "democratic" intentions for the Middle East. Now as Wolfo\vitz is visiting Baghdad, his face can't conceal a sense of worry. Worry regarding the exposed lies, the increased number ofkillings ofAmerican military personnel, and the growing public opinion against the war. Wolfo\vitz is like a stray cat stuck in a comer. Stray cats when stuck in a comer usually attack .The question that is asked frequently is: Who fed all these lies about the Iraqi weapons WMD program to the president? Most fingers point at the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans, headed by Adam Shulsky, a hard-line neo-conservative. The Office of Special Plans was set up in the fall of2001 as a two-man shop, but it grew into an eighteen-member nerve center ofthe Pentagon's effort to create disinformation, alleging that Iraq possessed WMD and had connections with terrorist groups. -------- --- -------- o Much ofthe garbage produced by that office found its"way into speeches by Rumsfeld, Cheney and Bush. It should be noted that the office was created after Sept. 11 by two of the most fervent and determined neo-cons: Paul Wolfo,vitz himself, the deputy defense secretary, and Douglas Feith, undersecretary ofdefense for policy, to probe into Saddam's WMD programs and his links to al-Qa'ida, because, it is alleged, they did not trost ot~er intelligenc~ agencies ofthe US government to come up with the goods. Most prominent neo-cons are right-wing Jews, and t~nd to be pro-Israeli zealots who,believe that Amer~can and Israeli interests are inseparable -- much to the alarm ofthe liberal pro~ peace Jews, whether in America, Europe, or Israel i~elf. Friends of Ariel Sharon's Likud party, they ten9 to loathe Arabs and Muslims. For them, the cause of "liberating" Iraq had little to do with the well being ofIraqis, just .as the cause of "liberating" Iran and ending its nuclear program -- recently advocated by Shimon Peres -- has little to do with the well being ofIranians. What they seek is an improvement in Israel's military and strategic environment. So-who will put the brakes on this madness, defend US national interests and give the administration wise counsel? Congress? It doesn't appear that way. The issue should go back to the American people. The integrity and credibility oftheir values and their future economic prosperity are very much at stake here. Pe9ple in the Middle East need to see the.ugly words ofWolfo,vitz and his like muted, and they need to see objective democratic results. Only then will Wolfo,vitz and his gang be m~ginalized. At least for a while. IL ALL INFORMATION CONTAI1~D HEREIN IS lTNCLASSIFIED DATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg The United States and Shi'ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba'thist Iraq JuanC91e In post-Saddam Husayn Iraq, Slli'ite militias rapidly established their authority in East Baghdad and other urban 1Zeighborhoodsofthe south. Among the vqrious groups which emerged, the Sadr Movement stands Ollt as militant and cohesive. The sectarian, anti-American Sadrists wish to impose a puritanical, Khomeinist vision on Iraq. Their political influence is potentially milch greater than their numbers. Incorporating them i~to a democratic Iraq while ensuring that they do not come to dominate it poses a severe challenge to tile US Administration. 1 planning the war on Iraq, the American Defense Department a~d· intelligen<.:e organizations appear to have been unaware that millions of Iraqi Shi'ites had joined a militant and puritanical movement dedicated to the establishment of an I~an-style Islamic Republic in Iraq, even though these developments h.ad been detailed in many Arabic-language books and articles. On February 18,2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul WOlfowitz gave an interview on National Public Radio in which he maintained that "The Iraqis are ... by and large quite secular. They are overwhelmingly Shi'a wh~ch is different from the Wahabis of the peninsula, and they don't bring the sensitivity of having the holy cities of Islam being on their territory."· Even mQre disturbingly, this quote shows that Wolfowitz did not realize that religious Iraqi ShiCites are extremely sensitive about foreigners in their shrine cities such as Najafand Karbala, or that these cities are religio~~ power centers of great symbolic potency. US Defense Department leaders such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputies, Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, mistakenly thought that the middle and lower strata of the BaCth bureaucracy, police, and army would survive the war, and that they could simply hand it over to secular expatriate figure Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress. Although from a Shi'ite backgrou!1d, Chalabi was largely unknown in Iraq and was wanted in Jordan on embezzlement charges.. The CIA and the State Department broke with Chalabi late in 2002 when he proved unable -Juan Cole is Professor ofModern Middle Eastern and South Asian History at the University ofMichigan. He is editor of the International Journal of Middle East Studies, and author of numerous books and articles. His recent works include Modernity and the Millennium (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1998) and Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History ofShi~ite Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002). • 1. "Deputy SecretaryWolfowitz Interview with National Public Radio," February 19,2003 at http:/ /www.washingtontile.netl2003IFeblFcb21IBURS09.HTM. MJDDLEEASfJOURNAL*VOLUMBS7.NO.4,AUTUMN2003 II CoreF'anaI pes 543 II ------------------ IL ,544*MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL to account for about$2 million of the 4 million they had given his Iraqi National .Congress. The major religious Shi'ite groups with which the Americans were negotiating were part of Chalabi's group and included the Tehran-based Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the London branch of the al-Da'wa Party, and the Khoei Foundation, of which only al-Da'wa ·had much popularity on the ground in Iraq. The US was ignorant of the Sadr Movement, the main indigenous Shi'ite force. This ignorance wa~ to cost the US great political capital in" the first months of the occupation. - When the Ba'th fell on April 9, 2003, Shi'ite militias seemed suddenly to emerge and take control of many urban areas in the south of the country, as wen as in the desperately poor slums of East Baghdad. The moral authority of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and his more quietist colleagues in Najaf had been known to the US, but it transpired that other ayatollahs and leaders had more political clout. The rank and file of Iraqi Shi'ites in the urban areas was far more radicalized by the last decade of Ba'thrule than anyone on the outside had realized. These developments alarmed Washington, given that some 60% to 65% of Iraqis are Shi'ites, and this group would therefore predominate in a democratic Iraq. The religious groups constitute only one section of the Shi'ite population, perhaps a third or more, but they are well organized and armed. My thesis here is that the Sadr Movement is at the moment the most important tendency among religious Shi'ites in post-Ba'thist· Iraq, and that it is best seen as a sectarian phenomenon in the "sociology of religions" sense. It is prima,rily a youth movement and its rank and file tend to be poor. It is highly puritanical and xenophobic, and it is characterized by an exclusivism unusual in Iraqi Shi'ism. To any extent that it emerges as a leading social force in Iraq, it will prove polarizing and destabilizing. In spring and summer of 2003 its leadership had decided not to challenge actively the coalition military. In contemporary theories of the sociology of religion, a Usect" is characterized by a high degree of tension with mainstream society, employing a rhetoric of difference, antagonism, and separation.2 The "high-tension" model of the sect predicts that. it will attempt strongly to demarcate itself off from the mainstream of society. It will also cast out those members who are perceived to be too accommodating of non-sectarian norms. That is, it demands high levels of loyalty and obedience in the pursuit of exclusivism. IRAQI SHl'ISM IN HISrORY Under the Ottomans, a Sunni political elite flourished in what is now Iraq, with political ties to Istanbul. Shi 'ism· remained vigorous, however. In the eigh~eenth and nineteenth centuries, many -tribespeople of the south converted to the Shi'ite branch of Islam, under the influence of missionaries sent out from the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala, where Shi'ite holy figures Imam 'Ali and Imam Husayn were interred. -2. Rodney StarkandWilliam Sims Bain~ridge, The Future ofReligion (Berkeley and LosAngeles: University ofCalifomia Press, 1985). pp. 19-34, 135. +. II o The Rulemt~e Turbail: Last September, Paul Wolfolvitz was the special guest at a memorial service in Arlington, Va.~ for an influential Shiite cleric killed in a car bombing in Najat: Iraq. The deputy defense secretary hailed Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir ai-Hakim as a Ittrue Iraqi patriot;" and he quoted from the Gettysburg Address as he likened the slain leader to the Union soldiers who haq died to preserve their country. It was a eulogy that ai-Hakim undoubtedly wouid have found jarring. His Islamist political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Re~olution in Iraq, and its 15,OOO-man militia had been funded by Iran, a member gg President Bush's "axis Pievil." And ai-Hakim himselfhad long been wary ~perceived American'imperialism in the Middle East, even as his party, known as SCIRI (pronounced "SEA-ree") [and otherwise also known in Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI)], cooperated. with the Coalition Provisional Authority on the.transfer to Iraqi sovereignty -- the likely reason he was targeted for assassination. As symbolism goes, the memorial service served to highlight the tangled politics in postSaddam Iraq, where idealized notionsM"friend" and "foe" have dissolved into a murJder reality. Once, Pentagon war planners like Wolfowitz envisioned the toppling ~ Saddam Hussein with clarity, predicting that the long-suppressed Shiite majority in Iraq would greet Americans as liberators and that democracy would naturally flower. But clarity has !Jeen washed away by images ~ charred American bodies swinging from bridges and naked Iraqi prisoners on dog leashes. Yet to emerge is a clear outline 9ia new Iraq, which has been tugged in opposite directions by official enemies -- Iran and the United.States -that happen to have shared a common interest in Sadda~'s removal. As the largest mainstream Shiite party, SCIRI is an important player in Iraq's future, but one with an ambivalent history with the United States. It was oneMthe opposition groups that the United States counted on to help bring down Sad9am. Yet SCIRI is also a vehicle in which Iran has invested heavily in a bid for influence in post-Saddam Iraq. And so despiteWolfowi~'s hailing 2fthe slain Ayatollah aI-Hakim as a kind ~ Shiite Abraham Lincoln, it is far from clear that his Islamist party, which supports an Iraqi government run according to Islamic principles, will help build the kind ~ secular democracy that the United States said it hoped to leave behind in Iraq. It is likely that the new Iraqi constitution will be influenced in some manner by Islamic principles, but it's anyb04Y's guess whether a sovereign Iraq -- assuming it stays united -- will look more like a secular Turkey, a cleric-run Iran or something in between. There are too many competing motives and agendas to predict any outcome with certainty, no matter what face US policymakers put on it. The blurring ~ Iranian, American and Iraqi interests came into shm> relief last month when Iraqi and American forces raided the Baghdad home and offices )if Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi on suspicion that the one-time Pentagon favorite had betrayed US secrets to Iran. It was a c.onfusing turn ~ events, made even more perplexing by the fact that Chalabi, a Shiite, had worked openly with Iranians for many y-ears, most prominently-through his contacts withSCIRI, which was knQwn to be an arm ~ Iranian intelligence. In fact, SCIRI was active in Chalabi's INC from 1992 through 1996 and was named in the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act, signed into law by President Clinton, as one ~ the opposition groups that the United States should work with to topple Saddam. It was thus no secret that Chalabi had, a relationship I , • ..,.. o o with Iranian intelligence. But the salient question quickly became: Which American official was so stupid as to tell the INC leader that the United States h~d broken Iran's secret communications code, information that US intelligence said Chalabi then passed on to Iran? Chalabi had long been an informal conduit between the United States and Iran, which have not had formal diplomatic relations since American hostages were seized in the 1979 Islamic revolution. Through SCIRI, the United States kept a back door to Tehran propped open. Had that game now gone awry? SCIRI was founded in 1980, at the beginning ~the Iran-Iraq war, by Iraqi Shiite clerics who sought a haven from oppression by Saddamwith fellow Shiites in neighboring Iran. But the relationship was controversial from the beginning, according to Imam Mustafa al-Qazwini, an Iraqi-born Shiite in Los Angeles whose father was a founder R! SCIRI. A handsome 42-year..old with a neatly trimmed, graying beard, alQazwini wears a black turban, symbolizing his family's descent from the prophet Mohammed. Anaturalized.US citizen, he speaks fluent, colloguial En lish. We met earlier this month at a "%ashington conference ~the J!!ii~~.t~~L~ii!iim\*s~ocHltioil~pf \nieric', an organization !ifpolitically active AmericanShiite Muslims. His father, Ayatollah Mortada al-Qazwini, broke with SCIRI's ai-Hakim soon after the group's founding amid a dispute about its alliance with Iran, al-Qazwini told me. His father believed that Iraqi Shiites would be better served by leaders who remained independent ~ foreign governments -- Iranian or American. In the mid-1980s, the Qazwini clan left Iran for the United States and its open political system. The elder al-Qazwini returned to Iraq last year, settling in Karbala, and, in the model b1Grand Ayatollah Ali al..Sistani, remains aloof from politics in the beliefthat clergy should not playa direct role in governance, his son told me. AI-Qazwini said that he and his father have rebuffed overtures from the US State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency over the years because they did not want to align themselves with any foreign governments. "I always feel, if you can work freely from these governments you should," al-Qazwini said. "Generally Iraqis don't like the ideaMdependence. Once someone is seen as collaborating with a foreign government, they might not be as trusted.II That has been a problem to varying degrees for both Chalabi and SCIRI in Iraq, he added. Still, SCIRI, now led by Ayatollah al-Hakim's younger brother, Abdul Aziz ai-Hakim, retains significant clout as the best organized Shiite party, in part because [{the support it had from Iran. SCIRI is believed to have taken from Iran an amount similar to the more than30 million Chalabi's INC accepted in U.S. funding before being abruptly cut off last month. And despite its quasi..official relationship with the United States, SCIRI mostly kept the Great Satan at arm's length. Until 2002, most contacts with the United States were made informally through Chalabi and Kurdish representatives, according to SCOO's US-based representative, Karim Khutar al-Musawi, who told me about the Eroup over coffee recently in Washington's Mayflower Hotel. Aside from acting as a kin~ ~ liaison between the United States and Iran, in the mid..'90s SCIRI agents also worked openly with Chalabi in northern Iraq on operations to undermine Saddam. Chalabi was then working for the CIA, whose small team in northerri Iraq was headed by former CIA operative Bob Baer. "SCIRI was never under any sort ~ Western supervision or control. They did exactly what they wanted. And they reported to Tehran,II Baer told me. As an American agent, Baer was keen to learn all he could about Iran. Chalabi invited him to meet his contacts in Tehran, but Baer had to decline. "I would (!'- o o have been happy to, but that was a firing offense. The State Department would have gone nuts," he said. But there was no restriction on meeting with SCIRI, which, after all, was partmthe American-backed Iraqi National Congress. . So, Baer said, he talked often with SCIRI agents in northern Iraq, where the Americans and Iranians shared a common enemy in Saddam Hussein. A master manipulator, Chalabi frequently played Iranian and American intelligence off each other, Baer said. The most serious stunt occurred in February 1995, wheri'Chalabi was gathering support for an uprising against Saddam. The Americans were noncommittal and, among other moves, the INC leader went fishing for Iranian support. He forged a letter from America's National Security Council that appeared to direct him to assassinate Saddam, then left it on his desk for Iranian intelligence agents to read, hoping the disinformation would convince the Iranians thatthe United States was serious about toppling Saddam, Baer said. "He was being very practical about this. He needed the Iranians to thinkth~lan would go through so they would let loose with the Badr Brigades,II the armed wing !!f SCIRI. Chalabi's uprising, and a parallel coup planned by Sunni Iraqi military officers inside Iraq, collapsed amid betrayals by the Kurds and continued ambivalence from Washington. The debacle caused both the CIA and SCIRI to part ways with Chalabi in 1996. But by 2002, when it looked as if President Bush was serious about toppling Saddam, SCIRI began sniffing around again. Its representative, al-Musawi, set up shop in Washington. And in August 2002, SCIRI logged its first formal contact with the United States when Ayatollah al-Hakim~ounger brother, Abdul, traveled to Washington as its representative for a pre-war round 91 meetings with Bush administration officials. AI-Hakim"and other Iraqi opposition figures met with Secretary ~. Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary ~ State Colin Powell and (via satellite hookup) Vice President Dick Cheney, al-Musawi said. Also at the 2002 meetings were Chalabi, Iyad Allawi -- the recently named interim prime minister ~ Iraq, who has longtime ties to the CIA -- and two Kurdish representatives, Massoud Barzani and lalal Talabani. "This was the first official contact for SCIRI, because before we did not ~utomatically believe in the American direction -- whether they meant it or not," al-Musawi said, referring to the United States' historical ambivalence toward removing Saddam, most prominently its failure to support Kurds and Shiites in their revolt after the Persian Gulf War, which Saddam brutally suppressed. Graham Fuller, former vice chairman ~the National Intelligence Council at the CIA and an expert on Islam,. said that the United States must deal with SCOO, despite America's preference that Iraq have a strictly secular government. Although SCIRI wants Iraq's government to be run according to Islamic principles, that probably does not mean an Iranian-style theocracy Fuller said. SCOO's al-Musawi confirmed that view, explaining that the party wants a "kind gj separationMchurch and state" in which clergy would not become politicians or government officials. Added Fuller ~ SCIRI: "They are uncomfortable with American goals in the region, and they would see the American policy as hostile, rightly or Wrongly, to any Islamic state, however you interpret that ... They're warymAmerican imperialism in general. But that dQesn't mean they weren't willing to cooperate in furthering the greater goal ~ removing Saddam.II Abdul Aziz ai-Hakim became SCIRI's representative on the United States' handpicked Iraqi Governing Council after the March 2003 invasion &fIraq. But when his brother was killed in the car bombing at the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf last August, aI-Hakim blamed the United States for creating instability and demanded an end to the occupation. Such positions are part ~ -- ----- o o SCIRI's balancing act, Fuller said. "As t~e majority, the Shiites are the beneficiary J!i [any] democracy, so they're willing to cut the United States a lot ~ slack as long as the US is bringing about the goalMdemocracy. But once they get to democracy, they want the United States to please leave," he said. A SCIRI member, Adel Abdul Mahdi, will serve as Iraq's finance minister in the interim government that takes power in Iraq June 30. Mahdi recently declared that the majority Shiites would not stand for limited Kurdish self-rule in the north, setting the stage for a showdown with the Kurds who have said they will secede from the central government without some guarantee Rfautonomy. Shiites, meanwhile, believe that radical Sunni Muslims -- both Iraqis and those newly arrived from other countries -- are targeting their leaders for assassination.with suicide bombings in an attempt to drive a wedge between the twq sects. What's more, "AI-Qaida is trying to make a war between the Sunni and Shia, to destroy the"American project in Iraq and break up the country so the Wahhabis can have influence" with Sunnis, asserted al-Musawi, referring to the strict fu~damentalist brand ~ Islam that is the official.state religion in Saudi Arabia. In that regard Iran, like the United States, also faces uncertainty about its interests in post-Saddam Iraq. A Wahhabi foothold in its next-door neighbor would be an unwelcome development for Iranian Shiites, whom Wahhabis loathe as infidels. Saddam had kept both Sunni and Shiite religious fervor in check through his authoritarian rule. But now there is no guarantee it can be contained. Looming behind this internal political struggle between religious factions are the two major. powers Rlthe Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iran. I The degree to which Iraq might become a chessboard on which they move their pawns remains uncertain. There are already indications that Wahhabi Islam is taking root in Iraq, worried Shiites say. AI-Qazwini, the Shiite imam from Los Angeles, said that on a recent visit to Baghdad he discovered that the Urn al-Tubul mosque had been renamed after 13th century Islamic theologian Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, an intellectual founder ~ Saudi Arabia. IlThere are big signs for the Ibn Taymiyya mosque now. You can see \$.em from the highway," al-Qazwini said. Fuller thinks it makes sense, with all the countervailing forces in the region, for the United States to deal with all major players, even those that have ties to Iran. liThe United States has slowly come around," he said. "The first Bush administration didn't want to touch the Shia. They were afraid the Shia would take over in Iraq" with an Iranian-style theocracy. But, he added, "I think now the US has leamed something about the Shia and their more complex nature. The Shia do not love us, but. they are grateful that we threw out Saddam. Now they want us to complete the job and leave.II It remains unclear which ler~cy will have the most lasting imprint in the new Iraq -- that ~ Abraham Lincoln or that ~ the turbaned clerics in Tehran. Source: Salon (US), Mary Jacoby, June 16,2004 http://fairose.laccesshost.comlnews2/salon24.htm ,. ANTI·:e WAR.S ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED O' ~REIN IS UNCLASSIFIED ~TE 07~29~2010 BY 60324 uc bali1/sab/lsg Page 1 of6 C!~PRINTTHIS May 28, 2004 Chalabi-gate: None Dare Call It Treason Neocons behind bars? Sounds good to me•••• by Justin Raimondo The fallout from Chalabi-gate continues to rain down on the heads of the War Party, opening up the exciting prospect that some neoconsmight well wind up behind bars. The charge? Espionage, as Sidney Blumenthal informs us: '~t a well-appointed conservative think tank in downtown Washington and across the Potomac River at the Pentagon, FBI agents have begun paying quiet calls on prominent neoconservatives, who are being interviewed in an investigation of.potential espionage, ac.cording to intelligence sources. 'Who gave Ahmed Chalabi· classified information about the plans of the U.S. government and military?" This information, says Vince Cannistraro, formerly at the CIA and the Pentagon, was so "very, very sensitive" that only a few U.S. government officials had access to it: "The evidence has pointed quite clearly, not only the fact that Chalabi might be an agent of influence of the Iranian government and that [Chalabi's intelligence chief, Aras Karim Habib] may be a paid agent of the Iranian intelligence service, but it is shown that there is a leak of classified information from the United States to Iran through Chalabi and Karim and that is the particular point that the FBI is investigating. In other words, some U.S. officials are under investigation on suspicion of providing classified information to these people that ended up in Iran." Blumenthal }tas more: '~ former staff member of the Offic.e of Special Plans and a currently serving defense official, two of those said to be questioned by the FBI, are considered witnesses, at least for now. Higher figures are under suspicion. Were they· ,witting or unwitting? If those who are being questioned turn ouf to· be misleading, they can- be charged ultimately with perjury an,q file:/lC:\DOCUME-l\agolwink\LOCALS-l\Temp\XN729MWP.htm 6/13/2005 I ... ; , - Page 2 of6 ., obstruction ofjustice.Qr them, the Watergate PrinQZe applies: It's not the crime, it's the coverup." The lie~ Chalabi fed to Washington policymakers, who eagerly scarfed them up and regurgitated them to the American public, originated with Iranian intelligence, as we are beginning to learn. But the neocon-Tehran information superhighway ran in both directions. As Julian Borger reports in the Guardian: '~n intelligence source in Washington said the CIA confirmed its long-held suspicions when it discovered that a piece of information from an electronic communications intercept by the National Security Agency had ended up in Iranian hands. The information was so sensitive that its circulation had been restricted to a handful of officials. 'This was 'sensitive compartmented information' - SCI - and it was tracked right back to the Iranians through Aras Habib,' the intelligence source said." UPI's Richard Sale reports that "the Federal Bureau of Investigation has launched a full field investigation into the matter,II and gives more information on what was compromised and how the Iranians pulled off this intelligence coup: "Chalabi allegedly passed National Security Agency/CIA intercepts to intelligence agents of the Iranian government using intermediaries or 'cutouts' or 'gophers' within the INC, another former CIA agent said. Some of the intercepts, dated from December, were the basis for a rec~nt Newsweek story, but there are others of a later date in possession of the FBI, this source said." How did Chalabi get his hot little hands on highly secret information? That's why the FBI - instead of going after, say, Brandon .Mayfield, or some other completely innocent person, as per usual - is now calling on "prominent" neocons at Washington's poshest thinktanks. I hope they're bringing an ample supply of handcuffs. But whom might they be handcuffing and frog-marching out the door, into a waiting paddywagon? UPI gives us the scoop, citing "a former very senior CIA official" as saying: "'Chalabi passed specially compartmented intelligence, extraordinarily sensitive stuff, to the. Iranians.' This source said that some of the intercepts are believed to have been given Chalabi by two U.S. officials of the Coalition Provision Authority, both of whom are not named here ·because UPI could not reach them for comment." Well, they aren't named, but they might as well have been: "Qne former CPA official has returned to the United States and is 'employed at ·the American Enterprise Institute, the fQrme~ very senior file:/IQ:\DOCUME-l\agolwink\LOCALS-l\Temp\XN729MWP.htm 6/13/2005 Page 3 of6 ~ offi;ial s~id, a fact wQh FBI sources confinned wQout additional comment. The other is still (l working Pentagon official, federal law enforcement officials and former CIA officials said." Independent journalist Bob Dreyfuss, whose excellent articles on the neocons in The American Prospect and Mother Jones puts him up there with Jim Lobe, Michael Lind, and Joshua Marshall as a veritable maven of neocon-ology, names names: "The two officials in the UPI story are, according to my sources, Harold Rhode, an officzal'in the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, and Michael Rubin, now at the American Enterprise Institute." Rubin, formerly of the Office of Special Plans and the CPA, who served as liaison with Chalabi's group, the Iraqi National Congress, certainly fits the bill. No wonder he's been so tI' cranky lately, what with FBI agents barging into his office and giving him the third degree. Rhode, a longtime Pentagon official assigned to the Office of Net Assessment and a specialist on Islam, is reportedly Douglas Feith's chief enforcer of the anti-Arab party line among the civilian Pentagon hierarchy. In refusing to be interviewed by Dreyfuss for a piece on the neocons in Mother Jones, Rhode's laconic reply was: "Those who speak, pay." Prescient words, arid truer than perhaps even Rhode realized at the time. Hauled up before·a grand jury, however, Rhode, Rubin, and the. rest of Chalabi's Pentagon fan club may have .no choice about speaking - especially with the prosp~ct of a long "vacationII at a ·federal facility staring them in the face. - Much is being made of bow the Iranians "duped" us into invading Iraq, and "used" the U.S. in getting rid of Saddam Hussein and "paving the way," as Julian Borger puts it, for a Shi'ite-ruled Iraq. But a simple map of the region- and rudimentary knowledge of the history of the past ~ecade or so would ha~e revealed as much. As I wrote in this space over a year ago: "In view of Iran's growing sphere of influence in Iraq, it seems rather disingenuous to destroy the Sunni minority government run by the Ba'ath Party and then deny any responsibility for the Shi'ite-y outcome. The U.S. has made a gift of Iraq to Teheran, reigniting the religious passions that overthrew the U.S.-backed Shah Reza· Pahlavi of Iran and propelled Khomeini to power." In charting the outlines of "phase two" of the invasion of Iraq, that same week ,last year, I pointed out: file:/lC:\DOCUME-l\agolwink\LOCALS....l\Temp\XN729MWP.htm 6/13/2005 " Page 4 of6 • . ~ IITh~ mai~ political c£equence of the war, internatjg is to increase Iranian influence: if free elections were held in the southern Shi'a provin_ces of Iraq, they would undoubtedly usher in some sort of 'Islami~ Republic.' The effort by the neocons in the administration to install Ahmed Chalabi as the Pentagon's puppet, far from forestalling this possibility, only makes it a more c~edible threat to the postwar order." But why would the militantly pro-Israel neocons, American partisans of the ultra-nationalist Likud party, act as patrons and promoters of an outfit, Chalabi's INC, that was really a cover for Iranian intelligence - their alleged mortal enemies? That's what I couldn't quite figure out, at least not until I read Robert Parry's excellent piece on the subject, and here's the money quote: - '~s Chalabi's operation fed anti-Saddam propaganda into the u.s. decisionmaking machinery, Bush also should have been alert to the Israeli role in opening doors for Chalabi in Washington. One intelligence source told me that Israel's Likud government had quietly promoted Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress with Washington's influential neoconservatives. That would help explain why the neoconservatives, who share an ideological alliance with the conservative Likud, would embrace and defend Chalabi even as the CIA and the State Department denounced him as a cpn man. "The idea of Israel promoting an Iranian agent also is not far-fetched if one understands the history. The elder Bush could tell his son about the long-standing strategic ties that have ~isted between Israel and Iran, both before and after the. Islamic revolution of 1979. It was Menachem Begin's Likud Party that rebuilt the covert intelligence relationship in 1980. Since then, it has been maintained through thick and thin, despite Iran's public anti-Israeli rhetoric." The enemy of my enemy is my friend: it's a principle, often invoked to justify a course of action seemingly in contradiction to the professed ideology of the actors. Lined up against a common enemy, American Likudniks and Ahmed Chalabi, an Iranian intelligence asset, teamed up to drag us into the Iraqi quagmire, with both members of this oddly coupled tag-team benefiting from the deal. While the neocons fed Chalabi - and his intelligence chief, Arras Karim Habib, a paid Iraqi agent - a steady diet of u.s. secrets, Chalabi fed the neocons (in government and much of the American media) a fresh serving- of tall tales cooked up in the INC's kitchen, and delivered piping hot to Judith Miller's doorstep. The Iranians, for their part, feasted on u.s. secrets so deep and dark that only a few top officials were privy to them - and had a good chunk of Iraq handed to th~m, while a d~ facto Kurdish state emerged as a buffer between Isr~~l an9. the ~hfite power rising in the East. The whole thing- was file:/lC:\DOCUME-l\agolwink\LOCALS-l\Temp\XN729MWP.htm 6/13/2005 ," Page 5 of6 , ..' sup;osed' to have beeQresided over by the ostensiQ pro-Western Chalabi, t4e neocons' Alger Hiss. That was the pl~Jl, at any rate, but something seems to have gone awry.... As in the Abu Ghraib photo-gallery of horrors, the nature of the crime suggests that a few lowly spear carriers -Rubin is just barely out of knee pants, and Rhode was certainly not in the loop on super-sensitive intelligence - didn't pull this off all on their own. Before it's all over, Chalabi-gate will reach into the favored nesting place of the neocons, the very top echelons .of the Pentagon. As UPI editor Martin Walker reports: "The real target goes beyond Chalabi. The hunt is on, in the Republican Party, in Congress, in the CIA and State Department and in a media which is being deluged with leaks, for' Chalabi's friends and sponsors in Washington - the group known as the neo-cons. In particular, the targets seem to be Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, the former assistant secretary (in Reagan's day) Richard Perle, Vice President Dick Cheney's national security aide Scooter Libby, and the National Security Council's Middle East aide Elliott Abrams. The leaking against them - from sources who insist on .anonymity, but some CIA and FBI veterans - is intense. Some of the sources are now private citizens, making a good living through business connections in the Arab world." Speaking of business connections, how does Richard Perle maKe his living except by using his governmentconnections to profit handsomely from the war-driven neocon agenda? Oh well, never mind that: let's get to the juicy 'part. Walker also reports that these poor persecuted neocons "are now beginning to fight back,II and in a familiar fashion: "Richard Perle told this reporter Tuesday that the gloves were off. ... Perle has no doubts that some of the attacks on him are- coming directly from the CIA, in. order to cover their own exposed rears, attacking Chalabi's intelligence to distract attention from their own mistakes. 7 believe that much of th~ CIA operation in Iraq was owned by Saddam Hussein,' Perle said. 'There were 45 decapitation attempts against Saddam - and he survived them all. How could that be, if he was not manipulating the intelligence?'" Gee, I guess this means that, on account of all those failed IIdecapitation attempts" on Fidel Castro over the years, the Cuban Communists exercised joint ownership of the CIA along with Saddam's Ba'athists. Oh, what a Perle of wisdom, but the Prince of Darkness was just getting started: "Perle went on to suggest an even darker motiv_e behind the attacks on the neo-cons; that the real target was Israel's Likud governm~nt a11:d the file:/IC:\DOCUME-l\agolwink\LOCALS-l\Temp\XN729MWP.htm 6/13/2005 Page 6 of6 .." sta~nch ~upportfor /;tel's prime minister Ariel sOon in the Bush administration. When this was put to one CIA source, the reply was mocking: 'That's what they always do. As soon as these guys get any criticism, they scream Israel and anti-Semitism, and I think people are finally beginning to see through that smokescreen.'" How and why an investigation into Iranian penetration of our most closely guarded secrets constitutes evidence of "anti-Semitism" is a question I'll leave (or weightier intellects to ponder. But such an unseemly outburst ought to put to rest any' doubts about a neocon-Iranian convergence of interests: we know something's afoot when both Richard Perle and the Iranian mullahs sound absolutely identical in tone as well as content. We knew what the neocons were capable of: smearing their enemies, lying about practicallyanything, even outing a CIA agent doing high-priority undercover work. Is anyone surprised that they're capable of espionage? Perle is right about one thing:· it's time to take the gloves off. -Justin Raimondo Find this article at: hltp:/lwMY.antiwar.comijustinl?articleid=2683 oCheck the bOx to include the list of links referenced in the article. file:IIC:\DOCUME-l\agolwink\LOCALS-l\Temp\XN729MWP.htm 6/13/2005 ..... ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED The New Yorker: PRINTABLES HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED ~ oDATE 07-29-2010 BY 60324 uc baW/sQ~U;1 THE NEW YORKER. FACT lEfTEI\ A\0a"1 WASHINGION REAL INSIDERS by JEFFREY GOLDBERG A pro-Israel lobby and an F.B.I. sting. Issue of 2005-07-04 Posted 2005-06-27 Page i or9.. Several years ago, I had dinner at Galileo, a Washington restaurant,. with Steven Rosen, who was the the director offoreign-policy issues at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. The group, whi( is better known by its acronym, AIPACt lobbies for Israel's financial and physical security. Like many .lobbyists, Rosen cultivated reporters, hoping to influence their writing while keeping his name out of print He is a voluble man, and liked to ,demonstrate his erudition and dispense aphori~ms. One that he ofte~ repeated could serve as the credo ofK Street, theRodeo Drive ofWashington's'influence ~ industry:. "A lobby is like a night flower: it thrives in the dark and dies in the sun." Lobbyists tend to believe that legislators are susceptible to persuasion in ways that executive-branch bureaucrats are not, and before Rosen came to AlPAC, in 1982 (he had been at the RAND Corporation, t defense-oriented think tank), the group focussed mainly on Congress. ButRosen arrived brandishing f new idea: that the organization could influence the outcome ofpolicy disputes within the executive ~ranch-in particular, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the National Security Council. Rosen began to court officials. He traded in gossip and speculation, and his reports to AlPAC's leaders helped them track currents in Middle East policymaking before those currents coalesced into executivi orders. Rosen also used his contacts to carry A1PAC'S agenda to the White House. An early success car in 1983, when he helpedlobby for a strategic cooperation agreement between Israel and the United States, which was signed over the objections ofCaspar Weinberger, the Secretary ofDefense, and which led to a new level of-intelligence sharing and -military sales. AlPAC is a leviathan among lobbies, as influential in its sphere as the National Rifle Association and th . American Association ofRetired Persons are in theirs, although it is, by comparison, much smaller. (AIPAC has ~bout a hundred thousand members, the N.R.A. more than four million.) President Bush, speaking at the annual AIPAC conference in May of2004, said, "You've always understood and warneagainst the evil ambition ofterrorism and their networks. In a dangerous new century, your work is more vital than ever." AIPAC is unique in the top tier oflobbies because its concerns are the economic ' health and security ofa foreign nation, and because its members are drawn almost entirely from a sing ethnic group. AIPAC's pr~fes~ional staft'=-it employs about a hundred people at its headquarters, two blocks from the Capitol-analyzes,congressional voting records and shares the results with its members, who can then contribute money to candidates directly or to a network of proIsrael political-action committees~ The Center for Responsive Politics, .a public-policy group, estimates that between 1990 at!d 2004 these PA( gave candidates and parties more than twenty million dollars~ Robert H. Asher, a former AIPAC president, told me that the PACs are usu8Ily given euphemistic names eel started a PAC called Citizens Concerned for the National Interest," he said. Asher, who is from Chicago, is a retired manufacturer oflamps and shades, ,and a member ofthe so-called Gang ofFourformer presidents ofAlPAC, who steered the group's policies for more than two decades. (The three 0 others are LanyWeinb~~ a California real"estate developer and a fonner owner ofthe Po~and T!"lIiI-? ~ - http://www.newyorker.comlprintableslfaetl05Q704f!1.J.~ ~~~~15- .eP~OO~[ z.,"Ii\' 'The New Yorker: PRINTABLES o .o Page20f9 Blazers;'Edward Levy, a construction-materials executive from Detroit; and Mayer "Bubba" Mitchell, a retired builder based in Mobile, Alabama.) AIPAC, Asher explained, is loyal to its friends and merciless to its enemies. In 1982, Asher led a campaign to defeat Paul Findley, a Republican congressman from Springfield, Hlinois, who once referred to himself as "¥asir Arafat's best friend in Congress," and who later compared Arafat to Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. "There was a real desire to h~lp Findley out of Congress," Asher said. He identified an obscure Democratic lawyer in Springfield, Richard Durbin, as someone whQ could defeat-Findley.. "We met at my apartment in Chicago, and I recruited him to run for Congress," he recalled. "I probed; his views and I explained things that I had learned mostly from AIPAC. I wanted to make sure,we were supporting someone who was not only against Paul Findley but also a friend of.Israel." Asher went on, "He beat Findley with a lot ofhelp from Jews, in-state and out-of-state. Now, how did the Jewish money find him? I travelled around the country talking about how we had the opportunity to defeat someone unfriendly to Israel. And the gates opened." Durbin, who 'Went on to win a Senate seat, is now the Democratic whip. He is a fierce critic ofBush's Iraq policy but, like AIPAC, generally supports the Administration's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict., Durbin says that he considers Asher to be his "most loyal friend in the Jewish community." Mayer Mitchell led a similar campaign, three years ago, to defeat Earl Hilliard, an Alabama congressman who was a critic oflsr~el. Mitchell helped direct support to a young Harvard Law School graduate named Artur Davis, who challenged Hilliard in the Democratic primary, and he solicited donations from AIPAC supporters across America. Davis won the primary, and the seat. "I, asked Bubba how he felt after Davis won," Asher said, "and he said, CJust like you did when Durbin got elected.' " Mitchell declined'to comment. AIPAC's leaders can be immoderately frank about the group's influence. At dinner that night with Steven Rosen, I mentioned a controversy that had enveloped AIPAC in 1992., David Steiner, a New Jersey real-estate developer who was then serving as AlPAC's president, was caught on tape boasting that he had "cut a deal" with the Administration ofGeorge H.·W.. Bush to provide more aid to Israel. Steiner also said that he was "negotiating" with the incoming Clinton Admini~tration over the appointment of a pro-Israel Secretary ofState. "We have a dozen people in his"-Clinton's-"headquarters .. " and they are all going-to get big jobs," Steiner said. Soon after- the tape's existence was disclos~d, Steiner resigned his post. I aske~ Rosen ifAIPAC suffered a,loss ofinfluence after the Steiner affair. Ahalf smile appeared on his face; and he pushed a napkin across the table. "You see this napkin?" he said. "In twenty-four hours, we could have the signatures ofseventy senators on this n~pkin~" Rosen was influential from the start. He was originally recruited for the job by Larry Weinberg, one ofthe Gang ofFour, and he helped"choose the group's leaders, including the current executive director, Howard Kohr, a Republican who began his AIPAC career as Rosen's deputy. Rosen, who can be argumentative and impolitic, was never a candidate for the top post. "He's a bit ofa kochleJlf'-the Yiddish term for a pot-stirrer, or meddler-Martin Indyk, who also served as Rosen's deputy, and who went on to become Preside~t Clinton's Ambassador to Israel, says. Rosen has. had an unusually eventful private life, marrying and divorcing six times (he is living again with his first wife); and he has a well-developed sense of paranoia. When we met, he would sometimes lower his voice, even when he was preparing to deliver an anodyne pronouncement. "Hostile ears·are always listening," he was fond ofsaying. Nevertheless, he is a keen analyst ofMiddle East politics, and a savvy bureaucratic infighter. His http://www.ne)v:y.Qlker.comlprintableslfactJ0507Q4fa_fa~ 6/27/2005 The New Yorker: PRINTABLES o o Page 3 of.9 views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are not notablY"4aw.kish;' he. onc~ c~l~ed bimselfCCtoo right for the left, and too left for the right." He is a hard-liner on.only one subject-Iran-and this preoccupation help"ed shape A1PAC's position: that Iran poses a greater threat to ~srael than any other n~tion. In this way, AIPAC i~ in agreement with a long line ofIsraeli leaders; including Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who fears Iran's nuclear intentions more than lie ever feared Saddam Hussein's. (AIPAcJobbied Congress in favor ofthe ~q war, but Iraq ~as not been one of its chief concems.).Rosen's main role at A1PAC, he once told me, was to collect evidence of· "Iranian perfidy" and share it with the United States. Unlike American n~oconselVatives, who have openly supported the Liktia Party over the m~re liberal Labor'Party, AIPAC does not generally take sides,in Israeli politics. But on Iran AIPAc's views resemble those ofthe neoconselVatives. In 1996, Rosen and other AIPAc,stattmembers helped write, and engineer the passage ot: the Iran and'Libya Sanctions Act, which imposed. sanctions on foreign oil companies doing business with tliose two countries; AIPAC ,is determine~-, above all, to deny Iran tl!e ability to m~ufactUre nuclear weapons. Iran was a main focus ofthis year's AIPAC policy conference, which was held in May at t~e Washington Convention Cente~. Ariel Sharon and ~ecretary ofState Condoleezza Rice, amorig others, addre.sseHe continued, "Do you know how dangeroys lran.is to our forces in the Gulf? We have great force~oncentration issues now'~-the presence of Americ~troops in Iraq-~'and the Iranians are very interested in making life difficult for American forces. They have the capability. You watch what they're do,ing in Iraq. Their infiltration is everywhere.." Franklin seeme~ more frustrated with American policy in Iran than he had the year before. "We don't understand that it'"s doable-regime change is doable," he said. "The people are so desperate to become free, and the mullahs are so unpopular. They're so pro-American, the people." Referring to the Bush Administration, he said, "That's what they don't understand," and he added, "And they also don't understand how anti-American the mullahs are.," Franklin was convinced that the Iranians would commit acts ofterrorism against Americans, on American soil. "'J;hese guys are a threat to us in Iraq and even at home," he said. Franklin was not a high-ranpng Pentagon official; he was five steps removed in the hierarchy from Douglas Feith, th~ Under-Secretary for Policy. For two years, though, he had been trying to change Atp.erican policy., His efforts took many fonns, including calls to reporters, meetings with Rosen and Weissman and with the political counsellor at the Israeli Embassy, Naor Gilan. According to Tracy O'Grady-Walsh~ a Pentagon spokeswoman, he w~ not acting on behalfof his superiors: "IfLany Franklin was fonnally or infonnally lobbying, he was doing it on his own." , ", Franklin also·sought infonnation from Iranian dissidents who might aid his cause. In December of2001, he and Rhode met in Rome with Michael'Ledeen and'a group ofIranians, including Manucher Ghorbanifar. Ledeen, who helped arrange the meeting, told me that the dissidents gave Franklin and Rhode infonnation about Iranian threats against American soldiers in Afghanistan. ·http://www.newyorker.comlprintableslf~ctl05Q7_04ftLf~~t 6/27/2005 The New Yorker: PRINTABLES , 0 o Page 5 of9 (Rhode- did not return calls seeking comment.) Franklin was initially skeptical~about the meeting, Ledeen said, but emerged believing that America could do business with these dissidents. Franklin's meetings with Gilon and with the two AIPAC men make up the heart ofthe indictment against him. The indictment alleges that Rosen-"CC;.I," or "Co-Conspirator 1"-caIIed the Pentagon in early August of2002, looking for the name ofan Iran specialist. He made contact with Franklin a short time later, but, according to the indictment, they did not meet until February of2003.. In their meetings, according to seve~ people with knowledge ofthe conversations, Franklin told the lobbyists that Secretary of State Colin Powell was resisting attempts by the Pentagon to formulate a tougher Iran policy. He apparently hoped to use AIPAC to lobby the Administration. The Franklin indictment suggests that the F.BJ. had been watching Rosen as well; for instance, it. . alleges that, in February of2003, Rosen, on his way to a meeting with Franklin, told someone'on' , the phone that he "was excited to meet with a 'Pentagon 8\1Y' because this person was a 'real insi~er..' " Franklin, Rose~, and Weissman met openly four times in 2003.. At one point, the indictment reads, somewhat mysteriously, "On or about March 10,2003, Franklin, CC-I and CC2"- Rosen and Weissman"'::"~cmet at Union Station early in the morning. In the course ofthe meeting, the three men moved from one restaurant to another restaurant and then finished the meeting in an empty restaurant." On June 26, 2003, at a lunch at the Tivoli Restaurant, near the Pentagon, Franklin reportedly told Rosen and Weissman about a draft ofa National Security Presidential Directive that outlined a series oftougher steps that the U.S. could"take against the Iranian leadership. The draft was written by a young Pentagon aide named Michael Rubin (who is now affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute). Franklin did not hand over a copy ofthe draft, but he described its contents, and, according to the indictment, talked about the "state ofinternal United States government deliberations." The'indictment also alleges that Franklin gave the two men "highly classified" information about potential attacks on American forces in Iraq. In mid-August of2002, according to the indictment, Franklin met with Oilon-'identified simply as "FO," or "foreign official"-at a restaurant, and Oilon explained to Franklin that he was the "policy" person at the Embassy. The two met regularly, the indictment alleges, often at the Pentagon OfficerS' Athletic'Club, to discuss "foreign-policy issues," particularly regarding a "Middle Eastern couniry"-Iran, by all accounts-and "its nuclear program." The indictment suggests that Franklin was receiving information and policy advice from Gilon; after one meeting, Franklin drafted an "Action Memo" to his supervisors incorporating Oilon's suggestions. Oilon is an expert on weapons proliferation, according to Danny Ayalon, the Israeli Ambassador, and has briefed reporters about Israel's position on Iran. A-ccording to Lawrence Di Rita, a Pentagon spokesman, it is part of the "job description" ofDefense D~partment desk 6ffigers to meet with their foreign counterparts. "Desk officers meet with foreign officials all the time, not with ministers, but interactions with people at their level," he said.. The indictment contends, however, that on two occasions Franklin gave Oilon classified information. The is~ue ofIsrael's activities in Washington is unusually sensitive. Twenty years ago, a civilian Naval Intelligence analyst named Jonathan Pollard·was caught stealing American secrets on behalfof an Israeli intelligence cell-a "rogue" cell, the Israelis later claimed. Pollard said that he 'was driven to treason because, as a Jew, he could not abide what he saw as America's unwillingness to share crucial intelligen~ with Israel. Pollard's actions were an embarrassment for American Jews, who fear the accusation of"dualloyalty"-the idea that they split their allegiance between the United States and Israel. For Israel, the case was a moral and political disaster. And there are some in the American intelligence community who suspect that Israel has never stopped spying on the United States. http://www.newyorker.com!printableslfactJ0507.04(a_fac! 6/27/2005 The New Yorker: PRINTABLES '0 o Page60f9 b7E ~ii~rthis month, Ayalon told me iliat lS~el dQes not "collect any intelligence on the United S~tes, period, full stop.. We won't do anything to risk tpis most important relationship.~' In any case, he said, there was no need to spy, ~'because cooperation is so intimate and effective between Israel and th~ U.S." Ayalon als9, said that Gilon, who is returning ~o Jerusalem later this summer, remains an important member ofhis staff; in recent months, Gilon has attended meetings at the. State Department, the Pentagon, and the White House. n June of2004, F.B.I. agents searched Franklin's Pentagon office and his h9me in·West .rginia, and allegedly found eighty-three classified documents. Some had to do with the Iran ebate, but some pertained to Al Qaeda and Iraq. (A separate federal indictment, citing the ocumentS, has be~anded d~~. i_n.}\'~t VIrginia.) ~~9r:d~pg.tQ a~p'er:sQn;:with.~owl~~g~ of ~~i!l~S-~as~,Jh~ilg~J~\q;~~ftT!6':af~~~q~#i~W~!~§ffi~~et~~W-9j@~g:~g..~~~~ .:": ~~~'::'~~~~lIffanldiii:fiiced·ftiiD%tli~~Qcum~~~~fQ~.na 'ift:,hi~;,Ii.QiJsef29.ulg~~!f~li~nijii~ a...- ~9.!t~llie~~IlfS2~~:J?~~!!!;~w.h~;!!ig[#,.Q~l&~v~~:I~:wYe~;;~gr~~.g.;t9t~9Jw1m~~!~~~~g~Oh9t i?~~~!f~Jl1:W.~i~!~!ialllio~~~~ppiieiitlY;lie:MiaS~ndtgiYeii~fii:reiUrnr~j~p'eCj.~Pt9.iP.~~~j~·"::-·-:::> {!~ni'e1i,*;Soon,he was wired, and was asked to contact the two AIP!\C employees. On July-21s~~ Fiiiiidin called Weissman and said that he had to speak to him immediately-that it was a matter oflife and death: They arranged to meet outside the Nordstrom's department store at Pentagon €ity.. Amonth before that meeting, The New Yorker had published an article by Seymour HerSh about the ~ctivities o(Israeli intelligence agents in northern Iraq. Franklin, who held a top-secret security clearance, allegedly told Weissman that he had new, classified info.rmation indicating that Iranian agents were planning to kidnap and kill the Israelis referred to by Hersh. American intelligenc~ Iqtew ~out tile threat, Franklin ~aid, but Israel ~ight not. He also said that the -Iranians had infi~trated southern Iraq, and were planning attacks o~ American soldiers. Rosen and Weissman, Franklit) hoped, .could insure that senior Administration officials received this news.. It is unclear whether what ;FranklilJ. relayed was troeor whether it had been manufactured ~y the F.B.I. TheBureau has refused to comment on the case. Weissman hurried back to AlPAC's headquarters. and briefed Rosen and Howard Kohr, AIPAC's executive director. According to AIPAC sources, Rosen and Weissman-asked K.ohr to gtve the information to Elliott Abrams, the senior Middle East official on the National Security CounciL Kohr didn't get in touch with Abrams, but Rosen andW~issman made two calls. They called. Oilon and told him about the threat to Israeli agents in Iraq, and then they called Glenn Kessler, a diplomatic correspondent at the Washington Post. and told him about the threat to Americans. Amonth later, on the morning ofAugust 27,2004, F.B.I. agents vi~ited Rosen· at his home, in Silver Spring, Maryland, se~king to question him. Rosen quickly called AlPAC'S lawyers. That night, CBS News reported that an unnamed Israeli "mole" had been discovered in ~he Pentagon, and that the mole had been passing documents to two officials of.AI?AC, who were passing the documents on tQ Israeli officials. Within days, the names ofFranklin, Rosen, and Weissman were made p~bl~c. TheF.B:I. informed Franklin that he was going tQ be charged with illegal possession ofclassified documents. Franklin was said by friends to be frightened, ~nd surprised. He said that he could not afford to hire a lawyer. The F.B.I. arranged for a court-appoiIited' att~rney to represent him.. The lawyer, a former federal prosecutor, advised him to plead guilty to espionage charges, ana receive a prison sentence of six to eight years. &16~1Jlj~~F~id1i~t~cii;~fi~~i~li~~I;~~4~~9;~m~;~J~;.~9~m~t!eI~:.o~~n .~ ~ _.~ • ..........---...._~..~~..~Lo~ p... _- -=-:a..-..-"'=:. ~.'''- 'C'I.~'''''~"_,,,,--,,:,:"'Ilo.~ . . http://www.newyorker.corolpri~!!l!?I~{~~t!Q?Q7Q4t~Ja~ _-. _ _ . '6/27/2005' TheNew Y-orker: PRINTABL0ES o Page.70f9 policy. "I called him and said, 'Larry, what's going on?' "·Ledeen recalled. "He said, 'Don't worry.. Sharansky' "-Natan Sharansky, the former Soviet dissident-" 'survived years in the Gulag, and I'll survive prison, too.' I said, 'What are you talking about?' He told me what was going on. I asked him ifhe had a good lawyer."'Ledeen called the criminal-defense attorney Plato Cacheris. "I knew him from when he served as Fawn's attorney," Ledeen said, referring to Fawn Hall, who was Colonel Oliver North's secretary at the time ofthe Iran-Contra affair. Cacheris has also represented Monica Lewinsky and the F.B.I. agent Robert Hanssen, who spied for Moscow. Cacheris offered to represent Franklin pro bono, and Franklin accepted the offer.. AIPAC launched a special appeal for donations-for the organization, ~ot for Rosen and Weissman.. "Your generosity at this time will help ensure that false allegations do not hamper our ability or yours to work for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship and a safe and secure Israel," AlPAC'S leaders wrote in the letter accompanying the appeal. But in December four AIPAC officials, including Kohr, were subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia. In March, AlPAC's principal lawyer, Nathan Lewin, met with the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District ofVirginia, Paul McNul~, who agreed to let Lewin see some ofthe evidence ofthe Pentagon City sting. According to an AIPAC source, an eleven-second portion ofthe telephone conversation between Rosen, Weissman, and the Post's Glenn Kessler, which the F.B.I. had recorded, was played for Lewin. In tha~ conversation, Rosen is alleged to have told Kessler about Iranian·agents in.southem Iraq-information that Weissman had received from Franklin. In the part ofthe conversation that Lewin heard, Rosen jokes about "not getting in trouble" over the infonnation. He also ~otes, "At least we have no Official Secrets Ace'-the British law that makes journalists li~ble to prosecutiQn ifthey publish classified material. Prosecutors argu~d to Lewin that this sPltement proved that Rosen and Weissman were aware that the info~ation ,Franklin had given them was classified, and thatRosen must therefore have mown that he was passing classified information to Oilon, a foreign official. Lewin, who declined to comment on the case, recommended that AlPAC fire Rosen and Weissman. He also told the board that McNulty had promised that AIPAC itselfwould not be a target ofthe espionage investigation. An AIPAC spokesman, Patrick Dorton, said ofthe firing, "Rosen and Weissman were dismissed because they engaged in conduct that was not part oftheirjobs, and because this conduct did not comport with the standards that AIPAC expects and requires ofits employees.tt When iasked Abbe Lowell, Rosen's lawyer, about the firings, he said, "Steve Rosen's dealings with Larry Franklin were akin to his dealings with executive-branch officials for more than two decades and were well1a).own, encouraged, and appreciated by AIPAC.." Last month, I met with Low~ll and Rosen in Lowell's office, which these days is a center of Washington sqandal management.. (He also represents the fallen lobbyist Jack Abramoff.) Lowell had instructed Rosen not to discuss specifics of}he case, but Rosen expressed disbeliefthat his career had'been ended by an F.B.I. investigation. "I'm being looked at for things I've done for twen~-three years, which other foreign-poli9Y groups, hundreds offoreign-policy groups, are doing," Rosen said, and went on, "Ourjob. at AIPAC was to understand what the government is doing, in order to help fonn better policies, in the interests ofthe U.S. I've never done anything illegal orharmful to the U.S. I never even dreamed ofdoing anything harmful to the U.S." Later, he said, "We did not knowingly receive classified infonnation from Lany Franklin." Lowell added, "When the facts are known, this will be a case not about Rosen and Weissman's actions but about the government's actions." Lowell said that he would not rehearse his arguments against any charges until there is an indictment. J' Rosen said that he was particularly upset by the al~egation that, because he had informed OiloD http://www~newyorker~comlprintableslfactJOS0704faJ~ct 6/27/2005 TheNew Yorker:.PRINTABL0ES o P~ge8of9 that Israeli lives might be in danger, he.was a spy forIsrael. "IfI had been given information that British or Australian soldiers were going to be kidnapped or killed in Iraq, I think I would have done the same thing," he said."'!'d have tried to warn them by calling friends at those e~bassies." He wants to believe that he could return to AIPAC if he is exonerated, but this does not seem likely. AIPAC leaders are downplayillg Rosen's importance to the organization.. "AIPAC is focussed primarily on legislative lobbying," Dorton told me. Rosen's severance pay will end in September, although AIPAC, in accordance with its bylaws, will continue to pay legal fees for Rosen and Weissman. Rosen's defenders are critical ofAIPAC for its handling ofthe controversy. Martin Indyk, who is now the director ofthe Saban Center for Middle East Policy, a think tank within the Brookings Institution, thinks that AIPAC made a tactical mistake by cutting offthe two men. "It appears they've abandoned their own on the battlefield," he says. "Because they cut Steve on: they leave. him no choice." Indykwouldn't elaborate, but the implication was clear: Rosen and Weissman will defend themselves by arguing that they were working in concert with the nighest officials of the organization, including Kohr. Until there is an indictment, the government's full case against Rosen and Weissman cannot be known; no one in the Justice Department will comment. The laws concerning the di~semination ofgovernment secrets are sometimes ambiguous and often unenforced, and prosecutors in such cases face complex choices. According to Lee Strickland, a former chief privacy officer ofthe C.I.A., prosecutors pressing espionage charges against Rosen and Weissman would have t9 prove that the information the two men gave to Gilon not merely was classified but rose to the level of "national-defense information," meaning that it could cause dire harm to the United States.. Yet a reporter who called the Embassy to discuss the same iJiformation in the course of preparing a story-thus violating the same statute-would almost certainly not be pro~ecuted., Strickland continued, "Twice in the Clinton Administration we had proposals to broaden the statutes to include the recipients, not just the leakers, ofclassified information.. TheNew York Times and the Washington Post went bat-shit about this legislation. They saw it as an attempt to shut down . leaks." IfAmerican law did punish those who receive, and then pass on, or publish, privileged information, much oftheWasllington press corps would be in jail, ~ccording t