911 Commission Cover-up

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SEC 9/11

100 ways the 911 Commission is utter cover-up,  Global Research

2. The omission of evidence about Mohamed Atta - such as his reported fondness for alcohol, pork, and lap dances -- that is in tension with the Commission's claim that he had become fanatically religious (20-21).

3. The obfuscation of the evidence that Hani Hanjour was too poor a pilot to have flown an airliner into the Pentagon (21-22).

4. The omission of the fact that the publicly released flight manifests contain no Arab names (23).

5. The omission of the fact that fire has never, before or after 9/11, caused steel-frame buildings to collapse (25).

6. The omission of the fact that the fires in the Twin Towers were not very big, very hot, or very long-lasting compared with fires in several steel-frame buildings that did not collapse (25-26).

7. The omission of the fact that, given the hypothesis that the collapses were caused by fire, the South Tower, which was struck later than the North Tower and also had smaller fires, should not have collapsed first (26).

8. The omission of the fact that WTC 7 (which was not hit by an airplane and which had only small, localized fires) also collapsed - an occurrence that FEMA admitted it could not explain (26).

9. The omission of the fact that the collapse of the Twin Towers (like that of Building 7) exemplified at least 10 features suggestive of controlled demolition (26-27).

10. The claim that the core of each of the Twin Towers was "a hollow steel shaft" - a claim that denied the existence of the 47 massive steel columns that in reality constituted the core of each tower and that, given the "pancake theory" of the collapses, should have still been sticking up many hundreds of feet in the air (27-2.

11. The omission of Larry Silverstein's statement that he and the fire department commander decided to "pull" Building 7 (2.

12. The omission of the fact that the steel from the WTC buildings was quickly removed from the crime scene and shipped overseas before it could be analyzed for evidence of explosives (30).

13. The omission of the fact that because Building 7 had been evacuated before it collapsed, the official reason for the rapid removal of the steel - that some people might still be alive in the rubble under the steel - made no sense in this case (30).

14. The omission of Mayor Giuliani's statement that he had received word that the World Trade Center was going to collapse (30-31).

15. The omission of the fact that President Bush's brother Marvin and his cousin Wirt Walker III were both principals in the company in charge of security for the WTC (31-32).

16. The omission of the fact that the west wing of the Pentagon would have been the least likely spot to be targeted by al-Qaeda terrorists, for several reasons (33-34).

17. The omission of any discussion of whether the damage done to the Pentagon was consistent with the impact of a Boeing 757 going several hundred miles per hour (34).

18. The omission of the fact that there are photos showing that the west wing's façade did not collapse until 30 minutes after the strike and also that the entrance hole appears too small for a Boeing 757 to have entered (34).

19. The omission of all testimony that has been used to cast doubt on whether remains of a Boeing 757 were visible either inside or outside the Pentagon (34-36).

20. The omission of any discussion of whether the Pentagon has a anti-missile defense system that would have brought down a commercial airliner - even though the Commission suggested that the al-Qaeda terrorists did not attack a nuclear power plant because they assumed that it would be thus defended (36).

21. The omission of the fact that pictures from various security cameras - including the camera at the gas station across from the Pentagon, the film from which was reportedly confiscated by the FBI immediately after the strike - could presumably answer the question of what really hit the Pentagon (37-3.

22. The omission of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's reference to "the missile [used] to damage [the Pentagon]" (39).

23. The apparent endorsement of a wholly unsatisfactory answer to the question of why the Secret Service agents allowed President Bush to remain at the Sarasota school at a time when, given the official story, they should have assumed that a hijacked airliner might be about to crash into the school (41-44).

24. The failure to explore why the Secret Service did not summon fighter jets to provide air cover for Air Force One (43-46).

25. The claims that when the presidential party arrived at the school, no one in the party knew that several planes had been hijacked (47-4.

26. The omission of the report that Attorney General Ashcroft was warned to stop using commercial airlines prior to 9/11 (50).

27. The omission of David Schippers' claim that he had, on the basis of information provided by FBI agents about upcoming attacks in lower Manhattan, tried unsuccessfully to convey this information to Attorney General Ashcroft during the six weeks prior to 9/11 (51).

28. The omission of any mention of the FBI agents who reportedly claimed to have known the targets and dates of the attacks well in advance (51-52).

29. The claim, by means of a circular, question-begging rebuttal, that the unusual purchases of put options prior to 9/11 did not imply advance knowledge of the attacks on the part of the buyers (52-57).

30. The omission of reports that both Mayor Willie Brown and some Pentagon officials received warnings about flying on 9/11 (57).

31. The omission of the report that Osama bin Laden, who already was America's "most wanted" criminal, was treated in July 2001 by an American doctor in the American Hospital in Dubai and visited by the local CIA agent (59).

32. The omission of news stories suggesting that after 9/11 the US military in Afghanistan deliberately allowed Osama bin Laden to escape (60).

33. The omission of reports, including the report of a visit to Osama bin Laden at the hospital in Dubai by the head of Saudi intelligence, that were in tension with the official portrayal of Osama as disowned by his family and his country (60-61).

34. The omission of Gerald Posner's account of Abu Zubaydah's testimony, according to which three members of the Saudi royal family - all of whom later died mysteriously within an eight-day period - were funding al-Qaeda and had advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks (61-65).

35. The Commission's denial that it found any evidence of Saudi funding of al-Qaeda (65-6.

36. The Commission's denial in particular that it found any evidence that money from Prince Bandar's wife, Princess Haifa, went to al-Qaeda operatives (69-70).

37. The denial, by means of simply ignoring the distinction between private and commercial flights, that the private flight carrying Saudis from Tampa to Lexington on September 13 violated the rules for US airspace in effect at the time (71-76).

38. The denial that any Saudis were allowed to leave the United States shortly after 9/11 without being adequately investigated (76-82).

39. The omission of evidence that Prince Bandar obtained special permission from the White House for the Saudi flights (82-86).

40. The omission of Coleen Rowley's claim that some officials at FBI headquarters did see the memo from Phoenix agent Kenneth Williams (89-90).

41. The omission of Chicago FBI agent Robert Wright's charge that FBI headquarters closed his case on a terrorist cell, then used intimidation to prevent him from publishing a book reporting his experiences (91).

42. The omission of evidence that FBI headquarters sabotaged the attempt by Coleen Rowley and other Minneapolis agents to obtain a warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui's computer (91-94).

43. The omission of the 3.5 hours of testimony to the Commission by former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds - testimony that, according to her later public letter to Chairman Kean, revealed serious 9/11-related cover-ups by officials at FBI headquarters (94-101).

44. The omission of the fact that General Mahmoud Ahmad, the head of Pakistan's intelligence agency (the ISI), was in Washington the week prior to 9/11, meeting with CIA chief George Tenet and other US officials (103-04).

45. The omission of evidence that ISI chief Ahmad had ordered $100,000 to be sent to Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11 (104-07).

46. The Commission's claim that it found no evidence that any foreign government, including Pakistan, had provided funding for the al-Qaeda operatives (106).

47. The omission of the report that the Bush administration pressured Pakistan to dismiss Ahmad as ISI chief after the appearance of the story that he had ordered ISI money sent to Atta (107-09).

48. The omission of evidence that the ISI (and not merely al-Qaeda) was behind the assassination of Ahmad Shah Masood (the leader of Afghanistan's Northern Alliance), which occurred just after the week-long meeting between the heads of the CIA and the ISI (110-112).

49. The omission of evidence of ISI involvement in the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Reporter Daniel Pearl (113).

50. The omission of Gerald Posner's report that Abu Zubaydah claimed that a Pakistani military officer, Mushaf Ali Mir, was closely connected to both the ISI and al-Qaeda and had advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks (114).

51. The omission of the 1999 prediction by ISI agent Rajaa Gulum Abbas that the Twin Towers would be "coming down" (114).

52. The omission of the fact that President Bush and other members of his administration repeatedly spoke of the 9/11 attacks as "opportunities" (116-17).

53. The omission of the fact that The Project for the New American Century, many members of which became key figures in the Bush administration, published a document in 2000 saying that "a new Pearl Harbor" would aid its goal of obtaining funding for a rapid technological transformation of the US military (117-1.

54. The omission of the fact that Donald Rumsfeld, who as head of the commission on the US Space Command had recommended increased funding for it, used the attacks of 9/11 on that very evening to secure such funding (119-22).

55. The failure to mention the fact that three of the men who presided over the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks - Secretary Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, and General Ralph Eberhart - were also three of the strongest advocates for the US Space Command (122).

56. The omission of the fact that Unocal had declared that the Taliban could not provide adequate security for it to go ahead with its oil-and-gas pipeline from the Caspian region through Afghanistan and Pakistan (122-25).

57. The omission of the report that at a meeting in July 2001, US representatives said that because the Taliban refused to agree to a US proposal that would allow the pipeline project to go forward, a war against them would begin by October (125-26).

58. The omission of the fact that Zbigniew Brzezinski in his 1997 book had said that for the United States to maintain global primacy, it needed to gain control of Central Asia, with its vast petroleum reserves, and that a new Pearl Harbor would be helpful in getting the US public to support this imperial effort (127-2.

59. The omission of evidence that some key members of the Bush administration, including Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, had been agitating for a war with Iraq for many years (129-33).

60. The omission of notes of Rumsfeld's conversations on 9/11 showing that he was determined to use the attacks as a pretext for a war with Iraq (131-32).

61. The omission of the statement by the Project for the New American Century that "the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein" (133-34).

62. The claim that FAA protocol on 9/11 required the time-consuming process of going through several steps in the chain of command - even though the Report cites evidence to the contrary (158).

63. The claim that in those days there were only two air force bases in NORAD's Northeast sector that kept fighters on alert and that, in particular, there were no fighters on alert at either McGuire or Andrews (159-162).

64. The omission of evidence that Andrews Air Force Base did keep several fighters on alert at all times (162-64).

65. The acceptance of the twofold claim that Colonel Marr of NEADS had to telephone a superior to get permission to have fighters scrambled from Otis and that this call required eight minutes (165-66).

66. The endorsement of the claim that the loss of an airplane's transponder signal makes it virtually impossible for the US military's radar to track that plane (166-67).

67. The claim that the Payne Stewart interception did not show NORAD's response time to Flight 11 to be extraordinarily slow (167-69).

68. The claim that the Otis fighters were not airborne until seven minutes after they received the scramble order because they did not know where to go (174-75).

69. The claim that the US military did not know about the hijacking of Flight 175 until 9:03, when it was crashing into the South Tower (181-82).

70. The omission of any explanation of (a) why NORAD's earlier report, according to which the FAA had notified the military about the hijacking of Flight 175 at 8:43, was now to be considered false and (b) how this report, if it was false, could have been published and then left uncorrected for almost three years (182).

71. The claim that the FAA did not set up a teleconference until 9:20 that morning (183).

72. The omission of the fact that a memo by Laura Brown of the FAA says that its teleconference was established at about 8:50 and that it included discussion of Flight 175's hijacking (183-84, 186).

73. The claim that the NMCC teleconference did not begin until 9:29 (186-8.

74. The omission, in the Commission's claim that Flight 77 did not deviate from its course until 8:54, of the fact that earlier reports had said 8:46 (189-90).

75. The failure to mention that the report that a large jet had crashed in Kentucky, at about the time Flight 77 disappeared from FAA radar, was taken seriously enough by the heads of the FAA and the FBI's counterterrorism unit to be relayed to the White House (190).

76. The claim that Flight 77 flew almost 40 minutes through American airspace towards Washington without being detected by the military's radar (191-92).

77. The failure to explain, if NORAD's earlier report that it was notified about Flight 77 at 9:24 was "incorrect," how this erroneous report could have arisen, i.e., whether NORAD officials had been lying or simply confused for almost three years (192-93).

78. The claim that the Langley fighter jets, which NORAD had previously said were scrambled to intercept Flight 77, were actually scrambled in response to an erroneous report from an (unidentified) FAA controller at 9:21 that Flight 11 was still up and was headed towards Washington (193-99).

79. The claim that the military did not hear from the FAA about the probable hijacking of Flight 77 before the Pentagon was struck (204-12).

80. The claim that Jane Garvey did not join Richard Clarke's videoconference until 9:40, after the Pentagon was struck (210).

81. The claim that none of the teleconferences succeeded in coordinating the FAA and military responses to the hijackings because "none of [them] included the right officials from both the FAA and the Defense Department" - although Richard Clarke says that his videoconference included FAA head Jane Garvey as well as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, the acting chair of the joint chiefs of staff (211).

82. The Commission's claim that it did not know who from the Defense Department participated in Clarke's videoconference - although Clarke's book said that it was Donald Rumsfeld and General Myers (211-212).

83. The endorsement of General Myers' claim that he was on Capitol Hill during the attacks, without mentioning Richard Clarke's contradictory account, according to which Myers was in the Pentagon participating in Clarke's videoconference (213-17).

84. The failure to mention the contradiction between Clarke's account of Rumsfeld's whereabouts that morning and Rumsfeld's own accounts (217-19).

85. The omission of Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta's testimony, given to the Commission itself, that Vice-President Cheney and others in the underground shelter were aware by 9:26 that an aircraft was approaching the Pentagon (220).

86. The claim that Pentagon officials did not know about an aircraft approaching Pentagon until 9:32, 9:34, or 9:36 - in any case, only a few minutes before the building was hit (223).

87. The endorsement of two contradictory stories about the aircraft that hit the Pentagon - one in which it executed a 330-degree downward spiral (a "high-speed dive") and another in which there is no mention of this maneuver (222-23).

88. The claim that the fighter jets from Langley, which were allegedly scrambled to protect Washington from "Phantom Flight 11," were nowhere near Washington because they were mistakenly sent out to sea (223-24).

89. The omission of all the evidence suggesting that the aircraft that hit the Pentagon was not Flight 77 (224-25).

90. The claim that the military was not notified by the FAA about Flight 93's hijacking until after it crashed (227-29, 232, 253).

91. The twofold claim that the NMCC did not monitor the FAA-initiated conference and then was unable to get the FAA connected to the NMCC-initiated teleconference (230-31).

92. The omission of the fact that the Secret Service is able to know everything that the FAA knows (233).

93. The omission of any inquiry into why the NMCC initiated its own teleconference if, as Laura Brown of the FAA has said, this is not standard protocol (234).

94. The omission of any exploration of why General Montague Winfield not only had a rookie (Captain Leidig) take over his role as the NMCC's Director of Operations but also left him in charge after it was clear that the Pentagon was facing an unprecedented crisis (235-36).

95. The claim that the FAA (falsely) notified the Secret Service between 10:10 and 10:15 that Flight 93 was still up and headed towards Washington (237).

96. The claim that Vice President Cheney did not give the shoot-down authorization until after 10:10 (several minutes after Flight 93 had crashed) and that this authorization was not transmitted to the US military until 10:31 (237-41).

97. The omission of all the evidence indicating that Flight 93 was shot down by a military plane (238-39, 252-53).

98. The claim that Richard Clarke did not receive the requested shoot-down authorization until 10:25 (240).

99. The omission of Clarke's own testimony, which suggests that he received the shoot-down authorization by 9:50 (240).

100. The claim that Cheney did not reach the underground shelter (the PEOC [Presidential Emergency Operations Center]) until 9:58 (241-44).

101. The omission of multiple testimony, including that of Norman Mineta to the Commission itself, that Cheney was in the PEOC before 9:20 (241-44).

102. The claim that shoot-down authorization must be given by the president (245).

103. The omission of reports that Colonel Marr ordered a shoot-down of Flight 93 and that General Winfield indicated that he and others at the NMCC had expected a fighter jet to reach Flight 93 (252).

104. The omission of reports that there were two fighter jets in the air a few miles from NYC and three of them only 200 miles from Washington (251).

105. The omission of evidence that there were at least six bases with fighters on alert in the northeastern part of the United States (257-5.

106. The endorsement of General Myers' claim that NORAD had defined its mission in terms of defending only against threats from abroad (258-62).

107. The endorsement of General Myers' claim that NORAD had not recognized the possibility that terrorists might use hijacked airliners as missiles (262-63).

108. The failure to highlight the significance of evidence presented in the Report itself, and to mention other evidence, showing that NORAD had indeed recognized the threat that hijacked airliners might be used as missiles (264-67).

109. The failure to probe the issue of how the "war games" scheduled for that day were related to the military's failure to intercept the hijacked airliners (268-69).

110. The failure to discuss the possible relevance of Operation Northwoods to the attacks of 9/11 (269-71).

111. The claim - made in explaining why the military did not get information about the hijackings in time to intercept them - that FAA personnel inexplicably failed to follow standard procedures some 16 times (155-56, 157, 179, 180, 181, 190, 191, 193, 194, 200, 202-03, 227, 237, 272-75).

112. The failure to point out that the Commission's claimed "independence" was fatally compromised by the fact that its executive director, Philip Zelikow, was virtually a member of the Bush administration (7-9, 11-12, 282-84).

113. The failure to point out that the White House first sought to prevent the creation of a 9/11 Commission, then placed many obstacles in its path, including giving it extremely meager funding (283-85).

114. The failure to point out that the Commission's chairman, most of the other commissioners, and at least half of the staff had serious conflicts of interest (285-90, 292-95).

115. The failure of the Commission, while bragging that it presented its final report "without dissent," to point out that this was probably possible only because Max Cleland, the commissioner who was most critical of the White House and swore that he would not be part of "looking at information only partially," had to resign in order to accept a position with the Export-Import Bank, and that the White House forwarded his nomination for this position only after he was becoming quite outspoken in his criticisms (290-291).

I will close by pointing out that I concluded my study of what I came to call "the Kean-Zelikow Report" by writing that it, "far from lessening my suspicions about official complicity, has served to confirm them. Why would the minds in charge of this final report engage in such deception if they were not trying to cover up very high crimes?" (291)

Global Research

51. The omission of the 1999 prediction by ISI agent Rajaa Gulum Abbas that the Twin Towers would be "coming down" (114).

52. The omission of the fact that President Bush and other members of his administration repeatedly spoke of the 9/11 attacks as "opportunities" (116-17).

53. The omission of the fact that The Project for the New American Century, many members of which became key figures in the Bush administration, published a document in 2000 saying that "a new Pearl Harbor" would aid its goal of obtaining funding for a rapid technological transformation of the US military (117-1.

54. The omission of the fact that Donald Rumsfeld, who as head of the commission on the US Space Command had recommended increased funding for it, used the attacks of 9/11 on that very evening to secure such funding (119-22).

55. The failure to mention the fact that three of the men who presided over the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks - Secretary Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, and General Ralph Eberhart - were also three of the strongest advocates for the US Space Command (122).

56. The omission of the fact that Unocal had declared that the Taliban could not provide adequate security for it to go ahead with its oil-and-gas pipeline from the Caspian region through Afghanistan and Pakistan (122-25).

57. The omission of the report that at a meeting in July 2001, US representatives said that because the Taliban refused to agree to a US proposal that would allow the pipeline project to go forward, a war against them would begin by October (125-26).

58. The omission of the fact that Zbigniew Brzezinski in his 1997 book had said that for the United States to maintain global primacy, it needed to gain control of Central Asia, with its vast petroleum reserves, and that a new Pearl Harbor would be helpful in getting the US public to support this imperial effort (127-2.

59. The omission of evidence that some key members of the Bush administration, including Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, had been agitating for a war with Iraq for many years (129-33).

60. The omission of notes of Rumsfeld's conversations on 9/11 showing that he was determined to use the attacks as a pretext for a war with Iraq (131-32).

61. The omission of the statement by the Project for the New American Century that "the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein" (133-34).

62. The claim that FAA protocol on 9/11 required the time-consuming process of going through several steps in the chain of command - even though the Report cites evidence to the contrary (158).

63. The claim that in those days there were only two air force bases in NORAD's Northeast sector that kept fighters on alert and that, in particular, there were no fighters on alert at either McGuire or Andrews (159-162).

64. The omission of evidence that Andrews Air Force Base did keep several fighters on alert at all times (162-64).

65. The acceptance of the twofold claim that Colonel Marr of NEADS had to telephone a superior to get permission to have fighters scrambled from Otis and that this call required eight minutes (165-66).

66. The endorsement of the claim that the loss of an airplane's transponder signal makes it virtually impossible for the US military's radar to track that plane (166-67).

67. The claim that the Payne Stewart interception did not show NORAD's response time to Flight 11 to be extraordinarily slow (167-69).

68. The claim that the Otis fighters were not airborne until seven minutes after they received the scramble order because they did not know where to go (174-75).

69. The claim that the US military did not know about the hijacking of Flight 175 until 9:03, when it was crashing into the South Tower (181-82).

70. The omission of any explanation of (a) why NORAD's earlier report, according to which the FAA had notified the military about the hijacking of Flight 175 at 8:43, was now to be considered false and (b) how this report, if it was false, could have been published and then left uncorrected for almost three years (182).

71. The claim that the FAA did not set up a teleconference until 9:20 that morning (183).

72. The omission of the fact that a memo by Laura Brown of the FAA says that its teleconference was established at about 8:50 and that it included discussion of Flight 175's hijacking (183-84, 186).

73. The claim that the NMCC teleconference did not begin until 9:29 (186-8.

74. The omission, in the Commission's claim that Flight 77 did not deviate from its course until 8:54, of the fact that earlier reports had said 8:46 (189-90).

75. The failure to mention that the report that a large jet had crashed in Kentucky, at about the time Flight 77 disappeared from FAA radar, was taken seriously enough by the heads of the FAA and the FBI's counterterrorism unit to be relayed to the White House (190).

76. The claim that Flight 77 flew almost 40 minutes through American airspace towards Washington without being detected by the military's radar (191-92).

77. The failure to explain, if NORAD's earlier report that it was notified about Flight 77 at 9:24 was "incorrect," how this erroneous report could have arisen, i.e., whether NORAD officials had been lying or simply confused for almost three years (192-93).

78. The claim that the Langley fighter jets, which NORAD had previously said were scrambled to intercept Flight 77, were actually scrambled in response to an erroneous report from an (unidentified) FAA controller at 9:21 that Flight 11 was still up and was headed towards Washington (193-99).

79. The claim that the military did not hear from the FAA about the probable hijacking of Flight 77 before the Pentagon was struck (204-12).

80. The claim that Jane Garvey did not join Richard Clarke's videoconference until 9:40, after the Pentagon was struck (210).

81. The claim that none of the teleconferences succeeded in coordinating the FAA and military responses to the hijackings because "none of [them] included the right officials from both the FAA and the Defense Department" - although Richard Clarke says that his videoconference included FAA head Jane Garvey as well as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, the acting chair of the joint chiefs of staff (211).

82. The Commission's claim that it did not know who from the Defense Department participated in Clarke's videoconference - although Clarke's book said that it was Donald Rumsfeld and General Myers (211-212).

83. The endorsement of General Myers' claim that he was on Capitol Hill during the attacks, without mentioning Richard Clarke's contradictory account, according to which Myers was in the Pentagon participating in Clarke's videoconference (213-17).

84. The failure to mention the contradiction between Clarke's account of Rumsfeld's whereabouts that morning and Rumsfeld's own accounts (217-19).

85. The omission of Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta's testimony, given to the Commission itself, that Vice-President Cheney and others in the underground shelter were aware by 9:26 that an aircraft was approaching the Pentagon (220).

86. The claim that Pentagon officials did not know about an aircraft approaching Pentagon until 9:32, 9:34, or 9:36 - in any case, only a few minutes before the building was hit (223).

87. The endorsement of two contradictory stories about the aircraft that hit the Pentagon - one in which it executed a 330-degree downward spiral (a "high-speed dive") and another in which there is no mention of this maneuver (222-23).

88. The claim that the fighter jets from Langley, which were allegedly scrambled to protect Washington from "Phantom Flight 11," were nowhere near Washington because they were mistakenly sent out to sea (223-24).

89. The omission of all the evidence suggesting that the aircraft that hit the Pentagon was not Flight 77 (224-25).

90. The claim that the military was not notified by the FAA about Flight 93's hijacking until after it crashed (227-29, 232, 253).

91. The twofold claim that the NMCC did not monitor the FAA-initiated conference and then was unable to get the FAA connected to the NMCC-initiated teleconference (230-31).

92. The omission of the fact that the Secret Service is able to know everything that the FAA knows (233).

93. The omission of any inquiry into why the NMCC initiated its own teleconference if, as Laura Brown of the FAA has said, this is not standard protocol (234).

94. The omission of any exploration of why General Montague Winfield not only had a rookie (Captain Leidig) take over his role as the NMCC's Director of Operations but also left him in charge after it was clear that the Pentagon was facing an unprecedented crisis (235-36).

95. The claim that the FAA (falsely) notified the Secret Service between 10:10 and 10:15 that Flight 93 was still up and headed towards Washington (237).

96. The claim that Vice President Cheney did not give the shoot-down authorization until after 10:10 (several minutes after Flight 93 had crashed) and that this authorization was not transmitted to the US military until 10:31 (237-41).

97. The omission of all the evidence indicating that Flight 93 was shot down by a military plane (238-39, 252-53).

98. The claim that Richard Clarke did not receive the requested shoot-down authorization until 10:25 (240).

99. The omission of Clarke's own testimony, which suggests that he received the shoot-down authorization by 9:50 (240).

100. The claim that Cheney did not reach the underground shelter (the PEOC [Presidential Emergency Operations Center]) until 9:58 (241-44).

101. The omission of multiple testimony, including that of Norman Mineta to the Commission itself, that Cheney was in the PEOC before 9:20 (241-44).

102. The claim that shoot-down authorization must be given by the president (245).

103. The omission of reports that Colonel Marr ordered a shoot-down of Flight 93 and that General Winfield indicated that he and others at the NMCC had expected a fighter jet to reach Flight 93 (252).

104. The omission of reports that there were two fighter jets in the air a few miles from NYC and three of them only 200 miles from Washington (251).

105. The omission of evidence that there were at least six bases with fighters on alert in the northeastern part of the United States (257-5.

106. The endorsement of General Myers' claim that NORAD had defined its mission in terms of defending only against threats from abroad (258-62).

107. The endorsement of General Myers' claim that NORAD had not recognized the possibility that terrorists might use hijacked airliners as missiles (262-63).

108. The failure to highlight the significance of evidence presented in the Report itself, and to mention other evidence, showing that NORAD had indeed recognized the threat that hijacked airliners might be used as missiles (264-67).

109. The failure to probe the issue of how the "war games" scheduled for that day were related to the military's failure to intercept the hijacked airliners (268-69).

110. The failure to discuss the possible relevance of Operation Northwoods to the attacks of 9/11 (269-71).

111. The claim - made in explaining why the military did not get information about the hijackings in time to intercept them - that FAA personnel inexplicably failed to follow standard procedures some 16 times (155-56, 157, 179, 180, 181, 190, 191, 193, 194, 200, 202-03, 227, 237, 272-75).

112. The failure to point out that the Commission's claimed "independence" was fatally compromised by the fact that its executive director, Philip Zelikow, was virtually a member of the Bush administration (7-9, 11-12, 282-84).

113. The failure to point out that the White House first sought to prevent the creation of a 9/11 Commission, then placed many obstacles in its path, including giving it extremely meager funding (283-85).

114. The failure to point out that the Commission's chairman, most of the other commissioners, and at least half of the staff had serious conflicts of interest (285-90, 292-95).

115. The failure of the Commission, while bragging that it presented its final report "without dissent," to point out that this was probably possible only because Max Cleland, the commissioner who was most critical of the White House and swore that he would not be part of "looking at information only partially," had to resign in order to accept a position with the Export-Import Bank, and that the White House forwarded his nomination for this position only after he was becoming quite outspoken in his criticisms (290-291).

I will close by pointing out that I concluded my study of what I came to call "the Kean-Zelikow Report" by writing that it, "far from lessening my suspicions about official complicity, has served to confirm them. Why would the minds in charge of this final report engage in such deception if they were not trying to cover up very high crimes?" (291)

Global Research

Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate

September 20, 2001

Chairman Sarbanes, Ranking Member Gramm, and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to offer the Securities and Exchange Commission's perspective on the condition of our financial markets in the aftermath of the recent terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.

September 11th was a terrible, dark day. The terrorists who attacked our Nation's Capital and the World's Financial Capital, inflicted irreparable losses of innocent lives and caused untold physical damage; but they did not destroy or diminish our Nation's strength, courage or resolve. We grieve for our lost friends and relatives; yet the Nation's response to this catastrophe has been extraordinary. On Monday, all the Nation's securities markets resumed trading, a trenchant symbol to the perpetrators of the heinous attacks.

As the events of last week and this week demonstrate, our capital markets are the world's strongest and most resilient. They reflect the character of our great Nation. When tragedy struck last week, our Nation responded by coming together. Police, firefighters, emergency medical personnel, members of the military and civilians participated in rescue efforts to save those injured in the attacks.

This same spirit of cooperation imbued the tremendous efforts by so many in the private and public sectors to restore the vitality of all of our securities markets less than one week after the attacks. Over the past week and a half, we have been privileged to work with the major U.S. securities markets and securities firms, industry associations, service providers and federal and state government bodies -- all of whom have provided leadership and invincible perspicacity in this crisis.

An attack of this nature and magnitude cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Accordingly, we coordinated our efforts with the larger federal government of which we are a part, and we worked cooperatively with the industry we oversee. We had two critical roles: first, to assist in implementing national policy; and second, to facilitate the responses planned by the securities industry, and ensure that those responses were consistent with the protection of investors and the national interest.

Upon learning of the World Trade Center disaster, we established communications with the organized securities markets and participated in frequent telephonic meetings of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets. In addition, we provided information to the White House and members of our Senate and House oversight committees. In times of crisis, we believe strongly that our obligation is to keep all those with a role as fully informed as possible.

Although the Commission has broad power over the securities markets and the professionals who operate in them, we viewed our role as ensuring that the markets and market professionals acted in unison and in furtherance of the interests of public investors. Thus, we listened first and responded only when the industry reached consensus. The overarching national goal was to have our securities markets up and running as soon as practicable, but only if there was no threat to public investors.

All the major markets and market participants decided, as a safety precaution, to remain closed for trading on Tuesday. We supported this decision as a responsible approach, and immediately issued a press release to notify investors of the change in normal trading patterns and to assure them this was a temporary phenomenon.

Concerned about safety and the well being of so many in the industry, we spoke with heads of firms to extend sympathy and express our hope that their employees would be accounted for, safe and sound. Sadly, many people employed in the securities industry are missing or dead, and we will forever mourn their loss. Fortunately, many personnel miraculously were evacuated to safety and reunited with loved ones.

Thereafter, our Staff and we continued monitoring developments and helped coordinate efforts to assess the situation and reopen the securities markets. Commission Staff contacted broker-dealers located in lower Manhattan, as well as other major broker-dealers, investment advisers, mutual funds and service providers, to determine their status and operational capability. We also remained in regular communication with the clearing agencies to assure they remained functional and to assess any connectivity problems with their participants. Virtually all securities firms that suffered significant physical damage were able to relocate promptly to alternative disaster recovery sites. We believe that much of the securities industry's success in meeting the demands of this unspeakable horror was due to the hard work and effort made to prepare for Y2K. Securities firms had in place contingency plans and emergency procedures designed to manage the conversion to 2001, never imagining that these plans and procedures would see them through the events of September 11.

We arranged to meet in Manhattan with the leadership of major markets, securities firms, banks, and clearing agencies, along with the offices of the Governor and Mayor, Con Edison and Verizon, and the New York Fed, to assess the situation and determine readiness for a reopening of the markets. Our role in arranging this meeting was not to dictate a decision, but to facilitate a market solution. The decision on when to reopen the markets was made by the private sector -- the markets and major market participants -- in consultation with the Commission. We held daily joint press conferences to keep the public fully and timely advised.

At meetings beginning the afternoon of Wednesday September 12th, this group unanimously agreed that, while every effort should be made to reopen the markets as soon as possible, there should be no interference with rescue efforts or jeopardy to securities industry personnel returning to work. Additional considerations included whether employees would have access to their workplaces and whether there would be adequate and reliable electric power and telecommunications services.

Connectivity among various market participants was also a significant concern. As a result, the industry representatives unanimously decided last Wednesday that the equities and options markets should not reopen Thursday, but rather Friday or Monday at the latest. Having participated in the discussions that produced that decision, our agency was confident the right decision had been reached under the circumstances.

On Thursday, the fixed income markets and futures markets successfully resumed trading. Although trading was relatively light and the number of market participants smaller than usual, no major problems were reported. When connectivity problems with clearing banks affected the government securities clearing agency, we closely monitored these problems in conjunction with the Federal Reserve.

We traveled to the financial district on Thursday morning to examine the facilities of the New York Stock Exchange and to meet with service providers (Verizon and Con Edison), as well as representatives of the Mayor's Office involved with rescue efforts, and representatives of the New York Fed. When industry representatives met later that day, they unanimously decided to reopen equities and options markets on Monday, not Friday.

Deferring the resumption of trading until Monday permitted extensive testing by market participants of systems operability and connectivity. Throughout the weekend, Commission staff worked with market and industry participants to monitor and coordinate extensive systems testing by the exchanges, clearing agencies and market participants. We offered assistance to every affected firm in New York City, and provided staff where requested. The Commission also sent staff to the major markets to monitor the testing. Participants in those tests included the New York Stock Exchange, and its specialists, floor brokers, and member firms; Nasdaq and its market makers and market participants, including ECNs; regional exchanges; DTCC; and SIAC. Fortunately, only minor problems arose and those were readily resolved. The tests ultimately verified that all systems were sound and operational.

We received invaluable assistance from FEMA, the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management, and New York State officials in assuring that market participants needing electrical or communications services received appropriate priority. They also kept us apprised of their assessment of the structural integrity of damaged buildings in the financial district.

From a regulatory perspective, last week the Commission reached out to major market participants, both directly and through industry groups such as the Securities Industry Association and the Bond Market Association, to determine whether it could provide appropriate temporary regulatory relief to facilitate the reopening of fair and orderly markets. The New York Stock Exchange, the NASD, Treasury and other regulators undertook similar outreach efforts.

As a result, the Commission for the first time invoked its emergency powers under Securities Exchange Act Section 12(k) and issued several orders and an interpretive release to ease certain regulatory restrictions temporarily.

A cornerstone of this relief was facilitating the ability of public companies to repurchase their own shares, thereby providing greater liquidity. Specifically, the Commission, for five business days following the resumption of trading, has permitted issuers to repurchase their securities without meeting the volume and timing restrictions that ordinarily would apply under our Rule 10b-18 safe harbor, and to do so without adverse accounting consequences. Our efforts were aided by the announcements of major public companies of significant buy-back programs. We also permitted brokerage firms to calculate net capital without considering days the markets were closed. We allowed mutual funds to borrow from and lend to related parties to facilitate liquidity.

We also responded to physical ramifications of the World Trade Center attacks. We provided temporary relief permitting Amex specialists to function like floor brokers under certain conditions due to space limitations of the Amex's relocated operations to the NYSE floor. We issued an interpretive release permitting accounting firms to provide bookkeeping services to, and help recover records for, audit clients with offices in and around the World Trade Center. To facilitate mutual fund board meetings, we relaxed in-person meeting requirements.

While we broadly solicited and considered suggestions for appropriate temporary relief, we did not implement all suggestions we received, such as prohibiting all short selling, moving to ten-cent quotation increments, and extending settlement cycles in the equity and corporate debt markets. We did, however, take action -- not intervention -- wherever we could to be responsive to industry concerns and to facilitate a smooth reopening of the markets.

We also made ourselves accessible to investors and market participants. We believe that government is and must be a service industry. Last week, the SEC placed additional information for investors and market participants on our website regarding market recovery efforts. Investors were invited to e-mail questions to our staff at a new hot line, [email protected]. We established a special toll-free investor telephone line. For the first time in our history, we also established dedicated telephone lines for inquiries from market participants and for firms seeking additional relief. And, we assured industry participants that if they came to us with their problems, we would work with them to find solutions, without after-the-fact recriminations, except in cases of venal conduct.

Fortunately, on Monday September 17th, all U.S. securities markets resumed trading without incident. Our Staff closely monitored the resumption of trading. We had staff available at the markets to provide assistance where necessary and made staff available on-site at each major broker-dealer that wanted our assistance. Commission Staff remained in constant contact with major market participants throughout the day, and was available to address any regulatory issues that arose. America's investors once again were able to rely upon the strength and soundness of our markets. All market and investor protections were squarely in place. The markets did not give way to panic selling; delays in resuming trading gave investors time to reflect and to speak up about the strength of America's markets. And, the world heard them.

Over the last week and a half, we have witnessed an extraordinary level of cooperation among market participants in the face of this tragedy. For instance, the New York Stock Exchange opened a portion of its floor to accommodate trading in equities and exchange-traded funds by the Amex. In addition, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange is permitting Amex options members to continue their livelihood by temporarily trading in the Philadelphia Stock Exchange's trading crowds. In less than a week, the entire options business of the Amex was moved to the Phlx. People worked day and night to ensure trading in those options opened on Monday without a hitch and that all options series were once again available to America's investors. And, brokerage firms that two weeks ago looked for every advantage over their competitors are today providing space to competitors that suffered as a result of the attacks. In short, the most competitive markets in the world are also the most compassionate.

As you know, our Northeast Regional Office at 7 World Trade Center was destroyed in the aftermath of the attacks. First and foremost, we have been focused on the human side of this tragedy and confirming the safety and well-being of all of our employees. We are gratified to report that every one of our employees has been accounted for and is safe. The staff of the office is convening offsite today to begin the healing and emotional recovery process, and we are making sure that counseling is readily available to anyone who wants it. As far as the work of the office is concerned, we have moved quickly to get things back on track. We have already identified new office space and hope to begin occupancy as early as October 1. Until then, the United States Attorney's Office in Brooklyn has generously provided us with office space for use by Northeast Regional Office supervisors to oversee the office's recovery efforts. Within two days of the attack, we had retrieved all documents stored electronically and had commenced a review of every single investigation and case currently underway in the office with the twin aims of ensuring that we do not miss any imminent deadlines and of developing a plan for completing our investigations and cases in timely fashion. While our review has not been completed, we are optimistic that we will not lose any significant investigation or case as a result of the loss of our building. No one whom we have sued or whose conduct we have been investigating should for a single moment doubt our resolve to continue our pursuit of justice in every such matter.

There also will not be any serious long-term impact on the Commission's oversight of securities firms located in the New York area. The Commission's records related to examinations of all securities firms are maintained electronically in a central database, and were unaffected by the tragedy. Electronic copies of examination reports and deficiency letters are maintained off-site for investment advisers, investment companies, broker-dealers and transfer agents. Records relating to open examinations will be reconstructed from records that exist at registrants' offices and from other sources. We are planning to utilize examination staff from other offices (Boston, Philadelphia and Washington, DC) and to work with self-regulatory organizations (the NYSE and NASDR) to ensure that examination cycles are fulfilled and that appropriate examination oversight is maintained. We are very mindful of the disruption to many firms' operations and records, and are ensuring reasonable accommodation to requests for extensions of time for on-site examinations or to produce records and other information.

We can be justifiably proud of our market participants and the way they have performed. Everyone pulled together to overcome this disaster and successfully reopen the U.S. equities and options markets. Americans demonstrated continued confidence in our markets. With the momentum built from this experience, we will move forward to make our markets even stronger, more transparent and more vibrant. As a Nation, and as an agency, we will not allow terrorists to destroy our spirit or impede our mission.

On behalf of the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to submit our views on the current state of the markets in America. I am happy to try to respond to any questions the Committee may have.

Condoleezza Rice: Vulcan and former National Security Advisor (2001-2005) and US Secretary of State (2005-2009) During the summer of 1998, George W. Bush met with Condoleezza Rice at the behest of George H.W. Bush at the Bush estate in Kennebunkport, Maine. Rice had been director for Soviet and East European Affairs of the National Security Council under Brent Scowcroft during George H. W. Bush's administration and Scowcroft had been guiding her career ever since, ensuring she came to the attention of Bush Sr. "Eventually he was quite taken with her," Scowcroft recalled in an interview by James Mann for his book Rise of the Vulcans (2004). According to Coit D. Blacker, Rice and George W. Bush also "bonded at Kennebunkport" in August 1998.[1] The several days of discussions that followed resulted in Rice agreeing to take charge of foreign policy for George W. Bush’s upcoming presidential campaign. Later that year Paul Wolfowitz, a former protégé of George Shultz and Dick Cheney, was taken on as well. Wolfowitz had also served as foreign policy advisor to Bob Dole during the 1996 U.S. presidential election. In early 1999, a team largely drawn from the middle echelons of the first Bush administration began to act as foreign policy advisors to George W. Bush.[2] Richard Armitage had performed various ambassador and emissary roles around the world for Bush Sr. Robert Blackwill had been Presidential Assistant for European and Soviet Affairs for Bush Sr. Stephen Hadley had been U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. Richard Perle had been U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Reagan administration. Condoleezza Rice Paul Wolfowitz Dov Zakheim had been U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources. Robert Zoellick had been aide to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. The name "The Vulcans" alludes to a huge statue of Vulcan, the Roman god of fire and metalworking, in Rice’s home town of Birmingham, Alabama. In early 1999, the Vulcans held their first meeting in Austin, Texas, which was attended by Cheney and Shultz. The group communicated regularly afterward.[3] During 1999 and 2000, a second group was formed under the leadership of Donald Rumsfeld to deal specifically with the subject of missile defence. While distinct from the Vulcans, it did include Rice, Wolfowitz, Hadley and Perle alongside Shultz and various scientists, including Martin Anderson of Stanford University and Lowell Wood of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.[4] [edit]Campaign

George W. Bush laid out his foreign policy plans on October 11, 2000, at the second Gore-Bush presidential debate against his Democratic rival Vice President Al Gore. "If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us. If we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll welcome us. Our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power, and that's why we have to be humble, and yet project strength in a way that promotes freedom."[1] “The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of troops,” Bush announced. “He believes in nation building. I would be very careful about using troops as nation builders,” he clarified, expressing particular concerns about the Clinton Administration’s recent involvement in Somalia and Haiti, by telling Gore: “I'm not so sure the role of the United States is to go around the world and say this is the way it's got to be. We can help. And maybe it's just our difference in government, the way we view government. I want to empower the people. I want to help people help themselves, not have government tell people what to do. I just don't think it's the role of the United States to walk into a country and say, we do it this way, so should you.” “I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war,” Bush went on to explain, “I don’t want to try to put our troops in all places at all times. I don’t want to be the world’s policeman.” During the campaign Bush promised to increase the defense budget, stating that “America’s armed forces need better equipment, better training and better pay.” However Bush did not promise as much of an increase as Gore even going as far as to state “If this is a race to see who can spend the most money, I’m going to lose.” Analyst William D. Hartung of the World Policy Institute points out that Gore promised $100 billion over 10 years while Bush promised $50 billion over the same period. However, according to Hartung, “the $50 billion referred to specific projects,” and that “[i]t could not possibly have referred to their entire proposed increase”. Bush, at the advice of Hadley, also proposed greater nuclear arms reductions than Gore. Hadley’s plan proposed unilaterally reducing the number of proposed long-range nuclear missiles to around 1,500-2,000 from the then 6,500-7,500, but caveats to this included the abandonment of attempts to get the Senate to ratify the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the development of new low-yield bunker-busting mini-nukes for actual battle-field use. Hartung feared that these steps would “re-start the nuclear arms race” as the U.S. arsenal was upgraded. At the advice of Rumsfeld’s missile defense group, Bush committed himself to building a strong National Missile Defense. Stating that "[n]ow is not the time to defend outdated treaties but to defend the American people," he made it clear that he was willing to abandon the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to do this. A member of the group had told the Washington Post that "All of us to a greater or lesser extent were uncomfortable with the treaty, but Bush said 'My concern isn’t the treaty. My concern is missile defense, and I don’t want anything to stand in the way of it.'" Bush’s plans for NMD went far beyond the limited options endorsed by the Clinton Administration. As Hartung points out, “Bush’s advisers suggested that if elected, would not limit the system to land-based options, but would move full speed ahead to develop interceptors based at sea, lasers based on aircraft and perhaps lasers or rockets based in space as well.” Hartung estimated that this would cost a minimum of $100–200 billion, far in excess of Bush's promised defense budget increase. [edit]Legacy

Paul Wolfowitz: Vulcan and Bush's Deputy Secretary of Defense Following the election of George W. Bush as President of the United States, the Vulcans all received key positions within the new administration. Condoleezza Rice was appointed U.S. National Security Advisor and later U.S. Secretary of State in Bush's Second Administration. Paul Wolfowitz was appointed U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense under Donald Rumsfeld and later president of the World Bank. Richard Armitage was appointed U.S. Deputy Secretary of State under Colin Powell. Robert Blackwill was appointed U.S. Ambassador to India and later U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor. Stephen Hadley was appointed U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor under Rice and later U.S. National Security Advisor. Richard Perle was appointed chairman of the U.S. Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee. Dov Zakheim was appointed Comptroller of the Pentagon. Robert Zoellick was appointed U.S. Trade Representative, United States Deputy Secretary of State and nominated as World Bank president in May 2007. On December 13, 2001, in accordance with his campaign promises on National Missile Defense, Bush gave Russia six months notice of the United States' withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This was the first time in recent history the United States had withdrawn from a major international arms treaty. The humble foreign policy outlined by Bush during his campaign, however, was quickly dropped after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in favor of a more aggressive policy that has been dubbed the Bush Doctrine. [edit]See also

Project for the New American Century, a think tank formed in 1997 with significant Vulcan membership Downing Street memo, a classified British assessment of US war intentions based on a meeting in July 2002 Hijacking Catastrophe, a documentary film narrated by Julian Bond (2004) Karen Kwiatkowski, Lt. Col. USAF, Ret., whistleblower Wolfowitz Doctrine Vulcan [edit]External links

US Department of Defense 1992 (Paul Wolfowitz) Defense Planning Guidance, A compilation of the Wolfowitz draft, the revised draft, and reporting by The Washington Post and The New York Times [2] Gordon Prather, Clarke's insights on Bush's 'Vulcans' (WorldNetDaily, March 27, 2004)[3] Glenn Kessler, U.S. Decision On Iraq Has Puzzling Past (Washington Post, January 12, 2003)[4] John B. Judis & Spencer Ackerman, The Selling of he Iraq War: The First Casualty (The New Republic, June 30, 2003)[5] [edit]References

^ Mann, James. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. p. 250. ^ Mann, James. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. p. 251-252. ^ Mann, James. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. p. 252. ^ Mann, James. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. p. 253. Zalmay Khalilzad (1994) From Containment to Global Leadership?: America & the World After the Cold War, RAND Corporation ISBN 0-8330-1620-2 Zalmay Khalilzad and Paul Wolfowitz, "Overthrow Him," Weekly Standard (December 1, 1997), an article about Saddam Hussein James Mann (2004) Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. Viking ISBN 0-670-03299-9 William D. Hartung (2003) How Much Are You Making On The War, Daddy? Bantum ISBN 1-86325-433-1 Paul Wolfowitz (1997) "The United States and Iraq," in The Future of Iraq, ed. John Calabrese, Middle East Institute