Index of Abramoff / Ledeen / Fascism connections
What was Judith Miller / Ahamed Chalabi
relationship? go to: Plamegate Timeline & Slate
by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi
National Congress go
to link original source.
Ahmad and Me, Christopher Hitchens "new
indictment ... Chalabi tricked
the U.S. into war, possibly on Iran's befalf, and that he has given
national secrets to Iran."
Please help NewsFollowUp and staff
continue this work.
Timeline and how it relates to Iran, Iraq, Chalabi,
Judith Miller, Cheney, Libby, Armitage, Novak, Condoleeza Rice.....
search internet: Harold Rhode (above photo, pic,
photograph) , Ledeen, Chalabi
The Rule 21 procedure that finally got
Senate INC report out.
also see GOP dirty tricks page
Iraqi National Congress Report Research top
National Congress search terms: Nasan Haqib, Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum, Entifadh
Qanbar, Francis Brooke, Sharif Ali Bin Al Hussein, Ahmad Chalabi.
Chalabi, White House access, wasteful spending,
KOS Abramoff, what's next and how can we bring down the GOP.
Jack Abramoff, political campaign contributions:
Security Senate Intelligence
Report, Prewar findings
Post "That Awful Power: How Judith Miller Screwed Us All"
search James Woolsey.
Weyrich Ledeen "In the late 1970s, Paul Weyrich, widely considered as
the guru of the modern conservative movement, Terry Dolan, Richard Viguerie,
the godfather of conservative direct mail, and Howard Phillips left
Christian Voice and tapped televangelist Falwell to head up the Moral
Majority. Over the years, as the Reverend became more influential
politically, he became a favored guest on cable television's news
Nation Rule 21 procedure that finally got this report out 11/05
Jack Abramoff, political campaign contributions:
War Profiteers Profits Over Patriotism in Iraq
a copy of Miller
story in the New York Times:
AN IRAQI DEFECTOR TELLS OF WORK ON AT
LEAST 20 HIDDEN WEAPONS SITES, and all the lies within
The Man Who Sold the War, search John
Rumsfeld: World Faces New Fascism notes: likened Iraq war critics to those
who appeased Nazis in 1930, moral and intellectual confusion, a new type of
fascism, spoke at American Legion, withdraw troops,
for Peace, Maine, search James Woolsey
"Woolsey wrote the foreword to the book, authored by Laurie Mylroie, an
adjunct fellow at the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute, or AEI.
Woolsey, who has argued for starting "World War IV" in the Middle
East, called the book "brilliant and brave." Judith
Miller and Mylroie coauthored: Sadam
Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf
Saddam Hussein ''did not have a relationship, harbor, or turn a blind eye
toward [Abu Musab al Zarqawi] and his associates.'' Instead, he
"attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al Zarqawi."
Senate Report Disputes Press Accounts of CIA Polygraph of Iraqi Informant
and see reports: Postwar
Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They
Compare with Prewar Assessments,
Rendon Group, search terms: polygraph machine,
Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, CURVE BALL, Kurdistan, civil engineer, claimed he helped
Saddam Hussein's men bury tons of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons,
illegal arms, buried in subterranean wells, beneath a hospital, polygraph
test, Pattaya, failed, fabrication put to good use, set up by CIA, Pentagon,
Rendon Group, perception management, Iraqi National Congress, install
Chalabi as leader of INC, Zaab Sethna, INC spokesman, employee of Rendon,
Francis Brooke, INC man in Washington, overthrow SH, story to Judith Miller,
New York Times, Bangkok, Miller story: AN IRAQI DEFECTOR TELLS OF WORK ON AT
LEAST 20 HIDDEN WEAPONS SITES, and see Washington
PSenate Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence
on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on
Iraq" July 9, 2004, Republican majority, Democrat minority, unanimously
endorsed its findings, phase II addressed the way senior policymakers used
the intelligence, Niger, pressure on analysts, Persian Gulf War 1991, 1998
critical report, UN inspection teams evacuated, inspector Richard Butler,
President Bill Clinton, Operation Desert Fox, October 2002 NIE, CIA Director
George Tenet published unclassified white paper on Iraq's WMD, joint
resolution authorizing the use of force was passed by both houses of
Chalabi and Colin Powell
British American Security Information Council
New York Times reporting, James Risen article: "C.I.A. Aides Feel
Pressure in Preparing Iraqi Reports," and Miller story: "Illicit
Arms Kept Till Eve of War, an Iraqi Scientist Is Said to Assert,"
- Booz, Allen Hamilton, see James Woolsey,
- Committee for the Liberation of Iraq,
founded by James Woolsey
- Bush Whitehouse
- Chambliss, Saxby, Sen.(R) "the
Committee found no evidence to suggest that the INC deliberately provided
- CIA Advisory Board, see James Woolsey
- Defense Policy Board, see James Woolsey
- Director of National Intelligence
News Team Bush Ramps Up Rhetoric on iraq and War on Terror,
Defeatocrats, In Truman administration, right=wing Republicans accused Dean
Acheson of appeasing Communism.
- Global Options, Neil Livingston, provides
contacts and consulting services to companies doing business in Iraq.
- Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004
- National Terrorism Center
- National Counterterrorism Center
- New York Times "Judy
is an intrepid, principled, and Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who has
provided our readers with thorough and comprehensive reporting throughout
- "The Postwar Findings About Iraq's
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Weapons Programs and Links to Terrorism and
How they Compare with Prewar Assessments"
- Presidents WMD Commission
- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
- Rendon, John
- Below: James Woolsey, Ahmad Chalabi, Judith Miller
- war propagandists and New
Blog Phase II
Pat Senator, Phase II
Ahmad and Me, Christopher Hitchens "new indictment ... Chalabi tricked
the U.S. into war, possibly on Iran's behalf, and that he has given national
secrets to Iran."
- Slate New
York Times, Judith
Miller, Mini Culpa The New York
Times Finally Concedes Its WMD Errors
House, Bush "Subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation.
Terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information about
the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy
theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that
would challenge popular prejudices and self-serving propaganda.
What about Senate Report
says there's no connection between Iraq and al Queda ... is the Senate a
below or go to:
by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi
original report or
Ahmad Chalabi and
- Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on The Use by the
Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National
Congress. September 8, 2006 - Ordered to be printed.
Committee members include: Pat Roberts, Kansas, Chairman; John D.
Rocefeller IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman; Orrin G. Hatch, Utah;
Mike DeWine, Ohio; Christopher S. Bond, Missouri; Trent Lott,
Mississippi; Olympia Snowe, Maine; Chuck Hagel, Nebraska; Saxby
Chambliss, Georgia; Carl Levin, Michigan; Deanne Feinstein,
California; Ron Wyden, Oregon; Evan BAyh, Indianna; Barbara A.
Mikulski, Maryland; Russell D. Feingold, Wisconsin. see Cooperative
Steve Francis, author of NewsFollowUp.com
- Conclusion 1.
"False information from the Iraqi National
Congress (INC)-affiliated sources was used to support key Intelligence
Community assessments on Iraq and was widely distributed in
intelligence products prior to the war." Information
provided by INC-affiliated sources resulted in the production and
distribution of a large body of intelligence reports and assessments
on Iraq prior to the war (250 from Source One alone), and was used to
support key judgments about Iraq's WMD (and alleged Iraq / Al Queda
links) programs in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).
- Conclusion 2.
"The Iraqi National Congress (INC)
attempted to influence United States policy on Iraq by providing false
information through defectors directed at convincing the United States
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had links to
terrorists." The INC had an aggressive 'publicity
campaign' and brought six defectors to the attention of the Congress,
media and other U.S. government agencies. In July 2004 the CIA
concluded that Source One (AntiPolygraph blog)
reporting was 'questionable' 'demonstrably
incorrect'. Source One (AntiPolygraph blog)
appeared deceptive about whether the INC
provided him information to give to the U.S. government on suspect
facilities. Source Two fabricated information, which included a
claim that in 1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile biological weapons
labs to evade UN inspections. A DIA debriefer said Source Two
was being coached by INC. In May 2002, the DIA issued a
fabrication notice on Source Two. A foreign intelligence service
also believed Source Two information was unreliable. James
Woolsey? MORE Where does he fit in? see below. Source
Three said that he observed non-Iraqi Arabs training (for hijackings)
in an abandoned aircraft shell at he Salman Pak training facility in
Iraq in 1994-1995. In December of 2001, CIA said that Source
Three "is under the influence/control of the INC and is not
considered to be very credible." In February 2002, the
CIA's Iraq Operations Group concluded that: "Although we can
verify a few elements of his story, we have determined that much of
his information is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S.
(and probably western policy on Iraq)." Source Four said
Iraqi intelligence trained Iraqi soldiers and 70-75 non-Iraqi Arabs in
hijacking techniques. In October 2001 Source Four complained
that his earlier accouts to the press about terrorist training camps
had been distorted and mistranslated by the INC translator. The
CIA Iraqi Operations Group lost interest in Source Four, citing, in a
February 2003 cable, Source Four's past exposure in the media and his
employment with the INC. In the fall of 2002 INC-affiliated
defector Source Five claimed to have seen Saddam Hussein meet with
Osama bin Laden in the early 1990's and SH's son, Uday, told Source
Five that bin Ladin was in Iraq to discuss training some of his people
in Iraq. The DIA would neither confirm or deny his access to SH
and his inner circle. DIA said Source Five's information
"may be intended to disinform." The CIA evaluation of
Source Five in October 2002 said the bin Ladin story was perhaps
contaminated with pockets of coached fabrications. DIA
terminated its relationship with Source Five and said his information
may have been intended to influence as well as inform U.S. government
- Conclusion 3.
"The Intelligence Community's use in
intelligence assessments of information provided by Iraqi National
Congress (INC)-affiliated defector Source Two
was a serious error. The use of the Source Two information came after
three Intelligence Community assessments raised questions about his
reliability as a source and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
issued a fabrication notice." Despite all the warnings
that Source Two may have been coached by the INC and fabricated
information to his debriefers, the Source Two reporting was cited
specifically in three subsequent CIA intelligence assessments issued
from July 2002 to November 2002 and the October 2002 NIE, as
corroborating other source reporting about Iraq's mobile biological
weapons program. Source Two also was one of the four human
intelligence sources specifically referred to in the part of Secretary
of State Powell's February 2003 UN Security Council speech.
Issuing a fabrication notice instead of recalling the
information left it available for use. Reforms by ODNI were
Chalabi and Colin Powell
- Conclusion 4. (redacted)
by Steve Francis, author of NewsFollowUp.com
- Conclusion 5.
"The July 2002 decision by the National
Security Council Deputies Committee directing the renewed funding of
the Iraqi National Congress (INC) Intelligence Collection Program
under Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) management was ill-advised
given the counterintelligence concerns of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and warnings of financial mismanagement from the
Department of State. At the time it assumed responsibility for
funding and managing the INC's collection effort in October 2002, the
DIA cautioned that the INC was penetrated by hostile intelligence
services and would use the relationship to promote its own agenda." Beginning
in March 2000, the Department of State entered into an agreement with
the INC, amended over time, to fund the Intelligence Collection
Program (ICP) to collect evidence on SH regime. An audit found
financial management and internal control weaknesses and a potential
for fraud. The State Department began to doubt the value on INC
information, and ceased funding the program in May 2002. On July
25, 2002, the NSC refunded it through the Department of Defense and on
Oct 25, 2002 the DIA assumed formal responsibility for funding and
managing the INC's collection effort despite warnings from both the
CIA, which terminated its relationship with the INC in December 1996,
and the DIA that the INC was penetrated by hostile intelligence
services, including the Iranians, and that the INC would use the
relationship with the Intelligence Community to promote its own
- Conclusion 6
- Conclusion 7
"The Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Central Intelligence Agency were inconsistent in identifying their
reporting from INC-affiliated defectors and INC members as
opposition-affiliated reporting." Information sources
affiliations and motivations of defectors were carelessly handled in
- Conclusion 8
"There is insufficient basis to determine
whether or not CURVE BALL (Cooperative
Research), the Intelligence Community's primary source
of intelligence about Iraq's alleged biological weapons program,
provided his information at the behest of the Iraqi National Congress
(INC)" Beginning in 2000, CURVE BALL provided information to
a foreign liaison intelligence service alleging that Iraq had a mobile
biological weapons program. And this led to the October NIE that
"Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin
BW agents." CURVE BALL provided false information to the
Intelligence Community and had a close relative who had worked for the
INC since 1992. A high-ranking official's statements led to
initial suspicion in the CIA that CURVE BALL may have provided false
information at the INC's behest. The CIA has since concluded
that the relative's connection to INC was coincidental. All this
open to question and debate. The CIA also assessed that CURVE
BALL's defection did not fit the pattern of the typical INC-influenced
defection in that the INC did not broker his introduction to the IC
and did not put him in front of the media. The IC did not
formally collect on the INC so has no information on the INC's
processes and procedures for disseminating information, a key element
to asses potential deception programs or tactics. The IC
does not understand why CURVE BALL provided false information and only
has a superficial understanding of CURVE BALL's contacts with his
close relative and other INC officials. Its an open question
whether he provided his information at the behest of the INC.
- Committee Actions
- On August 2, 2006, The Committee inserted text on page 61 concerning
the production by CIA analysts of a Memorandum or PDB (Presidential
Daily Brief) for the Vice President (Cheney) using an INC-affiliated
source's information to support the mobile BW (bio-weapons) program
judgment. As modified, the amendment clarified that the PDB did
not include caveats related to the source's reporting.
- On August 2, 2006, the Committee agreed (by party lines) to an
amendment by Senator Wyden that struck from the report a press
statement by Brigadier General Brooks, of the U.S. Central Command,
regarding information purportedly discovered in April 2003 at the
Salman Pak facility.
- Additional views of Chairman Roberts: included strong
objections to the conclusions of the report ... not supported by the
facts and contain numerous errors and omissions. But also said
it should be approved and declassified.
- Additional Views of Chairman Roberts Joined by Senators Hatch,
Dewine, Lott, Chambliss, and Warner: Includes referrals to
'systematic failures in prewar intelligence on Iraq",
reforms...etc. and that the INC only played a minor role in
prewar intelligence. And referred to HUMINT role, signals
intelligence. They blame the 'media' and media embellishments
and misguided attention to the INC as issues. Only about
20 intelligence products out of 40,000 had INC related material. The
ISG found that an Iraqi intelligence directorate, M14, used the Salman
Pak facility to train Iraqi, Palestinian, Syrian, Yemeni,
Lebanese, Egyptian, and Sudanese operatives. The Republicans
pick apart minutia detail of the report and try to cast doubt wherever
they can. But the bottom line is that the report was approved
including the conclusions by the committee. It is completely
predictable that the Republicans would not like this report. For
more details on Republican rebuttal, see the report.
Why was Valerie Plame really outed?
- Republican additional views (conclusion rebuttals): pages
125, 127, 190, 199 and see
- Democratic additional views pages 158
of original Report
by the Intelligence Community (IC) of information provided by the
Iraqi National Congress (summarization by Steve Francis,
author of NewsFollowUp.com)
- I. Introduction
- Feb 12, 2004 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence places 'the use
by the Intelligence Community (IC) of information provided by the
Iraqi National Congress (INC) in "phase II" of the Iraq
Inquiry. see first phase: Report of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 9, 2004.
- The report to focus on "prewar INC intelligence with regard to Iraq"
prior to March 19, 2003, start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
- INC was funded for over a year after the war started, and the report
does not include a review of the quality or utility of INC information
after the war started.
- The report does not focus on INC information in the early and mid
90's. CIA had a tumultuous relationship with INC and Ahmed Chalabi.
Ultimately the relationship ended.
- INC information was widely distributed, this also was not a focus of
- A general history of the use of INC information is included, and the
transition of information from the CIA to the State Dept to the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) ... and how it was used in analysis of 'WMD'
- The report distinguishes between INC info and INC-affiliated info.
Iran and other sources may have been feeding info to IC.
- II. Background
- 1991, Bush encouraged efforts towards Iraq regime change. Violence
was deemed a possibility.
- May 1991, CIA approached Chalabi, a secular Shiite Muslim, to rally
- June 1992, more than 200 opposition leaders met in Vienna. INC
then created, Wikipedia,
- Oct 1992, another conference held in Kurdish-controlled northern
Iraq. Chalabi elected INC chairman. Goals: overthrow Sadam Hussein,
establish Iraq democracy, Sadam trial.
- CIA had problems with Chalabi, say he didn't provide useful info,
and didn't deliver on assurances that disaffected Iraqi military
officers wanted to defect to opposition. Chalabi lobbied Congress
which caused friction with the CIA, and he said he was not under control
- Oct 1994, the INC provided a steady stream of low-ranking walk-ins
from various Iraqi army and Republican Guard units ... but described as
a spartan operation. A lot of squabbling between different
opposition groups. Chalabi awarded for his efforts.
- 1994 see Cooperative
Research, 'forgery shop' and Huffington
Post "That Awful Power: How Judith Miller Screwed Us
All" search James Woolsey.
- Jan 1995, a KDP / PUK cease fire negotiated, U.S. offered INC
funding for INC mediation efforts, U.S. said would cease no-fly zone
efforts if KDP / PUK didn't accept cease-fire.
- Feb 1995, CIA learned of new opposition plan to remove Saddam
Hussein (SH) from
power. An assault on SH Ujah residence Mar 4 or Mar 5 was planned.
- Mid Feb, KDP / PUK a fragile cease-fire holds, INC mediation and
separation forces were funded by U.S.
- Mid Feb, SH assassination plan ongoing, but U.S. not a participant,
U.S. wants Iraqis to do it.
- Mid Feb, Feb 17, 1995, overt U.S. diplomatic initiative with
Department of State, Chalabi was focusing on detaining SH in Ujah, then
wait for Iraqi people to rise up. The plan needed diversions in
Mosul and Kirkuk and uprisings in the Shi'a south. But KDP / PUK
was still fighting,
- Mar 1995, CIA met with SCIRI's (Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq) Badr Corps and others said they would support
early March coup attempt.
- CIA accompanied Chalabi to meetings to support a coup,
- Mar 3, 1995 Chalabi made contact with Iranian intelligence to
discuss coup support in southern Iraq, and signaled that U.S. supported
- Early Mar 1995, 'a foreign government' provided U.S. info
on Iran's view of this meeting. It was indicated that Iran
thought that the US was seeking Iranian support for the Iraqi
oppositionist uprising against Saddam Hussein planned for early March
1995. Iranian officials also believed that the U.S. person
involved in the matter was a CIA officer. Indications were that
Chalabi "handed" the Iranians a message at the meeting,
purportedly from the U.S., that said America would welcome the
involvement of Islamic forces in the operation against Saddam
Hussein, on the condition that the independence and unity of Iraq are
preserved, ant the Iraqi borders are not changed.
- By now there was a NSC firestorm and calls to the CIA to find out
what was happening and why a CIA agent was posing as a member of the
NSC and allegedly planning an assassination of SH.
- Further intelligence about the same meeting indicated that Chalabi
told the SCIRI representatives that Americas had promised to prevent
any action by the Iraqi army and to target them; to impede Iraqi any
tank movements in the cities, not in the marshes, via aerial
bombardment, and to prevent Saddam's army from suppressing this
initiative, through exploitation of resolutions 688 and 949.
- In early March, and on the day that the operation was to go forward,
messages were sent to all opposition members that the operation had
been totally compromised, there was a high risk of failure, and that
the U.S. government did not use Chalabi to pass any message to Iran.
- Chalabi believed it was too late to stop the operation, so proceeded
to initiate it, and called other opposition figures and informed them
that U.S. no longer supported the operation. And concern about
perception of US support, blame. Regrouping was necessary, maintain
sanctions, erosion of SH power.
- The coup plan never made it to the White House according to ICG.
NSC was surprised by the plan.
- The plan was a complete failure. Animosity grew between
Chalabi and the CIA, and differing opinions about whether Chalabi
consulted the CIA before initiating the coup arose and at the same
time claiming that the U.S. supported the uprising.
- But other reports said he did not enter the plan unilaterally and he
did consult the CIA from the beginning.
- Chalabi meetings with the Iranians also fueled CIA resentment.
They accused Chalabi of fraudulently acting on behalf of the U.S. when
he alleged to Iranian intelligence that Washington was interested in
enlisting Tehran's support for operations against SH.
- Chalabi did work openly with the Iranians, because much of the Iraqi
opposition lived in Iran.
- The CIA reduced contact and support for INC after the failed
- August 1996 incursion of Iraqi army into Northern Iraq stopped most
- Chalabi denied fabricating a written communication from the White
House (about U.S. support of SH uprising efforts), or any other part
of the U.S. government. He did work with the Iranians as part of
his efforts to establish and maintain the INC.
- In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which led to the
1999 INC authorization for federal assistance. The Iraqi National
Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) was created and granted $33
million (2000) to fund Iraq propaganda and research on SH war
crimes. Conflicts with INCSF wanting offices inside Iraq delayed
funding until Mar 2001 clearing the way for funding the Information
Collection Program (ICP) from countries surrounding Iraq. Offices were
in Tehran, Damascus, and Cairo.
Post "That Awful Power: How Judith Miller Screwed Us
All" search James Woolsey. 2003 Ahmad
Chalabi and Colin Powell
- In an October 2001 report the INCSF provided information on ICP
activities and included: "Collect sensitive information that
reveal Iraq's link with September 11th aftermath and anthrax exposures
in the USA,"
- The State Department still uncomfortable with ICP, and an April 2004
saw INC fraud as a PR threat and still doubted value of ICP
information and again cut off funding in May 2002. But in July
2002, DOD gave it back to DIA. In October of 2002 DIA took over and
forbid ICP from publicizing their efforts or work in Iraq.
- From August of 2002 until early 2004 the CIA voiced concerns about
the reliability of the INC information, that it had been penetrated by
Iranian and other intelligence services, and that it had its own
- In the fall of 2003 the DIA began making plans to terminate its
relationship with the INC assuming that it would become a political
party in Iraq.
- On May 12, 2004, and Iraqi Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant
for a senior INC official on allegations of fraud and other offenses.
On May 24th the DIA terminated it relationship with the INC and the
DOD terminated its relationship with the ICP.
- Information Provided by the INC In August 2002, the NIC published a
memorandum, Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi
National Congress. (an evaluation of approximately 300 pages of INC
materials). Was deemed of little value.
- Source One: (AntiPolygraph blog)
an Iraqi who lived and worked in Baghdad, defected
- Source One met with INC representatives who facilitated his travel
to Asia and his introduction to the international media.
wouldn't rule out involvement with Source One. Woolsey met Chalabi in
the late 90's and represented as co-council to eight INC members
detained in California on immigration charges.
- CIA preliminary analysis of Source One: (AntiPolygraph blog)
"does not have
access to specific programs at various facilities, his knowledge of
(facility) details, individual engineers, and personalities could
permit subject matter experts t analyze the data and extrapolate
broader program information." He passed a
polygraph. This report
created by Steve Francis, the author of NewsFollowUp.com
- January 10, 2002. The DIA produced and disseminated over 250
intelligence information reports from Source One's debriefings, and
all sent to the CIA. Source One worked as a contractor at several
Iraqi WMD sites of which he reported extensively on including SSO.
Two reports discussed suspect terrorist training sites in Iraq.
The first, dated January 2002, said that from 1997-1998, Afghan,
Pakistani, and Palestinian nationals were trained by the Fedayeen
Saddam at an Iraqi special forces training facility in Salman Pak,
Iraq. The report said the camp is "rumored to provide al-Qa'ida
terrorist teams with training" and added, "many Iraqis
believe that Saddam Hussein had made an agreement with Usama bin Ladin
in order to support his terrorist movement against the U.S. The
second report, dated March 2002, provided the general locations of suspected Iraqi terrorist training camps, including one at Salman Pak.
- In early 2002, WMD facilities reports appeared in the media drawing
attention to other foreign intelligence services. In March 2002, the
information was corroborated and vetted. On March 6 2002 the INR had
access to the reports and said they were useful. And in July
2002, in a NIC memo, Source One was described as "the most
successful INC referral" ... he had access to as many as 150
conventional or WMD facilities. ...but he did not have access to
more specific information regarding WMD programs. INR said his
claims about WMD work at various facilities are not adequately
- Source One's (AntiPolygraph blog)
descriptions of a specific suspect site were wrong on
many points. Despite this Source One's reporting was included in
two finished intelligence assessments, the October NIE Iraq's
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, and a DIA
assessment Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program. Much of
the reporting on a uranium enrichment facility was sexed-up to
somewhat match what Source One said.
- Postwar findings
- According to the DIA, the U.S. 75th Exploitation Task Force and Iraq
Survey Group (ISG) visited the suspect facility in the spring and
summer of 2003 respectively. Soil samples were normal and no
enriched uranium was found. No evidence was found to support
intelligence assessments that the site may have been involved in
nuclear related work.
- In early February 2004, in order to resolve credibility issues with
Source One, the IC elements brought Source One to Iraq. Source
One failed to prove any credibility about the suspect facility, but
was able to identify a second facility but the information may have
been coached and his WMD knowledge remained highly questionable.
DIA officers may have indeed created (extrapolated) the image that
Source One knew more than he did. The CIA studied this
possibility in comparing Iraqi opposition deception efforts to reports
prepared by DIA officials.
- Ultimately, the IC has never deemed Source One (AntiPolygraph blog)
to be a fabricator
and has not recalled his reporting.
references to Judith Miller and the 75th Exploitation Task Force in
Timeline and search her story "White House Lists Iraq Steps
to Build Banned Weapons". and ZMag
or New York Times and
Post "That Awful Power: How Judith
Miller Screwed Us All" search James Woolsey. 2003
- Source Two, a former Iraqi major, was referred to DIA on
February 8, 2002. James Woolsey
involved in the referral.
The DIA questioned his credibility on Iraqi chemical weapons
information. He may have had some limited knowledge of Iraqi
mobile R&D labs in its bio weapons program and VX. He told
debriefers he was involved in procuring dual-use technology in support
of Iraq's WMD program. He was asked not to talk to the
media. And again, his credibility was questioned, and he may
have been coached, but passed polygraph tests.
- In March of 2002, disseminated two intelligence reports based on
Source Two's information. The reports included info on the Iraqi
Intelligence Service (IIS) and mobile bio research labs (the word
weapons not included). March 18, the CIA told DIA that Source
Two was unreliable and fabricated information. March 20th all
contact ceased. In April, the DIA said that they thought he was
being coached by the INC. In May the DIA issued a fabrication
notice, and said that he was coached by INC and said he was a
- The DIA did not recall the original reports or reissue them with a
warning that Source Two was believed to be a fabricator.
- Despite all the above actions, Source Two was cited specifically in
five CIA intelligence assessments and the October NIE, as corroborating
other source reporting about a mobile biological weapons program.
- The five assessments included: WMD Association at Presidential
Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, Iraq: Expanding BW
Capabilities, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat,
Lessons Learned From Iraq's Past Efforts to Mask Its BW Program,
and the NIE. These reports used almost identical
descriptions of Source Two's information. The language in the
papers said that in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile
laboratories for BW agent research to evade UNSCOM
inspections...according to Source Two, an Iraqi defector associated
with the INC.
- Source Two was slso one of the four HUMINT sources specifically
referred to in the par of Secretary Powell's February 2003 speech
before the UN Security Council that discussed the mobile BW production
units. The DIA Division Chief who attended Powell's speech never
connected the fabrication notice and the source mentioned in the
speech so didn't raise concerns about it. The Iraq BW analysts
from the CIA, DIA, and State INR all acknowledged that the fabrication
notice was available in their message handling systems, but they all
said they did not see the notice. Other analysts involved in
Powell's speech said Source Two's reporting on the labs remained
plausible and was never cancelled. As long is it wasn't canceled
and was used with appropriate caveats, it could continue to be used in
finished intelligence reporting. Powell's speech contained no
- The fabrication notice was issued on the basis that Source Two was
coached, he was talking to the media and foreign intelligence
concerns. Source Two has disappeared.
- Source Three Ultimately, Source Three, according to a
response from the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, stated "is under
the influence/control of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not
considered to be very credible." Despite this, many reports
were disseminated from his reporting and he was described as a
"high ranking Iraqi public official with direct access to
- In late September 2001, James Woolsey
and INC presented another defector who had served as a liaison between
Iraqi intelligence and the Fedayeen Saddam from 1998 to 2000 and had
information on terrorist training in Iraq.
- Haydr al Bandor, an INC employee, said Source Three was a former
Iraqi lieutenant colonel who conducted training (aircraft hijackings,
underwater explosives and booby traps) of 70 Arab terrorists at a
special Iraqi training facility at Salman Pak. The DIA wanted a
CIA opinion on debriefings of Source Three. (Jihaz Mukhabarat al
- Using the information from al Bandar, the DIA disseminated two
reports. They described the information from Bandar as from
"a former Iraqi citizen, who received this information from a
subsource. Source and subsource's credibility have not been
determined." The reports did not indicate that the source
was a member of the INC or that the subsource was Source Three.
- The second report from Bandar provided only one paragraph of text
identifying an Egytian businessman who maintained a relationship with
the Iraqi intelligence service. DIA used the first report in
which Source Three was a subsource in a Defense Intelligence Terrorism
Summary (DITSUM) on September 30, 2001, titled Terrorists Allegedly
Training at Iraqi Camps. The DITSUM said Salman Pak was used for
hijacking training and Lake Tharthar was used for underwater
operations training. Source Three was instructed by INC to go to
the U.S. embassy for an interview. They thought he had
information on an Iraqi officer who had worked as Salman Pak. Source
Three only had info on a subsource that could broker a meeting with
this officer. The CIA and DIA continued to debrief Source Three about
- In mid October three more reports were disseminated based on Source
Three reporting and described Source Three as a "high ranking
Iraqi public official with direct access to reported
information." None of the reports discussed WMD. The
reports discussed Kuwait prisoners, a special unit of the Fedayeen
Saddam al-Qarai'a Force and its UAE deployment plans, training at the
Salman Pak location.
- In November 2001, the CIA published an assessment of the Salman Pak
facility titled Iraq: Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training
Facility. Despite reliability warnings said the reports
cannot be discounted.
- On December 6, 2001 a foreign intelligence service told the CIA that
their Iraqi contacts in (Israel?) said that the CIA was working with
- Source Three, according to a response from the CIA's
Counterterrorism Center, stated "is under the influence/control
of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not considered to be very
- Following debriefings, Source Three's story began to appear in the
press that were said to have discrepancies with CIA reports. This
report created by Steve Francis, the author of NewsFollowUp.com
- see New
American article and search on "Iraq and al-Qaeda: Interpreting a
Murky Relationship" and Uhler,
- On February 6, 2002, CIA's Iraq Operations Group (IOG) disseminated
a cable attempting to summarize the IC various interactions with
Source Three. Conclusions: Although they could verify a few
elements of his story, we have determined that much of his information
is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S. policy on
- Mistaken Identity
- On June 7, 2002, another CIA station requested a name
trace on former Iraqi military officer. Confusion seems to exist
between the identity of Source Two and Source Three stemming from
Source Three fleeing Iraq to Europe and being sought by stations in
Europe. Contact was not advised.
- Intelligence Assessments
- CIA analysts included Source Three's information in
three extensive assessments about Iraq's links to al-Qa'ida, a June
2002 paper, Iraq and al-Qa'ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship,
and September 2002 and January 2003 versions of Iraqi Support for
Terrorism. All three assessments noted that reporting surged
after September 11, 2001 from Iraqi defectors claiming that al-Qa'ida
and other non-Iraqi Arabs engaged in special operations training at
Salman Pak. Again the defectors information was suspect and all
were associated with INC. Despite the assertion in Iraqi
Support to Terrorism that the "defectors claimed that al-Qa'ida
and other non0iraqis" trained at Salman Pak, Committee staff
found no reports from these defectors claiming that it was member of
al-Qa'ida who received the training. The IC has no information
on the location of Source Three.
- Source Four Ultimately....CIA Headquaters
responded that given several concerns referenced in a separate cable,
including Source Four's past exposure in the media and his emplyment
with th INC, "we do not have any operational interest in further
pursuing (the suspected Iraqi intelligence officer) at this time.
- In October 2001, Source Four, a former Iraqi Fedayeen
Saddam captain, living in the U.S., was referred to the IC by Source
Three as someone who could confirm Source Three's story. A
meeting was arranged between him and a U.S. journalist. INC was
involved and provided an INC interpreter. The CIA received an
advance copy of the media article, it said Source Four was a terror
school instructor and said that the methods used at the training
school were similar to those used by September 11
- It was determined that Source Four did not have
first-hand access to the information he was giving and the other
sources embellished or exaggerated their stories on training camps and
may have been coached.
- Postwar Information on Salman Pak Steve
- A November 2003 assessment from DIA noted that
postwar exploitation of the Salman Pak facility found it devoid of
valuable intelligence. DIA concluded that "we don't know
whether the ex-regime trained terrorists on the aircraft at Salman
Pak. The plane was sold for scrap. In June 2006 DIA said it has
"no credible reports that non-Iraqis were trained to conduct or
support transnational terrorist operations at Salman Pak after
1991. It was a well-known facility and a large volume of heresay
evidence could be collected. The Iraqi Survey Group found that
an Iraqi intelligence directorate, M14 used Salman Pak for terrorist
- Source Five
- Ultimately ...An assessment of Source Five after his
media appearance in 2002 noted that his reports of a meeting between
Sadam Hussen and bin Ladin were not corroborated and other reports of
meetings between senior Iraqi officials and al-Qa'ida members provide
no indication that SH and bin Ladin met.
- Source Five was referred to the DIA by the INC
through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs. He did not recall making this referral. According
to the DIA, Source Five had been smuggled out of Iraq by the
INC. The DIA debriefed the source in the fall of 2002 and
produced sixteen intelligence reports based.
- Source Five claimed publicly that Osama bin Ladin
came to Baghdad. He passed polygraph tests. In October 2002 his
story appeard to be more or less cogent, but was perhaps contaminated
with pockets of coached fabrications. The DIA said that his
comments may have been intended to influence as well as inform
decision makers. The bin Ladin meeting report was the only
terrorism related report from the source. None other related to
- The Would-Be Defector No reporting resulted
from this referral.
- In July 2001, Ahmed Chalabi told an individual in the
Department of Defense he had information from an intermediary that a
senior Iraqi diplomat in Europe wanted to defect to the U.S. DIA
met with Chalabi to discuss the diplomat's possible defection.
He never defected and neither CIA or DIA officers met with him. No
reporting resulted from this referral.
- INC Reporting During DIA's Management of the ICP.
- DIA officially took over management of the ICP (Iraqi
Collection Program) from the State Department in late October
2002. From that time until the beginning of OIF, the DIA
disemminated reporting from fourteen other sources (and four others)
who were either members of or were associated with the INC. DIA
is unable to attribute the reporting to any single source within the
INC's ICP. The reports covered a myriad of information, with
mixed value similar to HUMINT sources. One report stated that Iraq
possessed several thousand chemical weapons shells filled with ebola
and anthrax. DIA thought this was credible and was included in
threat briefings. It was not cited in any written assessments.
- Other reports of which the vast majority were from
Iraqi opposition sources. The reports provided information about
SH genealogy, SH key personnel, a report about SH poisoning water
supplies with Anthrax, palaces, tribe loyalties, military plans,
locations of suspect WMD facilities, medical facilities, leadership
residences, regime biographies, smuggling of prohibited materials,
SCUD missiles, information on targeting Turkey if U.S. invaded,
conventional weapons production facilities, chemical and biological
weapons smuggled to Syria, al Qa'ida travel plans outside of Iraq,
dual-use materials from Jordan, T-72 tank parts, anti-tank missiles,
helicopter engines, and night-vision goggles, rumors of nuclear
activity at Tuwaitha and Ameriyah where radiation levels were above
acceptable safety standards, daily routine of Uday Hussein, Hussein
family residences, Republican Palace, Republican Guard Corp, the
Special Security Organization, the Gneeral Security Directorate,
Military Intelligence Directorate, business activities of Uday
Hussein, oil for food program kickbacks, a subsource report on moving
chemical and biological weapons by truck into Samawa, Iraqi
Intelligence officers id's, 1989 production of chemical masks,
information on Kurdish willingness to support U.S. effors to topple SH
in return for money and weapons, a report that Saddam had some units
which were dressed as U.S. and British troops and were prepared to
"execute chemical-biological warfare" on Iraqi citizens so
the world would blame President Bush.
- CIA Debrief of INC walk-in (Source Eighteen)
was judged a coached fabricator and IC had no further contact with him
- Alleged INC-Linked Sources (CURVE BALL)
- In the IC's judgment, CURVE BALL was the crucial
source that led the IC to judge in the 2002 NIE on Iraq's WMD
capabilities that "Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing
bacterial and toxin BW agents." There were three other
(insignificant) sources who the IC believed corroborated CURVE BALL's
reporting. He provided more than 100 reports.
- Uncertainties noted in 2004 of his reliability had
been raised but were not disseminated to analysts outside the
CIA. Despite these warnings CURVE BALL was judged to be
"credible" or "very credible" in its
reporting. The committee said concerns should have been passed
to policymakers. Ahmad
Chalabi and Colin Powell
- In the summer and fall of 2003, the Iraq Survey Group
investigated whether Iraq had a mobile biological weapons
program. It was to investigate sites identified by CURVE BALL
and later, CURVE BALL himself. None of the sixty individuals
debriefed provided evidence to substantiate the claim of a mobile BW
program. The CIA assessment on May 26, 2004 states he lied about
the program and issued a congressional notification in June 2004 and
that his reporting had been recalled.
- CURVE BALL had a close relative who had worked for
the INC since 1992, for at least some time in a senior position.
They believed he was also coached by the INC. The CIA believes
that CURVE BALL's close relative's connection to the INC is
coincidental, and is not an explanation for his fabrications. In
2003, a CIA analyst told the Committee that CURVE
BALL was located when he sought asylum in a European country, when
officials reviewed his asylum paperwork, noticed that he was an Iraqi
chemical engineer, and approached him to be
- Source Nineteen Ultimately....he was
unable to provide basic organizational information on the IIS that
would show familiarity with the organization.
- On February 27, 2002 Source Nineteen and Iraqi
defector walked in to a third country embassy in the Middle
East. Officers from both the CIA and the third country's
intelligence serve debriefed him four times. Source
Nineteen claimed to have worked as a civilian employee in the
IIS from 1988 to 2001, initially as a driver. He claimed that he
was aware of four trucks in Iraq that carried biological and nuclear
materal and that in 1995 al-Qa'ida sent some of its members to receive
training at a Baghdad intelligence school. He also provided the
names of individuals he sad were Iraq intelligence agents posted
abroad. ....he was unable to provide basic organizational
information on the IIS that would show familiarity with the
organization. Other details about Source Nineteen reveal trivial
details and lend support to his just being another fabricator/provacateur.
Some of his reports were included in one official IC product.
- go to Conclusions