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Intelligence Report Phase IIa, IIb
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They document Bush lies in run-up to Iraq War.... and Omissions |
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go back to: BushWatch
Amdocs Leakgate
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Jennings |
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| IIa 110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed |
| page 1, this page, page 3 Searchable text file IIA, page1, this page, page 2, page 3 Senate Intelligence Committee, pdf download Phase II A, II B | ||
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110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAQ CONDUCTED BY THE POLICY COUNTERTERRORISM EVALUATION GROUP AND THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PLANS WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY together with A ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of June _, 2008 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE United States Senate 110th Congress JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA RON WYDEN, OREGON CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA EVAN BAYH, INDIANA SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA BARBARA A. MUKULSKI, MARYLAND ORRIN HATCH, UTAH RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN OLYMPIA SNOWE, MAINE SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA HARRY REU), NEVADA, EX OFFICIO MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN, EX OFFICIO JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Scope and Methodology
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Millions Worldwide Believe 9/11 Conspiracy Theories,
NewsMax, below
'foreign government' = Israel * Senate Intelligence Committee, pdf download Phase II A, II B
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Michael Ledeen, Rove's Brain
Senate Intelligence Committee Phase II a, b - Bush lies to war. |
| Topic Index | |||
| Plame / Wilson / Novak | Pentagon mole, AIPAC Spies | AIPAC, Giuliani, Mukasey | Common |
| Millions Worldwide Believe 9/11 Conspiracy Theories |
| Millions Worldwide Believe 9/11 Conspiracy Theories Monday, 27 Sep
2010 01:21 PM Article Font Size By: Arnaud De Borchgrave
No sooner did Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggest from the rostrum of the U.N. General Assembly that most of the world believes the U.S. government was involved in a 9/11 conspiracy, than 32 nations followed the U.S. delegation as it walked out. These were members of NATO, the European Union (21 countries are members of both), Australia, New Zealand, and Costa Rica. More importantly, 167 nations didn't budge and went on listening to the Iranian's incendiary speech. We keep forgetting that countless millions in the world, including millions of Americans, have swallowed the monumental canard that the United States and Israel were part of a conspiracy designed to legitimize the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The first to finger the United States and Israel was Hamid Gul, two weeks after 9/11, in an interview with this reporter in Islamabad. Gul, a former head of Pakistani intelligence and notorious anti-American, added the U.S. Air Force to the conspiracy mix. The "evidence" he provided was that no U.S. fighter aircraft were scrambled on 9/11 to intercept the passenger planes that had abandoned their flight plans. Gul, a friend of Osama bin Laden dating to the days when they were allies against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, has yet to explain what he was doing in Kabul with his Taliban friends for two weeks immediately preceding 9/11. More recently, in Cairo, two former Egyptian ambassadors to the United States told me they believed there was a Mossad-CIA plot designed to keep Israel and America in lockstep in a war on terror. They pointed out that when President George W. Bush declared Global War in Terror, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was the first to sign up. For the two Egyptians, that validated their suspicions. There were also bestselling books about the "fact certain conspiracy" written in both French and German, by different authors, that each sold a million copies in both countries. For Gordon Duff, a Vietnam veteran and senior editor of "Veterans Today" and frequent "self-hating American" guest on radio and TV stations the world over, there is no doubt he is to the conspiracy theory born. "In America," he wrote last week, "groups have been popping up for years, not 'fringe' types but military and professional organizations, architects, engineers, pilots, intelligence officers. There is a vast underground that is never reported, never spoken of in the news and continually threatened. The FBI and Homeland Security have infiltrated these groups, illegal surveillance has been on a massive scale and, as the groups have grown and their reach has touched millions of Americans, the government, in the usual whispers, is talking about mass arrests, 'unplugging' the Internet, all those things the militia movements of the '90s said would happen." Outside of the United States, Duff adds, not in the Middle East, but Canada, Europe, Latin America, and the Far East, "finding people who accept the Bush and Obama administration's 'party line' about 'box cutters and hijackers' is difficult. No one wants to risk the public scorn of seeming like an imbecile." more
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NewsFollowUp.com___ Senate Intelligence Phase IIa page 3____________home___archive
| IIa 110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed |
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Amendment 26 Page l0, third paragraph — State/INR dissentedfrom the majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did “not add up t0 a compelling case for reconstitution " of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Amendment 26 — strike State/INR dissentedj$·om the majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did “not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution " of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. and insert State/INR dissented from the ma 'ori view and stated in the NIE ke 'ud ents that "the activities we have detected do not however add p to a com ellin case that Ira is currentl ursuin what INR would consider to be an inte ated and com rehensive a roach to a uire nuclear wea ons." In the main text of the NIE INR assessed that the available evidence did "not add p to a com ellin case for reconstitution" of an Ira i nuclear wea ons ro am. In the President’s summ of the NIE INR offered another version of its 'ud ent statin that "INR `ud es that the evidence indicates at most a limited Ira i nuclear reconstitution effort." Comment - Because this section of the report is being used to consider whether the President’s statements were substantiated by intelligence, we believe it is appropriate to include the President’s summary of the NIE, a document specifically prepared for and briefed to the President. The President’s summary of the NIE said, "Most agencies judge that Iraq is reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. INR judges that the evidence indicates, at most, a limited Iraqi nuclear reconstitution effort." In addition, the key judgments of the NIE said, "The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons." All of these are slightly different and should be included to show what was available to the President. Amendment 28 Page l0, fourth paragraph — Construction at sites known to have been part of Iraq ’s pre—GuU War nuclear weapons program was mentioned in earlier assessments (though not specyically in the NIE). Amendment 28 — strike (though not specyically in the NIE). and insert includin ir1 the NIE. Comment — The comment in the report is incorrect. Construction activity at Tuwaitha, a facility associated with Iraq’s pre Gulf war nuclear program was discussed in the 2002 NIE on page 24. This should be noted in the report. 123 Amendment 29 Page 10, last paragraph — State/INR ’s alternative views, which were incorporated in the NIE, said that State/INR accepted “the view of technical experts at the Department of Energy " who concluded that the aluminum tubes were ’poorly suited " for a nuclear weapons program. The alternative views also cast doubt on the judgment that other dual-use procurement ejjzorts were related to a nuclear program, and went on to say that “the information we have on Iraqi nuclear personnel does not appear consistent with a coherent ejjzort to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program. Amendment 29 — At the end of the paragraph insert ln the President’s summ of the NIE [NR said it `ud es that the evidence indicates at most a limited Ira i nuclear reconstitution eHort." Comment - Again, we believe that if the Committee is going to compare intelligence to statements made by the President, it should include the President’s summary of the NIE. _ 124 _ Amendment 30 Page II, first paragraph - The majority view of the NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five to seven years, and posited a “much less likebr scenario " in which production time could be shortened to three to five years. The majority view also assessed that y' Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside source that production time could be "within several months to a year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a "systematic ejfort to acquire foreign fissile materials from Russia [or] other sources. " State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program. Amendment 30 - strike The majority view of the NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five to seven years, and posited a "much less likely scenario" in which production time could be shortened to three to five years. The majority view also assessed that Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside source that production time could be “within several months to a year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a “systematic efort to acquire foreign fissile materials j$·om Russia [or] other sources. " State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program and insert The NIE ke `ud ents said "if Ba dad a uires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear wea on within several months to a ear." The main text of the NIE added "althou we have seen onl a few Ira i attem ts to a uire material from abroad those efforts do not seem to be p of s sternatic effort to a uire forei Hssile materials from Russia or other sources." State/INR said that it could not redict when Ira gl; a uire a nuclear wea on since it lacked ersuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear ro am. Comment - The paragraph as drafted distorts the NIE’s key judgments which actually listed the assessment that Iraq could build a weapon in one year as the first bullet point. The characterization in the report makes it sound like an afterthought or as if it was the last and, therefore, most minor issue the NIE considered, which it was not. Also, how long it would take Iraq to indigenously develop Hssile material was irrelevant to what the President was talking about. He specihcally said he was discussing how long it would take Iraq to build a weapon if it "acquired" fissile material. Also, it should be clear that the detail about not detecting a systematic effort was from the main body of the NIE, not the key judgments. 125 Amendment 31 Page 11, second paragraph — In the President ’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he stated that Iraq had pursued nuclear weapons even while weapons inspectors were in Iraq. He also said that the Iraqi regime had attempted to purchase aluminum tubes that could be used in a nuclear program, and that “the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought signqicant quantities of uranium ]$·om Africa. " While the intelligence community assessed that Iraq had initialhw attempted to continue its nuclear weapons program following the imposition of post-Guy' War sanctions, most agencies believed that the MEA and UNSCOM had succeeded in destroying or neutralizing Iraq ’s nuclear in]$·astructure, and that the regime did not resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons until December 1998, when UNSCOM inspectors le]? the country. Amendment 31 — insert after the first paragraph above He noted that Saddam "has not credibl ex lained these activities." Strike the second paragraph and insert The intelli ence communi assessed that Ira had initiall attem ted to continue its nuclear wea ons ro a.m followin the im osition of ost—Gu1f War sanctions. In Se tember 2002 the DCI submitted testimon to Con ess that "revelations after the Gulf war starkl demonstrated the extent of | Ira ’s denial . . . The IAEA did not reco `ze on oin uranium emichment activities" at two sites ins ected y the IAEA. Most a encies believed that the IAEA and UNSCOM had succeeded in destro ` or neutralizin Ira ’s nuclear infrastructure in the mid—1990s. Comment- None of the above discussion from the report is relevant to what the President said. He said that Iraq had pursued a nuclear weapons program while inspectors were in Iraq. This statement is substantiated by intelligence. Director Tenet’s submitted testimony to the SSCI and SASC from September 2002 notes that, "Revelations afier the Gulf war starkly demonstrated the extent of that denial. Based on CIA briefings about two suspect nuclear sites, the IAEA inspected Tuwaitha and Tarmiyah in rnid-May 1991. The IAEA did not recognize on oin uranium enrichment activities using Electromagnetic Isotope Separation at these sites, as neither it nor the US intelligence community anticipated such work was underwa ." This testimony makes it clear that the intelligence community did say that Iraq’s nuclear progra.m continued while inspectors were in Iraq. Current views of reconstitution and views of whether the IAEA and UNSCOM stopped those activities are irrelevant to the analysis. Finally, there is no citation for these claims at all. 126 _ Amendment 32 Page ll, fourth paragraph — The October 2002 NYE contained an annex on the high-strength aluminum tubes. Although all the intelligence agencies agreed that the aluminum tubes were a dual—use technology, DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikely that the tubes were being used for nuclear weapons-related purposes. Other agencies concurred with the majority view, which cited the aluminum tubes as the primary evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Neither the concurring nor dissenting agencies changed their view between the publication of the NIE and the invasion of Iraq. Amendment 32 — strike the above paragraph and insert - Ir1 the October 2002 NIE all intelli ence a encies a eed that the aluminum tubes could be used for nuclear wea ons and that Ira was r uired to declare the im orts and sub ` ect them to UN/IAEA monitorin but DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikel that the tubes were intended to be used for nuclear wea ons-related u oses. On December 17, 2002 CIA re ared an anal sis of Ira ’s wea ons declaration which noted that it "fails to acknowled e or ex lain rocurement of gl; s ecihcation aluminum tubes we believe suitable for use in as centrifu e uranium enrichment effort" and "fails to acknowled e efforts to rocure uranium from Ni er as noted in the UK dossier." Comment- The President was discussing the fact that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes it was prohibited from importing and that it had not credibly explained these activities. He did not say these items were part of a reconstituted nuclear program, only that Iraq had not credibly explained why it was importing such materials. Intelligence noting that all agencies assessed the aluminum tubes could be used for nuclear weapons and were prohibited items is more relevant to the statement in question. 127 Amendments 33 and 34 Page ll, last paragraph — An unclassyied British white paper from September 2002 had assessed that Iraq had sought large quantities of natural (non-enriched) uranium from Africa. This was echoed by a statement in the NIE, which said “Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons. " This was not cited by the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. State/INR ’s alternative views said that “the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR ’s assessment, highly dubious. " Amendment 33 — strike This was echoed by a statement and insert This assessment was also included Amendment 34 - strike This was not cited by the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. Comment- We suggest not using the word “echoed" which makes it sound like the intelligence community took the idea from the British White Paper, which was not the case. In addition we do not think the characterization of "key evidence" is accurate (we do not think the NIE used the term evidence) and the President did not say it was key evidence of reconstitution so this sentence is irrelevant. 128 _ Amendment 38 Page 13, last paragraph — On September 8, 2002, the National Security Advisor said that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq "are only realbv suited for nuclear weapons programs Although both the CIA and DIA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were “best suited " for centry'uges, and that other explanations were “inconsistent with the total body of intelligence the DOE had assessed that this was unlikely, and had published intelligence reports explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE ’s view, more likely) that the tubes were intended to be used to build conventional rockets. Amendment 38 — strike Although both the CIA and DLA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were “best suited "for centry'uges, and that other explanations were "inconsistent with the total body of intelligence the DOE had assessed that this was unlikely, and had published intelligence reports explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE ’s view, more likely) that the tubes were intended to be used to build conventional rockets. and insert Both the CIA and DLA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear wea ons ro am with the CIA notin that the tubes were "best suited” for centrifu es and that other ex lanations were "inconsistent with the total bod of intelli ence.” ln A ril 2001 CIA ublished a a er which said "Ira is gyg ng to urchase items that have little use other than for a uranium enrichment ro am." In Au st 2002 CIA ublished another a er which said "A1thou we have considered alternative ex lanations for the tubes — such as their use in multi le rocket launchers Q ) — CIA concurs with ound forces wea ons ex erts in the lntelli ence Communit that such an ex lanation is inconsistent with the overall bod of intelli ence on the sub 'ect." More than a ear earlier the DOE ublished an assessment that said an a lication other than centrifu e use was "more likel ’ but noted that "re ardless of end use the delive of aluminum tubes with the r orted s eciiications to Ira would be rohibited” items under the Nuclear Su liers Grou and UN Securi Council Resolutions. Comment- We believe the report as drafted excludes relevant information which was far more likely to have been provided to Secretary Rice than a DOE assessment published a year earlier. These should be included andlDOE’s judgments should be put in its own words, rather than those of the report authors. DOE used the words "more likely" not ‘“unlikely. • CIA, SEIB 01-083CHX April 10, 2001, "Iraq is trying to purchase items that have little use other than for a uranium enrichment program.” • CIA, August 2002, "A1though we have considered alternative explanations for the tubes — such as their use in multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) — CIA concurs with ground forces weapons experts in the Intelligence Community that such an explanation is inconsistent with the overall body of intelligence on the subj ect." _ 129 _ Amendment 39 Page 14, second non-bullet paragraph — - Intelligence obtained after the Guy War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons. Both apparently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the two had an estimated yield of less than _ and the larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of- could not be delivered by missile. Amendment 39 — strike - Intelligence obtained after the Guhf War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons. Both apparently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the two had an estimated yield of less than _ and the larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of- could not be delivered by missile. and insert 1 Numerous intelli ence assessment noted that Ira had develo ed two desi s rior to the Gulf War. Accordin to a 1999 IC nuclear assessment "nuclear desi efforts from 1988 throu mid-1990 were focused rimaril on conce ts and in 1990 Ira be an to ex lore more advanced desi s to ermit smaller size and hi er g eld." Comment- - The Secretary’s comments were made prior to the publication of the NIE, so the citation of the NIE here is irrelevant. The Committee should include intelligence assessments which were published before the statement in question such as the following: • "By 1991, Iraq had demonstrated sufficient calculational capability and an understanding of high-explosive systems to design devices with yields of as much as - for large diameter weapons and as much as _ for more advanced designs." PWR031202- 12 • 1999 JAEIC assessment- "According to all available information, nuclear desi efforts from 1988 through mid-1990 were focused primarily on - concepts and, in 1990, Iraq began to explore more advanced designs to permit smaller size and higher yield." • 1999 DIA assessment, DoD Futures Intelli ence Pro am, "It reviousl erformed field • March 14, 2002 SPWR, Iraq: Nuclear Weapon Design Program PubNo.· SPWR031402- 02, According to Iraqi-supplied documents, seized Ir i documents, and re ortin from Iraqi defectors, Iraq by early 1991 had researched desi and had conducted substantial work on an advanced esign 130 Amendments 41 and 41 a Page 14, last paragraph — In September 2002 the Vice President stated that there was “irrefutable evidence " that Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program. As noted, several intelligence agencies assessed that reconstitution was underway, but the Department of Energy assessed that the evidence was less conclusive (State/INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that poinU. Amendment 41 — strike but the Department of Energy assessed that the evidence was less conclusive. and insert . In an assessment in Au st 2002 the DOE said multi le-source re ortin su ests that Saddam Hussein is seekin to reconstitute Ira ’s nuclear wea ons ro am. Althou the re ortin roduces no "smokin n " continued vi `lance is re uired re ardin Ira ’s attem ts to re `uvenate its nuclear wea ons ro am." At hearin before the SSCI in S tember 2002 however the DCI testified that "Ira ’s a essive ursuit of gh stren aluminum tubes rovides com ellin evidence that Saddam is attem tin to reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort for Ba dad’s nuclear wea ons ro am." No dissentin o inion re ardin reconstitution was included in this testimon and the DOE witness testified that his a enc had no disa eement with testimon resented about Ira reconstitutin its nuclear ro am. Amendment 4-1(a) — strike (State/INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that poinU. Comment — Testimony from the DCI on September 17, 2002 to the SSCI and the SASC says "Iraq’s aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum tubes provides compelling evidence that Saddam is attempting to reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program? There are no dissenting views mentioned on reconstitution during this testimony at all. The DOE never used the words "less conc1usive." We also note that State/INR could not possibly convey an agreement with DOE to policymakers if it did not publish a judgment. In addition, this information was added to the report after the majority imposed amendment filing deadline, without the permission of the minority, which is inappropriate. 131 Amendment 42 Page 15 - Conclusion 1: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor regarding a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community. Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, some intelligence agencies assessed that the Iraqi government was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program, while others disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence. The Estimate itself expressed the majority view that the program was being reconstituted, but included clear dissenting views from the State Department ’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which argued that reconstitution was not underway, and the Department of Energy, which argued that aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended for a nuclear program. Amendment 42 — strike the conclusion as drafted and insert All olic aker statements reviewed in this section were substantiated y the available intelli ence. Comment- It is impossible for us to properly analyze the claims in this conclusion without knowing which specific statements the report is referencing. Also, it is incorrect to say that "others" disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program. At most, only one agency expressed any doubt about the reconstitution judgment and not in any document published outside its own agency prior to publication of the NIE. Although not stated definitely we believe that the statements this conclusion is referencing were made prior to the ‘ publication of the NIE, so the inclusion of INR’s dissent referenced in the NIE is irrelevant and unfair to those speakers. Additionally, it is misleading to discuss DOE’s dissent on the aluminum tubes but not include the fact that DOE agreed that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. Amendment 43 Page 16, Postwar Findings — entire section. Amendment 43 —- strike the postwar findings section Comment - None of the postwar Endings has citations so we cannot check their accuracy. Even with citations, we do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. 132 Amendment 54 Page 26, third paragraph - The DIA issued a report in February 2003, Iraq.· Denial and Deception: Iraqi Countertargeting Strategy, that stated it was standard denial and deception practice for Iraq to place various military hardware in, among other things, ‘palm and date tree groves ..., " but this report was issued ajier Secretary Powell ’s speech and did not mention biological weapons. There was operational intelligence trajjzic on this issue prior to the Secretary ’s speech, but the Committee is not aware of prior analytical assessments. Amendment 54 — Strike the above paragraph and insert The CIA rovided an intelli ence re ort for use in Secret Powell’s UN s eech which said that an lra i missile bri ade commander su ervised the dis ersal of his bri ade’s al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles in order to hide them from UN ins ectors. The re ort said that some of the missiles had warheads containin an ‘“unknown biolo ` cal a ent’ and that the missiles were hidden in "lar e alm oves." Comment- The document which we asked the drafters to incorporate is not "operationa1 intelligence traf’ric" as stated in the report. lt is a TD (telegraphic dissemination), or intelligence report, and it was provided to the Committee by the CIA when the Committee asked specifically what information it provided to Secretary Powell for use in this speech. The fact that the Committee is unaware of "analytical assessments" is irrelevant, because the Committee agreed to use "intelligence" to compare to statements, not just "ana1ytic assessments." This report was included in the Committee’s Erst Iraq report on page 243 and should be included in this report as well. 133 _ Amendment 58 Page 28, BW Conclusions — Conclusion 2: Statements in the major speeches analyzed as well additional statements, regarding Iraq ’s possession of biological agent, weapons, production capability, and use of mobile biological laboratories were substantiated by intelligence information. Intelligence assessments from the late J 990s through early 2003 consistently stated that Iraq retained biological warfare agent and the capability to produce more. Assessments on the mobile facilities included the production capabilities of those labs, both in terms of type of agent and in amount. Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments lef open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was activebi producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq ’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Amendment 58 — Strike Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments lef open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq ’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Comments — We do not think that the report has given any examples of intelligence assessments prior to the 2002 NIE which "left open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them" except the 2000 ICA, which was published more than two years before the policymakers’ statements were made and before any of them entered office. In addition, we do not believe there were any intelligence gaps articulated in the October 2002 NIE about Iraq’s BW program, with the possible exception of a lack of understanding of the specifics about the types of weapons and biological agents that analysts stated were in the possession of the Iraqi government. If the report drafters think there are such gaps they should be described in the report. Amendment 59 [ Page 28, Postwar Intelligence, entire section Amendment 59(a) — Strike the postwar findings section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. 134 _ Amendment 68 ‘ Page 37-38, Conclusions — Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq ’s chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community ’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing. The intelligence community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to have chemical weapons production capability and that Iraq was seeking to hide such capability in its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence assessments, especially prior to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that analysts could not confirm that production was ongoing. Amendment 68 — Strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 4: Statements y senior olic akers re ardin Ira ’s chemical wea ons roduction ca abili and activities were all substantiated y intelli ence information. - Comment- We dispute several of the contentions in this conclusion. The intelligence community assessed both before and alter the NIE that Iraq had a chemical weapons production capability, not just that Saddam wanted one. (See the CIA SEM Dec 2001 — "Iraq in the past several years has rebuilt a covert chemical weapons production capability by reconstructing dual- use industrial facilities and developing new chemical plants .... ") Most of the assessments which judged that actual production was ongoing were contemporaneous with the NIE or slightly prior (see Tenet’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee and SSCI below and the unclassified White Paper), but not all of them. More importantly, prior to the production of the NIE, no policymakers said that production was ongoing. If the report concludes that such statement is not substantiated, the report should clearly identify it so that it can be analyzed. • We assess that Iraq retains a stockpile of at least 100 tons of agent . . . Moreover, Iraq is rebuilding former chemical weapons facilities, developing plants, and trying to procure chemical warfare-related items covertly . . . Based on these construction and procurement activities, we assess that Iraq has a covert chemical wea ons roduction ca abili embedded in its civilian indus . Tenet testimony before SASC and SSCI September 16, 2002. • The main production building at Ira ’s Fallujah III chemical plant appears to have resumed operation, according to h . . . The Intelligence Community suspects this site supports production of CW precursors as well as the biological warfare agent ricin, extracted from castor oil beans. INR, Iraq: Suspect CB WProduction Facility Active, November 5, 200]. _ 135 Amendment 69 Page 38, Postwar Findings section Amendment 69 — Strike the postwar findings section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policy1nakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to mislead readers who might think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. Amendment 70 _ Page 40, second f11ll paragraph, (Scope Note) Scope Note: The term ‘weapons of mass a’estruction' (or ‘WIMDQ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Amendment 70 - Strike the scope note paragraph and insert Accordin to the October 2002 Ira WMD 'White Pa er Ira ’s biolo ` cal chemical ballistic missile and nuclear wea ons ro arns were collectivel referred to as wea ons of mass destruction { WMQ) Comment! Suggestion — We disagree that the intelligence community’s use of the term "WMD" excluded ballistic missiles and other WMD delivery vehicles. The Iraq WMD White Paper (or unclassified NIE) specifically states, "The Gulf war damaged Saddam Husayn’s biological, chemical, ballistic missile, and nuclear weapons programs, collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WIv[D)." The 2002 classified NIE on Iraq’s WMD programs included four categories including delivery systems. The report’s definition of what is included in the term WMD is incorrect and should include delivery systems. 'While this report’s inclusion of the DOD’s definition of WMD is interesting, this report is examining intelligence community judgments, not DOD’s. What matters is what the intelligence community included in defining WMD in 2002 which, the above reference to the NIE and White Papers makes clear, included delivery systems. _ 136 _ Amendment 71 and 71 a Page 40, last full paragraph - In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction, " and that “there is no doubt he is amassing them". He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing “the imminence of prolq’eration of weapons of mass destruction " with regard to Iraq as evidence that preemptive action was necessary. As noted, the term ‘weapons of mass destruction ’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Amendments 71 — Strike He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing “the imminence of proly'eration of weapons of mass destruction " with regard to Iraq as evidence that preemptive action was necessary. Amendment 71(a) - Strike As noted the term 'weapons of mass destruction ’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Comments — We have several comments about these paragraphs: (1) Again, as stated above and as defined by the IC, the term WMD also includes delivery systems; (2) It seems that the report is actually trying to show that the Vice President misrepresented the intelligence because he used the collective term WMD rather than specifically stating biological, chemical weapons and the means to deliver those weapons. The Vice President clearly said in the speech that Iraq was working on developing nuclear weapons—which shows there was no effort to include nuclear weapons among the WMD he said Iraq had; and (3) The use of a collective term does not indicate that all elements of that term must exist for the term to be true and the intelligence community regularly uses the term WMD to refer to some WMD elements. For example: • Tenet’s Threat Hearing testimony said: "Intelligence reporting on Saddam’s intentions to use WMD is clear and consistent .... " • CIA/NESA PC briefing book points stated that "Iraq’s activities since 1998 clearly show that it has repaired and expanded dual-use WMD facilities, increased WMD production capabilities, and advanced clandestine production and procurement." • Tenet testimony for SASC/ S SCI "Thus, experience shows that his regime will maintain weapons of mass destruction for use, not just deterrence" and "Saddam will never end his pursuit and possession of weapons of mass destruction" and Saddam "rnay decided that the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance . . . ." • August 10, 2001 CIA assessment, Developing Biological Weapons as a Strategic Deterrent, stated that "Iraq is attempting to address its regional security concerns by developing weapons of mass destruction and is focusing on biological warfare (BW) agents as a strategic deterrent .... " 137 Amendments 81-82 - Page 48, third non-bullet paragraph - The Iraqi regime was known to have constructed underground facilities for a variety of purposes, but the intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried facilities. US intelligence analysts suspected that the regime might be using underground facilities to conceal weapons activities, and there was some unconfirmed reporting that suggested this, but no intelligence agency claimed to know the location of any active underground WIMD facilities, and none expressed certainty that such facilities existed. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in 2001 that “elements of the regime ’s weapons of mass destruction (WYMD) and ballistic missile rograms probably are located in under round facilities but iieieii iiiiii _ nor intelligence sources have confirmed any WMD- or ballistic missile related underground facilities. " An August 2002 DL4 report noted that “Iraq has reportedly rebuilt its full ojfensive B W program in well-concealed, underground, mobile or dyficult-to- locate facilities " but went on to state that “no biological weapons (BW)—related underground facilities are currently confirmed to be in use in Iraq Amendment 81-82 -— Strike the above paragraph and insert - The intelli ence communi had lon assessed that the Ira i re ` e had hardened or under ound WMD stora e facilities and W"MD facilities dis ised as civilian installations both to im ede detection y ins ectors and intelli ence services and to rotect facilities from air attack. Intelli ence a encies assessed that Ira had dee l buried under ound facilities but had not identiied y of these facilities.2O4 The Defense Intelli ence A enc assessed in 2001 that "elements of the re `me’s wea ons of mass destruction ( W MQ) and ballistic missile ro ams robabl are located in under ound facilities " notin that "numerous re orts before and after DESERT SHIELD/ STORM mentioned the existence of nuclear biolo ` cal chemical and ballistic missile roduction and stora e sites that were shallow buried UGFs or in a few instances even de under ound facilities. The assessment also noted that i have confirmed y WMD- or ballistic missile related under ound facilities." An Au st 2002 DIA re ort also discussed r orts of shallow and de l buried biolo `cal warfare facilities. The r ort said that "des ite these man credible re orts and no functionin biolo `cal wea ons B - related under ound facilities are currentl confirmed to be in use in Ira ".2°5 Comment- Despite fixes made to this paragraph based on our earlier comments, as draiied it still is far more dismissive of the intelligence community’s assessments of underground facilities than the assessments themselves were. The reports should use the language used in the analytic papers. ’°‘N1c, Denial and Deception Nm, 1998 2°5 DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December l4, 2001; DIA, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook, August 2002. iii Amendment 83 Page 48, last paragraph — page 49, Erst paragraph - In November 2002, the National Intelligence Council noted in an assessment prepared in response to a request from the Secretary of Deknse, that "all the military and regime-associated UGFs [underground facilities] we have identyied thus far are vulnerable to conventional, precision-guided penetrating munitions because they are not deeply buried Amendment 83 — strike the above paragraph Comment- The November 2002 NIE was published two months after the Secretary spoke and is therefore irrelevant to what he said. In addition, only select information was taken from this NIE which gives a distorted picture of what the NIE said. The following relevant information was excluded: • "To date, the Community has located over 490 Iraqi operational UGFS associated with the military or the regime. • "We assess that Iraq has some large, deeply buried UGFS, but, because of the Iraqi denial and deception (D&D) program, we have not been able to locate any of these. • "All the military and regime-associated UGFs [underground facilities] we have identified thus far are vulnerable to conventional, precision-guided, penetrating munitions because they are not deeply buried. • "The number of UGFs identified and the suspected number of UGFs still tmlocated pose problems for effective operations of any UN inspection regime."2O6 206 National Intelligence Council, Implications of Iraqi Underground Facilities for US National Security, November 2002. 139 _ Amendment 85 Page 49-50, conclusions - Conclusion 5: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding Iraq ’s possession of weapons of mass destr·uction were generally substantiated by intelligence information, though many statements made regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected a higher level of certainty than the intelligence judgments themselves. Many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt that the Iraqi government possessed or was producing weapons of mass destruction. While the intelligence community assessed at this time that the Iraqi regime possessed some chemical and biological munitions, most reports produced prior to fall 2002 cited intelligence gaps regarding production and expressed room for doubt about whether production was ongoing. Prior to late 2002, the intelligence community did not collectively assess with any certainty that Iraq was actively producing any weapons of mass destruction. Amendment 85 — strike generally and strike everything after information Comment - We disagree with the use of the term "generally," because all of the statements were substantiated by the intelligence. Furthermore, the lack of identifying information about exactly which policymakers’ statements were viewed by the authors as reflecting a higher degree of certainty than the intelligence judgments makes it impossible for us to challenge the assertion (which we believe we could if the specific statements were identified). The conclusion is incorrect in asserting that there were "many statements regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002." This is simply false. None of the statements from this time period mentioned ongoing production at all. It is also false to state that "many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt" about Iraq’s possession of VVIVID. Only one policymaker used the term "no doubt" during this time period and it was in August 2002, not early 2002. This type of careless review certainly will be noticed by the readers of the report and harms the credibility of the Committee. We disagree with the comment that prior to 2002 the intelligence community "expressed room for doubt" about whether Iraq possessed chemical and biological munitions and believe, even if it were true, assessments prior to 2002 are irrelevant to what policymakers said in late 2002. We also disagree with including the comment that the intelligence community did not "collectively" assess that Iraq was actively producing any WMD. Whether the intelligence community had a "collective" judgment is irrelevant. The task of this report is not to look at only collective judgments; it is to examine available intelligence. 140 Amendment 86 Page 50, conclusions - Conclusion 6: The Secretary of Defense ’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WYWD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes was not substantiated by available intelligence information. While many intelligence analysts suspected that the Iraqi government might be using underground facilities to conceal WMD activities, no active underground WZMD facilities had been positively identyfied. Furthermore, none of the underground government facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be sa]% from conventional airstrikes. Amendment 86 — Strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 6: The Secreta of Defense’s statement that Ira i WMD facilities were not all vulnerable to attack from the air was substantiated y available intelli ence information. Comment — First, the Secretary did not say "conventional" airstrikes, he said that sites "were not all vulnerable to attack from the air." No intelligence assessments prior to the Secretary’s statement said that "none of the underground WMD facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be safe from conventional airstrikes." Furthermore, the Secretary was not only talking about facilities that were vulnerable due to being deeply buried. He also discussed facilities that were believed to have been located near mosques, schools, and hospitals which made them "not vuh1erable" to airstrikes unless we were willing to possibly strike those civilian facilities. Amendment 87 i Page 50, postwar findings Amendment 87 — strike this section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substar1tiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsub star1tiated if they turned out to be wrong. 141 Amendment 90 Page 54, third paragraph - Intelligence assessments regarding UA Vs shy‘ted ajter the October 2002 NIE. A subsequent NIE, Nontraditional Threats t0 the US Homeland Through 2007, published in January 2003, did not describe Iraq ’s UA V program as 'probably intended " for biological weapons delivery, and instead stated that “Iraq may be modyjiing UA Vs "for CBW delivery. This NIE also noted that Iraqi UA Vs could reach the United States, gf they were transported (in some unspecy‘ied manner) "to within a few hundred kilometers. " Amendment 90 — strike the above paragraph and the next two paragraphs. Comment- We do not believe that a document published in January, three months after the President made the speech should be analyzed in this section. It is not relevant to what the President said in October and, even if it were, the Threats to the Homeland NIE expressed the same concems that the President addressed in his speech, that the UAVs could be used to target the Homeland. Additionally, the NIE used the term "strike" the Homeland, not "reach" the Homeland. 142 Bush / Clinton Suspicious Death List Body Count / Attack: Aalund, James Downing; Adams, Doug, Adger, Sid; Al-huk,Mohammed Zia; Baldridge, Malcolm;Barkley, Maj. William; Baugh, Gandy; Bates, Robert; Baxter, Clifford J.; Bearden, Boonie; Boggs, Hale; Boorda, Jeremy 'Mike'; Branscum, Herby; Brown, Ron; Bunch, James; Butera, Eric; Caradori, Gary; Carnaby, Roland; Casey, William; Casolaro, Danny; Colby, William; Coleman, Suzanne; Collins, Gregory; Curie, Betty brother Theodore Williams Jr.; Corbin, Michael; Damus, Robert G.; Davis, L. J.; Delaney, Jack; Delaughter, Doc; Densberger, Col. William; Dickson, Steve; Dutko, Daniel A. Eisman, Dennis; Farish, William S.; Ferguson, Kathy; Ferrat, Mohamed Samir; Forrestal, James; Foster, Vincent; Fox, Cpl. Eric S.; Friday, Hershell; Fuentes, Rosa; Gandy, Baugh; Gibbs, Judy; Gosch, Johnny; Graham, Gary; Grober, Paula; Guerrin, Larry; Haney, Staff Sgt. Brian Harris, Lt. Col. William; Hartmann, Peter; Hatfield, James; Heard, Stanley; Herndon, Lance; Henry, Don; Hillier, John; Hamd, Riad, Holland, Don; Holton, Michael; Horton, Jake; Huggins, Stanley; Hume, Sandy; Hunt, Mrs. E. Howard; Hunziker, Evan; Ives, Kevin; Johnson, Gary; Jorton, Jake Jerkuic, Niko; Kangas, Steve; Kelly, Col. Robert; Kelly, Shelly; Kennedy, Robert Fitzgerald; Kennedy, John F. Jr.; Kettleson, Jordan; Killian, Lt. Col. Jerry B.; Kokal, John; Koney, Kieth; bin Laden, Salem; Laughton, Johnny; Lawhon, Johnny Jr.; Lawrence, Larry; LeBleu, Conway; Letelier, Orlando; Lombardi, Mark; Luna, Jonathan; Mahoney, Mary; Martin, Florence; McCoy, Don; McDougal, James; McKaskle, Keith; McKechan, Todd; McMillan, Colin; Meissner, Charles; Merrill, Phillip; Milam, James; list compiled by Steve Francis, NewsFollowUp.com, Millis, John; Miller, Charles Milbourne; Miller, Ron;Milosevic, Slobodan; Moffit, Ronni; Mohrenschildt, George de; Moody, Neal; Moser, Tony; Nichols, Larry; Nir, Amiram; Novinger, Darlene; Olson, Paull; O'Neil, John; Palme, Olaf; Parks, Luther (Jerry); Patrick, Dennis; Perdue, Sally; Raiser, Montgomery; Raiser, Victor C. II; Reynolds, Capt Scott; Rhodes, Spec. Gary; Rhodes, Jeff; Rice, Charles Dana; Robertson, Maj. Gen. William; Rogers, Dr. Ronald; Rose, Gen. James; Ruff, Charles; Sabel, Marine Sgt, Tim; Samples, Mike; Sanford, Paul; Schoedinger, Margie, Seal, Barry; Shelton, Bill; Sleeping Indian Mountain C-130; Spence, Craig; Spence, David Wayne; Spiro, Ian; Standoff, Alan; Tucker, Karla Faye; Tilly, Paul; Tower, John Sen.; Walker, Jon Parnell; Walraven, Calvin; Watkins, James Daniel; Webb, Maynard; Weiss, Gus W.; Welch, Russel; Wellstone, Paul Sen.; Wilcher, Paul; Wilhite, Jim; Wiley, Dr. Don C.; Willey, Ed; Williams, Robert; Williams, Theodore Jr.; Willis, Steve; Wilson, John; Winters, Richard; Wise, Barbera; Yeakey, Terrance; Chinese embassy Yugoslavia: Yunhuan, Shao; Xinghu, Xu and his wife, Zhu Ying,; 9/11 WTC victims, Flight 93 victims, Flight 77 / Pentagon victims, 1 million Iraqis. Franklin Scandal Omaha, White House call boy related: Aaron Owen, Shawn Boner, Bill Baker, Newt Copple, Clare Howard, Mike Lewis, Joe Malek, Charlie Rodgers, Dan Ryan, Curtis Tucker, Harmon Tucker. https://www.newsfollowup.com Will the Republicans assassinate Obama? probably ... there's too much at stake and Hillary will follow their course. Clinton Death List Amendment 96 Page 57-58 - Conclusion 8: Statements by the President, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UA Vs) that could be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons were generally substantiated by intelligence information, but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UA V program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new UA Vwas probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq “may " be modiyjring UA Vs for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency argued that the evidence for this was “not sujficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so. " Amendment 96 — strike generally; strike but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UA V program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new UA Vwas probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said merely that Iraq might be modiyying UA Vs for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency argued that the evidence for this was unpersuasive. and i11sert @ intelli ence a encies assessed that lra ’s UAVs could be used for CBW delive . Comments — Again, we disagree with the terms "generally" and we disagree that there was any disagreement within the intelligence community about whether the UAVs "could" be used to deliver CBW as the conclusion states. All agencies agreed that the UAVs could be used to deliver CBW, which is all that policymakers said. We further note that the Air Force dissent on the intended use of the UAVs was not included in the President’s summary of the NIE. 143 Amendment 97 Page 58 - Conclusion 9: The President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering using UA Vs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate noted that an Iraqi procurement network had attempted to purchase commercial mapping software that included data on the United States, and suggested that the Iraqi government was considering using UA Vs to target the US. The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability. Amendment 97 — strike but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. strike and suggested and insert which the IC said su ested ‘ strike The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability. Comment — We believe it is irrelevant whether the judgment later changed. This report is supposed to determine whether statements were substantiated by the intelligence policymakers had when they made the statement, not intelligence that came out later. Additionally, the President said "we are concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." This statement is not inconsistent with the NIE published in January. The IC remained concerned about this possibility. Amendment 98 Page 58, Postwar findings — entire postwar findings section g Amendment 98 — strike this section. Comment - None of the postwar findings have citations so we cannot check their accuracy. Even with citations, we do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is Lumecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they tumed out to be wrong. _ 144 Amendment 99 Page 62, fifth paragraph - Finally, the President stated that Saddam Hussein was "harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. " While this statement was not specQ‘ic to any group, the placement in the speech and the context suggests that the President was stating that Hussein was harboring al Qaeda. The statement appeared two paragraphs after statements that “...Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy, " that some "al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq, " and that “Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. " (These statements are discussed elsewhere in this report. ) The President ’s statement came in the same paragraph as the statement "confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror. " Amendment 99 — Strike the above paragraph alter the first sentence. Comment- We do not believe the President ever stated or implied that Saddam Hussein was harboring al-Qa’ida. In the referenced text he spoke specifically about harboring non-al-Qa’ida groups. We think it is stretching this project too far to not only purport to be the judge and jury of what policymakers said, but also what staff believes they "suggested" or "implied." Amendment 106 Page 65, third paragraph - The September 2002 CIA report Iraqi Support for Terrorism, which was coordinated with the DIA, stated that al-Libi said Iraq had ‘provided " unspecU‘ied CBW training for two al-Qa ’ida associates in 2000, but also stated that al Libi “did not know the results of the training. " Amendment 106 —ai°rer the sentence above insert Another version of the a er rovided to the Committee with the same date did not include the comment that al-Libi "did not know the results of the trainin ." The Committee did not ask wh there were two versions of this p p and did not ask whether one or both versions were sent to the White House. Comment - The Committee needs to get an answer about why there were two reports and find out whether both of them were disseminated. The report also should include the comments from both versions, not choose the one that best supports the point the authors are trying to make. _ 145 Amendment 108 Page 65, last paragraph — Months prior to the speech and in the latter intelligence products cited above, questions were raised in finished intelligence about al-Libi ’s credibility. Amendment 108 — insert a new paragraph before the discussion of the State of the Union which says the following: Des ite these issues when the White House submitted the s eech for CIA fact checkin and sources and methods clearances a CIA staff member told the DCI in writin that the CIA anal st had "read all the terrorism ara a hs and said it was all oka .” em hasis ori ` al (all okay should be underlined.) Comments - We know that this speech was fact checked by the CIA and we have this handwritten comment which shows that the CIA approved the language in the terrorism section. This should be stated in the report 146 _ Amendment 1 19 Page 71, conclusions - Conclusion 12: Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence. Intelligence assessments, including multiple CL4 reports and the November 2002 NIE, dismissed the claim that Iraq and al-Qa ’ida were cooperating partners. According to an undisputed INR footnote in the NIE, there was no intelligence information that supported the claim that Iraq would provide weapons of mass destruction to al-Qa ’ida. The credibility of the principal intelligence source behind the claim that Iraq had provided al-Qa ’ida with biological and chemical weapons training was regularly questioned by DL4, and later by the CL4. The Committee repeats its conclusion from a prior report that “assessments were inconsistent regarding the likelihood that Saddam Hussein provided chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training to al-Qa ’ida. " Amendment 119 —— strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 12: Statements y the President and Secreta Powell that Ira had rovided al- a’ida with wea ons trainin were su orted y the intelli ence. Numerous intelli ence assessments stated that Ira had rovided al- a’ida with wea ons trainin and s eciiicall trainin in oisons and ases. VVhi1e some DIA re orts raised uestions about the credibili of this re ortin and one CIA re ort noted that the source ma have exa erated his re ortin in a se arate area the CIA did not raise uestions about the source’s wea ons trainin re ortin an in fac rovided and a roved the use of this lan a e in both the President’s and Secreta ’s remarks. Comments - None of the statements provided in this report suggested or implied that Iraq and al- Qa’ida had "partnership." Additionally, while there were policymakers who commented that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, those comments were fully supported by the intelligence. The al-Libi reporting on CBW training was never questioned by the CIA and the information was approved by the CIA for use in both the President’s Cincinnati speech and Powell’s UN speech. In the case of the Powell speech CIA actually provided the information to him to use in the speech in the draft of the speech the CIA wrote. Furthermore, the conclusion as drafted says that intelligence community "asses sments were inconsistent" so accordingly, how can the Committee judge policymakers to not have any statements substantiated by the intelligence? 147 Amendment 120 Page 71, conclusions - Conclusion 13: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq ’s contacts with al-Qa’ida were substantiated by intelligence information. However, policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al-Qa ’ida. Amendment 120 — strike However, policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the .. contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al-Qa ’ida. Comments - We disagree that policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the nature of the contacts or left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation. Policymaker comments throughout this section nearly exactly matched what the intelligence community said about contacts. No policymaker implied that the contacts led to any Iraqi _ support of al-Qa’ida other than the safehaven, training, reciprocal non-aggression, which is well documented in numerous intelligence assessments. Furthermore, the comments from many of the policymakers outlined in the section were factchecked by the CIA. The report should identify the policymakers and the specific statements that are judged to be misleading so that we can analyze those statements. Amendment 121 Page 72, conclusions - Conclusion 14. The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001. Amendment 121 - strike the above conclusion Comments - At the time that the Vice President commented that "it’s been pretty well confirmed that [Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service" a CIA assessment said, "The Czech governmentlast week ublicl confirmed that suspected hij acker Muhammad Atta met with former Iraqi station chief Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani in Prague before al-Ani’s expulsion from the Czech Republic last April. Al-Ani and Atta met during 8-9 April in Prague, according to a foreign government service." (Emphasis added.) _ 148 Amendment 122 Page 72, Postwar findings — entire section Amendment 122 — strike all postwar findings Comment — None of the postwar Endings have citations so we cannot check their accuracy. Even with citations, we do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase ll report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. Amendment 125 Page 74, first non-bullet paragraph — In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretaigv of State all discussed Iraq ’s intentions regarding weapons of mass destruction. Both the President and the Wce President indicated that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorist groups. Amendment 125 — strike the above sentence. Comment/suggestion —None of these individuals discussed 1raq’s "intentions" regarding WMD or anything else. Both the President and the Vice President expressed concern that Saddam could share WMD with terrorists, not that he intended to do so and they did not say or "indicate" that he was "prepared” to do so. _ 149
_ Amendment 126 Page 74, second — fourth full paragraphs - (U) In the Vice President ’s August 2002 speech 0n Iraq, he discussed “the case of Saddam Hussein and indicated that Saddam was ‘prepared to share [weapons of mass destruction] with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States. " (U) At the time of the Vice President ’s speech, the intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists. The intelligence community had previously assessed that Saddam was interested in acquiring WMD to deter hostile foreign powers (including Israel, Iran, and the US—led Coalition) and as a means of achieving "regionalpreeminence. " (U) The intelligence community had also assessed that Saddam was unlikely to take actions that he believed would threaten the survival of his regime, and that he believed hostile actions such as a re-invasion of Kuwait would infact threaten his regime ’s survival. Amendment 126 — strike the above three paragraphs and insert In the Vice President’s Au st 2002 s eech on g, he discussed the threat of al- a’ida’s ursuit of wea ons of mass destruction. He noted that Cold War doctrines do not pp y in this scenario notin that "containment is not ossible when dictators obtain wea ons of mass destruction and are re ared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastro hic casualties on the United States." S ecificall re ardin Ira "armed with an arsenal of these wea ons of terror" he said "Saddarn Hussein could then be ex ected to seek domination of the entire Middle East take control of a eat ortion of the world’s ener su lies directl threaten America’s friends throu out the re ' on and sub `ect the United States to y other nation to nuclear b1ackmai1." Comment- The Vice President did not say that Saddam was "prepared to share WMD with terrorists," nor did he indicate as much. The report should analyze what he said, not the drafters’ interpretation of his comments. The VP was talking about al-Qa’ida pursuing WMD and said that Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment do not work against these kinds of enemies. He said "containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States." He then went on in the next paragraph separately to discuss the case of Saddam Hussein. The report should not say that he said something about Saddam when he never even mentioned Saddam at all. 150 Amend1nent 127 Page 75, last three paragraphs — In the President 's September 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Saddam Hussein was a “grave and gathering danger and that t0 assume Saddam ’s good faith would be tantamount to betting “the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. " The President also implied that the Iraqi regime was dangerous because it might provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists (“And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we find all these dangers .... U The intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein dealt with other countries in good faith and assessments regarding the potential use of WYMD were not based on assumptions of good faith. As discussed, the 1999 NIE on Iraqi military capabilities noted that it was dyjicult to gauge Saddam ’s intentions, but judged that he would be carejizl not to put his regime ’s survival at risk. Amendment 127- Strike In one place - in one regime — we find all these dangers .... U; Strike The intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein dealt with other countries in good faith and assessments regarding the potential use of WMD were not based on assumptions of good faith. and insert In a December 15 2001 assessment titled The Ira i Threat the CIA said "Saddam sees himself as a an-Arab leader and views his re ' e as the most orious cha ter in Ira i histo . . . His decision-makin is ided y o ommism distrust of others a ersonal need for ower and the sense that he is an historic fi e who must take bold risks to advance Ira ’s interests. He views state ower rimaiil in milit terms—twice launchin wars a air1st his nei bors—and his strate 'c aim is to establish Ira as the reeminent ower in the Persian Gulf." Comment- The last portion of the comment Hom the President in the second paragraph above was not referencing Saddam giving weapons to terrorists as the draft suggests. The President had explained several dangers in the previous few paragraphs including poverty and raging disease, ethnic and religious strife, and outlaw groups which accept no law and have no limit to their violent ambitions. These were the dangers he was talking about, but when the comments are taken out of context, that understanding is lost. Also, trying to contradict the President by saying what the intelligence community did not assess is ridiculous. The President did not claim that this was an intelligence community judgment. 111 Amendment 128 Page 76, first four full paragraphs - At the time of the President ’s UN speech, the October 2002 NIE was still being prepared, and was two weeks away from release. While the document itseb’ was not available at this time, its consistency with the 1999 NIE, and the lack of contradictory assessments in the intervening four year period, illustrate the continuity of the intelligence community ’s judgments on this topic. (ID The October 2002 NIE assessed that "Saddam 's past actions suggest that a decision to use WMD probabhr would come when he feels his personal survival is at stake even after he has exhausted all political, military and diplomatic options It noted that it the US would be unlikehr to know when Saddam felt that he had no other options for sefpreservation, but pointed out that “Iraq ’s methodical conventional defensive preparations alsocsuggest Saddam thinks an attack is not imminent ".2"7 (ID Additionally, the NIE pointed out that “Iraq 's historical use of C Wagainst Iran and its decision not to use VWWD against Israel or Coalition forces in 1991 indicates that an opponent’s retaliatory capability is a critical factor in Saddam ’s decisionmaking. "2"8 (U) The NIE also examined a variety of ways in which Iraq might conceivably use WAID, and noted that overall “we have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use VWWD. " Amendment 128- strike all of the above paragraphs. Comment- An NIE published after the President’s speech is irrelevant. National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. Ibid. _ 152 _ Amendments 129 Page 76, last paragraph - While the October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, it judged that Saddam was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. According to the NIE, "Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBWagainst the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger case for making war. " Amendment 129 — strike this paragraph and the next two paragraphs. Comment- The NIE did not say that Saddam was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. Furthermore, we believe all of this analysis and the analysis in the ' next two paragraphs are irrelevant and should be deleted. The President was not making a comment about what Iraq was likely to do now, he was specifically talking about the danger of waiting until Saddam had more powerful weapons which could change his calculations about the wisdom of giving WMD to terrorists. Nothing in the intelligence reporting casts doubt on the President’s comments that Iraq "could" give WMD to terrorists. Amendment 130 Page 77, second paragraph - As discussed elsewhere in this report, in October 2002 most intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. The State Department ’s Oyjice of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) believed that Saddam Hussein wanted to possess nuclear weapons, and was maintaining some capabilities with dual uses, but judged that the available evidence did "not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution. " Amendment 130 — aher the above start a new paragraph and insert In a statement released y the DCI about the President’s comment he said "There is no inconsistenc between out view of Saddam’s owin threat and the view as ex ressed y the President in his s eech. Althou we think the chances of Saddam initializin a WMD attack at this moment are low-in p because it would constitute an admission that he ossesses WMD-there is no uestion that the likelihood of Saddarn’s usin W1v1D a ainst the United States or our allies in the re ` on for blackmail deterrence or otherwise ows as his arsenal continues to build. His ast use of WMD a ainst civilian and milit tar ets shows that he roduces these wea ons to use not `ust to deter. Comment- The statement released by the DCI is relevant in this section and should be included. It explains that the President’s comments were consistent with the intelligence at the time and that the President and the intelligence in question were discussing two different things. We believe it also illustrates why the entire intent section is a distortion of what the policymakers in question were discussing, which was not Saddarn’s intent at all. 153 Amendment 1 3 1 Page 77, last two paragraphs — page 78, iirst two full paragraphs — As discussed the October 2002 NIE judged that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. More generally, it suggested that Saddam would probably decide to use WI\@ only y' he jelt he had no other options for survival and that "an opponent ’s retaliatory capability" would be a key factor in making this decision. A November 2002 NIE on nontraditional threats restated the October NIE ’s assessment about Saddam ’s willingness, y' "sujjiciently desperate " to employ an outside terrorist group to conduct an attack on the US as his "last chance for vengeance. " This NIE included the caveats that the intelligence community had low confidence in this assessments, and that "INR believes that the intelligence community has no reporting to support this assertion. " The October 2002 NIE ’s conclusions were essentially repeated again in a January 2003 Intelligence Community Assessment which said that "Saddam probably will not initiate hostilities for fear of providing Washington with justdication to invade Iraq. Nevertheless, he might deal the first blow, especially y' he perceives that an attack intended to end his regime is imminent. " Neither of these reports specqically focused on what Saddam might do y' he had nuclear weapons or a 'full arsenal" of chemical and biological weapons, possibbr because the intelligence community believed that Iraq was still years away from possessing either of these. Amendment 131 — Strike the first and last paragraphs above Comment- The NIE did not say that Saddam Hussein was ‘%mwilling" to conduct terrorist attacks and the President did not say that he would, he said that he could provide a chemical or biological weapon to terrorists. _ 154 _ Amendment 132 and 133 Page 78, third full paragraph — Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (ID In the Secretary of State 's February 2003 address t0 the United Nations Security Council, he stated that “ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, and that "al-Qaida could turn t0 Iraq for help in acquiring expertise 0n weapons of mass destruction. " Amendment 132 - insert before ambition and hatred "Some believe some claim that these contacts do not amount to much. The sa Saddam Hussein’s secular g y and al- a’ida’s reli ' ous g y do not mix. I am not comforted y this thou t. Amendment 133 — insert a new paragraph after the paragraph in Amendment 132 which says: Several intelli ence r oits described a mutual anti ath for the United States as a motivation for their contacts and dealin s includin the followin : • A ran e of intelli ence r orts indicates Ba dad and al- a’ida have been in contact since at least the mid-1990s. Mutual sus icion has blocked coo eration at various times but shared anti ath toward the US and the Saudi ro al famil has rovided a otential rationale for coo eration. CIA SPWR Ma 14 2002 • Ira ’s interaction with al- a’ida is im elled y mutual anti ath toward the United States and the Saudi ro al famil and y Bin Laden’s interest in unconventional weapons and relocation sites. in contrast to the atron-client attem between g and its Palestinian surro ates the relationshi between Saddam and Bin Laden a ears to more closel resemble that of two inde endent actors gxg gg to ex loit each other—their mutual sus icion subomed y al- a’ida’s interest in Ira i assistance and Ba dad’s interest in al- a’ida’s anti-US attacks. Jan 2003 Ira i Su ort for Terrorism p 11 • Discernin the reasons for Saddam’s contacts and dealin s with al a’ida is difficult but his main motivation ma be best ex ressed 5; the old roverb ‘the enem of y enem is y friend} The theme r eated y sources close to various levels of Saddam’s re ` e is that Saddam and Bin Laden reco 'zed the United States as a common enem that Saddam came to see al- a’ida as a force to be reckoned with and that for all their differences and mutual wariness at various times their interests coincided. — CIA in ut to Powell s eech .4 also Jan 2003 Ira i Su ort for Terrorism • Shared anti ath toward the US and Saudi Arabia rovides ossible common ound for coo eration des ite com etin ideolo ` es and mutual sus icion.June 25 2002 SPWR Iran—Ira -S ria: Willin ess to Overlook Ideolo in Iheir Relations With Terrorist Grou s Comment- The report as drafted left off relevant portions of the Secretary’s comments and excluded several intelligence reports with direct relevance to the Secretary’s comments. These should have been added. 155 Amendment 134 Page 78, fourth full paragraph - The intelligence community did not assess that Iraq and al- Qaida had a cooperative relationship. In June 2002 the CIA compared Iraq and al-Qaida to "rival intelligence services, with each trying t0 exploit the other for its own benefit. " While there was evidence of limited contacts throughout the J 990s, the CIA assessed that these ` contacts did not add up to an established relationship. In a January 2003 report the CIA noted that “Saddam Husayn and Usama bin Laden are far from being natural partners and stated that while there was little specy'ic intelligence about Saddam ’s opinion of al-Qaida, “his record suggests that any such ties would be rooted in deep suspicion. " Amendment 134~ Strike the entire paragraph Comment- Secretary Powell never said that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a cooperative relationship and the CIA never assessed that "these contacts did not add up to an established relationship." If there is such a document, it should be cited. Amendment 135 Page 78, last partial paragraph - As discussed, the October 2002 NIE assessed that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups at that time, because he did not want to put his regime ’s survival at risk. It noted that information on possible training of terrorists was “second hand, or from sources of varying reliability. " Amendment 135 — Strike the above paragraph. Comment- The NIE never used the term "unwilling." Furthermore, Secretary Powell’s entire UN speech was checked by the intelligence community, and some areas were actually drafted by the CIA. Obviously the intelligence community believed it was substantiated by intelligence i because they approved it. _ 156 Arnendrnent 136 Page 82, conclusions - Conclusion 15: Statements by the President and Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Saddam Hussein did not have nuclear weapons, and was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks the US using conventional, chemical or biological weapons at that time, in part because he feared that doing so would give the US a stronger case for war with Iraq. This judgment was echoed by both earlier and later intelligence community assessments. All of these assessments noted that gauging Saddam ’s intentions was quite dqjicult, and most suggested that he would be more likely to initiate hostilities if he felt that a US invasion was imminent. Amendment 136 — Strike the above conclusion Comrr1ent— All of the claims in this paragraph are false. Neither the President nor Vice President said or indicated that Saddam "was prepared to give WMD to terrorist groups for attacks on the US." Furthermore, the intelligence community made no assessments about whether Iraq "could" give WMD to terrorists, so the only intelligence information that could be compared to these statements is whether the intelligence community assessed Iraq had such weapons to give, which the intelligence community did. The statement that the NIE said Iraq was "unwilling" to conduct terrorist attacks is false. The NIE never said that. This judgment was not echoed in earlier assessments at all. Amendment 137 Pages 73-83, Intent section Amendment 137 — Strike the entire intent section Comment- As discussed in several previous amendments, we believe the intent section as a whole is distorting what policymakers were arguing at the time. They were not arguing that Saddam "intended" to do any of the things they were discussing, the argument was that, after September 11, we must refocus the debate on what Saddam could do. The intelligence community had low confidence in its judgments of Saddarn’s intent which bolstered the case of policymakers that, in light of such uncertainty, the focus needs to be on capabilities. 157 Amendment 138 Page 82-83, Postwar iindings — entire section Amendment 138 — Strike the postwar findings section. Cormnent - We do not believe that postwar iindings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to mislead readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they tumed out to be wrong. Amendment 140 Pages 84-88, Post-War Iraq section Amendment 140 — Strike the Post-War Iraq section Comments - This entire section is comparing apples to oranges. It compares statements made by policymakers discussing their opinions about postwar Iraq to intelligence unrelated to the comments made. In one case the Vice President quotes a Middle East expert, yet that comment too, according to the draft, must be substantiated by intelligence. We simply cannot expect policymakers to have their comments comport with intelligence even when their comments have nothing to do with intelligence. _ 158 Minority Views OF SENATOR WARNER I agree with many of the points made in the minority views of Senators Bond, Hatch, Chambliss, and Burr about the conduct and the content of this portion of the Committee’s Iraq review effort. I offer these views to focus on the issues which I believe are the most significant and troubling problems with the two reports released today. These concerns should be of no surprise to the Committee Chairman, or any of the Members who attended the business meeting to vote on these so-called Phase II reports, as I have made these points before. I am disappointed that the Committee missed an opportunity to have the staff work out many of the remaining problems with these reports. Staff from both sides of the aisle had commented that progress was being made and that more progress was possible, and, in fact likely, if there had been time allotted to that end. It is unfortunate that such time was not provided because many of the factual problems that remain in the reports may have been corrected. Instead, in the form voted on by a majority of my colleagues, the reports contain numerous inaccuracies, lack complete information, and are not reports that I could support. These inaccuracies are explained ir1 detail in the appendix of amendments attached to the Vice Chairman’s minority views. It is more disappointing that a motion offered by the Vice-Chairman—one I considered exceedingly important—was not given a vote or full consideration during the business meeting. The motion called for those individuals who are alleged in the reports to have made statements that were not substantiated by intelligence or to have otherwise failed in their duties, be afforded the opportunity to come before the Committee to have the opportunity to comment. In the spirit of fairness and full disclosure, these individuals should have been called to meet with the Committee long before the Chairman scheduled a vote on these reports. I believe the failure to do so was unjust to the individuals in question. One of the most fundamental tenets in our great Republic is the opportunity to confront one’s accuser. While the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is certainly not a court of law, these reports will undoubtedly be released to the public and scrutinized, therefore, in the court of public opinion. The individuals who are named in these reports must be afforded the opportunity to be heard about their statements, about the intelligence that was available to them, and to defend themselves if they deem it necessary. I believe this is particularly important in this case, because as the Vice Chainnan’s minority views state, the reports as drafted lack important and relevant information. We know, for example, that information provided by the intelligence community for use in Secretary Powell’s speech to the United Nations, was knowingly excluded from the report. We have an obligation to ask Secretary Powell about this information and any other information the intelligence community provided of which the Committee may not be aware. Because I was so concerned about what I consider to be a fundamental issue of fairness, I urged the Committee to contact the individuals named ir1 this report, prior to its release, to allow them to at least reply to what I believe are significant accusations. Although any responses and 159 any additional information cannot be incorporated into the reports themselves, the information can at least be made pan of the record. While I do not believe this is an acceptable altemative, it will have to suflice. I have served on this Committee for many years—once as ranking member——and I believe the Committee can best serve the Senate and the public, if we can achieve a high level of bipaitisanship. The subject of these reports was a difficult challenge; but, it is behind us now and I will work with all other members to achieve bipartisan solutions in the future. Joint WARNER _ 160 _ M1NOR1TY VIEWS OF SENATOR CHAMBLISS, VICE CHA1RMAN BOND, AND SENATOR HATCH The final two Phase ll reports and the process that produced them are a great disappointment. The products are poor and the process that produced them was regrettable. Although the Minority requested to be involved in the production of these reports at the start of the 110th Congress, we were excluded from the drafting of these reports and deprived of any meaningful role in the work that produced them. We believe the Senate Intelligence Committee, above all others in the Senate, should be a Committee where Members work together absent political agendas for the good of the nation. The process that produced these reports, unfortunately, was not in keeping with that conviction, and we are disappointed with the results. We fully concur with the Vice Chairmar1’s views submitted as an assessment on the substance of the two reports; here, however, we believe it is necessary to make known our disappointment over the process by which they were produced. On February 12, 2004, the Committee voted to authorize Phase ll of this Committee’s inquiry regarding the prewar intelligence on Iraq. Many of the Committee Members’ votes in support of authorizing Phase II of the investigation were based primarily to facilitate a unanimous consensus in completing the Committee’s Phase I report. That report was fair, accurate, and thorough, and proved to be the only substantive and bipartisan portion of this Committee’s investigation into the prewar intelligence on Iraq. Since that time, rather than focusing on how to improve our Intelligence Community or placing the full emphasis of our oversight on reforming the Intelligence Community following its reorganization in 2004, the Committee has spent four years looking backwards at past events that had already been examined by the Committee and by a number of independent Commissions. In addition, this latest round of the Com1nittee’s Phase ll reports and the manner in which they were produced calls into question the integrity of the Committee to act without bias in its oversight role over the Intelligence Community. Past Committee Practice The handling of these Phase II reports represents a significant departure from past Committee practice. In the Committee’s Phase I investigation, staff briefed the Members on a proposed work plan prior to initiating the investigation. Members on both sides of the aisle had an opportunity to request directly that specific areas of concern be investigated and to frame the scope and methodology of the investigation before it even began. At least fifteen times during the staff portion of the investigation, the Members of the Cornrnittee met to receive briefings and discuss issues related to the ongoing investigation. Before the Committee scheduled a meeting to adopt the Phase I report, Members had a drait report for over five months which they reviewed and edited, and had the ability to request further information. It was only aiter at least four additional business meetings of the Committee to discuss the draits that conclusions were formulated based upon Me1nbers’ input and the Committee’s review of the text. At all times throughout this investigation, the Minority had access to, and provided feedback on, the investigative process. This is not to say that the Minority was happy with every decision the Committee ultimately made, but they were briefed fully, had their concerns addressed either 161 _ through negotiations or amendments, and along with the Majority, they unanimously supported the Committee’s report. During the Committee’s first round of Phase II reports in the 109th Congress, the Committee held at least a dozen business meetings to discuss and receive briefings on two drafts—(l) The Use By the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress and (2) Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments. Members had an opportunity to propose additions to the reports and to draft conclusions over a period of ten months before reporting them out of Committee. During these discussions, Minority concenrs and suggestions were responded to and addressed, including requests for interviews and documents. In some instances, at the request of the Minority, information was even incorporated into the reports which was not required by the terms of reference for the inquiry in order to achieve comity among the Members of the Committee. Current Phase II Reports Unfortunately, the process by which the current Phase II reports were drafted did not conform even remotely to the Committee’s previously bipartisan process. From the time the new Democrat Majority resumed the Phase II effort last year, Minority Members and Minority staff were excluded hom the process. Several Majority staff were assigned to produce the two drafts, and numerous requests hom the Minority were denied, including requests to address scope problems, requests to conduct necessary interviews, and requests to include additional information. The Majority even denied the Minority access to the draft reports until two months after the Majority had reviewed them. We believe that working together hom the start would have precluded any significant disagreement over the scope, method, and procedure for producing these reports. As it turned out, we had very little input into these drafts and were not allowed adequate time to review and comment on them. The Minority was provided with the draft reports on January 15, 2008—reports which included stajfdrajted Committee conclusions. This was particularly disappointing to us because we believe that elected members of the Senate, not a few majority staff; should be forming the final conclusions on whether the highest officials of the Republic acted appropriately with regard to pre-war intelligence. At the first Committee meeting on Phase II, action on the drafts was postponed and no substantive discussion of the drafts occurred; from the time the drafts were circulated to Committee Members to their adoption on April 1, 2008, the Committee did not hold one business meeting where the substance of the reports was addressed. This stands in stark contrast with past Committee practice. For example, in late 2005, Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Levin, and Senator Feinstein wrote to the Senate leadership stating that during the. Committee’s Phase I review the "Com1nittee members and staff were given reasonable opportunities to review the draft sections of the report early in the process and to provide input and suggest changes to the report" (emphasis added). The letter added that the "Phase II investigation is an equally substantial task, and it is important for the Committee to approach it with the same process." Unfortunately, this inclusive process was not followed by those who earlier had prescribed it. *62 Adoption of the Reports If Chairman Rockefeller had conducted the current investigation according to the framework he insisted upon in his 2005 letter, we would have few objections to this process. Due to the little input that we were allowed, however, the Minority exercised its only option and filed over 170 amendments prior to the first business meeting scheduled to consider the Phase II reports. A number of these amendments addressed clear errors and contradictions in the draft reports that should have been addressed among staff during the production of the reports. As a consequence, those amendments that pointed out clear errors in draiting were addressed before the meeting on April 1, 2008. At that business meeting, the only one held to consider the substance of the Phase II reports, the Minority still had over 100 amendments outstanding. Additionally, five procedural motions were submitted for consideration in order to eliminate the need to work through all 100 amendments. Instead of allowing any consideration of the Vice Chairman’s motions beyond the first or any of his remaining amendments, the Chairman cut off discussion and unilaterally called for a vote on Hnal adoption of the reports. We cannot think of any time in our recollection of Committee proceedings or other Senate proceedings where there has been such a disregard for the rules, procedures, and traditions of the Senate. Especially curious to us was the fact that the iinal vote was called for even though the reports were not yet iinished. Rather, alter the vote the majority made clear its intention to iinish the reports on its own. This defies basic principles of fairness and sets a dangerous precedent. Never in the history of Phase I or Phase II were Members expected to vote on a report without the opportunity to be briefed on it several times and without having months to review and amend it, let alone be called to vote on a report that was not even finished. Rules and procedures in the Senate and its Committees provide stability and legitimacy to the body’s actions. Thomas J efferson’s A Manual of Parliamentary Practice, on the importance of rules in Congress, states: It is much more material that there be a rule to go by, than what that rule is; that there may be a unyformity of proceeding in business not subject to the caprice of the Speaker or captiousness of the members. It is very material that order, decency, and regularity be preserved in a dignyied public body. If decisions are approved according to orderly and fair proceedings, then the public is more likely to accept the results of those decisions. The rules of the Senate tend to advance the Minority’s rights and prohibit arbitrary procedures. It is ironic that the Majority would act outside the rules in order to adopt reports that accuse the Administration of distorting and mischaracterizing prewar intelligence on iraq. As the Vice Chairman’s minority views point out, these reports, crafted by the Majority, fail even to achieve their intended purpose. The Senate Intelligence Committee's unanimously approved July 2004 Phase I report makes clear that flawed intelligence—not Administration deception — was the basis for policymakers’ statements and decisions. None of the facts in these last two reports changes or negates the Committee’s unanimous conclusion four years ago. 163 _ Despite the Co1mnittee’s 2004 Report, these iinal two reports attempt to distort what the Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war in order to advance a presumed, politically advantageous argument. Yet those of us in Congress examined the same intelligence as the Bush Administration, and policymakers from the Legislature also characterized lraq as a growing and dangerous threat to the United States. ln fact, the public record is replete with examples of statements by Members of Congress making the same characterizations regarding lraq’s WMD and links to terrorism: There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next 5 years. - Chairman John Rockefeller, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, September 25, 2002. In the four years since the inspectors, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program . . . It is clear, however, that le]? unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capability to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons. — Senator Hillary Clinton, Statement on the Senate Floor, October 10, 2002. When you look at what Saddam Hussein has at his disposal, in terms of chemical, biological, and perhaps even nuclear weapons, we cannot ignore the threat that he poses to the region and the fact that he has fomented terrorism throughout his reign. — Senator Dick Durbin, CNN 's Larry King Live, “The Hunt for Bin Laden Intensifies; VVhat is to be done with John Walker?,” December 21, 2001. The President has rightly called Saddam Hussein ’s ejj‘orts to develop weapons of mass destruction a grave and gathering threat to Americans. The global community has tried but has failed to address that threat over the past decade. I have come to the inescapable conclusion that the threat posed to America by Saddam ’s weapons of mass destruction is so serious that despite the risks and we should not minimize the risks we must authorize the President to take the necessary steps to deal with that threat .... There has been some debate over how “imminent" a threat Iraq poses. I do believe Iraq poses an imminent threat. I also believe after September I I, that question is increasingly outdated. It is in the nature of these weapons that he has and the way they are targeted against civilian populations, that documented capability and demonstrated intent may be the only warning we get. To insist on further evidence could put some of our fellow Americans at risk Can we ajford to take that chance? I do not think we can. — Chairman John Rockefeller, Statement on the Senate Floor, October 10, 2002. Saddam fs existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose real threats to America today, tomorrow .... He could make these weapons available to many terrorist groups, third parties, which have contact with his government. Those groups, in turn, could bring those weapons into the United States and unleash a devastating attack 164 _ against our citizens. I fear that greatly. - Chairman John Rockefeller, Statement on the Senate Floor, October 10, 2002. Ultimately, these reports reveal a dubious agenda of vainly trying to prove the often quoted, but false, absolutely partisan, slogan, "Bush lied and people died." The Committee and the American people know full well that the intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programs was wrong, and that senior policy leaders irom both parties relied upon that incorrect intelligence to the nation’s detriment. Rather than wasting time and resources on this futile quest, the Committee should have spent, and should be spending, the full force of its oversight ensuring that the Intelligence Community does not make such egregious errors in intelligence analysis ever again. Any investigation that the Committee conducts should be done with the intention of improving the Intelligence Community and enhancing our national security. Regrettably, these reports neither improve our Intelligence Community nor enhance our national security. It is at the expense of long-standing Senate precedence and the credibility of this Committee that this futile and partisan exercise has been conducted. We believe it is vital for this Committee to return to bipartisan oversight and to depart irom such wasteful practices. Unless we do so, intelligence oversight will turn into an oxymoron. SAXBY CHAMBLISS Criiusrorinsiz S. BoND Onion G. HATCH 165 _ Am>1r1oNAL Vnzws or SENAroR Hnrcu J omni) BY Vrcn CnA1RMAN BoNn AND SENAroR BURR (U) In July, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued the Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, subsequently colloquially referred to as "Phase One" of the Committee’s investigation into intelligence failures related to the Iraq war. This report of over 500 pages, including 117 conclusions, was the most substantive investigation into a major intelligence failure since the original Church hearings and investigations that preceded the formation of the Committee in 1975. The substance of this report -- the careful parsing of the multiple intelligence failure -- is still being processed by the Intelligence Community and our oversight committees. This report was voted out of this Committee unanimously. The New York Times — not known for its sympathy to either the Republican administration or the Republican Senate leadership at the time — wrote: "The Senate report was remarkable both for the severity of its criticism and the fact that it reflected a bipartisan consensus rarely seen in Congress. " (Emphasis throughout is mine.) (U) Several months before the release of that report, the Committee concluded an agreement for subsequent investigations. These investigations — known since then as "Phase Two" — devolved from the beginning into partisan disagreement. The process, efforts and results under Phase Two — including the two reports that complete the process with this publication — failed significantly in achieving unanimous consensus. On no other matter subject to congressional oversight is unanimous consensus more of an indicator of success or failure than it is on oversight of intelligence matters. (U) The publication of these two reports — Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Ojice of Special Plans within the Ojice of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by US. Government Ojicials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information (hereafter referred to as "The Rome Meetings" and "State1nents," respectively) — came following repeated failures by the Majority to coordinate the work effort with the Minority. The decision to publish the reports was a peremptory decision by the Chairman of the Committee to terminate Minority participation in an amendment process that, while some might consider delaying by cavillation, had been well-established and productive in all previous stages of the investigation. As partisanship corrodes the value of intelligence, partisanship poisons intelligence oversight. (U) The reports, as a direct result of this unnecessarily partisan process, are inconclusive, misleading, incomplete. (For detailed substantiation of this assertion, I associate myself with the Additional Views of the Vice Chairman.) It is both sad and ironic that the impressive and historic efforts that began with the publication of Phase One in 2004 ended with a divided vote on incomplete products on April Fool’s Day, 2008. "The Rome Rep0rt" (U) An American ofricial not part of the Intelligence Community meets with a controversial Iranian in a bar. A plan is drafted on a napkin. (!) For $5 million, it is proposed *66 _ that trafiic can be jammed in Tehran. For more investment, it is insinuated that regime change can be effected. Here is the punchline to this joke: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigates this as part of its review 0n Iraq intelligence failures. - The colorful scene — not an intelligence activity, according to this report, as well as common sense — occurred during the period of the "Rome meetings," which refers to several days in December of 2001 when two Department of Defense officials met with two Iranian former officials (one a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and another associated with the "intelligence establishment of Iran," although the Committee’s report provides no further clarity on his association) to gather information on developments in Iran. The meeting was initiated by an American scholar from a conservative think tank, operating independently, and the Iranian ex atriate and Iran-Contra figure Manucher Ghorbanifar. The (U) The meetings received prior approval by the National Security Council. The DoD participants were there based on their long-standing and substantive knowledge of Iran and Farsi. The American scholar had over 20 years of experience on the subject. (U) American citizens should be asked whether they would expect their government to respond to offers for substantive meetings on sensitive subjects — and Iran remains to this day a critical subject, and the desire for insights into Iran immediately following September ll would not, in my opinion, be considered outlandish. (U) The Committee report says: "The Committee’s review of applicable laws and regulations indicates that Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz acted within their authorities in directing DoD personnel to attend the Rome meeting. The final version of the Counterintelligence Field Activity’s report also identified no violations of law regarding the DoD contacts with Mr. Ghorbanifar as of the date their review was halted." (U) At this point, the reader may pause to ask: "What does this have to do with Iraq?” The terms of reference determining the scope of "Phase Two," articulated in a press release by the Committee on February l2, 2004, give no insight. The investigation into the Rome meetings was about Iran, not Iraq, and never appeared to me to be related to completing the significant investigation this Committee had conducted on intelligence failures leading to the Iraq war. In a partisan Committee, as this one has sadly become, the Majority has within its purview the ability to conduct any investigation it deems worthwhile. That it did not conduct the review into the "Rome meeting" separately from the Iraq review and instead insisted on conducting this investigation into this Rome meeting about Iran as part of our investigation on Iraq leaves the proponents of this approach explaining a rationale I cannot, in good faith, articulate on their behalf. (U) The conclusions reveal the nullibiety of the Committee’s effort. The first and third conclusions appear to give bureaucratic direction on how to hold meetings. NSC Deputy Hadley 167 _ is, according to the report, mildly chastised for failing to inform DCI Tenet and Deputy Secretary Armitage of the "full nature of the planned contact," although anyone reading the report would discern that the "full nature" was not able to be known until after the meetings were actually held. The third conclusion criticizes participants for withholding certain information about these meetings. Keeping ir1 mind that the Committee report itself makes clear the Committee’s lack of understanding of what intelligence collection actually is, and reminding one that the report cites no laws or authorities broken or compromised, the lack of complete clarity between government agencies regarding certain meetings does not by any stretch of the imagination reach to a level of "stove-piping" or other act of legitimate intelligence oversight concern. (U) What is particularly disturbing about the conclusions to this report is the bandying of the term "inappropriate." The role of the U.S. citizen playing interlocutor to these meetings is "inapprop1iate." The handling of information was "inapprop1iate." What does "inapprop1iate" mean in this context? What is the norm for "appropriate"? As government officials, we deal within the lines of authority, regulation, law. Actions can be deemed to be within or outside of those lines, when they are the latter they are unauthorized, in violation of regulations, illegal. No action reviewed in this report is so deemed. Too often these days, it seems that when one seeks to criticize without substance or standing, one is reduced to uttering that something is "inappropriate." In Washington today, this has come to be the cheap calumniation by the callow-headed. (U) Every exercise of this Committee should seek opportunities to expand the understanding of intelligence — for Members of Congress, at the very least and, when the investigations result ir1 public reports, for the public, which needs to be educated on the important role of intelligence in our democracy. Near the conclusion of this report we find, "There can be varying opinions on the extent to which the Rome and Paris meetings represented _ intelligence information collection." Couldn’t this report have reviewed and articulated the various definitions of "intelligence collection," as understood in law and tradecraft? Is a meeting between an American official who is not a member of the Intelligence Community and a foreigner "intelligence collection"? (Hint: It is not.) On another point, the CIA has, through good and bad experience, developed a formal method for labeling foreign individuals "fabricators" and "information peddlers." What is the formal procedure for doing so? What are the implications, and are there regulations, for policymakers for subsequently dealing with individuals so labeled by the Intelligence Community? In the murky world of betrayed loyalties and stolen secrets, are "fabricators" and "information peddlers" ever again worthwhile sources? Finally, what are the guidelines for CIA officers, particularly serving in Stations overseas, for obtaining information on activities of American citizens, particularly U.S. government officials? Is it ever the norm for officers to seek information on U.S. policymakers from liaison services? All of these questions, in my opinion, begged to be addressed by the material covered in this report. (U) Instead, the Committee reviewed hundreds of pages of testimony and documents on the bureaucratic results of these meetings. Ultimately, the Rome meetings went nowhere. There was no policy action — certainly no covert action — initiated or even contemplated by government officials. It was a classic Washington episode: Meetings were held, no action was taken — but an 168 _ investigation was conducted. This was an investigation which, like the meetings of officials not in the Intelligence Community not dealing with Iraq, went nowhere. "Statements” (U) There continues to be debate over whether the Committee should investigate the use of ir1telligence by policymakers advocating war in Iraq. It is questionable that, in this particular exercise, the Committee excluded for consideration Congress, which exercised its constitutional policy making authority when it voted on the joir1t resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq in October of 2002. It is profoundly disappointing that, ir1 its illogical haste to terminate "Phase Two," the Committee’s majority made no effort to allow those in the executive it cites in this iinal report to explain how they weighed ir1telligence in the context of policy deliberation. By failing to do so, the Committee once again failed to illuminate the role the use of ir1telligence plays in the policy making process. (U) Seventy-seven Members of the United States Senate voted in favor of HJ. Res. 114, the joint resolution authorizir1g the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq. I don’t know how many read the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. Those of us on the Committee were privy to hearings as well as intelligence products. Five Members of the Committee at that time (all Democrats) voted against the resolution, 12 Members voted in favor. Of the 12 Members of the current Committee present then, 9 voted in favor, 3 against (all Democrats). Of the whole Senate, one Republican voted against, 30 Democratic senators, including a current presidential contender, voted in favor of the resolution authorizing the use force against Iraq. (U) Many Members of Congress have had reason to revisit their votes, and the reasons have been varied. What is interestir1g to note is how very few have hung their votes completely on how they understood the intelligence at the time. Many Members did not avail themselves of the intelligence (others claim to have relied on their staffs’ rendering of the National Intelligence Estimate). How many policymakers relied completely on intelligence to make their policy determination? I would argue none, because if a policymaker did rely solely on ir1telligence, they would be forfeiting the wider considerations prerequisite to being a policymaker. This applies, I have no doubt, to policymakers ir1 the Administration. And this is why it is a failure of analysis, let alone of fairness, that the Committee investigation on this particular report did not even attempt to solicit &om Administration officials cited in the report their views on how they weighed intelligence ir1 the context of their deliberations. (U) The report’s conclusions articulate what is already well-known for those of us who have labored through document review of "Phase One" and have heard — originally and repeatedly — the statements of Administration officials. On matters of capability, the report concludes that statements by Administration officials were substantiated by the intelligence on questions of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction in general. (The report notes that some statements on nuclear capability did not reflect disagreement within the IC, some on weapons of mass destruction did not reflect IC caveats known at the time, and that the Secretary of Defense’s statement on underground Wl\/DZ) facilities’ vulnerability to airstrikes was not supported by intelligence.) On statements by Administration officials on 169 _ Iraq’s link to terror groups other than Al-Qa’ida, the statements were substantiated by the intelligence, as were statements on Zarqawi ’s presence in Iraq, and statements that Iraq and Al- Qa ’ida had had contacts. (The report notes, however, that "Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and Al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided Al-Qa’ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence." I emphasize the verb "suggesting," noting officials never "asserted" such a partnership.) Statements on Saddam’s intentions — i.e., speculation on his future actions — had no intelligence support, and policy makers appear to me to be clear in their public statements that such speculation — while certainly legitimate, given the pollyannish lack of imagination we had on the Al-Qa’ida threat prior to 9/ 1 1 — was never an established "known," but that policymakers would never again commit the absence of imagination that had allowed Al-Qa’ida to strike us unprepared. (U) That "Phase One" concluded that this consensus between statements and intelligence was not the result of pressure from officials is relevant2°9. That the overall gist of this report is that Administration officials’ statements were supported by intelligence assessments comes as no relief, considering how utterly bad the underlying intelligence was. (U) There is, in my opinion, no excusing the spectacularly bad intelligence prepared by the IC in the rim-up to the war in Iraq, particularly on the question of weapons of mass destruction. However, the IC needs to be defended in one critical aspect: bad intelligence cannot be used wholly as the excuse for the decision to go to war. To do so would be to not only blur, but to eliminate, the line between policy-making and intelligence. To eliminate that line is to do no less than corrode a fundamental pillar of a democratic society. (U) Intelligence informs policy. It does not dictate policy. The policymaker who ignores the contribution of intelligence denies a potentially valuable source of analysis on difficult subjects about which the policy maker requires the widest breadth of insight. The intelligence analyst who writes analysis without subjecting it to competitive hypothesis testing fails the policymaker. The policy maker who relies solely on intelligence should be dismissed, for they do not grasp the most fundamental truth of intelligence — that it is an attempt to penetrate denied knowledge and will almost always be incomplete. The intelligence professional who seeks to make policy should also be dismissed, for the nature of intelligence — the need to keep and steal secrets, to entice foreigners to betray their governments, and act covertly on behalf of our government — must be kept distinct from the policy process in order for a democratic society to function. By keeping that distinction clear, the different roles of policymakers and intelligence professionals are maintained. Intelligence professionals are responsible for their failures in intelligence collection, analysis, counter-intelligence and covert action. Policymakers must also bear the burden of their mistakes, an entirely different order of mistakes. It is a pity this report fails to illuminate this distinction. 209 . Conclusion 83: “The Committee did not find any evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities? Conclusion 102: "The Comnrittee found that none of the analysts or other people interviewed by the Committee said that they were pressured to change their conclusions related to Iraq’s links to terrorism." 170 ORRIN G. HATCH CHRISTOPHER S. BOND RICHARD BURR 171 |
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Ari Fleischer Dan Bartlett ok Novak column Mission to Niger Novak
misspoke the first time we talked. Rove couldn't remember Rove second
source July 14th article. What did Rove tell Bush? Henry Waxman, security
breaches in Plame case with Sen. Byron Dorgon (D-N.D.) Cheney's stickin it
to the CIA. Novak word operative was journalistic miscue, skeptical. used
Valerie Plame and Valerie Wilson Timothy Phelps New York Times INR State
Department memo circulated on Bush Africa trip Time A war on Wilson by
Cooper Massimo Calabresi and John Dickerson. Quote government officials
Wilson's wife is a CIA official who monitors the proliferation of WMD
involved in decision to send Wilson to Niger. David Corn of the Nation
tells Wilson that leak is a crime. Rove said "I didn't know her
name" Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball articles. Andrea Mitchel
interview distorted by NBC, to push Wilson smear. Chris Mathews tells
Wilson that Karl Rove considered Plame 'fair game'. Consider Paul O'Neill,
Richard Clarke, Gen. Zinni, Gen Shinseki. Stephen Hadley offers to resign
on '16 words' Bush refuses resignation. Newsday reports Plame was
undercover until Novak outed her. CIA files crime report to DOJ. Bush
refuses Rice resignation. Letter to John Conyers. Two top Whitehouse
officials disclosed CIA identity. to at least six Washington journalists.
New York Times Douglas Jehl, study by the Defense Intelligence Agency
Chalabi intelligence was of little or no value. William Bowles. Attorney
General Alberto Gonzalez notified Andrew CArd of DOJ leak investigation at
8:00 PM, but waited 12 hours (next day) preserve documents. Shredding
party? Gonzalez was Whitehouse Council, Ashcroft was attorney general.
National Review, Clifford May. Phone logs, emails and Rep. Thomas M. Davis
II. Bush joked about leaks with African news session. Whitehouse
surrendered thousands of emails, call logs, and calendars. Notes say
Wilson was Kerry supporter, advisor. Oficials to sign waivers to overcome
reporter obstacles to revealing sources. Pincus Novak said 'no partisan
gunslinger' comment and "you know about it too". Was leak
retaliation. Bush said 'find out the truth'. Scott McClellan quote
"those individuals assured me they were not involved in this. And
that's where it stands" Bush: leaker may never be found'. Bush
threatened to withhold docs under executive privilege. McClellan spoke
about difference between unauthorized disclosure and 'setting the facts
straight'. Independent Media TV, Jason Leopold. Mike Allen and Dana
Priest: "Clearly, it was meant purely and simply for revenge".
Rove Newsweek 'far game' Chris Mathews, MSNBC. Hardball. Investigators are
studying Whitehouse reaction to Wilson's first public attack on Bush's
case about Iraq. Final deadline. Wall Street Journal article about Bureau
of Intelligence Research. John J. Kokal, Near East and South Asia division
found dead. Ashcroft briefings stopped. Fitzgerald appointed. Simone
Ledeen, daughter of Michael Ledeen goes to Bahgdad, CPA, Coalition
Provisional Authority, also brat pack, yellowcake. James Comey is
godfather. Aides sign waivers to journalistic privilege. Staff meet
informally about immunity. Mary matalin testifies. Pelosi Daschele,
Lieberman, Rockefeller ask for GAO investigation of covert status. Jim
Loebe knew. Cathie Martin (Cheney aid) interviewed, near combat
atmosphere. Grand Jury subpoenas Air Force One phone logs. What was
whitehouse PR strategy? Bush outside attorney James Sharp &
Associates, Ken Starr removed attorney-client privilege for government
lawyers in Clinton smear campaign. Glen Kessler discuss conversations.
Bush interviewed by Fitzgerald, Sharp present. Kerry dumps Sandy Berger
and Wilson from campaign. Federal Judge Thomas F. Hogan hold Time magazine
report Mathew Cooper in contempt of cout and orders him jailed for
refusing to reveal source of Plame leak. appeal goes to Supreme Court.
politics of truth, joe wilson. Judith miller receives subpoena. powell
testified. cooper testified about libby conversations. bush and dan rather
flap on military service in the news. bar lowered to committed a crime. LA
times doyle mcmanus "if rove is source #2, who is source #1. roy
kriger CIA agent fired because he spoke of informant saying iraq' uranium
enrichment program dead. Conyers and Slaughter call for investigation of
Jeff Gannon, James D. Guckert, as GOP fake journalist plant at whitehouse
briefings. free republic. Federal Judge rober sweet ruled miller not
required to reveal. in 2001 ARAMCO Cheney CEO signed $140 million
contract. Boston Globe. Brewster Jennings & Associates, BinLaden
group, Khalid bin Mahfouz, BCCI connections. Vincent Cannistraro said
forged niger yellowcake docs were made up in the U.S. mentioned Michael
ledeen. see downing street memo. downingstreetmemo.com. Supreme court
refuses miller cooper appeal. search jailhouse crock and miller as fake
martyr, obstructing justice for personal gain. Did rove break same law as
martha stewart? perjury. see Sen Lautenberg calendar. Miller is in
Alexandria Detention Center. Sen. Pat Roberts, Chairman of Senate
Intelligence Committee, will conduct hearings. What is the Federal Tort
Claim Act FTCA. Who is Karen Johnson? ask Karl Rove and Business Council,
Infrastructure Solutions. George Tennet, John McMclaughlin, Bill Harlow
and the stranger who approached Novak. Why did whitehouse shift blame to
the CIA for '16 words' in SOTU, State of the Union address speech. Bolton
neglected to tell congress about niger yellowcake. Wilson's op-ed piece
published. Oliver North and John Poindexter convictions overturned. Novak
challenges Harlow warning. Scooter Libby and Judith Miller convesations
hot. see columbia jouranlism review and vanity fair, wayne madsen report
on asher karni nuclear arms smuggler and district judge ricardo urbina on
nuclear triggers. ashcroft recused himself. what is hollinger
international, daved radler, lord conrad a. black, richart burt boy-toy.
What does miller have to do with tip-off of holy land foundation, global
relief foundation and benevolence international foundation. AIPAC
officials: Howard Kohr, Richard Fishman, Renee Rothstein, Raphael Danziger.
New Yorker, Seymour Hersch story on Bush plans to launch nuclear attack on
Iran summer of 2005. Cheney warns of Israeli preemptive strike on
Iran. Rosen's lawyer: Abbe Lowell. Perle (Defense Policy
Board)gives speech at AIPAC conference, calls for american military action
against iran. Iran has Shihab III intermediate range missile.
Franklin pleads innocent, Judje T.S. Ellis III. rove said he was
discouraging a reporter from writing a false story based on a false
premise. Frontpage mag interiviews Kenneth Timmerman. Naor
Gilon of Israeli embassy involved. Jack Abramoff indicted and Texans
for a Republican Majority. John N. Nassikas III, spy nest exposed.
and A.Q. Kahn. David Kelly is confidant of Judith Miller and
Pederson and Olivia Bosch at Royal Institute of international
affairs. Judge Ricardo Urbina and what did Thomas Dine
confirm. Patrick Dorton is AIPAC spokesperson. Harold Rhode is
source of plame leak and Jerry Hauer and cofer black. lawmakers
urged to support Iran Freedom and Support act and one of unnamed reporters
is Glenn Kessler by David Ignatius. USGO-1 is Kenneth Pollack and
Bob Dole is baffled. Iran 5 years away from nuclear weapons.
Miller and Zacarias Moussaoui together? Michael Ledeen is Rove's
brain. Ted Olson was Pollard's defense attorney. July 14th, 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21 22 23 24 25
26 27 28 29 30 August September October November December 2003 2004 2001 That gathering involved some of the most powerful names in the Jewish lobby in America, starting with Edgar Bronfman, the chairman of the World Jewish Congress. Others included: Charles Bronfman, Edgar's brother and a top executive of the family's flagship Seagrams Corp.; Leslie Wexler of Limited, Inc.; Charles Schusterman, chairman of Samson Investment Co. of Tulsa, Oklahoma; Harvey "Bud" Meyerhoff, a fabulously wealthy and powerful Baltimore real estate magnate; Laurence Tisch, chairman of Loews Corp.; Max Fisher, the Detroit oil magnate and Republican Party powerhouse; bagel magnate Max Lender; and Leonard Abramson, the founder of U.S. Healthcare presents the 13 most corrupt members of Congress: Rep. Roy Blunt (R-MO) -- Rep. Randy Cunningham (R-CA)-- Rep. Tom Feeney(R-FL)-- Rep. William Jefferson (D-LA)-- Rep. Marilyn Musgrave (R-CO)-- Rep. Bob Ney (R-OH)-- Rep. Richard Pombo (R-CA)-- Rep. Rick Renzi (R-AZ)-- Rep. Charles Taylor (R-NC)-- Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA)-- Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA)-- Senator Bill Frist (R-TN)-- Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT) |
| Aug 31, 05 Twenty Things We Know,
Independent TV USGO-1 Identified Middle East analyst: Kenneth Pollack,
National Security Council, Clinton administration. Sept 3, 05 Bob Dole
(baffled by Miller incarceration) visited Miller in jail, NYTimes copy.
Smokescreen on passing federal shield laws that would allow reporters to
protect their souces. Sept 5, 05 Rocky Mountain News, "Weapons of
Mass Delusion" Sept 6, 05 U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis III set
this Sept 6 trial date for Larry Franklin, Sept 6, 05 IISS International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Strategic Dossier', entitled Iran's
Strategic Weapons Programmes - A Net Assessment. Iran 5 years away from
a nuclear weapon. Why go to the stake to defend a spin doctor planting
bile? Guardian Unlimited todo: Antiwar, In These Times, Is Iran Next?
Counterpunch Zvi Bar'el, Chalabi, Feith and Israel, Theater of the
Absurd Sept 8, 05 Yahoo News Plamegate will rise up in a few weeks. Is
she bargaining?....what about possible criminal contempt charges?
Huffington Post Sept 10, 05 The Alexandria facility where Miller is,
also housed Zacarias Moussaoui..(just one floor above Miller's cell) The
gas station tapes of the attack on the Pentagon on 9/11 are 'classified'
because of his trial. They would reveal the real truth about what
aircraft slammed into the Pentagon that day. see NewsFollowUp.com/flight77
missile? National Press Club, honors Judith Miller see Franklingate
links page see Pakistan Daily Times on Iran latest news...and Michael
Ledeen, Rove's brain, AEI, prominent proponent of a violent regime
change in Iran. Ledeen has close ties to all Plamegate players. and see
Ledeen's ties to the Niger forged docs that led to Iraq War. It's all
one story. Lies of Ommision Progress Sept 11, 05 Peace Page, 9/11 poem
by Kristy we should share the shame search terms: Texas Secretary of
State, Roger Williams, Bush campaign, Karl Rove, Elizabeth Reyes. Sept
12, 05 Iran Mania News One week to U.N. meetings on Iran. Cooperative
Research, neocon run-up to war, timeline see Ted Olson links to Jonathan
Pollard, Pentagon, Perle, Lehman, Feith.... Ted Olson's wife 'died' on
Flight 77, 9/11? Sept 14, 05 New 'Amdocs' page, information on Israeli
owned telephone billing co. and connections to 9/11, AIPAC, neocons,
Iraq war, Iran war mongering. Against Bombing old timeline, not updated,
but some interesting links, stories DNC Democratic National Committee,
Plamegate Rovegate, Treasongate, Leakgate page Crosswalk, conservative
publication, Democrats keep focus on Plamegate Sept 15, 05 Bush / Rice
failing in Iran war mongering efforts. India, China and Russia nix U.S.
and EU effort to get a majority of IAEA board to refer Iran to UN
Security Council for sanctions. India says the plan will backfire.
search:Ahmadinejad. NYT copy David Fiderer on the "Abort the Plame
Investigation Act" or H.R. 581. Feb 05. Bob Dole and the
Republicans smokescreen tactics are difficult to see ...will they work?
Framing the issue around source id privilege keeps the buzz off what
Miller is hiding...just what they want. also see CSM Holt wants docs,
Fitzgerald says will harm investigation see SpinWatch on indictment Sept
16, 05 Asia Times review of Bush whitewash book..by Craig Whitney. DOJ
won't turn over docs to Congress and While You Were atching Katrina
House Republicans derail probes of Plame affair Village Voice Sept 17,
05 Some Miller elite visitors: Bob Dole, John Bolton, Tom Brokaw,
Gonzalo Marroquin, Sept 18, 05 Washington Report on Middle East Affairs
old but relevant story, Israeli spies in America. Amdocs, Report of
Israeli Eavesdropping on White House Telephones Gets Varying Media
Treatment Sept 19, 05 This article climbing in the search engines:
Frontpage Mag calls Plamegate non-event, "endless spider-web of
lies by Joe Wilson", "The media has gone out of its way to
question the credibility of Karl Rove", "non-leak of Plame's
non-secret identity',....and on...and on. and NFU-Franklingate research
on Amdocs, 9/11, art students, Israeli spies Sept 20, 05 Yahoo article:
What Show Did You Watch During the War Daddy? Iraq War, lost and now a
civil war....north to south, oil. Sept 21, 05 Jurist article: David
Radler, former President and COO of Hollinger International and former
publisher of the Chicago Sun-Times, will plead guilty to fraud charges.
Robert Novak is Sun-Times columnist. Aljazeera "Is it possible that
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is assisting Israel
in betraying American spy networks in Iran in return for the Iranians to
offer the release of captured Israeli spies?" AEI search on
Jonathan Pollard results in "Web of Conspiracies" book by
Michael Rubin. search Kwiatkowski, OSP, Mondale. Sept 23, 05 Register:
More on Amdocs corporate espionage. And The Age Police question Amdocs
exec...at least 19 arrested for infiltrating competitors computers.
World Net Daily, Stephen Hadley mentioned, prior knowledge of 911
information on Atta in Rep. Weldon (Republican) Book "Countdown to
Terror" Shaffer stopped from testifying about Able Danger data
mining. Gonzales will name D. Kyle Sampson as chief of staff (DOJ) and
in related article KerrySharesOurValues on D. Kyle Sampson, Raul Yanes
..and (Ted Ullyot) All three have been lawyers in the White House
counsel's office under Gonzales. ... Ullyot (Ullyot stepped down) and
Yanes were the coordinators of the White House's response to the
investigation into the leak of CIA operative Valerie Plame's identity.
Gonzales and Ashcroft will recuse, but will these three also? Sampson,
Ullyot and Yanes have represented tobacco companies. search Kirkland
& Ellis or (Tobacco.org), Kenneth Starr. tobacco thread articles /
timeline Iraqwar.org on Israeli spying and Lowell Sun Online The
invasion of Iraq was the “greatest strategic disaster in United States
history,” a retired Army general said yesterday, strengthening an
effort in Congress to force an American withdrawal beginning next year.
Retired Army Lt. Gen. William Odom, a Vietnam veteran, said the invasion
of Iraq alienated America's Middle East allies, making it harder to
prosecute a war against terrorists Imam Intikab Habib's....was swept out
of his FDNY appointment....Over the weekend, the message was pounded in
by the New York and other media that those who question the Official
Conspiracy Theory.... 911Truth.org Sept 25, 05 search internet: Kurzberg
Shmuel Ellner Marmari Amdocs for supporting evidence on Amdocs links to
9/11 WTC or search amdocs fema israel or amdocs foxnews and Amdocs page
Sept 26, 05 New Franklingate / DOJ selected press releases page Sept 27,
05 Shalom Center, article from 2004: "Neo-Cons, AIPAC, Israel,
& Alleged Spying " Oct 28, 05 The federal grand jury delving
into the matter expires Oct. 28. .. prosecutors could pursue a criminal
contempt of court charge against Miller. Sept 28, 05 Conk Websearch,
Encyclopedia entry on AIPAC, supporters, critics and quotations. Fatma
Nevin Vargun, is a Kurdish women's rights activist. Libby poem in a
letter to Miller in jail: "You went into jail in the summer. It is
fall now. You will have stories to cover -- Iraqi elections and suicide
bombers, biological threats and the Iranian nuclear program. Out West,
where you vacation, the aspens will already be turning. They turn in
clusters, because their roots connect them. Come back to work -- and
life. Until then, you will remain in my thoughts and prayers -- With
admiration, Scooter Libby." from Salon.com Sept 29, 05 Foxnews
"U.K.: Military Action against Iran, 'Inconceivable'. and "On
Saturday, the International Atomic Energy Agency passed a resolution
putting Iran on the verge of referral to the U.N. Security Council
unless Tehran eases suspicions about its nuclear activities"
"(Fitzgerald) was ready to extend her imprisonment for up to 18
months. ...on September 29, she walked out of prison ready to talk,
having secured a personal waiver of confidentiality from her own source,
Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the vice president's chief of
staff." Guardian Sept 30, 05 Miller testified before the grand jury
about two conversations with Libby in July 2003 Red Nova "Quality
of Iran's Nuclear Fuel Sheds Doubt on Weapons Capabilities" Daily
Star "Britain rules out military action against Iran over nuclear
program Tehran to vote on scaling back cooperation with IAEA Forward
Steven Rosen (AIPAC) seeking dismissal on the grounds that the U.S.
government has refused to disclose key evidence. Franklin will plead
guilty, Harretz ....Miller released, will testify, and Red Nova coverage
Oct 1, 05 Miller testified,...Fitzgerald agreed to limit his questioning
to Libby contacts regarding Plame. Miller was his final witness...the
interview lasted 4 hours. Libby's attorney Joseph Tate puzzled at a
second request for a release...it had been a year since they believe
they gave her a waiver. Oct 2, 05 Net search terms: Judith Miller,
Stephen Hadley, Able Danger, missing chart Oct 3, 05 Weldon's Able
Danger hearings will backfire on GOP "...both Miller and Libby
collaborated for months on manufacturing the bogus WMD hoax.."
Ahmed Amr, Palestine Chronicle (copy), and Nile Media Oct 4, 05 Miller
still trying to limit issue to her conversations with Libby? NY Times
copy Oct 5, 05 Libby Lawyer says Miller in jail on her own accord, was
given waiver a year ago Washington Post see changes to Franklingate
AIPAC page World Peace Herald: Able Danger report expected soon. Oct 6,
05 San Francisco Chronicle, Jon Carrol, "Everyone pretty much knows
that the Judith Miller story doesn't add up, except for her employers at
the New York Times" Indictments Any time? Editor & Publisher
Oct 7, 05 Live Journal "U.S. Preparing for a Strike on
Iran.....Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector to Iraq
.......warned in apocalyptic terms in London"
|
| CIA Threats of Federal
Prosecution Delay 9/11 Documentary,
9/11: Press for Truth. |
| CIA Threats of Federal Prosecution Delay 9/11 Documentary ... Wednesday, 14 September 2011, 12:30 pm Press Release: Kyle Hence Recent threats by the CIA prompt two freelance journalists to delay an investigative podcast naming CIA analysts complicit in obstruction of key pre-9/11 intelligence. The podcast will present revelations from former top US government personnel, including Richard Clarke, Pasquale D’Amuro, Bob Baer, and Mark Rossini, who echo concerns of former 9/11 Commission Chair Thomas Kean. ... Austin, Texas (FF4) September 12, 2011 – On Thursday, the CIA threatened the journalists behind Who Is Rich Blee? with possible federal prosecution if their investigative podcast reveals the names of two CIA analysts at the center of a pattern of obstruction and mishandling of intelligence that many feel would have stopped the 9/11 attacks. ... Like FBI agent Ali Soufan and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer before them, the podcast team, including John Duffy and Ray Nowosielski, are being subjected to intimidation and censorship by government officials over blowing the whistle on the true story surrounding two alleged 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. ... The podcast originally scheduled for September 11th release presents a narrative of how three CIA analysts working under Richard Blee, the long unknown former head of CIA’s Bin Laden Station, deliberately misled their colleagues and withheld key intelligence from FBI and the White House regarding the presence of two known Al-Qaeda operatives in the U.S. ... Four government investigations into CIA handling of pre-911 intelligence included personal details of the two CIA analysts and their actions. Nowosielski and Duffy deduced the identities of the two as yet unnamed CIA employees from internet research based on details provided from these and other open sources. When the producers used their full names in interviews, interviewees offered no correction. The CIA response provided the final confirmation. ... In project updates posted at SecrecyKills.com the producers announced the delay of the podcast and posted background of a complicated case that involves dozens of violations of protocol, intimidation, and incidents of obstruction by the CIA, with the two yet named CIA analysts at the center of many of them. ... Author and expert on the subject, Kevin Fenton, documents 35 such incidents between January 2000 and September 11th in his book, Disconnecting the Dots: How 9/11 Was Allowed to Happen. ... Pulitzer-prize winner Lawrence Wright, interviewed for the podcast, told producers the actions of one of the unnamed CIA analysts still employed at CIA amounts to obstruction of justice in the FBI’s criminal investigation of the deaths of 17 seaman aboard the USS Cole. ... The producers are not the first subject to government censorship over this case. Last month The New York Times reported on CIA efforts to censor an autobiography by Ali Soufan, a front-line FBI counter-terrorism special agent. Prior to 9/11, Soufan was interested in Mihdhar and Hazmi because of links to the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen. The CIA censored references to a passport photo of Mihdhar the CIA had withheld from Soufan, despite three written requests. ... Scott Shane of the New York Times reports today that, "Mr. Soufan accuses C.I.A. officials of deliberately withholding crucial documents and photographs of Qaeda operatives from the F.B.I. before Sept. 11, 2001, despite three written requests, and then later lying about it to the 9/11 Commission." ... Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer, interviewed for the podcast, was himself intimidated, demoted and smeared by the Pentagon after he came forward to the 9/11 Commission with details of how, on three occasions, unnamed DoD officials prevented his Able Danger operation from meeting with the FBI prior the attacks. ... In 2000 the Able Danger data-mining program placed Mohammed Atta in a Brooklyn terrorist cell but had also placed Hazmi and Mihdhar in a San Diego cell, the epicenter of intrigue around Alec Station’s Rich Blee, Tom Wilshere and the two as yet unnamed subordinates who themselves repeatedly withheld intelligence from the FBI. Though Shaffer was interviewed by 9/11 Commission’s Director Philip Zelikow and staffer Dieter Snell, the Commission left any mention of Able Danger from its final report. ... In the planned podcast, 9/11 Commission Chair Tom Kean is asked about a scant footnote to Chapter 6 of the 9/11 Report referring to an intelligence cable, seen by 50 at the CIA, but prevented from reaching the FBI. For Kean the incident was not a case of bungling or intel ‘stovepiping’: “Oh, it wasn’t careless oversight. It was purposeful. No question about that in mind. It was purposeful.” ... Whereas Kean explains it as a penchant for secrecy, Richard Clarke, the former head of counter-terrorism at the Bush White House, goes farther suggesting malfeasance and the possibility of illegal CIA-led domestic spying activity. Comments by Clarke released in a video in August led to a formal statement from George Tenet, Cofer Black and Richard Blee, and a response from the producers. ... “This was perhaps the closest U.S. intelligence got to foiling the 9/11 plot,” explains Nowosielski, “but instead of stopping the attack, the CIA stopped intel on two high-value targets from getting to the right people, repeatedly. And still the CIA protects the individuals responsible by intimidating those who simply want to know the truth behind a shocking and possibly criminal pattern of obstruction” ... In an email Thursday the CIA warned Nowosielski he could be subject to prosecution under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, a law intended to apply to government employees who violate their security clearance and never used to convict journalists. ... The producer’s online response: “The Society of Professional Journalists' code of ethics states that ‘journalists should be free of obligation to any interest other than the public's right to know’ and should ‘be vigilant and courageous about holding those with power accountable.’ The day that journalists' exposés of wrongdoing within government agencies require the approval of those government agencies before release, that is the day that transparency and accountability are lost.” ... John Duffy and Ray Nowosielski, both graduates of Chicago’s Columbia College Film School, produced the critically acclaimed 2006 documentary "9/11: Press for Truth." |
|
Ari Fleischer Dan Bartlett ok Novak column Mission to Niger Novak misspoke the first time we talked. Rove couldn't remember Rove second source July 14th article. What did Rove tell Bush? Henry Waxman, security breaches in Plame case with Sen. Byron Dorgon (D-N.D.) Cheney's stickin it to the CIA. Novak word operative was journalistic miscue, skeptical. used Valerie Plame and Valerie Wilson Timothy Phelps New York Times INR State Department memo circulated on Bush Africa trip Time A war on Wilson by Cooper Massimo Calabresi and John Dickerson. Quote government officials Wilson's wife is a CIA official who monitors the proliferation of WMD involved in decision to send Wilson to Niger. David Corn of the Nation tells Wilson that leak is a crime. Rove said "I didn't know her name" Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball articles. Andrea Mitchel interview distorted by NBC, to push Wilson smear. Chris Mathews tells Wilson that Karl Rove considered Plame 'fair game'. Consider Paul O'Neill, Richard Clarke, Gen. Zinni, Gen Shinseki. Stephen Hadley offers to resign on '16 words' Bush refuses resignation. Newsday reports Plame was undercover until Novak outed her. CIA files crime report to DOJ. Bush refuses Rice resignation. Letter to John Conyers. Two top Whitehouse officials disclosed CIA identity. to at least six Washington journalists. New York Times Douglas Jehl, study by the Defense Intelligence Agency Chalabi intelligence was of little or no value. William Bowles. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez notified Andrew CArd of DOJ leak investigation at 8:00 PM, but waited 12 hours (next day) preserve documents. Shredding party? Gonzalez was Whitehouse Council, Ashcroft was attorney general. National Review, Clifford May. Phone logs, emails and Rep. Thomas M. Davis II. Bush joked about leaks with African news session. Whitehouse surrendered thousands of emails, call logs, and calendars. Notes say Wilson was Kerry supporter, advisor. Oficials to sign waivers to overcome reporter obstacles to revealing sources. Pincus Novak said 'no partisan gunslinger' comment and "you know about it too". Was leak retaliation. Bush said 'find out the truth'. Scott McClellan quote "those individuals assured me they were not involved in this. And that's where it stands" Bush: leaker may never be found'. Bush threatened to withhold docs under executive privilege. McClellan spoke about difference between unauthorized disclosure and 'setting the facts straight'. Independent Media TV, Jason Leopold. Mike Allen and Dana Priest: "Clearly, it was meant purely and simply for revenge". Rove Newsweek 'far game' Chris Mathews, MSNBC. Hardball. Investigators are studying Whitehouse reaction to Wilson's first public attack on Bush's case about Iraq. Final deadline. Wall Street Journal article about Bureau of Intelligence Research. John J. Kokal, Near East and South Asia division found dead. Ashcroft briefings stopped. Fitzgerald appointed. Simone Ledeen, daughter of Michael Ledeen goes to Bahgdad, CPA, Coalition Provisional Authority, also brat pack, yellowcake. James Comey is godfather. Aides sign waivers to journalistic privilege. Staff meet informally about immunity. Mary matalin testifies. Pelosi Daschele, Lieberman, Rockefeller ask for GAO investigation of covert status. Jim Loebe knew. Cathie Martin (Cheney aid) interviewed, near combat atmosphere. Grand Jury subpoenas Air Force One phone logs. What was whitehouse PR strategy? Bush outside attorney James Sharp & Associates, Ken Starr removed attorney-client privilege for government lawyers in Clinton smear campaign. Glen Kessler discuss conversations. Bush interviewed by Fitzgerald, Sharp present. Kerry dumps Sandy Berger and Wilson from campaign. Federal Judge Thomas F. Hogan hold Time magazine report Mathew Cooper in contempt of cout and orders him jailed for refusing to reveal source of Plame leak. appeal goes to Supreme Court. politics of truth, joe wilson. Judith miller receives subpoena. powell testified. cooper testified about libby conversations. bush and dan rather flap on military service in the news. bar lowered to committed a crime. LA times doyle mcmanus "if rove is source #2, who is source #1. roy kriger CIA agent fired because he spoke of informant saying iraq' uranium enrichment program dead. Conyers and Slaughter call for investigation of Jeff Gannon, James D. Guckert, as GOP fake journalist plant at whitehouse briefings. free republic. Federal Judge rober sweet ruled miller not required to reveal. in 2001 ARAMCO Cheney CEO signed $140 million contract. Boston Globe. Brewster Jennings & Associates, BinLaden group, Khalid bin Mahfouz, BCCI connections. Vincent Cannistraro said forged niger yellowcake docs were made up in the U.S. mentioned Michael ledeen. see downing street memo. downingstreetmemo.com. Supreme court refuses miller cooper appeal. search jailhouse crock and miller as fake martyr, obstructing justice for personal gain. Did rove break same law as martha stewart? perjury. see Sen Lautenberg calendar. Miller is in Alexandria Detention Center. Sen. Pat Roberts, Chairman of Senate Intelligence Committee, will conduct hearings. What is the Federal Tort Claim Act FTCA. Who is Karen Johnson? ask Karl Rove and Business Council, Infrastructure Solutions. George Tennet, John McMclaughlin, Bill Harlow and the stranger who approached Novak. Why did whitehouse shift blame to the CIA for '16 words' in SOTU, State of the Union address speech. Bolton neglected to tell congress about niger yellowcake. Wilson's op-ed piece published. Oliver North and John Poindexter convictions overturned. Novak challenges Harlow warning. Scooter Libby and Judith Miller convesations hot. see columbia jouranlism review and vanity fair, wayne madsen report on asher karni nuclear arms smuggler and district judge ricardo urbina on nuclear triggers. ashcroft recused himself. what is hollinger international, daved radler, lord conrad a. black, richart burt boy-toy. What does miller have to do with tip-off of holy land foundation, global relief foundation and benevolence international foundation. AIPAC officials: Howard Kohr, Richard Fishman, Renee Rothstein, Raphael Danziger. New Yorker, Seymour Hersch story on Bush plans to launch nuclear attack on Iran summer of 2005. Cheney warns of Israeli preemptive strike on Iran. Rosen's lawyer: Abbe Lowell. Perle (Defense Policy Board)gives speech at AIPAC conference, calls for american military action against iran. Iran has Shihab III intermediate range missile. Franklin pleads innocent, Judje T.S. Ellis III. rove said he was discouraging a reporter from writing a false story based on a false premise. Frontpage mag interiviews Kenneth Timmerman. Naor Gilon of Israeli embassy involved. Jack Abramoff indicted and Texans for a Republican Majority. John N. Nassikas III, spy nest exposed. and A.Q. Kahn. David Kelly is confidant of Judith Miller and Pederson and Olivia Bosch at Royal Institute of international affairs. Judge Ricardo Urbina and what did Thomas Dine confirm. Patrick Dorton is AIPAC spokesperson. Harold Rhode is source of plame leak and Jerry Hauer and cofer black. lawmakers urged to support Iran Freedom and Support act and one of unnamed reporters is Glenn Kessler by David Ignatius. USGO-1 is Kenneth Pollack and Bob Dole is baffled. Iran 5 years away from nuclear weapons. Miller and Zacarias Moussaoui together? Michael Ledeen is Rove's brain. Ted Olson was Pollard's defense attorney. July 14th, 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 August September October November December 2003 2004 2001 That gathering involved some of the most powerful names in the Jewish lobby in America, starting with Edgar Bronfman, the chairman of the World Jewish Congress. Others included: Charles Bronfman, Edgar's brother and a top executive of the family's flagship Seagrams Corp.; Leslie Wexler of Limited, Inc.; Charles Schusterman, chairman of Samson Investment Co. of Tulsa, Oklahoma; Harvey "Bud" Meyerhoff, a fabulously wealthy and powerful Baltimore real estate magnate; Laurence Tisch, chairman of Loews Corp.; Max Fisher, the Detroit oil magnate and Republican Party powerhouse; bagel magnate Max Lender; and Leonard Abramson, the founder of U.S. Healthcare presents the 13 most corrupt members of Congress: Rep. Roy Blunt (R-MO) -- Rep. Randy Cunningham (R-CA)-- Rep. Tom Feeney(R-FL)-- Rep. William Jefferson (D-LA)-- Rep. Marilyn Musgrave (R-CO)-- Rep. Bob Ney (R-OH)-- Rep. Richard Pombo (R-CA)-- Rep. Rick Renzi (R-AZ)-- Rep. Charles Taylor (R-NC)-- Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA)-- Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA)-- Senator Bill Frist (R-TN)-- Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT) |
| Aug 31, 05 Twenty Things We Know,
Independent TV USGO-1 Identified Middle East analyst: Kenneth Pollack,
National Security Council, Clinton administration. Sept 3, 05 Bob Dole
(baffled by Miller incarceration) visited Miller in jail, NYTimes copy.
Smokescreen on passing federal shield laws that would allow reporters to
protect their souces. Sept 5, 05 Rocky Mountain News, "Weapons of
Mass Delusion" Sept 6, 05 U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis III set
this Sept 6 trial date for Larry Franklin, Sept 6, 05 IISS International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Strategic Dossier', entitled Iran's
Strategic Weapons Programmes - A Net Assessment. Iran 5 years away from
a nuclear weapon. Why go to the stake to defend a spin doctor planting
bile? Guardian Unlimited todo: Antiwar, In These Times, Is Iran Next?
Counterpunch Zvi Bar'el, Chalabi, Feith and Israel, Theater of the
Absurd Sept 8, 05 Yahoo News Plamegate will rise up in a few weeks. Is
she bargaining?....what about possible criminal contempt charges?
Huffington Post Sept 10, 05 The Alexandria facility where Miller is,
also housed Zacarias Moussaoui..(just one floor above Miller's cell) The
gas station tapes of the attack on the Pentagon on 9/11 are 'classified'
because of his trial. They would reveal the real truth about what
aircraft slammed into the Pentagon that day. see NewsFollowUp.com/flight77
missile? National Press Club, honors Judith Miller see Franklingate
links page see Pakistan Daily Times on Iran latest news...and Michael
Ledeen, Rove's brain, AEI, prominent proponent of a violent regime
change in Iran. Ledeen has close ties to all Plamegate players. and see
Ledeen's ties to the Niger forged docs that led to Iraq War. It's all
one story. Lies of Ommision Progress Sept 11, 05 Peace Page, 9/11 poem
by Kristy we should share the shame search terms: Texas Secretary of
State, Roger Williams, Bush campaign, Karl Rove, Elizabeth Reyes. Sept
12, 05 Iran Mania News One week to U.N. meetings on Iran. Cooperative
Research, neocon run-up to war, timeline see Ted Olson links to Jonathan
Pollard, Pentagon, Perle, Lehman, Feith.... Ted Olson's wife 'died' on
Flight 77, 9/11? Sept 14, 05 New 'Amdocs' page, information on Israeli
owned telephone billing co. and connections to 9/11, AIPAC, neocons,
Iraq war, Iran war mongering. Against Bombing old timeline, not updated,
but some interesting links, stories DNC Democratic National Committee,
Plamegate Rovegate, Treasongate, Leakgate page Crosswalk, conservative
publication, Democrats keep focus on Plamegate Sept 15, 05 Bush / Rice
failing in Iran war mongering efforts. India, China and Russia nix U.S.
and EU effort to get a majority of IAEA board to refer Iran to UN
Security Council for sanctions. India says the plan will backfire.
search:Ahmadinejad. NYT copy David Fiderer on the "Abort the Plame
Investigation Act" or H.R. 581. Feb 05. Bob Dole and the
Republicans smokescreen tactics are difficult to see ...will they work?
Framing the issue around source id privilege keeps the buzz off what
Miller is hiding...just what they want. also see CSM Holt wants docs,
Fitzgerald says will harm investigation see SpinWatch on indictment Sept
16, 05 Asia Times review of Bush whitewash book..by Craig Whitney. DOJ
won't turn over docs to Congress and While You Were atching Katrina
House Republicans derail probes of Plame affair Village Voice Sept 17,
05 Some Miller elite visitors: Bob Dole, John Bolton, Tom Brokaw,
Gonzalo Marroquin, Sept 18, 05 Washington Report on Middle East Affairs
old but relevant story, Israeli spies in America. Amdocs, Report of
Israeli Eavesdropping on White House Telephones Gets Varying Media
Treatment Sept 19, 05 This article climbing in the search engines:
Frontpage Mag calls Plamegate non-event, "endless spider-web of
lies by Joe Wilson", "The media has gone out of its way to
question the credibility of Karl Rove", "non-leak of Plame's
non-secret identity',....and on...and on. and NFU-Franklingate research
on Amdocs, 9/11, art students, Israeli spies Sept 20, 05 Yahoo article:
What Show Did You Watch During the War Daddy? Iraq War, lost and now a
civil war....north to south, oil. Sept 21, 05 Jurist article: David
Radler, former President and COO of Hollinger International and former
publisher of the Chicago Sun-Times, will plead guilty to fraud charges.
Robert Novak is Sun-Times columnist. Aljazeera "Is it possible that
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is assisting Israel
in betraying American spy networks in Iran in return for the Iranians to
offer the release of captured Israeli spies?" AEI search on
Jonathan Pollard results in "Web of Conspiracies" book by
Michael Rubin. search Kwiatkowski, OSP, Mondale. Sept 23, 05 Register:
More on Amdocs corporate espionage. And The Age Police question Amdocs
exec...at least 19 arrested for infiltrating competitors computers.
World Net Daily, Stephen Hadley mentioned, prior knowledge of 911
information on Atta in Rep. Weldon (Republican) Book "Countdown to
Terror" Shaffer stopped from testifying about Able Danger data
mining. Gonzales will name D. Kyle Sampson as chief of staff (DOJ) and
in related article KerrySharesOurValues on D. Kyle Sampson, Raul Yanes
..and (Ted Ullyot) All three have been lawyers in the White House
counsel's office under Gonzales. ... Ullyot (Ullyot stepped down) and
Yanes were the coordinators of the White House's response to the
investigation into the leak of CIA operative Valerie Plame's identity.
Gonzales and Ashcroft will recuse, but will these three also? Sampson,
Ullyot and Yanes have represented tobacco companies. search Kirkland
& Ellis or (Tobacco.org), Kenneth Starr. tobacco thread articles /
timeline Iraqwar.org on Israeli spying and Lowell Sun Online The
invasion of Iraq was the “greatest strategic disaster in United States
history,” a retired Army general said yesterday, strengthening an
effort in Congress to force an American withdrawal beginning next year.
Retired Army Lt. Gen. William Odom, a Vietnam veteran, said the invasion
of Iraq alienated America's Middle East allies, making it harder to
prosecute a war against terrorists Imam Intikab Habib's....was swept out
of his FDNY appointment....Over the weekend, the message was pounded in
by the New York and other media that those who question the Official
Conspiracy Theory.... 911Truth.org Sept 25, 05 search internet: Kurzberg
Shmuel Ellner Marmari Amdocs for supporting evidence on Amdocs links to
9/11 WTC or search amdocs fema israel or amdocs foxnews and Amdocs page
Sept 26, 05 New Franklingate / DOJ selected press releases page Sept 27,
05 Shalom Center, article from 2004: "Neo-Cons, AIPAC, Israel,
& Alleged Spying " Oct 28, 05 The federal grand jury delving
into the matter expires Oct. 28. .. prosecutors could pursue a criminal
contempt of court charge against Miller. Sept 28, 05 Conk Websearch,
Encyclopedia entry on AIPAC, supporters, critics and quotations. Fatma
Nevin Vargun, is a Kurdish women's rights activist. Libby poem in a
letter to Miller in jail: "You went into jail in the summer. It is
fall now. You will have stories to cover -- Iraqi elections and suicide
bombers, biological threats and the Iranian nuclear program. Out West,
where you vacation, the aspens will already be turning. They turn in
clusters, because their roots connect them. Come back to work -- and
life. Until then, you will remain in my thoughts and prayers -- With
admiration, Scooter Libby." from Salon.com Sept 29, 05 Foxnews
"U.K.: Military Action against Iran, 'Inconceivable'. and "On
Saturday, the International Atomic Energy Agency passed a resolution
putting Iran on the verge of referral to the U.N. Security Council
unless Tehran eases suspicions about its nuclear activities"
"(Fitzgerald) was ready to extend her imprisonment for up to 18
months. ...on September 29, she walked out of prison ready to talk,
having secured a personal waiver of confidentiality from her own source,
Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the vice president's chief of
staff." Guardian Sept 30, 05 Miller testified before the grand jury
about two conversations with Libby in July 2003 Red Nova "Quality
of Iran's Nuclear Fuel Sheds Doubt on Weapons Capabilities" Daily
Star "Britain rules out military action against Iran over nuclear
program Tehran to vote on scaling back cooperation with IAEA Forward
Steven Rosen (AIPAC) seeking dismissal on the grounds that the U.S.
government has refused to disclose key evidence. Franklin will plead
guilty, Harretz ....Miller released, will testify, and Red Nova coverage
Oct 1, 05 Miller testified,...Fitzgerald agreed to limit his questioning
to Libby contacts regarding Plame. Miller was his final witness...the
interview lasted 4 hours. Libby's attorney Joseph Tate puzzled at a
second request for a release...it had been a year since they believe
they gave her a waiver. Oct 2, 05 Net search terms: Judith Miller,
Stephen Hadley, Able Danger, missing chart Oct 3, 05 Weldon's Able
Danger hearings will backfire on GOP "...both Miller and Libby
collaborated for months on manufacturing the bogus WMD hoax.."
Ahmed Amr, Palestine Chronicle (copy), and Nile Media Oct 4, 05 Miller
still trying to limit issue to her conversations with Libby? NY Times
copy Oct 5, 05 Libby Lawyer says Miller in jail on her own accord, was
given waiver a year ago Washington Post see changes to Franklingate
AIPAC page World Peace Herald: Able Danger report expected soon. Oct 6,
05 San Francisco Chronicle, Jon Carrol, "Everyone pretty much knows
that the Judith Miller story doesn't add up, except for her employers at
the New York Times" Indictments Any time? Editor & Publisher
Oct 7, 05 Live Journal "U.S. Preparing for a Strike on
Iran.....Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector to Iraq
.......warned in apocalyptic terms in London"
|
| Please spread this copy of the list over the internet, there's strength in numbers. |
| Bush / Clinton Suspicious Death List Body Count / Attack: Aalund, James Downing; Adams, Doug, Adger, Sid; Al-huk,Mohammed Zia; Baldridge, Malcolm;Barkley, Maj. William; Baugh, Gandy; Bates, Robert; Baxter, Clifford J.; Bearden, Boonie; Boggs, Hale; Boorda, Jeremy 'Mike'; Branscum, Herby; Brown, Ron; Bunch, James; Butera, Eric; Caradori, Gary; Carnaby, Roland; Casey, William; Casolaro, Danny; Colby, William; Coleman, Suzanne; Collins, Gregory; Curie, Betty brother Theodore Williams Jr.; Corbin, Michael; Damus, Robert G.; Davis, L. J.; Delaney, Jack; Delaughter, Doc; Densberger, Col. William; Dickson, Steve; Dutko, Daniel A. Eisman, Dennis; Farish, William S.; Ferguson, Kathy; Ferrat, Mohamed Samir; Forrestal, James; Foster, Vincent; Fox, Cpl. Eric S.; Friday, Hershell; Fuentes, Rosa; Gandy, Baugh; Gibbs, Judy; Gosch, Johnny; Graham, Gary; Grober, Paula; Guerrin, Larry; Haney, Staff Sgt. Brian Harris, Lt. Col. William; Hartmann, Peter; Hatfield, James; Heard, Stanley; Herndon, Lance; Henry, Don; Hillier, John; Hamd, Riad, Holland, Don; Holton, Michael; Horton, Jake; Huggins, Stanley; Hume, Sandy; Hunt, Mrs. E. Howard; Hunziker, Evan; Ives, Kevin; Johnson, Gary; Jorton, Jake Jerkuic, Niko; Kangas, Steve; Kelly, Col. Robert; Kelly, Shelly; Kennedy, Robert Fitzgerald; Kennedy, John F. Jr.; Kettleson, Jordan; Killian, Lt. Col. Jerry B.; Kokal, John; Koney, Kieth; bin Laden, Salem; Laughton, Johnny; Lawhon, Johnny Jr.; Lawrence, Larry; LeBleu, Conway; Letelier, Orlando; Lombardi, Mark; Luna, Jonathan; Mahoney, Mary; Martin, Florence; McCoy, Don; McDougal, James; McKaskle, Keith; McKechan, Todd; McMillan, Colin; Meissner, Charles; Merrill, Phillip; Milam, James; list compiled by Steve Francis, NewsFollowUp.com, Millis, John; Miller, Charles Milbourne; Miller, Ron;Milosevic, Slobodan; Moffit, Ronni; Mohrenschildt, George de; Moody, Neal; Moser, Tony; Nichols, Larry; Nir, Amiram; Novinger, Darlene; Olson, Paull; O'Neil, John; Palme, Olaf; Parks, Luther (Jerry); Patrick, Dennis; Perdue, Sally; Raiser, Montgomery; Raiser, Victor C. II; Reynolds, Capt Scott; Rhodes, Spec. Gary; Rhodes, Jeff; Rice, Charles Dana; Robertson, Maj. Gen. William; Rogers, Dr. Ronald; Rose, Gen. James; Ruff, Charles; Sabel, Marine Sgt, Tim; Samples, Mike; Sanford, Paul; Schoedinger, Margie, Seal, Barry; Shelton, Bill; Sleeping Indian Mountain C-130; Spence, Craig; Spence, David Wayne; Spiro, Ian; Standoff, Alan; Tucker, Karla Faye; Tilly, Paul; Tower, John Sen.; Walker, Jon Parnell; Walraven, Calvin; Watkins, James Daniel; Webb, Maynard; Weiss, Gus W.; Welch, Russel; Wellstone, Paul Sen.; Wilcher, Paul; Wilhite, Jim; Wiley, Dr. Don C.; Willey, Ed; Williams, Robert; Williams, Theodore Jr.; Willis, Steve; Wilson, John; Winters, Richard; Wise, Barbera; Yeakey, Terrance; Chinese embassy Yugoslavia: Yunhuan, Shao; Xinghu, Xu and his wife, Zhu Ying,; 9/11 WTC victims, Flight 93 victims, Flight 77 / Pentagon victims, 1 million Iraqis. Franklin Scandal Omaha, White House call boy related: Aaron Owen, Shawn Boner, Bill Baker, Newt Copple, Clare Howard, Mike Lewis, Joe Malek, Charlie Rodgers, Dan Ryan, Curtis Tucker, Harmon Tucker. https://www.newsfollowup.com Will the Republicans assassinate Obama? probably ... there's too much at stake and Hillary will follow their course. |
|
and NFU stats
Mario Scaramella
