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Source: New York Times, August 5, 2002. and UCLA, Dept of Epidemiology, School of Public Health Anthrax Vaccine Maker Calls Finances Shaky
By JUDITH MILLER
LANSING, Mich., Aug. 1 -- The nation's sole producer of anthrax vaccine says it is in financial jeopardy because the Bush administration has failed to say how much vaccine it intends to buy, preventing it from selling vaccine to foreign and private customers at much higher prices. But the Pentagon has been unable to tell BioPort precisely how much more vaccine the government intends to order because several civilian agencies have not given the military budget commitments to pay for the vaccine they want, despite months of discussion. "Negotiations are ongoing and will be successful," a senior homeland security official said. "Sometimes talks go quickly; sometimes they don't."
The anthrax vaccine is at the heart of the Bush administration's effort to protect American soldiers and civilians against another mass exposure to the deadly pathogen, which last fall killed 5 people, sickened about 17 and led more than 20,000 people to take antibiotics. The impasse comes at a time when the Bush administration is vowing to oust Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who is believed to be storing thousands of gallons of anthrax that could be used as weapons in war or terrorism.
Senior BioPort executives disclosed that the Department of Defense is paying about $20 a dose for the vaccine, or more than three times the original price negotiated three years ago, and Pentagon officials confirmed this. But company officials say that even this price, while acceptable now, is too low to enable BioPort to make the long-term investments it needs to survive. "This company is a unique resource," Mr. Kramer said. "It's crazy for us as a business to risk our financial viability due to government indecision. Our long-term viability is at risk given the current situation."
Bush administration officials say that they understand the company's predicament but that BioPort is partly responsible for it because of faulty business assumptions, repeated failures to meet requirements of the Food and Drug Administration and overly optimistic assumptions about its ability to produce vaccine. In June, for instance, the company threw out about 180,000 doses of vaccine it deemed substandard -- the equivalent of two weeks' production.
In late June, the Pentagon announced a new anthrax vaccination policy, which reversed a plan by the Clinton administration to immunize all 2.4 million people in the military. The new policy limits vaccinations to soldiers in areas with a "higher risk" of exposure, widely reported to be the Middle East and the Korean peninsula. The policy also commits the administration to stockpiling for civilian use from 40 percent to half of the vaccine produced for the Pentagon. Soldiers are being vaccinated now, while civilians -- mostly police officers, firefighters, rescue crews and other "first responders" -- would receive shots only after exposure to anthrax. While BioPort says confusion exists in the government over how much vaccine should be ordered for both the military and civilians, some Bush administration officials blamed bureaucratic wrangling between civilian agencies and the Pentagon for the delay.
The Department of Homeland Security, which is being created, is supposed to take charge of such orders, but in the interim the Defense Department has been coordinating orders of vaccine for itself and for several civilian agencies that want to stockpile the vaccine to protect government employees overseas, along with F.B.I. and other law enforcement agents, state and local emergency personnel and health workers.
Providing immunity to the lethal anthrax spore is not easy. The Food and Drug Administration says that six shots given over 18 months and a yearly booster should be given to ensure protection. But new federal studies suggest that three shots of the vaccine may be enough, though the F.D.A. has not approved this. [Pentagon officials disclosed on Friday that 68,000 people on active duty in the military had received all six shots and that 440,000 had received at least two shots.]
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|INSLAW case murders|
Alan Standorf An employee of the National Security Agency in electronic intelligence. Standorf was a source of information for Danny Casalaro who was investigating INSLAW, BCCI, etc. Standorf's body was found in the backseat of a car at Washington National Airport on Jan 31, 1991. Etherzone 42inc NFU Jackson Stephens research
Ian Spiro Spiro had supporting documentation for grand jury proceedings on the INSLAW case. His wife and 3 children were found murdered on November 1, 1992 in their home. They all died of gunshot wounds to the head. Ian's body was found several days later in a parked car in the Borego Desert. Cause of death? The ingestion of cyanide. FBI report indicated that Ian had murdered his family and then committed suicide. Etherzone 42inc NFU Jackson Stephens research websites
|Anthrax Mailings Inquiries Lead to Battelle/Bioport|
|Anthrax Mailings Inquiries Lead to Battelle/Bioport
By Ingri Cassel-208/265-2575; 800/336-9266 donavan posted this on
Sunday, January 27, 2002
Sandpoint, ID - Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI) is increasingly becoming the central suspect in the anthrax mailings investigation according to a growing number of independent investigators and newspapers initially tipped by a report released last Monday by Dr. Leonard G. Horowitz, a Harvard trained public health authority. The NY Times is the latest newspaper to include this West Jefferson, Ohio defense contractor that documents prove maintained close ties to the U.S. Army's Dugway "Life Sciences" center where the specific strain of anthrax was undergoing tests.
The Baltimore Sun reported this week that, contrary to popular belief, the Defense Department maintained a potentially offensive biological weapons program using the Aimes strain of anthrax identified at Dugway. They failed to report that BMI largely administered and supplied this "Life Sciences" facility wherein a "virtually identical" strain of anthrax had been tested. After circulating his 20-page report (See:
http://www.tetrahedron.org )to members congress and the press, Dr. Horowitz, the author of the prophetically titled book, "Death in the Air: Globalism, Terrorism and Toxic Warfare", contacted the William J. Broad, the anthrax mailings investigator for the New York Times, and co-author of "Germs", to discuss the accumulating evidence against BMI. "All roads lead to BMI," Broad agreed.
Two days later, Broad and his co-author, Judith Miller, wrote that BMI "participated in a secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) program, code-named 'Clear Vision'" begun in 1997, that allegedly used benign substances similar to anthrax. The Horowitz report also argued that only someone with national security clearances, such as CIA operatives assigned to this top secret program, could have commandeered the anthrax from BMI to the mailings sites such as Trenton, New Jersey. He said, "CIA personnel are increasingly implicated in light of these revelations."
Further implicating BMI and the CIA, both leading anthrax experts-America's William C. Patrick, III, and Russian defector, Kanatjan Alibekov-are BMI consultants and on the CIA's payroll, according to earlier published reports cited in the Horowitz report.
"The whole truth would be severely embarrassing to the Bush administration," Dr. Horowitz said. "HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson has, after all, commandeered a bioterrorism preparedness drug feeding frenzy. With five persons killed and thirteen others infected so far, military-industrial officials may be implicated in serial homicide, if not economic genocide, while 'wagging the dog' for drug and vaccine company profits."
Dr. Horowitz says that the Baltimore Sun report was highly significant regarding Dugway's "Life Sciences" Division. "'Death Sciences' seems to be a more accurate title for the lab largely developed, administered, and supplied by BMI where all roads appear to lead," Dr. Horowitz said.
|excerpt from Centre for Research on Globalization, Propaganda Preparation for 9/11|
there has been a widespread campaign on to link the threat of al-Qaida
with that of a mass biological attack. At least the day after September
11, the link - as the Anthrax mailings had yet to arise - was not so
apparent. Yet on PBS' Frontline, the New York Times' Judith Miller (no
apparent relation to John Miller, as far as I'm aware), accompanied by the
New York Times' James Risen, was interviewed as an expert on al-Qaida.
Several weeks later, Judith Miller would once more make the headlines as
the apparent recipient of an anthrax mailing which turned out to be a
false alarm - yet was all the same conveniently timed with the
well-publicized launching of her book on...germ warfare. As was later
discovered, the anthrax mailings petered out once the news leaked that a
DNA test revealed the material to be of the Ames strain of anthrax, an
agent synthesized out of a CIA laboratory in Fort Detrick, Maryland.
Nevertheless, this was sufficient to fast-track Bioport's exclusive
license for the anthrax vaccine toward FDA approval. Formerly, Bioport's
experimental anthrax vaccine was being forcibly administered - under
threat of court-martial - to hundreds of thousands of American servicemen
(in conformity with Bioport's exclusive and lucrative contract with the
Department of Defense).
Judith Miller, along with Jerry Hauer, was among 17 "key"
participants in a biowarfare exercise known as "Dark Winter" - a
think tank-funded scenario that aimed to study the nationwide effects of a
hypothetical smallpox outbreak. One
of the sponsors of that exercise was the Anser Institute of Homeland
Security, an organization established before September 11, 2001.
Interestingly enough, the curious phrase "homeland
security" was starting to creep up with increasing frequency in the
vocabularies of certain political cliques (Dick Cheney, the Hart-Rudman
Commission, et al.) in the year or two leading up to 9/11.
|Judith Miller, NY Times, August 2004, Anthrax article:|
|Wrangling Impedes Transfer Of Civilian Anthrax Vaccine LinkedinDiggFacebookMixxYahoo! By JUDITH MILLER Published: August 20, 2004 ...Despite pledges two years ago to maintain a stockpile of drugs to protect Americans in the event of a bioterrorism attack, the federal government has so far set aside only 159 vials of anthrax vaccine for the civilian population enough for only 530 people, according to congressional and administration officials. ... The officials said the failure to transfer more of the vaccine from military to civilian control was caused by legal and bureaucratic wrangling among government agencies. They also cited the government's desire to buy a new vaccine that is potentially both cheaper and more efficient. That vaccine has not yet been approved by the Food and Drug Administration. ... Spokesmen for the Pentagon and the Department of Health and Human Services denied that the delay would imperil the well-being of civilians, saying that BioPort, the nation's sole producer of licensed anthrax vaccine, was storing nearly a million doses -- enough for more than 330,000 people. ... ''The bottom line is: if there is a civilian crisis that would require vaccination of the population, there is enough anthrax vaccine to do that,'' said Bill Pierce, a spokesman for the Department of Health and Human Services. ''It would just take a phone call to get that vaccine transferred from the Pentagon to the stockpile,'' he said, dismissing the delays to ''paperwork that will get done.'' ... But a spokesman for BioPort and Pentagon officials said that the doses being stored are intended for the military, which announced in June that it was expanding its anthrax and smallpox vaccination program. If those doses were used by civilians in an emergency, officials said, military vaccinations would have to be curtailed or scaled back. ... Michael Zamiara, the chief financial officer of BioPort, in Lansing, Mich., said the military had first call on its vaccine. ''We must run a business,'' he said. While the Department of Health and Human Services had indicated it wanted the vaccine for the civilian stockpile, he said, the agency had yet to ''pay us for it, or tell us how much it wants to buy.'' ... Officials also said that the Bush administration had not implemented an interagency agreement signed last April, a copy of which was provided to The Times, in which the Pentagon agreed to provide at least two million doses of anthrax vaccine to the civilian stockpile by the end of this fiscal year, or Sept. 30. ... ''It is a shocking lack of preparedness to have only 159 vials set aside for civilian use when we know that Al Qaeda would not hesitate to launch an anthrax attack against the United States,'' said Rep. Jim Turner, Democrat of Texas, the ranking member of the House select committee on homeland security, which has been investigating the state of the nation's strategic stockpiles. ... Jerome Hauer, a former assistant secretary with the Department of Health and Human Services in the Bush administration, said the months of infighting over such issues as who would indemnify BioPort for its vaccine reflected a lack of priority on biodefense. ... ''We now have bureaucrats and lawyers running bioterrorism preparedness,'' said Mr. Hauer, who heads a biodefense center at George Washington University. ... The vaccine issue has been complicated by Congress's recent transfer of control of the civilian stockpile from the Department of Homeland Security back to the Department of Health and Human Services. ... Many scientists at the health agency favor a new recombinant vaccine that may require fewer shots and be faster to make.|
|AIPAC, Rosen, Weissman, Judith Miller, New York Times, Bob Woodward links to anthrax attacks, war mongering, fear mongering to ram Patriot Act through Congress. Dov Zakheim, mastermind of 911, J-Street, using threat-to-free-speech argument, giving Israel Iraq / Iran troop movements info supplied by Larry Franklin is free speech. Greymail, Greymailing the case, Graymail, Graymailing,|
|Democracy Rising "Congressman Edward J. Markey
(D-MA) has taken the lead on working toward ending torture by U.S.
officials or by "rendition" of suspects to foreign governments
for torture there. He has introduced, along with 48 colleauges, H.R. 952
the Torture Outsourcing Prevention Act FAS Italy kidnappings, torture,
U.S. Secret prisons, prison ships, planes, Italy, kidnapping. CBS
News Extraordinary Rendition..."the government policy wherein terror
suspects are transferred from U.S. control into the control of foreign
governments, so that interrogation methods that are not permitted under
U.S. law may be applied to the suspects" International Criminal Court
Protection New York Times : Bush: Iraq War prisoners not entitled to
Geneva Convention rules Alternet search, 9/11 Center for Defense
Information arms trade, children in war, missile defense info Findlaw, War
on Terrorism Special coverage Global Policy Watching Zionism, 9/11
News from Russia Pravda, Israel, search Non Violence USA
International Relations and Security Network, Swiss Contribution to the
Partnership for Peace Newstrove, Guantanamo Bay World Court, International
Court of Justice American Center for Law and Justice search American
Conservative Union Action Alert lobbyists Anti Terrorism Coalition,
Islam is taking over the orld BioPort anthrax vaccine manufacturer
KOLIsrael Danger Zone Jobs.com Debka File search National Review search on
zionist, 9/11 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace Whitehouse,
Bush, Cheney, 'war on terrorism' Alternet search, Guantanamo Amnesty
International, UK Guantanamo Bay, latest news, releases Center for
Constitutional Rights, watching the events of Guantanamo, detainees,
Supreme Court decisions. Center for Defense Information arms trade,
children in war, missile defense info FAS search National Intelligence
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Source Human Rights Watch News from Russia Pravda, Israel,
search Palast, Greg, UK Guantanamo search. Discourse.net CIA,
Pentagon inquiry Findlaw, War on Terrorism Special coverage
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Network, Swiss Contribution to the Partnership for Peace International
Committee of the Red Cross, why did they wait months to report Iraq prison
abuse. Newstrove, Guantanamo Bay Human Rights First, formerly
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Justice, Dept of press releases
Judicial Watch World Court, International Court of
Justice American Center for Law and Justice search American Conservative
Union Anti Terrorism Coalition, Islam is taking over the world
Action Alert help ACU lobby Congress on these issues Council
on Foreign Relations corporate power to rural poor Republicans Debka File
search Global Security Guantanamo Bay, Camp X-Ray. Guantanamo Bay Naval
Station official site. Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs National Review
search on Guantanamo Bay, Rich Lowry Townhall search Washington Institute
for Near East Policy US
Anthrax Vaccination Immunization Program Army cover-up Carlyle, Group.net, Center for Defense Information arms trade research, info on children in war, missile defense info Gulf War Vets Anthrax vaccine deaths info IACenter Founded by Ramsey Clark, supports DLC, News from Russia Pravda, Israel, News Insider New World Peace, FBI incriminated in anthrax mailings, see NucNews, Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization's, Network rule of law, social justice, respect for Human Rights, links Vaccination Liberation hoax info, links Vaccination News vaccines, autism, shaken baby syndrome. links What Really Happened anthrax hoax FDA search UCLA dept of Epidemiology, Bioterrorism, National CFIDS Foundation, Chronic Fatigue Immune Dysfunction, ME, Myalgic Encephalopathy, Safety Alerts consumer product safety recall info, news UCLA, Dept of Epidemiology, School of Public Health Agilent Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program Official U.S. site Battelle Memorial Institute develops new tech, commercializes products Bayer, has Cipro patent, anthrax. BioMed Central, the-Scientist.com, news, BioPort anthrax vaccine manufacturer CIDRAP Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy FDA News, Drug industry news, daily Gulf War Medical Research Library, Harvard, Risk of death, bioterrorism, 1 in 56 million is chance of death from terrorist, Hollister-Stier Labs in partnership with BioPort National Acadamies, Press articles on Agent Orange, dioxins, TCDD National Center for Biotechnology Information National Library of Medicine, NIH NTI Security News PNNL, neural network, protein research, operated by Battelle, with Agilent TEVA Pharma, Cipro, patent, anthrax vaccine
|WASHINGTON — Buried in FBI laboratory reports about the anthrax mail
attacks that killed five people in 2001 is data suggesting that a
chemical may have been added to try to heighten the powder's potency, a
move that some experts say exceeded the expertise of the presumed
The lab data, contained in more than 9,000 pages of files that emerged a year after the Justice Department closed its inquiry and condemned the late Army microbiologist Bruce Ivins as the perpetrator, shows unusual levels of silicon and tin in anthrax powder from two of the five letters.
Those elements are found in compounds that could be used to weaponize the anthrax, enabling the lethal spores to float easily so they could be readily inhaled by the intended victims, scientists say.
The existence of the silicon-tin chemical signature offered investigators the possibility of tracing purchases of the more than 100 such chemical products available before the attacks, which might have produced hard evidence against Ivins or led the agency to the real culprit.
But the FBI lab reports released in late February give no hint that bureau agents tried to find the buyers of additives such as tin-catalyzed silicone polymers.
The apparent failure of the FBI to pursue this avenue of investigation raises the ominous possibility that the killer is still on the loose.
A McClatchy analysis of the records also shows that other key scientific questions were left unresolved and conflicting data wasn't sorted out when the FBI declared Ivins the killer shortly after his July 29, 2008, suicide.
One chemist at a national laboratory told McClatchy that the tin-silicone findings and the contradictory data should prompt a new round of testing on the anthrax powder.
A senior federal law enforcement official, who was made available only on the condition of anonymity, said the FBI had ordered exhaustive tests on the possible sources of silicon in the anthrax and concluded that it wasn't added. Instead, the lab found that it's common for anthrax spores to incorporate environmental silicon and oxygen into their coatings as a "natural phenomenon" that doesn't affect the spores' behavior, the official said.
To arrive at that position, however, the FBI had to discount its own bulk testing results showing that silicon composed an extraordinary 10.8 percent of a sample from a mailing to the New York Post and as much as 1.8 percent of the anthrax from a letter sent to Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, far more than the occasional trace contamination. Tin — not usually seen in anthrax powder at all — was measured at 0.65 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively, in those letters.
An FBI spokesman declined to comment on the presence of tin or to answer other questions about the silicon-tin connection.
Several scientists and former colleagues of Ivins argue that he was a career biologist who probably lacked the chemistry knowledge and skills to concoct a silicon-based additive.
"There's no way that an individual scientist can invent a new way of making anthrax using silicon and tin," said Stuart Jacobsen, a Texas-based analytical chemist for an electronics company who's closely studied the FBI lab results. "It requires an institutional effort to do this, such as at a military lab."
Martin Hugh-Jones, a world-renowned anthrax expert who teaches veterinary medicine at Louisiana State University, called it "just bizarre" that the labs found both tin — which can be toxic to bacteria such as anthrax during lab culturing — and silicon.
"You have two elements at abnormally high levels," Hugh-Jones said. "That reduces your probability to a very small number that it's an accident."
The silicon-tin connection wasn't the only lead left open in one of the biggest investigations in FBI history, an inquiry that took the bureau to the cutting edge of laboratory science. In April, McClatchy reported that after locking in on Ivins in 2007, the bureau stopped searching for a match to a unique genetic bacterial strain scientists had found in the anthrax that was mailed to the Post and to NBC News anchor Tom Brokaw, although a senior bureau official had characterized it as the hottest clue to date.
FBI officials say it's all a moot point, because they're positive they got the right man in Ivins. A mentally troubled anthrax researcher at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., Ivins overdosed on drugs not long after learning that he'd soon face five counts of capital murder.
In ending the inquiry last year, the Justice Department said that a genetic fingerprint had pointed investigators to Ivins' lab, and gumshoe investigative techniques enabled them to compile considerable circumstantial evidence that demonstrated his guilt.
Among these proofs, prosecutors cited Ivins' alleged attempt to steer investigators away from a flask of anthrax in his lab that genetically matched the mailed powder — anthrax that had been shared with other researchers. They also noted his anger over a looming congressional cut in funds for his research on a new anthrax vaccine.
However, the FBI never found hard evidence that Ivins produced the anthrax or that he scrawled threatening letters seemingly meant to resemble those of Islamic terrorists. Or that he secretly took late-night drives to Princeton, N.J., to mail them.
The FBI declared Ivins the killer soon after paying $5.8 million to settle a suit filed by another former USAMRIID researcher, Steven Hatfill, whom the agency mistakenly had targeted earlier in its investigation.
Anthrax is one of the deadliest and most feared biological weapons. Once inhaled, microscopic anthrax spores germinate into rapidly multiplying, highly toxic bacteria that attack human tissue. The resulting illnesses are lethal within days if untreated.
The letters, mailed just weeks after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, not only went to the New York Post, Leahy and Brokaw, but also to American Media Inc. in Boca Raton, Fla., and to Democratic then-Sen. Tom Daschle of South Dakota. Five people died, 17 were sickened and about 31,000 were forced to take powerful antibiotics for weeks. Crews wearing moon suits spent several weeks eradicating the spores from a Senate office building and a central Postal Service facility in Washington.
The FBI guarded its laboratory's finding of 10.8 percent silicon in the Post letter for years. New York Democratic Rep. Jerrold Nadler asked FBI Director Robert Mueller how much silicon was in the Post and Leahy letters at a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee in September 2008. The Justice Department responded seven months later that silicon made up 1.4 percent of the Leahy powder (without disclosing the 1.8 percent reading) and that "a reliable quantitative measurement was not possible" for the Post letter.
The bureau's conclusions that silicon was absorbed naturally drew a gentle challenge in February from a panel of the National Academy of Sciences, which evaluated the investigation's lab work.
While finding no evidence that silicon had been added to the mailed anthrax, the panel noted deep in its report that the FBI had provided "no compelling explanation" for conflicts in silicon test results between the Sandia National Laboratories and its own lab.
Sandia — which used electron microscopes, unlike the FBI — reported only a tenth as much silicon in the New York Post letter as the bureau's lab did. Sandia said it was all embedded in the spore coatings, where it wasn't harmful.
The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology ran a third set of tests and found pockets of heavy silica concentrations, but it couldn't say whether they were inside or outside the spores.
Jacobsen, the Texas chemist, suspects that the silica pockets represented excess material that went through a chemical reaction and hardened before it could penetrate the spores.
The National Academy of Sciences panel wrote that the varying composition of the powder might have accounted for the differing findings.
While finding no evidence that silicon was added, the panel said it "cannot rule out the intentional addition of a silicon-based substance ... in a failed attempt to enhance dispersion" of the New York Post powder.
Tufts University chemistry professor David Walt, who led the panel's analysis of the silicon issue, said in a phone interview that "there was not enough silicon in the spores that could account for the total silicon content of the bulk analysis."
He said it was unclear whether the "trace" levels of tin were significant.
During the FBI's seven-year hunt, the Department of Homeland Security commissioned a team of chemists at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California to grow anthrax-like spores under varying conditions to see how much silicon would end up naturally in the final product.
They found little, if any, silicon in most cases, far less than was in the New York Post letter, said Stephan Velsko, one of the two researchers. He called the tin readings from the FBI's anthrax data "baffling."
Peter Weber, Velsko's co-researcher, said the academy panel's focus on the conflicting data "raises a big question," and "it'd be really helpful for closure of this case if that was resolved."
He suggested that further "micro-analysis" with a highly sophisticated electron microscope could "pop the question marks really quickly."
In a chapter in a recently updated book, "Microbial Forensics," Velsko wrote that the anthrax "must have indeed been produced under an unusual set of conditions" to create such high silicon counts. That scenario, he cautioned, might not be "consistent with the prosecution narrative in this case."
About 100 tin-catalyzed silicone products are on the market, and an even wider array was available in 2000 and 2001, before the mailings, said Richie Ashburn, a vice president of one manufacturer, Silicones Inc., in High Point, N.C.
Mike Wilson, a chemist for another silicone products maker, SiVance, in Gainesville, Fla., said that numerous silicon products could be used to make spores or other particles water-repellent. He also said that the ratios of silicon to tin found in the Post and Leahy samples would be "about right" if a tin-catalyzed silicone had been added to the spores.
Jacobsen, a Scottish-born and -educated chemist who once experimented with silicon coatings on dust particles, said he got interested in the spore chemistry after hearing rumors in late 2001 that a U.S. military facility had made the killer potions. He called it "outrageous" that the scientific issues haven't been addressed.
"America, the most advanced country in the world, and the FBI have every resource available to them," he said. "And yet they have no compelling explanation for not properly analyzing the biggest forensic clue in the most important investigation the FBI labs had ever gotten in their history."
As a result of Ivins' death and the unanswered scientific issues, Congress' investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office, is investigating the FBI's handling of the anthrax inquiry.
Read more: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/05/19/114467/fbi-lab-reports-on-anthrax-attacks.html#disqus_thread#ixzz1NBATiXZ1
|WMR Guest article: Concerns Continue to Mount on U.S. Bioweapons Violations Anthony Freda Illustration Janet C. Phelan, Contributing Writer Activist Post|
|The Center for Disease Control has declined to confirm or deny
allegations that the United States government is stockpiling biological
and/or chemical weapons at Sierra Army Depot, a military base in
According to Ron Davenport, who was a biomedical engineer who worked at the medical clinic at Sierra Army depot in the seventies, the base at one time contained a stockpile of nuclear weapons. Davenport states that much of the base is actually underground. This reporter has obtained the testimony of a civilian contractor with a security clearance who has stated that the nukes have been replaced by large vats of liquid.
In an interview this week with Lori Bane, Associate Director for Policy with the CDC Division of Select Agents and Toxins and Von Roebuck, CDC Public Affairs officer, the two also declined to confirm or deny the existence of a number of biological safety labs level 4. The level 4 labs, called BSL-4.s, handle the most dangerous germs known to man, including Ebola, Marburg and Argentine hemorrhagic virus.
The CDC is charged with the responsibility of registering labs which work with “select agents” and toxins. The labs range from Levels 1 to 4, and are designated in terms of their containment capacity. The 3’s and 4’s handle the really nasty bugs, some of which have no known treatment or cure and pose a grave threat to human life.
Bane and Roebuck maintain that there are only six operational BSL-4’s within the borders of the United States. However, a number of other BSL-4’s appear to be now operational. Biosecurity.org lists eleven. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has counted thirteen, with some questions as to whether all the labs are operational at this point in time. The University of North Carolina has counted fifteen.
When this reporter did a “roll call,” running down the entire FAS list, Bane began to fidget. Asked if there were an operational BSL-4 in Galveston, Texas, she responded that she “didn’t feel comfortable confirming or denying” if that facility has a registered BSL-4 or not.
She responded in a similar manner to questions as to whether there was an operational BSL-4 in Montana. “Based on what I see on the internet there may be,” she volunteered. The CDC is posited with the responsibility of registering the BSL-4’s and when asked why she was relying on internet searches to determine this, she stated that she was answering in this manner “for security reasons.” However, the CDC’s own website contains multiple references to the Montana Lab.
The granddaddy of all BSL-4’s was first established at Fort Detrick in 1969. This reporter has found indications of two other BSL-4’s at Detrick. Bane stated she was unable to comment on this. Bane and Roebuck also attempted to convince this reporter that there is only one BSL-4 at the CDC. However, this reporter found indications that a second one may have gone online recently.
Following 911, and particularly following the anthrax letters which came fast on the heels of the Twin Towers attacks, these” biological safety” labs started to proliferate as silently and quickly as mushrooms. At this point in time, Congress is allocating over one billion dollars a year to fund biological defense research. But is it really defensive research going on in these labs?
According to the Sunshine Project, an international non-profit working against the hostile use of biotechnology, the institutional safeguards put into place to ensure that these labs are doing the appropriate kinds of research are almost nonfunctional. Edward Hammond, who was the director of the Sunshine Project, cited instance after instance where the oversight committees for these research facilities had never even convened, let alone reviewed the nature of the research ongoing in these facilities. He also found where the mandated research was not taking place and other, non- authorized research was occurring instead.
The Pentagon did not respond to queries concerning the possibility of BSL-4’s on two military bases, Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah and Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland. This reporter located two architectural firms which claimed that they had been involved in building BSL-4s at these bases: http://www.linkedin.com/in/waynewalters; http://www.ninowconsulting.com/
The potential presence of these weapons at Sierra Army Depot augurs the likelihood that these weapons are being stockpiled on other bases, as well. The Soldier and Biological Chemical Command of the U.S. military lists installations at these facilities: Aberdeen Proving Ground Anniston Chemical Activity Blue Grass Chemical Activity Deseret Chemical Depot Edgewood Chemical Activity Jefferson Proving Ground Newport Chemical Depot Pine Bluff Chemical Activity Pueblo Chemical Depot Rocky Mountain Arsenal Umatilla Chemical Depot Chem/Bio - Rapid Response Team Technical Escort Unit Natick Soldier Center Research, Development and Engineering Center Rock Island Site The apparent “secret” presence of BSL-4’s on military bases, coupled with indications of biological and/or chemical stockpiles at Sierra and elsewhere, point to the likelihood that the U.S. is engaged in developing biological warfare agents. This is a violation of the international Biological Weapons Convention. The U.S. signed the convention in 1972 and is a repository of this international arms treaty, along with Russia and Great Britain. Unlike many other arms treaties, which come with a host of inspection capabilities and repercussions for violators, the BWC has no teeth. There is no investigatory capability and no oversight body to assign penalties. In this sense, the BWC is merely window dressing. It has recently come to light that the United States violated this treaty, at least on paper, through the passage of the Expansion of the Biological Weapons Statute, which is published as Section 817 of the U.S. Patriot Act. This Statute largely reflects the language of the BWC, which restricts the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. However, there is a caveat at the end of 817 which releases the United States government from culpability for violating the restrictions contained in 817, stating: “ (c) Whoever knowingly violates this section shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but the prohibition contained in this section shall not apply with respect to any duly authorized United States governmental activity.” It is through this caveat that the U.S. violated both the letter and spirit of the BWC.
What the U.S. has accomplished, through the passage of The Expansion of the Biological Weapons Statute, is to give itself a “blank check” for the deployment of these weapons. Richard Ebright, a researcher at Rutgers University, disputes the perception that the U.S. is moving towards deployment. “A blank check doesn’t mean anything unless you use it,” he declared in an interview last month. Ebright vigorously denies that the U.S. is engaged in bioweapons research. However, the structure of the BWC itself, a convention without an investigatory or enforcement arm, could also be considered a blank check.
The anthrax attacks themselves belie the declarations that the U.S. is not engaging in this research. It has been generally acknowledged that the anthrax contained in the several letters was cooked up in a government lab. The FBI’s contention that they “had their man” in Dr. Bruce Ivins seemed to be both confirmed and put into suspension by Ivins’ alleged suicide. The mainstream media played down the fact that Ivins, who allegedly overdosed on Tylenol, began to gain strength in the hospital. While waiting for a kidney transplant, he was subsequently removed from life support. And that is how Dr. Ivins died.
Recently, the National Academies released their long awaited report concerning the FBI investigation which nailed Ivins as the anthrax mailer. The National Academies did not endorse the methodology used by the FBI to determine that Ivins was culpable and was unable to support and endorse the Department of Justice’s conclusions concerning Ivins’ guilt.
The affixing of responsibility to Dr. Ivins, who was a researcher at Ft. Detrick, does have its political perks. The identification of a suspect (conveniently now dead) removes suspicion from anyone else lurking in these labs. It certainly derails any concerns of a larger, government conspiracy concerning the anthrax letters, which were received by liberal Congressmen and members of the media right before the vote on the U.S Patriot Act. Viewed through this lens, nagging doubts may surface, in which a biological warfare agenda emerges into the foreground as a dark and ominous possibility.
“Dual-use” is a term often used to refer to technology which can be used for both peaceful and military aims. Obviously, weapons grade anthrax from a government lab was used against U.S. citizens in the anthrax attacks. Is other research going on now which might result in later attacks? And are these toxins being stockpiled on military bases and if so, why?
And if the U.S. is indeed manufacturing these weapons in “biosafety labs” under the guise of defensive research and stockpiling them at army bases, and if the purpose of the “blank check” being written for Biological and Chemical weapons via Section 817 of the U.S. Patriot Act and buttressed by the impotent BWC is to nullify the possibility of redress for deployment, then the next question becomes: How do we begin to address this spectre?
This reporter has applied for credentials to attend the BWC, which convenes every five years in Geneva. The next meeting is in December of 2011. At this date, the United Nations has not responded to the request for press credentials to attend the meeting.
Janet Phelan is an investigative journalist whose articles have appeared in the Los Angeles Times, The San Bernardino County Sentinel, The Santa Monica Daily Press, The Long Beach Press Telegram, Oui Magazine and other regional and national publications. Janet specializes in issues pertaining to legal corruption and addresses the heated subject of adult conservatorship, revealing shocking information about the relationships between courts and shady financial consultants. She also covers issues relating to international bioweapons treaties. Her poetry has been published in Gambit, Libera, Applezaba Review, Nausea One and other magazines. Her first book, The Hitler Poems, was published in 2005. She currently resides abroad. You may browse through her articles (and poetry) at janetphelan.com
|WMR James Holmes ... Aurora police chief's dubious connections|
|July 25-26, 2012 -- Aurora police chief's dubious connections
As Aurora, Colorado police chief Dan Oates receives accolades from officials from President Obama to Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper, Oates's past position with the New York Police Department is noteworthy as more details emerge of the connections between the alleged Century 16 movie theater shooter James Holmes and government-funded neuroscience research.
Oates retired from the New York Police Department in 2001 after a 21-year career. He served as safety services administrator in Ann Arbor, Michigan, the home of the University of Michigan, designated by former CIA director Richard Helms as one of the five top CIA-Advance Research Projects Agency (ARPA) [now known as the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency, or DARPA] "behavioral science" research campuses, along with Yale, M.I.T., U.C.L.A, and the University of Hawaii. In 2005, Oates left Ann Arbor to take up his present position in Aurora.
Oates's last job with the NYPD was as the chief of the intelligence division. As a member of Police Commissioner Howard Safir's executive staff, Oates's prepared, according to The New York Daily News, a daily intelligence briefing for Safir, which lasted some two hours. Oates's would have conceivably had access to a wide spectrum of intelligence information, including Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, and other federal agency reports on the suspicious activities of a number of Israeli "art students" and "office movers" in the year leading up to the 9/11 attack on New York's World Trade Center.
However, Oates apparently missed the critical intelligence or, if he passed it to Safir, it was ignored. Safir, who served as New York Police Commissioner from 1996 to 2000 and was appointed by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, previously served as a federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs agent and in 10972, was one of two BNDD agents who arrested Harvard University researcher Timothy Leary, a proponent of LSD use. However, Leary had also conducted research, under the guise of the Harvard Psilocybin Project. the Concord Prison Experiment, and the Marsh Chapel Experiment, for the CIA's MK-ULTRA mind control program. which was under the direction of CIA Technical Services director Dr. Sidney Gottlieb.
After Safir retired as police commissioner, he became the chief consultant to the CEO of ChoicePoint, Inc., the firm that was implicated in scrubbing voter rolls in Florida for the 2000 presidential election.
In December 2001, Safir became chairman and CEO SafirRosetti, a security firm that is a wholly owned subsidiary of Global Options Group, as well as CEO of Bode Technology, also a subsidiary of Global Options. Safir has also served as CEO of VRI Technologies LLC, a security investigations and data analysis firm; chairman of National Security Solutions, Inc., a counter-terrorism firm; chairman and CEO of the November Group Ltd, a strategic consulting firm headquartered in Annapolis, Maryland. In addition, he has served on the the board of directors of Implant Sciences Corp., an explosive trace detection sensor firm; and Verint Systems, Inc.
Verint was formerly known as Comverse/Infosys and the Department of Justice suspected the Israeli-owned firm, which had contracts to provide wiretapping systems to the FBI and Justice Department, of having significant links to Israeli intelligence. Comverse/Infosys, now known as Verint, was suspended from the New York NASDAQ index in 2007 over financial irregularities and money laundering brought about by the ex-CEO of Comverse/Infosys, Jacob "Kobi" Alexander, an Israeli national. Alexander fled prosecution for securities fraud in the United States and he now lives in the Namibian capital of Windhoek. Efforts to extradite Alexander from Namibia to the United States have been unsuccessful.
Verint provided the closed-circuit television surveillance system for the London Underground when the system was hit by terrorist bombs on July 7, 2005. A company called Visor Consultants was conducting a training exercise in which dummy bombs were used to simulate a terrorist bombing of the London Underground as the actual bombs were detonated. Giuliani, who appointed Safir as his polcie commissioner, happened to be staying in downtown London at the time of the bombings. Giuliani was staying and attending an economic conference at the Great Eastern Hotel, at which then-Israeli Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was also present.
Netanyahu had expressed a certain satisfaction over the 9/11 attack on U.S. television in implying the attack would be "good for Israel." The response to the 9/11 attack was severely affected by actual commercial airplane hijacking drills being run by the Pentagon during the actual attacks.
Ironically, Safir's one-time intelligence chief, Oates, would also face the strange situation where an emergency medical drill in nearby Douglas County, on the outskirts of Aurora, that dealt with a gunman shooting up a movie theater, was being conducted during the actual shooting at the Batman movie in Aurora.
Oates, in remarks to the media after the massacre at the theater, immediately moved to quash rumors on the Internet. He also told CBS News Face the Nation: "All evidence we have, every single indicator is that it was all Mr. Holmes' activity and that he wasn't particularly aided by anyone else." Oates was discounting anything other than a "lone nut" theory behind the mass shooting.
The Aurora police also revealed they were mistaken when they first reported that the car Holmes allegedly drove to the theater to conduct his shooting spree had Tennessee license plates. The alleged shooter's father, Robert Holmes, worked in some capacity for the U.S. Navy Personnel Research and Development Center in San Diego in 1988. The elder Holmes wrote a technical report for the center and the work appeared to have spanned from 1988 to 1989. In 2000, the San Diego center moved to a remodeled new "lab space" at the Naval Support Activity in Millington, Tennessee, near Memphis. The center was re-named the Navy Personnel Research, Studies and Technology (NPRST) Department. The Millington center concentrates on behavioral and social sciences research and is funded mostly out of the Human Systems Department at the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Navy research branch that works closely with DARPA and the CIA. NPRST also has close working relationships with two universities, the University of Mephis and the University of Mississippi.
It has also been revealed that Holmes spoke at the Salk Institute at the age of 18 on temporal illusions. Holmes explains that a temporal illusion is an illusion that allows one to change the past. One of slides shows the name of Terrence Sejnowski, Terrence Sejnowski, the Francis Crick Professor at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies and the director of the Computational Neurobiology Laboratory. In 2008, Sejnowski wrote that since early brain research conducted by the RAND Corporation in 1980, "we now know a lot about the brain, perhaps more than we need to know." In 2001, Sejnowski worked with the CIA to develop a facial recognition and analysis system to detect whether someone is lying. Three files of Sejnowski's research papers are located in Box 58 at the System Development Foundation (SDF) in Palo Alto, California. SDF has a rather complex and mysterious origin is said to have been created "in the 1950s" as a not-for-profit entity. SDF has an archival depository relationship with the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica.
RAND and Stanford Research Institute, two of the CIA's top west coast research centers, were involved in temporal illusion research throughout the 1970s and 80s. The CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency projects had various code-names, including GRILL FLAME and STAR GATE. All dealt with remote viewing, and WMR learned from a recent participant in the same program, now under the supervision of the National Security Agency (NSA) in Fort Meade, Maryland, has dealt on numerous occasions with temporal remote viewing, i.e., remote viewing of past and future events. The NSA program involves Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and the Monroe Institute in Faber, Virginia, according to the NSA source.
|Holmes's shrink's government connections|
|July 31-August 1, 2012 -- Holmes's shrink's government connections
WMR previously reported on the connections between accused Aurora movie theater shooter James Holmes and U.S. government-funded neuroscience research programs at the Anschutz Medical Campus at the University of Colorado and at the Salk Institute in La Jolla, California, in addition to his father's research work on neural networks for the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA). It has now emerged that James Holmes's psychiatrist, Dr. Lynne Fenton, worked as a psychiatrist for the U.S. Air Force.
Aurora police seized a notebook, containing drawings of stick figures opening fire with weapons, that Holmes mailed to Fenton before he allegedly carried out the massacre of the theater audience at a screening of the Batman movie "The Dark Knight Rises." Holmes's defense attorneys are trying to obtain the notebook, which legal experts claim is privileged information between Fenton and Holmes, who was under her care during the time leading up to the shooting spree that killed 12 and wounded more than 58 others.
Fenton officially practiced Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation in Denver but she has specialized in the study of schizophrenia. Fenton has served as the Director of Student Mental Health Services at the Anschutz campus since 2008. Holmes was one of six students to receive a National Institutes of Health grant for neuroscience research at Anschutz, a program he suddenly withdrew from in May.
Fenton is a graduate of the Chicago Medical School in 1986 and did her residency at Northwestern University in 1990. Northwestern's Department of Biomedical Engineering receives government funding to conduct research into neural engineering and rehabilitation, including restoration of human function, for example, neuroprosthetics, novel motor system therapies for stroke victims and assistive technologies for victims of neuropathologies, bio-inspired technologies for robotics, such as artificial sensor arrays, locomotion systems, sensory-feedback control algorithms. The former Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, whose facilities Anschutz now occupies, specialized in neuroprosthetics for veterans who lost limbs in combat.
In May, before he dropped out of his NIH-funded program at Anschutz, Holmes presented a paper on Micro DNA Biomarkers in a class on the Biological Basis of Psychiatric and Neurological Disorders.
The Salk Institute, where Holmes, an an intern, worked on temporal illusion projects, is part of the University of California at San Diego. The San Diego campus also hosts the Neural Engineering and Theoretical Neuroscience Laboratory and the Retina Engineering Center of the Department of Bioengineering at the Jacobs School of Engineering, which has a program funded by the U.S. Army Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center (TATRC), headquartered at Fort Detrick, Maryland, the home to a number of highly classified military medical research projects, incluidng weaponized anthrax research. One of the lab's projects is the design of retinal implants to replace damaged photoreceptors in the eye by detecting light and properly stimulating neurons in the retina or, simply stated, a technology that would allow the blind to see.
Fenton was also the chief of physical medicine for the Wilford Hall U.S. Air Force Medical Center at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, from 1990 to 1993.
On April 16, 2003, Air Force Colonel Philip Shue, a psychiatrist at the Air Force Medical Center, kissed his wife good-bye before driving to work. On his way to work, Shue was killed instantly in a crash in which the driver's side was severely impacted. The Air Force, local, and state police determined that Shue committed suicide. End of story? Not quite.
Shue's t-shirt was ripped open from his chest to his navel, with a six-inch vertical incision in his chest. Oddly, Shue's nipples had been removed. Shue's wrists were wrapped in duct tape. Investigators determined that Shue had suffered a psychological breakdown before mutilating himself and then committing suicide. A Kendall County grand jury later concluded that no foul play was involved in Shue's death and no crime was committed.
Noted pathologist Dr. Cyril Wecht, who investigated the assassination of John F. Kennedy -- determining there was more than one assassin -- and other high-profile deaths, concluded that there was no way that Shue could have mutilated himself and that Shue fell victim to torture and homicide. A trial over payment of Shue's USAA life insurance policy did result from the death but the presiding judge changed the cause of Shue's death from suicide to homicide although he ruled in a "take nothing" decision that USAA was not liable in paying out Shue's life insurance claim to Shue's first wife. Nevertheless, the Kendall County Sheriff's office refused to re-open the case as a homicide. And, like the trial of James Holmes in Aurora, the judge ruled that cameras were not permitted in the court room during the Shue trial. Subsequently, in a politically-motivated prosecution by the Bush administration, Wecht faced 84 criminal counts of misuse of his public office as Allegheny County medical examiner, including alleged misuse of an Allegheny County fax machine. In 2009, the Bush-appointed U.S. Attorney in Pittsburgh dismissed all charges against Wecht. However, the case left Wecht $8 million in debt.
Shue's murder, deemed a "suicide" by authorities, fits a familiar pattern of the government eliminating witnesses to illegal activities and gross misconduct. Although Fenton preceded Shue by ten years at the Lackland psychiatric department, Shue's suspicious death is an indication that he may have become aware of unethical activities at the medical center. Shue had also announced his decision to retire from the Air Force shortly before his death.
In 2005, Fenton received a reprimand from the Colorado medical board for prescribing Vicodin, Xanax, Lorazepam, and Ambien to her husband, her employee, and herself.
= go to NFU page
|June 3, 2003,
according to a Harris Poll, 35 percent of Americans believed that weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) had been found in Iraq, while 10 percent were not
sure; in October, 30 percent were still persuaded, although six months of
searching had failed to uncover any such weapons. How could so many have
been convinced in the face of the total absence of evidence? Selected
comments from New York Times reporter Judith Miller's dispatches from
December 2001 through June 2003 provide part of the answer. 
Miller, with a special knack for writing what the Pentagon liked to read, was the sole reporter embedded with the 75th Exploitation Task Force, which operated Mobile Exploitation Teams (MET Alpha, MET Bravo) hunting for WMD in Iraq. Her stories, which were widely reprinted or reported in other newspapers, on cable TV, and on talk radio, helped convey the impression to the nation that illicit weapons had been found in Iraq, supposedly validating the decision for war.
As she and others have explained, Ahmad Chalabi, an Iraqi expatriate, was the source of much of her information; some of the time she credited him directly.  She had mentioned him much earlier: In an interview in 1998, shortly after Operation Desert Fox (four nights in which the United States and Britain bombed numerous targets in Iraq), she said that Chalabi told her he had been given only "a few hours' notice" of the impending attack. 
On December 20, 2001, she wrote at length about Iraqi defector Adnan Ihsan Saeed Al Haideri (made available by Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress) who "personally worked on renovations of secret facilities for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. . . . [His] account gives new clues about the types and possible location of illegal laboratories, facilities, and storage sites." As Knight-Ridder's Jonathan Landay noted on May 18, 2004, this article was published three days after CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency officers rejected the defector's account as "unreliable" on the basis of a failed lie detector test. Miller admitted, "There was no means to independently verify Haideri's allegations."
On September 18, 2002, Miller's piece on the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) cast doubt on its ability to uncover Iraqi WMD. She quoted David Kay as believing that U.N. inspectors were on a "mission impossible." "They are weaker" than an earlier inspection team, according to former inspector Richard Spertzel. Inspectors claimed that Hans Blix, UNMOVIC head and the chief chemical and biological weapons inspector, "had eliminated many of the more aggressive inspectors from his organization."
Emphasizing the flaws of the new inspection regime, its inability to detect "cheating," and predicting its failure to find WMD was central to the Bush administration's marginalization of Hans Blix; it also supported the administration's argument that it needed to move beyond diplomacy to assure Iraqi compliance.
On November 12, 2002, Miller highlighted the preparation for, and likelihood of, Iraqi use of poison gas. "Iraq has ordered large quantities of a drug that can be used to counter the effects of nerve gas," she wrote. According to administration officials, "'If the Iraqis were going to use nerve agent, they would want to take [such] steps to protect their own soldiers.'"
On December 3, the threat was biowarfare: "Iraq obtained a particularly virulent strain of smallpox from a Russian scientist," she wrote, citing an unnamed informant.
Nine weeks before the attack on Iraq, on January 12, 2003, Miller described the war to come. "President [George] Bush told Iraqi opposition figures on Friday that he favored . . . a short military occupation after Saddam Hussein is out of power. . . . The dissidents assured him that [American soldiers] would be greeted with 'sweets and flowers.'" Referring to an opposition meeting to be held in northern Iraq, she quoted Ahmad Chalabi: "This will be an in-your-face-Saddam gathering."
On January 24, Miller alluded again to the impotence of the international inspection regime, and the usefulness of Chalabi's defectors. Because international inspectors were unlikely to find evidence that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction, she said, the Bush administration was preparing its own assessment that would rely heavily on Iraqi defectors. Some of the most valuable information came from a contractor who fled Iraq in 2001, she wrote. This informant, Haideri, whom Miller had discussed at length on December 20, claimed "that chemical and biological weapons laboratories were hidden beneath hospitals and inside presidential palaces." (As Landay pointed out in May 2004, when taken back to Iraq in early 2004 by the Iraq Survey Group, Haideri was unable "to identify a single site associated with illegal weapons.")
Miller added that the White House asked that the information from the defectors be used as "part of a 'bill of particulars'" to convince skeptical allies and the American public that Iraq's behavior warranted military action. The bill of particulars "may be incorporated into President Bush's State of the Union address."
Reporting on an interview with Hans Blix on January 30, 2003, she noted his contradiction of Secretary of State Colin Powell's claim that the inspectors "had found that Iraqi officials were hiding and moving illicit materials. . . . He had seen no persuasive indications of Iraqi ties to Al Qaeda. . . . [Blix] challenged President Bush's argument that military action is needed. . . . Scores of samples his team had taken across Iraq had turned up 'no trace' of chemical or biological agents."
Miller and co-author Julia Preston concluded, however, that Blix's report to the United Nations was less important for its failure to find evidence of WMD than for its "key" finding that Iraq had not provided "wholehearted" cooperation.
Reports from the search team?
Miller's first report as an "embed" (specifically assigned to travel with MET Alpha) came from Kuwait on March 19, the day before the war began. The administration has deployed mobile labs to help in the search for WMD, she wrote. "The discovery of such arms, officials said, would vindicate the administration's decision to go to war."
Five days later, on March 24, Miller depicted the mission of the search teams as the collection and analysis of samples "intended to prove to the court of world opinion . . . that Saddam Hussein, as President Bush alleges, has been hiding unconventional weapons." Still in Kuwait on March 27, she described an ammunition storage facility south of Baghdad that "remained suspicious" because chemical or germ weapons might have been made or stored there, although none were found. A senior Iraqi official said that there were "special bunkers"; a team found a biological hazard sign; experts found Soviet-style gas masks.
A few days later, a military inspection team returned to Kuwait from "its first foray" into southern Iraq having found "tons of [conventional] weapons" but "no trace of chemical or biological weapons." The experts "were not surprised," she wrote on April 2, because most of the WMD facilities are "closer to Baghdad."
By April 4, two weeks into the war, the headline was "A Nation at War: Illicit Arms." The text: "The United States has searched fewer than a dozen of several hundred sites. . . . Few, if any, have been sites at the top of the American list."
But now the war's purpose was beginning to change. On the second day of the war, Rumsfeld listed finding Iraq's WMD as second only to the goal of toppling Saddam, Miller wrote.
A week later, capturing "'terrorists sheltered in Iraq'" and collecting "'intelligence on terrorist networks'" topped Rumsfeld's list before the goal of securing Iraq's supposed WMD. Meanwhile, Miller was still in Kuwait. On April 4 she told CNN's American Morning host Bill Hemmer, "The key to this whole venture is really Iraqi scientists."
Finally, on April 10, Miller reached southern Iraq. At a suspect site, "sensors registered the presence of chemical agents. . . . The agricultural site was first reported as suspicious on April 6 after soldiers became nauseated and noticed welts on their hands. . . . The Iraqis had gone to great lengths to hide 11 or so 20-gallon drums . . . of a thin clear liquid." The liquid in the barrels turned out to be an organophosphate, used in pesticides, "though a sophisticated detector showed the presence of a nerve agent."
The next day, Miller reported that in Karbala a team of military experts began examining a cache of "sophisticated equipment" buried at an ammunition plant. "Much of the equipment could be used for multiple purposes, some peaceful, some not," she wrote of the experts' evaluations. But it was unclear if the equipment was intended for use in any weapons program, she added. A few days later, on April 16, she reported that the team had discovered "some suspicious items" but no "'smoking gun.'" "The team found radioactive material . . . and 'dual use' biological equipment that could be used for peaceful or military purposes," she wrote. Chief Warrant Officer Richard Gonzales remained optimistic: "'We are not going to find just a smoking gun, but a smoking cannon. . . . It's only a matter of time.'"
Then, on April 21, south of Baghdad, Miller's "Eureka!" moment arrived. An Iraqi scientist (whom, she admitted, she had not been allowed to interview) claimed that "Iraq destroyed chemical weapons and biological warfare equipment only days before the war began. . . . [He] led Americans to a supply of material that proved to be the building blocks of illegal weapons." According to Miller's report, Iraq had secretly sent unconventional weapons and technology to Syria, and it was now cooperating with Al Qaeda.
"The discovery of the buried material, the most important discovery to date . . . supports the Bush administration's charges that Iraq continued to develop weapons and lied to the United Nations." It also provided an explanation for why U.S. forces had not yet turned up banned weapons in Iraq. 
But by Miller's next dispatch on April 23, the object of the exercise had suddenly shifted. According to a member of the search team, "We've had a conceptual jump. . . . We must look at the infrastructure, not just for the weapons."
"The truth is not perishable," Maj. Gen. David Petraeus told her, "but timeliness is important."
Miller's first dispatch from Baghdad, published on April 24, dutifully reported what unnamed sources had told her, not what she had seen. "American-led forces have occupied a vast warehouse complex in Baghdad filled with chemicals where Iraqi scientists are suspected of having tested unconventional agents. . . . [Officials described] it as filled with broken parts and remnants of equipment consistent with a full-scale laboratory. This reporter was not permitted to visit the warehouse." Officials believed the information seemed to provide corroboration to accounts that Saddam Hussein continued expanding his weapons programs while claiming to have dismantled them, Miller wrote.
Three days later, on April 27, her account featured Nissar Hindawi, "a leading figure in Iraq's biological warfare program in the 1980s," who claimed Iraq had "'produced huge quantities'" of liquid anthrax and botulinum toxin. This informant had left the program in 1989, before the first Gulf War, and was described as "now in the protective custody of the Iraqi opposition leader Ahmad Chalabi."
Grasping at straws
By April 28, there seemed to be a note of irritation in Miller's reporting. "There are no chemical weapons at a site where American troops said they had found chemical agents and mobile labs." Repeatedly, early reports of discoveries "come to naught." The elaborate system created by Pentagon planners "has not worked out," she wrote.
On May 3, Miller reported that radioactive materials had been detected at a nuclear research facility. "What was found at Tuwaitha was the 'largest amount of radiological materials that has been found at a nuclear site in Iraq.' . . . [It] was consistent with industrial or research use . . . looters may have taken anthrax samples."
Two days later, on May 5, Miller reported that a biologist, Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, who had worked in Iraq's suspected biological warfare program, had "generated considerable excitement among weapons inspectors here in Iraq. . . . A mission was begun today to survey a mysterious white powder." The following day, she wrote that a "top-secret intelligence memo [was] found in a room" in secret police headquarters. The memo described an offer by a "holy warrior" to sell uranium and other nuclear material to Iraq--presumably lending support to Powell-Bush claims that Iraq had attempted to buy yellowcake from Niger, a claim later proved to be derived from clumsily forged documents. The search began when 16 soldiers "teamed up" with members of the Iraqi National Congress, headed by Ahmad Chalabi.
On May 8, Miller provided cover for Powell's description of Iraqi mobile bioweapons laboratories, which he had offered in a speech to the United Nations in February 2003. "A joint British-American team of experts had concluded that a tractor-trailer truck found in northern Iraq several weeks ago could be a mobile biological weapons lab," Miller wrote. A defector said it was for the production of biological agents. "The discovery would support the Bush administration's claims that Iraq continued to pursue weapons of mass destruction." The labs had been "designed" to produce germ warfare agents, she wrote. "American forces had collected much 'documentary evidence' that 'suggests there was an active program' for weapons of mass destruction."
On May 9, Miller reported: "A team returned today to Iraqi secret police headquarters [where the supposed offer to sell uranium had been found] . . . to find that someone had been picking through the basement. . . . Members of the Iraqi National Congress, led by Ahmad Chalabi, managed to secure the equipment." Outside the building, intelligence analysts found a section of a manual about administration plans to defend Americans against unconventional attacks. The material had been faxed from Iraq's United Nations office in New York, Miller wrote.
Two days later, the tractor-trailer had become a "smoking gun." Miller wrote that experts had concluded that "a trailer found near Mosul in northern Iraq in April is a mobile biological weapons laboratory . . . [although] some experts were still uncertain. . . . There might be as many as eight mobile labs in Iraq," a clear violation of United Nations sanctions, she wrote. This was just "the kind of 'smoking gun' . . . to substantiate the Bush administration's allegations." The configuration of the trailer was similar to the lab described by Secretary Powell in his speech to the United Nations in February, Miller wrote.
On May 12, Miller's last dispatch from Iraq recorded the discovery of "the strongest source of radiation found so far in Iraq, at a long-abandoned test range near Amiriya. . . . [The material] could be used to make 'dirty bombs.'"
A different story
During the period from March 18 to May 12 (when Miller was embedded), "unilateral" or non-embedded reporters conveyed a flavor somewhat at variance with hers. The Washington Post's Barton Gellman wrote a series of dispatches during this period. An early headline on March 30 read: "Special Search Operations Yield No Banned Weapons." His copy read, "U.S. forces have tested 10 of their best intelligence leads . . . [and] 'all the searches have turned up negative.'" On April 5, a Gellman report was headlined: "Suspicious Sites Provide No Proof Yet." He reported that components found there struck experts as ambiguous at best. Two days later, Gellman and co-author Rich Atkinson wrote: "The U.S. Army said today it had tentatively identified nerve and other chemical agents." But several suspect discoveries have proved to be false alarms, they added. On April 22, in "Hunt for Iraqi Arms Erodes Assumptions," Gellman reported that analysts were increasingly doubtful.
On May 10, Gellman reported that what had happened to uranium stores or other chemicals was unclear. "Seven nuclear facilities in Iraq have been damaged or effectively destroyed by looting," he wrote. The next day, the headline on his article read: "Frustrated, U.S. Arms Team to Leave Iraq. Task Force Unable to Find Any Weapons." "Erroneous intelligence and poor site security--dealt the severest blows to the hunt," inspectors told Gellman.
Back in New York, on May 21, little more than a week following the Gellman headline "Unable to Find Any Weapons," Miller and William J. Broad co-authored a report claiming that Iraqi germ-weapons production units had been discovered. "United States intelligence agencies have concluded that two mysterious trailers found in Iraq were mobile units to produce germs for weapons," Miller and Broad wrote. The "judgment would support some of the evidence that Secretary Powell presented on February 5 to the United Nations . . . a centerpiece of their argument that Iraq had a well-concealed germ weapons program." They added, though, that Iraqi scientists insisted the units were merely "mobile plants to make hydrogen for filling weather balloons."
Two and a half weeks later, on June 7, Miller and Broad reported that their "smoking guns" had gone up in smoke. "American and British intelligence analysts with direct access to the evidence are disputing claims that the mysterious trailers found in Iraq were for making deadly germs. . . . [The analysts said] the mobile units were more likely intended for other purposes and charged that the evaluation process had been damaged by a rush to judgment."
At long last, the Times inserted a footnote to this piece, revealing that Miller's "agreement with the Pentagon, for an 'embedded' assignment, allowed the military to review her copy. . . . [But] no changes were made in the review." The last sentence is ambiguous: The June 7 article was itself a lengthy review of the issue. Did the editors mean that the review was unchanged? Or that none of Miller's numerous reports had been altered by military censors? On April 21, readers were told that the dispatch was held up for three days and then "submitted for a check by military officials." "Those officials asked that details of what chemicals were uncovered be deleted," wrote Miller. Are readers to understand that a deletion is not a change?
Over time, Miller's reporting from Iraq attracted increasing attention. On April 21, Jack Shafer of Slate.com accused her and the Times of shortchanging readers by neglecting to detail the terms of censorship--or "accreditation to report" as Miller called it--that they had accepted. Nevertheless, Shafer credited her with a scoop for her report on the Iraqi scientist who witnessed the Iraqi destruction of WMD.
But the scoop, which was never verified, was described by one of Shafer's e-mail respondents as "unsubstantiated hearsay, speculation; possibly completely made up." Shafer, in a July 25 piece titled "The Times Scoops That Melted," suggested that the executive editor of the Times should launch an investigation: Had Miller "grown too close to her sources to be trusted . . . or to recant?"
The identical suggestion--that the Times undertake a critical review of its WMD reporting--was made a month later in Editor and Publisher.  The Times eventually did.
On May 13, the World Socialist Web site (wsws.org) posted a long piece characterizing Miller's April 21 story on the Iraqi scientist as "seemingly a stunning vindication of the Pentagon and the Bush administration." Yet, as author Bill Vann pointed out, Miller's only source "was the U.S. military," and she had done nothing to verify the claims she repeated. Vann suggested that Miller's listing as a speaker for the Middle East Forum, a right-wing lobbying group, could be a violation of Times ethics guidelines, which barred reporters from participating in groups that seek to shape public policy.
Soon after, Howard Kurtz of the Washington Post reported on a conflict within the Times staff. Quoting an irate e-mail from Baghdad bureau chief John Burns concerning a Chalabi story that he had assigned to another reporter, Kurtz included some of Miller's response, shedding even more light on how dubious her sources might have been: "I've been covering Chalabi for about 10 years. . . . He has provided most of the front page exclusives on WMD to our paper." More troubling still, it turned out, the army unit in which she was embedded was "using Chalabi's Intel and document network for its own WMD work." 
By early June 2003, according to Barton Gellman of the Washington Post, it became apparent that Task Force 20, a covert army Special Forces unit drawn from Delta Force, had been performing a major role in the search for Iraqi WMD. It was able to work more rapidly, with better communication, more Arab linguists, less chance for site-looting, strong detector technology, and full-time access to more technologically advanced helicopters. Members of Task Force 20 frequently reached sites ahead of the military site survey team to which Miller was assigned. Nonetheless, they had come no closer to finding WMD than did Miller's unit, MET Alpha. 
Articles critical of Judith Miller's reporting appeared in rapid succession in the Columbia Journalism Review, the New York Observer, The Nation, on the Internet, and in the New York Post.  The Washington Post published a detailed account depicting Miller's use of her leverage as the Times representative to serve as "middleman" between MET Alpha and Chalabi. According to a senior staff officer, she had an enormous impact on the unit's mission, "'and not for the better.'" "The unit was turned into what one official called a 'rogue operation.'" Miller's presence was "'detrimental'" and she "'was always issuing threats of going to the New York Times or to the Secretary of Defense.'"  A New York Times insider was quoted portraying her reporting as a "train wreck," adding, "she's considered an embarrassment." 
Miller's frustration at the final emptiness of the powerful, misleading rhetoric of her reports, as well as of the critical chorus, boiled over on July 20 in a report that she labeled "A Chronicle of Confusion in the U.S. Hunt for Hussein's Chemical and Germ Weapons." She found fault in everything but herself. "Chaos," she wrote, "disorganization, interagency feuds, disputes within and among various military units, and shortages of everything from gasoline to soap plagued the post-war search for . . . unconventional weapons. . . . The Bush administration used flawed intelligence" that "was often stunningly wrong."
"Promising sites were looted. . . . Special Forces alienated potential Iraqi sources. . . . The Pentagon [was] reluctant to make the mission an urgent priority. . . . The Pentagon initially erred in putting a field artillery brigade in charge. . . . Former inspectors from UNSCOM [the pre-1998 U.N. inspection unit], especially those who had interviewed Iraqis . . . should be involved." The task force had few analysts who knew Iraq or its weapons programs well, she wrote.
If readers were misled, it was all the fault of the U.S. military and surely Miller would share no blame. In this curiously indignant exercise, Miller both revealed and excused the limitations of her accounts.
Duty to readers?
On September 25, Miller reported that David Kay, head of the Iraqi Survey Group, had issued his interim report. "His team had not found any of the unconventional weapons cited by the Bush administration as a principal reason for going to war," she reported along with Douglas Jehl.
But the weapons had to be found. On October 2, Miller and co-author James Risen wrote: "The Bush administration is seeking more than $600 million from Congress to continue the hunt. . . . The total price tag for the search will approach $1 billion." And while the task force with which Judith Miller was embedded had worked out of an abandoned palace, "the Iraq Survey Group apparently spent its first weeks installing air-conditioned trailers, a new dining facility, state-of-the-art software, and even a sprinkler system for a new lawn." After three months' work by the new search team, no illegal weapons had been found, but the group had discovered some intent to develop such weapons, according to Kay.
William E. Jackson Jr. wrote three accounts of Miller's reporting that appeared on the Editor and Publisher Web site on July 2, September 23, and October 2. Jackson described Miller's reports as a "series of exaggerated stories" that merely endorsed the Bush administration's claims on WMD in Iraq. Miller, he concluded, had "crossed the line from that of reporter to that of a member of a team she referred to as 'my unit.'"
"There is the smell of compromised reporting," he wrote, "tainted Iraqi sources . . . surrendering detached judgment to the Pentagon." He was puzzled that a star reporter caught in highly misleading reporting on WMDs would be so protected from the consequences of her actions. After all, she was the "'drop' of choice for a politically motivated leaker."
Jackson added that military officials and journalists in Iraq believed Miller "had an exclusive deal with the Pentagon." And, he asked, did she "break credible hard news--or only flack for hawks in the government, an all-too-familiar role for her over the last two years?"
Other Jackson conclusions: "When her work is examined systematically, it is frequently found to be simply wrong on the facts." And "Miller is not a neutral, nor an objective journalist." Or as Slate's Shafer suggested in his August 19 report "Judith Miller: Duped?" Miller had swallowed the claims of unreliable Iraqi defectors, and the Times had given them great prominence.
A detailed analysis in the August/September 2003 American Journalism Review summarized many of the Miller articles and quoted Miller deriding the complaints about her stories as "sour grapes."
In February 2004, Michael Massing wrote a passionate evocation of the media's failure to record the doubts of many informed sources about the evidence of WMD before the war. Journalists like Judith Miller, he wrote, "were far too reliant on sources sympathetic to the administration." In an interview, Miller had said, "My job is to tell readers of the New York Times what the government thought about Iraq's arsenal." Massing suggested that it was also a journalistic function to evaluate official claims. While his focus was primarily on the pre-war period, he alluded to some of the criticism of Miller's depiction of the search for WMD during the war. 
It seems apparent that Miller was well-positioned to view an inept search by inexperienced members of the armed forces who were poorly trained, poorly equipped, and ill served in the chase by uncertain and inaccurate intelligence. Instead of relaying that message, she filled her days with "suspicions" rather than facts, chattered repeatedly about MET Alpha and MET Bravo units, and made it clear that spectacular discoveries of illicit weapons would soon be achieved. The "smoking gun" was always about to be uncovered.
Miller's early enthusiasm for the search was stimulated by her unusual access to Chalabi's various "defectors" and "informants," allowing her to weave a fabric full of rhetorical triumphs of exaggeration, while protecting her integrity by the high art of attribution to sources unknown.  Of her best-known source, Chalabi, it has recently been stressed that "officials warned in May 2002 that some of the information might be unreliable or fabricated." A favorite of pro-war Pentagon officials, he is "deeply distrusted by many rank-and-file professionals in the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and State Department." 
One analysis of the information furnished to Miller by defectors concluded that it "proved ultimately useless."  A second summarized the discrediting of Miller's source and story on aluminum tubes for centrifuges for a new "nuclear weapons program" in Iraq.  The Defense Intelligence Agency had already concluded that "much of the information it received from Iraqi defectors, including information provided by the Iraqi National Congress [Chalabi's group], was of little or no use."  (In the last few months, Chalabi, a member of the American-appointed Iraq Governing Council, has come under increasing criticism for his ties to the Iranian government and possible misuse of U.S. government financial support.)
The Times ultimately agreed that some of its reports had depended too heavily on information from Iraqi defectors and specifically named Chalabi in a May 26 "editors' note" in which it acknowledged its faults. "Looking back, we wish we had been more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence emerged--or failed to emerge. . . . Editors at several levels . . . should have been challenging reporters and pressing for more skepticism," the note read.
No accountability--not then, not now
As Vice President Dick Cheney candidly admitted during the first Gulf War, when he served as defense secretary, "I do not look on the press as an asset. Frankly, I looked on it as a problem to be managed."  During the second Gulf conflict, more than 600 reporters were "managed" as "embeds," agreeing to sign contracts with the military limiting when and what they could report. Each was able to provide a small slice of the war almost instantaneously; access was good, and the general feeling was that it worked well for both sides.  But were they able to draw the line between propaganda and journalism?
Or did the 2,100 "unilaterals"--independent reporters whose movements were relatively unrestricted--provide more objective, accurate dispatches? The analysis that would answer this question has not been performed. What seems clear is that if the war had extended well beyond three weeks, with greater casualties among the troops and the embeds, there might have been a significant clash between the need for accurate reporting and the Pentagon's public relations goals.
On January 29, 2004, David Kay, in his final appraisal, told the Senate that "we were all wrong," and that the Iraq Survey Group had found no WMD in Iraq. His conclusion makes it all the clearer how unconfirmed reports helped to justify a "preemptive" war, seemed to document intelligence that, in the words of David Kay, was "wrong," and served to support a false assertion of a grave threat to the United States.
When Kay resigned, the administration quickly replaced him with Charles Duelfer, who redefined the mission. "In its simplest terms," he told Congress on March 30, 2004, "my strategy is to determine the regime's intentions."
In her preference for hyperbole over dispassionate reporting, Miller made a choice. It was not that she created the news she reported, but rather that she evoked a tone and urgency that were unwarranted by the fragility and self-interestedness of her sources. She was careful to include caveats, qualifiers, disclaimers, and occasional doubts as an index of balance. But justifying the war and confirming her pre-war claims appear to have been more important to her than serving the interests of her readers. And it is not a trivial issue if these motives were "at odds with [her] professional duties." 
Unfortunately, it is likely that Miller, who seems to have been unconcerned about even the appearance of conflict of interest, will continue to consider any allusions to her problematic reporting--as in the foregoing pages--unwarranted. "I'm very comfortable with all of my reporting and very proud of it," she has said.  She stands by her dispatches and her view that critical comments about them are "beat[ing] up on the messenger" who willingly relayed unverified government handouts without making independent checks or sometimes even issuing necessary retractions.  It is even more unfortunate that it took her editors so long to acknowledge their failure in the matter.
1. The words in quotations contained in Miller's articles were usually attributed to poorly identified sources such as: "senior Bush officials," "an official," "one official," "experts," "White House officials," "foreign scientists," "an informant whose identity has not been disclosed," "Iraqi participants," "dissidents," "Iraqi defectors," "Iraqi scientists," "intelligence officials," "British planners and experts," "an Iraqi general," "a site survey team," "the team leader," "an elite American team," "the team's chemical expert," "the exploitation team," "weapons experts," "the biological specialist," and so on. All of these and many other nameless sources fed a constant stream of information to Miller that frequently ended up on the front page or in the front section of the New York Times. On rare occasion she would describe a site or a discovery without attribution, presumably indicating she had observed it herself.
2. Howard Kurtz, "Intra-Times Battle Over Iraqi Weapons," Washington Post, May 26, 2003.
3. Interview with Diane Dimond, CNBC Upfront Tonight, December 29, 1998. Chalabi was considered the favorite Iraqi expatriate of the Pentagon and the administration.
4. Nine and a half months later, James Woolsey cited Miller's report to explain David Kay's failure to find WMD. There had been a "last minute cleaning up" (Wall Street Journal, Feb. 2, 2004). Woolsey had claimed in 2001 that the United States could equip an Iraqi opposition force to overthrow Saddam in a matter of months. "We would have to have some forces in . . . we will be very popular." Interview with Chris Matthews, CNBC, December 20, 2001.
5. William E. Jackson Jr., "Real NY Times Scandal: Hyping WMDs in Iraq," www.editor andpublisher.com, June 17, 2003.
6. Kurtz, "Intra-Times Battle."
7. Barton Gellman, "Covert Unit Hunted for Iraqi Arms; Amid Raids and Rescue, Task Force 20 Failed to Pinpoint Weapons," Washington Post, June 13, 2003.
8. John R. McArthur, "The Lies We Bought," Columbia Journalism Review, May/ June 2003; Sridhar Pappu, New York Observer, June 22, 2003; Russ Baker, "Scoops and Truth at the Times," The Nation, June 27, 2003; Steve Gilliard, "So, Judith Miller Works for the New York Times and Not D.O.D., Right?" Daily Kos, June 25, 2003; Keith J. Kelly, "Times Brass Puts Leash on Miller," New York Post, June 29, 2003.
9. Howard Kurtz, "Embedded Reporter's Role in Army Unit's Actions Questioned by Military," Washington Post, June 25, 2003.
10. Keith J. Kelly, "Times Brass Puts Leash on Miller," New York Post, June 29, 2003.
11. Michael Massing, "Now They Tell Us," New York Review of Books, Feb. 26, 2004, pp. 43-49.
12. Geneva Overholzer, ombudsman at the Washington Post, believes that one of the most important preventive measures against deception and fraud in the media would be "less frequent use of anonymous sources." PBS's News Hour, March 22, 2004.
13. Jonathan S. Landay, "Key Source on Iraqi Bioweapons Was Deemed Dubious," Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 6, 2004.
14. Jack Shafer, "Judith Miller: Duped?" Slate.com, August 29, 2003.
15. Massing, "Now They Tell Us."
16. James Risen, "Data from Iraqi Exiles Under Scrutiny," New York Times, Feb. 12, 2004.
17. Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson, Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq (Guilford, Connecticut: Lyons Press), p. XII.
18. Tiffany Ayers, "The War in Primetime," Military Officer, February 2004.
19. Judith Lichthenberg, "Truth, Neutrality, and Conflict of Interest," Business and Professional Ethics Journal, Spring-Summer, 1990, pp. 75-78. 20. Kelly, "Times Brass."21. Massing, "Now They Tell Us." Back to top ^
WMD: Weapons of Miller’s descriptions Spoon-fed information about Iraq's WMDs, New York Times reporter Judith Miller authored many stories later found to be misleading or downright false. By Herbert L. Abrams July/August 2004 pp. 56-64 (vol. 60, no. 04) © 2004 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Herbert L. Abrams is a member-in-residence at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. July/August 2004 pp. 56-64 (vol. 60, no. 04) © 2004 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
|lternative Media Center Quebec|
York Times; Wrangling Impedes Transfer Of Civilian
By JUDITH MILLER Published: August 20, 2004 Despite pledges two years ago to maintain a stockpile of drugs to protect Americans in the event of a bioterrorism attack, the federal government has so far set aside only 159 vials of anthrax vaccine for the civilian population enough for only 530 people, according to congressional and administration officials.
The officials said the failure to transfer more of the vaccine from military to civilian control was caused by legal and bureaucratic wrangling among government agencies. They also cited the government's desire to buy a new vaccine that is potentially both cheaper and more efficient. That vaccine has not yet been approved by the Food and Drug Administration.
Spokesmen for the Pentagon and the Department of Health and Human Services denied that the delay would imperil the well-being of civilians, saying that BioPort, the nation's sole producer of licensed anthrax vaccine, was storing nearly a million doses -- enough for more than 330,000 people.
''The bottom line is: if there is a civilian crisis that would require vaccination of the population, there is enough anthrax vaccine to do that,'' said Bill Pierce, a spokesman for the Department of Health and Human Services. ''It would just take a phone call to get that vaccine transferred from the Pentagon to the stockpile,'' he said, dismissing the delays to ''paperwork that will get done.''
But a spokesman for BioPort and Pentagon officials said that the doses being stored are intended for the military, which announced in June that it was expanding its anthrax and smallpox vaccination program. If those doses were used by civilians in an emergency, officials said, military vaccinations would have to be curtailed or scaled back.
Michael Zamiara, the chief financial officer of BioPort, in Lansing, Mich., said the military had first call on its vaccine. ''We must run a business,'' he said. While the Department of Health and Human Services had indicated it wanted the vaccine for the civilian stockpile, he said, the agency had yet to ''pay us for it, or tell us how much it wants to buy.''
Officials also said that the Bush administration had not implemented an interagency agreement signed last April, a copy of which was provided to The Times, in which the Pentagon agreed to provide at least two million doses of anthrax vaccine to the civilian stockpile by the end of this fiscal year, or Sept. 30.
''It is a shocking lack of preparedness to have only 159 vials set aside for civilian use when we know that Al Qaeda would not hesitate to launch an anthrax attack against the United States,'' said Rep. Jim Turner, Democrat of Texas, the ranking member of the House select committee on homeland security, which has been investigating the state of the nation's strategic stockpiles.
Jerome Hauer, a former assistant secretary with the Department of Health and Human Services in the Bush administration, said the months of infighting over such issues as who would indemnify BioPort for its vaccine reflected a lack of priority on biodefense. ''We now have bureaucrats and lawyers running bioterrorism preparedness,'' said Mr. Hauer, who heads a biodefense center at George Washington University.
The vaccine issue has been complicated by Congress's recent transfer of control of the civilian stockpile from the Department of Homeland Security back to the Department of Health and Human Services. Many scientists at the health agency favor a new recombinant vaccine that may require fewer shots and be faster to make.
|Summary of evidence laid out by prosecutors|
| Summary of evidence prosecutors laid out against
suspected anthrax killer The Associated Press AP
News Aug 07, 2008 06:37 EST
Summary of evidence against suspected anthrax killer Bruce Ivins, as outlined by Jeffrey Taylor, the U.S. attorney in Washington:
_Investigators identified in early 2005 that the anthrax used in the mailings came from a single flask of spores known as RMR-1029. Ivins created and solely maintained it. Investigators ruled out others who could have accessed the flask, but they could not rule out Ivins.
_Ivins was one of the few scientists who could create spores of "the concentration and purity used in the attacks."
_In the days before the mailings, Ivins worked off-hours, alone at night and on the weekend, in the lab where the anthrax spores and production equipment were stored. He previously had not often done so. He could not adequately explain his reasons for being there.
_Ivins behaved in a way and said things that suggested "consciousness of guilt." He also submitted a questionable sample of anthrax to the FBI and attempted to divert attention away from himself.
_Ivins had a history of mental health problems and was having a hard time professionally in the summer and fall of 2001, "because an anthrax vaccine he was working on was failing."
_Ivins had frequently driven to other places to send packages in the mail under other names to disguise his identity.
_Ivins was a "prolific writer" to Congress and the media, which were targeted in the attacks. Authorities found 68 letters to these entities in a search of his house on Nov. 1, 2007.
_An e-mail written by Ivins used language similar to that of one of the anthrax letters.
_The envelopes used in the mailings were "very likely" sold in 2001 at a post office in the Frederick, Md.-area. Ivins had a post office box in Frederick from which the type of envelopes with print defects were sold.
_Federal authorities interviewed Ivins several times and found his statements were "inconsistent over time and failed to explain the evidence against him."
Source: AP News
|Wikipedia Judith Miller (born January 2, 1948), is an American journalist. Miller, based in Washington D.C., was a prominent New York Times reporter with access to top U.S. government officials. Her coverage of these officials, especially regarding the Bush administration’s conclusions about Iraq’s alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Program and her involvement in the Plame Affair, made her a conspicuous media personality. The work that Miller and Michael Gordon did in presenting the case for WMDs has been proven false. The New York Times apologized publicly for their poor reporting. Ms. Miller lost her job over these reporting blunders though Mr. Gordon has remained a reporter for the New York Times. Miller announced her "retirement" from The New York Times on November 9, 2005. ... In July of 2005, Miller was jailed for contempt of court for refusing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating a leak naming Valerie Plame as a covert CIA agent. Miller did not write about Plame, but was reportedly in possession of evidence relevant to the leak investigation. According to a subpoena, Miller met with an unnamed government official — later revealed to be I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff—on July 8, 2003, two days after former ambassador Joseph Wilson published an Op-Ed in the Times criticizing the Bush administration for "twisting" intelligence to justify war in Iraq. (Plame's CIA identity was revealed in a column by conservative political commentator Robert Novak on July 14, 2003.)|
|Senator Grassley, Eighteen Questions|
stats send comments to email@example.com test dishonor role
Weapons quality Anthrax mailed to lib politicians and the media, rattled the nation just days after 9/11
REVIEW – Anthrax Attacks
BioPort was in major financial distress