IIA page 1,  page 2,  page 3

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 IIa  110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008.  source tw3k

Washington, DC -- The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV, and a bipartisan majority of the Committee (10-5), today unveiled the final two sections of its Phase II report on prewar intelligence. The first report details Administration prewar statements that, on numerous occasions, misrepresented the intelligence and the threat from Iraq. The second report details inappropriate, sensitive intelligence activities conducted by the DoD’s Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, without the knowledge of the Intelligence Community or the State Department.

“Before taking the country to war, this Administration owed it to the American people to give them a 100 percent accurate picture of the threat we faced. Unfortunately, our Committee has concluded that the Administration made significant claims that were not supported by the intelligence,” Rockefeller said. “In making the case for war, the Administration repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was unsubstantiated, contradicted, or even non-existent. As a result, the American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed.”

John D. Rockefeller

“It is my belief that the Bush Administration was fixated on Iraq, and used the 9/11 attacks by al Qa’ida as justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. To accomplish this, top Administration officials made repeated statements that falsely linked Iraq and al Qa’ida as a single threat and insinuated that Iraq played a role in 9/11. Sadly, the Bush Administration led the nation into war under false pretenses.

report continued below

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report continued:

“There is no question we all relied on flawed intelligence. But, there is a fundamental difference between relying on incorrect intelligence and deliberately painting a picture to the American people that you know is not fully accurate.

“These reports represent the final chapter in our oversight of prewar intelligence. They complete the story of mistakes and failures – both by the Intelligence Community and the Administration – in the lead up to the war. Fundamentally, these reports are about transparency and holding our government accountable, and making sure these mistakes never happen again,” Rockefeller added.

The Committee’s report cites several conclusions in which the Administration’s public statements were NOT supported by the intelligence. They include:

Ø Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence.

Ø Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information.

Ø Statements by President Bush and Vice President Cheney regarding the postwar situation in Iraq, in terms of the political, security, and economic, did not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products.

Ø Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing.

Ø The Secretary of Defense’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes because they were underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available intelligence information.

Ø The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001 as the Vice President repeatedly claimed.

Additionally, the Committee issued a report on the Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The report found that the clandestine meetings between Pentagon officials and Iranians in Rome and Paris were inappropriate and mishandled from beginning to end. Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz failed to keep the Intelligence Community and the State Department appropriately informed about the meetings. The involvement of Manucher Ghobanifer and Michael Ledeen in the meetings was inappropriate. Potentially important information collected during the meetings was withheld from intelligence agencies by Pentagon officials. Finally, senior Defense Department officials cut short internal investigations of the meetings and failed to implement the recommendations of their own counterintelligence experts.

Today’s reports are the culmination of efforts that began in March 2003, when, as Vice Chairman, Senator Rockefeller initially requested an investigation into the origin of the fraudulent Niger documents. In June 2003, he was joined by all Democrats on the Committee in pushing for a full investigation into prewar intelligence, which was eventually expanded by the Committee in February 2004 to include the five phase II tasks.

The Committee released its first report on July 9, 2004, which focused primarily on the Intelligence Community’s prewar assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and links to terrorism. Those findings helped lay the foundation for some of the intelligence reforms enacted into law in late 2004.

In September 2006, the Committee completed and publicly released two sections of Phase II: The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress; and Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments.

In May 2007, the Committee released the third section of Phase II: Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq.

Separately, in early 2007, the Pentagon Inspector General released its own report on the intelligence activities conducted by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and also concluded that those activities were inappropriate

Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of June __, 2008 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, United States Senate 110TH Congress 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN; CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN;  DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA;  JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA RON WYDEN, OREGON CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA;  EVAN BAYH, INDIANA;  SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND; ORRIN HATCH, UTAH; RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN; OLYMPIA SNOWE, MAINE; SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND; RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA; HARRY REID, NEVADA;

EX OFFICIO MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY; EX OFFICIO CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN; EX OFFICIO JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO

Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information 

I. Scope and Methodology 

(U) This report’s scope, as agreed to unanimously by the Committee on February 12, 2004, is to assess "whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information. 

(U) In order to complete this task, the Committee decided to concentrate its analysis on the statements that were central to the nation’s decision to go to war. Specifically, the Committee chose to review five major policy speeches by key Administration officials regarding the threats posed by Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraqi ties to terrorist groups, and possible consequences of a US invasion of Iraq. These include: 

• Vice President Richard Cheney, Speech in Tennessee to the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention, August 26, 2002
• President George W. Bush, Statement before the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002.3 
•  President George W. Bush, Speech in Cincinnati, October 7, 2002.4 • 
• President George W. Bush, State of the Union address, January 28, 2003.5 • 
• Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003.

(U) These speeches are the best representations of how the Bush Administration communicated intelligence analysis to the Congress, the American people, and the international community. They are also fairly comprehensive in scope, so evaluations about whether a particular statement in a speech was substantiated can be extrapolated to cover similar statements made at similar times. The Committee believes that these speeches would have been subject to careful review inside the White House and most were also reviewed by the intelligence community. (The drafting processes for the Secretary of State’s speech to the Security Council, and portions of the 1 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Press Release, "Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller Issue Statement on Intelligence Committee’s Review of Pre-War Intelligence in Iraq," February 12, 2004. 

• Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html, link last visited March 21, 2008. 3 
• Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html, link last visited March 21, 2008. 
• Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html, link last visited March 21, 2008. 
• Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html, link last visited March 2 1 , 2008.
• Transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.html, link last visited March 21, 2008.

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• continued
• 2003 State of the Union and the President’s speech in Cincinnati, are all discussed in the Committee’s first report on pre-war Iraq intelligence, Senate Report 108-301. The Vice President’s August 2002 speech was not reviewed by the intelligence community. Intelligence officials have told the Committee that they could not find any evidence that the President’s September 2002 address to the UN General Assembly was reviewed by the intelligence community. 
• (U) The Committee selected particular statements from these speeches that pertained to eight categories: nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction (generally), methods of delivery, links to terrorism, regime intent, and assessments about the post-war situation in Iraq. The report is organized along these eight categories, with each section listing the relevant statements from the speeches. 
• (U) This report does not include statements made prior to summer 2002 or statements made by officials of the United States Government beyond the top levels of the Executive Branch. At the end of each section, following analysis of the five speeches, the Committee has listed additional statements by senior officials from the same time period. Those statements that contain assertions not included in the five major policy speeches have been examined further, to determine whether they were substantiated by available intelligence. 
• (U) To conduct this review, the Committee assembled hundreds of intelligence reports produced prior to March 19, 2003 in an effort to understand the state of intelligence analysis at the time of various speeches and statements. The Committee is fully aware that officials may have had multiple credible sources of information upon which to base statements, but has not attempted to document or analyze source materials other than the intelligence, since that is beyond the scope of this report. (U) Furthermore, the Committee reviewed only finished analytic intelligence documents, with few exceptions. This did not include intelligence reports "from the field" or less formal communications between intelligence agencies and other parts of the Executive Branch. 
• (U) The Committee has attempted to note where disagreements existed within the Intelligence Community and where different reporting could substantiate different interpretations. In order to complete this task, however, this report focuses first on major coordinated inter-agency intelligence reports such as National Intelligence Estimates, Intelligence Community Assessments and Briefs, and other consensus products. These products are not only the most authoritative, representing the full Intelligence Community position on the issues they cover, but also tend to be widely circulated within the government. The Committee also examined assessments, reports and statements to Congress from individual intelligence agencies to address those issues for which coordinated reports were not available or where there was disagreement among agencies. 
• (U) In addition to examining the question of whether public statements were substantiated by the underlying intelligence, the Committee’s review also addressed the extent to which statements were incomplete and where relevant Intelligence Community assessments were not made part of the public discourse. A public statement that selectively uses only that intelligence that supports a particular policy position while ignoring or disregarding intelligence that either weakens or contradicts the position may be accurate on its face but present a slanted picture nonetheless. 
• (U) Overlaying this issue of the selective use of intelligence is the more fundamental issue of the selective declassification of intelligence. Intelligence information contained in many of the speeches analyzed in this report had to be declassified before being released publicly. The Executive Branch has the prerogative to classify information to protect national security, and unlike Congress the Executive Branch can declassify information relatively easily. Until the Congress sought and obtained the release of an unclassified version of the key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s presumed weapons of mass destruction programs, the analytical judgments of the Intelligence Community on these matters were classified. The collected intelligence underlying these judgments remained classified until after the invasion of Iraq. Few, if any, of the Intelligence Community’s assessments on Iraq’s links to terrorism, the intent of the Iraqi regime, projected post-war conditions, or other relevant matters contained in the statements of senior officials were publicly released before the war. This ability of the Executive Branch to unilaterally declassify and divulge intelligence information at a time, place, and in a manner of its choosing must also be taken into account when evaluating policymakers’ use of intelligence information. _ 3
• II. Nuclear Weapons • "The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 •  
• "But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • 
• "Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • 
• "What he wants is time and more time to husband his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, and to gain possession of nuclear arms.” - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002   "Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program — weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq’s state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 
• "But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a — nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 
•  "The Iraqi regime has violated all of these obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 
• "The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists. . .Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weap0ns." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002
• "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun - that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • 
• "After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspection, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more. And he is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • 
• "We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a hope against all evidence." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 
• "To spare himself, he agreed to systematically disarm of all weapons of mass destruction. For the next twelve years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons — not economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile strikes on his military facilities." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003 • 
• "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high—strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production." · President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003 • 
• "We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • 
• "Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from eleven different countries, even after inspections resumed." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • 
• "By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • 
• "Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer showed that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • 

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• "We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high—speed balancing machines. Both items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 
• (U) In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State indicated that the Iraqi government had an active nuclear weapons program. The President and the Secretary of State both indicated that this nuclear weapons program had continued even while international weapons inspectors were in Iraq. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) 
• (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that the Iraqi regime had resumed pursuit of a nuclear weapons development program, and said "many of us are convinced that Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon". He also said that "Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons", and that the Iraqi regime "continue[s] to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago."7 
• (U) In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the intelligence community produced a number of coordinated assessments regarding possible Iraqi nuclear programs. These assessments consistently concluded that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) had destroyed or neutralized Iraq’s pre-Gulf War nuclear infrastructure, and that Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons pro gram.8 
• (U) These assessments were also consistent in assessing that Iraq had maintained some of the intellectual capital and physical infrastructure necessary for a nuclear weapons program, and that Iraq continued to procure "dual-use" technologies, with both nuclear and non-nuclear potential 7 White House Transcript, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103'd National Convention, August 26, 2002. 8 Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee Report, Reconstitution of Iraq ’s Nuclear Weapons Program: An Update, October 1997; National Intelligence Council Memorandum., Current WMD Capabilities, October 1998; Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee Report, Reconstitution of Iraq ’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Post Desert Fox, June 1999; Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq.· Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities, December 2000; and National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001. (These reports are summarized in Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004). They agreed that if Iraq decided to restart a nuclear weapons program, with proper foreign assistance it could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon within five to seven years, and that if Iraq in some way acquired adequate fissile material from a foreign source, it could produce a nuclear weapon within one year. The December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on foreign missile developments also noted that "Recent Iraqi procurements. . .suggest possible preparation for a renewed uranium enrichment program,” a slight shift in the intelligence community’s judgments, but still consistent with the judgment that Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program.9 
•  
• (U) The intelligence community’s collective judgment that Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program did not change until the publication of the October 2002 NIE on Iraqi WMD programs, which was the next NIE to address the topic. However, some individual agencies shifted their perspectives before this point. In April 2001, the CIA noted that Iraq’s attempts to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other dual-use equipment suggested that a reconstitution effort might be underway. This judgment was included in several other CIA assessments. 10 In August 2002 the CIA published a paper on Iraqi WMD capabilities (Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat), which concluded that these procurement activities indicated that the Iraqi government had restarted its nuclear weapons program. ll 
• (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced several similar assessments in 2002, noting in a May 2002 report that "Although there is no firm evidence of a current nuclear weapon design effort, we judge that continued procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items, key personnel assigned to nuclear weapon-capable sites, construction at nuclear facilities, and Saddam’s interactions with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission all indicate that Saddam has not abandoned the nuclear weapon pro gram."l2 
• (U) The Department of Energy (DOE) disagreed with the CIA’s conclusions regarding the aluminum tubes, and assessed that it was more likely that the tubes were intended for a different use, such as a conventional rocket program.13 Based on other evidence, including Saddam’s 
• 9 rm. l° Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq - Purchases Could Revive Nuclear Program (SC_No: PASS SEIB 01- 083CHX), April 10, 2001; CIA, Iraq: New Effort to Get Centrifuge Tubes, July 2001; Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq: Nuclear-Related Procurement Efforts, October 18, 2001; Senior Executive Intelligence Brief Iraq: Seeking to Rebuild Enrichment Capability, November 2001; CIA, Iraq: Centrifuge-based Uranium Enrichment Program Before and After Gulf War, November 2001; CIA Senior Executive Memorandum, December 15, 2001; CIA, Iraq: Status of the Nuclear Program, January 11, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Status of Baghdad ’s Uranium Enrichment Program, March 2002. UCLA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002. 12 DIA EH, Baghdad apparentlv has increased its activity at former and suspect nuclear sites, January 15, 2002; DIA Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq 's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post-9-1 1 September, January 2002; DIA Information Paper, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 15, 2002; DIA Information Paper, Comparison of NBC and missiles programs in Iraq, Iran and Syria, September 10, 2002; DIA, Iraq — Key WIMD Facilities An Operational Support Study, September 2002; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook (DI-1610-81-01), Defense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002; DIA, Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, September 2002. B Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Iraq: High Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement, April 11, 2001; Department of Energy Technical Intelligence Note, Iraq’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Is Reconstitution Underway?, August 17, 2001. 

page 7

•  
• meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, and possible attempts to procure uranium from Niger, the DOE assessed in July 2002 that Saddam Hussein might be attempting to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program, but suggested that the evidence was not conclusive.14 
• (U) The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes were probably intended for other purposes. This view was included in congressional testimony in September 2002, but State/INR did not publish any reports on the aluminum tubes outside of the State Department until after publication of the October 2002 NIE.15 _ Several of these intelligence agencies also made reference to assessments by the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) regarding the aluminum tubes. Testimony by the Director of Central Intelligence to Congress stated that NGIC judged that "Iraq’s dimensional requirements for the tubes are far stricter than necessary for rocket casings." A later memo from State/INR said that "the IAEA and - pertinent nuclear—technical experts have concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for Iraq’ s nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings. . .DOE and DoD’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE views on tactical rockets."l6 
• (U) According to a DIA report, the intelligence community continued to assess that it would take five to seven years from the commencement of a revived nuclear program for the Iraqi government to indigenously produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. This same report repeated the assessment that a nuclear weapon could be constructed much faster if adequate fissile material was acquired from a foreign source, though an earlier CIA assessment noted that "we have not detected a dedicated Iraqi effort to obtain fissile material abroad."17 President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 
• (U) In the President’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Iraq continued to develop weapons of mass destruction, and indicated that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Specifically, he referred to Iraqi efforts to purchase aluminum tubes, Iraqi efforts to conceal information about its pre-Gulf War nuclear program, and meetings between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi nuclear scientists. He noted that Iraq possessed some of the intellectual capital and physical infrastructure that would be necessary for a nuclear weapons program, and said that if Iraq could "acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year."18 (U) As noted above, the intelligence community had assessed for years that while Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure had been destroyed or neutralized by the IAEA and the UN, Iraq still possessed some of the physical infrastructure and scientific personnel that would be necessary for reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. Though the intelligence community as a whole had not yet concluded that a nuclear weapons program was underway, some (though not all) intelligence agencies believed that Iraq’s attempts to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes, along with supporting evidence such as Saddam’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear science personnel, indicated that the nuclear program was in fact being reconstituted
• M Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Ejforts Underway?, July 22, 2002. 15 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence transcript of Hearing on Iraq, September 17, 2002; Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 16 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence transcript of Hearing on Iraq, September 17, 2002; State/INR Memorandum, Iraq: Quest for Aluminum Tubes, October 9, 2002. 17 CIA, Senior Executive Memorandum, December 15, 2001; DIA, Iraq.· Nuclear Program Handbook (DI-1610-81- 01), Defense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002 (citing the views of the intelligence community). _ 8

page 8

• . (U) Intelligence community analysts generally believed that the Iraqi govenment’s failure to provide certain evidence and documents regarding its pre-1991 nuclear program indicated that the Iraqi government was attempting to conceal this information. However, this conclusion was not cited by the intelligence community as compelling evidence for a reconstituted, post-Gulf War nuclear weapons program.19 
• (U) Numerous intelligence assessments made reference to open source information showing that Saddam met with personnel from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).2° 
• (U) At the time of the President’s address to the General Assembly, the intelligence community had not changed its judgment that it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon (‘five to seven years’ was the commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002 DIA report judged that it could be done in four)2l, and that Iraq could build a nuclear weapon within one year if it in some way acquired an adequate amount of iissile material from a foreign source.
•  
•  President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
•  
• (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated that the Iraqi regime was "seeking nuclear weapons", and that Saddam Hussein was "moving ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon". He reiterated earlier statements about Saddam holding "numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists”, and attempting to "purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges”. He also said that Iraq was "rebui1ding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the 2past", and that "the evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons pro gram."2 18 White House Transcript, President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002. 19 CIA, Iraq: Continuing To Stonewall IAEA, July 10, 1998; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook (DI-1610-81- 01), Defense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002; and CIA, Iraq: Status of the Nuclear Program, January 11, 2002. 20 DOE, Iraq: Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway? , July 22, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Questions on Nuclear Timeline, September 11, 2002; Report on the US. Intelligence Community 's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 21 DIA, Iraq — Key WMD Facilities An Operational Support Study, September 2002. 22 White House Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. _ 9 .... this file originally created by NewsFollowUp.com Steve Francis on June 7, 2008.

page 9

•  
• (U) The President also repeated his statement that if the Iraqi regime came to possess highly emiched uranium, "it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year." Additionally, he suggested that there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon, declaring that "facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking grm — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." He concluded that "we could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a hope against all evidence."23 
• (U) In the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence community expressed the majority view (with all agencies except State/INR concurring) that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. This conclusion was based on three primary bodies of evidence: Iraqi procurement attempts (primarily of aluminum tubes, but also including other dual-use technologies, such as magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools), apparent regime efforts to reestablish Iraq’s cadre of weapons personnel, and apparent activity at several suspected nuclear weapons sites.24 
• (U) State/INR dissented from the majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did "not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution" of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. The DOE dissented from the majority view that the high-strength aluminum tubes were intended for use in a nuclear program, but concurred with the majority judgment that reconstitution was underway.25 
• (U) In addition to discussing Iraqi attempts to procure aluminum tubes and other dual-use technologies, the NIE described meetings between Saddam Hussein and IAEC personnel. The NIE, like several earlier DIA reports, also discussed construction at facilities that might have nuclear applications Construction at sites known to have been part of Iraq’s pre-Gulf War nuclear weapons program was mentioned in earlier assessments (though not specifically in the NIE).26 
• (U) State/IN`R’s altenative views, which were incorporated in the NIE, said that State/ INR accepted "the view of technical experts at the Department of Energy" who concluded that the aluminum tubes were "poorly suited" for a nuclear weapons program. The alternative views also cast doubt on the judgment that other dual-use procurement efforts were related to a nuclear program, and went on to say that "the information we have on Iraqi nuclear personnel does not appear consistent with a coherent effort to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program."27 23 rbrd. 24 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq 's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. Committee staff were also permitted to view a one-page summary of the NIE, which was prepared for the President. This one-page summary stated that "INR judges that the evidence indicates, at most, a limited Iraqi nuclear reconstitution effort." 25 rbrd. 26 DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook, May 2002; DIA, Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, September 2002; DIA, Iraq -— Key WMD Facilities An Operational Support Study, September 2002; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq: Steadibr Pursuing WMD Capabilities, December 2000. 27 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002.

page 10

• (U) The majority view of the NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five to seven years, and posited a "much less likely scenario" in which production time could be shortened to three to five years. The majority view also assessed that if Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside source that production time could be "within several months to a year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a "systematic effort to acquire foreign fissile materials from Russia [or] other sources." State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear pro gram.28
•  
•  President ’s State of the Union Address (January 29, 2003) 
• (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he stated that Iraq had pursued nuclear weapons even while weapons inspectors were in Iraq. He also said that the Iraqi regime had attempted to purchase aluminum tubes that could be used in a nuclear program, and that "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."29 
• (U) While the intelligence community assessed that Iraq had initially attempted to continue its nuclear weapons program following the imposition of post-Gulf War sanctions, most agencies believed that the IAEA and UNSCOM had succeeded in destroying or neutralizing Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure, and that the regime did not resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons until December 1998, when UNSCOM inspectors left the country. As noted above, State/INR did not believe that reconstitution had begun at all.30 
• (U) The October 2002 NIE contained an annex on the high-strength aluminum tubes. Although all the intelligence agencies agreed that the aluminum tubes were a dual-use technology, DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikely that the tubes were being used for nuclear weapons- related purposes. Other agencies concurred with the majority view, which cited the aluminum tubes as the primary evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Neither the concurring nor dissenting agencies changed their view between the publication of the NIE and the invasion of Iraq.31 
• (U) An unclassified British white paper from September 2002 had assessed that Iraq had sought large quantities of natural (non-enriched) uranium from Africa. This was echoed by a statement in the NIE, which said "lraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons." This was not cited by the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program.  State/INR’s alternative views said that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR’s assessment, highly dubious."
• 2* ibid. 29 White House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union January 28, 2003. 30 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Prepared Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 17, 2002; and Report on the UTS. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 31 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002, and Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. 

page 11

•  
•  (U) The CIA’s comments and assessments about the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting were inconsistent, and at times contradictory, following the publication of the NIE. Neither State/INR, nor the DIA, nor the DOE shifted their assessments regarding this issue between the publication of the NIE and the invasion of Iraq.33 
• (U) Intelligence assessments regarding the uranium reporting and the coordination process for the State of the Union address are discussed in more detail in previous Committee reports. (Senate Reports 108-301 and 109-331). Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (U) In the Secretary of State’s February 2003 address to the United Nations Security Council, he stated that Saddam Hussein was detemined to acquire nuclear weapons, and argued that Iraq had not abandoned its pre-Gulf War weapons program. He specifically referred to Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use technologies, including aluminum tubes, magnets, and high-speed balancing machines. 
• (U) The Secretary of State said that "most U.S. experts" believed that the aluminum tubes were intended to be part of a nuclear weapons program, and acknowledged that "other experts", as well as the Iraqi government, had argued that the tubes were intended for use in conventional rocket programs. 
• (U) United States intelligence agencies continued to differ over the intended purpose of the aluminum tubes - State/INR and the DOE continued to disagree with the majority view and assessed that procurement efforts were "not clearly linked to a nuclear end use." 
• (U) The intelligence community also assessed that the Iraqi government was seeking to purchase certain other dual-use technologies, and State/INR continued to disagree with the majority view that these technologies were part of a nuclear weapons program.  "[T]he issue’s not inspectors. The issue is that [Saddam Hussein] has chemical weapons and he’s used them. The issue is that he’s developing and has biological weapons. The issue is that he’s pursuing nuclear weapons...[H]e is actively pursuing nuclear weapons at this time..." - Vice President Dick Cheney, Late Edition, March 24, 2002 • (Question: Can we rule out right now Saddam’s having a nuclear weapon?) "I would not want to give you an intelligence judgment on that. Our best information right now is that he is working hard on [developing nuclear weapons], but we cannot confirm that he has one. But we are absolutely certain that he continues to try to develop one or obtain one." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Fox News Sunday, September 8, 2002 • "With respect to nuclear weapons, we are quite confident that [Saddam Hussein] continues to try to pursue the technology that would allow him to develop a nuclear weapon. Whether he could do it in one, five, six or seven, eight years is something that people can debate about, but what nobody can debate about is the fact that he still has the incentive, he still intends to develop those kinds of weapons. " — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Fox News Sunday, September 8, 2002 • "[Saddam] now is trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium to make the bombs." — Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, September 8, 2002 • "[Saddam Hussein’s] regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Service Committee, September 18, 2002   
• Additional Statements 32 Joint Intelligence Committee of the United Kingdom, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, September 24, 2002; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Report on the US. Intelligence Community 's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 33Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 12

page 13

• (U) The Secretary of State did not mention apparent activity at former nuclear facilities or reports about Iraq acquiring uranium from Africa in his address to the Security Council.
• (U) The above statements are all consistent with the five policy speeches analyzed. The statements below differ in significant ways. "We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. We do know that there have been shipments going into Iran, for instance -- into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to -- high-quality aluminum tubes that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs. We know that he has the infrastructure, nuclear scientists to make a nuclear weapon." — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002 (U) On September 8, 2002, the National Security Advisor said that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs". Although both the CIA and DIA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were "best suited" for centrifuges, and that other explanations were "inconsistent with the total body of intelligence"), the DOE had assessed that this was unlikely, _ 13 and had published intelligence reports explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE’s view, more likely) that the tubes were intended to be used to build conventional rockets.34 • "His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. They have the knowledge of how to produce nuclear weapons, and designs for at least two different nuclear devices.` They have a team of scientists, technicians and engineers in place, as well as the infrastructure needed to build a weapon. Very likely all they need to complete a weapon is fissile material-and they are, at this moment, seeking that material-both from foreign sources and the capability to produce it indigenously." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002 
• (U) On September 19, 2002, the Secretary of Defense stated that Iraq possessed designs for at least two nuclear devices. He also stated that the Iraqi government was seeking fissile material from foreign sources. - Intelligence obtained after the Gulf War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons. Both aparently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the two had an estimated y and the larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of , could not be delivered by missile.36 Although the intelligence community did not assess that Iraq was engaged in a systematic effort to acquire fissile material from abroad, a September 2002 DIA report noted that "a sensitive source indicates that since inspectors left in 1998, Iraq has been trying to acquire highly enriched uranium."37 • "But we now have irrefutable evidence that he has once again set up and reconstituted his program, to take uranium, to enrich it to sufficiently high grade, so that it will function as the base material as a nuclear weapon." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Speech in Casper, Wyoming, September 20, 2002 (quoted by the Associated Press) 
• (U) In September 2002 the Vice President stated that there was "irrefutable evidence" that Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program. As noted, several intelligence agencies assessed that reconstitution was underway, but the Department of Energy assessed that the evidence was less conclusive (State/ INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that point).  "It is going to be cheaper and less costly to do it now than it will be to wait a year or two years or three years until he’s developed even more deadly weapons, perhaps nuclear weapons." — Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March 16, 2003 
• (U) In March 2003 the Vice President suggested that it was possible that Iraq could develop nuclear weapons within one to three years. The majority view of the NIE concluded that unless it acquired fissile material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a nuclear weapon for five to seven years. The NIE described a "much less likely" scenario in which Iraq could produce enough fissile material for a weapon in three to five years, and also assessed that if the Iraqi regime acquired sufficient fissile material from abroad, it could build a weapon in "several months to a year." While most intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq had made a few efforts to acquire fissile material from abroad, the NIE noted that Iraq had apparently not instituted a systematic effort to acquire foreign fissile materials.39 • "We know that based on intelligence that he has been very, very good at hiding these kinds of efforts. He’s had years to get good at it and we know he has been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr. El-Baradei frankly is wrong. And I think if you look at the track record of the International Atomic Energy Agency and this kind of issue, especially where Iraq’s concerned, they have consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing. I don’t have any reason to believe they’re any more valid this time than they’ve been in the past." - Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, March 16, 2003
• 38 34 Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Iraq: High Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement, April ll, 2001; Department of Energy, Iraq 's Gas Cenmyixge Program: Is Reconstitution Underway?, August 17, 2001, p. 12; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook (DI—1 61 0-8 1 -01), Defense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002; Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Underway?, July 22, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002. 35 A lciloton is a measure of explosive force equivalent to 1000 tons of TNT. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima is generally estimated to have exploded with a force of 12-15 kilotons. 36 The post-Gulf War reporting is summarized in the October 2002 NIE, which was published a few weeks after the Secretary’s testimony. 37 DIA, Iraq ’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program, September 2002. 38 Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Iraq: High Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement, April 11, 2001; Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Underway?, July 22, 2002; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence transcript of Hearing on Iraq, September 17, 2002. 14

page 14

•  (U) In March 2003 the Vice President also said that Iraq had reconstituted nuclear weapons. Elsewhere in the same interview he indicated that Iraq did not yet possess nuclear weapons, and that "it’s only a matter of time until he [Saddam Hussein] acquires nuclear weapons." No intelligence agency ever assessed that Iraq had reconstituted nuclear weapons. In an interview on September 13, 2003, the Vice President said that he had misspoken, and had meant to say "nuclear weapons capability", rather than "nuclear weapons". 
• Conclusions (U) Conclusion 1: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor regarding a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community. Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, some intelligence agencies assessed that the Iraqi government was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program, while others disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence. The Estimate itself expressed the majority view that the program was being reconstituted, but included clear dissenting views from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which argued that reconstitution was not underway, and the Department of Energy, which argued that aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended for a nuclear program. 39 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002.

page 15

•  Postwar Findings 
• (U) Postwar findings revealed that Iraq ended its nuclear weapons program in 1991, and that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively declined aiier that date. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found no evidence that Saddam Hussein ever attempted to restart a nuclear weapons program, although the Group did find that he took steps to retain the intellectual capital generated during the program. That intellectual capital decayed between 1991 and 2003, however, and the ISG found no evidence that the relevant scientists were involved in renewed weapons work. 
• (U) Postwar findings confirmed that the high-strength aluminum tubes sought by Iraq had been intended for a conventional rocket program, and found no evidence that other dual-use technologies (magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools) were intended for use in a nuclear weapons program. Various ongoing activities at former nuclear sites were apparently unrelated to any weapons program, and construction observed at the al-Tahadi high- voltage and electromagnetic facility also had no apparent connection to any nuclear weapons program. 
• (U) P4qstwar surveys found no evidence that Iraq sought uranium from any foreign sources alter 1 991 . 40 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006.

page 16

•   IH. Biological Weapons • "The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents." - Wce President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "What he wants is time and more time to husband his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, and to gain possession of nuclear arms." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Ir1 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq’s military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing millions." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons. Every chemical and biological weapon that Iraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Yet, Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite international sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the civilized world." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons, and is increasing his capabilities to make more." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the last casualty in a war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he agreed to disarm of all weapons of mass destruction. For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons — not economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile strikes 

page 17

• on his military facilities." — President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late l990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspections. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed them." — President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "We know, we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq .... Most of the launchers and warheads had been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape detection." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq’s biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share with you what we know from eyewitness accounts. We have first-hand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Although Iraq’s mobile production program began in the mid-1990s, UN inspectors at the time only had vague hints of such programs. Confirmation came later, in the year 2000. The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities. He actually was present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. l2 technicians died from exposure to biological agents." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "A second source. An Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the details of the program confirmed the existence of transportable facilities moving on trailers." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "A third source, also in a position to know, reported in summer, 2002, that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on road-trailer units and on rail cars." 
• page 18
• - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Finally, a fourth source. An Iraqi major who defected confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories in addition to the production facilities I mentioned earlier." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent factories." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry, biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "We also have sources who tell us that since the l980s, Saddam’s regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. Vice President ’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) 
• (U) The Vice President’s speech stated generally that Iraq had been "enhancing its capabilities in the field of’ biological agents and that Saddam Hussein wanted "time and more time to husband his resources [and] to invest in his ongoing biological weapons programs." 
• (U) The intelligence community produced a number of coordinated and single-agency reports on Iraq’s biological weapons program after United Nations inspectors left Iraq in the l990s. One such report was the December 2000 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. The ICA noted that "Our main judgment about what _ 

page 19

• remains of Iraq’s original WMD programs, agents stockpiles, and delivery systems have changed little: Iraq retains stockpiles of chemical and biological agents and munitions."44 - The ICA also judged that Iraq had largely rebuilt its biological weapons facilities that raised ana1ysts’ concern about Iraq’s intentions, but could not determine "whether Iraq is diverting these or other of its many pharmaceutical, vaccine, or pesticide plants to produce BW agents." Similarly, the ICA reported that _ Iraq had built a new castor oil plant that "could easily" be used to produce the toxin ricin. 
• (U) Consistent with most contemporaneous intelligence reports, the ICA reported that UN inspectors, and the intelligence community, did not believe that Iraq had destroyed its previous biological weapons and agent. It also assessed that Iraq had "taken steps to bolster" its biological weapons research and development program. 
• (U) While the Vice President’s speech did not reference the mobile biological laboratories, the biological weapons section of the ICA began with such biological weapons production plants. This portion of the ICA was based on "credible US military reporting from a single source" who was described in the Committee’s previous report as being the asylum seeker codenamed "CU`RVEBALL."42 The ICA, like other finished intelligence at the time, did not cite the source by name. The ICA cited this source as saying that Iraq had "developed a clandestine production capability ... which has the potential to turn out several hundred tons of unconcentrated BW agent per year." According to the source, Iraq had constructed seven transportable biological weapons plants. 
• (U) An August 10, 2001 CIA assessment, Developing Biological Weapons as a Strategic Deterrent, stated that "Iraq is attempting to address its regional security concerns by developing weapons of mass destruction and is focusing on biological warfare (BW) agents as a strategic deterrent to its enemies’ conventional and non- conventional forces." The agency assessed that "Iraq does not require outside assistance to produce BW, which can be easily hidden from weapons inspectors and national technical collection means." The paper also said, "we assess Baghdad already has a thriving biological weapons program to augment any stockpiles it hid from weapons inspectors."43 
• (U) A December 15, 2001 CIA report, The Iraqi Threat, stated that "Iraq maintains an active and capable BW program that includes research, production, and weaponization of BW agents." The paper assessed that anthrax and botulinum were the most likely candidate agents for weaponization.44 
• (U) An August 2002 DIA assessment, Iraq: Biological Wagfare Program Handbook, judged that: 44 December 2000 Intelligence Community Assessment, 
• (U) Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities. ICA 2000- 007HCX. 42 See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 2004, p. 144. 43 August 10, 2001 CIA intelligence assessment, Developing Biological Weapons as a Strategic Deterrent (CLAINESAF IA 2001-200721) 44 A December 15, 2001 SPWR, The Iraqi Threat (SPWRl2l501-07) _ 

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Bush - fascist,  (noble lies) and pedophilia, common amongst Nazi leaders.  People in powerful positions have take advantage of small children throughout history.   more Gannon, Guckert, spent many nights in the White House,  White House visits when no news briefings, many with no record of entry or exit  go to YouTube   How is this connected to the Franklin Scandal Rove, Gannon & Eberle and the Franklin Cover-up scandal Is there a common thread between the sexual abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib,  Guantanamo,  the Franklin Cover-up Scandal - Omaha  (1989), Catholic and Protestant clergy sexual abuse, GOP leadership cover-up of the Foley affair, ... Jeff Gannon White House sleepovers, Clinton sexual adventures, Deborah Jeane Palfrey... and ???  more?

• page 20
• Iraq is assessed to have an active BW research and development program. Baghdad has reportedly rebuilt its full offensive BW program in well-concealed, underground, mobile or difficult-to-locate facilities applying lessons learned during the former UNSCOM inspection process to prevent penetration by foreign intelligence services. The Iraqi biological warfare (BW) program is assessed to continue today despite Iraq’s claims to have destroyed its BW agents and weapons completely in 1991. Numerous sources have stated that Iraq still has stockpiles of BW agents. DIA cannot rule out Iraqi possession of agents produced before or during Operation Desert Storm or in the years since the Gulf War. 
• (U) This DIA paper also repeated assessments that Iraq "may retain" biological weapons munitions; that it "has maintained or developed the indigenous capability to almost completely support its BW program;" and that Iraq did not adequately cooperate with UN inspectors.45 President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) (U) The President commented in his September 2002 speech to the United Nations that "Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons." 
• (U) This statement is consistent with those in the Vice President’s August 2002 speech described above.  President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
• (U) The President’s Cincinnati speech included statements that Iraq "possesses and produces" biological weapons and mentioned "surveillance photos" of rebuilt facilities. He cited Iraqi admissions that it had previously produced more than 30,000 liters of biological agents, and that UN inspectors’ views were that Iraq "likely produced two to four times that amount" that had not been accounted for. The President also stated that Saddam Hussein was "increasing his capabilities to make more" such weapons. 
• (U) The October 2002 Iraq weapons of mass destruction NIE was issued shortly prior to the Cincinnati speech. It represented a shift in the IC’s judgments about Iraq’s biological weapons program from what had been presented in previous reports, and did not contain the uncertainties that were expressed in previous IC assessments about what was known about the BW program.46 The NIE’s key judgments were that all key elements of Iraq’s biological weapons program were active and more advanced than before the Gulf War. The judgments specifically stated that: 45 August 2002 DIA assessment, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook (DI-1650-63-02). 46 For more discussion on the changes between the 2002 NIE and previous reports, see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, UTS. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 2004. _ 

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• We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives (emphasis added); • Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability; and • Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within several days these units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war.47 
• (U) The body of the NIE noted that "Iraq’s BW program, however, continues to be difficult to penetrate and access" and stated that "we do not have specific information on the types of weapons, agent, or stockpiles Baghdad has at its disposal."48 (U) The NIE included a passage that "Only after UNSCOM confronted Baghdad with irrefutable evidence of excessive growth media procurement did Iraq admit that it had an offensive BW program and had made 30,000 liters of concentrated biological weapons agents. Even then, UNSCOM estimates that