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They document Bush lies in run-up to Iraq War.... and Omissions

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IIa  110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed   
report:

110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAQ CONDUCTED BY THE POLICY COUNTERTERRORISM EVALUATION GROUP AND THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PLANS WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

together with A ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of June _, 2008

 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE United States Senate 110th Congress JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA RON WYDEN, OREGON CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA EVAN BAYH, INDIANA SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA BARBARA A. MUKULSKI, MARYLAND ORRIN HATCH, UTAH RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN OLYMPIA SNOWE, MAINE SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA HARRY REU), NEVADA, EX OFFICIO MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN, EX OFFICIO JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO

Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Scope and Methodology 

  • (U) ln February 2004 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revised the terms of reference for its ongoing inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. The new issue areas included "any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy." The Committee pursued this issue area in 2004, but subsequently the Committee’s attention was placed on other aspects of the terms of reference.1 
  • (U) In September 2005, the Committee deferred efforts on the issue of intelligence activities within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD(P)], when then- Committee Chairman Pat Roberts requested that the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) review whether the OUSD(P)’s Office of Special Plans "at any time conducted unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate intelligence activities." Later in September 2005 Senator Carl Levin, then ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, issued a similar request for the DoD IG to review the activities of the OUSD(P), including the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and Policy Support Office, to determine whether any of their activities were either inappropriate or improper. Senator Levin’s request included a list of ten questions to be answered by the DoD IG. The Intelligence Committee planned to resume its inquiry based on the outcome of the DoD IG’s review. 
  • (U) The DoD IG began the review requested by Senators Roberts and Levin in November 2005. In February 2007, the DoD IG issued the requested report, which was titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. That report concluded: The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD(P)] developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the products did not clearly show 1 To date the Committee has published four reports based on its inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq: • July 9, 2004, US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, • September 8, 2006, Postwar Findings about Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and how they Compared with Prewar Assessments, • September 8, 2006, The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, • Mayg3 l , 2007, Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq. _ 1

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  • _ the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Committee and were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products. This condition occurred because the OUSD(P) expanded its role and mission from formulating Defense Policy to analyzing and disseminating alternative analysis.2 
  • (U) The DoD IG review was focused on intelligence activities within the OUSD(P) only with respect to the production and dissemination of intelligence. The DoD IG stated in materials that accompanied the release of the February 2007 report that the "review focused on OUSD(P) assessments provided to the Executive Branch."3 The DoD IG did not include within its report an assessment of whether any of the OUSD(P)’s actions could be considered the collection of intelligence even though the "collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities" falls under the definition of intelligence activities as set forth in the Executive Order on United States Intelligence Activities.4 
  • (U) In February 2004 when the Committee’s terms of reference were updated, the Committee was in the process of looking into issues surrounding a December 2001 meeting in Rome, Italy between DoD officials, including an OUSD(P) representative, and current and former Iranian officials, and a related follow-up meeting in June 2003. The Committee pursued information on these meetings in October 2003 and conducted a number of related interviews in early to mid-2004. The DoD IG touched on these meetings in a separate report, but did not conduct an extensive review. 
  • (U) The Committee’s updated terms of reference called for a review of any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the OUSD(P). The Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group was a two person group created in November 2001, after discussions on how to pursue the Rome meeting were already underway in the OUSD(P). No members of that group participated in the meetings that are the subject of this report. The Office of Special Plans was created in October 2002, after the Rome meeting had taken place. One participant in the Rome meeting did join the Office of Special Plans after it was formed, but his activities surrounding the Rome meeting had been completed months before. As noted in the February 2007 DoD IG report, however, "[t]he term OSP [Office of Special Plans] has become generic terminology for the activities of the OUSD(P), including the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and Policy Support Oflice."5 
  • (U) The December 2001 Rome meeting involved discussions with alleged current and former members of the Iranian security service and a foreign government (Israel) entity which included the foreign government (Israel) intelligence service. While the information obtained was related to Iran instead of Iraq, senior OUSD(P) personnel were directed to conduct the Rome meeting and were 2 2007-0782, February 9, 2007, DoD IG report titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of theUnder Secretary of Defense for Policy, page 4. 3 2007-0782, Materials accompanying the February 9, 2007, DoD IG report titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Questions and Answers, Answer to question #5. 4 Executive Order Number 12333, dated December 4, 1981, Part 1, Paragraph 1.4 (a). 5 2007-0782, February 9, 2007, DoD IG report titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, pages 1-3. _ 2

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  • _ involved in the decision—making process on how to undertake the meeting, and an OUSD(P) employee attended the meeting. In light of the fact that the DoD IG did not evaluate the propriety of conducting these meetings, Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV directed that the Committee’s review of the December 2001 and June 2003 meetings be completed as part of its pre-war intelligence on Iraq inquiry. This report completes the Committee’s inquiry into the Rome meeting and the issue of whether the OUSD(P) undertook inappropriate intelligence collection activities. 
  • (U) The Comn1ittee’s review is based on interviews with current and former Intelligence Community and DoD officials, briefings, and documentation provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DoD, and State Department. The DoD Office of the Inspector General provided the Committee with additional information collected as part of its February 2007 review of the activities of the OUSD(P). 
Michael Ledeen, Rove's Brain Karl Rove, Bush's Brain   = go to NFU pages 
  • Issues not in this report
  • Forged yellow cake documents. more
  • Rosen Weissman, AIPAC espionage case.
  • Sibel Edmonds FBI wiretap translator, more
  • Role of Judith Miller and the New York Times   Leakgate
  • Project for New American Century, PNAC
  • Valerie Plame, Brewster Jennings & Associates  more
  • Omissions and misstatements in the 911 Commission Report more
  • Israeli Art Students, their addresses tracked the addresses of the 911 hijackers.  more
  • 911 was an inside job (Bush, Israel, neocons) the only people who don't believe this are duped Americans, the rest of the world believes it.   more
  • I The Rome Meeting Introduction · (_) The "Rome meeting" was actually a series of sessions that took place in an apartment building in Rome, Italy Hom December 10, 2001 through December 13, 2001. The DoD IG determined that: The meeting included Larry Franklin (Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs), Harold Rhode (Office of Net Assessments), Michael Ledeen (former Office of the Secretary of Defense and National Security Council consultant), Manucher Ghorbanifar (Iranian exile), [Iranian am (Iranian exile living in Morocco), [Iranian #2] (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Official), and an unidentified employee of [a foreign government (Israel)]. Michael Ledeen arranged the meeting with the help of his contacts in Italy and [the foreign government (Israel)] who provided the meeting place and other logistical support. 
  • (U) Mr. Franklin joined the OUSD(P) in July 2001 as an Iran desk officer within the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia Affairs, William Luti. (Mr. Franklin was assigned to the Office of Special Plans within Mr. Luti’s office in late 2002, but retained his responsibilities for Iran.)7 Mr. Luti reported to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Peter Rodman. Mr. Rodman played a 6 2007-1142, March 6, 2007, DoD IG Report, DOD Involvement with the Rendon Group, page 8. 7 Mr. Franklin is currently awaiting direction from the Department of Justice to report to prison on matters unrelated to those discussed in this report. He was indicted in August 2005 along with two employees of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for conspiring with each other to unlawfully disclose classified national defense information. Mr. Franklin subsequently pled guilty, and was sentenced in January 2006 on three felony counts: conspiracy to communicate national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it; conspiracy to communicate classified information to an agent of a foreign government (Israel); and the unlawful retention of national defense information. _ 3

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  • _ significant role in the decision-making process on how DoD would participate in the Rome meeting, and reported to the USD(P), Douglas Feith. 
  • (U) Mr. Rhode was a career civilian employee in the Office of Net Assessment and currently remains employed within the DoD. The Office of Net Assessment is not a part of the OUSD(P). The Director of Net Assessment reports to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and is responsible for providing assessments on the capabilities of the United States (U.S.) military. 
  • (U) Mr. Ledeen is a U.S. citizen employed by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Mr. Ledeen had numerous contacts within the DoD and other elements of the U.S. Government at the time of the Rome meeting, but at no time during preparations for or throughout the Rome meeting did he have a formal relationship (e. g., employee, contractor, or consultant) with the DoD. Without any such affiliation, Mr. Ledeen organized the Rome meeting with the help of the foreign government (Israel). Mr. Ledeen paid his own expenses for the trip and never asked or expected to be reimbursed.8 The DoD’s reliance on Mr. Ledeen to organize the Rome meeting resulted in senior DoD officials, to include Mr. Feith and Mr. Rodman, not being aware of the involvement of Mr. Ghorbanifar and the foreign government (Israel) until after the Rome meeting. 
  • (U) It is not entirely clear how Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode were selected to attend the meeting. Mr. Ledeen advised the Committee that during a November 200l discussion with Stephen Hadley, then serving as Deputy National Security Advisor, he was asked who he would recommend sending to a potential meeting with the Iranians. Mr. Ledeen said he offered the names of Harold Rhode and Larry Franklin, due to their expertise and language skills.9 Mr. Franklin told the Committee that he was informed by his immediate supervisor, Mr. Luti, of a potential trip for which the DoD needed an Iran analyst who was conversant in Farsi. Mr. Franklin said he did not know Mr. Ledeen at that time.10 Mr. Rhode could not recall who approached him about the trip due to the passage of time, but said it was probably Mr. Luti. Even though he did not work within the OUSD(P), Mr. Rhode often interacted with that office and knew Mr. Luti. Mr. Rhode stated that he was selected most likely because he had studied in Iran and worked on the issue of how to understand Iranians.  In 2003, Mr. Luti informed the DoD’s Counterintelligence Field Activitys that he selected Mr. Franklin, but did not know who had chosen Mr. Rhode to participate in the meeting.l3 Ultimately, Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode traveled to Rome under official U.S. government travel orders. 8 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 12, 14-15. 9 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of lvfr. Ledeen, pages 5-6. 10 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages. 7-8. H 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages. 3-6. NOTE: An attempt was made to reinterview Mr. Rhode to clarify his involvement in a number of the issues raised in this report. Officials within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs informed the Committee that Mr. Rhode declined to be reinterviewed. V 12 As discussed later in this report, the DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity conducted a review of DoD contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar in 2003 at the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Interviews conducted by the Counterintelligence Field Activity are referenced throughout this report and were also a primary source for the DoD IG review. 13 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIPA Report, Luti Interview. _ 4

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  • (U) Mr. Ghorbanifar was a long time friend of Mr. Ledeen ’s who lived in France and had offered to arrange a meeting with current and former Iranian officials.14 Mr. Ghorbanifar’s attendance at the meeting ultimately raised concerns because of his prior history with the Intelligence Community and his participation in the Iran-Contra scandal in 1986. As a result of the CIA’s prior dealings with Mr. Ghorbanifar, the agency in l984 had issued a fabrication notice on Mr. Ghorbanifar to its operational personnel stating that he was regarded as an unreliable source of intelligence. A publicly available Congressional report on the Iran-Contra scandal includes a redacted copy of the notice that states Mr. Ghorbanifar "should be regarded as an intelligence fabricator and a nuisance. Any further approaches by subject or his brother Ali should be reported but not taken seriously."15 The Iran-Contra scandal involved the illegal sale of arms to Iran by the U.S. Government and use of the profits to fund rebels in Nicaragua. Mr. Ghorbanifar had been a middleman in the weapons exchange. Mr. Ledeen was a consultant to the National Security Council at the time of the Iran-Contra scandal and also played a role in the weapons exchange.16 According to Mr. Ledeen , the first Iranian participant in the Rome meeting, , was a former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps member who was subsequently branded a traitor, but was able to escape Iran after more than a year of torture. Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that the second Iranian, _ was "a high-ranking officer in the intelligence establishment of Iran."17 The Committee’s attempts to corroborate this information with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were complicated by several factors. The first Iranian has a common name and there are multiple variations of the spelling of both names. The CIA provided information on three versions of the first name, two of which could have been the participant in the Rome meeting. It appears the second Iranian - _ was deemed an "information peddler" based on his attempts to sell information. The information the CIA collected on this individual was sufficient for the Agency 
  • (U) During the Rome meeting the two Iranians provided biographic details on themselves and information on the political and economic conditions in Iran. Specific issues discussed during the meeting included Iran’s long standing relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Iran’s perception on Saddam Hussein’s grip on Iraq, the growth of anti-regime sentiment in Iran, and the Iranian regime’s attitudes toward the U.S.19 14 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #4, Undated DIA Contact Memorandum on Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Referral, pages 1-2. 15 Declassified July 25, 1984 CIA Cable Director 023056, Subject: Fabricator Notice — Manuchehr Gorbanifar 16 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 3. 17 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staif Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 17-18. 18 2007-4174, October 22, 2007 & November 28, 2007 CIA responses to Questions for the Record 19 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 7, Mr. Franklins notes on the Iranian interviews. Two versions, one undated and one dated January 21, 2001 (presumed to be a typo). _ 5

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New York Times  "SISMI sent the CIA and U.S. and British officials information that it knew was forged"

Niger Forged Yellowcake Documents more

Michael Ledeen has denied any involvement in the Niger forged documents, but this Senate Report places him on the scene.

  • Origins of the Rome Meeting 
  • (U) The December 2001 Rome meeting was initiated by Mr. Ledeen . According to Mr. Ledeen , soon after September 11, 2001, probably in the October 2001 timeframe, Mr. Ghorbanifar contacted him about "people in Iran who were willing to come out and meet with officials of the American government to provide accurate information about what was going on inside the country, Iranian support of terrorist organizations and plans to kill Americans in Afghanistan."20 This discussion prompted Mr. Ledeen to contact U.S. Government officials. 
  • (U) Mr. Rodman informed the Committee that Mr. Ledeen had contacted him at some point and suggested that DoD officials meet with the Iranian contacts, but Mr. Rodman had deferred at that time. The tasking later came back to him through senior DoD channels as a request from Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley for the DoD to pursue the meeting with the Iranians.21 Mr. Ledeen advised the Committee that he had contacted Mr. Hadley, who he described as an "old fiiend,"22 and subsequently met with Mr. Hadley and another National Security Council official to present Mr. Ghorbanifar’s offer to arrange meetings with Iranian officials. Mr. Ledeen advised the Committee that he did not endorse Mr. Ghorbanifar’s information, but felt obliged to convey the offer to the U.S. Government. Mr. Ledeen indicated that he was certain that the Intelligence Community would not be interested in pursuing the information due to their distrust of Mr. Ghorbanifar.23 
  • (U) According to an April 16, 2004, letter to the Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, "in November 2001, the Deputy National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, called the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, and reported that Iranians with inside knowledge of Iranian security and intelligence operations, including involvement in terrorism and threats to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, wished to defect." The letter also indicated that the Iranians did not want to deal with the CIA and that Mr. Hadley asked Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to have the DoD handle the contact. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz agreed to do so and subsequently informed the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.24 
  • (U) A February 2004 draft chronology prepared by staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and provided to the Committee in April 2004 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs indicates that the call from Mr. Hadley to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz occurred on November 7, 2001.25 The request from Mr. Hadley prompted Mr. Rodman to ask the DoD Office of General Counsel to review whether contact with potential defectors could take place without CIA involvement.26 In mid-November 2001, Mr. Rodman learned from Mr. 20 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 4. 21 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007 Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1. 22 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staii Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 4. 23 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staif Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 5. 24 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, pages 1-2. 25 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 26 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from the DoD office of General Counsel, and Tab 4, November 16, 2001 Memo from Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. _ 6

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  • _ Ledeen that the Iranians did not want to defect, but merely wanted to pass on information.27 The DoD chronology indicated this newfound knowledge prompted Mr. Rodman to inform Mr. Hadley that the DoD could make the initial contact and Mr. Hadley proceeded to obtain approval for this course of action from the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice.28 A memorandum dated November 16, 2001, from Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz indicated that the Deputy Secretary authorized this course of action,29 and a subsequent action memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld dated July 19, 2002, stated that Mr. Hadley "strongly encouraged the meeting."3 
  • (U) According to the April 2004 letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, in early December 2001 Mr. Hadley coordinated the proposed DoD contact with Iranian officials with the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet, and they did not object to the DoD’s making the contact. 31 Deputy Secretary Armitage and DCI Tenet were not provided with significant details regarding the proposed meeting. A 2004 State Department response to Committee questions indicated that Deputy Secretary Armitage recalled Mr. Hadley contacting him in the November/December 2001 timeframe and advising that the DoD wished to debrief some Iranians with information on Iraq. The State Department response further indicated that Deputy Secretary Armitage voiced no objections, but was provided no details on who would attend the meeting or its location. 32 
Roland Carnaby displayed a signed copy of Tenet's book  Roland Carnaby, Southwest Region CIA station chief
   
  • (U) Director Tenet’s 2007 book titled At the Center of the Storm states that in early December 2001 Mr. Hadley mentioned only "that DoD might meet with some Iranians in Europe who had terrorist threat information." Director Tenet notes that there was no mention of the involvement of Mr. Ledeen or Mr. Ghorbanifar. He also indicates that the discussion made him uncomfortable and that he did not understand why the CIA was not being asked to get involved. He adds, however, that "if there was information available about a threat to U.S. interests, I wasn’t going to let bureaucratic reasons stand in the way of our getting the details."33 In March 2008, DCI Tenet provided the Committee with his recollections of his conversation with Mr. Hadley. He recalled being provided no details on the proposed meeting other than it involved access to terrorist threat information. He reiterated that he had concerns about the information provided by Mr. Hadley, but he was not going to stand in the way of collecting threat information so soon after September 11, 2001. Former Director Tenet also stated his view that Mr. Hadley’s call was not intended to gain his permission. For these reasons he did not pursue further details at that time.34 27 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology, and Tab 4, November 16, 2001 Memo Bom Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. Z8 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 29 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 4, November 16, 2001 Memo from Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz., 30 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 25, July 19, 2002, Action Memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld. 31 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, page 2. 32 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #7. 33 At the Center of theStorm, George Tenet, Page 312. 34 March 10, 2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George Tenet, page 1. _ 7

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  • _ -) According to Mr. Ledeen , once he received concurrence from the DoD he directly contacted the foreign government (Israel) official, who he described as an old friend, and told him the background on the proposed meeting. Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that the foreign government (Israel) made any necessary arrangements for the Iranian participants, and provided a secure location and full time intepreter for the meeting.33 ® It is not clear at what point senior DoD officials knew the foreign government (Israel) and foreign government (Israel) intelligence service would play a role in facilitating and attending the meeting. When Mr. Rhode was asked if he knew before the meeting whether the foreign government (Israel) would be involved, he stated "I think so."37 Mr. Franklin told the Committee that Mr. Ledeen advised him on the first morning of the Rome meeting that "the _ [foreign government (Israel)] was involved and had helped out a great deal in setting up the place of the meeting and that they would be present at the meeting." 8 A February 2004 chronology prepared by staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated DoD awareness that the foreign government (Israel) arranged for the meeting site, but it is not stated when this became known.39 In a September 2007 interview, Mr. Rodman, advised the Committee that DoD officials knew the foreign government (Israel) was involved, but they did not know the full extent of that involvement, to include the intelligence service, in advance. 0 
  • (U) Regarding Mr. Ghorbanifar’s attendance at the Rome meeting, Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that he had made it clear to Mr. Hadley that it was Mr. Ghorbanifar who had the ability to organize the Rome meeting. Mr. Ledeen did not indicate that he made Mr. Hadley aware that Mr. Ghorbanifar would attend the meeting.4l Correspondence to the Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs in 2004 stated “[n] one of the senior DoD officials involved in this matter — Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Feith, Mr. Rodman, and Mr. Luti — anticipated that the Iranian security officials would be joined by Ghorbanifar, nor, I am informed, did Mr. Had1ey."42 Mr. Rodman conhrmed to the Committee in September 2007 that he did not know in advance that Mr. Ghorbanifar was going to be at the meeting.43 A memorandum prepared by counsel representing Mr. Feith included the following statement: "Before the Rome meeting occurred, neither Hadley, Wolfowitz nor Feith knew that Ghorbanifar was involved."44 None of the three DoD-provided documents that were written during preparations for the Rome meeting contain a reference to Mr. Ghorbanifar. 35 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 9-10. 36 2003-4209, Cable, 11 February 2002. 37 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 15 and 20-21. 3 3 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 18. 39 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, page 2 and Tab 1, Februa.ry 2004 Chronology. 40 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007 Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 2. 41 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 6, and October 24, 2007, staff` interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 2. 42 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, page 2. 43 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1. 44 2007-1561, July 13, 2006, Memorandum from Patton Boggs LLP to the DoD IG, page 21. _ 8

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  • _ (U) The only DoD official who indicated an awareness that Mr. Ghorbanifar would attend the Rome meeting was Mr. Rhode. Mr. Rhode informed the Committee in April 2004 that prior to departing for the trip he was aware that Mr. Ghorbanifar would be involved in the meeting. When Committee staff asked Mr. Rhode if he was certain that he was aware Mr. Ghorbanifar would be attending the Rome meeting before the meeting, Mr. Rhode said, "yes."45 Material provided to the Committee by the DoD in March 2008 indicates that Mr. Rhode does not now recall whether or not he knew in advance of Mr. Ghorbanifar’s involvement. The material also states that Mr. Rhode can no longer recall anything he told the Committee on this point in 2004.46 Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that he did not know that Mr. Ghorbanifar was involved until he was informed by Mr. Ledeen on the morning of the first day of the Rome meeting.47 
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Senate Intelligence Committee, pdf  Phase IIA,     Senate Intelligence Committee, pdf    II B  
  •  
  • Authority to Conduct the Rome Meeting 
  • (U) The U.S. Government officials involved in approving the Rome meeting had the authority to do so, even if it was considered an intelligence activity. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council (through the Committee on Foreign Intelligence) is given broad authority to identify intelligence needs, establish priorities to meet those intelligence needs, and establish policies relating to the conduct of intelligence activities of the United States, "including appropriate roles and missions for the elements of the intelligence community and appropriate targets of intelligence collection activities."48 These specified authorities are in addition to "performing such other functions as the President may direct."49 
  • (U) Thus, Mr. Hadley, who received concurrence from National Security Advisor Rice, had the authority to request Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, who coordinated with Secretary Rumsfeld, to dispatch two DoD employees to Rome to meet with Iranians who may have been able to provide information related to the national security. 
  • Coordination of the Rome Meeting 
  • (U) While the DoD had the authority to conduct the meeting in Rome, there was limited advance coordination of the activity outside of the Department. Mr. Rodman informed the Committee that Mr. Hadley had advised the DoD to pursue the matter on a close-hold basis due to its unusual nature and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had reiterated that guidance. Mr. Rodman continued by saying that had the National Security Council or Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz not requested that it be close-hold the meeting would have been handled through normal channels. · But, since that request had been made, it was decided that the first meeting would not involve any element of the Intelligence Community.5O 45 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, StaH Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 4 and 9-10. 46 2008-1182, March 12, 2008 DoD Response to Questions for the Record, Question #4. 47 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, StaH Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 7-8 and 19-20. 48 National Security Act of 1947, NewsFollowUp.com § 101(h). 49id.,§101(b). 50 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman , pages 2 and 5. _ 9

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  • (U) Hand written notes prepared by Mr. Rodman on November 7, 2001 indicated that in a discussion with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary conveyed that the Iranians’ mistrust of the CIA had prompted Mr. Hadley to refer the matter to the DoD.5 I The draft chronology prepared by the Department in February 2004 specifically stated that Mr. Ledeen , "who was facilitating the contact, stressed the Iranians’ mistrust of CIA officials."52 In his September 2007 interview, Mr. Rodman reiterated that Mr. Ledeen was adamant about not having any CIA involvement, citing the Iranian’s paranoia about the CIA.53 (U) The Committee received testimony from Mssrs. Ledeen , Franklin, and Rhode that calls into question the willingness of the Iranians who were met in Rome to deal with the CIA. When Mr. Ledeen was asked whether he had suggested that the Iranians would not meet with the CIA he replied that he did not think so. Mr. Ledeen stated that Iranians to be met in subsequent meetings had made it clear they would not meet with the CIA, but he reiterated that the two Iranians at the Rome meeting had expressed no qualms about dealing with the CIA. 54 Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that neither of the Iranians he met in Rome expressed concerns about who in the U.S. Government they were meeting with. When asked if there had been an indication beforehand that there were limitations on whom the Iranians would talk to, Mr Franklin responded "no."55 When asked whether it had been conveyed to him during the meeting that the Iranians did not want to deal with the CIA, Mr. Rhode also responded "no."56 (I) The perceived intention of the Iranians was also a factor in the decision about whether to coordinate the Rome meeting outside of the DoD. According to the April 2004 letter to the Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, when Mr. Hadley first approached Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Mr. Hadley indicated that the Iranians wished to defect. 7 This prompted Mr. Rodman to seek guidance from the DoD Office of General Counsel and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) about whether contact with potential defectors required coordination with the CIA. Mr. Rodman received a memo, dated November 15, 2001, from the DoD Deputy General Counsel (Intelligence) indicating that Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 4/ 158 required each Intelligence Community component to "report promptly _ the identity of any walk-in or other disaffected person who may be of interest together with all available and pertinent information."59 He further advised that the "DIA may initiate an intelligence collection operation with a foreign 51 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 2, November 7, 2001, Handwritten notes of Mr. Rodman. 52 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 53 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1. 54 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 7-8. 55 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 31-32. 56 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 26. 57 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Page 1. 58 A DCID was a directive issued by the Director of Central Intelligence providing guidance to the Intelligence Community on a specific topic of interest. With the creation of the Director of National Intelligence, DCIDs are being replaced by Intelligence Community Directives. 59 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from the DoD office of General Counsel. _ 10

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  • _ military member subject to internal DoD regulations and DCID 5/1 coordination."6° Directive 5/1 stated that "the CIA is primarily responsible for the conduct and coordination of espionage to meet the national security intelligence needs of the U.S. Government. . ." The Directive allows that the DoD may conduct such activities in response to tasking from the DCI or "as required for the execution of the Secretary of Defense’s responsibilities."61 The DIA Director, Admiral Thomas Wilson, provided Mr. Rodman similar advice, noting that an individual could defect to a DoD employee, but further handling would be the legal responsibility of the CIA.62 (U) The General Counsel’s memo was written under the assumption that the Iranians wished to defect. Their true purpose, however, became known to Mr. Rodman about the same time the memo was written. Once it was detemined that the Iranians did not want to defect, but merely wanted to pass on information, DoD personnel did not advise CIA personnel of the pending meeting, and DIA officials were not included in further planning for the meeting. In a September 2003 written response to the Committee’s Vice Chairman, the CIA Director of Congressional Affairs stated on behalf of the DCI that "DoD officials did not coordinate their contacts with CIA, and CIA subsequently raised objections and questions about such contacts." The response further stated that the CIA was not in a position to conclude whether DCID 5/1 requirements were applicable to the Rome meeting, but noted that official trips to a country would routinely be cleared through the ambassador.63 Mr. Rhode advised the Committee that he was unaware of the content of DCIDs 4/1 and 5/1, while Mr. Franklin expressed some awareness, but assumed any required action had been taken by his chain of command.64 (I) Materials prepared by counsel on behalf of Under Secretary of Defense Feith expressed the view that "[a]lthough the U.S. ambassador to Italy and the CIA - - complained that they were not informed about the meeting, it was not the responsibility of the Defense Department to inform them." The material noted that the Deputy National Security Advisor had consulted with the Deputy Secretary of State and the DCI in advance. 65 This response fails to consider that the DCI and Deputy Secretary were not provided enough information to know who to inform of the pending activity. (U) In a September 2007 interview, Mr. Rodman summarized the issue of coordinating the Rome meeting by stating that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had wanted to keep this meeting "close-hold" until the DoD could determine if there was any value to the contact and how it should be pursued further. He added that if there had been an attempt to go through normal channels, the State Department and CIA would have never wanted to speak with the Iranians.66 A National Security Council legal advisor informed the Counterintelligence Field Activity in 2003 that Mr. Hadley had been surprised to learn there had been no coordination with the 60 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter Hom the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from the DoD oiiice of General Counsel. 61 DCID 5/1, , effective December 19, 1984, Section 3. 62 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of Events. 63 2003-41 16, September 23, 2003 letter from CIA, Director of Congressional Affairs. 64 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 18, and 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 10-11. 65 2007-1561, July 13, 2006, Memorandum Hom Patton Boggs LLP to the DoD IG, page 21. 66 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 5.

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  • _ ambassador and CIA.67 DCI Tenet’s 2007 book notes that after the Rome meeting Mr. Hadley asked him if Mr. Wolfowitz had previously called him to explain the situation and DCI Tenet had responded "no."66 In March 2008, DCI Tenet informed the Committee that at no time prior to or after the Rome meeting did Mr. Wolfowitz contact him to discuss the Rome meeting.6 
  • (U) The limited awareness of the Rome meeting within the CIA and the State Department, as well as the involvement of the foreign government (Israel) and Mr. Ghorbanifar, would have a significant impact on the ultimate outcome of this activity. 
Wayne Madsen Report Mario Scaramella
Dec. 25-26, 2006 -- "The enigmatic Italian self-described environmental "security" expert and alleged weapons smuggler and colleague of various right-wing European operatives Mario Scaramella was arrested ....  As previously reported by WMR, Scaramella's links to various right-wing "intelligence" groups in Italy and abroad have also placed him in the middle of an attempt by former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and his Russian-Israeli Mafia friends to tarnish current Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi as a "KGB agent." Russian President Vladimir Putin was a collateral target of Russian-Israeli mobster Boris Berezovsky.  ....  The activities of Scaramella and his colleagues are now under a criminal investigation by the Rome prosecutor's office.  ...   With Scaramella now under arrest in Italy and all investigative roads -- the forged Niger documents, the kidnapping and rendition by U.S. and Italian agents of an Egyptian Imam in Milan, dirty tricks against Prodi, the Pentagon's pre-war connections to Rome-based Iranian Mossad asset Manucher Ghorbanifar, and the U.S. assassination of SISMI deputy chief Nicola Calipari in Baghdad -- now leading to Rome, Italy may hold the key to much more than Scaramella's dubious business dealings. That key may unlock the door of the identities of the actual perpetrators of the 9/11 and other terrorist attacks in London, Madrid, Beslan, Istanbul, and Casablanca." full article
  • Country Clearance through the Ambassador 
  • (U) Most U.S. Government employees are required to receive country clearance from the appropriate U.S. ambassador prior to foreign travel on official business. The U.S. ambassador and the CIA were under the impression that DoD employees traveling to Rome on official business would be required to clear their travel through the embassy. According to the State Department, no one from the office of the Secretary of Defense or the foreign government (Israel) notified the Rome embassy about the meeting.76 
  • (U) Clearing DoD personnel travel through the ambassador is addressed in a series of DoD guidance. Mr. Rhode had a blanket travel order issued through the Office of Net Assessment that was valid through September 30, 2002. Such a travel order removes the administrative burden of obtaining a new travel order for each trip and is generally only provided to frequent travelers. Mr. Rhode’s blanket travel order specified that the "[c]learance requirements of DoD Directive 4500.54 must be observed." Mr. Franklin’s travel order was issued through the OUSD(P) and made no reference to country clearance regulations.71
  • (U) The subject of DoD Directive 4500.54 is Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad. The text applicable to Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode stated that all travelers other than DoD civilian officials appointed by the President "must obtain a ‘theater clearance’ from the Unified Commander and/or ‘country clearance’ from the U.S. Embassy."72 The Directive notes that the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide outlines the procedures for obtaining these clearances. The Directive indicates, however, that in some cases "country or theater clearance may not be required," and again refers to the Foreign Clearance Guide. If the Foreign Clearance Guide is not clear on this requirement the reader is referred to the applicable embassy U.S. Defense Attaché Officer or Office of Defense Cooperation for additional information.76 (I) A review of the Foreign Clearance Guide in effect for Italy at the time of the Rome meeting would indicate that in the specific instance of Mssrs Franklin and Rhode, country clearance was not required because they were not of sufficient rank and did not visit the U.S. 67 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIFA Report, Bellinger Interview. 68 At the Center of the Storm, George Tenet, page 312. 69 March 10, 2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George Tenet, page 1. 76 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #1. 71 The term country clearance refers to the process of notifying a U.S. embassy or mission of the pending travel of a U.S. Government employee to that facility and requesting the appropriate approval for that visit. 72 DoDD 4500.54, Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, Paragraph 5.2 73 DoDD 4500.54, Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, Paragraph 5.4 

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  • _ embassy or a consulate. A country clearance would have been required to visit an Italian government, military, or industry organization; however, prior to their departure the DoD officials involved were unaware of the involvement of so, it is not clear whether the Rome meeting took place in an actual . C) There is no evidence that the DoD officials involved in planning for or attending the Rome meeting researched the general requirement for country clearance. Despite the fact that his travel order said that the clearance requirements of DoD Directive 4500.54 must be observed, Mr. Rhode seemed to be unaware of these requirements and noted that he was given no guidance to contact the embassy.75 The 2003 Counterintelligence Field Activity report on DoD contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar stated that Mr. "Franklin assumed that all the necessary coordination had been done at a higher level and that there was no ‘coordination problem’ since the DEPSECDEF [Deputy Secretary of Defense] and the were involved in this matter."76 Mr. Franklin gave a similar explanation to the Committee in 2004, noting that he had been told it had been approved up the chain of command and therefore he did not think it was his responsibility to check in at the embassy.77 Mr. Rodman informed the Committee in 2007 that he was puzzled by all of the interest in whether a country clearance was obtained for the Rome meeting. He reiterated that the whole process was directed by Mr. Hadley to be "close-hold" and by the very definition of the term a lot of people would not be told about the trip. He pointed out again that Mr. Hadley had told both DCI Tenet and Deputy Secretary Armitage about the trip in advance.78 
  •  
  • Content of the Rome Meeting 
  • (U) During the Rome meeting, Mr. Rhode took contemporaneous notes on a laptop computer, while Mr. Franklin took handwritten notes. These notes were provided to the Committee by the DoD. Based on a review of the notes, the specific issues discussed during the meeting included the following:79 . • Iranian "hit teams" targeting U.S. personnel and facilities in Afghanistan; • Iran’s long standing relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization; • Tunnel complexes in Iran for weapons storage or exfiltration of regime leaders; • Iran’s perception on Saddam Hussein’s grip on Iraq; • The growth of anti—regime sentiment in Iran; • Iranian regime attitudes toward the U.S.; and • Internal rivalries among Iran’s intelligence agencies. 74 December 10, 2001, DoD Foreign Clearance Guide, Europe, Italy, Section H A. 1. 75 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 17. 76 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin Interview. 77 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 10. 78 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 2. 79 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 7, Mr. Franklin’s notes on the Iranian interviews. Two versions, one undated and one dated January 21, 2001 (presumed to be a typo). _ 13

page 13

  • _ (U) When the Rome meeting ended on December 13, 2001, Mr. Franklin returned to the Pentagon and began preparing a summary of the information provided by the Iranians. It appears there were multiple versions of the summary as a result of the editing process. Mr. Franklin’s summary was completed in early January 2002. Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that he considered the information provided by the two Iranians to be "good".80 The information on Iranian hit teams targeting U.S. interests in Afghanistan was particularly interesting to him because prior to the Rome meeting, Mr. Franklin had traveled to Afghanistan and been in contact with U.S. Special Operations Forces. When the issue was raised by the second Iranian at the Rome meeting, Mr. Franklin requested details on the hit team in a particular part of Afghanistan and the Iranian provided names and a photograph of a team member. 
  • (U) While preparing his summary, Mr. Franklin attempted to corroborate the hit team information with some of his contacts at the DIA. He could not recall the content of his discussion with a former colleague in the Defense HUMINT Service beyond going over the general details of the meeting, but Mr. Franklin provided the Committee details of his discussion with a DIA analyst. Mr. Franklin understood that the analyst had been able to corroborate that one of the names associated with the hit team in Afghanistan was a current member of the Iranian intelligence structure.81 During a 2007 Committee interview the DIA analyst recalled that he found no information in the DIA database that specifically corroborated the name and ur1it data provided by Mr. Franklin. The analyst stated, however, that the information provided by Mr. Franklin had sounded plausible and credible because he had other information indicating that Iranian forces were involved in covert activities in Afghanistan.82 
  • (U) Based on his exchange with the DIA analyst, Mr. Franklin contacted a Special Forces Commander in Afghanistan and relayed the hit team information via secure telephone. Mr. Franklin indicated that this exchange would have taken place not long after he returned from the Rome meeting while he was writing his summary report.83 That Commander subsequently invited Mr. Franklin to attend a briefing he was giving to Secretary Rumsfeld upon his return to the Pentagon. Mr. Franklin believed that he was invited because his information had proved valuable. He stated that the Commander had advised him that the information had allowed them to turn "the tables on these Iranians" and offered as an example the fact that they had been able to take pictures of the Iranians loading weapons into a van registered to a warlord. Based on his discussions with the Commander, Mr. Franklin concluded that some of the information provided by the Iranians had "saved American 1ives."84 The DIA analyst contacted by Mr. Franklin upon his return informed the Committee that it genuinely seemed to be Mr. Franklin’s perception that the information saved American lives, but added that he could not speculate on whether it was truly useful.85 Mr. Franklin’s notion that the Iranian information "saved American lives" would 80 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 27. Note also that on page l of the September 25, 2003 Counterintelligence Field Activity interview with Mr. Rhode, he indicated that the information was "very good." 81 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 27 and 38-41. 82 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with [DIA Analyst #1], pages 1-2. 83 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 24-25 and 32-33. 84 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin Interview. See also 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 24-25. 85 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with [DIA Analyst 1], page 2. _ 14

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  • _ become widely used by DoD officials and Mr. Ledeen to describe the utility of attending the Rome meeting. 
  • (U) After the memo was completed, Mr. Franklin went back to his regular duties with almost no role in the decision on whether to continue contact with the Iranians. He remained in contact with Mr. Ledeen , and for a number of weeks after the trip received phone calls and faxes from Mr. Ghorbanifar. Mr. Franklin advised the Committee that he returned the calls for a while to be polite on the chance that Mr. Ghorbanifar could facilitate future access, however the faxes offered no new information and he eventually discontinued the contact.86 Mr. Franklin retained the faxed material for a period of time, but it appears it was destroyed prior to the Counterintelligence Field Activity’s 2003 review.87 
  • (U) Mr. Rhode advised the Committee that he passed his Rome meeting notes to Mr. Luti. He subsequently played no further role in the follow up to the Rome meeting.88 Mr. Ghorbanifar’s Plan 
  • (U) While in Rome, Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode became involved in discussions that went beyond obtaining information from the Iranian sources. Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that during the trip to Rome Mr. Ghorbanifar pressed his own agenda for regime change in Iran.89 Mr. Franklin stated that late one night during a discussion in a bar Mr. Ghorbanifar laid out his plan on a napkin. The plan involved the simultaneous disruption of traffic at key intersections leading to Tehran that would create anxiety, work stoppages and other disruptive measures. Mr. Franklin recalled that Mr. Ghorbanifar asked for $5 million in seed money to facilitate this activity. He added that Mr. Ghorbanifar indicated that if the iirst action was successful additional money may be needed later on, but Mr. Franklin could not recall speciiic amounts being discussed beyond the $5 million.90 Mr. Rhode recalled Mr. Ghorbanifar discussing a plan to set up a network that could lead to the overthrow of the regime, but could not recall a speciiic dollar amount.91 Mr. Ledeen provided the Committee similar recollections, noting that Mr. Ghorbanifar offered a variety of different schemes for regime change in Iran dating to the time the two had iirst met. Mr. Ledeen added that he believed the U.S. Government should be supporting Iranians who want to overthrow the regime. He stated that he had passed the notion of the plan on to Mr. Hadley, Mr. Luti and Mr. Rodman upon returning from the ’ Rome meeting.92 (I) The proposed funding for, and foreign involvement in, Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan for regime change were never fully understood. When the DoD began receiving questions on this topic in early 2002, several summaries were produced. A synopsis of the discussions in Rome on Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan, prepared by Mr. Rodman in mid—February 2002 with input from Mr. 86 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 29, 37 and 48-49. 87 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin Interview. 88 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 33-34. 89 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 26. 90 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 26-27 and 63-65. 91 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 27. 92 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 21-22, and 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, October 24, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 2. _ 15
  • _ Franklin, stated that Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Ghorbanifar advised Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode of "the ign government] support for this information collection opportunity and financing by [foreign] corporate enterprises midway through the interviews .... ." The summary goes on to indicate the costs would be in the millions and entailed "extrication /reentry of numerous sources, granting visas, and eventual resettlement outside of Iran. . ." A later version of this summary dated February 12, 2002 referenced contracts "that would assure oil and gas sales in the event of regime change."93 An action memo prepared by Mr. Rodman in July 2002 referred to "[m]ultimillion-dollar business deals that the h [foreign government (Israel)] arranged for the two Iranian interlocutors."94 Despite the changing descriptions of foreign involvement, there was no attempt by the DoD, or any other entity of the U.S. Governrnent, to determine the true intentions of the foreign government (Israel) with regard to interacting with the Iranians or Mr. Ghorbanifar. (U) The confusion within DoD channels over Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan and foreign involvement partially reflects that Messrs. Franklin and Rhode had focused on the assigned task of listening to the information provided by the Iranians. Officials from the DoD were consistent in stating that the DoD participants had been instructed prior to the meeting that their sole purpose in attending was to listen and bring back any useful information provided by the Iranians.95 Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode were also consistent in stating that they viewed the information gathering with the two Iranians and Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan to weaken the Iranian regime as two entirely separate issues. Mr. Franklin indicated that upon his return he made it clear to those in the OUSD(P) that there should be no follow up on Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan. He added that at no time during the follow-on contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar did he offer encouragement for the p1an.96 Ambassador and CIA Inquire About the Rome Meeting (U) Upon the return of Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode, and the completion of the Rome meeting summary, two series of events began to unfold. First, State Department and CIA officials attempted to determine what Mr. Ledeen and the DoD representatives had done in Rome, and second, DoD officials debated the next course of action. These deliberations eventually became intertwined, but the decision to limit coordination prior to the meeting, and concerns about Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan for regime change, essentially eliminated the potential for further contact with Iranian officials via Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Ghorbanifar. The two series of events are outlined below. 
  • (U) The U.S. ambassador to Italy at the time of the Rome meeting was Melvin Sembler. Ambassador Sembler had been sworn in on November 16, 2001. On December 12, 2001, during 93 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tabs 21, February 12, 2002, Note on foreign government (Israel) Support, and 22, February 12, 2002, Rome Meeting: References to Financin . 94 2004- F675, April 16, 2004, letter nom the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 25, July 19, 2002, Action Memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld. 95 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 27 and 58, 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 13, and 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter Bom the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 96 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 37 and 48-49. _ 16
Wayne Madsen Report  Ambassador Sembler
The Post's deputy foreign editor Peter Eisner has just co-written a book, "The Italian Letter," about the forged Niger documents that were used to lead the U.S. to war in Iraq. In the book, Eisner gives a virtual free pass to arch-neocon Michael Ledeen and his dealings with Iranian con man Manucher Ghorbanifar in helping to cook up the scheme. Eisner also suggests that the U.S. ambassador to Italy at the time, Mel Sembler , was out of the loop on the Ledeen-Ghorbanifar meetings. In fact, Sembler , as much a neocon as Ledeen , was not only aware of the meetings, according to our sources, but helped set them up. Eisner quotes an unnamed U.S. embassy source in Rome as stating that Sembler "blew a gasket" when he found out about Ledeen meetings in Rome. Sembler more likely blew a gasket when the details of the Niger forgeries and the role played by the neocon cabal in the Bush administration, a grouping that includes Ledeen , the Pentagon's Harold Rhode, and Sembler as charter members, became public. full article

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  • _ the course of the Rome meeting, Ambassador Sembler had breakfast with Mr. Ledeen . A February 2002 State Department cable indicated that Mr. Ledeen informed Ambassador Sembler that he was in Italy "under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense and that two DoD employees were with him. Their project was to make contact with high-level officials of the Iranian Intelligence Service."97 In Mr. Ledeen ’s 2004 testimony to the Committee he added that he had told the ambassador they were going to have conversations with Iranians who were promising to be helpful with terrorism, and that he had informed the ambassador as a courtesy and requested that he keep it to himself.98 In an August 2004 response to questions for the record, the State Department indicated that l\/Ir. Ledeen offered the ambassador no explanation for his wish to keep it confidential. The response further stated that Ambassador Sembler speculated that it derived from the involvement of the foreign government (Israel).99 The February 2002 State Department cable further indicated that l\/Ir. Ledeen told that ambassador that he would provide additional information after the Rome meeting. Later on December 12, 2001, Ambassador Sembler had dinner with the foreign government (Israel) official and his wife, and l\/Ir. Ledeen. The Rome meeting was not discussed over dinner.lOO 
  • (U) According to the February 2002 State Department cable, following the events of December 12, 2001, Ambassador Sembler asked a senior official at the embassy whether U.S. officials were required to seek country clearance to travel to Rome on official business. The ambassador also expressed awareness that 1\/Ir. Ledeen was not a U.S. Government employee and a lack of comfort with his activities. The senior official at the embassy denied any knowledge of Mr. Ledeen’s activities and confirmed the need for country clearance. The senior official at the embassy agreed to check with the embassy’s Defense Attaché for any further information.1O1 The Defense Attaché was unable to find anyone requesting such a clearance who matched the information provided by the senior official at the Embassy.]O2 
  • (U) According to the February 2002 State Department cable, on December 23, 2001, Ambassador Sembler had dinner with Mr. Ledeen and his family at the ambassador’s residence. The cable stated that in a private conversation with the ambassador Mr. Ledeen indicated that he had made contact with the Iranian officials and there was a "sizeable financial involvement to secure their cooperation." During the conversation Mr. Ledeen also expressed his belief that it was a deal the U.S. should take.1 3 The ambassador did not focus on the matter again until a call from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, on February 1, 2002, which the ambassador and his deputy were under the impression was prompted by the Under Secretary becoming aware of a summary of the Rome meeting prepared by 1\/Ir. Ledeen for Mr. Hadley.1°4‘ During that call the ambassador was provided what were believed to be the names of the DoD participants in the Rome meeting. Unbeknownst to the ambassador, one of the names was wrong, but after the call he contacted his deputy and the senior official at the embassy to 97 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). gg 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen , pages 11-12. 99 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #4. 100 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). ml 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). ‘°2 2003-4209, came, February 1, 2002. 103 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). 104 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #3. _ 17

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  • _ discuss the matter. Neither of them recognized the correct name of Mr. Rhode}05 The ambassador would memorialize his recollections of his prior discussions with Mr. Ledeen in a February 8, 2002 cable to Under Secretary Grossman, and defer further action on the matter to hjmlros (_) As noted above, in early December 200l Mr. Hadley had mentioned to DCI Tenet that the DoD might meet with Iranians in Europe to discuss terrorist threat information. The DCI had no details, however, on the location of the meeting or its participants.l°7 For that reason, during a January 14, 2002, meeting in the DCI’s office that 01010000 S0¤i0r CLA officials, the CIA participants were surprised when the foreign government (Israel) intelligence service asked if they were aware of DoD officials "coming to Italy to talk about Iran."1°8 The conversation was cut short and was not pursued at that time. When approached by the ambassador after his February 1, 2002, call from Under Secretary Grossman, however, - _ question durin the meeting at CIA headquarters with the activities of Mr. Ledeen . the ambassador had indicated that the DoD participants "were talking about 25 million [U.S. dollars] for some k.ind of Iran program." - noted that the ambassador speculated that "perhaps it was for some sort of opposition sup ort."1°9 . he DCI was in contact with Mr. Hadley about the matter. The DDO also expressed a number of concerns:110 First, I was not advised, the DCI was not advised, and you were not advised of DoD’s apparent use of- [foreign government (Israel)] to facilitate some sort of dialogue with the Iranian government. We were not asked to trace the names of the Iranians. We were not asked to comment on the substance of the alleged Iranian offer. 0n F¢bf¤¤1"y 7. 2002. indicated that the ambassador had clarified that it was the Iranians who had told the DoD officials that for $25 million they could provide “certain unspecified information and services."m He noted that the ambassador planned to inform Under Secretary Grossman that "given the discussion of money for services, this effort may be crossing into the area of covert action, for which he is not aware of any residential authorization."u2 - “" ibid 106 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). 107 At the Center of the Storm, George Tenet, page 312, and March l0, 2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George Tenet, page l. ‘°" 2003-4209, cebre, February 1, 2002. ‘°’ ibid “° 2003-4209, cebre, February s, 2002. ‘“ 2003-4209, cebre, February 7, 2002. *12 ibid _ 18

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  • _ Defense Department Decision on VVhether to Continue Contact 
  • (U) Mr. Franklin’s summary of the Rome meeting had been passed up his chain of command via Mr. Luti to Mr. Rodman. On January 7, 2002, Mr. Rodman drafted a letter for Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to send to DIA Director Wilson with a copy to Mr. Hadley. The draft letter reminded the Director of their previous interaction on the matter, advised that the meeting had taken place once it became known the Iranians merely intended to provide information and not defect, and requested that the Director review the attached summary to determine whether the DoD should pursue the matter further through DIA channels. This letter was never sent.115 Instead, a meeting was arranged between Mr. Rodman and Director Wilson for February 2, 2002. In a January 31, 2002, handwritten memo to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Mr. Rodman advised that the meeting was set, that a new version of the summary had been prepared, and reminded the Deputy Secretary that he had previously instructed him not to hand the summary over.116 Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz responded with a note indicating that the DoD needed to insulate the activity "from the appearance of being a policy channel, but it might be possible to include Rhode or Franklin as part of a DIA team." Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s response also reiterated the requirement that Director Wilson be allowed read the summary, but not ma.ke a copy, and observed that this would underscore that the Director was not to discuss the matter with anyone else until further authorized. The response also instructed Mr. Rodman to ask Director Wilson his opinion on the intelligence value of proceeding with further contact and how he would handle it if given the assignment.] 17
  • (U) Mr. Rodman met with Director Wilson on February 2, 2002, and later that day prepared a memorandum to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz summarizing the meeting. The memo noted that Director Wilson had been shown a copy of the summary, but it had not been left with him, and stated that the Director had found the information to be "mildly interesting." H8 Mr. H3 2003-4209, came, February 11, 2002. U4 2003-4209, came, March 21, 2002. 115 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 11, January 7, 2002, Memo from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Iranian Debrief 116 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 14, January 31, 2002, Handwritten note from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Iranian Matter. 117 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 15, February 1, 2002, Handwritten notes from Mr. Wolfowitz to Mr. Rodman on DIA Director Meeting. Us 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 17, February 2, 2002, Memo Hom Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Meeting with the DIA Director. NOTE: Admiral Wilson was DIA Director Hom July 1999 to July 2002. Committee staff interviewed Admiral Wilson via telephone on June 10, 2004. Admiral Wilson could not recall many of the events relating to the Rome meeting beyond advising Mr. Rodman that DIA could handle any further contacts with the Iranians and that they should be coordinated with the CIA. He could not recall reading the Rome meeting summary or referring to the information as _ 19

page 19

  • _ Rodman’s memo also indicated that Director Wilson had offered several different ways to pursue the matter ranging from continued debriefings to full recruitment. Director Wilson had noted that the DIA was capable of handling any of the options, but a clandestine recruitment would require coordination with the CIA, although DIA could perhaps do a one-time interview without informing the CIA in advance. Director Wilson wrote down the names of the Iranians and offered to conduct name traces, but was told to hold off until it was authorized at higher levels. Mr. Rodman reminded him to discuss the matter with no one else without author·ization.u9
  • (U) On February 5, 2002, Mr. Rodman prepared handwritten notes for a memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld outlining the potential options for moving forward with the Iranians. The options offered were to drop the matter, continue in non- intelligence channels, or to do it through the DIA without telling the CIA who the sources were.l2° An undated draft memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld that expanded on the material in the handwritten notes offered the same choices, but included the option to seek Presidential authority to override the DCID requirement for CIA coordination. The overall recommendation in the draft memo was to "put it into regular intelligence channels," but the memo noted the conflict between the alleged reluctance of the Iranians to deal with the CIA and the requirement to coordinate future contact with that agency. 121
  • (U) Handwritten notes from Mr. Rodman, dated February 9, 2002, indicate his awareness that the Rome meeting issue had become known to the CIA, Under Secretary Grossman, and the U.S. embassy in Rome. The notes indicate that because of Mr. Ghorbanifar the "whole world is involved," and contain the reference "$25 m[illion] ??" with no further explanation.122 The notes also state that Mr. Ledeen played a role in raising that awareness and that Mr. Rodman contacted him at his home that day.l 3 According to a draft chronology prepared for the Secretary of Defense by Mr. Rodman in August 2003, on February 9, 2002, the State Department and CIA indicated their opposition to further contact and as a result the DoD dropped the matter.124 (U) When the DoD decided to drop the matter in early February 2002, the information provided by the two Iranian sources had not been fully evaluated or vetted with other known information by the Intelligence Community, beyond Mr. Franklin passing a portion of the information collected to Special Forces in Afghanistan. Mr. Franklin told the Committee that mildly interesting. When interviewed in 2003 by the Counterintelligence Field Activity Admiral Wilson provided a similar response. 119 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 17, February 2, 2002, Memo from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Meeting with the DIA Director. 120 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 18, February 5, 2002, Handwritten Note from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz. 121 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 19, Draft Memo from Mr. Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld on Iranian Sources. 122 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tabs 21, rcbmapy 12, 2002, Nm.-; pp _ Support, and 22, Febmapy 12, 2002, Rome Muang; References to Financing, and 2004-4231 indicate that on February 12, 2002 Mr. Rodman researched the financial proposals discussed at the Rome meeting. To the best of Mr. Rodman’s recollection, Mr. Franklin assisted in drafting a memo on the subject dated February 12, 2002. 123 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 20, February 9, 2002, Handwritten Notes from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz. 124 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of Events. _ 20

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  • _ Mr. Rodman informed him that he had handed the Rome meeting summary to DIA Director Wilson and that "since it was given to the Director I knew that he would pass it down to desk analysts." However, he also stated that he was unaware of: any intelligence reports that were generated from the information; it being passed to another element of the Intelligence Community; or any actions that Director Wilson may have taken with his summary. He added that no one ever called him and asked for input.125 The Defense HUMINT Service representative that Mr. Franklin contacted after his return from the meeting told the Committee that beyond the verbal briefing from Mr. Franklin he never saw any intelligence reports or requests for further follow-up.126 The DIA analyst contacted by Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that to his knowledge there was no subsequent entry of the information provided by Mr. Franklin into DIA databases and it was not used in any DIA analytic products.12 As noted above, Director Wilson had not been allowed to retain a copy of the summary.
  • (U) In April 2002, the Defense HUMINT Service received an "executive referral" from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to meet with Mr. Ledeen . A Defense HUMINT Service contact memorandum describing the meeting indicated that the tasking resulted from a briefing on the Rome meeting from Mr. Ledeen to representatives in Mr. Rodman’s office. The Defense HUMINT Service document outlined the Rome meeting as recalled by Mr. Ledeen , and noted that Mr. Ledeen repeatedly declined to provide details that the interviewer deemed necessary to assess the validity of Mr. Ledeen ’s contacts such as specific names, locations, and contact information. The document indicated Mr. Ledeen promised more details once the DoD expressed real interest in pursuing further contact.1 8 (-) Information provided by the DoD in March 2008 indicates that after the interview of Mr. Ledeen , the Defense HUMINT Service held discussions with several <>¤mr¤¤¤¢¤tS Of the CTA, During the meeting, the Defense HUMINT Service learned that Mr. "Ledeen had a history of approaching his USG [U.S. Government] contacts with various ‘schemes’ to gain USG interest and/or support for various issues normally related to Hizbollah, Iran, and or Terrorism." The Service also became aware that some of Mr. Ledeen ’s contacts were considered "nefarious and unreliable." The Defense HUMINT Service determined that no further contact with Mr. Ledeen was warranted or advisable.129 The Ongoing Actions of Mr. Ledeen 
  • (U) After the Rome meeting, Mr. Ledeen continued to press for continued contact with the Iranians through his variety of contacts inside the U.S. Government. In mid-January 2002, 125 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 35-36 and 39. 126 2004-2735, Transcript of June 8, 2004, Staff Interview of [DIA Employee #1], pages 4-6. As noted later in this report, in April 2002, the Defense HU`M]NT Service received an "executive referral" from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to meet with Mr. Ledeen . A Defense HUMINT Service contact memorandum outlined the Rome meeting as recalled by Mr. Ledeen , but noted that Mr. Ledeen repeatedly declined to provide details such as specific names, locations, and contact information. 127 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with [DIA Analyst #1], page 2. 128 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #4, Undated DIA Contact Memorandum on Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Referral, pages 1-2. 129 2008-1182, March 12, 2008 DoD Response to Questions for the Record, Question #14. _ 21

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  • _ Mr. Ledeen held discussions with Mr. Rodman on how best to continue the exchange, and had scheduled a meeting with Mr. Hadley for January 16, 2002, to discuss the matter.13 Mr. Franklin advised the Committee that he became aware of Mr. Ledeen ’s efforts to push for other elements of the U.S. Government to hear Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan. He recalled being approached by an official from the Office of the Vice President in early 2002 requesting his opinion of Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan and his judgments of its prospects for success. Mr. Franklin stated that he recommended that it not be pursued. 131
  • (U) According to a draft chronology prepared for the Secretary of Defense by Mr. Rodman in August 2003, a memorandum that Mr. Ledeen had been circulating was sent from former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich to Secretary Rumsfeld in June 2002. The memorandum expressed concern about the failure to continue contact with Iranian officials who had provided valuable information in the past.132 The DoD provided the Committee with a copy of the memorandum with an explanatory note stating that while a stamp on the memorandum indicated the Secretary saw it on June 27, 2002, it merely reflected that the memorandum had "passed through" the Secretary’s office. The use of that stamp had since been discontinued.133
  • (U) According to a July 18, 2002 cable from Ambassador Sembler to Under Secretary Grossman, on July 4, 2002, Mr. Ledeen contacted Ambassador Sembler and at the end of a social conversation informed him that he would be returning to Rome in early August to "resume that program." The ambassador advised the Under Secretary that he presumed this to be a reference to the December meeting with Iranian officials and noted that these activities had undermined the credibility of the U.S. Government. The ambassador also indicated that Mr. Ledeen had only provided him with a small amount of information on the subject and went on to state that "I am increasingly concerned that his activity borders on, or has already entered, an area which would require explicit Presidential authorization and notification of the Chief of Mission."134 There was no response to the cable. The DDO added that CIA leadership had been informed and he had asked that the National Security Council be queried immediately. 136 According to handwritten notes prepared by Mr. Rodman and dated July 13, 2002, a special assistant to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, DoD Employee #2, had advised him that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had spoken with DCI Tenet and determined that the DCI now supported further contacts with the Iranians. In addition, Assistant 130 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 12, January 16, 2002, Note from [DoD Employee #1] to Mr. Rodman. m 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 43-44. 132 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of Events, page 2. 133 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 23, May 10, 2002 fax to Secretary Rumsfeld, and attached explanatory note. 134 2003-4617, Rome 03565, 18 July 2002 (State Department Cable). ‘” 2003-4209, came, July 15, 2002. 126 2003-4209, came, July 16, 2002. _ 22

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  • _ Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, Charles Allen, had been selected to coordinate on the matter.137
  • (U) On July 19, 2002, Mr. Rodman prepared an action memo for Secretary Rumsfeld in response to the Secretary’s request about what the DoD should do with respect to contacts with Iran, as described in the memo forwarded to him by former Speaker Gingrich. The action memo described the origins of the Rome meeting, and outlined complications due to the involvement of Mr. Ghorbanifar and the previous objections of DCI Tenet and Secretary of State, Colin Powell. The memo concluded with the recommendation that the "DoD be prepared to continue the contact, through regular DHS [Defense HUMINT Service] channels and with CIA coordination." The memo was reviewed by Under Secretary Feith, on July 25, 2002.13 8 <j> in 0 July 25, 2002, according to the ambassador, Under Secretary Grossman had raised the issue with Secretary Powell, who had proceeded to pursue it with Secretary Rumsfeld and the National Security Council. h at each step, Secretary Powell was advised that Mr. Ledeen ’s desire to continue the program at the planned August meeting was not authorized.139 An August 8, 2002 the CIA had been told by a National Security Council legal advisor that Mr. Hadley had personally chastised Mr. Ledeen for continuing to pursue the matter even though he had been told to desist in December 2001, and advised Mr. Ledeen in strong terms to "cease his activity on the issue." At that point, the DDO - concluded the matter was behind them.140 No such meeting organized by Mr. Ledeen occurred in the August 2002 timeframe.
  • (U) Ambassador Sembler traveled to Washington, D.C. for a series of meetings on September 4, 2002. During this visit the ambassador met with National Security Advisor Rice and Mr. Hadley and was advised that Mr. Ledeen ’s activities would not continue. He received a similar response from Deputy Secretary Armitage in a separate meeting.141
  •  
  • Other Related Activities
  • (U) The only other event related to the Rome meeting that occurred in 2002 involved a chance meeting between Mr. Rhode and one of the Iranians he and Mr. Franklin had met in Rome. According to a September 2003 interview of Mr. Rhode by the Counterintelligence Field Activity, in December 2002 Mr. Rhode attended a U.S. Government endorsed Iraqi opposition conference in London, England. According to Mr. Rhode a number of DoD and State Department personnel attended the conference. At the conference he unexpectedly encountered one of the Iranians he had met at the Rome meeting. The Iranian asked Mr. Rhode about U.S. views on regime change in Iran and Mr. Rhode indicated that those types of decisions were made 137 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative AEairs, Tab 24, July 13, 2002, Handwritten Notes of Mr. Rodman on a Discussion with [DoD Employee #2] , and 2007-1561 DoD IG source document #1, Draft 8/11/03 chronology, page 2. 138 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 25, July 19, 2002, Action Memo Hom Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld. 139 2003-4209, Cable, July 25, 2002. "° 2003-4209, cubic, August 8, 2002. 141 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #5. _ 23

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continued

 
  • the Al Husseir1, with an estimated range of 630 km, and "possibly" the Al Abbas, with an estimated range of 900 km. 
  • (U) The intelligence community also assessed that Iraq was working to develop new ballistic missiles with a range of 750-3000 km, which would be greater than its presumed "Scud-type force", but available intelligence indicated that Iraq was still at the early stages of development on this project  President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
  • (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated that "Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles. . .We’ve also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States."H2 
  • (U) As noted above, the IC assessed at that time that Iraq had a small force of pre-Gulf War Scud-variant missiles, with a likely range of 630-900 kilometers, or roughly 400-560 miles. The IC also assessed that Iraq was in the final stages of development of new short-range ballistic missiles, but estimated that the range of these missiles was 150-300 km, or under 200 miles. These judgments were contained in several assessments, including the October 1, 2002 NIE.m 
  • (U) The October 2002 NIE stated that Iraq was developing and flight-testing small-to-medium sized UAVs, and had a UAV development program that was "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agent". The majority of the IC also believed that at least one of these UAVs was close to being ready for operational use. The intelligence branch of the US Air Force disagreed with this part of the analysis of the UAV program, however. Air Force intelligence noted in the NIE that "CBW [chemical and biological weapons] delivery is an inherent capability" of UAVs, but judged that "the small size of Iraq’s new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance."H4 110 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; DIA, Iraq Missile Proliferation Activity, March 1, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002; Prepared Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 17, 2002; DIA, Military Threats to Israel, December 2002. U1 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. H2 White House Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. U3 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; DIA, Iraq Missile Proliferation Activity, March 1, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002; Prepared Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 17, 2002; DIA, Military Threats to Israel, December 2002; and National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. Committee staff were also permitted to view a one-page summary of the NIE, which was prepared for the President. This one-page summary included two sentences on delivery systems, which stated "Baghdad has some SRBMs that exceed UN range limits of 150 km. It has UAVs, probably fgrrcéegvery of biological weapons and less likely for chemical weapons agents? 1 . 53
  • (U) Despite the fabrication notice, the October 2002 Iraq WMD NIE cited four sources (not three as was included in the President’s speech the following January) of the mobile biological lab intelligence, including al-Assaf by name. 
  • (U) The October 2002 NIE said, "Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within several days these units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war." The NIE also said, "an Iraqi defector deemed credible by the IC said seven mobile BW production units were constructed and that one began production as early as l997."57 
  • (U) Prior to the President’s address, some CIA operations officers had doubts about the credibility of CURVE BALL and debated the point at high levels within the Directorate of Operations. Additionally, on December 20, 2002, the Chief of the relevant station cabled CIA headquarters to describe a meeting that day with the head of the foreign intelligence service handling CURVE BALL. The cable summarized the meeting and noted that the head of the service wrote a letter to the DCI to the effect that CURVEBALL’s reporting on mobile facilities "has not been verified." The CIA station did not send the actual letter from the head of the foreign intelligence service to CIA headquarters until February 5, 2003. On January 27, 2003, the same Chief of Station cautioned CIA headquarters in another cable to "take the most serious consideration" before using CURVEBALL’s information publicly. The Committee has found no evidence that then-Director Tenet or policymakers were informed of the doubts that some Intelligence Community officers had about CURVEBALL’s reliability or about concerns with using CURVEBALL’s information publicly. Secretary of State ’s Address t0 the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
  • (U) Secretary Powell’s presentation delved into greater detail on Iraq’s biological weapons program and capabilities. He said there "can be no doubt" that Iraq possessed biological weapons and discussed their means for delivery. He stated that rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent were dispersed to various locations, many of them hidden in large groves of palm trees, and moved every one to four weeks to escape detection. 
  • (U) Secretary Powell described the mobile labs in great detail. He cited sources with "iirst-hand descriptions" of the factories, and described four human sources in terms of their professions and access to the information. Powell stated that the labs — "at least seven" in number — on truck and rail cars "can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War." 
  • (U) Secretary Powell specified that the mobile labs can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin, and that overall, "Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox." 57 The National Intelligence Council subsequently notified recipients of the NIE that the term "several days" was an error and should be replaced with "three to six months." 

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  • (U) Finally, Powell referenced human sources that told the intelligence community that Iraq had experimented with biological weapons on human beings. (U) In addition to the intelligence assessments described above, reports relevant to whether specific claims in the February 5 speech were substantiated by the intelligence are described below. 
  • (U) The DIA issued a report in February 2003, Iraq: Denial and Deception: Iraqi Countertargeting Strategy, that stated it was standard denial and deception practice for Iraq to place various military hardware in, among other things, "palm and date tree groves. . .," but this report was issued after Secretary Powe11’s speech and did not mention biological weapons. There was operational intelligence traffic on this issue prior to the Secretary’s speech, but the Committee is not aware of prior analytical assessments. 
  • (U) The number of mobile labs — "at least seven" — was included in, among other reports, the December 2000 ICA and October 2002 NIE as described above. Multiple reports described seven mobile production facilities and provided schematic details on two- or three-railcar systems. 
  • (U) Secretary Powell stated that Iraq has investigated dozens of biological agents, and named eight specifically. All eight were included, along with 13 others, in a list in the October 2002 NIE entitled, "BW Agents that Iraq has researched." A report produced by CIA WINPAC on November 13, 2002 said that "Iraq probably possesses at least 20 to 25 different microbes or toxins for possible BW use."58 The same report had noted that Iraq ‘°has the capability to produce sufficient quantities [of smallpox] for use in various delivery systems."59 Numerous other intelligence assessments discussed Iraq’s capability to produce smallpox and other biological agents. 
  • (U) On the topic of human testing, the October 2002 NIE stated that "A former Directorate of General Security officer said that 1,600 death row prisoners in 1995 were transferred "to the Haditha area" for CBW testing-—probably to the Qadisiyah complex—from Baghdad prisons. Inmate transfer files from 1995 were missing during UNSCOM inspections of the Baghdad prisons in 1998, adding weight to the source’s claim." Additional Statements • "So, we know that he has stored the biological weapons. We know that he has used chemical weapons. And we know that he has looked for ways to weaponize those and I deliver them. — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002 58 November 13, 2002 CIA WINPAC assessment, Iraq: Biological Warfare Agents Pose Growing Threat to US Interests (CIAWINPAC IA 2002-060CX). 59 ibid. _  

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  • "But I can say obviously that they have had an enormous appetite for weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. They’ve taken these capabilities and weaponized them. They are continuing to do so today. They are looking not only at a variety of biological capabilities, but at a variety of ways of dispensing or weaponizing them so that they have a range of choices with respect to it." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "His regime has amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons, including anthrax and botulinim toxin and possibly smallpox. — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. • "They have amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons including anthrax and possibly smallpox." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, September 27, 2002 - • "[The Iraqi declaration has] no information about Iraq’s mobile biological-weapons production facilities. And, very disturbingly, Iraq has not accounted for some two tons of anthrax growth media." — Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Address to Council on Foreign Relations, January 1, 2003 • "The December 7, 2002 declaration was padded with reams of extraneous material, but failed to address scores of questions pending since 1998. It seeks to deceive when it says that Iraq has no ongoing WMD programs. Illustrative examples — but not a complete list — of Iraq’s omissions identified as issues by UNSCOM include ...tens of thousands of liters of unaccounted biological agents." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 • "Where is the evidence that Iraq has destroyed the tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and botulinum we know it had before it expelled the previous inspectors? This isn’t an American determination. This is the determination of previous inspectors... What happened to the three metric tons of growth material that Iraq imported which can be used for producing early, in very rapid fashion, deadly biological agents? Where the mobile vans that are nothing more than biological laboratories on wheels?" — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World Economic Forum, January 26, 2003 -• Firsthand witnesses have informed us that Iraq has at least seven mobile factories for the production of biological agents -— equipment mounted on trucks and rails to evade discovery. — President Bush, February 8, 2003, Radio address 
  • (U) These statements were consistent with the intelligence described above. 
  •  
  •  

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  • Conclusions 
  • (U) Conclusion 2: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s possession of biological agent, weapons, production capability, and use of mobile biological laboratories were substantiated by intelligence information. Intelligence assessments from the late l990s through early 2003 consistently stated that Iraq retained biological warfare agent and the capability to produce more. Assessments on the mobile facilities included the production capabilities of those labs, both in terms of type of agent and in amount. Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments left open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Postwar Intelligence 
  • (U) The postwar review by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) determined that Iraq was not conducting biological weapons production on research after 1996.60 The ISG determined that depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to months of a decision to do so, but found no indications that Iraq was pursuing this option.61 
  • (U) The ISG found "no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons."62 
  • (U) The Committee’s report, "Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments" described the postwar findings on CURVE BALL. It noted that the ISG "harbors severe doubts about the source’s credibility." The CIA and DIA issued a joint congressional notification in June 2004 noting that CURVE BALL was assessed to have fabricated his claimed access to a mobile BW production project and that his reporting had been recalled.63 ET Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Biological Section, p. l. Ibid, p.2. 62 rnd. 63 CIA and DIA Congressional Affairs Notification, June 7, 2004

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  • IV. Chemical Weapons • "The lraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "What he wants is time and more time to husband his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, and to gain possession of nuclear arms." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "United Nations’ inspections also revealed that lraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, ` mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas. Saddam Hussein also has experience in using chemical weapons. He has ordered chemical attacks on lran, and on more than forty villages in his own country. These actions killed or injured at least 20,000 people, more than six times the number of people who died in the attacks of September the 11th." — President George W. Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The lraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. lt possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons. Every chemical and biological weapon that lraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Yet, Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite intemational sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the civilized world." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons, and is increasing his capabilities to make more." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the last casualty in a war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he agreed to disarm of (sic) all weapons of mass destruction. For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons — not 

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  • economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile strikes on his military facilities. " — President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He’s not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them." — President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up sixteen of them — despite Iraq’s recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed them." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has undertaken an effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely associated with its past program to develop and produce chemical weapons." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq’s procurement efforts include: equipment that can filter and separate A microorganisms and toxins involved in biological weapons; equipment that can be used to concentrate the agent; growth media that can be used to continue producing anthrax and botulinum toxin; sterilization equipment for laboratories; glass-lined reactors and specialty pumps that can handle corrosive chemical weapons agents and precursors; large amounts of thionyl chloride, a precursor for nerve and blister agents; and other chemicals such as sodium sulfide, an important mustard agent precursor." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times the size of Manhattan.” - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again — against his neighbors and against his own people. And we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn’t be passing out the orders if he didn’t 

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  • _ have the weapons or the intent to use them." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We also have sources who tell us that since the 1980s, Saddam’s regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 Vice President ’s Speech in Tennessee Mugust 26, 2002) 
  • (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that Iraq has been "busy enhancing its capabilities in the iield of chemical" agents and that Saddam Hussein wanted "time and more time to husband his resources [and] to invest in his ongoing chemical" weapons program. 
  • (U) The Committee reviewed prewar intelligence assessments in its July 2004 report, US. Intelligence Community 's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. That report described a December 2000 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities, which represented the iirst comprehensive, coordinated report on all aspects of Iraq’s WMD capabilities since United Nations (UN) inspectors departed Iraq.
  • (U) The ICA stated that "Iraq’s expansion of its chemical industry is intended to support CW production" but that "we have seen no indication since the Gulf War that Iraq has engaged in large-scale production of CW agents, but we cannot rule out that small-scale production has occurred." 
  • (U) The ICA judged that "We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in bulk storage, production equipment, and iilled munitions that are still militarily useful." And that "[w]e assess the size of the CW agent stockpile to be 100 tons or less. We are uncertain about the extent and condition of Iraq’s stockpile, although we believe mustard agent- and to a lesser degree G-agents Sarin and VX — and related munitions probably are key components." The ICA noted that the available intelligence "suggests that a small portion of Iraq’s prewar stockpile of iilled munitions remains. Iraq also retains the capability to produce many types of weapons that could be filled with chemical agents." - The intelligence produced between the December 2000 ICA and the Vice President’s August 2002 speech tended to reiterate and confirm the ICA views. For example, a December 14, 2001 DIA assessment stated that "Saddam Hussein will continue to pursue a chemical weapons (CW) program to help ensure his personal survival and the survival of his regime, and to increase respect for Iraq as a regional power." It also stated that "Iraq is assessed to hold 100 metric tons of chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled munitions."64 The same assessment noted that DIA cannot confirm whether Iraq is currently producing chemical agents, or whether Baghdad has decided to re-establish a large—scale CW production capability. However, "we assess that Iraq has plans to re-establish such a capability." And "DL°1 judges that 64 DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December 14, 2001 (DI-1650-57-Ol). 

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  • Nearly 80% of Christian Fundamentalists voted for Bush in 2000, 2004, 2006...and now he has a less than 30% approval rating?
Without the Christian right, Bush would not have been elected, and consequently would not have been able to launch the Iraq War.

 

=go to NFU pages

Better than abstinence?

 
  • Saddam Husayn’s goal is to re-establish a robust chemical weapons (CW) progra1n." Also in December, the CIA wrote a Senior Executive Memorandum which stated that "_ - Iraq in the past several years has rebuilt a covert chemical weapons production capability by reconstructing dual-use industrial facilities and developing new chemical plans.66 
  • (U) A January 2002 Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post-I I September, stated "DIA cannot confirm with conidence that Iraq has successfully restarted an offensive CW program. However, if it has, Iraq probably can produce mustard, sarin or GF, and VX, though mustard may be the only agent it can produce without external resources."66 The assessment also commented on the possibility of using dual use facilities to produce chemical weapons agent, noting that "DIA cannot state with confidence the composition or total output of chemical products at (Iraq’s suspected CW) facilities, but production lines are currently operational. .. Currently, DIA cannot identify where the CW center of gravity exists, but it could be hidden in dual-use and industrial facilities." _ The question of Iraq’s production capabilities was also addressed in a May 16, 2002 CIA report, Iraq: Seeking To Expand CWProduction Capability. This report assessed that "Iraq in the past three years has sought foreign equipment and chemicals that would give it the capability to roduce chemical warfare (CW) agents for a limited strategic stockpile, according to reporting." The report went on to state that "Small-scale chemical agent production, probably of mustard, sarin, GF, and VX, could be hidden within Iraq’s legitimate chemical industry. Baghdad has the equipment and the expertise to match its pre-Gulf war production of nerve and blister agents, but Iraq’s inability to produce key precursors could limit nerve agent production."67 
  • (U) On August l, 2002, the CIA prepared another assessment which said, "Iraq probably has rebuilt a covert CW production capability by expanding its chemical industry. It is rebuilding former CW facilities, developing new chemical plants, and trying to procure CW-related items covertly. We judge it has the capability to produce mustard blister agent and the nerve agents sarin, GF, and VX. Iraq’s CW agent production capability probably is more limited than it was at the time of the Gulf war.68 (U) Thus while the intelligence community believed that the Iraqi regime had retained some chemical weapons and had worked to develop the capability to produce new chemical weapons at unknown levels within its civilian chemical infrastructure. The Intelligence Community had not reached conclusions on whether Iraq had actually begun production of chemical weapons. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 65 
  • CIA, SPWR, The Iraqi Threat, December 15, 2001 (SPWRl2l50l-07). 66 DIA, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs.· Post-!] September, January 2002 (DI- l 600-50Q-02-SCI). 67 CIA SEIB, Iraq: Seeking T 0 Expand C WPr0ducti0n Capability, May I6, 2002 (PASS SEIB 02-l l4 CHX). 68 CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Post Growing Threat, August l, 2002. 32

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  • (U) In the President’s September 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that UN inspections "revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents." This statement was consistent with the statements and intelligence above. 
  • (U) The President’s statement that Iraq was "rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of "` producing chemical weapons" suggests more coincedence in Iraq’s progress than the intelligence assessments at the time. Ir1 addition to the reports described earlier, a July 22, 2002 CIA assessment noted that "Iraq has rebuilt destroyed CW-related and civilian facilities while building a number of new, ostensibly civilian chemical production facilities. Although CIA does not know the function of these new facilities, chemical precursors and, in some cases, agent production could be conducted at dual-use chemical facilities.69 An April 2002 CIA paper noted that "Iraq has obtained technical and logistical support to rehabilitate its industrial chemical industry and potentially to rebuild its CW program. Most ... assistance has involved the reconstruction of the chlorine facility at Al Tareq. Al Tareq probably is still connected to Iraq’s CW program and could be converted quickly to CW precursor production."70 
  • (U) The September DIA report had written on this topic that "Iraq retains all the chemicals and equipment to produce the blister agent mustard but its ability for sustained production of G—series nerve agents and VX is constrained by its stockpile of key chemical precursors and by the destruction of all known CW production facilities during Operation Desert Storm and during subsequent UNSCOM inspections. In the absence of external aid, Iraq will likely experience difficulties in producing nerve agents at the rate executed before Operation Desert Storm" and that "Baghdad is rebuilding part of its chemical production infrastructure under the guise of a civilian need for pesticides, chlorine, and other legitimate chemical products, giving Iraq the potential for a small ‘breakout’ production capability."71 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
  • (U) The President discussed chemical weapons in greater detail at his Cincinnati speech of October 2002. He stated that "we know" that Iraq "has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas" and that Iraq has used chemical weapons before. The President stated that the Iraqi regime "possesses and produces chernical" weapons. He cited "surveillance photos" of rebuilding at facilities that had previously been used to produce chemical weapons. 
  • (U) A September 2002 DIA report stated that "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has —-or will--establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities." The same report, however, also said that "Iraq likely has resumed some chemical and biological agent production, but we lack conclusive proof due to Iraq’s effective national-level denial and deception (D&D) program."72 69 Iraq: Ensuring CBW Survivability, July 22, 2002, p.2. 70 Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Profiting From Equipment and Chemical Transfers, April 2002, p. l. 71 The DIA included similar language in a November 2002 report described later in this report. 72 DIA, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities - An Operational Support Study 2900-51 l-02, September 2002. 33
  •  

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  • (U) Intelligence community products clearly stated that Iraq had produced large volumes of chemical agents in the past, during and after its war with Iran. The intelligence community also agreed that Iraq had used chemical weapons before, against Iran in the 1980s and against Iraqi Kurds. As stated above, intelligence products prior to this speech but before the October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical weapons - 100 metric tons of chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled munitions. Director Tenet’s testimony to Senate Committees in September 2002 stated that "We assess that Iraq retains a stockpile of at least 100 tons of agent" but did not state an upper end for the estimate.7 
  • (U) Between the President’s September speech to the UN and the October speech in Cincirmati, the intelligence community had produced and disseminated its October 2002 NIE on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. In most respects, the NIE’s judgments were more assertive than previous intelligence judgments, stating that "We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX." 
  • (U) On the question of chemical weapons stockpile, the NIE updated the previous assessment- 100 tons or less — to an assessment that "Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents—much of it added in the last year." A footnote in the body of the report added that the 100 ton figure was a "conservative estimate" and that the "500-ton upper-end estimate takes into account practical bounds .... " In saying that Iraq "has produced thousands of tons" of agent, the President did not give the time frame for this production or say that Iraq had this volume of agent stockpiled. The intelligence at the time did not suggest that Iraq had produced — or was producing such quantities at the time of the speech, though Iraq had produced such quantities since the inception of its chemical weapons program. The NIE didn’t specifically state how much chemical agent Iraq could produce. It did state that "Iraq’s CW capability probably is more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent shelf life probably have been improved." - the intelligence community had produced reports on construction and activity at suspected chemical weapons facilities, in particular the Fallujah plants. These plants also had legitimate dual-use purposes for producing chlorine, but the intelligence community assessed that plants were producing more chemicals than were needed for civilian purposes. The NIE noted that Iraq’s legitimate needs were being met through authorized imports and other chlorine plants in the country, and listed other reasons to be skeptical that the plant was being used for legitimate purposes.74 President ’s State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003) 73 Testimony of Director George Tenet to the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 17, 2002. 74 October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. The other reasons were: a concern about the plant’s cover story, shallow burial of equipment for denial and deception purposes, Iraq’s use of its procurement network to obtain chemical weapons precursors, and that personnel identified with the previous weapons program were linked to the facility. 

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  •  
 
  • The moral majority, perverts, child abusers.
  • Power and pedophilia, sexual deviants.

 

The worst President ever.

 
  • (U) In the President’s State of the Union Address in January 2003, he said nothing has restrained Saddam Hussein from his pursuit of chemical weapons (along with other WMD). He cited intelligence estimates that Hussein "had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent" and a former stockpile of "upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents” that had not been accounted for. A _ 
  • (U) As described above, the October 2002 NIE stated that Iraq had, as an upper limit, 500 tons on chemical agent and that Iraq had renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX. 
  • (U) A November 2002 DIA report had stated that "Baghdad probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of CW agents -- much of it added in the last year.” That same report also contrasted with the NIE’s judgment that "Baghdad has begtm renewed production” of certain CW agents, saying that "No reliable information indicates whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where the country has — or will — establish its chemical agent production facilities." The report also stated, however, that "Iraq probably has resumed some chemical and biological agent production, but no conclusive proof is available because of the effective national-level denial and deception program.”75 
  • (U) The Intelligence Community regularly reported that Iraq had not accounted for its previous chemical weapons or precursor stockpiles and that Iraq retained a large number of munitions capable of delivering chemical weapons. The NIE stated that "Iraq provided little verifiable evidence that it unilaterally destroyed 15,000 artillery rockets after the Gulf war." 
  • (U) The reference to 30,000 (empty) chemical agent munitions was based on UNSCOM reporting. The Intelligence Community had provided assessments to policymakers in December 2002 and January 2003 on Iraq’s WMD declarations. One assessment stated that "[The declaration] fails to address unaccounted chemical munitions disputed by the UN, including 550 155mm mustard filled artillery shells or 30,000 empty CW munitions."76 Another, provided by the CIA in advance of Secretary Powell’s speech, stated that, "Baghdad did not account for 30,000 empty prewar munitions, which leaves us concerned that Iraq retained a supply for later filling with CW agents."77 Secretary of State ’s Address t0 the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (U) Secretary Powell’s February 2003 speech repeated many of the statements addressed above. He stated that ‘%zve know Iraq has embedded key portions" of a chemical weapons program into its civilian industry and reconstituted facilities associated with its past weapons program. Secretary Powell addressed the intelligence on Iraq’s stockpile as had been done in speeches described above, saying that "[o]ur conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent." 75 DLA, Iraq’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapon and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities DI-1569-44-02, November 2002. 76 US Analysis of Iraq’s Declaration, 7 December 2002. 77 CIA input for Powell speech, provided to the White House in mid-January 2003. 

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  • (U) Also described in this statement but not the others previously addressed, Secretary Powell referenced human sources who said that Saddam Hussein had authorized field commanders to use chemical weapons. He also referred to sources claims that Saddam Hussein’s regime had experimented on human beings as part of its chemical weapons program. 
  • (U) As described above, the October 2002 NIE assessed that 100 tons of chemical weapons agent was a "conservative estimate" and that Iraq could possess "possibly as much as 500 MT." A footnote to the NIE elaborated that the Intelligence Community believed that "the Iraqis are capable of producing significantly larger quantities of CQ agent in some scenarios; the 500-ton upper-end estimate takes into account practical bounds, such as Iraq’s limited delivery options, and approximates Iraq’s stocks at the time of Operation Desert Storm."78 According to the Committee’s first report, analysts believed that the 500 ton figure was meant as an upper bound, and not as an estimate of Iraq’s stockpile.79 
  • (U) In two places, the October 2002 NIE states that Saddam Hussein had delegated the authority to use chemical weapons to "corps-level commanders" at the end of the Iran-Iraq war or shortly aferwards. 
  • (U) On the topic of human testing, the October 2002 NIE stated that "A former Directorate of General Security officer said that 1,600 death row prisoners in 1995 were transferred "to the Haditha area" for CBW testing—probably to the Qadisiyah complex—from Baghdad prisons. Inmate transfer files from 1995 were missing during UNSCOM inspections of the Baghdad prisons in 1998, adding weight to the source’s claim.”80 Other Statements • There’s no doubt that he has chemical weapon stocks. We destroyed some after the Gulf War with the inspection regime, but there’s no doubt in our mind that he still has chemical weapon stocks and he has the capacity to produce more chemical weapons. — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Fox News Sunday, September 8, 2002. • "So, we know that he has stored the biological weapons. We know that he has used chemical weapons. And we know that he has looked for ways to weaponize those and deliver them. — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002 7* me at 28. 79 SSCI report at 206. 80 Additional reporting on human experimentation was in a CIA SPWR (Senior Publish When Ready), Possible Experimentation on Prisoners, December 30, 2002, which reported that "Baghdad is experimenting on prisoners with toxic substances" and that Iraq had used prisoners for biological and chemical agent testing in the 1980s and 1990s.

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  • • “His regime has amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX and sarin and mustard gas." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. • “He’s got chemical weapons; he needs to get rid of them, all of them." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Houston, Texas, September 26, 2002. • "They have amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons including anthrax and possibly smallpox. They have amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons including VX and sarin and mustard gas. His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, September 27, 2002 • "His regime has large, unaccounted for stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons - including VX, sarin, mustard gas, anthrax, botulism, and possibly smallpox - and he has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks to ROA, January 20, 2003 • "The December 7, 2002 declaration was padded with reams of extraneous material, but failed to address scores of questions pending since 1998. It seeks to deceive when it says that Iraq has no ongoing VVMD programs. Illustrative examples — but not a complete list — of Iraq’s omissions identified as issues by UNSCOM include: 550 artillery munitions filled with mustard agent; tons of unaccounted for chemical weapons precursors; 30,000 empty chemical munitions; tens of thousands of liters of unaccounted biological agents." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 • "What happened to nearly 30,000 munitions capable of carrying chemical agents? Saddam should tell the truth, and tell the truth now. The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World Economic Forum, January 26, 2003 (U) These statements were consistent with the intelligence described above. 
  •  
  • Conclusions 
  • (U) Conclusion 3: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s possession of chemical weapons were substantiated by intelligence information. Intelligence assessments, including the December 2000 ICA stated that Iraq had retained up to 100 metric tons of its chemical weapons stockpile. The October 2002 NIE provided a range of 100 to 500 metric tons of chemical weapons.

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  •  
  • (U`) Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing. The intelligence community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to have chemical weapons production capability and that Iraq was seeking to hide such capability in its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence assessments, especially prior to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that analysts could not confirm that production was ongoing. 
  • Postwar Findings 
  • (U`) The Committee reported on postwar findings on Iraq’s chemical weapons program in its September 2006 report, Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments. The Committee found the following. 
  • (U`) Following the war, the Iraq Survey Group conducted its review of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and found that there "were no caches of CW munitions and no single rounds of CW munitions." Additionally, "the ISG has high confidence that there are no CW present in the Iraqi inventory."8l Some pre-1991 chemical weapons munitions have been found since the end of the combat operations. 
  • (U`) The ISG found no credible evidence indicating Iraq resumed its chemical weapons program after 1991, but said that "Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable."82 
  • (U`) The ISG investigated whether Iraq had intended to produce chemical weapons through its civilian chemical industry. It found that Iraq had an inherent capability to use its civilian industry for sulfur mustard CW agents, but did not find any production units that had been configured to produce CW agents or key chemical precursors. The ISG found that Iraq did not have a capability to produce nerve agents.83 gl Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chemical Section at p. 123. 82 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chemical Section at p. land 97. 83 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chemical Section at p. 25. _ 38

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  •  
  • V. Weapons of Mass Destruction • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "As former Secretary of State Kissinger recently stated: ‘The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system, and the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action."’ - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a - nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "If we know that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today — and we do- does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?" - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Saddam is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of death and destruction." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "From intelligence sources we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials fiom the UN inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors themselves." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002 • "Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003

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  • "Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction, to keep them from being found by inspectors." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "VVe also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address t0 the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 
  • (U) In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State all stated that the Iraqi government possessed weapons of mass destruction. In later speeches, both the President and the Secretary of State said that the Iraqi government was engaged in a large- scale deception effort to conceal weapons of mass destruction programs from United Nations inspectors. 
  • (U) Scope Note: The term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (or ‘WMD’) is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and this is the official Department of Defense definition.84 No official definition existed for the intelligence community at the time of the speeches being examined, and different intelligence products have used different definitions. A substantial number of policymaker statements regarding Iraq referred generally to ‘weapons of mass destruction"‘, without specifying whether the weapons in question were nuclear, biological, chemical, or some combination thereof. This section examines statements that refer generally to ‘weapons of mass destruction’, and compares them to intelligence regarding these three types of weapons. Statements regarding specific types of weapons are discussed in the other, corresponding sections of this report. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) 
  • (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that "there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction," and that "there is no doubt he is amassing them". He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing "the imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" with regard to Iraq, and "the huge dangers it involves", as evidence that preemptive action was necessary.85 
  • (U) As noted, the term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed that Iraq 84 Discussions of WMD frequently include references to ballistic missiles and other WMD delivery systems, but delivery systems by themselves are specifically excluded from the official Department of Defense definition. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms dennes "weapons of mass destruction" as "Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high-yield explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon." 85 White House Transcript, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention, August 26, 2002. 40
  • possessed nuclear weapons, but reached different conclusions about chemical and biological weapons.86 
  • (U) In the late 1990s and early 2000s the intelligence community had consistently assessed that Iraq possessed remnants from its previous biological weapons stockpile. Some reporting also assessed that Iraq had an active biological weapons program, and that production of biological weapons was ongoing.87 
  • (U) During this same time frame, intelligence assessments noted that Iraq maintained a small stockpile of pre-Gulf War chemical weapons. Some assessments stated that Iraq had developed the capability to produce new chemical weapons at unknown levels within its civilian chemical infrastructure, while other assessments were not conclusive on this point. The Intelligence Community had not reached conclusions about whether Iraq had actually begun production of chemical weapons.88 
  • (U) The intelligence community’s assessments regarding Iraqi possession and production of chemical and biological weapons remained consistent until the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 
  • (U) In the President’s September 2002 address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Saddam Hussein’s regime was a "grave and gathering danger", and "continues to develop weapons of mass destruction." He did not state that Iraq possessed or produced weapons of mass destruction at that time.89 
  • (U) Several intelligence assessments discussed Iraq’s development of "weapons of mass destruction" generally. While not from a iinished intelligence product, a briefing book prepared by the CIA in May 2002 for the Prirrcipals’ Committee of the National Security Council said that "Iraq’s activities since 1998 clearly show that it has repaired and expanded dual-use WMD facilities, increased WMD production capabilities, and advanced clandestine production and procurement? As of September 2002, intelligence community assessments stated that Iraq had worked to rebuild a chemical weapons production capacity within its civilian industry but did not state that production was ongoing. The intelligence community also assessed that Iraq maintained the capability to produce biological weapons, and the CIA assessed that production was ongoing.9° 86 A summary of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding nuclear weapons and Iraq can be found in the Nuclear Weapons section of this report. 87 A summary of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding biological weapons and Iraq can be found in the Biological Weapons section of this report. 88 A summary of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding chemical weapons and Iraq can be found in the Chemical Weapons section of this report. 89 White House Transcript, President ’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly. 90 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; CIA Iraq Seeking To Expand C WProduction Capacity, May 16, 2002; DIA Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook. _ 41

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  • (U) The intelligence community did not publish a coordinated community judgment that Iraq had begun to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program until October 2002. I However, as discussed in the Nuclear Weapons section of this report, by September 2002 both the CIA and the DIA concluded that reconstitution had begun.92 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October Z 2002) 
  • (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated that "we know that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today" and that "Saddam is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of death and destruction." He also implied that Saddam was likely to develop "even more dangerous weapons."93 
  • (U) The October 2002 NIE assessed with high levels of confidence that Iraq possessed both chemical and biological weapons and was continuing with active production programs. This represented a shift from previous intelligence community assessments, which concluded that Iraq probably possessed a small stockpile of chemical weapons and biological weapons. Previous community assessments did not judge that Iraq was actively producing chemical weapons, and had lower confidence that biological weapons production was ongoing. Intelligence agencies did not agree on the question of whether Baghdad was attempting to reconstitute its nuclear program, but the majority view of the NIE (which all agencies except State/INR supported) concluded that reconstitution had begun, and that Iraq would probably be able to produce a nuclear weapon in the next five to seven years.94 President’s State of the Union Address (January 29, 2003) 
  • (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he stated that "thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials from the UN inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites, and monitoring the inspectors themselves."95 
  • (U) As of January 2003, the intelligence community had not produced a coordinated assessment regarding the Iraqi government’s response to the ongoing UNMOVIC inspections. However, both the CIA and the DIA had produced multiple reports suggesting that active deception efforts were underway, and that these efforts ir1cluded sanitizing weapons facilities as well as concealing 91 The 2002 NIE represented the first collective intelligence community assessment on this topic since the December 2001 NIE, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. The December 2001 NIE was consistent with previous assessments that Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. 92 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq 's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Defense Intelligence Assessment Iraq 's Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program, September 2002; CIA Iraq: Expanding WILID Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002. 93 White House Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. 94 Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq.· Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities, December 2000; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 95 White House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union ", January 28, 2003. 

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  • documents and other evidence. The reports generally did not describe the number of Iraqis involved in these apparent efforts with any speciiicity.96 Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
  • (U) In the Secretary of State’s February 5, 2003 address to the United Nations Security Council, he said that the Iraqi regime was actively concealing "efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction." He stated that numerous hrunan sources had reported that Iraqis were concealing "not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction" from UN inspectors. He said that satellite photos "indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities."9' 
  • (U) A coordinated Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) from February 2003, entitled Iraq 's Denial and Deception Capabilities judged that Iraq successfully employed a number of denial and deception techniques against UN inspectors and US intelligence agencies. The ICA stated that these techniques included moving prohibited materials and evidence among multiple "hide sites", and that this conclusion was based on reporting from human sources and "defector testimony". The ICA also included recent satellite imagery of a storage facility that "showed the removal of possible chemical munitions from this site, almost certainly to thwart the UNMOVIC inspections conducted there."98 Additional Statements • "Every world leader that comes to see me, I explain our concerns about a nation which is not conforming to agreements that it made in the past; a nation which has gassed her people in the past; a nation which has weapons of mass destruction and apparently is not afraid to use them." —President George W Bush, Press Conkrence, March I3, 2002 • "And [Saddam Hussein] is a man who refuses to allow us to determine whether or not he still has weapons of mass destruction, which leads me to believe he does. He is a dangerous man who possesses the world’s most dangerous weapons". — President George W Bush, Press Conference, March 22, 2002 • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use them against our friends, against our allies and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors; confrontations that 96Iraq.· Bolstering Ejjbrts to Deceive Inspectors, November 30, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Moving C WInto Underground Facilities, December 17, 2002; DIA Executive Highlight, Iraq: Reports of Iraq concealing experts on weapons of mass destruction increased notably during the past week January 6, 2003; CIA, Iraq: Undermining WMD Inspections, January 6, 2003; DIA Executive Highlight, Iraq: The Iraqi Intelligence Service has taken on an increased role in concealment of Iraq 's weapons of mass destruction experts, January 9, 2003. 97 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 98 Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq 's Denial and Deception Capabilities, February 2003.

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  • will involve both the weapons that he has today and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth. ... In the face of such a threat, we must proceed with care, deliberation and in consultation with our allies. ...What we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is to give in to wishful thinking or to willful blindness.’ — Vice President Dick Cheney, Statement before the Veterans of the Korean War, San Antonio, Texas, August, 29, 2002 • "l’m deeply concerned about a leader who has ignored all -- who ignored the United Nations for all these years, has refused to conform to resolution after resolution after resolution; who has weapons of mass destruction. And the battlefield has now shifted to America, so there’s a different dynamic than we’ve ever faced before." - President George W Bush, Remarks at the Afghanistan Embassy, September 10, 2002 • "l would respond this way. lf failure to comply with weapons of mass destruction inspections is a casus belli, the UN already has it." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "...[I]t’s clear from the Iraqi regime’s eleven years of defiance that containment has not led to their compliance. To the contrary, contair1ment is breaking dowr1." — Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 r • "And [Saddam Hussein] has biological and chemical weapons. And he is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The region knows that." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "[Saddam Hussein] has in place an elaborate organized system of denial and deception to frustrate both inspectors and outside intelligence efforts. ...We do know that the Iraqi regime has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, that they’re pursuing nuclear weapons, that they’ve a proven willingness to use those weapons... ...We do know that Saddam Hussein has been actively and persistently pursuing nuclear weapons for more than 20 years, but we should be just as concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002 • "[T]his is a man who has weapons of mass destruction and says he doesn’t. He poses a serious threat to the American people." — President George W Bush, Remarks at OHS Complex, September 19, 2002 • "We can have debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile of WMD and of mid- and long-range missiles. But no one can doubt the record of Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions, one after another, and for twelve long years." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, September 19, 2002 _ 44

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  • • "These four years have been more than enough time for Iraq to procure, develop, and hide proscribed items well beyond the reach of the kinds of inspectors that were subject to Sadda.m’s cheat and retreat program from 1991 to 1998." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, September 19, 2002 • ". . .[N]o one can doubt that the Iraqi dictator’s intentions have not changed. He wants weapons of mass destruction as clearly as he wants to remain in power." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, September 19, 2002 • "The point is this: we know Iraq possesses biological weapons, and chemical weapons, and is expanding and improving their capabilities to produce them. That should be of every bit as much concern as Iraq’s potential nuclear capability." — Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Testimony before SASC, September 19, 2002 • "For eleven years he’s claimed he has had no weapons and, yet, we know he has." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Trenton, New Jersey, September 23, 2002 • "We know they [the Iraqi regime] have weapons of mass destruction. We know they have active programs. There isn’t any debate about it." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defense Press Conference, September 26, 2002 • "[Saddam Hussein’s] got chemical weapons; he needs to get rid of them, all of them. He’s got biological weapons; he needs to destroy all of them. There’s no doubt in my mind he wants to have a nuclear weapon, and he’s got some capacity. I’m not saying he’s got one yet, but he’s developing the capacity, as we learned right after Desert Storm...The burden of proof is on Saddam Hussein." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Houston, Texas, September 26, 2002 • "We can have debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile, we can have debates about how long it will take him to reach this level of readiness or that level of readiness with respect to these weapons, but no one can doubt two things: One, they are in violation of these resolutions. There’s no debate about that. And secondly, they have not lost the intent to develop these weapons of mass destruction, whether they are one day, five days, one year, or seven years away from any particular weapon, whether their stockpile is small, medium or large, what has not been lost is the intent to have such weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 26, 2002 • "The danger to our country is grave. The danger to our country is growing. The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons." — President George W Bush, Statement in the Rose Garden, September 26, 2002 • "The man who said he would get rid of weapons of mass destruction still has them. And we need to fear the fact that he has weapons of mass destruction. He’s used them before.

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  • He’s used them on his own people before. He’s invaded two countries. He’s lied and deceived the world." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Denver, Colorado, September 27, 2002 • "We know [Saddam’s] got chemical weapons, probably has biological weapons." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, November 1, 2002 • "Well, we know that Saddam Hussein has chemical and biological weapons. And we know he has an active program for the development of nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Dejense Donald Rumsfeld, CBS Radio, November 14, 2002 • "In short, we have not seen anything that indicates that the Iraqi regime has made a strategic decision to disarm. On the contrary, we believe that Iraq is actively working to disrupt, deny and defeat inspectors." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 • "So far, however, there are no signs that the regime has taken the decision to make a strategic shift in its approach and to give up its WMD. Indeed, there are many troubling and serious signs that it has no intention to disarm at all." — President Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2003, January 20, 2003 • "Even more serious is Iraq’s response to UNSCR 1441 ’s requirement that Iraq make a "currently accurate, full and complete" declaration of its weapons of mass destruction activities. Iraq’s declaration was incomplete and inaccurate." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 • "[Saddam Hussein] has been told to disarm for eleven long years. He’s not disarming." — President George W Bush, remarks with economists, January 2], 2003 • "[Saddam Hussein] has weapons of mass destruction, the world’s deadliest weapons, which pose a direct threat to the United States, our citizens and our friends and a1lies." — President George W Bush, Remarks with Economists, January 2], 2003 • "The Iraqi regime has actively and secretly attempted to obtain equipment needed to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons." —— President George Bush, Press Conference, February 6, 2003 • "In this case, we’re dealing with a country, a regime that has chemical weapons, biological weapons and a nuclear program, and has used chemical weapons against its neighbors and its own people." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Press Conference, February 7, 2003.

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  • "So has the strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction by the leadership of Baghdad? I think our judgment has to be clearly not." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, United Nations Security Council, March 7, 2003 • "But we also have to address the question of where might these terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons? And Saddam Hussein becomes a prime suspect in that regard because of his past track record and because we know he has, in fact, developed these kinds of capabilities, chemical and biological weapons. We know he’s used chemical weapons. We know he’s reconstituted these programs since the Gulf War. We know he’s out trying once again to produce nuclear weapons and we know that he has a long-standing relationship with various terrorist groups, including the al-Qaeda organization." — Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, March 16, 2003 • "lntelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised." — President George W Bush, Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003 • "The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons." — President Bush, Report in Connection w/ Presidential Determination under PL 107-244, March 19, 2003 
  • (U) The above statements are all consistent with the five policy speeches analyzed. The statements below differ in significant ways, either by making different assertions or addressing different topics. • "They now have massive tunneling systems. . .They’ve got all kinds of things that have happened in the period when the inspectors have been out. So the problem is greater today. And the regime that exists today in the U.N. is one that has far fewer teeth than the one you are describing." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "Even the most intrusive inspection regime would have difficulty getting at all of [Saddam Hussein’s] weapons of mass destruction. Many of his WMD capabilities are mobile; they can be hidden from inspectors no matter how intrusive. He has vast underground networks and facilities and sophisticated denial and deception techniques." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "[W]e simply do not know where all or even a large portion of Iraq’s WMD facilities are. We do know where a fraction of them are. . .[O]f the facilities we do know, not all are vulnerable to attack from the air. A good many are underground and deeply buried. Others are purposely located near population centers —— schools, hospitals, mosques — where an air strike could kill a large number of innocent people. The Iraq problem cannot be solved by air strikes alone." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002 

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  • • "Iraqi operatives continue to hide biological and chemical agents to avoid detection by inspectors. In some cases, these materials have been moved to different locations every l2 to 24 hours, or placed in vehicles that are in residential neighborhoods." — President George W Bush, National Press Conference, March 6, 2003 • "He claims to have no chemical or biological weapons, yet we know he continues to hide biological and chemical weapons, moving them to different locations as often as l2 to 24 hours, and placing them in residential neighborhoods." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Press Conference, March I 1, 2003 
  • (U) In testimony before Congress on September 18 and l9, 2002, the Secretary of Defense stated that the Iraqi regime had developed extensive underground facilities and elaborate deception techniques to conceal WMD prograrns.99 
  • (U) Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, intelligence agencies consistently assessed that the Iraqi regime engaged in aggressive denial and deception tactics, particularly with regard to weapons programs}0 - The Iraqi regime was known to have constructed underground facilities for a variety of purposes, but the intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried facilities. US intelligence analysts suspected that the regime might be using underground facilities to conceal weapons activities, and there was some unconfirmed reporting that suggested this, but no intelligence agency claimed to know the location of any active underground WMD facilities, and none expressed certainty that such facilities existed. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in 2001 that "elements of the regime’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs robably are located in underground facilities", but noted that "neither _ ¤<>r i¤t¢11ig¢¤<>¢ S<>¤r<>¢S have confirmed any WMD- or ballistic missile related underground facilities." An August 2002 DIA report noted that "Iraq has reportedly rebuilt its full offensive BW program in well- concealed, underground, mobile or difficult-to-locate facilities" but went on to state that "no biological weapons (BW)-related underground facilities are currently confirmed to be in use in Iraq".1°1 
  • (U) In November 2002, the National Intelligence Council prepared an assessment on underground facilities in response to a request from the Secretary of Defense. This report stated that Iraq had an extensive network of underground facilities "consisting primarily of earth- bunkered aboveground structures, basement bunkers, and shallow-buried facilities." It went on 99 Department of Defense Transcript, Testimony as Delivered before the House Armed Services Committee regarding Iraq, September 18, 2002; Department of Defense Transcript, Testimony as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald Rums eld be ore the Senate Armed Services Committee re ardin Ira , Se tember 19, 2002. M mA. [mq.- 1r¤qiDe¤i¤1 and Deception: Countertargeting Methods, February 28, 1998; CIA, Iraq: Status of the Nuclear Program, January 11, 2002; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook, May 2002. wl DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December 14, 2001; DLA, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook August 2002. Both of these assessments noted that Iraq had stored some biological and chemical munitions underground during the Gulf War.

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  • to say that "We assess that Iraq has some large, deeply buried UGFs, but, because of the Iraqi denial and deception (D&D) program, we have not been able to locate any of these. . .A1l the military and regime-associated UGFs [underground facilities] we have identified thus far are vulnerable to conventional, precision- guided, penetrating munitions because they are not deeply cd>»·lO2 • "Iraq must be disarmed of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, weapons production capabilities, and the means to deliver these weapons. This will be a complex, dangerous, and expensive task -- one for which detailed planning is underway. Third, we must also eliminate Iraq’s terrorist infrastructure." — Mr. Stephan Hadley, Remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations, February I2, 2003 
  • (U) In a speech in February 2003, the Deputy National Security Advisor stated that Iraq needed to be disarmed of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, production capabilities and delivery systems. The October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, but the intelligence community did not assess that Iraq had nuclear weapons.1°3 _ The assertion in the final two statements about movement of materials matched a February 2003 CIA assessment, reporting a "mid-ranking Iraqi security officer involved in the surveillance of United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) activities in Iraq" who said Iraqi authorities had "decided that prohibited materials would never remain in any one location for more than 12 hours or 24 hours at the most and only under specifc circumstances."1°4 A second report sourced to an "Iraqi Security Officia1" said that Iraq’s WIWD "had begun being moved to new locations every 12 hours."1°6 Conclusions 
  • (U) Conclusion 5: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction were generally substantiated by intelligence information, though many statements made 102 National Intelligence Council, Implications of Iraqi Underground Facilities for US National Security, November 2002. '°3 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs or Weapons 0 Mass Destruction, October 2002. IM CIA assessment, DO Memorandum Intelligence Report, Feb 12, 2003. CIA DO Memorandum Intelligence Report, Q Fcbm 12, 2002. CIA 2003.

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  •  regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected a higher level of certainty than the intelligence judgments themselves. Many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt that the Iraqi government possessed or was producing weapons of mass destruction. While the intelligence community assessed at this time that the Iraqi regime possessed some chemical and biological munitions, most reports produced prior to fall 2002 cited intelligence gaps regarding production and expressed room for doubt about whether production was ongoing. Prior to late 2002, the intelligence community did not collectively assess with any certainty that Iraq was actively producing any weapons of mass destruction. 
  • (U) Conclusion 6: The Secretary of Defense’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional air strikes because they were underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available intelligence information. While many intelligence analysts suspected that the Iraqi government might be using underground facilities to conceal WMD activities, no active underground WMD facilities had been positively identified. Furthermore, none of the underground government facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be safe from conventional air strikes. Postwar Findings 
  • (U) Postwar findings regarding weapons of mass destruction can be found in the nuclear, biological, and chemical sections of this report. 50

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  • VI. Delivery • "Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can [sic] inflict mass death throughout the region." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles. . .We’ve also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets." - ` Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "1n 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif, told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "While inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited ballistic missiles, numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometers." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "What 1 want you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for over a decade." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "According to Iraq’s December 7m declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq’s newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 

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  • kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted here." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq could use these small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver biological agents to its neighbors, or if transported, to other countries, including the United States." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 
  • (U) In major policy speeches the President and the Secretary of State described Iraq as possessing and developing advanced weapon systems, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles and longer-range ballistic missiles. Both the President and the Secretary of State suggested that these weapon systems could be used for long-range biological or chemical attacks. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 
  • (U) In the President’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that "Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can [sic] inflict mass death throughout the region."l°7 This statement included two separate assertions: that Iraq possessed missiles with greater-than-permitted range, and that Iraq was building more long-range missiles and increasing the size of its missile force. This statement also implied that these missiles could be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction, but this was not specifically stated. 
  • (U) Iraq’s ballistic missile force, as viewed by US intelligence analysts in 2002, can be broken into three fairly distinct categories: 1) older Scud-type missiles with ranges of 625-900 km, remaining from its pre-Gulf War missile force, 2) newer A1-Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles with estimated ranges of 150-300 km, and 3) future medium-range missiles with ranges of 750- 3000 km (which were assessed in 2002 to still be in the development stage). The maximum range permitted by UN sanctions was 150 km. 
  • (U) The CIA and DIA both assessed that Iraq was in the process of deploying the A1-Samoud and Ababil-100 short-range missiles. Estimates of these missiles’ range varied between 150 and 300 km.‘°8 
  • (U) At this time the intelligence community also assessed that Iraq possessed a small number of pre-Gulf War Scud-variant short-range ballistic missiles. Estimates varied as to the size of this force, but a May 2002 assessment from State INR stated that "the highest estimates are on the order of 25-30 missiles."In March 2002 the DIA assessed that this force "probably" included 107 White House Transcript, President 's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September l2, 2002. 108 CIA, Iraq: Al Samoud Program Advancing Toward Deployment, February 13, 2001; DIA, Proly’eration of Ballistic Missiles, January 9, 2002; DIA, Iraq Missile Proly’eration Activity (TS-9l, 650-02) March l, 2002; CIA, Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August l, 2002. 109 State/INR, Iraq: WMD and Ballistic Missile Programs, May 8, 2002. _ 52

 

AIPAC, Rosen Weissman Timeline excerpt .... go to page 4 of Timeline
  • Aug 27, 2004 the FBI raided (first of two raids) the office of AIPAC director Steve Rosen, copied his hard drive. 
  • Aug 27, 2004 CBS  Investigator said they want AIPAC information on contacts between Franklin, Feith and Wolfowitz.  An Israeli spokesperson denied everything.  CBS 
  • Wolfowitz and Feith
  • Dan Rather, CBS issue, check dates? smokescreen? Rathergate.
  • National Review by Michael Ledeen on "my pal' Larry Franklin, ho hum. Aug 31 04
  • August 29, 2004 United Jersalem "Allegations of Israel spying Usually go away"  see indictment
  • August 29, 2004"..... Feith has been a target of criticism from Democrats who claim that two offices in his branch -- the Office of Special Plans, headed by Luti, and the Counterterrorism Evaluation Group -- sought to manipulate intelligence to improve the Bush administration's case for war against Iraq. House and Senate intelligence committee investigators found no evidence for allegations that the Pentagon offices tried to bypass the CIA or had a major impact on the prewar debate. But in the Senate panel's report on prewar intelligence" Washington Postfile
  • Sept  2004,  Franklin probe went dark?
  • Sept 1,  2004 "FBI SEIZES COMPUTER FROM AIPAC OFFICES By Janine Zacharia The Jerusalem Post September 1, 2004 NEW YORK — FBI agents on Friday copied the computer hard drive of a senior staffer at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee who has been questioned in relation to the case of a Pentagon official suspected of turning over a classified document either directly to Israel, or via the pro-Israel lobby group".  Shalom Center
  • Sept 1, 2004 article search terms: Office of Special Plans, David Wurmser (see Cheney), 'A Clean Break' Netanyahu, Likud, Road Map,  Counterpunch
  • Larry Franklin, Defense Intelligence Agency, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, reports to William Luti
  • Sept 6, 2004MSNBC story: "In the Pentagon, a suspected spy allegedly passes secrets about Iran to Israel".  Larry Franklin turns up while FBI monitoring lunch conversation.  Was there an Abu Ghraib smokescreen story?  Newsweek  interviews Ledeen on the story and he says Franklin charges are "nonsensical".  and Newsweek tries to spin Franklin as a loner in the case and supports view that Israel no longer spies on U.S.  Linked Franklin to Luti, Gingrich, Feith and Likud.  and also Washington Monthly  Franklin, Rhode were involved in contacts with Manucher Ghorbanifar and other Iranian exiles ....all in waring administration camps on 'regime change' in Iran versus a more cautious approach. Ledeen / Iran Sep 01   Sep 03Sep 04  Latest Entries

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  • (U) The NIE also described an older UAV program that used larger aircraft. Analysts assessed that this program involved "as many as ten L-29 1960s vintage Czech-built trainers" which had been converted into UAVs as of 2000, and noted that these planes’ operational status was unknown. The NIE noted that the US Air Force assessed that "no flyable L-29 airframes remain", and included a footnote pointing out that "the Military Intelligence Community assesses that the role of the L-29 UAV-modified aircraft is largely historical and that concentrating on it distracts from other more viable delivery mechanisms for CBW".ll5 
  • (U) The NIE went on to state that Iraq had "at least one small UAV that could be employed eovertly against the continental United States", and that this UAV "might be available for operational use within months". The NIE also described an incident in which an Iraqi procurement network "attempted to procure commercially available route planning software and an associated topographic database that [would] provide coverage of the ‘50 states"’. The NIE concluded that this information suggested that "Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States".u6 
  • (U) Intelligence assessments regarding UAVs shifted after the October 2002 NIE. A subsequent NIE, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007, published in January 2003, did not describe Iraq’s UAV program as "probably intended" for biological weapons delivery, and instead stated that "Iraq may be modifying UAVs" for CBW delivery. This NIE also noted that Iraqi UAVs could reach the United States, if they were transported (in some unspecified manner) "to within a few hundred kilometers."m 
  • (U) The January 2003 NIE also discussed Iraqi attempts to procure mapping software, but stated only that this software "could support programming of a UAV autopilot for operation in the United States."H8 
  • (U) The Air Force continued to dissent hom even these less conclusive judgments. Joined by the DIA and the Army intelligence branch, the Air Force stated that, while most UAVs were capable of being used to deliver biological weapons, evidence that Iraqis were modifying UAVs for this purpose was "unconfirmed, and is not sufficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so." These services further noted that they believed that "the purpose of the Iraqi request for route planning software and topographic database was to acquire a generic mapping capability — a goal that is not necessarily indicative of an intent to target the U.S. Homeland."1 9 
  • (U) The President did not mention Iraqi missiles or UAVs in the 2003 State of the Union Address.12° *15 md. “‘ mid. t lljlbagional Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats t0 the US Homeland, January 2003. 1 . “° mid. 120 White House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union", January 28, 2003.

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  • Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
  • (U) The Secretary of State made several mentions of prohibited missiles and UAV capabilities in his February 2003 address to the UN Security Council. He asserted that "Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets", and that "In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif, told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG- 21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons."l2 
  • (U) Both of these statements were substantiated by intelligence assessments, however both referred to pre-Gulf War programs - The Secretary made two central assertions regarding prohibited missiles, first stating that "numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometers."m This assertion was included in the earlier NIE and a number of other intelligence reports. However, the NIE did not r ort any direct evidence of this Scud-variant force and stated that this assessment was basedch _”" His other key assertion regarding missiles was that "Ira has no arms that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers."125 These programs were also referenced in the earlier NIE, which noted that they were in an earlier stage of development than shorter-range missile pro grams.126 
  • (U) Regarding UAVs, the Secretary made four major statements, including "Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for over a decade."m Intelligence assessments had indicated the existence of the pre-Gulf War MiG UAV program, as well as the L-29 program mentioned in the NIE. Reporting on Iraq’s smaller UAV program was more recent, and appears to have begun in 2001. The Committee is also aware of intelligence provided directly to the Secretary by the CIA which also substantiated this statement.128 m White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. m DIA, Iraq ’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities (DI-156, 9-27-00) May 2000. 123 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 124 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 125 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 126 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 127 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 128 DIA, Iraq ’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities (DI-156, 9-27-00) May 2000; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq: Shopping for UA V Equipment, September 14, 2001. _ 55

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  • (U`) The Secretary went on to say that "we detected one of Iraq’s newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted here."129 The January 2003 NIE described this flight data, and stated that the UAVs autonomous flight range was at least 500 kilometers.]3° 
  • (U`) The Secretary drew a connection between the apparent UAV program and biological weapons, stating that "There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs." Finally, he argued that "Iraq could use these small UAVs, which have a wingspan of only a few meters, to deliver biological agents to its neighbors, or if transported, to other countries, including the United States."13l 
  • (U) Iraq’s pre-Gulf War program to fit Mirage jets with aerosol spray tanks was mentioned in numerous intelligence assessments, as well as Iraqi declarations to the UN.132 As noted above, the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq "may be modifying UAVs to deliver CBW agents, according to numerous sources." The Air Force/Army/DIA dissent to this NIE agreed that biological weapons delivery is an inherent capability of most UAVs," but concluded that "a reconnaissance mission for the UAV program is more likely."133 
  • (U) The January 2003 NIE stated that "UAVs could strike the homeland if transported to within a few hundred kilometers." It noted that "Iraq has at least one small UAV" with a range of "at least 500 krn," or roughly 300 miles.134 Additional Statements • "And let there be no doubt about it, his regime has dozens of ballistic missiles and is working to extend their range in violation of U.N. restriction." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "His regime is pursuing pilotless aircraft as a means of delivering chemical and biological weapons." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 129 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 130 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Tltreats to the US Homeland, January 2003. 131 White House Transcript, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N Security Council, February 5, 2003. 132 CIA, Iraq: Iraq’s Biological Warfare Program: Well Positioned for the Future, April 14, 1997; CIA, Iraq’s L-29: A Biological and Chemical Warfare Challenge to US Forces, July 12, 2001; DIA, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post September lim, January 1, 2002; DIA, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook, August 2002; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 133 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland, January 2003. 13* rpm. _ 56

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  • • "The Iraqi regime has acquired and tested the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction. All the world has now seen the footage of an Iraqi Mirage aircraft with a fuel tank modified to spray biological agents over wide areas. Iraq has developed spray devices that could be used on unmanned aerial vehicles with ranges far beyond what is permitted by the Security Council. A UAV launched from a vessel off the American coast could reach hundreds of miles inland." — President George W Bush, Statement in the Roosevelt Room, February 6, 2003 
  • (U) The above statements are all consistent with the five major policy speeches analyzed. The statement below differs from these speeches. • The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more, and according to the British government, [Iraq] could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as forty-five minutes after the order is given." — President George W Bush, Radio Address, September 28, 2002 - On September 28, 2002, the President cited the British government as the source of a statement that the Iraqi government was capable of launching chemical or biological attacks with forty-five minutes of warning. A report from _ that same month had cited an intelligence source who said that the Iraqi government possessed chemical and biological munitions that could be deployed (apparently against neighboring countries) with a forty-five minute response time. Conclusions 
  • (U) Conclusion 7: Statements in the major speeches and additional statements analyzed regarding Iraqi ballistic missiles were generally substantiated by available intelligence. The intelligence community was consistent in its judgments that the Iraqi military possessed a small number of Scud-type missiles left over from the Gulf War era (although the October 2002 NIE noted that these judgments were based on accounting gaps rather than direct evidence), and that Iraq was developing short-range missiles whose range exceeded the range permitted under UN sanctions by as much as 150 km, or 93 miles. The corrnnunity also judged that Iraq was pursuing the capability to build longer-range missiles, but assessed that this project was still at the early stages of development. 
  • (U) Conclusion 8: Statements by the President, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons were generally substantiated by intelligence information, but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UAV program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new UAV was probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq "may" be modifying UAVs for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence 57
  • Agency argued that the evidence for this was "not sufficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so." 
  • (U) Conclusion 9: The President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering using UAVs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate noted that an Iraqi procurement network had attempted to purchase commercial mapping software that included data on the United States, and said that this suggested that the Iraqi governmentwas considering using UAVs to target the US. The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability. Postwar Findings A 
  • (U) Postwar findings confirm that Iraq was developing the Al-Samoud and Al-Fat’h (formerly Ababil-100) missiles, and that both had ranges that exceeded 150 km. In early February 2003 the intelligence community revised it’s assessment of the al-Samoud’s maximum range down iiom 300 km to 170 km, which was consistent with postwar iindings.135 In late February 2003 Saddam agreed to UN demands that his Al-Samoud inventory be destroyed. Postwar findings indicate that the Iraqi government unilaterally destroyed its remaining Scud-type ballistic missiles in 1991
  • (U) Postwar findings confirmed that Iraq’s UAV development program was primarily intended for reconnaissance. Postwar investigations did not find any evidence that Iraq had conducted any research to develop a chemical or biological weapons capability for its developmental UAV program, or that Iraq had intended to use its UAVs for missions targeting the United States.136 135 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, February 2003. 136 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 58

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  • VH. Links to Terrorism • "Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraq’s government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "[The Iraqi regime] has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq’s eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Over the years, Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, whose terror organization carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries that killed or injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans. Iraq has also provided safe haven to Abu Abbas, who was responsible for seizing the Achille Lauro and killing an American passenger. And we know that Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives assistance to groups that use terrorism to undermine Middle East peace." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks. We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. And he cannot be trusted. The risk is simply too great that he will use them, or provide them to a terror network. " - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.” — President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modem methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al—Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants.” - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 59

page 59 see NewsFollowUp.com FEMA Concentration Camp, Beech Grove, Indiana YouTube are these meant for US citizens?  Sounds ridiculous until you watch the video.

  • • "Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northem Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein’s controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000, this agent offered al-Qaida safe haven in the region." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "After we swept al-Qaida from Afghanistan, some of those members accepted this safe haven. They remain there today." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Zarqawi’s activities are not confined to this small comer of northeast Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May of 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day. During his stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These al- Qaida affiliates in Baghdad now coordinate the movement of people, money, and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they have now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Last year, two suspected al-Qaida operatives were arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were linked to associates of the Baghdad cell and one of them received training in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades-long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and al- Qaida. Going back to the early and rnid-1990s when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an al-Qaida source tells us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that al- Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early al-Qaida ties were forged by secret high-level intelligence service contacts with al-Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraqis continue to visit bin Laden in his new home in Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam’s former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to al-Qaida members on document forgery." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 60

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  • • "The support that this detainee describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qaida associates beginning in December 2000." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address t0 the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 
  • (U) The Committee addressed the pre-war intelligence linking Iraq and terrorist organizations in its first Iraq report, US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments 0n Iraq, in July 2004. The Committee reviewed the accuracy of the prewar intelligence in its report, Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links t0 Terrorism and How They Compare · with Prewar Assessments, in September 2006. 
  • (U) Scope Note: This section addresses statements that referenced past or present Iraqi links to terrorism. Statements regarding possible future links or cooperation between the Iraqi regime and terrorism are discussed in the Intent section. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) 
  • (U) The Vice President made no reference to links between Iraq and al Qaeda or any other terrorist group in his August 2002 speech. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 
  • (U) In this speech, the President stated that "Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations" in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1372, and that "al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq." 
  • (U) The intelligence community believed that Iraq had long supported, through safeharbor, financial support, and training various regional terrorist organizations such as Abu Nidal and Palestinian groups. For example, Director Tenet testified before the Committee on February 6, 2002 that, "Iraq provides safe haven, financial support, and low-level training to a number of terrorist groups——including the Palestine Liberation Front, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the Mojaheddin al Kha1q." 137 (U) The February 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), International Terrorist Threats t0 US Interests, included a section on Iraq under the heading of state sponsors of terrorism. The NIE stated that "Saddam will continue contacts with several terrorist groups and will weigh carefully the risks and possible beneifits of supporting their operations." It continued that "As Iraq strengthens ties to other countries and sends its intelligence officers abroad, under official or commercial cover, its ability to conduct or sponsor terrorism will increase." 137 See also CIA, SEM, The Terrorist Threat jrom Iraq, December 15, 2001, "Baghdad continues to provide safehaven, financial support, and low-level terrorist training to a number of terrorist groups. Iraq continues to support to varying degrees the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abu Ibrahim of the 15 May Organization, the Arab Liberation Front, and the Abu Nidal Organization, which appears to be rebuilding with help from Iraq." _ 61

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  • _ A CIA r ort in June 2002 discussed al Qaeda operatives moving from Afghanistan to Iraq, saying ‘ reporting show that unknown numbers of al Qaeda associates fleeing Afghanistan since December have used Iraq—including the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, Baghdad, and other regions—as a safehaven and transit area." The paper continued, "We lack positive indications that Baghdad is complicit in this activity, but the persistence of an al Qaeda presence and the operatives’ silence about any harassment from Iraqi authorities, who closely monitor the population, may indicate Baghdad is acquiescent or finds their presence useful."l38 _ A June 24, 2002 c1A··se¤rer, Pubirsh VVhen Reeayr (sewn) repea, Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to Al-Qa 'ida, stated that ‘ reporting indicate some al Qaeda operatives and fighters, including most notably senior al- Qa’ida operative Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, have fled to Baghdad as well as to the Kurdish regions since the Taliban collapsed. 1 intelligence gives no indication of Iraqi regime complicity but also reveals no concern about possible arrest or scrutiny by Iraqi security services."1 9 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
Chalabi, and John McCain support of Chalabi
  • Think Progress  "Iraqi exile leader Ahmad Chalabi was one of the most sordid figures in the run-up to the Iraq war. Paid by the Bush administration to muster pre-war intelligence, Chalabi drummed up claims that Saddam Hussein had WMD, helping lead the United States into war. More recently, he promoted the “surge” to the Iraqi government. A new book by Aram Roston reveals that Chalabi supported John McCain (R-AZ) for president in 2000, believing that the senator would be the most receptive to his agenda. Muckraked reports:

    One of his key backers has been John McCain, who was one of the first patrons of Chalabi’s grand-sounding International Committee for a Free Iraq when it was founded in 1991. McCain was Chalabi’s favored candidate in the 2000 election since Chalabi knew that he would be able to free up the $97 million in military aid plus millions pushed through in Congress and earmarked for Chalabi’s exile group, the Iraqi National Congress, but held up by the Clinton State Department.

    Indeed, McCain was a Chalabi backer long before President Bush took power. In 1997, he tried to pressure the Clinton administration into setting up an Iraqi government in exile. Despite opposition from the Pentagon and the State Department, the next fall, McCain co-sponsored the Iraq Liberation Act, committing the United States to overthrowing Saddam and funding opposition groups. According to a 2006 article by John Judis: McCain welcomed Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), to Washington and pressured the administration to give him money. When General Anthony Zinni cast doubt upon the effectiveness of the Iraqi opposition, McCain rebuked him at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

    In 2003, McCain joined four other Republican senators and asked Bush to “personally clear the bureaucratic roadblocks within the State Department” that blocked increased funding for the Chalabi’s group. Also that year, McCain said of Chalabi, “He’s a patriot who has the best interests of his country at heart.”

  •    

  • Iraqi National Congress research

  • YouTube

  •  
  • (U) This speech made a number of distinct claims about Iraq and terrorism. The President reiterated his earlier statement about Iraq providing shelter and support to terrorism, specifically citing safe haven for Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas and financing of terrorist groups undermining Middle East peace. 
  • (U) The President stated that "We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade." He referenced al Qaeda leaders fleeing Afghanistan for Iraq, noting in particular Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as having "received medical treatment in Baghdad." The President added that "We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." 
  • (U) Finally, the President stated that Saddam Hussein was "harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction." While this statement was not specific to any group, the placement in the speech and the context suggests that the President was stating that Hussein was harboring al Qaeda. The statement appeared two paragraphs after statements that ". . .Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy," that some "al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq," and that "Iraq has trained a1 Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." (These statements are discussed elsewhere in this report.) The President’s statement came in the same paragraph as the statement "confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror." 
  • (U) The President’s statement on contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda did not elaborate on the nature of these contacts or whether they reflected a substantive relationship between the two 138 Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq and al Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 2l, 2002, 9. Other reports on al Qaeda’s presence in Iraq include CIA, SEIB, Sep l0, 2002, al Qaeda Determined to Strike Soon; and May 24, 2002 State Department INR document entitled, Iraq terrorists Al-Qaida Operatives Moving into Baghdad. 139 CIA SPWR, Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to AZ-Qa ’ida, (SPWRO62402-Ol). 62

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  •  
  • _ sides. The intelligence community reported numerous times on interactions between elements in the Iraqi regime and members of al Qaeda and, through direct contacts with Saddam Hussein as well as with various high-level Iraq regime officials. (U) DCI Tenet’s statement to the Committee on February 6, 2002 underscored the duration of the contacts but provided additional analysis on the nature of those contacts. He wrote that "Baghdad’s connections to al Qaeda are tenuous, but they appear to have maintained a mutually wary relationship for nearly a decade. Intelligence reports indicate that Iraq has maintained a liaison relationship with Bin Laden. At the same time, we assess that their divergent ideologies make it difficult for Baghdad and al Qaeda to forge the kind of cooperation that Baghdad has with terrorist groups such as the PLF, AN O, and the MEK." (U) A CIA paper from June 7, 2002 noted that intelligence reporting "of varying reliability indicates that the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda have had mutually wary contacts for the last decade. It is possible that the two have forged ties that could have resulted in cooperation on specific terrorist operations, but the available reporting does not point to such a relationship."l 0 (U) In part of an intelligence summary that dismissed a claim that Saddam and bin Laden met in Iraq in 2000, the DLA assessed that "an alliance between the two individuals is unlikely as Saddam views Bin Laden’s brand of Islam as a threat to his regime and Bin Laden is opposed to those Muslim states that do not follow his version of Islam."m This theme was repeated in a June 24, 2002 CIA paper, which assessed that "interaction between Saddam and Bin Laden appears to be more akin to activity between rival intelligence services, each trying to use the relationship to its own advantage."142 (U) The same report also noted that "contacts between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda appear to reach back over the past l0 years and possibly strengthened around 1998. CIA analysts agree al- Qa’ida gained some tangible benefits from these contacts but do not agree on Sadda1n’s agenda. Some think he is concerned principally with penetrating and monitoring al Qaeda, while others see more collusion."143 (U) Another CIA report in June 2002 said, "intelligence reporting highlights more than a decade of contacts between the Iraqi Government and al Qaeda based on shared anti-US goals and Bin Laden’s interest in unconventional weapons and safehaven."144 This report was "purposefully aggressive in seeking to draw cormections, on the assumption that any indication of a relationship between these two hostile elements could carry great dangers to the United States." Nonetheless, the report assessed that the "pattern of contacts and cooperation reflects wariness coupled with recognition of potential mutual benefit. In contrast to the traditional patron-client relationship Iraq enjoys with radical secular Palestinian groups, the ties between 140 CIA SPWR dated June 7, 2002 titled, Possible Meeting Between Bin Laden and Iraqi Ojicials in Sudan. H1 AFebruary 6, 2002, and a February 7, 2002 DITSUM (No. 031-02 and No. 032-02). 142 - A June 24, 2002 SPWR, Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to AZ-Qa ’ida (SPWR062402-0 l). Later, the report states "_ reporting indicates that Bin Laden, while in Sudan in 1993, reached an ‘understanding’ with Saddam under which Bin Laden’s followers would not undertake actions against the Iraqi leader. The report indicated the two also agreed to cooperate, although no details were provided." 1 . 144 CIA, Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 21, 2002. _ 63

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  • Saddam and Bin Laden appear to be much like those between rival intelligence services, with each side trying to exploit the other for its own benefit." 
  • (U) The intelligence on the contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda appears to have grown by Fall of 2002. A CIA paper from September 13, 2002, stated that "We have identified about 12 meetings between Iraqi officials and senior al-Qa` ida leaders from a review of reporting we assess to have at least some credibility. Ten of these reports mention specific discussions involving top al- Qa’ida operatives."]45 _ DCI Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony to the Committee elaborated on these contacts, saying that "there is solid evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda have had sporadic contacts over the past decade. Intelligence reports point to various Iraq-al Qaeda meetings through high-level and third-party intermediaries. 
  • (U) Tenet also described in his testimony "credible reporting of about a dozen direct meetings between senior Iraqi intelligence officials and top al Qaeda operatives from the early 1990s to the present." He noted that the intelligence sources on the contacts "do not describe Iraqi complicity in, control over, or authorization of specific terrorist attacks carried out by al Qaeda. Taken together, the mass of reporting outlines a relationship in which both sides probably were determining how best to take advantage of the other.”]46 
  • (U) On the topic of Iraqi providing harbor for al Qaeda members, Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony began by saying that "most of the reporting on this involves Kurdish-inhabited northern Iraq, which Baghdad has not controlled since 1991. Intelligence confirms that al- Qa’ida fighters have relocated to the north, where they are hosted by a local Kurdish extremist group called Ansar al Islam. The relocations have increased since the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan began late last year. We estimate there are about 100 to 200 al-Qa’ ida members and associates in the area." _ Tenet added that "an unknown number of al Qaeda associates have fled during the past six months to or through other parts of Iraq .... 1 intelligence in May 2002 indicated that several militants associated with al Qaeda were checking into hotels in Baghdad and were using the Iraqi capital as a base for financial transactions and other activities.” Tenet concluded these statements, however, by saying that "we do not know to what extent Baghdad may be actively complicit in this use of its territory for safe haven and transit. The operatives have not mentioned Iraq’s security presence, but their conversations often are cryptic, sprinkled with code words, and short on specifics. Given the pervasive presence of Iraq’s security apparatus, it would be difficult for al-Qaida to maintain an active, long-terrn presence in Iraq without alerting the authorities or without at least their acquiescence." 145 SPWR dated September 13, 2002 titled, Terrorism: Contacts Between al-Qu 'idrz Ojjicials and Iraqi Intelligence O cers. l4gSeptember 17, 2002 testimony by DCI Tenet to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. _ 64

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  • (U) The President’s next statement in the Cincinnati speech was that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi "received medical treatment in Baghdad.” Director Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony noted this point specifically, saying that, "Of particular interest is senior al Qaeda planner Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, who was in Baghdad under an assumed identity in late May, possibly seeking medical treatment. We do not know his current location, but his close associates remain active in Baghdad, leaving open the possibility that he could be elsewhere in Iraq." The issue of Zarqawi’s medical treatment was also discussed in reports by the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the DLA.147 
  • (U) The President’s final terrorism statement in the speech was "[w]e’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and deadly gases .” The intelligence community had produced assessments on the topic of bomb making. The intelligence reports on chemical and biological weapons training came primarily from the interrogation of al Qaeda detainee Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. 
  • (U) The September 2002 CIA report Iraqi Support for Terrorism, which was coordinated with the DLA, stated that al-Libi said Iraq had "provided" unspecified CBW training for two al-Qa’ ida associates in 2000, but also stated that al Libi "did not know the results of the training."148 In the June 2002 paper, Iraq and al Qa ’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationshqr, the CIA also stated that al-Libi claimed Iraq had "provided" unspecified CBW training for two al Qaeda associates in 2000.149 
  • (U) Director Tenet testified in September 2002 that, "[t]here is evidence that Iraq provided al- Qa’ida with various kinds of training—combat, bomb-making, and CBRN. Although Saddam did not endorse al Qaeda’s overall agenda and was suspicious of Islamist movements in general, he was apparently not averse, under certain circumstances, to enhancing Bin Laden’s operational capabilities. 
  • (U) The October 2002 WMD National Intelligence Estimated stated that "Detainee Ibn al- Shaykh al-Libi—who had significant responsibility for training—has told us that Iraq provided unspecified chemical or biological weapons training for two al Qaeda members beginning in December 2000."150 
 
  • Christian Science Monitor "J Street," a new lobby which describes itself as pro-Israel. It's directed by Jeremy Ben-Ami, a former Clinton official whose father fought alongside Menachem Begin for Israel's independence. J Street (a play on the K Street address of many lobbyists), seeks a less hard-line US policy in the Middle East and wants to create an environment in which politicians can confidently discuss such a change without fear of political punishment or being labeled anti-Semitic. Several US groups share J Street's views but they don't have much political muscle. J Street wants to build clout by using the Internet to raise money from small donors, and to contribute to congressional campaigns. ... Next week, it will endorse several candidates who support a major US push for a negotiated, two-state solution to the Palestinian crisis. J Street also favors dialogue with Israel's enemies, including Hamas and Iran; an Israeli-Syrian peace deal; and US withdrawal from Iraq.
  • (U) Months prior to the speech and the latter intelligence products cited above, questions were raised in iinished intelligence about al-Libi’s credibility. A February 22, 2002 DLA Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary noted that Ibn al-Shaykh [al-Libi] "lacks specific details on the Iraqi’s involvement, the CBRN materials associated with the assistance, and the location where the training occurred. It is possible he does not know any further details; it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers. Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows will retain their interest. Saddarn’s regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary 147 State INR, Iraq/Terrorism: Al-Qaida Operatives Moving into Baghdad, May 24, 2002; DIA, Transnational/Iraq; Senior al-Qaida Operative Reportedly in Iraq, May 28, 2002 DIA. 148 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002, p. I2 (SSCI # 2005-5178). 149 CIA, Iraq and al-Qa ’ida.· Interpreting a Murky Relationship, July 2002, p. 6 (SSCI# 2002-3005). 150 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002, 68. _ 65
  • movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control."m 
  • (U) DIA reiterated some of these points in additional reports. On August 7, 2002, the CIA reported on al-Libi’s credibility. The summary of the report stated that "questions persist about [al-Libi’s] forthrightness and truthfulness" and later elaborating, "In some instances, however, he seems to have fabricated information. Perhaps in an attempt to exaggerate his own importance, Ibn al-Shaykh claims to be a member of al Qaeda’s Shura Council, a claim not corroborated by other intelligence reporting"l52 President’s State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003) 
  • (U) President Bush stated that "Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda." He also reiterated the concern that Iraq could secretly provide weapons to terrorists or help them develop their own. The intelligence relating to these claims was described above. 
  • (U) The November 2002 NIE, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007 repeated much of the intelligence cited above on the relationship between Iran and al Qaeda.l53 The NIE said that "the relationship between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda appears more to be two sides trying to feel one another out or exploit each other." The NIE cited "solid reporting" that "Iraq and al-Qa’ ida have had senior-level contacts going back to the rise of Usarna Bin Laden. Intelligence reportirrg-albeit fragmentary and at times corrtlicting-indicates a series of contacts over nearly a decade between the Iraqi Government and al Qaeda .... "l54 
  • (U) The NIE also stated that "[w]e have credible reporting that al Qaeda leaders sought help from Baghdad in acquiring WMD capabilities and that Iraq provided training in bomb-making and, according to one detainee, in the area of chemical and biological agents," and that "[w]e have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members including some that have been in Baghdadrm Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
  • (U) Secretary Powell’s statements repeated and amplified those previously mentioned. His stated that Iraq "harbors a deadly terrorist network" headed by Zarqawi; that an Iraqi agent "offered al-Qaida safe haven" in the northern Kurdish regions; and that "al-Qaida affiliates in Baghdad now ... have been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months." 151 DIA DITSUM 044-02 of February 22, 2002. 152 CIA, Terrorism: Credibility of Ibn al-Shaykh al—Libi and the Information He Has Provided While in Custody (SPWR080702—05), August 7, 2002. I 153 This NIE was not published until I anuary 2003. 154 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007, NIE 2002-15HJ, November 2002, 16-17. *55 ibid, 17. _ 66

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  • (U) Secretary Powell referred to "secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida" that resulted in an understanding between Hussein and bin Laden that al—Qa’ida would not to support terrorist activities against Baghdad. Powell cited "at least eight [meetings] at very senior levels since the early 1990s." He cited "a foreign security service as providing information on meetings between bin Laden and an Iraqi intelligence offrcer in 1996 and the head of the Iraqi intelligence service afterwards. Powell laid out cooperation between Iraq and al-Qa’ ida, including Iraq’s provision of assistance in document forgery, bombmaking, and chemical and biological weapons training. 
  • (U) Many of these statements are consistent with ones made in speeches previously described. Additional intelligence relating to Secretary Powell’s statements is below. 
  • (U) On January 31, 2003, the State Department Undersecretary for INR, Carl Ford, wrote a memo to Secretary Powell laying out the intelligence on Iraq’s ties to al Qaeda. He wrote that "Our evidence suggests that Baghdad is strengthening a relationship with al-Qaida that dates back to the mid-1990s, when senior Iraqi Intelligence officers established contact with the network in several countries." Ford added that "we have some evidence that Iraqi Intelligence has been in contact with elements in the northeastern area. And the al-Qaida operatives there are in regular contact with other operatives located in Baghdad. The Iraqi governmenthas also received information from other sources alerting it to the presence of al-Qaida operatives in Baghdad." 
  • (U) Ford wrote that Zarqawi "has had a good relationship with Iraqi intelligence officials" and that "we have hard evidence that al-Qaida is operating in several locations in Iraq with the knowledge and acquiescence of Saddam’s regime." Ford wrote that intelligence "revealed the presence of safehouse facilities in the city as well as the clear intent to remain in Baghdad. Also, foreign NGO workers outside of Iraq who we believe provide support to al-Qaida have also expressed their intent to set up shop in Baghdad." 
  • (U) Secretary Powell stated that the Zarqawi network had freedom of movement in Baghdad the ability to command and control terrorist elements throughout Iraq. As discussed previously, several intelligence reports noted Zarqawi’s presence in Baghdad, including a September 2002 CIA assessment which said "Although most al Qaeda operatives in Iraq are adjacent to the Kurdish safehaven in northern Iraq, an unknown number of individuals have used Baghdad and other regions of the country as bases to orchestrate operations."156 - Director Tenet testifred to the Committee on Se tember 17, 2002 that "In Jaw , an sl- aids assssists brsggsd that the situation in W was ood, that Baghdad could be transited quickly formally or informally, ." 
  • (U) A CIA SPWR dated December 21, 2002 titled, Iraq: Extremists in Baghdad Aid Al-Zarqawi Operations, relayed that "[Reporting] indicates more than a dozen al Qaeda affiliated extremists converged on Baghdad beginning in May and have since been coordinating the movement of people, money, and supplies into Baghdad and northeastern Iraq. Veteran Egyptian Islamic Jihad 156 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002, p. iv. _ 67

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  • (EIJ) operative Yusif al-Dardiri a.rrived in Baghdad in mid-May—about the time Abu Mus’ab al- Zarqawi went there for medical treatrnent-and signed a one-year house lease for his associates." The CIA reported again on al-Dardiri in a January 2003 report, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, stating that he was in Baghdad and facilitating Zarqawi’s operations. 
  • (U) Secretary Powell described the group Ansar al-Islam in northern Iraq, and area that Powell said was outside of Saddam’s control. He that an Iraqi agent that was in a senior position in Ansar al-Islam had offered al-Qaida safe haven in the north. The intelligence community agreed that al Qaeda and Ansar al-Islam had a relationship and that terrorist training and plotting was ongoing in northern Iraq. 
  • (U) A February 2003 CIA report noted that "In an August 2000 meeting, al Qaeda officials met with three Kurdish Islamist leaders, now all senior AI officials, who agreed to provide al Qaeda a safehaven if the group lost Afghanistan as a sanctuary, according to a PUK detainee."157 A separate CIA report noted that "Abu Wa’il, whose role as a senior AI official and close al Qaeda associate allows him to know the full scope of activities in northeastern Iraq and in Baghdad, was identified as an IIS associate by three detainees in PUK custody."158 
  • (U) The link between Baghdad and Ansar al-Islam was, however, questioned in intelligence channels. An August 15, 2002 State Department INR assessment, Terrorism: Al-Qaida ’s Presence in Iraq—An Update, stated that "We still have not seen definitive evidence of cooperation between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaida, but the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) almost certainly is aware al-Qaida operatives are present in Iraq." Director Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony to the Committee included that "Baghdad reportedly has had contacts with Ansar al-Islam that include IIS penetrations of the organization, but we ca.nnot determine their frequency or purpose." 
  • (U) Secretary Powell’s UN speech repeated previous Administration statements about the length and number of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. This issue is addressed above. Secretary Powell did reference "an understanding that al-Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad." 
  • (U) A May I4, 2002, CIA paper Iraq: Strengthening Its Terrorist Capabilities, noted that "In 1993, Bin Laden reached an ‘understanding’ with Saddam under which al Qaeda forbade operations against the Iraqi leader, according to sensitive reporting that was released in US court documents during the Aiiica Embassy trial." The September 13, 2002, CIA paper Terrorism: Contacts Between al-Qa ’ida Officials and Iraqi Intelligence Officers included a comment that "Sensitive reporting indicates that Bin Laden reached an ‘understanding’ with Baghdad in 1993 that al Qaeda would not support any anti-Saddarn activities. We have no information about how such an agreement might have been reached." Additional Statements 157 CIA Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Terrorism: Ansar al Islam’s Threat to the US (SEIB 03-028CHX) February 4, 2003. 158 Abu Wa’il was one of the three AI officials in the February 2003 CIA report. 68

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Wayne Madsen Report                                     
  • January 18-20, 2008 - Plame and Edmonds were looking at the same covert network

    WMR has learned that former CIA covert agent Valerie Plame Wilson, whose covert status was leaked by the Bush White House, and former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds, who was focused on a major covert network involving Turkish, Israeli, and key members of the Bush administration and Republican Party and weapons and drug smuggling, were essentially looking at the same network.

    The nexus of Turkey with both the covert CIA Brewster Jennings and Associates operations and the Turkish-Israeli network of influence active within the Defense and State Departments, is the key factor in understanding the complicated counter-espionage operation conducted by both the FBI and CIA.

    The congressional investigation by Senators Pat Leahy and Charles Grassley in support of Edmonds' revelations and congressional and judicial efforts to obtain White House emails on the leak of Plame's identity have been stymied by a powerful array of top Bush administration officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Bush adviser Karl Rove, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, convicted Cheney Chief of Staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, former Deputy Defense Secretary for Policy and Plans Douglas Feith, and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman.  full article

  •  
  • • "There is certainly evidence that al Qaeda people have been in Iraq. There is certainly evidence that Saddam Hussein cavorts with terrorists. 1 think that if you asked, do we know that he had a role in 9/11, no, we do not know that he had a role in 9/11. But I think that this is the test that sets a bar that is far too high." — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002. • "He plays host to terrorist networks,’assassinates his opponents, both in Iraq and abroad, and has attempted to assassinate a former president of the United States." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. • "[Since we began after September 11th,] we do have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad. We have what we consider to be very reliable reporting of senior level contacts going back a decade, and of possible chemical and biological agent training. And when I say contacts, I mean between Iraq and al Qaeda. The reports of these contacts have been increasing since 1998. We have what we believe to be credible information that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven opportunities in Iraq, reciprocal nonaggression discussions. We have what we consider to be credible evidence that al Qaeda leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities. We do have -- I believe it’s one report indicating that Iraq provided unspeciied training relating to chemical and/or biological matters for al Qaeda members. There is, I’m told, also some other information of varying degrees of reliability that supports that conclusion of their cooperation." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumskzld, Press briefing, September 26, 2002. ‘ • "We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network, headed by a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner. The network runs a poison and explosive training center in northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad." - President George W Bush, Press conference, February 6, 2003. 
  • (U) These statements are consistent with those described above. • "We know that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq today, and that little happens in Iraq without the knowledge of the Saddam Hussein regime. We also know that there have been a number of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda over the years. We know Saddam has ordered acts of terror himself, including the attempted assassination of a former U.S. President" — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002. • ". .. it’s been pretty well confirmed that [Mohammed Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the attack. Now, what the purpose of that was, what transpired between them, we simply don’t know at this point, but that’s clearly an avenue that we want to pursue." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, December 9, 2001. 69

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  •  
  • • ". .. We’ve seen in connection with the hijackers, of course, Mohamed Atta, who was the lead hijacker, did apparently travel to Prague on a number of occasions. And on at least one occasion, we have reporting that places him in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official a few months before the attack on the World Trade Center. The debates about, you know, was he there or wasn’t he there, again, it’s the intelligence business. [Tim Russert: What does the CIA say about that? Is it credible?] It’s credible. But, you know, I think a way to put it would be it’ s unconfirmed at this point." - Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, September 8, 2002. 
  • (U) Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the intelligence community produced reports of a meeting between 9/11 hijacker Mohammad Atta and an Iraqi intelligence official. A September 17, 2001 CIA report, Iraq: Indications of Possible Iraqi Links to Attacks, noted "a foreign government service last Thursday reported that the local Iraqi Intelligence Service chief met in mid-April with suspected American Airlines Flight 11 hijacker Mohammad Atta.159 Shortly thereafter, the CIA reported that Saddam Hussein was trying to "avert a US strike by asking other Arab governments to convey to Washington that Baghdad is not complicit in the ll September attacks."16O 
  • (U) There were several intelligence reports between September 2001 and September 2002 that both repeated the initial claims that Atta met with Iraqi officials and stated that the claims could not be corroborated or verified. Some of the reports stated that the only confirmed trip by Atta to Prague was in 2000, most reports stated that a 2001 visit could not be confirmed. A 
  • (U) On November 1, 2001, a CIA report relayed the Czech Government’s public confirmation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence official and cited a "foreign government service" as saying the meeting occurred. The CIA stated that the agency "cannot corroborate Atta’s travel to Prague in April through travel or financial records but he could have traveled under an alias" and that CIA has no new information on the substance of the alleged meetings."161 A follow-up CIA report on March 19, 2002, said that the CIA was "pursuing conflicting leads and repeated that it was "trying to confirm a report that American Airlines Flight 11 hijacker Muhammad Atta met with Iraqi intelligence officer al-Ani in Prague in April of last year."l62 The report stated that "Neither the Czechs nor we have been able to verify Atta’s alleged trip to Prague in April of last year." (U) A May 14, 2002 CIA report again cited the foreign government service reporting from September 2001 and said that "Fragmentary intelligence reporting points to indirect ties between Baghdad and the 11 September hijackers but offers no conclusive indication of Iraqi complicity 159 Central Intelligence Agency SEIB, Iraq: Indications of Possible Iraqi Links to Attacks, September 17, 2001. 160 Central Intelligence Agency SEIB, Iraq: Using Back Channels To Refute Terrorist Allegations, September 28, 200 1. 161 - Central Intelli ence A enc , SPWR titled, Terrorism: Muhammed Atta 's travels to Prague - November 1, 2001. CIA, SPWR dated March 19, 2002, T errorism: Reporting on Muhammad Atta in Prague. 70

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  • or foreknowledge. Foreign government service sensitive reporting in September. indicated that Muhammad Atta met with an IIS officer in Prague in April of 2001. There is contradictory reporting on this trip and we have not been able to verify Atta’s reported trip through other channels."463 A DIA report on July 31, 2002 stated that "There are significant informationgaps in this reporting that render the issue impossible to prove or disprove with available information."4 4 Conclusions (U) Conclusion 10: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s support for terrorist groups other than al Qaeda were substantiated by intelligence information. The intelligence community reported regularly on Iraq’s safe harbor and financial support for Palestinian rejectionist groups, the Abu Nidal Organization, and others. The February 2002 NIE fully supported the claim that Iraq had, and would continue, to support terrorist groups. 
  • (U) Conclusion 11: Statements that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other al Qaeda-related terrorist members were substantiated by the intelligence assessments. Intelligence assessments noted Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq and his ability to travel and operate within the country. The intelligence community generally believed that Iraqi intelligence must have known about, and therefore at least tolerated, Zarqawi’s presence in the country. 
  • (U) Conclusion 12: Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al Qaeda had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al Qaeda with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence. Intelligence assessments, including multiple CIA reports and the November 2002 NIE, dismissed the claim that Iraq and al Qaeda were cooperating partners. According to an undisputed INR footnote in the NIE, there was no intelligence information that supported the claim that Iraq would provide weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda. The credibility of the principal intelligence source behind the claim that Iraq had provided al Qaeda with biological and chemical weapons training was regularly questioned by DIA, and later by the CIA. The Committee repeats its conclusion from a prior report that "assessments were inconsistent regarding the likelihood that Saddam Hussein provided chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training to al Qaeda."465 
  • (U) Conclusion 13: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s contacts with al Qaeda were substantiated by intelligence information. However, policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al Qaeda. M3 CIA, SPWR dated May 14, 2002 titled, Iraq: Strengthening Its Terrorist Capabilities. 464 DIA, July 31, 2002 DIA Special Analysis, Iraq ’s Inconclusive Ties to al-Qaida. 165 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. 71

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  • (U) Conclusion 14. The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001. Postwar Findings 
  • (U) The Committee issued a number of conclusions in its September 2006 report, Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, relating to the pre-war links between Iraq and terrorism. The Committee found the following. 
  • (U) Iraq and al Qaeda did not have a cooperative relationship. Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al Qaeda and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from al Qaeda to provide material or operational support. 
  • (U) Most of the contacts cited between Iraq and al Qaeda before the war by the intelligence community and policymakers have been determined not to have occurred. One of the reported contacts has been confirmed, and two other meetings have since been identified. 
  • (U) Postwar information supports prewar assessments and statements that Abu Musab al- Zarqawi was in Baghdad and that al Qaeda was present in northern Iraq. 
  • (U) No postwar information has been found that indicates Iraq provided chemical and biological weapons training to al Qaeda. The detainee who provided the key prewar reporting about this training recanted his claims after the war. In 2004, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi recanted his earlier statements about biological and chemical weapons training. Al-Libi told debriefers that he had fabricated information while in US custody to receive better treatment and in response to threats of being transferred to a foreign intelligence service which he believed would torture him. He also said that later, while he was being debriefed by a foreign intelligence service, he fabricated more information in response to physical abuse and threats of torture. The Committee’s prior report on post-war findings cited a CIA officer who explained that while CIA believes that al- Libi fabricated information, the CIA cannot determine whether, or what portions of, the original statements or the later recants are true or fa1se.166 
  • (U) Intelligence gathered after the war has led analysts to doubt that Mohamed Atta had ` meetings with Iraq officials in the Czech Republic. According to the Committee’s prior report, "Postwar findings support CIA’s January 2003 assessment, which judged that ‘the most reliable reporting casts doubt’ on one of the leads, an alleged meeting between Muhammad Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague, and confirm that no such meeting occurred."l67 M6 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006, 108. 167 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January 2003, as quoted and described in Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 72

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  • VIII. Intent • "And containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime’s good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and building new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest fear is that terrorists will frnd a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we frnd all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to con’rront." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7 2002 • "We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a hope against all evidence." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003 • "Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qaida. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003 • "Some believe, some claim these contacts do not add up to much. They say Saddam Hussein’s secular tyranny and al-Qaida’s religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida _ 73

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  • together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al Queda could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond‘?" - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 
  • (U) In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State all discussed Iraq’s intentions regarding weapons of mass destruction. Both the President and the Vice President indicated that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorist groups. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) 
  • (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he discussed "the case of Saddam Hussein", and indicated that Saddam was "prepared to share [weapons of mass destruction] with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States."166 
  • (U) At the time of the Vice President’s speech, the intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists. The intelligence community had previously assessed that Saddam was interested in acquiring WMD to counter his neighbors’ capabilities, deter hostile foreign powers (including Israel, Iran, and the US—led Coalition) and as a means of achieving "regional preemir1ence." 
  • (U) The intelligence community had also assessed that Saddam was unlikely to take actions that he believed would threaten the survival of his regime, and that he believed hostile actions such as a re-invasion of Kuwait would in fact threaten his regime’s sru·vival. 
  • (U) There were few recent coordinated intelligence assessments regarding Saddam Hussein’s intentions at the time of the Vice President’s speech. In 1998 the intelligence community had assessed that "Saddam has three primary, and interrelated, goals: maintaining power, having sanctions lifted as soon as possible, and, over the long term, reasserting Iraq’s regional dominance. . .Saddam is committee to seeing Iraq reemerge as the dominant power in the region: He is determined to retain elements of his WMD programs so that he will be able to intimidate Iraq’s neighbors and deter potential adversaries, such as Iran, Israel, and the United States".169 166 White House Transcript, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103'6 National Convention, August 26, 2002. 169 Intelligence Community Brief, Iraq: Prospects for Confrontation, July 17, 1998. _ 74

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  • (U) In 1999 the intelligence community produced a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) entitled Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003, which discussed Saddam’s likely perceptions and intentions. In 2004, the National Intelligence Council informed the SSCI that the views expressed in the 1999 NIE were "generally held by the IC until well into 2002 with some views carried over into" an October 2002 NIE on Saddam’s military intentions and capabilities.17° 
  • (U) Specifically, the 1999 NIE noted that: (U) Reading Saddam’s intentions is difficult. He can be impulsive and deceptive; critical factors in shaping his behavior are largely hidden from us. . .But there are two fundamental guideposts that drive our calculus of his actions. First, we judge that Saddam would be careful not to place his regime’s survival at risk. Second, he probably believes that a re-invasion of Kuwait would provoke a Coalition response that could threaten to destroy his regime. ` 
  • (U) ...We judge that Saddam continues to believe that Iraq needs WMD and long-range missiles to: 1) counter Israeli and Iranian capabilities. . .; 2) deter military attacks, including by Coalition forces; 3) achieve regional preeminence.171 
  • (U) A separate CIA memorandum on this topic, published in December 2001, stated that "Saddam sees himself as a pan-Arab leader and views his regime as the most glorious chapter in Iraqi history. . .His decision-making is guided by opportunism, distrust for others, a personal need for power, and the sense that he is an historic figure who must take bold risks to advance Iraq’s interests. He views state power primarily in military terms — twice launching wars against his neighbors — and his strategic aim is to establish Iraq as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf" President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 
  • (U) In the President’s September 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Saddam Hussein was a "grave and gathering danger", and that to assume Saddam’s good faith would be tantamount to betting "the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble." 
  • (U) The President also implied that the Iraqi regime was dangerous because it might provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists ("And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we find all these dangers .... ").m 
  • (U) The intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein dealt with other countries in good faith, and assessments regarding the potential use of WMD were not based on 170 Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. m National Intelligence Estimate, Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003, 1999. 172 White House Transcript, President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002. _ 75

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  • assumptions of good faith. The 1999 NIE on Iraqi military capabilities noted that it was difficult to gauge Saddam’s intentions, but judged that he would be careful not to put his regime’s survival at risk.173 
  • (U) At the time of the President’s UN speech, the October 2002 NIE was still being prepared, and was two weeks away from release. While the document itself was not available at this time, its consistency with the 1999 NIE, and the lack of contradictory assessments in the intervening four year period, illustrate the continuity of the intelligence community’s judgments on this topic. 
  • (U) The October 2002 NIE assessed that "Saddam’s past actions suggest that a decision to use WMD probably would come when he feels his personal survival is at stake even after he has exhausted all political, military and diplomatic options". It noted that the US would be unlikely to know when Saddam felt that he had no other options for self-preservation, but pointed out that "Iraq’s methodical conventional defensive preparations also suggest Saddam thinks an attack is not immmcmr-."* 
  • (U) Additionally, the NIE pointed out that "Iraq’s historical use of CW against Iran and its decision not to use WMD against Israel or Coalition forces in 1991 indicates that an opponent’s retaliatory capability is a critical factor in Saddam’s decisionmal<ing."l75 
  • (U) The NIE also examined a variety of ways in which Iraq might conceivably use WMD, and noted that overall "we have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use WMD."l76 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
  • (U) The President spoke further on Iraqi intentions during his speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, where he said that "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists." In discussing Iraq’s alleged nuclear program, he stated that "facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." Finally, he concluded that "we could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a hope against all evidence."m 
  • (U) While the October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, it judged that Saddam was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. According to the NIE, "Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger case for making war."m 173 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003, 1999. 1;; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. H6 iii 177 White House Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. 178 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. _ 76
  •  
  • Harold Rhode

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  • (U) The NIE concluded that Iraq would be more likely to conduct a terrorist-style attack on the US if Saddam perceived that the US could not be deterred from invading Iraq and destroying his regime. It assessed that if he made such a decision, Saddam would be most likely to rely on Iraqi intelligence officers under his command. It considered the possibility of Saddam employing an outside terrorist group to assist in such an attack, and concluded that this "extreme step" was conceivable if Saddam were "sufticiently desperate" and seeking a "last chance to exact vengeance." The NIE also noted that "although Saddam has not endorsed al-Qaida’s overall agenda and has been suspicious of Islamist movements in general, apparently he has not been averse to some contacts with the organization." The NIE stated that the intelligence community had low confidence in its own ability to assess when Saddam might use WMD and whether he would engage in clandestine attacks on the US homeland}79 
  • (U) As discussed elsewhere in this report, in October 2002 most intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. The State Department’s Office of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) believed that Saddam Hussein wanted to possess nuclear weapons, and was maintaining some capabilities with dual uses, but judged that the available evidence did "not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution."18° President’s State of the Union Address (January 29, 2003) 
  • (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he said that Saddam Hussein "could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own." He also stated that Saddam had "ambitions of conquest in the Middle East" that he could resume if he had "nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons".l8l 
  • (U) As discussed, the October 2002 NIE judged that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. More generally, it suggested that Saddam would probably decide to use WMD only if he felt he had no other options for survival and that "an opponent’s retaliatory capability" would be a key factor in making this decision}82 
  • (U) A November 2002 NIE on nontraditional threats restated the October NIE’s assessment about Saddam’s willingness, if "suff1ciently desperate" to employ an outside terrorist group to conduct an attack on the US as his "last chance for vengeance." This NIE included the caveats U *79 mid. 180 Ibid. As discussed in a previous Committee report (Senate Report 109-331) the Director of Central Intelligence also released a public statement regarding the President’s speech. This statement did not specifically address the possibility of Saddam providing WMD to terrorists, but said "There is no inconsistency between our view of Saddam’s growing threat and the view as expressed by the President in his speech. Although we think the chances of Saddam initializing a WMD attack are low — in part because it would constitute an admission that the [sic] possesses WMD — there is no question that the likelihood of Saddam using WMD against the United States or our allies in the region grows as his arsenal continues to build." I; E/hiite House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union ", January 28, 2003. 1 . _ 77

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  • that the intelligence community had low confidence in these assessments, and that "IN`R believes that the intelligence community has no reporting to support this assertion."183 
  • (U) The October 2002 NIE’s conclusions were essentially repeated again in a January 2003 Intelligence Community Assessment which said that "Saddam probably will not initiate hostilities for fear of providing Washington with justification to invade Iraq. Nevertheless, he might deal the first blow, especially if he perceives that an attack intended to end his regime is ' inent."184 
  • (U) Neither of these reports specifically focused on what Saddam might do if he had nuclear weapons or a "full arsenal" of chemical and biological weapons, possibly because the intelligence community believed that Iraq was still years away from possessing either of these. Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
  • (U) In the Secretary of State’s February 2003 address to the United Nations Security Council, he stated that "arnbition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together", and that "al Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction."185 
  • (U) The intelligence community did not assess that Iraq and al Qaida had a cooperative relationship. In June 2002 the CIA wrote that "in contrast to the traditional patron—client relationship Iraq enjoys with secular Palestinian groups, the ties between Saddam and bin Laden appear much like those between rival intelligence services, with each trying to exploit the other for its own benefit."186 While there was evidence of limited contacts throughout the 1990s, the CIA did not assess that these contacts added up to an established, cooperative relationship. In a January 2003 report the CIA noted that the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida shared mutual enemies, and that several reports of varying reliability mentioned "the involvement of Iraq or Iraqi nationals in al-Qaida’s efforts to obtain CBW [chemical and biological weapons] training. However, the same report also assessed that "Saddam Husayn and Usama bin Laden are far from being natural partners", and stated that while there was little specific intelligence about Saddam’s opinion of al-Qaida, "his record suggests that any such ties would be rooted in deep suspicion."187 
  • (U) The Committee is also aware of intelligence provided directly to the Secretary by the CIA which echoed these assessments. 
  • (U) As discussed, the October 2002 NIE assessed that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups at that time, because he did not want to put his 183 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats t0 the US Homeland Through 2007, November 2002 H4 Intelligence Community Assessment, Key Warnings for 2003, January 2003. 185 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 186 CIA, Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 21, 2002. H7 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January 29, 2003. The Iraqi regime’s possible links to terrorist groups are discussed in the Terrorism section of this report. _ 78

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  • regime’s survival at risk. It noted that information on possible training of terrorists was "second hand, or from sources of varying reliability."188 Additional Statements • "And as I have said repeatedly, Saddam Hussein would like nothing more than to use a terrorist network to attack and to kill and leave no fingerprints behind." — President George W Bush, Remarks with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, January 31, 2003 • "Every world leader that comes to see me, I explain our concerns about a nation which is not conforming to agreements that it made in the past; a nation which has gassed her people in the past; a nation which has weapons of mass destruction and apparently is not afraid to use them." — President George W Bush, Press Conference, March 13, 2002 • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use them against our friends, against our allies and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors; confrontations that will involve both the weapons that he has today and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth." — Vice President Dick Cheney, Statement before the Veterans of the Korean War, San Antonio, Texas, August, 29, 2002 • "But we should be just as concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons. They’re simpler to deliver and even more readily transferred to terrorist networks, who could allow Iraq to deliver them without Iraq’s fingerprints." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the HASC September 18, 2002 • "There are a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of mass destruction -- Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria to name but a few. But no terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people and the stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "We do know that the Iraqi regime currently has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, and we do know they’re currently pursuing nuclear weapons, that they have a proven willingness to use those weapons at their disposal and that they’ve proven an aspiration to seize the territory of and threaten their neighbors, proven support for and cooperation with terrorist networks and proven record of declared hostility and venomous rhetoric against the United States. Those threats should be clear to all." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 188 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. _ 79

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  • _ • "He’s hostile to our country. Because we have denied him the ability he has fought to impose his will on his neighbors, he has said in no uncertain terms that he would use weapons of mass destruction against the United States. He has at this moment stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the 1:L4SC, September 18, 2002 • "There are ways Iraq can easily conceal responsibility for a WMD attack. For example, they could give biological weapons to terrorist networks to attack the United States from within and then deny any knowledge. Suicide bombers are not deterrable." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "Moreover, if he decided it was in his interest to conceal his responsibility for an attack on the U.S., providing WMD to terrorists would be an effective way of doing so." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002 • "We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein, in possession of weapons of mass destruction, could empower a few terrorists to threaten millions of innocent people." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, September 19, 2002 • "Every month that goes by, his WMD programs are progressing and he moves closer to his goal of possessing the capability to strike our population, and our allies, and hold them hostage to blackmail." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Prepared Testimony before the SASCZ September 19, 2002 • "Al Qa’ ida hides, Saddam doesn’t, but the danger is, is that they work in concert. The danger is, is that al Qa’ida becomes an extension of Sadda1n’s madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world...[Y]ou can’t distinguish between al Qa’ida and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror." — President George W Bush, Remarks with Columbian President Uribe, September 25, 2002 • "Each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX -- nerve gas -- or some day a nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally." —- President George W Bush, Remarks in the Rose Garden with Congressional Leaders, September 26, 2002 • "We know that the Iraqi regime is led by a dangerous and brutal man. We know he is actively seeking the destructive technologies to match his hatred. And we know that he must be stopped. The dangers we face will only worsen from month to month and year to year. To ignore these threats is to encourage them -— and when they have fully materialized, it may be too late to protect ourselves and our allies. By then, the Iraqi dictator will have had the means to terrorize and dominate the region, and each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX nerve gas or 80

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  • _ someday a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group." — President George W Bush, Radio Address, September 28, 2002 • "The danger to America from the Iraqi regime is grave and growing. The regime is guilty of beginning two wars. It has a horrible history of striking without warning. In deiiance of pledges to the United Nations, Iraq has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons and is rebuilding the facilities used to make more of those weapons. Saddam Hussein has used these weapons of death against innocent Iraqi people, and we have every reason to believe he will use them again. Iraq has longstanding ties to terrorist groups which are capable of, and willing to, deliver weapons of mass death." — President George W Bush, Radio Address, October 5, 2002 • "Indeed, the more time passes the more time Saddam Hussein has to develop his deadly weapor1s and to acquire more. The more time he has to plant sleeper agents in the United States and other friendly countries or to supply deadly weapons to terrorists he can then disown, the greater the danger. The notion that we can wait until the threat is imminent assumes that we will know when it is imminent." — Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Remarks at Fletcher Conference, October 16, 2002 • "After September the llth, we’ve entered into a new era and a new war. This is a man that we know has had connections with al Qa’ida. This is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al Qa’ida as a forward anny." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Dearborn, Michigan, October 14, 2002 • "His regime has had high-level contacts with al Qa’ida going back a decade and has provided training to al Qa’ida terrorists. And as the President has said, ‘Iraq could decide on any given day to provide biological or chemical weapons to a terrorist group or to individual terrorists’ -- which is why the war on terror will not be won till Iraq is completely and verifiably deprived of weapons of mass destruction." — Woe President Dick Cheney, Remarks at the Air National Guard Conference, December 2, 2002 • "He has weapons of mass destruction, the world’s deadliest weapons, which pose a direct threat to the United States, our citizens and our friends and allies." — President George W Bush, Remarks with Economists, January 21, 2003 • "The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World Economic Forum, January 26 2003 • "Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave danger —· not only to his neighbors, but also to the United States. His regime aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qa’ida. He could decide secretly to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for use against us. And as the President said on Tuesday night, it would take just one vial, one canister, one crate to bring a day of horror to our 81

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  • nation unlike any we have ever known." — Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks to the Conservative PAC January 30, 2003 • "I believe Saddam Hussein is a threat to the American people. I believe he’s a threat to the neighborhood in which he lives. And I’ve got a good evidence to believe that. He has weapons of mass destruction, and he has used weapons of mass destruction in his neighborhood and on his own people. He’s invaded countries in his neighborhood. He tortures his own people. He’s a murderer. He has trained and financed A1 Qaida-type organizations before -- A1 Qaida and other terrorist organizations." — President George W Bush, News Confrence, March 6, 2003 • "[The Iraqi regime] has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And [Iraq] has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qa’ida. The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other." — President George W Bush, Address to the Nation, March 1 7, 2003 
  • (U) The above statements are all consistent with the five policy speeches analyzed. Conclusions (
  • (U) Conclusion 15: Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Saddam Hussein did not have nuclear weapons, and was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks the US using conventional, chemical or biological weapons at that time, in part because he feared that doing so would give the US a stronger case for war with Iraq. This judgment was echoed by both earlier and later intelligence community assessments. All of these assessments noted that gauging Saddam’s intentions was quite difficult, and most suggested that he would be more likely to initiate hostilities if he felt that a US invasion was imminent. Postwar Findings (U) Postwar findings indicate that Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qaida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, and refused all requests from al-Qaida to provide material or operational support. No postwar information indicates that Saddam ever considered using any terrorist group to attack the United States. (U) In 2004, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Saddam had aspired to rebuild weapons of mass destruction capabilities if and when international sanctions ended, but that the Iraqi regime had no strategy or plan for the eventual revival of such capabilities. _ 82

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  • (U) The Iraq Survey Group also concluded that Saddam and his advisors had judged that a US invasion was the greatest potential threat to regime survival, but that Saddam believed that such an invasion was very unlikely. According to the Survey Group’s findings, Saddam’s military policies were based primarily on his desire to deter neighboring countries — particularly Iran — from taking direct military action against him.           189 189 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How Hey Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 83

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  • _ IX. Post-War Iraq • "Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the Arab ‘street,’ the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are ‘sure to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans.’ - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "With our help, a liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again. Iraq is rich in natural resources and human talent, and has unlimited potential for a peaceful, prosperous future. Our goal would be an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a government that is democratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of every ethnic and religious group are recognized and protected. In that troubled land all who seek justice, and dignity, and the chance to live their own lives, can know they have a friend and ally in the United States of America." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "The lives of Iraqi citizens would improve dramatically if Saddam Hussein were no longer in power, just as the lives of Afghanistan’s citizens improved after the Taliban." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Iraq is a land rich in culture, resources, and talent. Free from the weight of oppression, Iraq’s people will be able to share in the progress and prosperity of our time. If military action is necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy, and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors.” - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 Intelligence 
  • (U) The Committee summarized and analyzed the intelligence products written between April 19, 1999 and the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003 in its previous report, Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq. 190 The Committee received dozens of all- source intelligence reports as part of this review. As described in that report, two Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs) provided the best snapshots of the IC’s views on postwar Iraq. Both were produced in January 2003, and thus are not applicable in determining whether statements made in August and October of 2002 were substantiated by the intelligence information. 
  • (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced two briefing presentations in April 2002 that discussed the challenges that could arise for US military and coalition forces in the Phase IV post-combat phase of the war plan for Iraq.l9l The Erst DIA briefing assessed that the Iraqi 190 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq, May 31, 2007. An unclassified copy of this report can be found at http://intelligence.senate.gov/prewar.pdf 191 DIA, Knowledge of Iraqi Society: Policymaker Need for Insight and Looking at Post-Saddam Iraq, April 2002. 84

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  • _ Baath Party "will attempt to return by any means necessa.ry" that "large portions of the population will remain intirnidated," and that the "Iraqi populace will adopt an ambivalent attitude toward liberation." The briefing also assessed that "Significant force protection threats will emerge from the Baathists, the Jihadists and Arab nationalists who oppose any US occupation of Iraq."192 
  • (U) The second DIA briefing noted that "managing rivalries will be a major challenge to the new regime." DIA assessed that most seams and fissures will remain, but should be manageable and noted that most rivalries are intra-communal, not between ethnic or religious groups." It also outlined that potential post-war challenges that included, "preventing Kurdish separation, eradicating terrorists in Ansar area, managing inter-ethnic/tribal violence, gaining control of the regime’s geographic power base, and accounting for WMD."193 
  • (U) In August 2002, the CIA produced a report, Can Iraq Ever Become A Democracy? , at the request of the National Security Council. In the report’s scope note, the CIA stated that: "This assessment fully accepts that traditional Iraqi political culture has been inhospitable to democracy. Nevertheless, we feel it is appropriate to explore, in a necessarily initial and speculative fashion, to what extent post-Saddam Iraq might possess some democratic building blocks, and under what circumstances these blocks might be used to construct a democratic government in post-Saddarn Iraq."194 
  • (U) The report stated that, "On the surface, Iraq currently appears to lack both the socio- economic and politico—cultural prerequisites that political scientists generally regard as necessary to nurture democracy. Nevertheless, we believe that Iraq has several advantages that, if buttressed by the West, could foster democracy in post-Saddam Iraq."195 The advantages cited I by the report included the return of exiled elites, a weak tradition of political Islam, near- universal revulsion against Saddarn’s dictatorship, and economic resources. The report emphasized that "None of these factors should be seen as minimizing the obstacles to democratization in Iraq after Saddam."196 
  • (U) The CIA also pointed to Iraqi Kurdistan as a potential model for democratic development in the rest of Iraq. The report noted, for example, that "Iraqi Kurdistan has become one of the more democratic regions in the Middle East. In 1991 it was as badly off—both economically and from the viewpoint of political culture and history—as the rest of Iraq would likely be should Saddam be defeated."197 
  • (U) The report noted such "words of caution" as "we are uncertain how rapidly Iraq. .. can recover from the massive socio-economic and political damage inflicted by Saddam, especially since 1991 ." The report assessed that without "long-term, active US/Western military, political, *9* ibid *99 ibid 194 CIA, Can Iraq Ever Become a Dem0cracy?, August 8, 2002, pp. i - iv. *99 1b1d,p. *99 1b1d,p. 111 *9* ibid, p. 1 85

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  • and economic involvement with the country" the chance of achieving even "the partial democratic successes of, for example, Iraqi Kurdistan to be poor." 19 
  • (U) The report assessed that, "In theory, Iraq should be better placed than its current dire economic statistics and dictatorial government suggest to recuperate lost ground and forge a more modern society once Saddam is toppled. It is also possible, however, that Saddam’s rule has damaged the Iraqi body politic and set back Iraqi socio-economic development in more severe ways that will require many more years to overcome. We simply cannot know until the dictator is gone." 199 
  • (U) The CIA wrote a second August 2002 intelligence assessment in response to tasking by the National Security Council. This report, The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences of Invading Iraq, was intended to set forth worst—case scenarios that might emerge from US-led regime change in Iraq. The scope note stated that the "spirit of the paper reaches beyond what we normally would assess as plausible" and that the report was intended to "look at a number of situations that, when taken separately or together, could complicate US efforts in a campaign against Iraq." The negative consequences highlighted in the paper were: anarchy and territorial breakup in Iraq; instability in key Arab states; a surge of global terrorism and deepening Islamic antipathy toward the United States; major oil supply disruptions; and severe strains in the Atlantic alliance. 
  • (U) In October 2002, the National Intelligence Council published a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), entitled Saddam ’s Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities.2°° While not the central focus of the NIE, it did note that ". . .US and Coalition forces will face enormous requirements to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians. If Saddam adopted a scorched earth policy — and some intelligence reporting suggests he will- advancing forces will be confronted with large-scale destruction of oil and power facilities, the contamination of food supplies and other potential environmental devastation."2°1 Additional Statements • "Now, I think things have gotten so bad inside Iraq, from the standpoint of the Iraqi people, my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. • MR. RUSSERT: If your analysis is not correct, and we’re not treated as liberators, but as conquerors, and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in Baghdad, do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly, and bloody battle with significant American casualties? VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: Well, I don’t think it’s likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators. - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. 198 Ibid, pp. i - iv. 199 CIA, Can Iraq Ever Become a Democracy?, August 8, 2002, pp. i- iv. 200 NIC, Saddam ’s Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities, October 2002, p i 201 NIC, Saddam ’s Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities, October 2002, p i _ 86

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  • • MR. RUSSERT: Every analysis said this war itself would cost about $80 billion, recovery of Baghdad, perhaps of Iraq, about $10 billion per year. We should expect as American citizens that this would cost at least $100 billion for a two-year involvement. VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: I can’t say that, Tim. There are estimates out there. It’s important, though, to recognize that we’ve got a different set of circumstances than we’ve had in Afghanistan. . .. In Iraq you’ve got a nation that’s got the second-largest oil reserves in the world, second only to Saudi Arabia. It will generate billions of dollars a year in cash flow if they get back to their production of roughly three million barrels of oil a day, in the relatively near future. - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. • ". .. The point is this is not a nation without resources, and when it comes time to rebuild and to make the kinds of investments that are going to be required to give them a shot at achieving a truly representative government, a successful government, a government that can defend itself and protect its territorial integrity and look to the interests of its people, Iraq starts with significant advantages. It’s got a well-trained middle class, a highly literate work force, a high degree of technical sophistication. This is a country that I think, but for the rule of Saddam Hussein and his brutality and his diversion of the nation’s resources and his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, can be one of the leading, perhaps the leading state in that part of the world in terms of developing a modem state and the kind of lifestyle that its people are entitled to." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. • MR. RUSSERT: And you are convinced the Kurds, the Sunnis, the Shiites will come together in a democracy? VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: They have so far. One of the things that many people forget is that the Kurds in the north have been operating now for over 10 years under a sort of U.S.—provided umbrella with respect to the no-ily zone, and they have established a very strong, viable society with elements of democracy and important part of it. . .. - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. • ". .. I think the prospects of being able to achieve this kind of success, if you will, from a political standpoint, are better than they would be for virtually any other country in under similar circumstances in that part of the world." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. 
  • (U) These statements were made roughly five months later than the statements in the major I speeches described above, and the intelligence community had written several intelligence products in the intervening period. In particular, the National Intelligence Council had produced two coordinated Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs) in January 2003 as described above. A redacted copy of both reports can be found as appendices in the Committee’s report, Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq. 
  • (U) In the first ICA, entitled Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq, the Intelligence Community analyzed the "most important political, economic, and social consequences of _ 87

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  •  
  • regime change in Iraq .... "202 The second ICA, Principal Challenges in P0st—Saddam Iraq, examined "the internal dynamics of Iraq that will frame the challenges for whatever government succeeds the regime of Saddam Hussein."203 
  • (U) The two lCA’s did not directly assess whether U.S. personnel would be "greeted as liberators," but did address underlying factors that would likely shape Iraqi’s views. The Committee’s May 2007 summarized the assessments in the two January 2003 reports. These prewar assessments were that: • Establishing a stable democratic government in postwar Iraq would be a long, difficult and probably turbulent challenge. • Iraq was a deeply divided society that likely would engage in violent conflict unless an occupying power prevented it. • The Iraqi government would have to walk a fine line between dismantling the worst aspects of Saddam’s police, security, and intelligence forces and retaining the capability to enforce nationwide peace. • Iraq’s large petroleum resources would make economic reconstruction a less difficult challenge than political transformation, but that postwar Iraq would nonetheless face significant economic challenges. • The new Iraqi government would require significant outside assistance to rebuild Iraq’s water and sanitation infrastructure. Conclusions 
  • (U) Conclusion 16: Statements by President Bush and Vice President Cheney regarding the postwar situation in Iraq, in terms of the political, security, and economic, did not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products. There were relatively few intelligence products on this subject prior to January 2003, and senior policymakers did not request them. The Committee recognizes that there were many other sources of information available to policymakers that would inform their views about post-war Iraq. The Committee did not explore these other sources as it is beyond the scope of this report. 202 National Intelligence Council, Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq, January 2003. 203 National Intelligence Council, Princzpal Challenges in P0st-Saddam Iraq, January 2003. 88

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  • ADDITIONAL Views or Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV On April 1, 2008, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence approved on a bipartisan vote of l0-5 the remaining two reports of its investigation into pre-war intelligence on Iraq and related matters. The first Committee report evaluates whether the public statements of senior United States government officials leading up to the war were substantiated by underlying intelligence information. The second report, building on previous work done by the Committee and the Department of Defense (DoD) inspector General, further details the intelligence activities of Defense Department policy officials conducted outside the Intelligence Community. These two reports are part of a second phase of the Iraq investigation authorized unanimously by the Committee on February 12, 2004. in undertaking these additional lines of inquiry, the Committee acted to tell the complete story of how intelligence was not only collected and analyzed prior to the Iraq invasion but how it was publicly used in authoritative statements made by the highest officials of the Bush Administration in furtherance of its policy to overthrow Saddam Hussein. For three years, the Committee’s investigative mandate foundered. Under the direction of the then-majority, the Committee failed to show the same disciplined and objective oversight it demonstrated in producing its July 2004 report on the Intelligence Community’s pre-war intelligence assessments on Iraq. Committee Chairman Pat Roberts halted the investigation on the intelligence activities of the Defense Department officials and farmed out the work to the DoD inspector General in November 2005. The public statements section of the investigation was slow-walked and a draii report was never presented to the Committee membership prior to the change in the Senate majority in 2007, evidently a task too politically sensitive to handle. Upon assuming the Committee chairmanship, I directed that work be restarted on the remaining sections of the investigation (another report on pre-war assessments on post-war Iraq was approved by the Committee and released in May 2007). Soon thereafter, on February 9, 2007, the DoD inspector General issued its own report reviewing the activities of DoD policy officials prior to the war. The Inspector General’s report, based on extensive interviews and a thorough review of documents, concluded that the policy office in the Pentagon had expanded its role and mission from formulating policy and had inappropriately disseminated an alternative analysis drawing a link between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorists who carried out the attacks on September llth that the Intelligence Community was unable to substantiate. The Committee uncovered this attempt by DoD policy officials to shape and politicize intelligence in order to bolster the Administration’s policy of invasion in its July 2004 report. After the release of the February 2007 DoD inspector General report, Vice Chairman Christopher "Kit" Bond wrote me urging that the Committee not finish the investigation of the Pentagon policy office it officially authorized three years earlier. As a concession to the Vice Chairman’s request, I agreed to not revisit the same events examined in the inspector General 89

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  •  report, but rather to restart a portion of the Committee’s suspended Pentagon investigation unexamined by the Inspector General: clandestine meetings in Rome and Paris between DoD policy officials and Iranians in 2001 and 2003, facilitated by Manucher Ghorbanifar, the Iranian exile and fabricator implicated in the 1986 Iran—Contra scandal, in which intelligence was collected but kept from the Intelligence Community. The Committee began examining the circumstances surrounding these meetings in 2003 based on an agreement between Chairman Roberts and me (serving then as Vice Chairman) pursuant to the original terms of reference of the Committee’s investigation. We agreed at the time that while these meetings concerned Iran and not Iraq, it was important nevertheless to fully understand how the meetings came to be, what was discussed and proffered at them, and why they were not handled in normal diplomatic or intelligence channels. These were matters of fundamental, statutorily-mandated congressional oversight that the Committee was not at liberty to ignore. The resulting report is based on interviews of numerous Administration officials, including those Pentagon officials attending the Rome and Paris meetings, and a careful examination of hundreds of pages of documentation, including cable traffic, meeting notes, and an internal DoD review concerning the propriety of the meetings. Whereas the Committee’s 2004 report presented evidence that the DoD policy office attempted to shape the CIA’s terrorism analysis in late 2002 and, when it failed, prepared an altemative intelligence analysis denigrating the CIA for not embracing a link between Iraq and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the most recent report shows that the rogue actions of the office were not isolated. The Committee’s findings paint a disturbing picture of Pentagon policy officials who were distrustful of the Intelligence Community and undertook the collection of sensitive intelligence without coordinating their activities or reporting the information they collected through proper channels. The actions of DoD officials to blindly disregard the red flags over the role played by Mr. Ghorbanifar in these meetings and to wall—off the Intelligence Community from its activities and the information it obtained were improper and demonstrated a fundamental disdain for the Intelligence Community’s role in vetting sensitive sources. In preparing its report on public statements made by U.S. government officials prior to the war, the Committee decided to concentrate its analysis on those statements that were central to the debate in 2002-2003 over the decision to go to war. The Committee identified five major policy speeches made by President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, and Secretary of State Colin Powell during this period as the most significant expressions of how the Bush Administration communicated intelligence judgments to the American people, the United States Congress, and the international community. Additional statements made by senior Administration officials during this time frame containing assertions not included in the five major policy speeches were examined as well. _ 90

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  • The Committee decided not to consider public statements made prior to the summer of 2002 in its review or those made by lower level Executive Branch officials. They were not deemed to be as central to the lead-up to war in Iraq. Statements made by members of Congress also were not evaluated. A bipartisan majority of the Committee agreed that these statements do not carry the same weight of authority as statements made by the President and others in the Executive Branch who are charged with representing the views of the U.S. government in a State of the Union Address viewed by 50 million Americans or in a speech before the United Nations. In addition, members of Congress did not have the same ready access to intelligence as senior Executive Branch policymakers. As the Committee’s 2004 Iraq report highlights, it took requests by members of the Committee to the Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet in September 2002 for the Intelligence Community to produce its National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. The hastily produced NIE was not published until October 2002, mere days before Congress was scheduled to vote on the resolution to authorize the use of force in Iraq. By this time, the Administration had made repeated public assertions regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorism as a predicate for the pre-emptive use of military force that would soon follow. The Committee carefully examined these public statements against the intelligence products distributed by the Intelligence Community at the time of the statement. The report’s conclusions highlight which statements were substantiated by the intelligence reporting and which statements were not. The Committee’s findings are fair and objective. In those instances where a statement is not substantiated by the intelligence, the Committee renders no judgment as to why. As the report details, Administration statements prior to the war often reflected the reporting of the Intelligence Community, even when the judgments underlying the reporting were based on flawed analysis or false information. However, senior Administration officials repeatedly spoke in declarative and unequivocal terms about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and support for terrorists. These declarative statements were not substantiated. In the push to rally public support for the invasion of Iraq, Administration officials often failed to accurately portray what was known, what was not known, and what was suspected about Iraq and the threat it represented to our national security. The report documents significant instances in which the Administration went beyond what the Intelligence Community knew or believed in making public claims, most notably on the V false assertion that Iraq and al-Qaeda had an operational partnership and joint involvement in carrying out the attacks of September llth. The President and his advisors undertook a relentless public campaign in the aftermath of the attacks to use the war against al-Qaida as a justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Representing to the American people that the two had an operational partnership and posed a single, indistinguishable threat was fundamentally misleading and led the Nation to war on false premises. The Committee also found instances where a public statement selectively used that intelligence information which supported a particular policy viewpoint while ignoring 91

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  •  contradictory information that weakened the position. While on its face, a statement may have been accurate, it nevertheless presented a slanted picture to those who were unaware of the hidden intelligence. The Administration’s misuse of intelligence prior to the war was aided by the selective declassification of intelligence reporting. The Executive Branch historically exercises the prerogative to classify information in order to protect national security and, unlike Congress, it can declassify information unilaterally and with ease. The Administration exploited this declassification authority in the lead up to the war and disclosed intelligence at a time and in a manner of its choosing with impunity, knowing that others attempting to disclose additional details that might provide balance or improve accuracy would be prevented from doing so under the threat of prosecution. This unlevel playing field allowed senior officials to disclose and discuss sensitive intelligence reports when it supported the Administration’s policy objectives and keep out of the public discourse information which did not. The canon of the Committee’s Iraq investigation - a series of six reports issued over a four-year period — demonstrates why congressional oversight is essential in evaluating America’s intelligence collection and analytic activities. During the course of its investigation, the Committee uncovered that the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction was based on stale, fragmentary, and speculative intelligence reports and replete with unsupported judgments. Troubling incidents were reported in which internal dissent and warnings about the veracity of intelligence on Iraq were ignored in the rush to war. The Committee’s investigation also revealed how the Administration policymakers applied pressure on intelligence analysts prior to the war to support a link between Iraq and those terrorists responsible for the attacks of September llth that did not exist. Our investigation detailed how the Iraqi National Congress attempted to influence United States policy on Iraq by providing false information through defectors directed at convincing the United States that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had links to terrorists, and how this false information was embraced despite warnings of fabrication. The Committee’s investigation also documented for the public how the Administration ignored the pre-war judgments of the Intelligence Community that the invasion of Iraq would destabilize security in-country and provide al-Qaida with an opportunity to exploit the situation and increase attacks against United States forces during and after the war. After tive years and the loss of over 4,000 American lives, these ignored judgments were tragically prescient. Overall, the findings and conclusions of the Committee’s Iraq investigation were an important catalyst in bringing about subsequent legislative and administrative reforms of the Intelligence Community designed to learn from these painful lessons of the past. Finally, I am disappointed that Vice Chairman Bond was unable to support the issuance of these two remaining reports. From when the initial drafts of both reports were presented to 92

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  • Committee members on January 15, 2008, to their adoption two and a half months later, every effort was made to accommodate changes proposed by all members. In the end, the Vice Chairman was the only Committee member to file amendments seeking further revision to the report. Of the over 170 amendments he filed, the Committee was able to accept or resolve more than half. By the time the reports were adopted on April lst, they reflected over 300 changes made at the request of the Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairman’s remaining amendments were requested changes that would have gutted the reports’ conclusions, changed the factual underpinnings of the investigation, and significantly delayed completion of the long-overdue reports. When the Vice Chairman repeatedly refused my request at the April lst meeting that he call up those remaining amendments he wanted considered and voted on, the Committee, on a bipartisan basis, voted 10-5 to approve and release the final installments of the Committee’s investigation. _ Conmacrion Sunrvnrrian BY CHAIRMAN J orm D. ROCKEFELLER IV _ An error appears on page 8 of the report on public statements. An additional sentence should be included in the paragraph discussing the views of the National Ground Intelligence Center, so that it reads: "A later memo from State/INR said that ‘the IAEA and - pertinent technical expert has concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for Iraq’s nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings. . .’ The memo also stated that ‘l-Iigh-grade aluminum is used for tactical rockets by a number of countries. Examples identified by DOE. . .include the United States, Russia (905 x 80mm rockets), and apparently Switzerland and Italy, whose 81rmn rocket design is assessed to have been reverse- engineered for the Nasser MLR system’, with the note that ‘DOE and DoD’s National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE views on tactical rockets."’ (U) This correction was not made in the body of the report due to an objection by the Vice Chairman. J orm D. ROCKEFELLER IV _ 93
  • ADDITIONAL Vnzws or Senator Dianne Feinstein I applaud the completion of the Committee’s Phase II investigations. Since the Committee’s first report in July 2004, we have known that the prewar intelligence on Iraq was both bad and wrong — it was the result of flawed tradecraft and produced the inaccurate belief that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. It has been four years since the Committee began the second phase of its review. The results are now in. Even though the intelligence before the war supported inaccurate statements, this Administration distorted the intelligence in order to build its case to go to war. The Executive Branch released only those findings that supported the argument, did not relay uncertainties, and at times made statements beyond what the intelligence supported. I am pleased that these reports have been completed and released for the public’s review. We can now tum our full attention to the present and the future, and making sure the mistakes of the past are not repeated. DLANN12 FE1Nsr121N _ 94

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  • _ ADDITIONAL Vmws or Senator FEINGOLD The Administration, and particularly President Bush and Vice President Cheney, made repeated assertions about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein that were not supported by the intelligence available at the time. Those assertions overstated the nature and urgency of the threat, as described in the intelligence, ignored ongoing disagreements and uncertainty within the Intelligence Community, and, at times, outright contradicted intelligence assessments. Together, the statements sought to make the case for a war in Iraq by convincing the American people, first, that Saddam had, might have, or was on the verge of obtaining a nuclear weapon, and, second, that Saddam had a relationship with Al Qaeda and would provide Al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of attacking the United States. Even the deeply flawed October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) did not support the claims made by the President and the Vice President regarding an Iraqi nuclear program. That NIE assessed that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one, and that without sufficient fissile material acquired from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 or 2009. Yet the President made the following statements: "[Saddarn] possesses the world’s most dangerous weapons" (March 22, 2002); "[w]e don’t know whether or not [Saddam] has a nuclear weapon" (December 31, 2002); and, of course, "[i]acing clear evidence of peril, we carmot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the forrn of a mushroom cloud" (October 7, 2002). Meanwhile, Vice President Cheney insisted that assessments related to Iraq’s nuclear program that were disputed within the Intelligence Community were known "with absolute certainty" (September 8, 2002) and through "irrefutable evidence" (September 20, 2002). And, on the eve of war, after the IAEA had reported that its inspectors had found "no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq, the Vice President asserted, "[w]e believe [Saddam] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons" (March 16, 2003). Administration ofl·icials’ claims of a relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda were even more outlandish. Before the war, the Central Intelligence Agency assessed that "Saddam has viewed Islamic extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat," that "Saddam Hussein and Usama bin Laden are far from being natural paitners," and that assessments about Iraqi links to al Qaeda rested on "a body of fragmented, conflicting reporting from sources of varying reliabi1ity." Moreover, the Intelligence Commiuiity consistently assessed that Saddam’s use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States rested on his being "sufficiently desperate" in the face of a U.S. attack and his possible desire for a "last chance at vengeance." Yet the President not only repeatedly suggested an operational relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, but asserted that Saddam would provide weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda for an unprovoked attack against the United States: "you can’t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror" (September 25, 2002); "[e]ach passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX — nerve gas — or some day a nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally" (September 26, 2002); "[Saddarn] is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al Qaeda as a forward army" (October 14, 2002); "[Saddam] is a threat because he is dealing with al Qaeda. .. [A] true threat facing our country is that an al Qaeda-type network trained and armed by Saddam could attack American and not leave one ’ringerprint" (November 7, 2002); and "[t]he danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help _ 95

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  • of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other" (March 17, 2002). Yet, as the Committee report has concluded, "[s]tatements by the President and Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information." Further, "[s]tatements and implications by the President and the Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al Qaeda had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al Qaeda with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence." Even statements that Saddam harbored al Qaeda, such as the President’s assertion that he "aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda" (January 28, 2003) were not supported by the intelligence available at the time. As the CIA acknowledged, "we lack positive indications that Baghdad is complicit" in the presence of operatives associated with al Qaeda in Iraq in 2002. These and other assertions that were contradicted by the available intelligence, including predictions of a smooth transition to a stable democracy, were intended to drive the country into a war that has cost thousands of American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, visited untold misery on the Iraqi people, and severely damaged our national security. Administration officials used the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to justify a war that has not only been waged in a country that had no connection to the attacks, but has seriously damaged our ability to fight al Qaeda. In that respect, the President’s statement, on October 2, 2002, that "the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency" was perhaps most inaccurate of all. In October 2002, and still today, the threat of unique urgency facing the United States does not come from Iraq, but from the Afghanistan/Pakistan safe haven and global capabilities of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Russsu. D. FEINGOLD 96

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  • _ ADDITIONAL Vmws or SENATORS HAGEL AND SNowE On February 12, 2004, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued a joint statement regarding the Committee’s Review of Pre-War Intelligence in Iraq. Specifically, the Chairman and Vice Chairman announced that the Committee had "unanimously agreed to refine the terms of reference of the Committee’s ongoing inquiry into pre war intelligence with regard to Iraq." The Chairman expressly stated that the "resolution adopted unanimously today illustrates the commitment of all members to a thorough review, to learning the necessary lessons from our experience with Iraq, and to ensuring that our armed forces and policymakers benefit from the best and most reliable intelligence that can be collected. I believe that the report which we are currently reviewing will have a profound impact on the future of our intelligence Community." We concurred completely. We also believe that the process by which the Committee drafted and approved the reports could have been significantly improved. The Committee took more than four years to review information of great import. The process was marked by partisan quarrels; however, we believe that every member had sufficient time to review and comment on the respective reports. In fact, of the 165 amendments filed to these reports, over 50% were resolved or withdrawn. Unfortunately, members never had an opportunity to vote up or down on the remaining amendments. We endorse the reports as the final chapter of the Committee’s inquiry into prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq. However, given the opportunity to vote, we also would have likely supported some of the amendments that had been filed, which would have improved the final product. On balance, these reports contain critical information that should unequivocally be publicly released, enabling the public to formulate their own conclusions. These reports in no way preclude the committee from undertaking additional inquiries ir1to the prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq. These reports simply bring closure to the Committee’s review. Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy The February l2, 2004 terms of reference of the Com1nittee’s inquiry mandated that the Committee review "any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy," (OUSDP) as well as "other issues we mutually identify in the course of the Committee’s review." The Committee began its review of intelligence activities by the offices reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 2004, but the effort was suspended in September 2005, when the Committee requested the Department of Defense Inspector General (`DoD IG) to review whether the Office of Special Plans, which reported to the OUSDP, "at any time, conducted unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate intelligence activities." _ 97

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  • The DoD IG reviewed whether personnel assigned to the PCTEG, OSP or OUSDP had conducted unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate intelligence activities from September 2001 through June 2003, completing its report in February 2007. The IG report concluded that "the Offrce of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaeda relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were. . .inappropriate. [. . .] This condition occurred because of an expanded role and mission of the Ofiice of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from policy formulation to altemative intelligence analysis and dissemination. As a result, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not provide "the most accurate analysis of intelligence" to senior decision makers." We endorse the DoD IG’s iinding that the OUSDP personnel’s actions were inappropriate, and, given the thorough work completed by the DoD IG on this issue, we do not believe it would serve the public interest to go over the same ground again. Based on the results of the DoD IG’s review, the Committee decided to examine intelligence collection activities within the OUSDP, which had not been included in the DoD IG report. Both reviews demonstrate that intelligence activities undertaken by the United States Government should rely on the professional Intelligence Community. We believe it is important for the American public to be aware of the results of this inquiry. Whether Public Statements regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information The Committee unanimously agreed to evaluate "whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information." According to the Committee report, the "Committee decided to concentrate its analysis on the statements that were central to the nation’s decision to go to war," and "specifically, the committee chose to review {ive major policy speeches by key Administration officials regarding the threats posed by Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraqi ties to terrorist groups, and possible consequences of a US invasion of Iraq." No amendments were iiled to either strike or revise this language. The Committee report continued stating that the "speeches are the best representations of how the Bush Administration communicated intelligence analysis to the Congress, the American people, and the international community" and that the speeches "are also fairly comprehensive in scope, so evaluations about whether a particular statement in a speech was substantiated can be extrapolated to cover similar statements made at similar times." In order to conduct this review "the Committee assembled hundreds of intelligence reports produced prior to March 19, 2003 in an effort to understand the state of intelligence analysis at the time of various speeches and statements." _ 98

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Millions Worldwide Believe 9/11 Conspiracy Theories, NewsMax,  below

'foreign government' = Israel *

Senate Intelligence Committee, pdf download Phase II AII B  

= go to NFU pages below

Michael Ledeen, Rove's Brain

more below

Senate Intelligence Committee Phase II a, b - Bush lies to war.

 
Topic Index
Plame / Wilson / Novak Pentagon mole, AIPAC Spies AIPAC, Giuliani, Mukasey Common
Millions Worldwide Believe 9/11 Conspiracy Theories
Millions Worldwide Believe 9/11 Conspiracy Theories Monday, 27 Sep 2010 01:21 PM Article Font Size By: Arnaud De Borchgrave

No sooner did Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggest from the rostrum of the U.N. General Assembly that most of the world believes the U.S. government was involved in a 9/11 conspiracy, than 32 nations followed the U.S. delegation as it walked out.

These were members of NATO, the European Union (21 countries are members of both), Australia, New Zealand, and Costa Rica.

More importantly, 167 nations didn't budge and went on listening to the Iranian's incendiary speech.

We keep forgetting that countless millions in the world, including millions of Americans, have swallowed the monumental canard that the United States and Israel were part of a conspiracy designed to legitimize the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

The first to finger the United States and Israel was Hamid Gul, two weeks after 9/11, in an interview with this reporter in Islamabad.

Gul, a former head of Pakistani intelligence and notorious anti-American, added the U.S. Air Force to the conspiracy mix. The "evidence" he provided was that no U.S. fighter aircraft were scrambled on 9/11 to intercept the passenger planes that had abandoned their flight plans.

Gul, a friend of Osama bin Laden dating to the days when they were allies against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, has yet to explain what he was doing in Kabul with his Taliban friends for two weeks immediately preceding 9/11.

More recently, in Cairo, two former Egyptian ambassadors to the United States told me they believed there was a Mossad-CIA plot designed to keep Israel and America in lockstep in a war on terror. They pointed out that when President George W. Bush declared Global War in Terror, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was the first to sign up.

For the two Egyptians, that validated their suspicions.

There were also bestselling books about the "fact certain conspiracy" written in both French and German, by different authors, that each sold a million copies in both countries.

For Gordon Duff, a Vietnam veteran and senior editor of "Veterans Today" and frequent "self-hating American" guest on radio and TV stations the world over, there is no doubt he is to the conspiracy theory born.

"In America," he wrote last week, "groups have been popping up for years, not 'fringe' types but military and professional organizations, architects, engineers, pilots, intelligence officers. There is a vast underground that is never reported, never spoken of in the news and continually threatened. The FBI and Homeland Security have infiltrated these groups, illegal surveillance has been on a massive scale and, as the groups have grown and their reach has touched millions of Americans, the government, in the usual whispers, is talking about mass arrests, 'unplugging' the Internet, all those things the militia movements of the '90s said would happen."

Outside of the United States, Duff adds, not in the Middle East, but Canada, Europe, Latin America, and the Far East, "finding people who accept the Bush and Obama administration's 'party line' about 'box cutters and hijackers' is difficult. No one wants to risk the public scorn of seeming like an imbecile."   more

 

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NewsFollowUp.com___  Senate Intelligence Phase IIa page 3____________home___archive

 
IIa  110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed   
 
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  • Then, importantly, the report acknowledges that the "Committee is fully aware that officials may have had multiple credible sources of information upon to which to base statements, but has not attempted to document or analyze source materials other than intelligence, so that is beyond the scope of this report.” The report focuses on major coordinated inter-agency intelligence reports and assessments. The Committee deemed that these reports were the most "authoritative” and represented the "full Intelligence Community position.” The Committee elected to not include "less formal communications between intelligence agencies and other parts of the Executive Branch” or reports "from the field.” Although we have repeatedly advocated for releasing as much information to the public as possible, we agreed that in this context, basing the report on major coordinated interagency intelligence reports and assessments, which represent the collective informed views of the Intelligence Community, was appropriate. Although we would have likely supported amendments expanding the scope if afforded the opportunity to vote, the scope and methodology was consistent with the unanimously agreed to charter, and, therefore, we supported it. In the event that assessments were referenced in the report and not included or cited, we would have clearly supported their inclusion. However, these assessments arguably would not have had a profound impact on the report or significantly affected the overall conclusions; they would have only provided context. The report accomplished its primary objective, unanimously agreed to by the committee: to evaluate "whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information.” CHUCK HAGEL OLYMPIA J. SNowE 

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  • _ MINORITY Views or Vrcn CnA1mv1AN BOND AND SENATORS CHAMBLISS, Hxrcn, AND BURR* This majority-only written report by the Senate Intelligence Committee is a great disappointment to us and an unfortunate commentary on the political nature of intelligence oversight in the Congress today. We regret that at a time when the Committee should be focusing its full attention on improving our intelligence community, closing the gaps in critical intelligence, and making our country safer, that the Committee Ends itself again consumed with political gamesmanship. Although we asked from the beginning of this investigation to be included in it, we were cut out; although we asked that the Members of the Committee produce the conclusions on this report, two majority staff were assigned to the task; and although we had over 50 amendments on the table at our Committee meeting on this report, we were not allowed to offer any of them. We have rarely seen such a poorly handled congressional investigation, and we believe the facts detailed below speak for themselves. Early History In late 2003 the Democrats first proposed that the Committee expand its inquiry of intelligence on Iraq into how administration policymakers "used" intelligence, frankly, we were not sure what they meant. At the time, it was already becoming clear to the Committee that the intelligence community’s performance in its estimate of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities had been a serious failure. Having heard many of the statements those policymakers had made, it seemed obvious to us that they "used" the intelligence on Iraq the same way policymakers in Congress at the time and policymakers in previous administrations had: they read it, made decisions based on what they read (as well as other available information), and they spoke to the American public about their policies and decisions. Once the Committee’s inquiry began to reveal that analysts were not "pressured" by the administration to assess that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and that, in fact, the intelligence itself was wrong, it appeared that the Democrats wanted to add a more subjective element into the investigation—how policymakers "used" intelligence. The reason for this initiative became clear in November 2003 when the press exposed a memo which outlined the "plan" by Committee Democrats to explore "vague notions of use" in order to make the greatest political gain from the Committee’s Iraq investigation. They intended to "pull the majority along as far as we can on issues that may lead to new disclosures regarding improper or questionable conduct by administration officials." The memo said that "we don’t know what we will End but our prospects for getting access we seek is far greater when we have the backing of the majority." The memo also noted that "we can verbally mention some of the intriguing leads we are pursuing"——presumably to the press and in violation of the Committee rules. . In spite of this disturbing revelation that the Democrats were seeking to politicize deliberately the national security oversight function of the Congress, in an effort toward bipartisan compromise, in February 2004 the Committee agreed to examine "whether public * I concur with the Vice Chairman’s views on the substance of the report as well as the Minority’s amendments. I am unable to comment on any Phase I or Phase H activities that preceded my membership on this Committee. 000

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  • _ statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information” as part of a second phase of the Iraq inquiry. Given what we had already learned, we warned that this could quickly devolve into an unfortunate use of the Committee’s time and resources, but we were willing to agree to the compromise nonetheless, confident that any fair inquiry would show clearly that the statements of administration officials were substantiated by the intelligence available to them at the time, intelligence that, as described in the Committee’s unanimous Phase I report, was flawed. Unfortunately, the report released today confirmed our early suspicions. The Phase II effort has indeed resulted in a partisan exercise and requests made by the Democrats of the then- Republican Committee leadership from 2004 to 2006 for the inquiry itself and for unnecessary interviews and documents were clearly intended as roadblocks to prevent the inquiry’s completion and to allow bogus charges of "obstruction” intended to help the Democrats’ political goals. Ironically, but not surprisingly, even when the Democrats gained control of the Committee and were in a position to take their best shot at fashioning a purely partisan inquiry— specifically by instructing only two majority staffers to conduct the review, cutting out the minority entirely, twisting the statements of the policymakers they reviewed, and cherry picking the intelligence that helped best make their case—the reports essentially validate what we have been saying all along: that policymakers’ statements were substantiated by the intelligence. As the Committee’s Phase I report showed, it was the intelligence that was faulty. In the cases in which the majority concluded that statements were not substantiated by intelligence or did not convey fully the intelligence community’s analysis, it is clear that either the words of the policymakers in question or the body of intelligence available at the time were distorted in order to make these false charges. We have addressed each of those cases in the attached amendments in Appendix A (see amendments 42, 68, 85, 86, 96, 119, 120, and 136) With the partisan elements of this inquiry now fully exposed, we hope that others will see why we are so disappointed that Committee time and resources have been wasted at this critical juncture in our nation’s history. We have not had an Intelligence Authorization Bill become law in this Congress or the last Congress, we have not had a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) reform bill become law in this Congress—two badly needed bil1s—both to improve the functioning of the intelligence community and protect the nation. Yet, we have been forced to waste countless man-hours to show what we and the American people already knew four years ago, that policymakers’ statements turned out to be wrong after the war because the statements were based on flawed intelligence. The Committee’s Phase I report, which investigated that intelligence failure and explained how it happened, was a judicious and valuable act of intelligence oversight. Distorting intelligence and misleading the public, as the current majority report does, is not. We are also disappointed that in a zealous, but ultimately failed, attempt to expose alleged "distortions" by the administration, the majority chose to cover up and distort information themselves. Specifically, the majority report excludes from consideration all of the statements made by Members of Congress and the previous administration that were submitted wl
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  • _ for review by the Republican Members. It also excludes relevant intelligence information requested for inclusion by Republican Members including instances ir1 which the Committee knew that specific policymakers’ statements were fact-checked and approved by intelligence community agencies. It treats policymakers unfairly by distorting their words and refusing those individuals the opportunity to respond to what has been alleged about their statements. Because these issues are our most serious concerns about this flawed majority report, we address each in more detail below. Cover-up for Democrats Following the Committee’s agreement on February l2, 2004, to examine "whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information" the Chairman and Vice Chairman each provided a list of statements their respective Members wanted examined by the Committee staff. In the reports released today, only those statements submitted by the Democrats were reviewed. The Republican Members of the Committee submitted approximately 100 statements for review. These were statements made by officials in the previous administration and Members of Congress. Many of our Members believed it was relevant and important to include those statements, particularly from Democrats in Congress, to show that during the debate leading up to and during the authorization of the war in Iraq and during previous efforts to use force in Iraq, Members of both parties with access to intelligence information, not just the Republican administration, made very similar statements about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities and links to terrorism. In our opinion, the statements from most policymakers, whether or not they supported the decision to go to war in Iraq, were similar because everyone saw virtually the same intelligence and used that same intelligence in speeches to explain their own decision—making. Nuclear In the nuclear area, for example, the majority report’s first conclusion notes that policymakers’ statements about Iraq’s nuclear activities were substantiated by intelligence, but the majority concludes that some statements did not convey disagreements that existed within the intelligence community. Many Democrats in Congress also discussed Iraq’s nuclear efforts during the Iraq war debate and in other venues and similarly did not describe disagreements within the intelligence community. For example, all of the following statements discussed Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, but none of them noted that there was a dissent from one of the agencies within the intelligence community. Conversely, the report is critical of administration officials who did not discuss this dissent even though the dissent had not even been published by that agency at the point the statements by the administration officials were made. The majority apparently believes some policymakers should be mind-readers. All of the following statements made by Democrats in Congress were made after the publication of the Iraq WMD NIE in which the nuclear alternative judgment was published, yet none of them was allowed to be included in the report. 102

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  • • In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qa’ida members. — Senator Hillary Clinton, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next 5 years. He could have it earlier if he is able to obtain fissile materials on the outside market, which is possible—difiicult but possible. We also should remember we have always underestimated the progress that Saddam Hussein has been able to make in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • Saddam Hussein is an evil man, a dictator who oppresses his people and flouts the mandate of the international community. While this behavior is reprehensible, it is Hussein’s vigorous pursuit of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and his present and potential future support for terrorist acts and organizations, that ma.ke him a terrible danger to the people to the United States. Senator Charles Schumer, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002 • There is no question that Iraq possesses biological and chemical weapons and that he seeks to acquire additional weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. That is not in debate. Senator Christopher Dodd, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002. • We know that he has chemical and biological weapons. He has already used them against his neighbors and his own people, and is trying to build more. We know that he is doing everything he can to build nuclear weapons, and we know that each day he gets closer to achieving that goal. Senator John Edwards, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • Almost no one disagrees with these basic facts: that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a menace; that he has weapons of mass destruction and that he is doing everything in his power to get nuclear weapons; that he has supported terrorists; that he is a grave threat to the region, to vital allies like Israel, and to the United States; and that he is thwarting the will of the international community and undermir1ing the United Nations’ credibility. Senator John Edwards, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002 The following statement from Senator John Kerry went a step further, claiming that "all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons." In fact, not "all" intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq was seeking nuclear weapons; as noted in the majority report, one agency considered the evidence inadequate to reach such a judgment. 103

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  • • According to the CIA’s report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There is little question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear weapons. The more difficult question to answer is when Iraq could actually achieve this goal. That depends on is its ability to acquire weapons- grade fissile material. If Iraq could acquire this material from abroad, the CIA estimates that it could have a nuclear weapon within 1 year. Senator John Kerry, October 9, 2002. This comment from Senator Durbin, made nearly a year earlier, actually indicated that I Saddam Hussein had “perhaps even nuclear weapons" at his disposal. At no time did the intelligence community assess that Iraq perhaps had nuclear weapons. • When you look at what Saddam Hussein has at his disposal, in terms of chemical, biological, and perhaps even nuclear weapons, we cannot ignore the threat that he poses to the region and the fact that he has fomented terrorism throughout his reign. Senator Dick Durbin, December 21, 2001, Larry King Live. Why were none of these statements considered worthy of analysis by the majority's review staff, particularly those made by Senators Durbin, Edwards, and Rockefeller, who were all members of the Senate Intelligence Committee at that time, and by Senator Clinton, who has publicly acknowledged being briefed on the NIE? UA Vs Regarding Iraq’s UAV capability, the report notes that some administration statements did not convey disagreements or evolving views within the intelligence community about whether Iraq intended to use UAVs for chemical or biological weapons delivery. The report, however, failed to analyze statements made by Democrats like: • Saddam’s existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose real threats to America today, tomorrow. Saddam has used chemical weapons before, both against Iraq’s enemies and against his own people. He is working to develop delivery systems like missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles that could bring these deadly weapons against U.S. forces and U.S. facilities in the Middle East. He could make these weapons available to many terrorist groups, third parties, which have contact with his government. Those groups, in turn, could bring those weapons into the United States and unleash a devastating attack against our citizens. I fear that greatly. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • In addition, Iraq is developing umnanned aerial vehicles UAVs, capable of delivering chemical and biological warfare agents, which could threaten Iraq’s neighbors as well as American forces in the Persian Gulf Senator John Kerry, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002. 104

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  •  “Intent " In a section titled "Intent" the majority report includes statements from several administration officials which discussed their concerns about what Saddam Hussein could do with his weapons of mass destruction considering his disdain for the United States and his long association with terrorist groups. We believe that these statements were not about Iraq’s "intent" at all, as the majority report says, but were explaining that with a lack of information about Iraq’s intent, these policymakers were concerned about Iraq’s capabilities. We note that many Democrats also expressed the same concerns about the threat Iraq posed or might have posed to the United States due to his weapons of mass destruction capabilities, connections to terrorists, or both in speeches that were not analyzed in the majority report: • I have come to the inescapable conclusion that the threat posed to America by Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction is so serious that despite the risks and we should not minimize the risks we must authorize the President to take the necessary steps to deal with that threat. There has been some debate over how "imminent" a threat Iraq poses. I do believe Iraq poses an imminent threat. I also believe after September ll, that question is increasingly outdated. It is in the nature of these weapons that he has and the way they are targeted against civilian populations, that documented capability and demonstrated intent may be the only warning we get. To insist on further evidence could put some of our fellow Americans at risk. Can we afford to take that chance? I do not think we can. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • Is [Saddam Hussein] a greater threat than he was in l99l‘? He surely is. There’s different ways of launching scuds and all kinds that go faster, farther. There is no question on that. .. And if [our allies] are not there for us, does that mean in this debate, precedent-based, historically-based, that we sort of sit and take it, or are we going to end up basically being unilateral anyway because we cannot have our children smallpoxed. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, September 25, 2002. ` • When I vote to give the President of the United States the authority to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat to our security and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf region. Senator John Kerry, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002. • I believe that Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime represents a clear threat to the United States, to our allies, to our interests around the world, and to the values of freedom and democracy we hold dear .... Thousands of terrorist operatives around the world would pay anything to get their hands on Saddam’s arsenal, and there is every possibility that he could tum his weapons over to these terrorists...we can hardly ignore the terrorist threat, and the serious danger that Saddam would allow his arsenal to be used in aid of terror. Senator John Edwards, Congressional Record, September 12, 2002. 105

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  •  • When I consider that Hussein could either use or give to terrorists weapons of mass destruction biological, chemical or nuclear and that he might just be mad enough to do it I End, aiter careful research, the answer to my question: we cannot afford to leave him alone over the next 5 or even 3 years. Senator Charles Schumer, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002 • If you allow someone like Saddam Hussein to get nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons, how many people is he going to kill with such weapons? He’s already demonstrated a willingness to use the weapons. He poison-gassed his own people. He used poison gas and other weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors. This man has no compunction about killing lots and lots of people. So this is a way to save lives and to save the stability and peace of a region of the world that is important to the peace and security of the entire world. Vice President A1 Gore, Address to the Nation, December 16, 1998. • Our strategic objective is to contain Saddam Hussein and curtail his ability to produce the most deadly weapons known to mankind-weapons that he has unleashed with chilling alacrity against his own people. Leit unchecked, Saddam Hussein would in short order be in a position to threaten and blackmail our regional allies, our troops, and, indeed, our nation. Senator Joe Biden, Congressional Record, February 12, 1998. • Saddam Hussein, with one nuclear weapon, would be far more dangerous than the Soviet Union with 20,000. The difference is, they would not use [their weapons]. They were not suicidal. He would. Senator Carl Levin, Congressional Record, October 9, 1998 • With the peace of the region and, and in fact, much of the world at risk, we cannot allow Iraq to continue its maneuvers designed to protect such a dangerous buildup of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, December 16, 1998. • It is not possible to overstate the ominous implications for the Middle East if Saddam were to develop and successfully militarize and deploy potent biological weapons. We can all imagine the consequences. Extremely small quantities of several known biological weapons have the capability to exterminate the entire population of cities the size of Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. These could be delivered by ballistic missile, but they also could be delivered by much more pedestrian means; aerosol applicators on commercial trucks easily could suffice. If Saddam were to develop and then deploy usable atomic weapons, the same holds true. Senator John Kerry, Congressional Record, November 9, 1997 This is only a sampling of the approximately 100 statements submitted by Republican Members of this Committee for review and which we repeatedly requested be included in the 106

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  • _ report as agreed previously by the Committee Members. This request was ignored by the majority during two iterations of comments on the report drafts and a motion to include such statements, offered by the Vice-Chairman at the Committee’s business meeting, was denied a hearing by the Chairman. Che —Pickin Intelli ence We have several concerns about the intelligence information the majority chose to include, and chose to ignore, in its report. j First, the majority chose to include only "finnished disseminated intelligence" for comparison with policymakers’ statements. This is not only a departure from the Committee’s agreed upon terms of reference, it is unfair to policymakers whom we know had access to far more than just published intelligence assessments. For example, in preparation for Secretary Powell’s statement before the UN on February 5, 2003, the CIA provided an intelligence report called a TD (telegraphic dissemination) for use in the speech. In spite of the fact that the CLLX informed the Committee about this in early 2004 and that the information was included in the Committee’s first Iraq report published nearly four years ago, the majority refused to include, or even consider, the TD in its majority report. Instead the majority report included an intelligence assessment published after the Secretary’s speech and noted the existence of "operational intelligence traffic." Any intelligence officer who has been on the job more than a week knows that a TD is an intelligence report, not "operational traffic." Moreover, after refusing our request to include the TD, incorrectly arguing that it was "operational," the majority drafters included several actual operational cables of their choosing in another section of the report. Worse, these were operational cables which the Committee knows were not finished intelligence reports for policymakers and were not given to any administration officials; yet the much more widely disseminated TD, specifically provided to Secretary Powell for use in his speech, was not included in the majority report. Even worse, excluded those sections of the report which specifically analyze the President’s statements, is the President’s Summary of the NIE, a summary document prepared for and presented to the President. This is most disturbing since in two important cases- regarding reconstitution of Iraq’s nuclear pro gram and Iraq’s intent to use its small UAVs for biological weapons delivery—the judgments and dissents were presented differently than in the NIE’s key judgments and main text. In fact, in the case of Iraq’s UAVs, the dissent was not included in the President’s summary at all. Second, the report excludes other information relevant to any fair inquiry of whether policymakers’ statements were substantiated by intelligence. For example, the Committee obtained information related to the coordination, declassifrcation, and fact-checking of the President’s Cincinnati speech with the CIA, relevant portions of which we requested be included in the report. Specifically, a handwritten note by a CIA officer at the bottom of one of the drafts to then-DCI Tenet said that the CIA terrorism analyst had "read all the terrorism paragraphs and said it was all oka ’ (emphasis original.) We believed it was only fair to let the public know that the CIA checked the President’s speech and said that all of the terrorism paragraphs were M

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  • _ determined by CIA analysts to be "all okay." Apparently the majority did not think this was something the public needed to know since they denied our request to include it and did not allow a vote on the amendment offered to tix this shortcoming. Why do the Democrats want to hide the fact that the CIA cleared the President’s speech'? As another example, the majority report analyzes Secretary Powell’s UN speech, but does not explain that this speech was not only checked and rechecked by the intelligence community to ensure that the speech was well supported by the available intelligence, but also that the first draft of the speech was actually written by the CIA. Notably, the report fails to mention this. In some cases the majority report actually claims that Secretary Powell’s statements in this speech were not substantiated by intelligence, even though the intelligence was in the original draft written by the CIA. We are at a loss to explain how the majority can believe that a speech drafted by the CIA and then checked and rechecked by the intelligence community to ensure that it was strongly supported by the available intelligence could in any way be characterized as unsubstantiated by intelligence at that time. Third, in several cases, the report compares policymaker statements to intelligence published after, sometimes months after, the statements were made. This just does not make sense. For example, Amendment 97 addresses a conclusion which says the "President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering using UAVs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003." Whether the NIE judgments were reviewed after the President’s speech is irrelevant to whether the statement was substantiated at the time it was made. Furthermore, we note that t.his conclusion also distorts the President’s words because he did not say that Iraq was considering using UAVs to target the United States. Rather, he said: "we are concerned that Iraq was exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States," a comment that was fully consistent with the January 2003 NIE, Nontraditional Threats to the US. Homeland Through 200 7. Obviously the intelligence community had to be concerned that Iraq could use these UAVs to target the homeland or they would not have been included in an NIE about threats to the Homeland at all. We find the refusal to include all relevant intelligence and the inclusion of information published after the delivery of statements to be particularly ironic since in a letter on November 14, 2005, then-Vice Chairman Rockefeller, along with Senators Levin and Feinstein, wrote to the Majority and Minority Leaders explaining that they had "insisted that the Committee compare statements of government officials against all intelligence information prepared for circulation and relevant to the subject matter at issue, provided it was it was available at the time the statement was made." This appeared to be considered a worthwhile task when the burden of collecting all of the available intelligence from the end of the Gulf War through the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom fell to Republican Members and their staff, but when the Democrats took charge, including only some of the intelligence was deemed acceptable. Perhaps forcing the Republican staff to review over 40,000 documents was just a request intended to delay further publication of the Phase II effort and allow the continuation of charges of "obstruction." 108

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  • _ The idea of limiting the intelligence to that which was "available at the time the statement was made" must have seemed like a better idea when the Democrats thought policymakers would not be able to use information published even days after their statements to defend themselves. When it turned out that this could be used to the majority’s own advantage, however, information that was actually available to policymakers apparently became less important. Maybe the majority believes those reading the report will not bother to check the dates. On behalf of the minority, the Vice-Chairman filed 26 amendments in the category of "che1ry picking or excluding relevant information from the report." The Chairman refused to allow consideration of any of these amendments at the Committee’s business meeting. (See Appendix A, amendments 13, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28, 29, 32, 38, 39, 54, 71(a), 81, 82, 97, 106, 108, 130,132, and 133. Unsubstantiated Claims/Distorting Intelligence One of the most hypocritical aspects of the Majority report is that while it purports to cast judgment on how well policymakers characterized intelligence analysis in their public statements, the report itself distorts many policymakers’ statements and the intelligence analysis. This has the unfortunate consequence of undermining the Committee’s credibility in exercising oversight. Several of the mir1ority’s amendments focused on the issue of mischaracterizing policymakers’ statements., One example is Amendment 7 which addresses a portion of the majority report which says that the President, Vice President, and the Secretary of State "stated that the Iraq govemrnent had an active nuclear weapons program." However, even a cursory examination of the statements included for review in the report shows that none of the named individuals "stated" that Iraq had an "active nuclear weapons program," not one. Another amendment, Number 136, addresses a conclusion that claims the President and Vice President made statements that "Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States." Yet, neither the President nor the Vice President said this. The report also distorts the intelligence analysis to help bolster its case against policymakers. For example, Amendment 129 addresses a portion of the report which claims that the October 2002 NIE judged that "Saddam was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time." The NIE never said this. In fact, this NIE judged that Iraq was investigating mapping software for its UAVs, useless outside the United States. The NIE said this "suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." ln addition, Amendments 81-82 address a portion of the report which says that the "intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried facilities" in Iraq. This makes it sound as though the intelligence community did not assess that Iraq had deeply-buried facilities. In reality, the intelligence community had long assessed that Iraq had deeply-buried facilities in Iraq; they noted only that they were unable to specifically identify them, something hardly uncornrnon in intelligence. 109

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  •  A final example, Amendment 58 addresses a conclusion about Iraq’s biological weapons capabilities which states that policymakers’ statements were substantiated by intelligence information, but concludes that they "did not discuss gaps in Iraq’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the NIE." The NIE’s assessment of Iraq’s biological weapons program was that "all key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war." This judgment and the NIE judgment that Iraq had biological weapons were "high confidence" judgments. In a ten-page discussion of Iraq’s biological warfare capabilities only one sentence noted any gaps in knowledge of Iraq’s BW program and this was only regarding "specific information on the types of weapons, agent, or stockpiles Baghdad has at its disposal." In other words, there were no gaps noted regarding the judgments that Iraq had an offensive biological weapons program or stocks, only uncertainty as to what kinds of agents were in those stocks—hardly a gap. On behalf of the minority, the Vice-Chairman filed 31 amendments in this category- unsubstantiated claims or distorting information. The Chairman reii1sed to allow consideration of any of these amendments at the Committee’s business meeting. (See Appendix A, amendments 7,11,16,17,17(a),19, 21, 22(a), 23, 30, 31, 33, 34, 4·1, 41(a), 58, 68, 70, 71, 83, 85, 86, 90, 96, 99,119,120,121,125,126,127,128,129,131,135,135,136,137, and 140. Reii1sal to Offer Polic akers the Qpp g; to Be Heard We also disagree with the majority’s decision not to request interviews with policymakers whom the report alleges made unsubstantiated statements. These individuals deserve the opportunity to respond to the majority’s allegations and be afforded the opportunity to inform the majority of intelligence information that may be lacking from the report that had been used in the preparation of their statements. We note that in the last Congress the Democrats argued that policymakers needed to be brought before the Committee to be interviewed about their statements even before the ‘ Committee had made a determination about whether their statements were substantiated. Then- Vice Chairman Rockefeller even wrote to the Chairman with a list of people to be interviewed which included Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, among others. In addition, Senators Rockefeller, Levin, and Feinstein wrote to the Senate leadership in November 2005 saying that a task force of Committee Members discussed the importance of interviewing current a.nd former officials within the Departments of State and Defense and the Office of the Vice President, among others. While the letter was, in fact, not an accurate portrayal of the discussions at that meeting (the transcript of the meeting shows that the only individual the task force actually discussed interviewing was Secretary Powell), it nonetheless shows that these Members wanted to conduct such interviews. We agreed that it was important to interview many of these individuals, and others, if the Committee Members found that any of their statements were not substantiated by the intelligence M0

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  • or if they were in another way relevant to the Committee’s inquiry. At the time the Committee voted on the Phase II terms of reference in February 2004, Senator Levin agreed with us, noting "but you’ve got to ask policymakers who made statements relative to weapons of mass destruction what was the basis in intelligence for their statements, if we believe that their statements, reports, or testimony went beyond the intelligence that they were given." Despite this and despite Chairman Rockefeller’s own letter requesting these interviews, when we requested that the interviews be conducted so that policymakers could respond to the drafted conclusions that alleged unsubstantiated statements, the request was ignored, and a motion to conduct these interviews offered at the Committee’s business meeting was denied a hearing by the Chairman. Interestingly, in the additional views attached to a Committee report on "The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress," Chairman Rockefeller and Senators Levin, Feinstein, Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, and Feingold wrote that the Committee Chairman had declined a request of the Vice Chairman for the Committee to interview White House officials, including speech writers, to fully understand how and why the intelligence assessments were included in major prewar speeches, such as the President’s State of the Union Address and Secretary Powell’s speech to the UN Security Council. Yet, none of these Members wanted to pursue these interviews once they were in charge of the review. The only reason we can imagine why the Democrats would not undertake interviews that they had repeatedly requested in the last Congress, is that the interviews were another tactic at delaying the report and allowing more false charges of "obstruction." Conclusion Although we are troubled by all of the issues we have outlined thus far—that the report released today was a waste of Committee time and resources that should have been spent overseeing the intelligence community, that the report is part of a partisan agenda, that the report cherry picked information and distorted policymakers’ statements and intelligence, and that the majority refused to offer those it is accusing the opportunity to be heard—we are most concerned about the damage that this report will do, and that the whole Phase II effort has done for the past several years, in creating the impression that policymakers should be bound to make policy based on only that which is published in intelligence assessments. This is not only wrong, it is dangerous and it is contrary to everything else this Committee has done since it published its first report on the Iraq intelligence failure. It has the effect of encouraging intelligence community analysts to become policymakers, and encouraging policymakers to adhere strictly to whatever analysts write, when we know that intelligence analysis can be dangerously inaccurate. Have we forgotten how wrong the intelligence judgments were in the October 2002 Iraq WMD NIE and how many other intelligence failures we had before that one? Intelligence is not incontestable truth and it is only one factor out of many that a policymaker must consider before making a policy decision. This fallacy has also unnecessarily increased demands on the intelligence community. Requesting NIEs with unclassified key judgments has become sport in Washington as each side hopes the NIE will support its position. Cries of "politicization" usually follow from whichever M1

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  • side is unhappy with the results. This is not only unfair to the intelligence community, it is dangerous in that analysts will attempt to please all sides and their muddied judgments will help no one. We expect intelligence analysts to follow tried and true marching orders for intelligence: tell me what you know, tell me what you don’t know, tell me what you think, and make sure the policymaker understands the difference. Analysts cannot do this if they are constantly wondering if their assessments will be used for politics. The Democratic maj ority, in the partisan way it attempted to suppress intelligence information and skew the historical record, is betting that the public and the media will not take the time to read these and other minority views that expose its hypocrisy. We have written these views to shine a light on it, for if there is any oversight value left in this fruitless endeavor that has consumed so much of the resources of this Committee over a four year period, it would be to expose the true intent of this supposed "oversight." We regret the damaging effect the majority’s report has on this COI1’1II1llI€€’S credibility to oversee our intelligence community and we urge our colleagues to return to the non-partisan underpinnings that the Senate Intelligence Committee was founded upon. CHRISTOPHER S. Bonn SAXBY CHAMBLISS ORRIN G. HATCH RICHARD BURR _ 112

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  • _ Apendix A Filed Amendments 0n Phase II Report: Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence ("Statements") U3

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  • Amendment 6 Page 3, last paragraph — Overlaying this issue of the selective use of intelligence is the more fundamental issue of the selective declassification of intelligence. Intelligence information contained in many of the speeches analyzed in this report had to be declassified before being released publicly. The Executive Branch has the prerogative to classify information to protect national security, and unlike Congress the Executive Branch can declassified information relatively easily. Until the Congress sought and obtained the release of an unclassified version of the key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq ’s presumed weapons of mass destruction programs, the analytical judgments of the Intelligence Community on these matters were classified. The collected intelligence underlying these judgments remained classified until after the invasion of Iraq. Few, if any, of the Intelligence Community ’s assessments on Iraq 's links to terrorism, the intent of the Iraqi regime, projected post-war conditions, or other relevant matters contained in the statements of senior officials were publicly released before the war. This ability of the Executive Branch to unilaterally declassified and divulge intelligence information at a time, place, and in a manner of its choosing must also be taken into account when evaluating policymakers ’ use of intelligence information. Amendment 6 — Strike the above paragraph. Comment- It is misleading to simply say that the Executive branch makes ‘“unilateral" decisions about what to declassify. Congress can also request declassification and usually gets what it wants unless the Executive branch can establish a sources-and-methods reason not to disclose it. In addition, Section 8 of S. Res. 400 offers a mechanism for the Senate to disclose classified information. The fact that the Senate chose not to do this does not mean that it did not have the opportunity. Amendment 7 Page 6, first full non-bullet paragraph — In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State indicated that the Iraqi government had an active nuclear weapons program. Amendment 7- Strike the above sentence. Comment- None of the statements listed in the report shows that the President, Vice President, or Secretary of State indicated that the Iraqi government had an active nuclear weapons program. We believe that if this Committee is going to scrutinize each and every word these policymakers uttered, we should clearly state what they said, not re-interpret what they said. U4

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  • _ Amendment 11 Page 7, first paragraph — They agreed that y' Iraq decided to restart a nuclear weapons program, with proper foreign assistance it could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon within five to seven years, and that q' Iraq in some way acquired adequate fissile material ]9·om a foreign source, it could produce a nuclear weapon within one year. Amendment 11 — Strike proper, in some way, and adequate. Comment- The coordinated assessments did not use the terms "proper," "in some way" and “adequate." The Committee should be accurate in describing the assessments; they should be deleted from the report. Amendment 13 Page 7, second paragraph — In April 2001 , the CIA noted that Iraq ’s attempts to purchase high- strength aluminum tubes and other dual-use equipment suggested that a reconstitution e]j’ort might be underway. This judgment was included in several other CIA assessments. In August 2002 the CIA published a paper on Iraqi WIMD capabilities (Iraq: Expanding WZMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threay, which concluded that these procurement activities indicated that the Iraqi government had restarted its nuclear weapons program. Amendment13 — Insert after the above sentence A December 2001 CIA Senior Executive Memorandum said that rocurement activities "show Ira is g pg to `um -start a clandestine uranium emichment ro am to roduce the fissile material for a wea on otentiall y late this decade assurnin it roduces the necess com onents indi enousl ." In J anu 2002 the CIA ublished an assessment which said "Procurement activities detected in the ast ear are consistent with Ira attem tin to 'um -start a clandestine uranium enrichment ro am to roduce the fissile material needed to make a nuclear wea on otentiall y late this decade. Ira retains a si `f1cant number of nuclear ro am scientists ro am documentation and robabl the manufacturin infrastructure to su ort a nuclear wea ons ro a1n." 1 Comment — We requested that several relevant reports below be added to this section, but they were added only to the footnote. We would at least like the December 2001 report, which seems to be the most important and relevant to policymaker’s statements in questions, added to the text. • A July 2001 CIA assessment, Iraq: New Effort to Get Centriiiige-Related Tubes, had the same assessment as the April 2001 paper already cited. • An October 2001 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) discussed Iraq’s "nuclear- related procurement efforts," including the aluminum tubes and uranium from Ni er. • In a November 2001 Senior Executive Memorandum (SEM) the CIA wrote that k _ reporting indicate Baghdad still has a vast procurement network to seek materials and equipment that can be used in a centrifuge program, including the recent effort to get aluminum tubes for a Zippe-type centrifuge, but it is unclear if Iraq has embarked on an extensive nuclear weapons effort." M5

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  • _ • Also in November 2001 a CIA SEIB titled "lraq: Seeking to Rebuild Enrichment Capability" discussed Iraq’s procurement of aluminum tubes. • A December 2001 SEM said "Procurement activities detected within the past year show Iraq is trying to jump-start a clandestine uranium enrichment program to produce the fissile material for a weapon, potentially by late this decade, assuming it produces the necessary components indigenously." • In January 2002 the CIA wrote in a Senior Publish When Ready (SPWR) that "Procurement activities detected in the past year are consistent with Iraq attempting to jump-start a clandestine uranium enrichment program to produce the tissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon, potentially by late this decade. Iraq retains a significant nrunber of nuclear program scientists, program documentation, and probably the manufacturing infrastructure to support a nuclear weapons pro gram." • In March 2002 a CIA SPWR said "We assess that Iraq currently may be trying to reconstitute its gas centrifuge program. Since intrusive inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has increased efforts to buy critical dual-use items that could support a gas centrifuge program, including aluminum tubes suitable for rotors, magnets, machine tools, essential chemicals and centrifuge cascade related equipment." Amendment 16 Page 7, last partial paragraph — The Department 0f Energy (DOE) disagreed with the CL4 ’s c0nclusi0ns regarding the aluminum tubes, and assessed that it was more likely that the tubes were intended for a dyferent use, such as a c0nventi0nal r0cket program. Based 0n 0ther evidence, including Saddam ’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, and p0ssible attempts t0 pr0cure uranium from Niger, the DOE assessed in July 2002 that Iraq might be attempting t0 reconstitute a nuclear weap0ns pr0gram, but suggested that the evidence was n0t conclusive. Amendment 16 — Strike the above paragraph and insert In a Jul 2002 p p the De artment of Ener DOE said "Multi le-source r ortin su ests that Saddam Hussein is seekin to reconstitute Ira ’s nuclear wea ons ro am. Althou the re ortin roduces no "smoking gun, continued vi 'lance is re uired re ardin Ira ’s attem ts to re 'uvenate its nuclear wea ons ro am." Comment- We do not believe that an assessment which solely discusses DOE’s judgment about the end-use for the alumintun tubes is relevant in this section because the assessment did not discuss nuclear reconstitution at all. The statements under review from the Vice President make no mention of aluminun tubes. The report should say what DOE’s assessment was of reconstitution, which was: "Multiple-source reporting suggests that Saddam Hussein is seeking to reconstitute Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Although the reporting produces no "smoking gun," continued vigilance is required regarding Iraq’s attempts to rejuvenate its nuclear weapons program." H6

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  • _ Amendment 17 Page 8, first full paragraph — The Department of State ’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes were probably intended for other purposes. This view was included in congressional testimony in September 2002, but State/INR did not publish any reports on the aluminum tubes outside the State Department until afler publication of the October 2002 NIE. Amendment 17 — strike the above paragraph and insert INR did not ublish y assessments outlinin their views on reconstitution of Ira ’s nuclear ro am rior to the Vice President’s statement. Comment -— The comment that INR "disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes were probably intended for other purposes" has no citation. If the intent is to cite this to the Committee’s first report, the attribution is mischaracterizing the comments in that report. The Committee’s report was describing what INR analysts told the staff after the fact about their views at the time, which should not be construed to mean those views were articulated to policymakers. The report should cite a document or report in which INR "disagreed," otherwise this discussion should be deleted. In addition, if testimony to Congress is going to be offered in lieu of an assessment from INR, the report should include comments attributed to the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) at the same hearing. Testimony at the September 17, 2002 hearing was that "State/INR and DOE are still examining the latest specifications but currently believe that the tubes more likely are intended for alternative conventional weapons uses, such as the multiple rocket launcher program. The NGIC — the U.S. experts on foreign ground force weapons systems — notes, however, that Iraq’s dimensional requirements for the tubes are far stricter than necessary for rocket casings." Finally, we do not understand why testimony given in mid- September is being used in a section which analyzes the Vice President’s speech from August. This report is supposed to determine whether po1icymakers’ statements were substantiated by intelligence. How can we expect policymakers to be aware of a view that wasn’t published or briefed to them until after they made their statement? Mi

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  • _ Amendment 17 a _ Page 8, second full paragraph — Several of these intelligence agencies also made reference to assessments by the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) regarding the aluminum tubes. Testimony by the Director of Central Intelligence to Congress stated that NGIC judged that "Iraq ’s dimensional requirements for the tubes are far stricter than necessary for rocket casings. " A later memo ]9·om State/INR said that "the L4EA and the - pertinent nuclear-technical experts have concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for Iraq ’s nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings...DOE and DoD ’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE views on tactical rockets. " q Amendment l7(a) - strike A later memo ]$·om State/INR said that "the L4EA and the pertinent nuclear-technical experts have concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for Iraq 's nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings...DOE and DoD ’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE views on tactical rockets. " Corn1nent— We see that the Majority added this information to the report after the amendment filing deadline. We asked that the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) information be included, but we did not request and did not consent to including the State/INR paper for two reasons: first, because it was published more than two months after the Vice President’s speech; and second, because the report misquotes the INR document. The INR report did not say that DoD’s NGIC concurred with the assessment that the aluminum tubes were consistent with rocket casings. This is a gross distortion of the INR assessments and the position of NGIC. If this text is included, it will make the Committee look foolish since our own 2004 report explained that NGIC was one of the main proponents of the argument that the tubes were inconsistent with rocket casings. The INR report said that that NGIC agreed only with the assessment that high strength is used for tactical rockets by a number of countries; although NGIC said in the NIE that because of the unsuitability of the wall thickness and weight of the Iraqi aluminum tubes that they were "unIikely to be intended for rocket motor cases. The report, as drafted, clearly misquotes the INR paper. This should be deleted. H8

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  • Amendment 18 Page 8, third full paragraph — According t0 a DL4 report, the intelligence community continued to assess that it would take five to seven years from the commencement of a revived nuclear program for the Iraqi government to indigenously produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. This same report repeated the assessment that a nuclear weapon could be constructed much faster y' adequate fissile material was acquired from a foreign source, though an earlier CL4 assessment noted that “we have not detected a dedicated Iraqi ejjfort to obtain fissile material abroad. " Amendment 18 — Strike the above paragraph. Comment/Suggestion — This is a May 2002 DLA report referring to an intelligence community judgment which had not been updated since 2000. At the time of the Vice President’s speech, DLA assessed that Iraq could have a weapon as soon as 2006, and INR had no judgment on this since the 2000 ICA. This sentence should be changed to accurately reflect the judgments of each agency. Amendment 19 Page 8, last paragraph — In the President ’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Iraq continued to develop weapons of mass destruction, and indicated that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Amendment 19 — Strike the paragraph above. Con1ment— None of the statements in the report taken from the President’s speech suggest that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. The President commented that Iraq employed capable nuclear scientists, retained physical infrastructure needed to build a weapon, and made attempts to buy aluminum tubes. As noted in the report, several intelligence community assessments mentioned these things without concluding that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. _ H9

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  • Amendment 20 Page 9, 'rirst full paragraph - Though the intelligence community as a whole had not yet concluded that a nuclear weapons program was underway, some (though not all intelligence agencies believed that Iraq ’s attempts to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes, along with supporting evidence such as Saddam ’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear science personnel, indicated that the nuclear program was in fact being reconstituted. Amendment 20 — strike (though not alb and insert and the end of the paragraph All intelligence a encies assessed that the aluminum tubes could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons but DOE and State INR assessed that the tubes were more likely intended for a conventional weapons ro am. Comment — Again, the President did not say that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program or had an ongoing nuclear program in this speech. He mentioned the acquisition of aluminum tubes "used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.” All agencies, including DOE and State/INR assessed that these tubes could be used for this purpose and Saddam’s meeting with nuclear science personnel were discussed in numerous intelligence community papers from CIA, DIA, and DOE. A discussion of whether or not agencies judged that these efforts were part of a reconstituted nuclear program is irrelevant here because the President did not say they were part of a reconstituted nuclear program. Also, "some" always means "not all." This is redundant. Amendment 21 Page 9, second paragraph — Intelligence community analysts generally believed that the Iraqi government ’s failure to provide certain evidence and documents regarding its pre-] 99] nuclear program indicated that the Iraqi government was attempting to conceal this information. However, this conclusion was not cited by the intelligence community as compelling evidence for a reconstituted, post-Guy War nuclear weapons program. Amendment 2l— strike However, this conclusion was not cited by the intelligence community as compelling evidence for a reconstituted, post-Gab' War nuclear weapons program. Comment- Again, the last sentence is irrelevant because the President did not cite Iraq’s concealment of documents as evidence of a reconstituted, post-Gulf War nuclear weapons program. His comments about withholding information refer to the pre-Gulf War program. 120

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  • _ Amendment 22 Page 9, third full paragraph —— Numerous intelligence assessments made reference to open source information showing that Saddam met with personnel from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (MEC). Amendment 22 — Strike made reference to open source information showing ar1d insert showed Comment - The majority report changed this sentence from saying "ir1telligence reporting" to "open source infor1nation." The report should still say "intelligence" because numerous intelligence assessments cited the meetings between Saddam ar1d the IAEC personnel and much of the information was from intelligence reporting vice open source reporting. This information was provided to the Majority as requested and still it was not included in the report. • In January 2002, a DIA Executive Highlight (EH) said ". .. the increased frequency of operations at former and suspect nuclear facilities is highly suspect. In a possibly related incident, Saddam Husayn met with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission on 10 January and praised its efforts. Baghdad probably will continue trying to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. Although no firm evidence exists that reconstitution has begun, Iraq had continued to obtain dual-use equipment ar1d to maintain its scientific cadre." • In January 2002, ar1other DIA assessment said, "Persistent procurement efforts to acquire approximately 60,000 aluminum alloy tubes, coupled with recent statements by Saddam to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, suggest an intent to reconstitute the nuclear program." • In September 2002, a DIA Key WMD Operational Support study on Iraq said "Iraq likely revitalized its nuclear weapons program shortly after the end of UNSCOM inspections ended in December 1998. There is no firm evidence of a current nuclear weapon design effort, but we judge that continued procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items, the assignment of key personnel to nuclear weapon-capable sites, construction at nuclear facilities, ar1d Saddarn’s interactions with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission all indicate that Iraq revitalized its nuclear weapon program after 1998." • CIA SPWR 9/11/2002 — "Saddarn’s exhortations to his nuclear Mujahidin, periodically reported in the Iraqi press since 1998, are the most compellir1g indicator that his nuclear weapons work resumed in 1998, when inspectors were ordered out of Iraq." • DIA assessment September 2002, "The renewed regular contact between Saddam ar1d the IAEC, as well as the enhanced security, suggests the IAEC is again the focal point of Saddarn’s nuclear prograrn." • July 22, 2002, DOE assessment "Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway‘?" said, "Aecording to Iraqi press reports, Saddam recently met with personnel from the IAEC. He reportedly commended the staff for their efforts ‘to make science serve the programs of comprehensive development, which are under way in Iraq despite the circumstances of the wicked embargo.’ The staff was referred to in the press report as mujahidin . . . These meetings indicate that Saddam continues to place a high priority on a potential nuclear option for his strategic goals." 121

 

  • Amendment 22 ) Page 9, fourth full paragraph —At the time of the President ’s address t0 the General Assembly, the intelligence community had not changed its judgment that it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon (five to seven years ’ was the commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002 DIA report judged that it could be done in four), and that Iraq could build a nuclear weapon within one year q' it in some way acquired an adequate amount of fissile material from a foreign source. Amendment 22(a) — strike it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon (five to seven years ’ was the commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002 DIA report judged that it could be done in four), and that Comment- The beginning of this sentence is not related to t.he President’s comments. He said what Iraq could do should it "acquire" Hssile material. How long it would take Iraq to indigenously produce fissile material is irrelevant. In addition, since t.he 2000 ICA did not say "in some way" it should be deleted. Amendment 23 Page l0, first paragraph - Additionally, he said that there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon, declaring that 'facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. Amendment 23 — Strike there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon, declaring that Comment- None of the statements cited in t.he report hom the Cincinnati speech quote t.he President saying that "there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon." The report should simply say what the President said. _ 122
 
IIa  110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed   
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Link Deborah Jeane Palfrey CIA, Foggo, Wilkes,  Hookergate and Gov, Bob Ehrlich ... and Cheney, 911, Iran Attack?

 

 

Mukasey, Schumer, Feinstein, Conflict of Interest 

 

Amendment 26 Page l0, third paragraph — State/INR dissentedfrom the majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did “not add up t0 a compelling case for reconstitution " of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Amendment 26 — strike State/INR dissentedj$·om the majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did “not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution " of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. and insert State/INR dissented from the ma 'ori view and stated in the NIE ke 'ud ents that "the activities we have detected do not however add p to a com ellin case that Ira is currentl ursuin what INR would consider to be an inte ated and com rehensive a roach to a uire nuclear wea ons." In the main text of the NIE INR assessed that the available evidence did "not add p to a com ellin case for reconstitution" of an Ira i nuclear wea ons ro am. In the President’s summ of the NIE INR offered another version of its 'ud ent statin that "INR `ud es that the evidence indicates at most a limited Ira i nuclear reconstitution effort." Comment - Because this section of the report is being used to consider whether the President’s statements were substantiated by intelligence, we believe it is appropriate to include the President’s summary of the NIE, a document specifically prepared for and briefed to the President. The President’s summary of the NIE said, "Most agencies judge that Iraq is reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. INR judges that the evidence indicates, at most, a limited Iraqi nuclear reconstitution effort." In addition, the key judgments of the NIE said, "The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons." All of these are slightly different and should be included to show what was available to the President. Amendment 28 Page l0, fourth paragraph — Construction at sites known to have been part of Iraq ’s pre—GuU War nuclear weapons program was mentioned in earlier assessments (though not specyically in the NIE). Amendment 28 — strike (though not specyically in the NIE). and insert includin ir1 the NIE. Comment — The comment in the report is incorrect. Construction activity at Tuwaitha, a facility associated with Iraq’s pre Gulf war nuclear program was discussed in the 2002 NIE on page 24. This should be noted in the report. 123

Amendment 29 Page 10, last paragraph — State/INR ’s alternative views, which were incorporated in the NIE, said that State/INR accepted “the view of technical experts at the Department of Energy " who concluded that the aluminum tubes were ’poorly suited " for a nuclear weapons program. The alternative views also cast doubt on the judgment that other dual-use procurement ejjzorts were related to a nuclear program, and went on to say that “the information we have on Iraqi nuclear personnel does not appear consistent with a coherent ejjzort to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program. Amendment 29 — At the end of the paragraph insert ln the President’s summ of the NIE [NR said it `ud es that the evidence indicates at most a limited Ira i nuclear reconstitution eHort." Comment - Again, we believe that if the Committee is going to compare intelligence to statements made by the President, it should include the President’s summary of the NIE. _ 124

_ Amendment 30 Page II, first paragraph - The majority view of the NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five to seven years, and posited a “much less likebr scenario " in which production time could be shortened to three to five years. The majority view also assessed that y' Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside source that production time could be "within several months to a year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a "systematic ejfort to acquire foreign fissile materials from Russia [or] other sources. " State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program. Amendment 30 - strike The majority view of the NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five to seven years, and posited a "much less likely scenario" in which production time could be shortened to three to five years. The majority view also assessed that Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside source that production time could be “within several months to a year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a “systematic efort to acquire foreign fissile materials j$·om Russia [or] other sources. " State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program and insert The NIE ke `ud ents said "if Ba dad a uires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear wea on within several months to a ear." The main text of the NIE added "althou we have seen onl a few Ira i attem ts to a uire material from abroad those efforts do not seem to be p of s sternatic effort to a uire forei Hssile materials from Russia or other sources." State/INR said that it could not redict when Ira gl; a uire a nuclear wea on since it lacked ersuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear ro am. Comment - The paragraph as drafted distorts the NIE’s key judgments which actually listed the assessment that Iraq could build a weapon in one year as the first bullet point. The characterization in the report makes it sound like an afterthought or as if it was the last and, therefore, most minor issue the NIE considered, which it was not. Also, how long it would take Iraq to indigenously develop Hssile material was irrelevant to what the President was talking about. He specihcally said he was discussing how long it would take Iraq to build a weapon if it "acquired" fissile material. Also, it should be clear that the detail about not detecting a systematic effort was from the main body of the NIE, not the key judgments. 125

Amendment 31 Page 11, second paragraph — In the President ’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he stated that Iraq had pursued nuclear weapons even while weapons inspectors were in Iraq. He also said that the Iraqi regime had attempted to purchase aluminum tubes that could be used in a nuclear program, and that “the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought signqicant quantities of uranium ]$·om Africa. " While the intelligence community assessed that Iraq had initialhw attempted to continue its nuclear weapons program following the imposition of post-Guy' War sanctions, most agencies believed that the MEA and UNSCOM had succeeded in destroying or neutralizing Iraq ’s nuclear in]$·astructure, and that the regime did not resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons until December 1998, when UNSCOM inspectors le]? the country. Amendment 31 — insert after the first paragraph above He noted that Saddam "has not credibl ex lained these activities." Strike the second paragraph and insert The intelli ence communi assessed that Ira had initiall attem ted to continue its nuclear wea ons ro a.m followin the im osition of ost—Gu1f War sanctions. In Se tember 2002 the DCI submitted testimon to Con ess that "revelations after the Gulf war starkl demonstrated the extent of | Ira ’s denial . . . The IAEA did not reco `ze on oin uranium emichment activities" at two sites ins ected y the IAEA. Most a encies believed that the IAEA and UNSCOM had succeeded in destro ` or neutralizin Ira ’s nuclear infrastructure in the mid—1990s. Comment- None of the above discussion from the report is relevant to what the President said. He said that Iraq had pursued a nuclear weapons program while inspectors were in Iraq. This statement is substantiated by intelligence. Director Tenet’s submitted testimony to the SSCI and SASC from September 2002 notes that, "Revelations afier the Gulf war starkly demonstrated the extent of that denial. Based on CIA briefings about two suspect nuclear sites, the IAEA inspected Tuwaitha and Tarmiyah in rnid-May 1991. The IAEA did not recognize on oin uranium enrichment activities using Electromagnetic Isotope Separation at these sites, as neither it nor the US intelligence community anticipated such work was underwa ." This testimony makes it clear that the intelligence community did say that Iraq’s nuclear progra.m continued while inspectors were in Iraq. Current views of reconstitution and views of whether the IAEA and UNSCOM stopped those activities are irrelevant to the analysis. Finally, there is no citation for these claims at all. 126

_ Amendment 32 Page ll, fourth paragraph — The October 2002 NYE contained an annex on the high-strength aluminum tubes. Although all the intelligence agencies agreed that the aluminum tubes were a dual—use technology, DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikely that the tubes were being used for nuclear weapons-related purposes. Other agencies concurred with the majority view, which cited the aluminum tubes as the primary evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Neither the concurring nor dissenting agencies changed their view between the publication of the NIE and the invasion of Iraq. Amendment 32 — strike the above paragraph and insert - Ir1 the October 2002 NIE all intelli ence a encies a eed that the aluminum tubes could be used for nuclear wea ons and that Ira was r uired to declare the im orts and sub ` ect them to UN/IAEA monitorin but DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikel that the tubes were intended to be used for nuclear wea ons-related u oses. On December 17, 2002 CIA re ared an anal sis of Ira ’s wea ons declaration which noted that it "fails to acknowled e or ex lain rocurement of gl; s ecihcation aluminum tubes we believe suitable for use in as centrifu e uranium enrichment effort" and "fails to acknowled e efforts to rocure uranium from Ni er as noted in the UK dossier." Comment- The President was discussing the fact that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes it was prohibited from importing and that it had not credibly explained these activities. He did not say these items were part of a reconstituted nuclear program, only that Iraq had not credibly explained why it was importing such materials. Intelligence noting that all agencies assessed the aluminum tubes could be used for nuclear weapons and were prohibited items is more relevant to the statement in question. 127

Amendments 33 and 34 Page ll, last paragraph — An unclassyied British white paper from September 2002 had assessed that Iraq had sought large quantities of natural (non-enriched) uranium from Africa. This was echoed by a statement in the NIE, which said “Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons. " This was not cited by the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. State/INR ’s alternative views said that “the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR ’s assessment, highly dubious. " Amendment 33 — strike This was echoed by a statement and insert This assessment was also included Amendment 34 - strike This was not cited by the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. Comment- We suggest not using the word “echoed" which makes it sound like the intelligence community took the idea from the British White Paper, which was not the case. In addition we do not think the characterization of "key evidence" is accurate (we do not think the NIE used the term evidence) and the President did not say it was key evidence of reconstitution so this sentence is irrelevant. 128

_ Amendment 38 Page 13, last paragraph — On September 8, 2002, the National Security Advisor said that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq "are only realbv suited for nuclear weapons programs Although both the CIA and DIA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were “best suited " for centry'uges, and that other explanations were “inconsistent with the total body of intelligence the DOE had assessed that this was unlikely, and had published intelligence reports explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE ’s view, more likely) that the tubes were intended to be used to build conventional rockets. Amendment 38 — strike Although both the CIA and DLA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were “best suited "for centry'uges, and that other explanations were "inconsistent with the total body of intelligence the DOE had assessed that this was unlikely, and had published intelligence reports explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE ’s view, more likely) that the tubes were intended to be used to build conventional rockets. and insert Both the CIA and DLA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear wea ons ro am with the CIA notin that the tubes were "best suited” for centrifu es and that other ex lanations were "inconsistent with the total bod of intelli ence.” ln A ril 2001 CIA ublished a a er which said "Ira is gyg ng to urchase items that have little use other than for a uranium enrichment ro am." In Au st 2002 CIA ublished another a er which said "A1thou we have considered alternative ex lanations for the tubes — such as their use in multi le rocket launchers Q ) — CIA concurs with ound forces wea ons ex erts in the lntelli ence Communit that such an ex lanation is inconsistent with the overall bod of intelli ence on the sub 'ect." More than a ear earlier the DOE ublished an assessment that said an a lication other than centrifu e use was "more likel ’ but noted that "re ardless of end use the delive of aluminum tubes with the r orted s eciiications to Ira would be rohibited” items under the Nuclear Su liers Grou and UN Securi Council Resolutions. Comment- We believe the report as drafted excludes relevant information which was far more likely to have been provided to Secretary Rice than a DOE assessment published a year earlier. These should be included andlDOE’s judgments should be put in its own words, rather than those of the report authors. DOE used the words "more likely" not ‘“unlikely. • CIA, SEIB 01-083CHX April 10, 2001, "Iraq is trying to purchase items that have little use other than for a uranium enrichment program.” • CIA, August 2002, "A1though we have considered alternative explanations for the tubes — such as their use in multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) — CIA concurs with ground forces weapons experts in the Intelligence Community that such an explanation is inconsistent with the overall body of intelligence on the subj ect." _ 129

_ Amendment 39 Page 14, second non-bullet paragraph — - Intelligence obtained after the Guy War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons. Both apparently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the two had an estimated yield of less than _ and the larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of- could not be delivered by missile. Amendment 39 — strike - Intelligence obtained after the Guhf War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons. Both apparently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the two had an estimated yield of less than _ and the larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of- could not be delivered by missile. and insert 1 Numerous intelli ence assessment noted that Ira had develo ed two desi s rior to the Gulf War. Accordin to a 1999 IC nuclear assessment "nuclear desi efforts from 1988 throu mid-1990 were focused rimaril on conce ts and in 1990 Ira be an to ex lore more advanced desi s to ermit smaller size and hi er g eld." Comment- - The Secretary’s comments were made prior to the publication of the NIE, so the citation of the NIE here is irrelevant. The Committee should include intelligence assessments which were published before the statement in question such as the following: • "By 1991, Iraq had demonstrated sufficient calculational capability and an understanding of high-explosive systems to design devices with yields of as much as - for large diameter weapons and as much as _ for more advanced designs." PWR031202- 12 • 1999 JAEIC assessment- "According to all available information, nuclear desi efforts from 1988 through mid-1990 were focused primarily on - concepts and, in 1990, Iraq began to explore more advanced designs to permit smaller size and higher yield." • 1999 DIA assessment, DoD Futures Intelli ence Pro am, "It reviousl erformed field • March 14, 2002 SPWR, Iraq: Nuclear Weapon Design Program PubNo.· SPWR031402- 02, According to Iraqi-supplied documents, seized Ir i documents, and re ortin from Iraqi defectors, Iraq by early 1991 had researched desi and had conducted substantial work on an advanced esign 130

Amendments 41 and 41 a Page 14, last paragraph — In September 2002 the Vice President stated that there was “irrefutable evidence " that Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program. As noted, several intelligence agencies assessed that reconstitution was underway, but the Department of Energy assessed that the evidence was less conclusive (State/INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that poinU. Amendment 41 — strike but the Department of Energy assessed that the evidence was less conclusive. and insert . In an assessment in Au st 2002 the DOE said multi le-source re ortin su ests that Saddam Hussein is seekin to reconstitute Ira ’s nuclear wea ons ro am. Althou the re ortin roduces no "smokin n " continued vi `lance is re uired re ardin Ira ’s attem ts to re `uvenate its nuclear wea ons ro am." At hearin before the SSCI in S tember 2002 however the DCI testified that "Ira ’s a essive ursuit of gh stren aluminum tubes rovides com ellin evidence that Saddam is attem tin to reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort for Ba dad’s nuclear wea ons ro am." No dissentin o inion re ardin reconstitution was included in this testimon and the DOE witness testified that his a enc had no disa eement with testimon resented about Ira reconstitutin its nuclear ro am. Amendment 4-1(a) — strike (State/INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that poinU. Comment — Testimony from the DCI on September 17, 2002 to the SSCI and the SASC says "Iraq’s aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum tubes provides compelling evidence that Saddam is attempting to reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program? There are no dissenting views mentioned on reconstitution during this testimony at all. The DOE never used the words "less conc1usive." We also note that State/INR could not possibly convey an agreement with DOE to policymakers if it did not publish a judgment. In addition, this information was added to the report after the majority imposed amendment filing deadline, without the permission of the minority, which is inappropriate. 131

Amendment 42 Page 15 - Conclusion 1: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor regarding a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community. Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, some intelligence agencies assessed that the Iraqi government was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program, while others disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence. The Estimate itself expressed the majority view that the program was being reconstituted, but included clear dissenting views from the State Department ’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which argued that reconstitution was not underway, and the Department of Energy, which argued that aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended for a nuclear program. Amendment 42 — strike the conclusion as drafted and insert All olic aker statements reviewed in this section were substantiated y the available intelli ence. Comment- It is impossible for us to properly analyze the claims in this conclusion without knowing which specific statements the report is referencing. Also, it is incorrect to say that "others" disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program. At most, only one agency expressed any doubt about the reconstitution judgment and not in any document published outside its own agency prior to publication of the NIE. Although not stated definitely we believe that the statements this conclusion is referencing were made prior to the ‘ publication of the NIE, so the inclusion of INR’s dissent referenced in the NIE is irrelevant and unfair to those speakers. Additionally, it is misleading to discuss DOE’s dissent on the aluminum tubes but not include the fact that DOE agreed that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. Amendment 43 Page 16, Postwar Findings — entire section. Amendment 43 —- strike the postwar findings section Comment - None of the postwar Endings has citations so we cannot check their accuracy. Even with citations, we do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. 132

Amendment 54 Page 26, third paragraph - The DIA issued a report in February 2003, Iraq.· Denial and Deception: Iraqi Countertargeting Strategy, that stated it was standard denial and deception practice for Iraq to place various military hardware in, among other things, ‘palm and date tree groves ..., " but this report was issued ajier Secretary Powell ’s speech and did not mention biological weapons. There was operational intelligence trajjzic on this issue prior to the Secretary ’s speech, but the Committee is not aware of prior analytical assessments. Amendment 54 — Strike the above paragraph and insert The CIA rovided an intelli ence re ort for use in Secret Powell’s UN s eech which said that an lra i missile bri ade commander su ervised the dis ersal of his bri ade’s al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles in order to hide them from UN ins ectors. The re ort said that some of the missiles had warheads containin an ‘“unknown biolo ` cal a ent’ and that the missiles were hidden in "lar e alm oves." Comment- The document which we asked the drafters to incorporate is not "operationa1 intelligence traf’ric" as stated in the report. lt is a TD (telegraphic dissemination), or intelligence report, and it was provided to the Committee by the CIA when the Committee asked specifically what information it provided to Secretary Powell for use in this speech. The fact that the Committee is unaware of "analytical assessments" is irrelevant, because the Committee agreed to use "intelligence" to compare to statements, not just "ana1ytic assessments." This report was included in the Committee’s Erst Iraq report on page 243 and should be included in this report as well. 133

_ Amendment 58 Page 28, BW Conclusions — Conclusion 2: Statements in the major speeches analyzed as well additional statements, regarding Iraq ’s possession of biological agent, weapons, production capability, and use of mobile biological laboratories were substantiated by intelligence information. Intelligence assessments from the late J 990s through early 2003 consistently stated that Iraq retained biological warfare agent and the capability to produce more. Assessments on the mobile facilities included the production capabilities of those labs, both in terms of type of agent and in amount. Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments lef open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was activebi producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq ’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Amendment 58 — Strike Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments lef open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq ’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Comments — We do not think that the report has given any examples of intelligence assessments prior to the 2002 NIE which "left open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them" except the 2000 ICA, which was published more than two years before the policymakers’ statements were made and before any of them entered office. In addition, we do not believe there were any intelligence gaps articulated in the October 2002 NIE about Iraq’s BW program, with the possible exception of a lack of understanding of the specifics about the types of weapons and biological agents that analysts stated were in the possession of the Iraqi government. If the report drafters think there are such gaps they should be described in the report. Amendment 59 [ Page 28, Postwar Intelligence, entire section Amendment 59(a) — Strike the postwar findings section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. 134

_ Amendment 68 ‘ Page 37-38, Conclusions — Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq ’s chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community ’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing. The intelligence community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to have chemical weapons production capability and that Iraq was seeking to hide such capability in its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence assessments, especially prior to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that analysts could not confirm that production was ongoing. Amendment 68 — Strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 4: Statements y senior olic akers re ardin Ira ’s chemical wea ons roduction ca abili and activities were all substantiated y intelli ence information. - Comment- We dispute several of the contentions in this conclusion. The intelligence community assessed both before and alter the NIE that Iraq had a chemical weapons production capability, not just that Saddam wanted one. (See the CIA SEM Dec 2001 — "Iraq in the past several years has rebuilt a covert chemical weapons production capability by reconstructing dual- use industrial facilities and developing new chemical plants .... ") Most of the assessments which judged that actual production was ongoing were contemporaneous with the NIE or slightly prior (see Tenet’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee and SSCI below and the unclassified White Paper), but not all of them. More importantly, prior to the production of the NIE, no policymakers said that production was ongoing. If the report concludes that such statement is not substantiated, the report should clearly identify it so that it can be analyzed. • We assess that Iraq retains a stockpile of at least 100 tons of agent . . . Moreover, Iraq is rebuilding former chemical weapons facilities, developing plants, and trying to procure chemical warfare-related items covertly . . . Based on these construction and procurement activities, we assess that Iraq has a covert chemical wea ons roduction ca abili embedded in its civilian indus . Tenet testimony before SASC and SSCI September 16, 2002. • The main production building at Ira ’s Fallujah III chemical plant appears to have resumed operation, according to h . . . The Intelligence Community suspects this site supports production of CW precursors as well as the biological warfare agent ricin, extracted from castor oil beans. INR, Iraq: Suspect CB WProduction Facility Active, November 5, 200]. _ 135

Amendment 69 Page 38, Postwar Findings section Amendment 69 — Strike the postwar findings section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policy1nakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to mislead readers who might think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. Amendment 70 _ Page 40, second f11ll paragraph, (Scope Note) Scope Note: The term ‘weapons of mass a’estruction' (or ‘WIMDQ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Amendment 70 - Strike the scope note paragraph and insert Accordin to the October 2002 Ira WMD 'White Pa er Ira ’s biolo ` cal chemical ballistic missile and nuclear wea ons ro arns were collectivel referred to as wea ons of mass destruction { WMQ) Comment! Suggestion — We disagree that the intelligence community’s use of the term "WMD" excluded ballistic missiles and other WMD delivery vehicles. The Iraq WMD White Paper (or unclassified NIE) specifically states, "The Gulf war damaged Saddam Husayn’s biological, chemical, ballistic missile, and nuclear weapons programs, collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WIv[D)." The 2002 classified NIE on Iraq’s WMD programs included four categories including delivery systems. The report’s definition of what is included in the term WMD is incorrect and should include delivery systems. 'While this report’s inclusion of the DOD’s definition of WMD is interesting, this report is examining intelligence community judgments, not DOD’s. What matters is what the intelligence community included in defining WMD in 2002 which, the above reference to the NIE and White Papers makes clear, included delivery systems. _ 136

_ Amendment 71 and 71 a Page 40, last full paragraph - In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction, " and that “there is no doubt he is amassing them". He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing “the imminence of prolq’eration of weapons of mass destruction " with regard to Iraq as evidence that preemptive action was necessary. As noted, the term ‘weapons of mass destruction ’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Amendments 71 — Strike He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing “the imminence of proly'eration of weapons of mass destruction " with regard to Iraq as evidence that preemptive action was necessary. Amendment 71(a) - Strike As noted the term 'weapons of mass destruction ’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Comments — We have several comments about these paragraphs: (1) Again, as stated above and as defined by the IC, the term WMD also includes delivery systems; (2) It seems that the report is actually trying to show that the Vice President misrepresented the intelligence because he used the collective term WMD rather than specifically stating biological, chemical weapons and the means to deliver those weapons. The Vice President clearly said in the speech that Iraq was working on developing nuclear weapons—which shows there was no effort to include nuclear weapons among the WMD he said Iraq had; and (3) The use of a collective term does not indicate that all elements of that term must exist for the term to be true and the intelligence community regularly uses the term WMD to refer to some WMD elements. For example: • Tenet’s Threat Hearing testimony said: "Intelligence reporting on Saddam’s intentions to use WMD is clear and consistent .... " • CIA/NESA PC briefing book points stated that "Iraq’s activities since 1998 clearly show that it has repaired and expanded dual-use WMD facilities, increased WMD production capabilities, and advanced clandestine production and procurement." • Tenet testimony for SASC/ S SCI "Thus, experience shows that his regime will maintain weapons of mass destruction for use, not just deterrence" and "Saddam will never end his pursuit and possession of weapons of mass destruction" and Saddam "rnay decided that the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance . . . ." • August 10, 2001 CIA assessment, Developing Biological Weapons as a Strategic Deterrent, stated that "Iraq is attempting to address its regional security concerns by developing weapons of mass destruction and is focusing on biological warfare (BW) agents as a strategic deterrent .... " 137

Amendments 81-82 - Page 48, third non-bullet paragraph - The Iraqi regime was known to have constructed underground facilities for a variety of purposes, but the intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried facilities. US intelligence analysts suspected that the regime might be using underground facilities to conceal weapons activities, and there was some unconfirmed reporting that suggested this, but no intelligence agency claimed to know the location of any active underground WIMD facilities, and none expressed certainty that such facilities existed. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in 2001 that “elements of the regime ’s weapons of mass destruction (WYMD) and ballistic missile rograms probably are located in under round facilities but iieieii iiiiii _ nor intelligence sources have confirmed any WMD- or ballistic missile related underground facilities. " An August 2002 DL4 report noted that “Iraq has reportedly rebuilt its full ojfensive B W program in well-concealed, underground, mobile or dyficult-to- locate facilities " but went on to state that “no biological weapons (BW)—related underground facilities are currently confirmed to be in use in Iraq Amendment 81-82 -— Strike the above paragraph and insert - The intelli ence communi had lon assessed that the Ira i re ` e had hardened or under ound WMD stora e facilities and W"MD facilities dis ised as civilian installations both to im ede detection y ins ectors and intelli ence services and to rotect facilities from air attack. Intelli ence a encies assessed that Ira had dee l buried under ound facilities but had not identiied y of these facilities.2O4 The Defense Intelli ence A enc assessed in 2001 that "elements of the re `me’s wea ons of mass destruction ( W MQ) and ballistic missile ro ams robabl are located in under ound facilities " notin that "numerous re orts before and after DESERT SHIELD/ STORM mentioned the existence of nuclear biolo ` cal chemical and ballistic missile roduction and stora e sites that were shallow buried UGFs or in a few instances even de under ound facilities. The assessment also noted that i

have confirmed y WMD- or ballistic missile related under ound facilities." An Au st 2002 DIA re ort also discussed r orts of shallow and de l buried biolo `cal warfare facilities. The r ort said that "des ite these man credible re orts and no functionin biolo `cal wea ons B - related under ound facilities are currentl confirmed to be in use in Ira ".2°5 Comment- Despite fixes made to this paragraph based on our earlier comments, as draiied it still is far more dismissive of the intelligence community’s assessments of underground facilities than the assessments themselves were. The reports should use the language used in the analytic papers. ’°‘N1c, Denial and Deception Nm, 1998 2°5 DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December l4, 2001; DIA, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook, August 2002. iii

Amendment 83 Page 48, last paragraph — page 49, Erst paragraph - In November 2002, the National Intelligence Council noted in an assessment prepared in response to a request from the Secretary of Deknse, that "all the military and regime-associated UGFs [underground facilities] we have identyied thus far are vulnerable to conventional, precision-guided penetrating munitions because they are not deeply buried Amendment 83 — strike the above paragraph Comment- The November 2002 NIE was published two months after the Secretary spoke and is therefore irrelevant to what he said. In addition, only select information was taken from this NIE which gives a distorted picture of what the NIE said. The following relevant information was excluded: • "To date, the Community has located over 490 Iraqi operational UGFS associated with the military or the regime. • "We assess that Iraq has some large, deeply buried UGFS, but, because of the Iraqi denial and deception (D&D) program, we have not been able to locate any of these. • "All the military and regime-associated UGFs [underground facilities] we have identified thus far are vulnerable to conventional, precision-guided, penetrating munitions because they are not deeply buried. • "The number of UGFs identified and the suspected number of UGFs still tmlocated pose problems for effective operations of any UN inspection regime."2O6 206 National Intelligence Council, Implications of Iraqi Underground Facilities for US National Security, November 2002. 139

_ Amendment 85 Page 49-50, conclusions - Conclusion 5: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding Iraq ’s possession of weapons of mass destr·uction were generally substantiated by intelligence information, though many statements made regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected a higher level of certainty than the intelligence judgments themselves. Many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt that the Iraqi government possessed or was producing weapons of mass destruction. While the intelligence community assessed at this time that the Iraqi regime possessed some chemical and biological munitions, most reports produced prior to fall 2002 cited intelligence gaps regarding production and expressed room for doubt about whether production was ongoing. Prior to late 2002, the intelligence community did not collectively assess with any certainty that Iraq was actively producing any weapons of mass destruction. Amendment 85 — strike generally and strike everything after information Comment - We disagree with the use of the term "generally," because all of the statements were substantiated by the intelligence. Furthermore, the lack of identifying information about exactly which policymakers’ statements were viewed by the authors as reflecting a higher degree of certainty than the intelligence judgments makes it impossible for us to challenge the assertion (which we believe we could if the specific statements were identified). The conclusion is incorrect in asserting that there were "many statements regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002." This is simply false. None of the statements from this time period mentioned ongoing production at all. It is also false to state that "many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt" about Iraq’s possession of VVIVID. Only one policymaker used the term "no doubt" during this time period and it was in August 2002, not early 2002. This type of careless review certainly will be noticed by the readers of the report and harms the credibility of the Committee. We disagree with the comment that prior to 2002 the intelligence community "expressed room for doubt" about whether Iraq possessed chemical and biological munitions and believe, even if it were true, assessments prior to 2002 are irrelevant to what policymakers said in late 2002. We also disagree with including the comment that the intelligence community did not "collectively" assess that Iraq was actively producing any WMD. Whether the intelligence community had a "collective" judgment is irrelevant. The task of this report is not to look at only collective judgments; it is to examine available intelligence. 140

Amendment 86 Page 50, conclusions - Conclusion 6: The Secretary of Defense ’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WYWD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes was not substantiated by available intelligence information. While many intelligence analysts suspected that the Iraqi government might be using underground facilities to conceal WMD activities, no active underground WZMD facilities had been positively identyfied. Furthermore, none of the underground government facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be sa]% from conventional airstrikes. Amendment 86 — Strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 6: The Secreta of Defense’s statement that Ira i WMD facilities were not all vulnerable to attack from the air was substantiated y available intelli ence information. Comment — First, the Secretary did not say "conventional" airstrikes, he said that sites "were not all vulnerable to attack from the air." No intelligence assessments prior to the Secretary’s statement said that "none of the underground WMD facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be safe from conventional airstrikes." Furthermore, the Secretary was not only talking about facilities that were vulnerable due to being deeply buried. He also discussed facilities that were believed to have been located near mosques, schools, and hospitals which made them "not vuh1erable" to airstrikes unless we were willing to possibly strike those civilian facilities. Amendment 87 i Page 50, postwar findings Amendment 87 — strike this section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substar1tiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsub star1tiated if they turned out to be wrong. 141

Amendment 90 Page 54, third paragraph - Intelligence assessments regarding UA Vs shy‘ted ajter the October 2002 NIE. A subsequent NIE, Nontraditional Threats t0 the US Homeland Through 2007, published in January 2003, did not describe Iraq ’s UA V program as 'probably intended " for biological weapons delivery, and instead stated that “Iraq may be modyjiing UA Vs "for CBW delivery. This NIE also noted that Iraqi UA Vs could reach the United States, gf they were transported (in some unspecy‘ied manner) "to within a few hundred kilometers. " Amendment 90 — strike the above paragraph and the next two paragraphs. Comment- We do not believe that a document published in January, three months after the President made the speech should be analyzed in this section. It is not relevant to what the President said in October and, even if it were, the Threats to the Homeland NIE expressed the same concems that the President addressed in his speech, that the UAVs could be used to target the Homeland. Additionally, the NIE used the term "strike" the Homeland, not "reach" the Homeland. 142

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Amendment 96 Page 57-58 - Conclusion 8: Statements by the President, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UA Vs) that could be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons were generally substantiated by intelligence information, but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UA V program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new UA Vwas probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq “may " be modiyjring UA Vs for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency argued that the evidence for this was “not sujficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so. " Amendment 96 — strike generally; strike but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UA V program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new UA Vwas probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said merely that Iraq might be modiyying UA Vs for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency argued that the evidence for this was unpersuasive. and i11sert @ intelli ence a encies assessed that lra ’s UAVs could be used for CBW delive . Comments — Again, we disagree with the terms "generally" and we disagree that there was any disagreement within the intelligence community about whether the UAVs "could" be used to deliver CBW as the conclusion states. All agencies agreed that the UAVs could be used to deliver CBW, which is all that policymakers said. We further note that the Air Force dissent on the intended use of the UAVs was not included in the President’s summary of the NIE. 143

Amendment 97 Page 58 - Conclusion 9: The President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering using UA Vs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate noted that an Iraqi procurement network had attempted to purchase commercial mapping software that included data on the United States, and suggested that the Iraqi government was considering using UA Vs to target the US. The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability. Amendment 97 — strike but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. strike and suggested and insert which the IC said su ested ‘ strike The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability. Comment — We believe it is irrelevant whether the judgment later changed. This report is supposed to determine whether statements were substantiated by the intelligence policymakers had when they made the statement, not intelligence that came out later. Additionally, the President said "we are concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." This statement is not inconsistent with the NIE published in January. The IC remained concerned about this possibility. Amendment 98 Page 58, Postwar findings — entire postwar findings section g Amendment 98 — strike this section. Comment - None of the postwar findings have citations so we cannot check their accuracy. Even with citations, we do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is Lumecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they tumed out to be wrong. _ 144

Amendment 99 Page 62, fifth paragraph - Finally, the President stated that Saddam Hussein was "harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. " While this statement was not specQ‘ic to any group, the placement in the speech and the context suggests that the President was stating that Hussein was harboring al Qaeda. The statement appeared two paragraphs after statements that “...Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy, " that some "al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq, " and that “Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. " (These statements are discussed elsewhere in this report. ) The President ’s statement came in the same paragraph as the statement "confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror. " Amendment 99 — Strike the above paragraph alter the first sentence. Comment- We do not believe the President ever stated or implied that Saddam Hussein was harboring al-Qa’ida. In the referenced text he spoke specifically about harboring non-al-Qa’ida groups. We think it is stretching this project too far to not only purport to be the judge and jury of what policymakers said, but also what staff believes they "suggested" or "implied." Amendment 106 Page 65, third paragraph - The September 2002 CIA report Iraqi Support for Terrorism, which was coordinated with the DIA, stated that al-Libi said Iraq had ‘provided " unspecU‘ied CBW training for two al-Qa ’ida associates in 2000, but also stated that al Libi “did not know the results of the training. " Amendment 106 —ai°rer the sentence above insert Another version of the a er rovided to the Committee with the same date did not include the comment that al-Libi "did not know the results of the trainin ." The Committee did not ask wh there were two versions of this p p and did not ask whether one or both versions were sent to the White House. Comment - The Committee needs to get an answer about why there were two reports and find out whether both of them were disseminated. The report also should include the comments from both versions, not choose the one that best supports the point the authors are trying to make. _ 145

Amendment 108 Page 65, last paragraph — Months prior to the speech and in the latter intelligence products cited above, questions were raised in finished intelligence about al-Libi ’s credibility. Amendment 108 — insert a new paragraph before the discussion of the State of the Union which says the following: Des ite these issues when the White House submitted the s eech for CIA fact checkin and sources and methods clearances a CIA staff member told the DCI in writin that the CIA anal st had "read all the terrorism ara a hs and said it was all oka .” em hasis ori ` al (all okay should be underlined.) Comments - We know that this speech was fact checked by the CIA and we have this handwritten comment which shows that the CIA approved the language in the terrorism section. This should be stated in the report 146

_ Amendment 1 19 Page 71, conclusions - Conclusion 12: Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence. Intelligence assessments, including multiple CL4 reports and the November 2002 NIE, dismissed the claim that Iraq and al-Qa ’ida were cooperating partners. According to an undisputed INR footnote in the NIE, there was no intelligence information that supported the claim that Iraq would provide weapons of mass destruction to al-Qa ’ida. The credibility of the principal intelligence source behind the claim that Iraq had provided al-Qa ’ida with biological and chemical weapons training was regularly questioned by DL4, and later by the CL4. The Committee repeats its conclusion from a prior report that “assessments were inconsistent regarding the likelihood that Saddam Hussein provided chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training to al-Qa ’ida. " Amendment 119 —— strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 12: Statements y the President and Secreta Powell that Ira had rovided al- a’ida with wea ons trainin were su orted y the intelli ence. Numerous intelli ence assessments stated that Ira had rovided al- a’ida with wea ons trainin and s eciiicall trainin in oisons and ases. VVhi1e some DIA re orts raised uestions about the credibili of this re ortin and one CIA re ort noted that the source ma have exa erated his re ortin in a se arate area the CIA did not raise uestions about the source’s wea ons trainin re ortin an in fac rovided and a roved the use of this lan a e in both the President’s and Secreta ’s remarks. Comments - None of the statements provided in this report suggested or implied that Iraq and al- Qa’ida had "partnership." Additionally, while there were policymakers who commented that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, those comments were fully supported by the intelligence. The al-Libi reporting on CBW training was never questioned by the CIA and the information was approved by the CIA for use in both the President’s Cincinnati speech and Powell’s UN speech. In the case of the Powell speech CIA actually provided the information to him to use in the speech in the draft of the speech the CIA wrote. Furthermore, the conclusion as drafted says that intelligence community "asses sments were inconsistent" so accordingly, how can the Committee judge policymakers to not have any statements substantiated by the intelligence? 147

Amendment 120 Page 71, conclusions - Conclusion 13: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq ’s contacts with al-Qa’ida were substantiated by intelligence information. However, policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al-Qa ’ida. Amendment 120 — strike However, policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the .. contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al-Qa ’ida. Comments - We disagree that policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the nature of the contacts or left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation. Policymaker comments throughout this section nearly exactly matched what the intelligence community said about contacts. No policymaker implied that the contacts led to any Iraqi _ support of al-Qa’ida other than the safehaven, training, reciprocal non-aggression, which is well documented in numerous intelligence assessments. Furthermore, the comments from many of the policymakers outlined in the section were factchecked by the CIA. The report should identify the policymakers and the specific statements that are judged to be misleading so that we can analyze those statements. Amendment 121 Page 72, conclusions - Conclusion 14. The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001. Amendment 121 - strike the above conclusion Comments - At the time that the Vice President commented that "it’s been pretty well confirmed that [Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service" a CIA assessment said, "The Czech governmentlast week ublicl confirmed that suspected hij acker Muhammad Atta met with former Iraqi station chief Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani in Prague before al-Ani’s expulsion from the Czech Republic last April. Al-Ani and Atta met during 8-9 April in Prague, according to a foreign government service." (Emphasis added.) _ 148

Amendment 122 Page 72, Postwar findings — entire section Amendment 122 — strike all postwar findings Comment — None of the postwar Endings have citations so we cannot check their accuracy. Even with citations, we do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase ll report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. Amendment 125 Page 74, first non-bullet paragraph — In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretaigv of State all discussed Iraq ’s intentions regarding weapons of mass destruction. Both the President and the Wce President indicated that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorist groups. Amendment 125 — strike the above sentence. Comment/suggestion —None of these individuals discussed 1raq’s "intentions" regarding WMD or anything else. Both the President and the Vice President expressed concern that Saddam could share WMD with terrorists, not that he intended to do so and they did not say or "indicate" that he was "prepared” to do so. _ 149

 
IIa  110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed   

_ Amendment 126 Page 74, second — fourth full paragraphs - (U) In the Vice President ’s August 2002 speech 0n Iraq, he discussed “the case of Saddam Hussein and indicated that Saddam was ‘prepared to share [weapons of mass destruction] with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States. " (U) At the time of the Vice President ’s speech, the intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists. The intelligence community had previously assessed that Saddam was interested in acquiring WMD to deter hostile foreign powers (including Israel, Iran, and the US—led Coalition) and as a means of achieving "regionalpreeminence. " (U) The intelligence community had also assessed that Saddam was unlikely to take actions that he believed would threaten the survival of his regime, and that he believed hostile actions such as a re-invasion of Kuwait would infact threaten his regime ’s survival. Amendment 126 — strike the above three paragraphs and insert In the Vice President’s Au st 2002 s eech on g, he discussed the threat of al- a’ida’s ursuit of wea ons of mass destruction. He noted that Cold War doctrines do not pp y in this scenario notin that "containment is not ossible when dictators obtain wea ons of mass destruction and are re ared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastro hic casualties on the United States." S ecificall re ardin Ira "armed with an arsenal of these wea ons of terror" he said "Saddarn Hussein could then be ex ected to seek domination of the entire Middle East take control of a eat ortion of the world’s ener su lies directl threaten America’s friends throu out the re ' on and sub `ect the United States to y other nation to nuclear b1ackmai1." Comment- The Vice President did not say that Saddam was "prepared to share WMD with terrorists," nor did he indicate as much. The report should analyze what he said, not the drafters’ interpretation of his comments. The VP was talking about al-Qa’ida pursuing WMD and said that Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment do not work against these kinds of enemies. He said "containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States." He then went on in the next paragraph separately to discuss the case of Saddam Hussein. The report should not say that he said something about Saddam when he never even mentioned Saddam at all. 150

Amend1nent 127 Page 75, last three paragraphs — In the President 's September 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Saddam Hussein was a “grave and gathering danger and that t0 assume Saddam ’s good faith would be tantamount to betting “the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. " The President also implied that the Iraqi regime was dangerous because it might provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists (“And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we find all these dangers .... U The intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein dealt with other countries in good faith and assessments regarding the potential use of WYMD were not based on assumptions of good faith. As discussed, the 1999 NIE on Iraqi military capabilities noted that it was dyjicult to gauge Saddam ’s intentions, but judged that he would be carejizl not to put his regime ’s survival at risk. Amendment 127- Strike In one place - in one regime — we find all these dangers .... U; Strike The intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein dealt with other countries in good faith and assessments regarding the potential use of WMD were not based on assumptions of good faith. and insert In a December 15 2001 assessment titled The Ira i Threat the CIA said "Saddam sees himself as a an-Arab leader and views his re ' e as the most orious cha ter in Ira i histo . . . His decision-makin is ided y o ommism distrust of others a ersonal need for ower and the sense that he is an historic fi e who must take bold risks to advance Ira ’s interests. He views state ower rimaiil in milit terms—twice launchin wars a air1st his nei bors—and his strate 'c aim is to establish Ira as the reeminent ower in the Persian Gulf." Comment- The last portion of the comment Hom the President in the second paragraph above was not referencing Saddam giving weapons to terrorists as the draft suggests. The President had explained several dangers in the previous few paragraphs including poverty and raging disease, ethnic and religious strife, and outlaw groups which accept no law and have no limit to their violent ambitions. These were the dangers he was talking about, but when the comments are taken out of context, that understanding is lost. Also, trying to contradict the President by saying what the intelligence community did not assess is ridiculous. The President did not claim that this was an intelligence community judgment. 111

Amendment 128 Page 76, first four full paragraphs - At the time of the President ’s UN speech, the October 2002 NIE was still being prepared, and was two weeks away from release. While the document itseb’ was not available at this time, its consistency with the 1999 NIE, and the lack of contradictory assessments in the intervening four year period, illustrate the continuity of the intelligence community ’s judgments on this topic. (ID The October 2002 NIE assessed that "Saddam 's past actions suggest that a decision to use WMD probabhr would come when he feels his personal survival is at stake even after he has exhausted all political, military and diplomatic options It noted that it the US would be unlikehr to know when Saddam felt that he had no other options for sefpreservation, but pointed out that “Iraq ’s methodical conventional defensive preparations alsocsuggest Saddam thinks an attack is not imminent ".2"7 (ID Additionally, the NIE pointed out that “Iraq 's historical use of C Wagainst Iran and its decision not to use VWWD against Israel or Coalition forces in 1991 indicates that an opponent’s retaliatory capability is a critical factor in Saddam ’s decisionmaking. "2"8 (U) The NIE also examined a variety of ways in which Iraq might conceivably use WAID, and noted that overall “we have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use VWWD. " Amendment 128- strike all of the above paragraphs. Comment- An NIE published after the President’s speech is irrelevant. National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. Ibid. _ 152

_ Amendments 129 Page 76, last paragraph - While the October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, it judged that Saddam was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. According to the NIE, "Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBWagainst the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger case for making war. " Amendment 129 — strike this paragraph and the next two paragraphs. Comment- The NIE did not say that Saddam was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. Furthermore, we believe all of this analysis and the analysis in the ' next two paragraphs are irrelevant and should be deleted. The President was not making a comment about what Iraq was likely to do now, he was specifically talking about the danger of waiting until Saddam had more powerful weapons which could change his calculations about the wisdom of giving WMD to terrorists. Nothing in the intelligence reporting casts doubt on the President’s comments that Iraq "could" give WMD to terrorists. Amendment 130 Page 77, second paragraph - As discussed elsewhere in this report, in October 2002 most intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. The State Department ’s Oyjice of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) believed that Saddam Hussein wanted to possess nuclear weapons, and was maintaining some capabilities with dual uses, but judged that the available evidence did "not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution. " Amendment 130 — aher the above start a new paragraph and insert In a statement released y the DCI about the President’s comment he said "There is no inconsistenc between out view of Saddam’s owin threat and the view as ex ressed y the President in his s eech. Althou we think the chances of Saddam initializin a WMD attack at this moment are low-in p because it would constitute an admission that he ossesses WMD-there is no uestion that the likelihood of Saddarn’s usin W1v1D a ainst the United States or our allies in the re ` on for blackmail deterrence or otherwise ows as his arsenal continues to build. His ast use of WMD a ainst civilian and milit tar ets shows that he roduces these wea ons to use not `ust to deter. Comment- The statement released by the DCI is relevant in this section and should be included. It explains that the President’s comments were consistent with the intelligence at the time and that the President and the intelligence in question were discussing two different things. We believe it also illustrates why the entire intent section is a distortion of what the policymakers in question were discussing, which was not Saddarn’s intent at all. 153

Amendment 1 3 1 Page 77, last two paragraphs — page 78, iirst two full paragraphs — As discussed the October 2002 NIE judged that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. More generally, it suggested that Saddam would probably decide to use WI\@ only y' he jelt he had no other options for survival and that "an opponent ’s retaliatory capability" would be a key factor in making this decision. A November 2002 NIE on nontraditional threats restated the October NIE ’s assessment about Saddam ’s willingness, y' "sujjiciently desperate " to employ an outside terrorist group to conduct an attack on the US as his "last chance for vengeance. " This NIE included the caveats that the intelligence community had low confidence in this assessments, and that "INR believes that the intelligence community has no reporting to support this assertion. " The October 2002 NIE ’s conclusions were essentially repeated again in a January 2003 Intelligence Community Assessment which said that "Saddam probably will not initiate hostilities for fear of providing Washington with justdication to invade Iraq. Nevertheless, he might deal the first blow, especially y' he perceives that an attack intended to end his regime is imminent. " Neither of these reports specqically focused on what Saddam might do y' he had nuclear weapons or a 'full arsenal" of chemical and biological weapons, possibbr because the intelligence community believed that Iraq was still years away from possessing either of these. Amendment 131 — Strike the first and last paragraphs above Comment- The NIE did not say that Saddam Hussein was ‘%mwilling" to conduct terrorist attacks and the President did not say that he would, he said that he could provide a chemical or biological weapon to terrorists. _ 154

_ Amendment 132 and 133 Page 78, third full paragraph — Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (ID In the Secretary of State 's February 2003 address t0 the United Nations Security Council, he stated that “ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, and that "al-Qaida could turn t0 Iraq for help in acquiring expertise 0n weapons of mass destruction. " Amendment 132 - insert before ambition and hatred "Some believe some claim that these contacts do not amount to much. The sa Saddam Hussein’s secular g y and al- a’ida’s reli ' ous g y do not mix. I am not comforted y this thou t. Amendment 133 — insert a new paragraph after the paragraph in Amendment 132 which says: Several intelli ence r oits described a mutual anti ath for the United States as a motivation for their contacts and dealin s includin the followin : • A ran e of intelli ence r orts indicates Ba dad and al- a’ida have been in contact since at least the mid-1990s. Mutual sus icion has blocked coo eration at various times but shared anti ath toward the US and the Saudi ro al famil has rovided a otential rationale for coo eration. CIA SPWR Ma 14 2002 • Ira ’s interaction with al- a’ida is im elled y mutual anti ath toward the United States and the Saudi ro al famil and y Bin Laden’s interest in unconventional weapons and relocation sites. in contrast to the atron-client attem between g and its Palestinian surro ates the relationshi between Saddam and Bin Laden a ears to more closel resemble that of two inde endent actors gxg gg to ex loit each other—their mutual sus icion subomed y al- a’ida’s interest in Ira i assistance and Ba dad’s interest in al- a’ida’s anti-US attacks. Jan 2003 Ira i Su ort for Terrorism p 11 • Discernin the reasons for Saddam’s contacts and dealin s with al a’ida is difficult but his main motivation ma be best ex ressed 5; the old roverb ‘the enem of y enem is y friend} The theme r eated y sources close to various levels of Saddam’s re ` e is that Saddam and Bin Laden reco 'zed the United States as a common enem that Saddam came to see al- a’ida as a force to be reckoned with and that for all their differences and mutual wariness at various times their interests coincided. — CIA in ut to Powell s eech .4 also Jan 2003 Ira i Su ort for Terrorism • Shared anti ath toward the US and Saudi Arabia rovides ossible common ound for coo eration des ite com etin ideolo ` es and mutual sus icion.June 25 2002 SPWR Iran—Ira -S ria: Willin ess to Overlook Ideolo in Iheir Relations With Terrorist Grou s Comment- The report as drafted left off relevant portions of the Secretary’s comments and excluded several intelligence reports with direct relevance to the Secretary’s comments. These should have been added. 155

Amendment 134 Page 78, fourth full paragraph - The intelligence community did not assess that Iraq and al- Qaida had a cooperative relationship. In June 2002 the CIA compared Iraq and al-Qaida to "rival intelligence services, with each trying t0 exploit the other for its own benefit. " While there was evidence of limited contacts throughout the J 990s, the CIA assessed that these ` contacts did not add up to an established relationship. In a January 2003 report the CIA noted that “Saddam Husayn and Usama bin Laden are far from being natural partners and stated that while there was little specy'ic intelligence about Saddam ’s opinion of al-Qaida, “his record suggests that any such ties would be rooted in deep suspicion. " Amendment 134~ Strike the entire paragraph Comment- Secretary Powell never said that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a cooperative relationship and the CIA never assessed that "these contacts did not add up to an established relationship." If there is such a document, it should be cited. Amendment 135 Page 78, last partial paragraph - As discussed, the October 2002 NIE assessed that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups at that time, because he did not want to put his regime ’s survival at risk. It noted that information on possible training of terrorists was “second hand, or from sources of varying reliability. " Amendment 135 — Strike the above paragraph. Comment- The NIE never used the term "unwilling." Furthermore, Secretary Powell’s entire UN speech was checked by the intelligence community, and some areas were actually drafted by the CIA. Obviously the intelligence community believed it was substantiated by intelligence i because they approved it. _ 156

Arnendrnent 136 Page 82, conclusions - Conclusion 15: Statements by the President and Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Saddam Hussein did not have nuclear weapons, and was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks the US using conventional, chemical or biological weapons at that time, in part because he feared that doing so would give the US a stronger case for war with Iraq. This judgment was echoed by both earlier and later intelligence community assessments. All of these assessments noted that gauging Saddam ’s intentions was quite dqjicult, and most suggested that he would be more likely to initiate hostilities if he felt that a US invasion was imminent. Amendment 136 — Strike the above conclusion Comrr1ent— All of the claims in this paragraph are false. Neither the President nor Vice President said or indicated that Saddam "was prepared to give WMD to terrorist groups for attacks on the US." Furthermore, the intelligence community made no assessments about whether Iraq "could" give WMD to terrorists, so the only intelligence information that could be compared to these statements is whether the intelligence community assessed Iraq had such weapons to give, which the intelligence community did. The statement that the NIE said Iraq was "unwilling" to conduct terrorist attacks is false. The NIE never said that. This judgment was not echoed in earlier assessments at all. Amendment 137 Pages 73-83, Intent section Amendment 137 — Strike the entire intent section Comment- As discussed in several previous amendments, we believe the intent section as a whole is distorting what policymakers were arguing at the time. They were not arguing that Saddam "intended" to do any of the things they were discussing, the argument was that, after September 11, we must refocus the debate on what Saddam could do. The intelligence community had low confidence in its judgments of Saddarn’s intent which bolstered the case of policymakers that, in light of such uncertainty, the focus needs to be on capabilities. 157

Amendment 138 Page 82-83, Postwar iindings — entire section Amendment 138 — Strike the postwar findings section. Cormnent - We do not believe that postwar iindings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to mislead readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they tumed out to be wrong. Amendment 140 Pages 84-88, Post-War Iraq section Amendment 140 — Strike the Post-War Iraq section Comments - This entire section is comparing apples to oranges. It compares statements made by policymakers discussing their opinions about postwar Iraq to intelligence unrelated to the comments made. In one case the Vice President quotes a Middle East expert, yet that comment too, according to the draft, must be substantiated by intelligence. We simply cannot expect policymakers to have their comments comport with intelligence even when their comments have nothing to do with intelligence. _ 158

Minority Views OF SENATOR WARNER I agree with many of the points made in the minority views of Senators Bond, Hatch, Chambliss, and Burr about the conduct and the content of this portion of the Committee’s Iraq review effort. I offer these views to focus on the issues which I believe are the most significant and troubling problems with the two reports released today. These concerns should be of no surprise to the Committee Chairman, or any of the Members who attended the business meeting to vote on these so-called Phase II reports, as I have made these points before. I am disappointed that the Committee missed an opportunity to have the staff work out many of the remaining problems with these reports. Staff from both sides of the aisle had commented that progress was being made and that more progress was possible, and, in fact likely, if there had been time allotted to that end. It is unfortunate that such time was not provided because many of the factual problems that remain in the reports may have been corrected. Instead, in the form voted on by a majority of my colleagues, the reports contain numerous inaccuracies, lack complete information, and are not reports that I could support. These inaccuracies are explained ir1 detail in the appendix of amendments attached to the Vice Chairman’s minority views. It is more disappointing that a motion offered by the Vice-Chairman—one I considered exceedingly important—was not given a vote or full consideration during the business meeting. The motion called for those individuals who are alleged in the reports to have made statements that were not substantiated by intelligence or to have otherwise failed in their duties, be afforded the opportunity to come before the Committee to have the opportunity to comment. In the spirit of fairness and full disclosure, these individuals should have been called to meet with the Committee long before the Chairman scheduled a vote on these reports. I believe the failure to do so was unjust to the individuals in question. One of the most fundamental tenets in our great Republic is the opportunity to confront one’s accuser. While the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is certainly not a court of law, these reports will undoubtedly be released to the public and scrutinized, therefore, in the court of public opinion. The individuals who are named in these reports must be afforded the opportunity to be heard about their statements, about the intelligence that was available to them, and to defend themselves if they deem it necessary. I believe this is particularly important in this case, because as the Vice Chainnan’s minority views state, the reports as drafted lack important and relevant information. We know, for example, that information provided by the intelligence community for use in Secretary Powell’s speech to the United Nations, was knowingly excluded from the report. We have an obligation to ask Secretary Powell about this information and any other information the intelligence community provided of which the Committee may not be aware. Because I was so concerned about what I consider to be a fundamental issue of fairness, I urged the Committee to contact the individuals named ir1 this report, prior to its release, to allow them to at least reply to what I believe are significant accusations. Although any responses and 159

any additional information cannot be incorporated into the reports themselves, the information can at least be made pan of the record. While I do not believe this is an acceptable altemative, it will have to suflice. I have served on this Committee for many years—once as ranking member——and I believe the Committee can best serve the Senate and the public, if we can achieve a high level of bipaitisanship. The subject of these reports was a difficult challenge; but, it is behind us now and I will work with all other members to achieve bipartisan solutions in the future. Joint WARNER _ 160

_ M1NOR1TY VIEWS OF SENATOR CHAMBLISS, VICE CHA1RMAN BOND, AND SENATOR HATCH The final two Phase ll reports and the process that produced them are a great disappointment. The products are poor and the process that produced them was regrettable. Although the Minority requested to be involved in the production of these reports at the start of the 110th Congress, we were excluded from the drafting of these reports and deprived of any meaningful role in the work that produced them. We believe the Senate Intelligence Committee, above all others in the Senate, should be a Committee where Members work together absent political agendas for the good of the nation. The process that produced these reports, unfortunately, was not in keeping with that conviction, and we are disappointed with the results. We fully concur with the Vice Chairmar1’s views submitted as an assessment on the substance of the two reports; here, however, we believe it is necessary to make known our disappointment over the process by which they were produced. On February 12, 2004, the Committee voted to authorize Phase ll of this Committee’s inquiry regarding the prewar intelligence on Iraq. Many of the Committee Members’ votes in support of authorizing Phase II of the investigation were based primarily to facilitate a unanimous consensus in completing the Committee’s Phase I report. That report was fair, accurate, and thorough, and proved to be the only substantive and bipartisan portion of this Committee’s investigation into the prewar intelligence on Iraq. Since that time, rather than focusing on how to improve our Intelligence Community or placing the full emphasis of our oversight on reforming the Intelligence Community following its reorganization in 2004, the Committee has spent four years looking backwards at past events that had already been examined by the Committee and by a number of independent Commissions. In addition, this latest round of the Com1nittee’s Phase ll reports and the manner in which they were produced calls into question the integrity of the Committee to act without bias in its oversight role over the Intelligence Community. Past Committee Practice The handling of these Phase II reports represents a significant departure from past Committee practice. In the Committee’s Phase I investigation, staff briefed the Members on a proposed work plan prior to initiating the investigation. Members on both sides of the aisle had an opportunity to request directly that specific areas of concern be investigated and to frame the scope and methodology of the investigation before it even began. At least fifteen times during the staff portion of the investigation, the Members of the Cornrnittee met to receive briefings and discuss issues related to the ongoing investigation. Before the Committee scheduled a meeting to adopt the Phase I report, Members had a drait report for over five months which they reviewed and edited, and had the ability to request further information. It was only aiter at least four additional business meetings of the Committee to discuss the draits that conclusions were formulated based upon Me1nbers’ input and the Committee’s review of the text. At all times throughout this investigation, the Minority had access to, and provided feedback on, the investigative process. This is not to say that the Minority was happy with every decision the Committee ultimately made, but they were briefed fully, had their concerns addressed either 161

_ through negotiations or amendments, and along with the Majority, they unanimously supported the Committee’s report. During the Committee’s first round of Phase II reports in the 109th Congress, the Committee held at least a dozen business meetings to discuss and receive briefings on two drafts—(l) The Use By the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress and (2) Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments. Members had an opportunity to propose additions to the reports and to draft conclusions over a period of ten months before reporting them out of Committee. During these discussions, Minority concenrs and suggestions were responded to and addressed, including requests for interviews and documents. In some instances, at the request of the Minority, information was even incorporated into the reports which was not required by the terms of reference for the inquiry in order to achieve comity among the Members of the Committee. Current Phase II Reports Unfortunately, the process by which the current Phase II reports were drafted did not conform even remotely to the Committee’s previously bipartisan process. From the time the new Democrat Majority resumed the Phase II effort last year, Minority Members and Minority staff were excluded hom the process. Several Majority staff were assigned to produce the two drafts, and numerous requests hom the Minority were denied, including requests to address scope problems, requests to conduct necessary interviews, and requests to include additional information. The Majority even denied the Minority access to the draft reports until two months after the Majority had reviewed them. We believe that working together hom the start would have precluded any significant disagreement over the scope, method, and procedure for producing these reports. As it turned out, we had very little input into these drafts and were not allowed adequate time to review and comment on them. The Minority was provided with the draft reports on January 15, 2008—reports which included stajfdrajted Committee conclusions. This was particularly disappointing to us because we believe that elected members of the Senate, not a few majority staff; should be forming the final conclusions on whether the highest officials of the Republic acted appropriately with regard to pre-war intelligence. At the first Committee meeting on Phase II, action on the drafts was postponed and no substantive discussion of the drafts occurred; from the time the drafts were circulated to Committee Members to their adoption on April 1, 2008, the Committee did not hold one business meeting where the substance of the reports was addressed. This stands in stark contrast with past Committee practice. For example, in late 2005, Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Levin, and Senator Feinstein wrote to the Senate leadership stating that during the. Committee’s Phase I review the "Com1nittee members and staff were given reasonable opportunities to review the draft sections of the report early in the process and to provide input and suggest changes to the report" (emphasis added). The letter added that the "Phase II investigation is an equally substantial task, and it is important for the Committee to approach it with the same process." Unfortunately, this inclusive process was not followed by those who earlier had prescribed it. *62

Adoption of the Reports If Chairman Rockefeller had conducted the current investigation according to the framework he insisted upon in his 2005 letter, we would have few objections to this process. Due to the little input that we were allowed, however, the Minority exercised its only option and filed over 170 amendments prior to the first business meeting scheduled to consider the Phase II reports. A number of these amendments addressed clear errors and contradictions in the draft reports that should have been addressed among staff during the production of the reports. As a consequence, those amendments that pointed out clear errors in draiting were addressed before the meeting on April 1, 2008. At that business meeting, the only one held to consider the substance of the Phase II reports, the Minority still had over 100 amendments outstanding. Additionally, five procedural motions were submitted for consideration in order to eliminate the need to work through all 100 amendments. Instead of allowing any consideration of the Vice Chairman’s motions beyond the first or any of his remaining amendments, the Chairman cut off discussion and unilaterally called for a vote on Hnal adoption of the reports. We cannot think of any time in our recollection of Committee proceedings or other Senate proceedings where there has been such a disregard for the rules, procedures, and traditions of the Senate. Especially curious to us was the fact that the iinal vote was called for even though the reports were not yet iinished. Rather, alter the vote the majority made clear its intention to iinish the reports on its own. This defies basic principles of fairness and sets a dangerous precedent. Never in the history of Phase I or Phase II were Members expected to vote on a report without the opportunity to be briefed on it several times and without having months to review and amend it, let alone be called to vote on a report that was not even finished. Rules and procedures in the Senate and its Committees provide stability and legitimacy to the body’s actions. Thomas J efferson’s A Manual of Parliamentary Practice, on the importance of rules in Congress, states: It is much more material that there be a rule to go by, than what that rule is; that there may be a unyformity of proceeding in business not subject to the caprice of the Speaker or captiousness of the members. It is very material that order, decency, and regularity be preserved in a dignyied public body. If decisions are approved according to orderly and fair proceedings, then the public is more likely to accept the results of those decisions. The rules of the Senate tend to advance the Minority’s rights and prohibit arbitrary procedures. It is ironic that the Majority would act outside the rules in order to adopt reports that accuse the Administration of distorting and mischaracterizing prewar intelligence on iraq. As the Vice Chairman’s minority views point out, these reports, crafted by the Majority, fail even to achieve their intended purpose. The Senate Intelligence Committee's unanimously approved July 2004 Phase I report makes clear that flawed intelligence—not Administration deception — was the basis for policymakers’ statements and decisions. None of the facts in these last two reports changes or negates the Committee’s unanimous conclusion four years ago. 163

_ Despite the Co1mnittee’s 2004 Report, these iinal two reports attempt to distort what the Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war in order to advance a presumed, politically advantageous argument. Yet those of us in Congress examined the same intelligence as the Bush Administration, and policymakers from the Legislature also characterized lraq as a growing and dangerous threat to the United States. ln fact, the public record is replete with examples of statements by Members of Congress making the same characterizations regarding lraq’s WMD and links to terrorism: There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next 5 years. - Chairman John Rockefeller, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, September 25, 2002. In the four years since the inspectors, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program . . . It is clear, however, that le]? unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capability to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons. — Senator Hillary Clinton, Statement on the Senate Floor, October 10, 2002. When you look at what Saddam Hussein has at his disposal, in terms of chemical, biological, and perhaps even nuclear weapons, we cannot ignore the threat that he poses to the region and the fact that he has fomented terrorism throughout his reign. — Senator Dick Durbin, CNN 's Larry King Live, “The Hunt for Bin Laden Intensifies; VVhat is to be done with John Walker?,” December 21, 2001. The President has rightly called Saddam Hussein ’s ejj‘orts to develop weapons of mass destruction a grave and gathering threat to Americans. The global community has tried but has failed to address that threat over the past decade. I have come to the inescapable conclusion that the threat posed to America by Saddam ’s weapons of mass destruction is so serious that despite the risks and we should not minimize the risks we must authorize the President to take the necessary steps to deal with that threat .... There has been some debate over how “imminent" a threat Iraq poses. I do believe Iraq poses an imminent threat. I also believe after September I I, that question is increasingly outdated. It is in the nature of these weapons that he has and the way they are targeted against civilian populations, that documented capability and demonstrated intent may be the only warning we get. To insist on further evidence could put some of our fellow Americans at risk Can we ajford to take that chance? I do not think we can. — Chairman John Rockefeller, Statement on the Senate Floor, October 10, 2002. Saddam fs existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose real threats to America today, tomorrow .... He could make these weapons available to many terrorist groups, third parties, which have contact with his government. Those groups, in turn, could bring those weapons into the United States and unleash a devastating attack 164

_ against our citizens. I fear that greatly. - Chairman John Rockefeller, Statement on the Senate Floor, October 10, 2002. Ultimately, these reports reveal a dubious agenda of vainly trying to prove the often quoted, but false, absolutely partisan, slogan, "Bush lied and people died." The Committee and the American people know full well that the intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programs was wrong, and that senior policy leaders irom both parties relied upon that incorrect intelligence to the nation’s detriment. Rather than wasting time and resources on this futile quest, the Committee should have spent, and should be spending, the full force of its oversight ensuring that the Intelligence Community does not make such egregious errors in intelligence analysis ever again. Any investigation that the Committee conducts should be done with the intention of improving the Intelligence Community and enhancing our national security. Regrettably, these reports neither improve our Intelligence Community nor enhance our national security. It is at the expense of long-standing Senate precedence and the credibility of this Committee that this futile and partisan exercise has been conducted. We believe it is vital for this Committee to return to bipartisan oversight and to depart irom such wasteful practices. Unless we do so, intelligence oversight will turn into an oxymoron. SAXBY CHAMBLISS Criiusrorinsiz S. BoND Onion G. HATCH 165

_ Am>1r1oNAL Vnzws or SENAroR Hnrcu J omni) BY Vrcn CnA1RMAN BoNn AND SENAroR BURR (U) In July, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued the Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, subsequently colloquially referred to as "Phase One" of the Committee’s investigation into intelligence failures related to the Iraq war. This report of over 500 pages, including 117 conclusions, was the most substantive investigation into a major intelligence failure since the original Church hearings and investigations that preceded the formation of the Committee in 1975. The substance of this report -- the careful parsing of the multiple intelligence failure -- is still being processed by the Intelligence Community and our oversight committees. This report was voted out of this Committee unanimously. The New York Times — not known for its sympathy to either the Republican administration or the Republican Senate leadership at the time — wrote: "The Senate report was remarkable both for the severity of its criticism and the fact that it reflected a bipartisan consensus rarely seen in Congress. " (Emphasis throughout is mine.) (U) Several months before the release of that report, the Committee concluded an agreement for subsequent investigations. These investigations — known since then as "Phase Two" — devolved from the beginning into partisan disagreement. The process, efforts and results under Phase Two — including the two reports that complete the process with this publication — failed significantly in achieving unanimous consensus. On no other matter subject to congressional oversight is unanimous consensus more of an indicator of success or failure than it is on oversight of intelligence matters. (U) The publication of these two reports — Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Ojice of Special Plans within the Ojice of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by US. Government Ojicials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information (hereafter referred to as "The Rome Meetings" and "State1nents," respectively) — came following repeated failures by the Majority to coordinate the work effort with the Minority. The decision to publish the reports was a peremptory decision by the Chairman of the Committee to terminate Minority participation in an amendment process that, while some might consider delaying by cavillation, had been well-established and productive in all previous stages of the investigation. As partisanship corrodes the value of intelligence, partisanship poisons intelligence oversight. (U) The reports, as a direct result of this unnecessarily partisan process, are inconclusive, misleading, incomplete. (For detailed substantiation of this assertion, I associate myself with the Additional Views of the Vice Chairman.) It is both sad and ironic that the impressive and historic efforts that began with the publication of Phase One in 2004 ended with a divided vote on incomplete products on April Fool’s Day, 2008. "The Rome Rep0rt" (U) An American ofricial not part of the Intelligence Community meets with a controversial Iranian in a bar. A plan is drafted on a napkin. (!) For $5 million, it is proposed *66

_ that trafiic can be jammed in Tehran. For more investment, it is insinuated that regime change can be effected. Here is the punchline to this joke: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigates this as part of its review 0n Iraq intelligence failures. - The colorful scene — not an intelligence activity, according to this report, as well as common sense — occurred during the period of the "Rome meetings," which refers to several days in December of 2001 when two Department of Defense officials met with two Iranian former officials (one a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and another associated with the "intelligence establishment of Iran," although the Committee’s report provides no further clarity on his association) to gather information on developments in Iran. The meeting was initiated by an American scholar from a conservative think tank, operating independently, and the Iranian ex atriate and Iran-Contra figure Manucher Ghorbanifar. The

(U) The meetings received prior approval by the National Security Council. The DoD participants were there based on their long-standing and substantive knowledge of Iran and Farsi. The American scholar had over 20 years of experience on the subject. (U) American citizens should be asked whether they would expect their government to respond to offers for substantive meetings on sensitive subjects — and Iran remains to this day a critical subject, and the desire for insights into Iran immediately following September ll would not, in my opinion, be considered outlandish. (U) The Committee report says: "The Committee’s review of applicable laws and regulations indicates that Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz acted within their authorities in directing DoD personnel to attend the Rome meeting. The final version of the Counterintelligence Field Activity’s report also identified no violations of law regarding the DoD contacts with Mr. Ghorbanifar as of the date their review was halted." (U) At this point, the reader may pause to ask: "What does this have to do with Iraq?” The terms of reference determining the scope of "Phase Two," articulated in a press release by the Committee on February l2, 2004, give no insight. The investigation into the Rome meetings was about Iran, not Iraq, and never appeared to me to be related to completing the significant investigation this Committee had conducted on intelligence failures leading to the Iraq war. In a partisan Committee, as this one has sadly become, the Majority has within its purview the ability to conduct any investigation it deems worthwhile. That it did not conduct the review into the "Rome meeting" separately from the Iraq review and instead insisted on conducting this investigation into this Rome meeting about Iran as part of our investigation on Iraq leaves the proponents of this approach explaining a rationale I cannot, in good faith, articulate on their behalf. (U) The conclusions reveal the nullibiety of the Committee’s effort. The first and third conclusions appear to give bureaucratic direction on how to hold meetings. NSC Deputy Hadley 167

_ is, according to the report, mildly chastised for failing to inform DCI Tenet and Deputy Secretary Armitage of the "full nature of the planned contact," although anyone reading the report would discern that the "full nature" was not able to be known until after the meetings were actually held. The third conclusion criticizes participants for withholding certain information about these meetings. Keeping ir1 mind that the Committee report itself makes clear the Committee’s lack of understanding of what intelligence collection actually is, and reminding one that the report cites no laws or authorities broken or compromised, the lack of complete clarity between government agencies regarding certain meetings does not by any stretch of the imagination reach to a level of "stove-piping" or other act of legitimate intelligence oversight concern. (U) What is particularly disturbing about the conclusions to this report is the bandying of the term "inappropriate." The role of the U.S. citizen playing interlocutor to these meetings is "inapprop1iate." The handling of information was "inapprop1iate." What does "inapprop1iate" mean in this context? What is the norm for "appropriate"? As government officials, we deal within the lines of authority, regulation, law. Actions can be deemed to be within or outside of those lines, when they are the latter they are unauthorized, in violation of regulations, illegal. No action reviewed in this report is so deemed. Too often these days, it seems that when one seeks to criticize without substance or standing, one is reduced to uttering that something is "inappropriate." In Washington today, this has come to be the cheap calumniation by the callow-headed. (U) Every exercise of this Committee should seek opportunities to expand the understanding of intelligence — for Members of Congress, at the very least and, when the investigations result ir1 public reports, for the public, which needs to be educated on the important role of intelligence in our democracy. Near the conclusion of this report we find, "There can be varying opinions on the extent to which the Rome and Paris meetings represented _ intelligence information collection." Couldn’t this report have reviewed and articulated the various definitions of "intelligence collection," as understood in law and tradecraft? Is a meeting between an American official who is not a member of the Intelligence Community and a foreigner "intelligence collection"? (Hint: It is not.) On another point, the CIA has, through good and bad experience, developed a formal method for labeling foreign individuals "fabricators" and "information peddlers." What is the formal procedure for doing so? What are the implications, and are there regulations, for policymakers for subsequently dealing with individuals so labeled by the Intelligence Community? In the murky world of betrayed loyalties and stolen secrets, are "fabricators" and "information peddlers" ever again worthwhile sources? Finally, what are the guidelines for CIA officers, particularly serving in Stations overseas, for obtaining information on activities of American citizens, particularly U.S. government officials? Is it ever the norm for officers to seek information on U.S. policymakers from liaison services? All of these questions, in my opinion, begged to be addressed by the material covered in this report. (U) Instead, the Committee reviewed hundreds of pages of testimony and documents on the bureaucratic results of these meetings. Ultimately, the Rome meetings went nowhere. There was no policy action — certainly no covert action — initiated or even contemplated by government officials. It was a classic Washington episode: Meetings were held, no action was taken — but an 168

_ investigation was conducted. This was an investigation which, like the meetings of officials not in the Intelligence Community not dealing with Iraq, went nowhere. "Statements” (U) There continues to be debate over whether the Committee should investigate the use of ir1telligence by policymakers advocating war in Iraq. It is questionable that, in this particular exercise, the Committee excluded for consideration Congress, which exercised its constitutional policy making authority when it voted on the joir1t resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq in October of 2002. It is profoundly disappointing that, ir1 its illogical haste to terminate "Phase Two," the Committee’s majority made no effort to allow those in the executive it cites in this iinal report to explain how they weighed ir1telligence in the context of policy deliberation. By failing to do so, the Committee once again failed to illuminate the role the use of ir1telligence plays in the policy making process. (U) Seventy-seven Members of the United States Senate voted in favor of HJ. Res. 114, the joint resolution authorizir1g the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq. I don’t know how many read the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. Those of us on the Committee were privy to hearings as well as intelligence products. Five Members of the Committee at that time (all Democrats) voted against the resolution, 12 Members voted in favor. Of the 12 Members of the current Committee present then, 9 voted in favor, 3 against (all Democrats). Of the whole Senate, one Republican voted against, 30 Democratic senators, including a current presidential contender, voted in favor of the resolution authorizing the use force against Iraq. (U) Many Members of Congress have had reason to revisit their votes, and the reasons have been varied. What is interestir1g to note is how very few have hung their votes completely on how they understood the intelligence at the time. Many Members did not avail themselves of the intelligence (others claim to have relied on their staffs’ rendering of the National Intelligence Estimate). How many policymakers relied completely on intelligence to make their policy determination? I would argue none, because if a policymaker did rely solely on ir1telligence, they would be forfeiting the wider considerations prerequisite to being a policymaker. This applies, I have no doubt, to policymakers ir1 the Administration. And this is why it is a failure of analysis, let alone of fairness, that the Committee investigation on this particular report did not even attempt to solicit &om Administration officials cited in the report their views on how they weighed intelligence ir1 the context of their deliberations. (U) The report’s conclusions articulate what is already well-known for those of us who have labored through document review of "Phase One" and have heard — originally and repeatedly — the statements of Administration officials. On matters of capability, the report concludes that statements by Administration officials were substantiated by the intelligence on questions of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction in general. (The report notes that some statements on nuclear capability did not reflect disagreement within the IC, some on weapons of mass destruction did not reflect IC caveats known at the time, and that the Secretary of Defense’s statement on underground Wl\/DZ) facilities’ vulnerability to airstrikes was not supported by intelligence.) On statements by Administration officials on 169

_ Iraq’s link to terror groups other than Al-Qa’ida, the statements were substantiated by the intelligence, as were statements on Zarqawi ’s presence in Iraq, and statements that Iraq and Al- Qa ’ida had had contacts. (The report notes, however, that "Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and Al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided Al-Qa’ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence." I emphasize the verb "suggesting," noting officials never "asserted" such a partnership.) Statements on Saddam’s intentions — i.e., speculation on his future actions — had no intelligence support, and policy makers appear to me to be clear in their public statements that such speculation — while certainly legitimate, given the pollyannish lack of imagination we had on the Al-Qa’ida threat prior to 9/ 1 1 — was never an established "known," but that policymakers would never again commit the absence of imagination that had allowed Al-Qa’ida to strike us unprepared. (U) That "Phase One" concluded that this consensus between statements and intelligence was not the result of pressure from officials is relevant2°9. That the overall gist of this report is that Administration officials’ statements were supported by intelligence assessments comes as no relief, considering how utterly bad the underlying intelligence was. (U) There is, in my opinion, no excusing the spectacularly bad intelligence prepared by the IC in the rim-up to the war in Iraq, particularly on the question of weapons of mass destruction. However, the IC needs to be defended in one critical aspect: bad intelligence cannot be used wholly as the excuse for the decision to go to war. To do so would be to not only blur, but to eliminate, the line between policy-making and intelligence. To eliminate that line is to do no less than corrode a fundamental pillar of a democratic society. (U) Intelligence informs policy. It does not dictate policy. The policymaker who ignores the contribution of intelligence denies a potentially valuable source of analysis on difficult subjects about which the policy maker requires the widest breadth of insight. The intelligence analyst who writes analysis without subjecting it to competitive hypothesis testing fails the policymaker. The policy maker who relies solely on intelligence should be dismissed, for they do not grasp the most fundamental truth of intelligence — that it is an attempt to penetrate denied knowledge and will almost always be incomplete. The intelligence professional who seeks to make policy should also be dismissed, for the nature of intelligence — the need to keep and steal secrets, to entice foreigners to betray their governments, and act covertly on behalf of our government — must be kept distinct from the policy process in order for a democratic society to function. By keeping that distinction clear, the different roles of policymakers and intelligence professionals are maintained. Intelligence professionals are responsible for their failures in intelligence collection, analysis, counter-intelligence and covert action. Policymakers must also bear the burden of their mistakes, an entirely different order of mistakes. It is a pity this report fails to illuminate this distinction. 209 . Conclusion 83: “The Committee did not find any evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities? Conclusion 102: "The Comnrittee found that none of the analysts or other people interviewed by the Committee said that they were pressured to change their conclusions related to Iraq’s links to terrorism." 170

ORRIN G. HATCH CHRISTOPHER S. BOND RICHARD BURR 171

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Ari Fleischer Dan Bartlett ok Novak column Mission to Niger Novak misspoke the first time we talked. Rove couldn't remember Rove second source July 14th article. What did Rove tell Bush? Henry Waxman, security breaches in Plame case with Sen. Byron Dorgon (D-N.D.) Cheney's stickin it to the CIA. Novak word operative was journalistic miscue, skeptical. used Valerie Plame and Valerie Wilson Timothy Phelps New York Times INR State Department memo circulated on Bush Africa trip Time A war on Wilson by Cooper Massimo Calabresi and John Dickerson. Quote government officials Wilson's wife is a CIA official who monitors the proliferation of WMD involved in decision to send Wilson to Niger. David Corn of the Nation tells Wilson that leak is a crime. Rove said "I didn't know her name" Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball articles. Andrea Mitchel interview distorted by NBC, to push Wilson smear. Chris Mathews tells Wilson that Karl Rove considered Plame 'fair game'. Consider Paul O'Neill, Richard Clarke, Gen. Zinni, Gen Shinseki. Stephen Hadley offers to resign on '16 words' Bush refuses resignation. Newsday reports Plame was undercover until Novak outed her. CIA files crime report to DOJ. Bush refuses Rice resignation. Letter to John Conyers. Two top Whitehouse officials disclosed CIA identity. to at least six Washington journalists. New York Times Douglas Jehl, study by the Defense Intelligence Agency Chalabi intelligence was of little or no value. William Bowles. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez notified Andrew CArd of DOJ leak investigation at 8:00 PM, but waited 12 hours (next day) preserve documents. Shredding party? Gonzalez was Whitehouse Council, Ashcroft was attorney general. National Review, Clifford May. Phone logs, emails and Rep. Thomas M. Davis II. Bush joked about leaks with African news session. Whitehouse surrendered thousands of emails, call logs, and calendars. Notes say Wilson was Kerry supporter, advisor. Oficials to sign waivers to overcome reporter obstacles to revealing sources. Pincus Novak said 'no partisan gunslinger' comment and "you know about it too". Was leak retaliation. Bush said 'find out the truth'. Scott McClellan quote "those individuals assured me they were not involved in this. And that's where it stands" Bush: leaker may never be found'. Bush threatened to withhold docs under executive privilege. McClellan spoke about difference between unauthorized disclosure and 'setting the facts straight'. Independent Media TV, Jason Leopold. Mike Allen and Dana Priest: "Clearly, it was meant purely and simply for revenge". Rove Newsweek 'far game' Chris Mathews, MSNBC. Hardball. Investigators are studying Whitehouse reaction to Wilson's first public attack on Bush's case about Iraq. Final deadline. Wall Street Journal article about Bureau of Intelligence Research. John J. Kokal, Near East and South Asia division found dead. Ashcroft briefings stopped. Fitzgerald appointed. Simone Ledeen, daughter of Michael Ledeen goes to Bahgdad, CPA, Coalition Provisional Authority, also brat pack, yellowcake. James Comey is godfather. Aides sign waivers to journalistic privilege. Staff meet informally about immunity. Mary matalin testifies. Pelosi Daschele, Lieberman, Rockefeller ask for GAO investigation of covert status. Jim Loebe knew. Cathie Martin (Cheney aid) interviewed, near combat atmosphere. Grand Jury subpoenas Air Force One phone logs. What was whitehouse PR strategy? Bush outside attorney James Sharp & Associates, Ken Starr removed attorney-client privilege for government lawyers in Clinton smear campaign. Glen Kessler discuss conversations. Bush interviewed by Fitzgerald, Sharp present. Kerry dumps Sandy Berger and Wilson from campaign. Federal Judge Thomas F. Hogan hold Time magazine report Mathew Cooper in contempt of cout and orders him jailed for refusing to reveal source of Plame leak. appeal goes to Supreme Court. politics of truth, joe wilson. Judith miller receives subpoena. powell testified. cooper testified about libby conversations. bush and dan rather flap on military service in the news. bar lowered to committed a crime. LA times doyle mcmanus "if rove is source #2, who is source #1. roy kriger CIA agent fired because he spoke of informant saying iraq' uranium enrichment program dead. Conyers and Slaughter call for investigation of Jeff Gannon, James D. Guckert, as GOP fake journalist plant at whitehouse briefings. free republic. Federal Judge rober sweet ruled miller not required to reveal. in 2001 ARAMCO Cheney CEO signed $140 million contract. Boston Globe. Brewster Jennings & Associates, BinLaden group, Khalid bin Mahfouz, BCCI connections. Vincent Cannistraro said forged niger yellowcake docs were made up in the U.S. mentioned Michael ledeen. see downing street memo. downingstreetmemo.com. Supreme court refuses miller cooper appeal. search jailhouse crock and miller as fake martyr, obstructing justice for personal gain. Did rove break same law as martha stewart? perjury. see Sen Lautenberg calendar. Miller is in Alexandria Detention Center. Sen. Pat Roberts, Chairman of Senate Intelligence Committee, will conduct hearings. What is the Federal Tort Claim Act FTCA. Who is Karen Johnson? ask Karl Rove and Business Council, Infrastructure Solutions. George Tennet, John McMclaughlin, Bill Harlow and the stranger who approached Novak. Why did whitehouse shift blame to the CIA for '16 words' in SOTU, State of the Union address speech. Bolton neglected to tell congress about niger yellowcake. Wilson's op-ed piece published. Oliver North and John Poindexter convictions overturned. Novak challenges Harlow warning. Scooter Libby and Judith Miller convesations hot. see columbia jouranlism review and vanity fair, wayne madsen report on asher karni nuclear arms smuggler and district judge ricardo urbina on nuclear triggers. ashcroft recused himself. what is hollinger international, daved radler, lord conrad a. black, richart burt boy-toy. What does miller have to do with tip-off of holy land foundation, global relief foundation and benevolence international foundation.  AIPAC officials: Howard Kohr, Richard Fishman, Renee Rothstein, Raphael Danziger.  New Yorker, Seymour Hersch story on Bush plans to launch nuclear attack on Iran summer of 2005.  Cheney warns of Israeli preemptive strike on Iran.  Rosen's lawyer: Abbe Lowell.  Perle (Defense Policy Board)gives speech at AIPAC conference, calls for american military action against iran.  Iran has Shihab III intermediate range missile.  Franklin pleads innocent, Judje T.S. Ellis III.  rove said he was discouraging a reporter from writing a false story based on a false premise.  Frontpage mag interiviews Kenneth Timmerman.  Naor Gilon of Israeli embassy involved.  Jack Abramoff indicted and Texans for a Republican Majority.  John N. Nassikas III, spy nest exposed. and A.Q. Kahn.  David Kelly is confidant of Judith Miller and Pederson and Olivia Bosch at Royal Institute of international affairs.  Judge Ricardo Urbina and what did Thomas Dine confirm.  Patrick Dorton is AIPAC spokesperson.  Harold Rhode is source of plame leak and Jerry Hauer and cofer black.  lawmakers urged to support Iran Freedom and Support act and one of unnamed reporters is Glenn Kessler by David Ignatius.  USGO-1 is Kenneth Pollack and Bob Dole is baffled.  Iran 5 years away from nuclear weapons.  Miller and Zacarias Moussaoui together?  Michael Ledeen is Rove's brain.  Ted Olson was Pollard's defense attorney. July 14th, 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 August September October November December 2003 2004 2001

That gathering involved some of the most powerful names in the Jewish lobby in America, starting with Edgar Bronfman, the chairman of the World Jewish Congress. Others included: Charles Bronfman, Edgar's brother and a top executive of the family's flagship Seagrams Corp.; Leslie Wexler of Limited, Inc.; Charles Schusterman, chairman of Samson Investment Co. of Tulsa, Oklahoma; Harvey "Bud" Meyerhoff, a fabulously wealthy and powerful Baltimore real estate magnate; Laurence Tisch, chairman of Loews Corp.; Max Fisher, the Detroit oil magnate and Republican Party powerhouse; bagel magnate Max Lender; and Leonard Abramson, the founder of U.S. Healthcare

presents the 13 most corrupt members of Congress: Rep. Roy Blunt (R-MO) -- Rep. Randy Cunningham (R-CA)-- Rep. Tom Feeney(R-FL)-- Rep. William Jefferson (D-LA)-- Rep. Marilyn Musgrave (R-CO)-- Rep. Bob Ney (R-OH)-- Rep. Richard Pombo (R-CA)-- Rep. Rick Renzi (R-AZ)-- Rep. Charles Taylor (R-NC)-- Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA)-- Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA)-- Senator Bill Frist (R-TN)-- Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT) 

Aug 31, 05 Twenty Things We Know, Independent TV USGO-1 Identified Middle East analyst: Kenneth Pollack, National Security Council, Clinton administration. Sept 3, 05 Bob Dole (baffled by Miller incarceration) visited Miller in jail, NYTimes copy. Smokescreen on passing federal shield laws that would allow reporters to protect their souces. Sept 5, 05 Rocky Mountain News, "Weapons of Mass Delusion" Sept 6, 05 U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis III set this Sept 6 trial date for Larry Franklin, Sept 6, 05 IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Strategic Dossier', entitled Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes - A Net Assessment. Iran 5 years away from a nuclear weapon. Why go to the stake to defend a spin doctor planting bile? Guardian Unlimited todo: Antiwar, In These Times, Is Iran Next? Counterpunch Zvi Bar'el, Chalabi, Feith and Israel, Theater of the Absurd Sept 8, 05 Yahoo News Plamegate will rise up in a few weeks. Is she bargaining?....what about possible criminal contempt charges? Huffington Post Sept 10, 05 The Alexandria facility where Miller is, also housed Zacarias Moussaoui..(just one floor above Miller's cell) The gas station tapes of the attack on the Pentagon on 9/11 are 'classified' because of his trial. They would reveal the real truth about what aircraft slammed into the Pentagon that day. see NewsFollowUp.com/flight77 missile? National Press Club, honors Judith Miller see Franklingate links page see Pakistan Daily Times on Iran latest news...and Michael Ledeen, Rove's brain, AEI, prominent proponent of a violent regime change in Iran. Ledeen has close ties to all Plamegate players. and see Ledeen's ties to the Niger forged docs that led to Iraq War. It's all one story. Lies of Ommision Progress Sept 11, 05 Peace Page, 9/11 poem by Kristy we should share the shame search terms: Texas Secretary of State, Roger Williams, Bush campaign, Karl Rove, Elizabeth Reyes. Sept 12, 05 Iran Mania News One week to U.N. meetings on Iran. Cooperative Research, neocon run-up to war, timeline see Ted Olson links to Jonathan Pollard, Pentagon, Perle, Lehman, Feith.... Ted Olson's wife 'died' on Flight 77, 9/11? Sept 14, 05 New 'Amdocs' page, information on Israeli owned telephone billing co. and connections to 9/11, AIPAC, neocons, Iraq war, Iran war mongering. Against Bombing old timeline, not updated, but some interesting links, stories DNC Democratic National Committee, Plamegate Rovegate, Treasongate, Leakgate page Crosswalk, conservative publication, Democrats keep focus on Plamegate Sept 15, 05 Bush / Rice failing in Iran war mongering efforts. India, China and Russia nix U.S. and EU effort to get a majority of IAEA board to refer Iran to UN Security Council for sanctions. India says the plan will backfire. search:Ahmadinejad. NYT copy David Fiderer on the "Abort the Plame Investigation Act" or H.R. 581. Feb 05. Bob Dole and the Republicans smokescreen tactics are difficult to see ...will they work? Framing the issue around source id privilege keeps the buzz off what Miller is hiding...just what they want. also see CSM Holt wants docs, Fitzgerald says will harm investigation see SpinWatch on indictment Sept 16, 05 Asia Times review of Bush whitewash book..by Craig Whitney. DOJ won't turn over docs to Congress and While You Were atching Katrina House Republicans derail probes of Plame affair Village Voice Sept 17, 05 Some Miller elite visitors: Bob Dole, John Bolton, Tom Brokaw, Gonzalo Marroquin, Sept 18, 05 Washington Report on Middle East Affairs old but relevant story, Israeli spies in America. Amdocs, Report of Israeli Eavesdropping on White House Telephones Gets Varying Media Treatment Sept 19, 05 This article climbing in the search engines: Frontpage Mag calls Plamegate non-event, "endless spider-web of lies by Joe Wilson", "The media has gone out of its way to question the credibility of Karl Rove", "non-leak of Plame's non-secret identity',....and on...and on. and NFU-Franklingate research on Amdocs, 9/11, art students, Israeli spies Sept 20, 05 Yahoo article: What Show Did You Watch During the War Daddy? Iraq War, lost and now a civil war....north to south, oil. Sept 21, 05 Jurist article: David Radler, former President and COO of Hollinger International and former publisher of the Chicago Sun-Times, will plead guilty to fraud charges. Robert Novak is Sun-Times columnist. Aljazeera "Is it possible that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is assisting Israel in betraying American spy networks in Iran in return for the Iranians to offer the release of captured Israeli spies?" AEI search on Jonathan Pollard results in "Web of Conspiracies" book by Michael Rubin. search Kwiatkowski, OSP, Mondale. Sept 23, 05 Register: More on Amdocs corporate espionage. And The Age Police question Amdocs exec...at least 19 arrested for infiltrating competitors computers. World Net Daily, Stephen Hadley mentioned, prior knowledge of 911 information on Atta in Rep. Weldon (Republican) Book "Countdown to Terror" Shaffer stopped from testifying about Able Danger data mining. Gonzales will name D. Kyle Sampson as chief of staff (DOJ) and in related article KerrySharesOurValues on D. Kyle Sampson, Raul Yanes ..and (Ted Ullyot) All three have been lawyers in the White House counsel's office under Gonzales. ... Ullyot (Ullyot stepped down) and Yanes were the coordinators of the White House's response to the investigation into the leak of CIA operative Valerie Plame's identity. Gonzales and Ashcroft will recuse, but will these three also? Sampson, Ullyot and Yanes have represented tobacco companies. search Kirkland & Ellis or (Tobacco.org), Kenneth Starr. tobacco thread articles / timeline Iraqwar.org on Israeli spying and Lowell Sun Online The invasion of Iraq was the “greatest strategic disaster in United States history,” a retired Army general said yesterday, strengthening an effort in Congress to force an American withdrawal beginning next year. Retired Army Lt. Gen. William Odom, a Vietnam veteran, said the invasion of Iraq alienated America's Middle East allies, making it harder to prosecute a war against terrorists Imam Intikab Habib's....was swept out of his FDNY appointment....Over the weekend, the message was pounded in by the New York and other media that those who question the Official Conspiracy Theory.... 911Truth.org Sept 25, 05 search internet: Kurzberg Shmuel Ellner Marmari Amdocs for supporting evidence on Amdocs links to 9/11 WTC or search amdocs fema israel or amdocs foxnews and Amdocs page Sept 26, 05 New Franklingate / DOJ selected press releases page Sept 27, 05 Shalom Center, article from 2004: "Neo-Cons, AIPAC, Israel, & Alleged Spying " Oct 28, 05 The federal grand jury delving into the matter expires Oct. 28. .. prosecutors could pursue a criminal contempt of court charge against Miller. Sept 28, 05 Conk Websearch, Encyclopedia entry on AIPAC, supporters, critics and quotations. Fatma Nevin Vargun, is a Kurdish women's rights activist. Libby poem in a letter to Miller in jail: "You went into jail in the summer. It is fall now. You will have stories to cover -- Iraqi elections and suicide bombers, biological threats and the Iranian nuclear program. Out West, where you vacation, the aspens will already be turning. They turn in clusters, because their roots connect them. Come back to work -- and life. Until then, you will remain in my thoughts and prayers -- With admiration, Scooter Libby." from Salon.com Sept 29, 05 Foxnews "U.K.: Military Action against Iran, 'Inconceivable'. and "On Saturday, the International Atomic Energy Agency passed a resolution putting Iran on the verge of referral to the U.N. Security Council unless Tehran eases suspicions about its nuclear activities" "(Fitzgerald) was ready to extend her imprisonment for up to 18 months. ...on September 29, she walked out of prison ready to talk, having secured a personal waiver of confidentiality from her own source, Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the vice president's chief of staff." Guardian Sept 30, 05 Miller testified before the grand jury about two conversations with Libby in July 2003 Red Nova "Quality of Iran's Nuclear Fuel Sheds Doubt on Weapons Capabilities" Daily Star "Britain rules out military action against Iran over nuclear program Tehran to vote on scaling back cooperation with IAEA Forward Steven Rosen (AIPAC) seeking dismissal on the grounds that the U.S. government has refused to disclose key evidence. Franklin will plead guilty, Harretz ....Miller released, will testify, and Red Nova coverage Oct 1, 05 Miller testified,...Fitzgerald agreed to limit his questioning to Libby contacts regarding Plame. Miller was his final witness...the interview lasted 4 hours. Libby's attorney Joseph Tate puzzled at a second request for a release...it had been a year since they believe they gave her a waiver. Oct 2, 05 Net search terms: Judith Miller, Stephen Hadley, Able Danger, missing chart Oct 3, 05 Weldon's Able Danger hearings will backfire on GOP "...both Miller and Libby collaborated for months on manufacturing the bogus WMD hoax.." Ahmed Amr, Palestine Chronicle (copy), and Nile Media Oct 4, 05 Miller still trying to limit issue to her conversations with Libby? NY Times copy Oct 5, 05 Libby Lawyer says Miller in jail on her own accord, was given waiver a year ago Washington Post see changes to Franklingate AIPAC page World Peace Herald: Able Danger report expected soon. Oct 6, 05 San Francisco Chronicle, Jon Carrol, "Everyone pretty much knows that the Judith Miller story doesn't add up, except for her employers at the New York Times" Indictments Any time? Editor & Publisher Oct 7, 05 Live Journal "U.S. Preparing for a Strike on Iran.....Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector to Iraq .......warned in apocalyptic terms in London"

 

CIA Threats of Federal Prosecution Delay 9/11 Documentary,

9/11: Press for Truth.

CIA Threats of Federal Prosecution Delay 9/11 Documentary    ...   Wednesday, 14 September 2011, 12:30 pm Press Release: Kyle Hence Recent threats by the CIA prompt two freelance journalists to delay an investigative podcast naming CIA analysts complicit in obstruction of key pre-9/11 intelligence. The podcast will present revelations from former top US government personnel, including Richard Clarke, Pasquale D’Amuro, Bob Baer, and Mark Rossini, who echo concerns of former 9/11 Commission Chair Thomas Kean. ...   Austin, Texas (FF4) September 12, 2011 – On Thursday, the CIA threatened the journalists behind Who Is Rich Blee? with possible federal prosecution if their investigative podcast reveals the names of two CIA analysts at the center of a pattern of obstruction and mishandling of intelligence that many feel would have stopped the 9/11 attacks.    ...   Like FBI agent Ali Soufan and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer before them, the podcast team, including John Duffy and Ray Nowosielski, are being subjected to intimidation and censorship by government officials over blowing the whistle on the true story surrounding two alleged 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar.    ...   The podcast originally scheduled for September 11th release presents a narrative of how three CIA analysts working under Richard Blee, the long unknown former head of CIA’s Bin Laden Station, deliberately misled their colleagues and withheld key intelligence from FBI and the White House regarding the presence of two known Al-Qaeda operatives in the U.S.    ...   Four government investigations into CIA handling of pre-911 intelligence included personal details of the two CIA analysts and their actions. Nowosielski and Duffy deduced the identities of the two as yet unnamed CIA employees from internet research based on details provided from these and other open sources. When the producers used their full names in interviews, interviewees offered no correction. The CIA response provided the final confirmation.    ...    In project updates posted at SecrecyKills.com the producers announced the delay of the podcast and posted background of a complicated case that involves dozens of violations of protocol, intimidation, and incidents of obstruction by the CIA, with the two yet named CIA analysts at the center of many of them.    ...   Author and expert on the subject, Kevin Fenton, documents 35 such incidents between January 2000 and September 11th in his book, Disconnecting the Dots: How 9/11 Was Allowed to Happen.    ...    Pulitzer-prize winner Lawrence Wright, interviewed for the podcast, told producers the actions of one of the unnamed CIA analysts still employed at CIA amounts to obstruction of justice in the FBI’s criminal investigation of the deaths of 17 seaman aboard the USS Cole.    ...   The producers are not the first subject to government censorship over this case. Last month The New York Times reported on CIA efforts to censor an autobiography by Ali Soufan, a front-line FBI counter-terrorism special agent. Prior to 9/11, Soufan was interested in Mihdhar and Hazmi because of links to the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen. The CIA censored references to a passport photo of Mihdhar the CIA had withheld from Soufan, despite three written requests.    ...   Scott Shane of the New York Times reports today that, "Mr. Soufan accuses C.I.A. officials of deliberately withholding crucial documents and photographs of Qaeda operatives from the F.B.I. before Sept. 11, 2001, despite three written requests, and then later lying about it to the 9/11 Commission."    ...   Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer, interviewed for the podcast, was himself intimidated, demoted and smeared by the Pentagon after he came forward to the 9/11 Commission with details of how, on three occasions, unnamed DoD officials prevented his Able Danger operation from meeting with the FBI prior the attacks.    ...    In 2000 the Able Danger data-mining program placed Mohammed Atta in a Brooklyn terrorist cell but had also placed Hazmi and Mihdhar in a San Diego cell, the epicenter of intrigue around Alec Station’s Rich Blee, Tom Wilshere and the two as yet unnamed subordinates who themselves repeatedly withheld intelligence from the FBI. Though Shaffer was interviewed by 9/11 Commission’s Director Philip Zelikow and staffer Dieter Snell, the Commission left any mention of Able Danger from its final report.    ...    In the planned podcast, 9/11 Commission Chair Tom Kean is asked about a scant footnote to Chapter 6 of the 9/11 Report referring to an intelligence cable, seen by 50 at the CIA, but prevented from reaching the FBI. For Kean the incident was not a case of bungling or intel ‘stovepiping’: “Oh, it wasn’t careless oversight. It was purposeful. No question about that in mind. It was purposeful.”    ...   Whereas Kean explains it as a penchant for secrecy, Richard Clarke, the former head of counter-terrorism at the Bush White House, goes farther suggesting malfeasance and the possibility of illegal CIA-led domestic spying activity. Comments by Clarke released in a video in August led to a formal statement from George Tenet, Cofer Black and Richard Blee, and a response from the producers.    ...   “This was perhaps the closest U.S. intelligence got to foiling the 9/11 plot,” explains Nowosielski, “but instead of stopping the attack, the CIA stopped intel on two high-value targets from getting to the right people, repeatedly. And still the CIA protects the individuals responsible by intimidating those who simply want to know the truth behind a shocking and possibly criminal pattern of obstruction”    ...   In an email Thursday the CIA warned Nowosielski he could be subject to prosecution under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, a law intended to apply to government employees who violate their security clearance and never used to convict journalists.    ...   The producer’s online response: “The Society of Professional Journalists' code of ethics states that ‘journalists should be free of obligation to any interest other than the public's right to know’ and should ‘be vigilant and courageous about holding those with power accountable.’ The day that journalists' exposés of wrongdoing within government agencies require the approval of those government agencies before release, that is the day that transparency and accountability are lost.”    ...   John Duffy and Ray Nowosielski, both graduates of Chicago’s Columbia College Film School, produced the critically acclaimed 2006 documentary "9/11: Press for Truth."

Ari Fleischer Dan Bartlett ok Novak column Mission to Niger Novak misspoke the first time we talked. Rove couldn't remember Rove second source July 14th article. What did Rove tell Bush? Henry Waxman, security breaches in Plame case with Sen. Byron Dorgon (D-N.D.) Cheney's stickin it to the CIA. Novak word operative was journalistic miscue, skeptical. used Valerie Plame and Valerie Wilson Timothy Phelps New York Times INR State Department memo circulated on Bush Africa trip Time A war on Wilson by Cooper Massimo Calabresi and John Dickerson. Quote government officials Wilson's wife is a CIA official who monitors the proliferation of WMD involved in decision to send Wilson to Niger. David Corn of the Nation tells Wilson that leak is a crime. Rove said "I didn't know her name" Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball articles. Andrea Mitchel interview distorted by NBC, to push Wilson smear. Chris Mathews tells Wilson that Karl Rove considered Plame 'fair game'. Consider Paul O'Neill, Richard Clarke, Gen. Zinni, Gen Shinseki. Stephen Hadley offers to resign on '16 words' Bush refuses resignation. Newsday reports Plame was undercover until Novak outed her. CIA files crime report to DOJ. Bush refuses Rice resignation. Letter to John Conyers. Two top Whitehouse officials disclosed CIA identity. to at least six Washington journalists. New York Times Douglas Jehl, study by the Defense Intelligence Agency Chalabi intelligence was of little or no value. William Bowles. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez notified Andrew CArd of DOJ leak investigation at 8:00 PM, but waited 12 hours (next day) preserve documents. Shredding party? Gonzalez was Whitehouse Council, Ashcroft was attorney general. National Review, Clifford May. Phone logs, emails and Rep. Thomas M. Davis II. Bush joked about leaks with African news session. Whitehouse surrendered thousands of emails, call logs, and calendars. Notes say Wilson was Kerry supporter, advisor. Oficials to sign waivers to overcome reporter obstacles to revealing sources. Pincus Novak said 'no partisan gunslinger' comment and "you know about it too". Was leak retaliation. Bush said 'find out the truth'. Scott McClellan quote "those individuals assured me they were not involved in this. And that's where it stands" Bush: leaker may never be found'. Bush threatened to withhold docs under executive privilege. McClellan spoke about difference between unauthorized disclosure and 'setting the facts straight'. Independent Media TV, Jason Leopold. Mike Allen and Dana Priest: "Clearly, it was meant purely and simply for revenge". Rove Newsweek 'far game' Chris Mathews, MSNBC. Hardball. Investigators are studying Whitehouse reaction to Wilson's first public attack on Bush's case about Iraq. Final deadline. Wall Street Journal article about Bureau of Intelligence Research. John J. Kokal, Near East and South Asia division found dead. Ashcroft briefings stopped. Fitzgerald appointed. Simone Ledeen, daughter of Michael Ledeen goes to Bahgdad, CPA, Coalition Provisional Authority, also brat pack, yellowcake. James Comey is godfather. Aides sign waivers to journalistic privilege. Staff meet informally about immunity. Mary matalin testifies. Pelosi Daschele, Lieberman, Rockefeller ask for GAO investigation of covert status. Jim Loebe knew. Cathie Martin (Cheney aid) interviewed, near combat atmosphere. Grand Jury subpoenas Air Force One phone logs. What was whitehouse PR strategy? Bush outside attorney James Sharp & Associates, Ken Starr removed attorney-client privilege for government lawyers in Clinton smear campaign. Glen Kessler discuss conversations. Bush interviewed by Fitzgerald, Sharp present. Kerry dumps Sandy Berger and Wilson from campaign. Federal Judge Thomas F. Hogan hold Time magazine report Mathew Cooper in contempt of cout and orders him jailed for refusing to reveal source of Plame leak. appeal goes to Supreme Court. politics of truth, joe wilson. Judith miller receives subpoena. powell testified. cooper testified about libby conversations. bush and dan rather flap on military service in the news. bar lowered to committed a crime. LA times doyle mcmanus "if rove is source #2, who is source #1. roy kriger CIA agent fired because he spoke of informant saying iraq' uranium enrichment program dead. Conyers and Slaughter call for investigation of Jeff Gannon, James D. Guckert, as GOP fake journalist plant at whitehouse briefings. free republic. Federal Judge rober sweet ruled miller not required to reveal. in 2001 ARAMCO Cheney CEO signed $140 million contract. Boston Globe. Brewster Jennings & Associates, BinLaden group, Khalid bin Mahfouz, BCCI connections. Vincent Cannistraro said forged niger yellowcake docs were made up in the U.S. mentioned Michael ledeen. see downing street memo. downingstreetmemo.com. Supreme court refuses miller cooper appeal. search jailhouse crock and miller as fake martyr, obstructing justice for personal gain. Did rove break same law as martha stewart? perjury. see Sen Lautenberg calendar. Miller is in Alexandria Detention Center. Sen. Pat Roberts, Chairman of Senate Intelligence Committee, will conduct hearings. What is the Federal Tort Claim Act FTCA. Who is Karen Johnson? ask Karl Rove and Business Council, Infrastructure Solutions. George Tennet, John McMclaughlin, Bill Harlow and the stranger who approached Novak. Why did whitehouse shift blame to the CIA for '16 words' in SOTU, State of the Union address speech. Bolton neglected to tell congress about niger yellowcake. Wilson's op-ed piece published. Oliver North and John Poindexter convictions overturned. Novak challenges Harlow warning. Scooter Libby and Judith Miller convesations hot. see columbia jouranlism review and vanity fair, wayne madsen report on asher karni nuclear arms smuggler and district judge ricardo urbina on nuclear triggers. ashcroft recused himself. what is hollinger international, daved radler, lord conrad a. black, richart burt boy-toy. What does miller have to do with tip-off of holy land foundation, global relief foundation and benevolence international foundation.  AIPAC officials: Howard Kohr, Richard Fishman, Renee Rothstein, Raphael Danziger.  New Yorker, Seymour Hersch story on Bush plans to launch nuclear attack on Iran summer of 2005.  Cheney warns of Israeli preemptive strike on Iran.  Rosen's lawyer: Abbe Lowell.  Perle (Defense Policy Board)gives speech at AIPAC conference, calls for american military action against iran.  Iran has Shihab III intermediate range missile.  Franklin pleads innocent, Judje T.S. Ellis III.  rove said he was discouraging a reporter from writing a false story based on a false premise.  Frontpage mag interiviews Kenneth Timmerman.  Naor Gilon of Israeli embassy involved.  Jack Abramoff indicted and Texans for a Republican Majority.  John N. Nassikas III, spy nest exposed. and A.Q. Kahn.  David Kelly is confidant of Judith Miller and Pederson and Olivia Bosch at Royal Institute of international affairs.  Judge Ricardo Urbina and what did Thomas Dine confirm.  Patrick Dorton is AIPAC spokesperson.  Harold Rhode is source of plame leak and Jerry Hauer and cofer black.  lawmakers urged to support Iran Freedom and Support act and one of unnamed reporters is Glenn Kessler by David Ignatius.  USGO-1 is Kenneth Pollack and Bob Dole is baffled.  Iran 5 years away from nuclear weapons.  Miller and Zacarias Moussaoui together?  Michael Ledeen is Rove's brain.  Ted Olson was Pollard's defense attorney. July 14th, 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 August September October November December 2003 2004 2001

That gathering involved some of the most powerful names in the Jewish lobby in America, starting with Edgar Bronfman, the chairman of the World Jewish Congress. Others included: Charles Bronfman, Edgar's brother and a top executive of the family's flagship Seagrams Corp.; Leslie Wexler of Limited, Inc.; Charles Schusterman, chairman of Samson Investment Co. of Tulsa, Oklahoma; Harvey "Bud" Meyerhoff, a fabulously wealthy and powerful Baltimore real estate magnate; Laurence Tisch, chairman of Loews Corp.; Max Fisher, the Detroit oil magnate and Republican Party powerhouse; bagel magnate Max Lender; and Leonard Abramson, the founder of U.S. Healthcare

presents the 13 most corrupt members of Congress: Rep. Roy Blunt (R-MO) -- Rep. Randy Cunningham (R-CA)-- Rep. Tom Feeney(R-FL)-- Rep. William Jefferson (D-LA)-- Rep. Marilyn Musgrave (R-CO)-- Rep. Bob Ney (R-OH)-- Rep. Richard Pombo (R-CA)-- Rep. Rick Renzi (R-AZ)-- Rep. Charles Taylor (R-NC)-- Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA)-- Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA)-- Senator Bill Frist (R-TN)-- Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT) 

Aug 31, 05 Twenty Things We Know, Independent TV USGO-1 Identified Middle East analyst: Kenneth Pollack, National Security Council, Clinton administration. Sept 3, 05 Bob Dole (baffled by Miller incarceration) visited Miller in jail, NYTimes copy. Smokescreen on passing federal shield laws that would allow reporters to protect their souces. Sept 5, 05 Rocky Mountain News, "Weapons of Mass Delusion" Sept 6, 05 U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis III set this Sept 6 trial date for Larry Franklin, Sept 6, 05 IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Strategic Dossier', entitled Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes - A Net Assessment. Iran 5 years away from a nuclear weapon. Why go to the stake to defend a spin doctor planting bile? Guardian Unlimited todo: Antiwar, In These Times, Is Iran Next? Counterpunch Zvi Bar'el, Chalabi, Feith and Israel, Theater of the Absurd Sept 8, 05 Yahoo News Plamegate will rise up in a few weeks. Is she bargaining?....what about possible criminal contempt charges? Huffington Post Sept 10, 05 The Alexandria facility where Miller is, also housed Zacarias Moussaoui..(just one floor above Miller's cell) The gas station tapes of the attack on the Pentagon on 9/11 are 'classified' because of his trial. They would reveal the real truth about what aircraft slammed into the Pentagon that day. see NewsFollowUp.com/flight77 missile? National Press Club, honors Judith Miller see Franklingate links page see Pakistan Daily Times on Iran latest news...and Michael Ledeen, Rove's brain, AEI, prominent proponent of a violent regime change in Iran. Ledeen has close ties to all Plamegate players. and see Ledeen's ties to the Niger forged docs that led to Iraq War. It's all one story. Lies of Ommision Progress Sept 11, 05 Peace Page, 9/11 poem by Kristy we should share the shame search terms: Texas Secretary of State, Roger Williams, Bush campaign, Karl Rove, Elizabeth Reyes. Sept 12, 05 Iran Mania News One week to U.N. meetings on Iran. Cooperative Research, neocon run-up to war, timeline see Ted Olson links to Jonathan Pollard, Pentagon, Perle, Lehman, Feith.... Ted Olson's wife 'died' on Flight 77, 9/11? Sept 14, 05 New 'Amdocs' page, information on Israeli owned telephone billing co. and connections to 9/11, AIPAC, neocons, Iraq war, Iran war mongering. Against Bombing old timeline, not updated, but some interesting links, stories DNC Democratic National Committee, Plamegate Rovegate, Treasongate, Leakgate page Crosswalk, conservative publication, Democrats keep focus on Plamegate Sept 15, 05 Bush / Rice failing in Iran war mongering efforts. India, China and Russia nix U.S. and EU effort to get a majority of IAEA board to refer Iran to UN Security Council for sanctions. India says the plan will backfire. search:Ahmadinejad. NYT copy David Fiderer on the "Abort the Plame Investigation Act" or H.R. 581. Feb 05. Bob Dole and the Republicans smokescreen tactics are difficult to see ...will they work? Framing the issue around source id privilege keeps the buzz off what Miller is hiding...just what they want. also see CSM Holt wants docs, Fitzgerald says will harm investigation see SpinWatch on indictment Sept 16, 05 Asia Times review of Bush whitewash book..by Craig Whitney. DOJ won't turn over docs to Congress and While You Were atching Katrina House Republicans derail probes of Plame affair Village Voice Sept 17, 05 Some Miller elite visitors: Bob Dole, John Bolton, Tom Brokaw, Gonzalo Marroquin, Sept 18, 05 Washington Report on Middle East Affairs old but relevant story, Israeli spies in America. Amdocs, Report of Israeli Eavesdropping on White House Telephones Gets Varying Media Treatment Sept 19, 05 This article climbing in the search engines: Frontpage Mag calls Plamegate non-event, "endless spider-web of lies by Joe Wilson", "The media has gone out of its way to question the credibility of Karl Rove", "non-leak of Plame's non-secret identity',....and on...and on. and NFU-Franklingate research on Amdocs, 9/11, art students, Israeli spies Sept 20, 05 Yahoo article: What Show Did You Watch During the War Daddy? Iraq War, lost and now a civil war....north to south, oil. Sept 21, 05 Jurist article: David Radler, former President and COO of Hollinger International and former publisher of the Chicago Sun-Times, will plead guilty to fraud charges. Robert Novak is Sun-Times columnist. Aljazeera "Is it possible that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is assisting Israel in betraying American spy networks in Iran in return for the Iranians to offer the release of captured Israeli spies?" AEI search on Jonathan Pollard results in "Web of Conspiracies" book by Michael Rubin. search Kwiatkowski, OSP, Mondale. Sept 23, 05 Register: More on Amdocs corporate espionage. And The Age Police question Amdocs exec...at least 19 arrested for infiltrating competitors computers. World Net Daily, Stephen Hadley mentioned, prior knowledge of 911 information on Atta in Rep. Weldon (Republican) Book "Countdown to Terror" Shaffer stopped from testifying about Able Danger data mining. Gonzales will name D. Kyle Sampson as chief of staff (DOJ) and in related article KerrySharesOurValues on D. Kyle Sampson, Raul Yanes ..and (Ted Ullyot) All three have been lawyers in the White House counsel's office under Gonzales. ... Ullyot (Ullyot stepped down) and Yanes were the coordinators of the White House's response to the investigation into the leak of CIA operative Valerie Plame's identity. Gonzales and Ashcroft will recuse, but will these three also? Sampson, Ullyot and Yanes have represented tobacco companies. search Kirkland & Ellis or (Tobacco.org), Kenneth Starr. tobacco thread articles / timeline Iraqwar.org on Israeli spying and Lowell Sun Online The invasion of Iraq was the “greatest strategic disaster in United States history,” a retired Army general said yesterday, strengthening an effort in Congress to force an American withdrawal beginning next year. Retired Army Lt. Gen. William Odom, a Vietnam veteran, said the invasion of Iraq alienated America's Middle East allies, making it harder to prosecute a war against terrorists Imam Intikab Habib's....was swept out of his FDNY appointment....Over the weekend, the message was pounded in by the New York and other media that those who question the Official Conspiracy Theory.... 911Truth.org Sept 25, 05 search internet: Kurzberg Shmuel Ellner Marmari Amdocs for supporting evidence on Amdocs links to 9/11 WTC or search amdocs fema israel or amdocs foxnews and Amdocs page Sept 26, 05 New Franklingate / DOJ selected press releases page Sept 27, 05 Shalom Center, article from 2004: "Neo-Cons, AIPAC, Israel, & Alleged Spying " Oct 28, 05 The federal grand jury delving into the matter expires Oct. 28. .. prosecutors could pursue a criminal contempt of court charge against Miller. Sept 28, 05 Conk Websearch, Encyclopedia entry on AIPAC, supporters, critics and quotations. Fatma Nevin Vargun, is a Kurdish women's rights activist. Libby poem in a letter to Miller in jail: "You went into jail in the summer. It is fall now. You will have stories to cover -- Iraqi elections and suicide bombers, biological threats and the Iranian nuclear program. Out West, where you vacation, the aspens will already be turning. They turn in clusters, because their roots connect them. Come back to work -- and life. Until then, you will remain in my thoughts and prayers -- With admiration, Scooter Libby." from Salon.com Sept 29, 05 Foxnews "U.K.: Military Action against Iran, 'Inconceivable'. and "On Saturday, the International Atomic Energy Agency passed a resolution putting Iran on the verge of referral to the U.N. Security Council unless Tehran eases suspicions about its nuclear activities" "(Fitzgerald) was ready to extend her imprisonment for up to 18 months. ...on September 29, she walked out of prison ready to talk, having secured a personal waiver of confidentiality from her own source, Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the vice president's chief of staff." Guardian Sept 30, 05 Miller testified before the grand jury about two conversations with Libby in July 2003 Red Nova "Quality of Iran's Nuclear Fuel Sheds Doubt on Weapons Capabilities" Daily Star "Britain rules out military action against Iran over nuclear program Tehran to vote on scaling back cooperation with IAEA Forward Steven Rosen (AIPAC) seeking dismissal on the grounds that the U.S. government has refused to disclose key evidence. Franklin will plead guilty, Harretz ....Miller released, will testify, and Red Nova coverage Oct 1, 05 Miller testified,...Fitzgerald agreed to limit his questioning to Libby contacts regarding Plame. Miller was his final witness...the interview lasted 4 hours. Libby's attorney Joseph Tate puzzled at a second request for a release...it had been a year since they believe they gave her a waiver. Oct 2, 05 Net search terms: Judith Miller, Stephen Hadley, Able Danger, missing chart Oct 3, 05 Weldon's Able Danger hearings will backfire on GOP "...both Miller and Libby collaborated for months on manufacturing the bogus WMD hoax.." Ahmed Amr, Palestine Chronicle (copy), and Nile Media Oct 4, 05 Miller still trying to limit issue to her conversations with Libby? NY Times copy Oct 5, 05 Libby Lawyer says Miller in jail on her own accord, was given waiver a year ago Washington Post see changes to Franklingate AIPAC page World Peace Herald: Able Danger report expected soon. Oct 6, 05 San Francisco Chronicle, Jon Carrol, "Everyone pretty much knows that the Judith Miller story doesn't add up, except for her employers at the New York Times" Indictments Any time? Editor & Publisher Oct 7, 05 Live Journal "U.S. Preparing for a Strike on Iran.....Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector to Iraq .......warned in apocalyptic terms in London"

 

Please spread this copy of the list over the internet, there's strength in numbers.
Bush / Clinton Suspicious Death List Body Count / Attack:  Aalund, James Downing; Adams, Doug, Adger, Sid; Al-huk,Mohammed Zia; Baldridge, Malcolm;Barkley, Maj. William; Baugh, Gandy; Bates, Robert; Baxter, Clifford J.; Bearden, Boonie; Boggs, Hale; Boorda, Jeremy 'Mike'; Branscum, Herby; Brown, Ron; Bunch, James; Butera, Eric; Caradori, Gary; Carnaby, Roland; Casey, William; Casolaro, Danny; Colby, William; Coleman, Suzanne; Collins,  Gregory; Curie, Betty brother Theodore Williams Jr.; Corbin, Michael; Damus, Robert G.; Davis, L. J.; Delaney, Jack; Delaughter, Doc; Densberger, Col. William; Dickson, Steve; Dutko, Daniel A.  Eisman, Dennis; Farish, William S.; Ferguson, Kathy; Ferrat, Mohamed Samir; Forrestal, James; Foster, Vincent; Fox, Cpl. Eric S.; Friday, Hershell; Fuentes, Rosa; Gandy, Baugh; Gibbs, Judy;  Gosch, Johnny; Graham, Gary; Grober, Paula; Guerrin, Larry; Haney, Staff Sgt. Brian  Harris, Lt. Col. William; Hartmann, Peter; Hatfield, James; Heard, Stanley; Herndon, Lance; Henry, Don; Hillier, John; Hamd, Riad, Holland, Don; Holton, Michael; Horton, Jake; Huggins, Stanley; Hume, Sandy; Hunt, Mrs. E. Howard; Hunziker, Evan; Ives, Kevin; Johnson, Gary; Jorton, Jake  Jerkuic, Niko; Kangas, Steve; Kelly, Col. Robert; Kelly, Shelly; Kennedy, Robert Fitzgerald; Kennedy, John F. Jr.; Kettleson, Jordan; Killian, Lt. Col. Jerry B.; Kokal, John; Koney, Kieth; bin Laden, Salem; Laughton, Johnny; Lawhon, Johnny Jr.; Lawrence, Larry; LeBleu, Conway; Letelier, Orlando; Lombardi, Mark; Luna, Jonathan; Mahoney, Mary; Martin, Florence; McCoy, Don; McDougal, James; McKaskle, Keith; McKechan, Todd; McMillan, Colin; Meissner, Charles; Merrill, Phillip; Milam, James; list compiled by Steve Francis, NewsFollowUp.com, Millis, John; Miller, Charles Milbourne; Miller, Ron;Milosevic, Slobodan; Moffit, Ronni; Mohrenschildt, George de; Moody, Neal; Moser, Tony; Nichols, Larry; Nir, Amiram; Novinger, Darlene; Olson, Paull; O'Neil, John; Palme, Olaf; Parks, Luther (Jerry); Patrick, Dennis; Perdue, Sally; Raiser, Montgomery; Raiser, Victor C. II; Reynolds, Capt Scott; Rhodes, Spec. Gary; Rhodes, Jeff; Rice, Charles Dana; Robertson, Maj. Gen. William; Rogers, Dr. Ronald; Rose, Gen. James; Ruff, Charles; Sabel, Marine Sgt, Tim; Samples, Mike; Sanford, Paul; Schoedinger, Margie, Seal, Barry; Shelton, Bill; Sleeping Indian Mountain C-130; Spence, Craig; Spence, David Wayne; Spiro, Ian; Standoff, Alan; Tucker, Karla Faye; Tilly, Paul; Tower, John Sen.; Walker, Jon Parnell; Walraven, Calvin; Watkins, James Daniel; Webb, Maynard; Weiss, Gus W.; Welch, Russel; Wellstone, Paul Sen.; Wilcher, Paul; Wilhite, Jim; Wiley, Dr. Don C.; Willey, Ed; Williams, Robert; Williams, Theodore Jr.; Willis, Steve; Wilson, John; Winters, Richard; Wise, Barbera; Yeakey, Terrance; Chinese embassy Yugoslavia: Yunhuan, Shao; Xinghu, Xu and his wife, Zhu Ying,; 9/11 WTC victims, Flight 93 victims, Flight 77 / Pentagon victims, 1 million Iraqis. Franklin Scandal Omaha, White House call boy related: Aaron Owen, Shawn Boner, Bill Baker, Newt Copple, Clare Howard, Mike Lewis, Joe Malek, Charlie Rodgers, Dan Ryan, Curtis Tucker, Harmon Tucker.  http://www.newsfollowup.com  Will the Republicans assassinate Obama? probably ... there's too much at stake and Hillary will follow their course.
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